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The origin of the Institute goes back to the Institut des Études balkaniques
founded in Belgrade in 1934 as the only of the kind in the Balkans. The
initiative came from King Alexander I Karadjordjević, while the Institute's
scholarly profile was created by Ratko Parežanin and Svetozar Spanaćević.
The Institute published *Revue internationale des Études balkaniques*, which
assembled most prominent European experts on the Balkans in various
disciplines. Its work was banned by the Nazi occupation authorities in 1941.
The Institute was not re-established until 1969, under its present-day name
and under the auspices of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. It
assembled a team of scholars to cover the Balkans from prehistory to the
modern age and in a range of different fields of study, such as archaeology,
ethnography, anthropology, history, culture, art, literature, law. This
multidisciplinary approach remains its long-term orientation.

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# Nomadic Pastoralism in the Early Bronze Age of the Central Balkans
## Evaluation of Background Knowledge

**Abstract**: The aim of the paper is to examine background knowledge about the organizational properties of mobile pastoral groups in order to assess the likelihood of the existence of pastoral nomads in the Early Bronze Age in the central Balkans. The patterning found by A. L. Johnson (2002) is taken as a point of departure for the cross-cultural analysis conducted in this study. Johnson's findings are in the main corroborated. Acquired knowledge about the workings of pastoral societies suggests that highly mobile pastoral groups should not be expected in the Early Bronze Age of the central Balkans.

**Keywords**: mobility, pastoralism, transhumance, Early Bronze Age, central Balkans, cross-cultural analysis

*Introduction*

The existence of nomadic pastoralism in Neolithic and Bronze Age Europe has been a widely-debated topic (e.g. Chapman 1979; Geddes 1983; Hielte 2004; Higgs 1976; Walker 1983), with the debate often focusing on the scale and range of mobility and the degree of pastoral specialization. Generally, the post-Neolithic period in Europe is characterized by an increased emphasis on the pastoral mode of subsistence, which in turn can be considered as one aspect of the so-called Secondary Products Revolution (Sherratt 1983).

The idea that animal husbandry and animal products other than meat gained importance in the post-Neolithic period has had implications even for pottery type terminology. So we have forms which were a priori (based on formal ethnographic analogy) identified functionally as milk jugs (Ger. *Milchtopf*, fossil type of the Bodrogkeresztúr group) and milk churns (Ger. *Fischbutte*, vessel type occurring in the Baden and Baden-related groups), although it has been shown later that such interpretations are not entirely correct, at least when it comes to milk jugs (Craig et al. 2003).

Similarly, ethnographic analogy has been used to infer about organizational aspects of post-Neolithic societies. For example, M. Garašanin (1977; 1994) relied on ethnographic analogy in his attempt to explain the apparent lack of settlement sites in the Early Bronze Age (EBA) central Balkans, western Serbia in particular. He postulated a resemblance of the subsistence and settlement system to that of the ethnographically known

Balkan pastoral nomads such as Vlachs and Sarakatchani (cf. Hielte 2004 for similar ideas). I have argued elsewhere (Porčić, forthcoming) that this interpretation is very unlikely to be true for many reasons, and that besides new problem-oriented archaeological research, the problem of the EBA in the central Balkans requires some new theoretical (anthropological and middle-range research) work.

One of the basic objections to the nomadic pastoralism hypothesis in European prehistory was put forward by P. Halstead years ago. According to Halstead (1987: 80–81), in the prehistoric Mediterranean there was no propitious social environment (e.g. market economy) for the emergence of a specialized pastoral economy (such as that of e.g. Vlachs and Sarakatchani). This is a very strong theoretical argument against highly specialized pastoral adaptations in prehistoric contexts (at least in the Balkans).

When it comes to theory, the results of A. L. Johnson's (2002) research on pastoral adaptations are the most relevant source. Her inquiry into pastoral adaptations, conducted in the style of Lewis Binford's (2001) seminal work on hunters and gatherers, can be seen as a landmark in building background knowledge relevant to the study of pastoral groups. As a result of her preliminary study, she has been able to recognize three distinct pastoral adaptation modes (Johnson 2002: 166):

1) Agropastoralists — who employ mixed subsistence strategies involving animal husbandry and agriculture, have moderate mobility, and occupy habitats with a biomass greater than or equal to 1500 g/m²/yr. Dependence on acquired plant food is generally below 20%.

2) Subsistence pastoralists — who rely mainly on small stock and have mobility up to 100 km/yr. Agriculture is mostly absent and dependence on acquired plant food is between 20% and 40%. Their habitats exceed 500 g/m²/yr in biomass.

3) Economic specialists — whose subsistence depends more than 40% on plant food acquired by trade or purchase. They occupy the least productive habitats in biomass terms (less than 500 g/m²/yr) and are highly mobile.

These system states can be distinguished by reliance on acquired food, mobility and organization of labour (Johnson 2002: 161).

Although the sample size of Johnson's study is very small (14 cases), her conclusions seem very convincing and offer a range of possibilities for further research and theory building; but above all, there are for the first time frames of reference against which informed evaluation of past pastoral systems can be carried out, and one that is not based on formal analogy.

The aim of this paper is to explore the ideas proposed by Johnson and Halstead and to evaluate the hypothesis about nomadic pastoralism in the

central Balkans in terms of the background knowledge gained in an exercise of cross-cultural pattern recognition.

## 1. Investigating the patterns using a cross-cultural sample

Johnson bases her analysis on 14 ethnographic cases of pastoral groups. The first thing she does is to make a distinction between dependence on animal husbandry in economic terms (production for trade and exchange) and dependence on pastoralism in dietary terms (reliance on milk, meat and blood), because, as she stresses, these two dimensions are often conflated in the literature (Johnson 2002, 159). Thus, reliance on pastoralism is not to be thought of as single-dimensional (cf. Cribb 2004: 15–20; Porčić 2007). She provides figures for dietary dependence on pastoral products (ranging from 15% to 65%) for the societies in question, but no figures for the other dimension (economic dependence); rather she states that they all are "economically dependent on herding" (Johnson 2002: 160).

Johnson's conclusions can be framed as a set of hypotheses regarding environmental, socioeconomic and demographic variables. Some of these might be:

1) Dietary dependence on pastoral products is inversely correlated with dependence on acquired plant foods. As calculated from Johnson's data, this seems to be true (Pearson's r=-0.605, p=0.028, N=13).

2) Mobility of a group is positively correlated with dependence on acquired plant foods. Johnson measures mobility in two ways — as the number of moves per year and as the distance moved per year. Positive non-linear correlation with the distance moved measured by Spearman's rho is indicated from Johnson's data (Spearman's rho=0.754, p=0.084, N=6), but fails to reach the significance level of 0.05, probably because of the small sample size.

The question is: Can these results be replicated on a larger sample?

### 1.1. Defining the variables

The only cross-cultural databases available to the me have been the *Ethnographic Atlas* (EA) (Murdock 1967) and the *Standard Cross-Cultural Sample* (SCCS) (Murdock and White 1969), published in electronic format by the *World Cultures* journal. Unfortunately, hypotheses that may be derived from Johnson's study cannot be rigorously tested because of incomparability between her variables and those from the EA and SCCS. For example, both

the EA and SCCS[1] contain the variables termed *Dependence on Animal Husbandry* and *Settlement Patterns*, but it is unclear how they correspond to Johnson's variables.

Although an exact correspondence cannot be established, the effort will be made to find at least a hint to what these variables measure (more or less) in terms of Johnson's variables. Fortunately some but unfortunately not all of Johnson's cases are recorded as cases in the EA and SCCS (Table 1).

I ran cross-tabulations of the variables measuring dependence on pastoralism and mobility from Johnson and the EA. In addition, I cross-tabulated Johnson's variable measuring the percentage of acquired food and SCCS vi, *Intercommunity Trade as Food Source*. The results are shown in Tables 2–5.

It is evident that the variables are not measuring the same thing, except perhaps the pair of variables in Table 5, but the SCCS variable (vi) has a lower measurement resolution since it is given on an ordinal scale. There might be, judging from Table 2, a vague correspondence between the number of moves per year and settlement patterns, but the cases are too few to permit any confident claims.

The *Dependence on Animal Husbandry* variable does not correspond to the one termed *Percentage Subsistence from Pastoral*. It is possible that the EA and SCCS variables referring to the importance of animal husbandry for subsistence are in fact measuring the economic activities pursued, which, as already noted by Johnson (2002: 159), is often the case. If this is true in this instance, we would expect to find a negative correlation between the EA/SCCS variables measuring dependence on animal husbandry and Johnson's variable measuring dietary dependence on pastoral products. No such correlation could be detected, but then, it would be difficult to detect even if it existed given the small sample size (N=7). It should be mentioned in this context that the aforementioned significant correlation between *Percentage Subsistence from Pastoral* and *Dependence on Acquired Plant Foods* from Johnson's data diminishes and becomes statistically insignificant if the correlation coefficient is computed using the only seven cases that can be matched in the EA. The question of what the EA and SCCS variables are measuring in comparison with Johnson's data will be put aside for the moment.

The analysis has proceeded using only SCCS data. First the number of SCCS cases has been reduced by excluding all those categorized as hunters, fishers or gatherers on variable 820 (*Principal Subsistence Category*). Then a missing value analysis has been carried out (MVA module in SPSS) in

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[1] Most variables included in the EA are also included in the SCCS and measure the same thing. The opposite is not the case.

order to determine whether the cases on variable 728 (*Importance of Animal Husbandry in Subsistence*) are missing at random. As it has been determined that they are really missing at random, missing values have been replaced using the multiple regression procedure (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007) with recoded v5 *Animal Husbandry–Contribution to Food Supply* (7 categories being collapsed into 5 categories to obtain an ordinal scale),[2] and v206 *Dependence on Animal Husbandry* as independent variables (adjusted $R^2$=0.730, p<0.001).

Furthermore, all the cases with values less than 4 on v5 (meaning that less than 10% of food supply is contributed by animal husbandry) have been excluded from the analysis, as well as the cases on v6 (*Mean Size of Local Communities*) exceeding the value of 6 (meaning that the mean value of local communities is over 5,000 people with towns and possibly cities present). So, 49 cases have remained for further analysis.

Principal component analysis has been carried out separately on two sets of variables. One set is related to the pastoralism dimension: the recoded v5 (*Importance of Animal Husbandry in Food Supply*); v728 (*Importance of Animal Husbandry in Subsistence*); v206 (*Dependence on Animal Husbandry*); and v812 (*Importance of Domestic Animals*). The first component has been extracted using this variable set and interpreted as the dimension of pastoralism (eigenvalue 3.522, 88.039% variance explained, variable loadings: v5 – 0.928; v815 – 0.954; v206 – 0.919; v728 – (-0.952)). The other set of variables has been used to construct a mobility scale. Three variables have been used: v61 (*Fixity of Settlement*); v150 (*Fixity of Residence*); and the recoded (in order to achieve ordination) v234 (*Settlement Patterns*).[3] The first principal component has been extracted and equated with the dimension of mobility[4] (eigenvalue 2.854, 95.132% of variance explained, variable loadings v234 – 0.951; v61 – 0.988; v150 – 0.986). What exactly this component measures in terms of Johnson's variables is unclear, but an educated guess

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[2] The original coding for this variable was: 1) none; 2) present, not food source; 3) less than 10% food supply; 4) <50%, chiefly meat; 5) <50%, chiefly dairy; 6) <50%, chiefly honey; 7) >50%. Categories 4, 5 and 6 have been collapsed into one.

[3] The original coding for this variable was: 1) nomadic or fully migratory; 2) seminomadic; 3) semisedentary; 4) compact but impermanent settlements; 5) neighbourhoods of dispersed family homesteads; 6) separated hamlets, forming a single community; 7) compact and relatively permanent settlements; 8) complex settlements. Categories 5, 6 and 7 have been collapsed into one category.

[4] The scores for this component were multiplied by -1, because the original variables were coded in such a way that higher values meant lower mobility. By multiplying the component scores by -1 the signs of the scores are changed, so that higher scores on the thus transformed Mobility Component correspond to higher mobility, which is more intuitive.

can be made that mobility as measured in the SCCS is more related to the number of moves per year than to the distance moved per year.

I have mentioned that there might be an indirect way to infer what the component of pastoralism measures. The idea is to see whether there is a positive correlation with the variables measuring the importance of trade in the SCCS. Two such variables are present. One is the already mentioned v1 (ordinal), and the other is v819 (*Importance of Trade*) (approximating the interval scale). Kruskal-Wallace test shows that there is no significant difference between the categories of v1 on the dimension of pastoralism (Chi-Square 4.919, df=3, p=0.178), but if the categories of v1 are collapsed into two supercategories <=10% and 10–50% of intercommunity trade importance, Mann-Whitney test shows a statistically significant difference on the dimension of pastoralism, with the latter supercategory showing higher scores on the component of pastoralism (Mann-Whitney U=71, exact p=0.048). Correlation between the component of pastoralism and v819 is weak, but statistically significant (r=0.352, p=0.033). All this suggests that the thus defined dimension of pastoralism is weakly correlated but cannot be fully equated with the variable measuring the degree of economic specialization. This means that the original SCCS animal husbandry-related variables and the derived first component probably measure a little bit of both variables (the one relating to dietary reliance on pastoralism and the other relating to economic specialization) with a stronger emphasis on the economic aspect of animal husbandry.

### 1.2. Evaluating the patterns

Apparently, it is not possible to test Johnson's hypotheses rigorously, but it would be useful to examine the data with these hypotheses in mind and see what inferences could be drawn.

First the relationship between mobility and pastoralism will be evaluated (Fig. 1). The overall picture resembles the relationship between mobility and pastoralism as envisioned by Cribb (2004: 15–20) and further elaborated by Porčić (2007), in terms of the overall positive relationship between the two dimensions. This pattern, however, is a very broad one, and the goal set here is to investigate the more detailed and informative patterning discovered by Johnson. Labelled cases in Figure 1 are those which are present both in the SCCS and in Johnson. All cases have been marked with v1 (*Intercommunity Trade as Food Source*) in order to explore Johnson's findings concerning dependence on acquired food. Both Teda and Tuareg (Ahhagar) are characterized as economic specialists by Johnson (2002: 158), while Chukchi (Chukchee in the SCCS) are classified as subsistence pasto-

ralists. Teda and Tuareg score highly on both the pastoralism and mobility components.

High mobility for the system state of economic pastoralists is predicted by Johnson's model and high scores on the pastoralism component can be brought into correspondence with her findings if the pastoralism component is interpreted in terms of economic specialization.

But the validity of such an interpretation could be called into question, because the Chukchi have a higher score (than Teda and Tuareg) on the pastoralism component, which is consistent with the higher score of Chukchi on the variable measuring the contribution of pastoral products in Johnson (2002: 157). The contradiction is obvious.

Yet, it seems that there are three clusters of cases: 1) groups with high mobility and high scores on the pastoralism dimension, characterized by a predomination of the highest and second highest score on v1;[5] 2) groups with low mobility and low scores on the pastoralism component; 3) not so well defined cluster of cases with higher mobility than cluster 2, and lower scores on the pastoralism component.

Can these clusters be equated with Johnson's system states? Not quite. Teda and Tuareg (designated as economic specialists) are in the same cluster as Chukchi (designated as subsistence pastoralists). It could be argued that this cluster consists of two subclusters which are impossible to detect with so coarse measuring tools as the mobility and pastoralism components used here. Moreover, where are agropastoralists then? If we equate groups from cluster 3 with agropastoralists, a discrepancy arises because these groups have much lower mobility scores than Chukchi, and, according to Johnson (2002: 166), this should not be the case since the mobility of agropastoral groups should substantially exceed that of subsistence pastoralists both in the number of residential moves per year and in the distance moved per year (Johnson 2002: 164, Fig. 5).

The third option would be to equate cluster 1 with subsistence pastoralists, and cluster 3 with agropastoralists, but in that case subsistence pastoralists would practically be sedentary communities (note that all cases from cluster 3 have the same lowest score on the mobility component, meaning that these are sedentary communities), and Chukchi would be too far to belong to that cluster.

Marking the cases in terms of their primary (v1716) and secondary sources of subsistence (v1717) somewhat clarifies the matter (Fig. 2). It is

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[5] The precision of v1 is quite dubious, given that Ahaggar Tuareg score 52% on Johnson's variable measuring the proportion of subsistence mix acquired through trade or purchase, while this group was categorized as depending less than 50% on trade as food source. It seems best, then, to consider v1 mainly in relative terms.

evident that trade is the secondary source of subsistence for nearly all communities in cluster 1. This supports the idea that this cluster mainly represents specialized pastoral communities. The primary source of subsistence for the cases in cluster 1 is mainly animal husbandry, while the primary source for those in cluster 3 is extensive or intensive agriculture. If the cases are marked as v246 (*Subsistence economy*) instead of v1716, it is clear that cluster 3 could not possibly represent subsistence pastoralists since their primary subsistence activity is agriculture, which cannot be true in terms of Johnson's model[6] (Fig. 3).

Could it be then that the cases from cluster 3 are in fact agropastoralists? Or is it possible that this frame of reference gives clue to a kind of patterning different from the one found by Johnson? From cross-tabulating the categorical variable describing the system state with v30 (*Settlement patterns*) from the small sample of matching cases in the EA, a suggestive patterning emerges. Agropastoral cases seem to show lower mobility than subsistence groups. If agropastoralists scored lower on the mobility component as measured by the EA and SCCS variables, then it would make sense to equate cluster 3 with this system state. Since too much speculation and ambiguity has been involved in the previous discussion, the best thing to do would be to change the frame of reference.

A somewhat clearer picture emerges when the SCCS cases are plotted against v819 (*Importance of Trade* expressed as percentage) and the mobility component marked with v246 (*Subsistence Economy*) (Fig. 4). Three clusters and one group are now discernible. The group of cases with the lowest scores on the mobility component (sedentary agricultural societies) will be omitted from further discussion. The cluster membership of Kurd, Toda, Papago and Basseri is uncertain in this property space.

Cluster 1 consists of cases with high mobility and high scores on v819, cluster 2 consists of cases with high mobility and low scores on v819 (mostly with score of 5), and finally, cluster 3 consists of cases with mobility score ranging from 0 to 1, and v819 score ranging from 0 to 5. If it were not for the discrepancy (in terms of Johnson's model) in ordination of system states on the mobility component, I would be very tempted to equate cluster 1 with economic specialists, cluster 2 with subsistence specialists, and cluster 3 with agropastoralists.

Further support for equating cluster 1 with agriculturalists comes from the examination of population densities. It is obvious from Johnson's data that agropastoralists have the highest population densities (Table

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[6] It is interesting to note that Teda are coded as practising intensive agriculture on v246 (Fig. 3), but this group is designated as economic specialists by Johnson and scores highly on pastoralism and mobility. The only explanation I can think of is a coding error.

7). Density-related information (as measured by the ordinal v1130 from SCCS) is summarized in terms of medians for separate clusters in Table 8. It is clear that cluster 3 cases have the highest population density, but now there is another ambiguity regarding the first two clusters, because cluster 2 (which I have tentatively identified as subsistence pastoralists) has got a smaller median value than cluster 1 (tentatively equated with economic specialists), which should not be the case judging from Johnson's data, where the mean and the median of subsistence pastoralists are greater by order of magnitude than the same statistics for specialists. But the maximum values of v1130 for different clusters are consistent with the ordination of system states by density medians as shown in Table 8.

At least two explanations are possible for the observed patterns. Either the variables in the SCCS are very low in resolution (and incomparable with Johnson's variables), or some of Johnson's generalizations, particularly the one concerning the mobility of agropastoralists, are incorrect since they are based on only two cases of agropastoral groups.

Whatever of the two is the case, it is a fact that the groups associated with the highest mobility score highly on the pastoralism dimension and have the highest dependence on trade (measured by v1 and v819), creating a cluster which, in general, can be equated with specialized pastoralists (allowing for possible exceptions, such as that of Maasai,[7] because of the ambiguity of the SCCS variables).

The hypothesis about the relationship between mobility and importance of trade (v819) can be formally tested by calculating the correlation coefficient (assuming that this variable correlates with the variable measuring the importance of acquired food in Johnson's study, which seems to be a reasonable assumption given the scores of Teda, Tuareg and Chukchi on v819). Correlation coefficients range from 0.422 (p=0.003, N=49) to 0.496 (p=0.016, N=23) for Pearson's r, and from 0.405 (p=0.004, N=49) to 0.497 (p=0.016, N=23) for Spearman's rho, depending on whether all cases or only those belonging into the defined clusters are included into the calculation.

It can be concluded that even though the data resolution in the SCCS and EA is not high enough to test Johnson's model rigorously, there are indications that the organizational properties discovered by Johnson are genuine. The most important result regarding the problem discussed in this paper is that it is possible to delineate two clusters (1 and 2) of highly mobile pastoral groups so that their properties could be further examined.

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[7] It may be concluded from Marshall (1990) that Maasai are actually subsistence pastoralists rather than economic specialists.

*2. Social and natural environment of specialized pastoral groups*
*2.1. Social environment*

A logical consequence of Johnson's definition of specialized pastoral groups is that such groups are heavily dependent on trade for their subsistence, and that they need to have someone to trade with and something to trade for. In addition, their high mobility necessitates a social environment suitable for making long journeys unhindered by various social and political obstacles.

The previous section has demonstrated that most cases from the specialized pastoralists' cluster had trade as a secondary subsistence activity. Halstead's (1987) argument has been that the existence of markets and marketplaces was an essential prerequisite for specialized pastoralism. It should be mentioned that the models put forward to explain the beginnings of specialized pastoralism in the Near East insist that this kind of adaptation developed as a consequence of changes in social and economic environments — e.g. the development of the first states, irrigation systems, population pressure, rise of cities and marketplaces (cf. Lees and Bates 1974; Levy 1983; Rosen 1988).

But it seems that this argument applies only to the Near-Eastern and circum-Mediterranean forms of pastoralism, because it is often claimed that nomadic pastoralism in East Africa developed in a different way and for different reasons (cf. Marshall 1990; Spooner 1971). It has been argued that the development of specialized pastoralism in Africa precluded that of agriculture (Marshall 1990; Marshall and Hildebrand 2002). The difference between modern African and Near-Eastern pastoralism, as suggested by Spooner (1971: 202), is that the former is directly dependent on pastoral products as a regular supply of food, while the latter "lay greater emphasis on the production of a marketable surplus of pastoral products, which they then trade for the greater part of their non-pastoral needs". In Johnson's terms the former are mainly subsistence pastoralists while the latter are economic specialists.

The issue of cattle-breeding societies in Africa is not without its problems though. There are opposite claims that pastoral groups were actually very much involved in the market economy (Turner 1993: 407). Turner's criticism may be valid for modern or historical cases. When it comes to prehistory, however, Marshall's (1990) explanation for adopting the pastoral way of life seems more likely since in prehistoric East Africa there was no market economy on a scale comparable to the colonial and postcolonial periods.

If we are to trust Marshall's conclusions, nomadic pastoralism can develop even without all these preconditions occurring in the Near-Eastern model. Khazanov (1994: 71) states that close dependence on market trading

is a characteristic of modern nomads, but not necessarily of all of them. But he also notes that:

> Nomadism is practically inseparable not only from supplementary forms of economic activity, but also from such social and political activity which numbers amongst its aims the overcoming of economic one-sidedness. Of course, in the different variants of nomadism and even in different nomadic societies, specialization has manifested itself in different ways and with different degrees of intensity. (Khazanov 1994: 70)

As for the different ways of integrating with the social environment, the aspects of the social environment that can act as constraints are worth mentioning. The presence or absence of a market economy is not the only constraining factor. Political environment is very important for the movement of people. It has been recognized that long-range movements of pastoral peoples in the Balkans coincided with the existence of great empires. For instance, the range and intensity of pastoral movements in the Balkans was much greater at the time of Ottoman rule (Antonijević 1982: 41). But Cribb (2004: 60) reports that the intensity of pastoral migrations in Iran was much higher in periods when there was a collapse of central authority. The contrast is more apparent than real, because in the former case, the disintegration of such a large political entity as the Ottoman empire resulted in the formation in the Balkans of several small nation-states whose defined borders became an obstacle to long-range migrations (Antonijević 1982: 42), while in the latter, the disintegration of central authority led to a certain form of anarchy with no established borders to act as obstacles to nomadic movements. The main point is that nomadic pastoral adaptation is very much dependent on the social environment.

## 2.2. Natural environment

The natural environment is an important factor constraining and partly determining the nature of pastoral adaptation. As shown by Johnson (2002), the three system states of pastoral adaptation are largely dependent on the biomass of the environment. In turn, the amount of biomass is determined primarily by solar radiation and water availability (for a detailed account, see Binford 2001: 55–113).

A very robust illustration of the claim about the marginality of niches exploited by highly mobile pastoralists emerges in Fig. 5 and Table 9.

It is evident that most of the highly mobile societies come from extremely dry and/or extremely hot/cold conditions. Mobility is a way of coping with an unpredictable environment with its marked intra-annual and inter-annual variation. The impact of an unpredictable environment on

mobility can be detected by means of the multiple regression model where MTEMP variable, which measures the temperature constancy intra-annually (after Binford 2001: 68, Eq. 4.03), and the natural logarithm of the coefficient of variation in mean annual rainfall (as a measure of inter-annual unpredictability of rainfall, v1914 in the SCCS), are independent variables, and mobility is a dependent variable. The multiple correlation coefficient is significant (as are both predictors), but the effect size is quite low (R=0.429, adjusted $R^2$=0.148, p=0.01, Beta(MTEMP)=-0.275, p=0.048, Beta(ln(v1914))=0.297, p=0.034), meaning that mobility is inversely correlated with the evenness of temperature during the year and positively correlated with the inter-annual variation in rainfall. Unfortunately, as the data on intra-annual rainfall variation are not available in the SCCS, this analysis is not complete, but the results are nevertheless in accord with Spooner's (1971: 205) statement that the habitat of nomads is marginal in terms of intra-annual and inter-annual climatic variation.

As more precise data regarding the rainfall have not been available to the author, caution should be taken not to overinterpret these results. For the sake of discussion, I shall proceed with the analysis nonetheless.

If 49 SCCS cases are organized by regional groups and the same regression model is applied, the only region for which the model is statistically significant is Sub-Saharan Africa (Table 10). What is interesting is that MTEMP is statistically significant as a predictor, whereas v1914 is not.

In the case of East Eurasia the situation is completely opposite. Although the model does not reach the level of significance of 0.05, it is very close to it (0.061). What is even more interesting is that v1914 is closer to being statistically significant and is more important as a predictor (as measured by beta value) than MTEMP, meaning that inter-annual variability in rainfall is a more important determinant of mobility than intra-annual variability in temperature.

As I have already noted, one should not put too much faith in these results, since the validity and meaning of the mobility dimension is very vague, its resolution coarse, and the relevant climatic variables used are too few (especially in comparison with Binford 2001). But it does seem that ecological variables explain variability in mobility in Sub-Saharan Africa more than in any other region. It should be kept in mind that the origin of mobile pastoralism in Africa is correlated to the emergence of bimodal rainfall pattern (Marshall 1990), that is to ecological variables.

What can be affirmed as a result of this very low-grained analysis is that most mobile pastoral adaptations arise in climatic circumstances which are not temperate. Mobility is negatively correlated with mean annual rainfall (Pearson's r=-0.476, p=0.001), which is roughly in agreement with Johnson's conclusion about the role of biomass in determining the system state.

It is important to note that in general the extreme climate (dry) is usually accompanied by greater mobility.

It may be argued that circum-Mediterranean and Near-Eastern pastoral economic specialization was an adaptation to the social rather than the natural environment. In contrast, it seems that in East Africa pastoral specialization was mainly a response to ecological conditions (Marshall 1990). Obviously this is a gross oversimplification, but it emphasizes the supposed distinction between economic and subsistence specialists. This is not to say that pastoralists in the Near East (and Europe in particular) do not migrate in accordance with seasonal changes (because they obviously do), or that East-African pastoralists do not exchange their products; this should only point out that different causes might have been conducive to the origin of the phenomenon.

### 3. Looking back at the EBA of the central Balkans

The main purpose of the exploration presented above has been to identify some of the major properties and determinants of mobile pastoral societies. It is time now to make an attempt to view the problem of the EBA in the central Balkans in the context of previous discussion.

The first question is: if the EBA populations of the central Balkans were mobile pastoralists, is it possible to infer what was their system state in Johnson's terms?

One possible approach to this question is quite straightforward and relies on Johnson's projection (Johnson 2002: 168; Fig. 7) of the expected system state for a certain region using the model she formulates as a baseline. It is evident from her projection that if entire Europe was populated by pastoralists, the expected system state for all these groups would be agropastoral. Johnson (2002: 169) directly addresses this issue and comments that the results of this projection do not support the ideas of Marija Gimbutas (e.g. 1965: 21) regarding widespread nomadic incursions into Europe. It is interesting to note that Johnson's projections predict agropastoral adaptation even in the Russian steppes.

To answer only the first question using Johnson's method is not enough for two reasons. First, we do not know whether the adaptations and their organizational properties as inferred by Johnson are entirely correct (since her results are preliminary and based on a small sample), and second, the projection tells us only what is to be expected under certain conditions, it is meant only as a frame of reference, not as a final statement about what really happened.

The most problematic part of Johnson's model, in my view, concerns the mobility of agropastoralists. It can be deduced from her conclusions

that the distance moved by agropastoralists usually exceeds 100km/yr.[8] The results of my analysis show that the general mobility (as measured by the ill-defined mobility component) of agropastoralists (that is the groups of which I think are compatible with that system state — cluster 3) should be lower than the mobility of subsistence pastoralists. Although I tend to trust Johnson's results much more than my own because of the quality of her data, it is possible that the small sample size (only 6 cases coded for the distance moved per year) influenced her results, because variation in pastoral mobility can be very high, even among the nomads of the same "type" populating similar habitats (cf. Khazanov 1994, 52).

The results of my analysis imply that high mobility is associated with the marginal environment and unpredictability of rainfall. The climate of the central Balkans is temperate, so the reasons for the existence of high mobility are questionable. Moreover, Arnold and Greenfield (2006: 9) contrast the Mediterranean with the continental parts of the western and central Balkans in terms of possible causes of transhumance. Their point is that while ecological reasons for seasonality are more or less clear along the Adriatic coast because of the Mediterranean climate with its sharp contrasts in rainfall during the year and high summer aridity (see also Gušić 1976; Ršumović 1976), they are not so unambiguous for the temperate climate hinterland. This implies that subsistence and economic pastoralism should not be expected to arise in this area for ecological reasons alone. If I understand correctly the meaning of Johnson's agropastoralist system state as characterized by a mix of agriculture and pastoralism — diversified economy, then this is precisely what one would expect to arise in the central Balkans.

But what about Vlachs and Sarakatchani, the ethnographically known pastoral nomads, the group which Garašanin used as a source for formal analogy with the EBA groups of western Serbia? They are certainly not agropastoralists because they practise no agriculture whatsoever (Antonijević 1982). Even though I have no quantitative data for their dependence on food acquired by trade, I am inclined to classify them as economic specialists because of their very important role in the trade and commerce in the Balkans (Trojanović 1909). Their way of life could be viewed as an adaptation to the social environment (although their migrations are necessarily finely tuned with seasonal changes in temperature and rainfall); they were dependent on markets and sedentary populations. It would be very difficult to argue that markets and a comparable social environment existed in the EBA of the central Balkans. That is why it is more probable that small-scale

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[8] Since they should be more mobile than subsistence pastoralists who, according to Johnson (2002: 166), generally do not move more than 100km/yr.

vertical transhumance and a mixed economy were the subsistence basis for the period and region in question.

Why are there no EBA settlement sites then? Garašanin's explanation for the lack of settlements is that since the EBA people were highly mobile their dwellings were made of light and perishable materials and thus difficult, if not impossible, to detect archaeologically. The relationships between the durability, mobility and permanence of settlement have been theoretically elaborated (McGuire and Schiffer 1983) and empirically tested (Binford 1990; Diehl 1992), and in that sense Garašanin's statement is likely to be true. But is it likely that there was an economic (or subsistence) specialization in the EBA of the central Balkans that would imply high mobility? The answer is probably negative, because there were neither ecological nor social reasons for such specialization to arise (cf. Bankoff and Greenfield 1984).

It may be interesting to compare the archaeological signatures of the Final Neolithic sites in the Nabta region, Western Desert, Egypt (Johnson 2002), and the EBA in central Serbia. In both cases there are no houses detected, only burial tumuli; in both cases small cattle gains importance.

Johnson (2002: 173) states that her model predicts economic specialization for that particular area, but she also adds that none of the modern groups living nearby could be used as direct analogs for the Final Neolithic groups. The role of the tumuli in Nabta is discussed in connection with the leaders' increasing prerogatives. One of the things that Johnson has empirically found is that the leaders of the economic specialist groups have the highest prerogatives because of their role in the trade with the external (to the community in question) world. Johnson hypothesizes that the building of the tumuli and megaliths is connected with the increasing role of leadership. The pottery of the Final Neolithic from the Nabta region is similar to the contemporaneous pottery from the Nile valley. Johnson does not offer any definitive interpretation, but is it possible that what we have here is some kind of specialized pastoral economy with elements of trade? I am not an expert on the prehistory of Africa, so I really do not know the answer to that particular question, but what interests me is whether this situation is comparable to the Early Bronze Age in Serbia.

Let us compare. First of all, it cannot be claimed a priori that the EBA tumuli in the Balkans were elite burials. Perhaps they were, but it is something to be tested (or at least evaluated), not assumed in advance. There is evidence for long-distance trade: a very small amount of amber (33 amber necklace parts) (Palavestra 1993: 139–140). But I do not believe it enough to be able to infer that these groups were involved in large-scale trading, or that they were specialized traders. Objects from distant sources are known even in the preceding Neolithic period (e.g. obsidian and *Spondylus* arte-

facts), and nomad-mediated trade is not the only way for foreign materials and objects to arrive in certain context.

Finally, the ecological and climatic properties of the two regions are completely different, one being in an African desert and the other in the temperate region of Southeast Europe. The ecological determinants of mobility have already been elaborated, so there is no need to dwell on them any further.

The main point is that the use of formal analogy would not take us far, because if you only look hard enough similarities are easy to find almost everywhere, both in archaeology and ethnography (e.g. Hielte 2004).

There is a possibility, though small, that what we are dealing with in the EBA of the central Balkans is a completely unique form of pastoral adaptation, but this would be an *ad hoc* hypothesis because, from all that we have learned in the course of background knowledge exploration, this should not be so. There is a potentially much more down-to-earth and simpler explanation for the lack of settlement sites in the region — the lack of appropriate survey design. Central Balkan EBA communities were probably more mobile than Neolithic groups, but far less mobile than modern specialized pastoralists. Their settlement pattern probably even has a modern analog in the Balkan semisedentary transhumant groups with permanent settlements in lowland and pastoral outposts in highland areas. These communities practise agriculture and not all of their members are mobile.

*Conclusion*

The construction of frames of reference, as envisioned by Lewis Binford in 2001, is one of the most important tasks for archaeologists interested in theory building. Organizing prior knowledge about the organizational properties of different systems is a difficult but rewarding enterprise. I have tried in this paper to look at one particular problem with the background knowledge in mind. Organizing background knowledge and constructing frames of reference in an analytical way is still in a preliminary phase when pastoral groups are in question, but even these preliminary studies yield quite interesting results.

I believe that I have been able to provide a rough confirmation of Johnson's preliminary results for the relationship between major variables of pastoral systems, the only discrepancy relating to the mobility of agropastoralists and subsistence pastoralists. The communities tentatively identified as subsistence and economic specialists in my analysis tend to be highly mobile. High mobility in turn is related to the extreme climatic conditions with high seasonal variability. There are no cases coming from a temperate climate that score highly on mobility. The causal mechanism behind the fact

that most mobile communities come from less productive environments in terms of biomass is clear. Put simply, once the local resources are depleted, the group has to target another area for resources.

After evaluating these patterns and establishing the frames of reference, I have looked at the problem of pastoralism in the EBA central Balkans. My conclusion, in the light of our current background knowledge about pastoral adaptations, is that Garašanin's hypothesis is not probable. The conclusion should not be viewed as the final word on the problem, because the archaeological evidence must be evaluated too. To use a Bayesian metaphor, this kind of consideration is similar to determining the prior probability of a hypothesis. This is best expressed by Johnson:

> The point is not to assign meaning to our current understanding of the archaeological record but to work between the archaeological record and the ethnographic frame of reference to identify what we still need to learn. (Johnson 2002: 174)

In the case of the EBA of the central Balkans there is still much to be learned, especially about the archaeological record. Our prior knowledge tells us that we should not expect to find nomads in the Balkans in the Early Bronze Age. The current state of archaeological investigation in western Serbia is far from being such that we can say safely and with enough certainty that the theory is wrong simply because we have not found any settlement sites. What seems to be needed first therefore is problem-oriented fieldwork, survey in particular. Before being able to proceed to discuss the organizational properties of the system under study, we need to determine if there is a case to answer at all — whether there really are no settlement sites or whether we just failed to detect them due the lack of properly designed survey.

**Table 1** Cases shared by Johnson (2002), EA and SCCS

| Groups present both in Johnson (2002) and in EA | Groups present both in Johnson (2002) and in SCCS |
| --- | --- |
| Chukchi | Chukchi |
| Teda | Teda |
| Tuareg-Ahaggar | Tuareg-Ahaggar |
| Nuer | |
| Jie | |
| Turkana | |
| Kababish | |
| Mutair | |

**Table 2** Variable *Settlement Patterns* (v30) from EA and variable *NOMOV* from Johnson (2002)

| | | Settlement Patterns | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Nomadic or fully migratory | Seminomadic | Semisedentary | Total |
| NOMOV (Number of moves) | 6.00 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| | 6.50 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| | 7.00 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| | 20.00 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Total | | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 |

**Table 3** *Settlement Patterns* (v30) from EA and variable *DISTMOV* from Johnson (2002)

| | | Settlement Patterns | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Nomadic or fully migratory | Seminomadic | Semisedentary | Total |
| DISTMOV (Distance moved) (km) | 93.00 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| | 241.00 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| | 354.30 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | 483.00 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Total | | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 |

**Table 4** Variable *Animal Husbandry* (v4) from EA and variable *Percentage Subsistence from Pastoral* from Johnson (2002)

| | | Animal Husbandry | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 26–35% Dependence | 46–55% Dependence | 76–85% Dependence | 86–100% Dependence | Total |
| Percentage Subsistence from Pastoral | 15.00 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| | 20.00 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| | 30.00 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | 45.00 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| | 62.00 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Total | | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 7 |

**Table 5** Variable *Intercommunity Trade as Food Source* (v1) from SCCS and variable *Percentage Subsistence from Acquired Food* from Johnson (2002)

|  |  | Intercommunity Trade as Food Source | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | <10% of food | <50% of food/less local source | Total |
| Acquired food | 1.00 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
|  | 45.00 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
|  | 52.00 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | | 1 | 2 | 3 |

**Table 6** System state and mobility of the eight matching cases from Johnson (2002) and EA

|  |  | Settlement Patterns | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | Nomadic or fully migratory | Seminomadic | Semisedentary | Nomadic or fully migratory |
| System state | Agropastoral | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
|  | Pastoral subsistence | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
|  | Specialized pastoral | 2 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| Total | | 3 | 4 | 1 | 8 |

**Table 7** Differences in population densities between different system states calculated from Johnson's data (2002)

|  |  | Density (p/100sq km) | |
|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | Median | Mean |
| System state | Agropastoralists | 257.00 | 296.36 |
|  | Subsistence Specialists | 100.00 | 115.86 |
|  | Economic specialists | 9.98 | 35.31 |

**Table 8** Median and maximum population densities (v1130) across clusters, calculated from SCCS data. Coding for v1130: 3=1–4.9 persons/sq mile; 4=5–24.9 persons/sq mile; 5=25–99.9 persons/sq mile

| | | Population Density | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Median | Maximum |
| Cluster | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| | 2 | 2.5 | 4 |
| | 3 | 4 | 5 |

**Table 9** Cluster membership and niche rainfall (v855) from SCCS

| | | Niche Rainfall (Approximate) | | | | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Tropical rainforest | Very wet | Wet | Moderately wet | Dry | Very dry | Desert | Tropical rainforest |
| Cluster | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 6 |
| | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 6 |
| | 3 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| Total | | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 20 |

**Table 10** Results of **multiple regression analysis for different regions of the world** with the Mobility Component as a dependent variable, and temperature evenness (MTEMP) and natural logarithm of coefficient of variation in mean annual rainfall (v1914) as independent variables

| REGION | Adjusted $R^2$ | MTEMP Beta coefficient | ln(v1914) Beta coefficient | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Africa (without Sahara and Madagascar) | $R^2$=0.796 p=0.008 | -0.95 P=0.003 | 0.27 p=0.185 | 8 |
| Circum-Mediterranean (North Africa, Europe, Turkey, Caucasus, Semitic Near East) | $R^2$=0.079, p=0.663 | -0.271 P=0.397 | 0.47 p=0.881 | 13 |
| East Eurasia (including Madagascar and islands in the Indian Ocean) | $R^2$=0.359 p=0.061 | -0.2278 P=0.256 | 0.446 p=0.079 | 16 |

Fig. 1 Groups from the SCCS plotted against the components of mobility and pastoralism



Fig. 2 Groups from the SCCS plotted against the components of mobility and pastoralism and marked by v1716 (Primary Source of Subsistence) and labelled by v1717 (Secondary Source of Subsistence)

Fig. 3 Groups from the SCCS plotted against the components of mobility and pastoralism



Fig. 4 Groups from the SCCS plotted against v819 (Importance of Trade) and the Mobility Component

Fig. 5 Groups from the SCCS plotted against the Pastoralism and Mobility Component

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## Critias and Democracy

**Abstract**: The majority of Critias' contemporaries and fellow citizens saw the leader of the most brutal regime in Athenian history as a ruthless oligarch, moreover as a tyrant. Many ancient sources share this view. It is somewhat surprising therefore to see the most famous of his victims, the controversial politician Theramenes, denouncing him as a supporter of democracy. This contradiction has given rise to different, even diametrically opposed, modern interpretations. It is this variety of interpretations and the importance of this question for understanding the political situation in Athens at the end of the fifth century BC, as well as the rise of tyranny in Thessaly, that has prompted us to take yet another look at this controversial issue.

**Keywords**: Athens, Thessaly, democracy, tyranny, the Thirty, Critias, Theramenes, Lycophron

Critias was born about 460 BC into one of the oldest and most distinguished Athenian aristocratic families; he was a relative of Plato and Charmides.[1] He obviously had the privilege of receiving an excellent education. He was taught by the most renowned sophists and was for a while a member of Socrates' circle.[2] The dramas, political, philosophical and cultural-historical writings attributed to him show a wide range of interests,[3] but they

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[1] Diog. Laert. 3.1; Plat. Tim. 20e–21b; Charm. 154b–155a; 157e; cf. J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families 600–300 B.C.* (Oxford 1971), 326–328. The titles of modern journals and ancient works are abbreviated after DNP: H. Cancik and H. Schneider, eds., *Der Neue Pauly. Enzyklopädie der Antike* (Stuttgart–Weimar 1996), vol. I, xxxix-xlvii.

[2] Plat. Prot. 316a; Tim. 20 a; Schol. Plat. Tim. 21a; Philostr. ep. 73; soph. 501–503; Xen. mem. 1.2,12–18, 24–26, 29–39; Aischin. 1,37; cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge 1969), vol. III, 299–300. For the view that Socrates' connection with Critias was a major, if not the major, reason why the famous philosopher was prosecuted in 399 BC, see P. Scholz, "Der Prozeß gegen Sokrates. Ein 'Sündenfall' der athenischen Demokratie?", in L. Burckhardt and J. v. Ungern-Sternberg, eds., *Große Prozesse im antiken Athen* (Munich 2000), 159–164.

[3] For Critias' literary work, see M. N. Djurić, *Istorija helenske etike*, 2nd ed. (Belgrade 1990), 215–217; A. Lesky, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, 3rd. ed. (Bern–Munich 1971), 406–407; H. Patzer, "Der Tyrann Kritias und die Sophistik", in K. Döring and W. Kullmann, eds., *Studia Platonica*. Festschrift für Hermann Gundert zu seinem 65. Geburtstag (Amsterdam 1974), 3–19.

also show that he cannot be considered a sophist in the strictest sense.[4] He maintained a long-standing friendship with famous and influential Alcibiades.[5] Yet, Critias is best known for the role he played in the notorious rule of the Thirty in 404/3 BC.[6] Of more than 2500 people murdered under that regime of collective tyranny about 1500 were Athenian citizens.[7] During this reign of terror Critias stood out from among the Thirty for his lust for power and ruthlessness.[8]

The most puzzling about Critias' biography, however, is his political transformation from an apolitical aristocrat uninterested in public life into the unscrupulous leader of the most infamous regime in the history of Athens. On the one hand, it is unlikely that a philolacon and a bitter opponent of the rule of the demos such as Critias would have embarked upon a political career in Athens with a democratic regime still in place, in contrast to his friend Alcibiades. What is surprising on the other hand is that he remained outside politics even when the domestic scene began to grow ever more unstable. He was not involved in the mutilation of the

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[4] Unlike sophists, Critias did not teach. His philolaconism is in direct contrast to the typically sophistic relativism and reservations about all forms of government; cf. M. Dreher, "Die Sophisten – Parteigänger der Demokraten oder der Oligarchen?", *Studi e ricerche* II (1984), 63–88. Finally, not even the nature of most of his writing is typical of a sophist. It is therefore difficult to see Critias as a representative of the sophistic movement; cf. Guthrie, *Greek Philosophy*, 301; Patzer, "Tyrann Kritias", 3–4; A. Momigliano, "Lebensideale in der Sophistik: Hippias und Kritias", in C. J. Classen, ed., *Sophistik* (Darmstadt 1976), 466–467; G. B. Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge 1981), 52–53; J. de Romilly, *The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens* (Oxford 1992), 108–109, 216; H. Scholten, *Die Sophistik. Eine Bedrohung für die Religion und Politik der Polis?* (Berlin 2003), 228.

[5] DK 88B 4–5; cf. W. Nestle, "Kritias. Eine Studie", in W. Nestle, ed., *Griechische Studien. Untersuchungen zur Religion, Dichtung und Philosophie der Griechen* (Stuttgart 1948), 253–320, 259–261; M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law. Law, Society, and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens* (Berkeley–Los Angeles–London 1986), 403, 428, 464, 543.

[6] Cf. P. Krentz, *The Thirty at Athens* (Ithaca–London 1982), 45–88; G. A. Lehmann, "Die revolutionäre Machtergreifung der 'Dreißig' und die staatliche Teilung Attikas (404–401/0 v. Chr.)", in R. Stiel and G. A. Lehmann, eds., *Antike und Universalgeschichte*. Festschrift Hans Erich Stier zum 70. Geburtstag (Munster 1972), 201–233.

[7] Aischin. 3,235; Aristot. Ath. pol. 35,4; Isokr. or. 7,67; 20,11; Schol. Aischin. 1,39; cf. G. A. Lehman, "Überlegungen zu den oligarchischen Machtergreifungen im Athen des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.", in W. Eder, ed., *Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert. v. Chr. Vollendung oder Verfall einer Verfassungsform?* (Stuttgart 1995), 145; Krentz, *Thirty*, 78-86.

[8] Xen. Hell. 2.3,15–4,1; cf. Th. Lenschau, "Hoi triákonta", *RE* 6A/2 (1937), 2366–2368.

herms and the mockery of the Eleusinian mysteries.[9] It is possible that he was a member of the Four Hundred, a short-lived regime which overthrew democracy in 411 BC, but his role must have been insignificant since he stayed in Athens after its downfall, obviously not fearing retribution.[10] If he did take part in that regime, it is possible that his involvement was motivated by his friendship with Alcibiades rather than by political ambition. This seems to find corroboration in his motion that the corpse of Phrynichus, a radical oligarch and the main opponent of Alcibiades among the Four Hundred, be tried for high treason and, if found guilty, disinterred and thrown out of Attica.[11] Furthermore, Critias insisted that Alcibiades should be recalled from exile.[12] Finally, not even Critias' banishment from Athens about 407/6 BC, probably instigated by Cleophon, seems to have been the consequence of any particular political offence.[13] Perhaps it may be explained by his friendship with Alcibiades,[14] but such an explanation is at odds with two facts: firstly, once banished from Athens, Critias did not choose to join the exiled Alcibiades in Thrace and, secondly, all indications are that Critias was one of the instigators of Alcibiades' murder a few years

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[9] Andok. 1,47.

[10] Xen. mem. 1.2,25; cf. D. Whitehead, "Sparta and the Thirty Tyrants", *AncSoc* 13/14 (1982/1983), 114–115; P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford 1981), 429; Lehmann, *Dreißig*, 210; Krentz, *Thirty*, 46; P. Krentz, *Xenophon: Hellenika II.3.11 – IV.2.8* (Warminster 1995), 126; Ostwald, *Popular Sovereignty*, 403 with note 229; 463–464. Diametrically opposed positions have been taken most prominently by H. C. Avery, "Critias and the Four Hundred", *CPh* 58 (1963), 165–167, and G. Adeleye, "Critias: Member of the Four Houndred?", *TAPA* 104 (1974), 1–9, the former explicitly arguing against and the latter for Critias' membership in the Four Hundred.

[11] Lycurg. Leocr. 113; cf. H. Heftner, "Phrynichos Stratonidou Deiradiotes als Politiker und Symbolfigur der athenischen Oligarchen von 411 v. Chr.", in U. Bultrighini, ed., *Democrazia e antidemocrazia nel mondo Greco*. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi, Chieti 9–11 aprile 2003 (Alexandria 2005), 89–108. Critias' motion is yet another proof that he did not hold a prominent position under the Four Hundred. It should also be noted that he played no part in the downfall of that regime, either.

[12] Plut. Alk. 33,1; cf. Lehmann, *Dreißig*, 210; Ostwald, *Popular Sovereignty*, 428, 464; Krentz, *Thirty*, 46.

[13] Aristot. rhet. 1375b 31-35; Xen. Hell. 2.3,36; Mem. 1.2,24.

[14] Cf. Krentz, *Thirty*, 46; Ostwald, *Popular Sovereignty*, 431; 464; K.-W. Welwei, *Das klassische Athen. Demokratie und Machtpolitik im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert* (Darmstadt 1999), 247; Lehmann, *Dreißig*, 210; P. J. Rhodes, *A History of the Classical Greek World: 478-323 B.C.* (Oxford 2006), 167.

later.[15] Therefore, what seems to be a more probable explanation of his banishment from Athens is the activity of sycophants. Namely, after the fall of the Four Hundred the settling of scores with the oligarchs took on a life of its own, and many members of the Athenian elite became innocent victims of sycophantic abuse. Sycophantic abuse was seen as an inherent weakness of democratic government, which only deepened the animosity of many Athenians towards democracy as such.[16]

Briefly, there is no evidence of any kind for Critias' political engagement before 407/6 BC. But only a few years later, in 404/3 BC, Critias, as a leader of the Thirty, not only shows profound hostility towards democrats but openly uses the most extreme methods to strengthen the new regime.[17] Such a dramatic transformation must have had a cause. As it coincided

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[15] Plut. Alk. 38,5–39,9; Iust. 5,8; Nep. Alc. 10; Xen. Hell. 2.3,42; Diod. 14.11,4); cf. Lehmann, *Dreißig*, 210 with note 24; D. Lotze, *Lysander und der Peloponnesische Krieg* (Berlin 1964), 59–60; Ch. D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories. Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War* (Ithaca–London 1979), 77; Ostwald, *Popular Sovereignty*, 464; Krentz, *Hellenika*, 135; W. M. Ellis, *Alcibiades* (London–New York 1989), 95–97; M. Munn, *The School of History: Athens in the Age of Socrates* (Berkeley–Los Angeles 2000), 234.

[16] Cf. Lys. 17,9; 20,6–7; 17–19; 25,3; 19; 24–27; Xen. Hell. 2.3,12; Symp. 29–32; Aristoph. Ran. 687 ff; 708 f; see J. Bleicken, *Die athenische Demokratie*, 4th ed. (Paderborn–Munich–Vienna–Zurich 1995), 420–421; Lehmann, *Dreißig*, 203–204; G. A. Lehmann, "Überlegungen zur Krise der attischen Demokratie im Peloponesischen Krieg: Vom Ostrakismos des Hyperbolos yum Thargelion 411 v. Chr.", *ZPE* 69 (1987), 40, 51; B. Bleckmann, *Athens Weg in die Niederlage. Die letzten Jahre des Peloponesischen Krieges* (Stuttgart–Leipzig 1998), 609–613; E. Schütrumpf and H.-J. Gehrke, *Aristoteles, Politik IV–VI, Aristoteles Werke in Deutscher Übersetzung* IX-3 (Berlin 1996), 478; 481–482; Welwei, *Athen*, 231; Krentz, *Hellenika*, 124–125; D. M. Lewis, "Oligarchic Thinking in the Late Fifth Century", in R. M. Rosen and J. Farrell, eds., *Nomodeiktes. Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald* (Ann Arbor 1993), 207–211; D. Harvey, "The Sykophant and Sykophancy: Vexatious Redefinition?", in P. Cartledge, P. Millet and S. Todd, eds., *Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society* (Cambridge 1990), 103–121, esp. 116–119, with a detailed list of sources on pp. 119–121; for the treatment of the members of the Four Hundred after 410 BC, see also A. Dössel, *Die Beilegung innerstaatlicher Konflikte in den griechischen Poleis vom 5.-3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Frankfurt am Main 2003), 72–88. The fact that one of Critias' first measures was to do away with sycophants supports the likelihood that he had been one of their "innocent victims" (Xen. Hell 2.3,12; Aristot. Ath. pol. 35,3; Diod 14.4,2), and so does the claim of the Thirty that they want to restore justice in Athens (Lys. 12,5; Plat. ep. 7,324d).

[17] All other figures holding important positions from the very outset of the coup, such as Theramenes, Charicles, Aristotle or Eratosthenes, had already been in politics or had been sentenced to exile because of their participation in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred. Charmides is not important here, since his kinship with Critias is probably what earned him a place among the Ten in Piraeus.

with his exile, it seems reasonable to assume that the two were somehow connected. Apparently, two factors were critical. One was his banishment from Athens. In such a proud and self-confident aristocrat as Critias was, the banishment could only deepen a strong resentment towards democracy, even more so as it was undeserved, i.e. it was not the consequence of any particular political offence. The other was his stay in Thessaly during the exile. The exiled Critias was very active politically and even seems to have taken part in local strife, which is especially interesting since his activities at the time have been brought into connection with the beginnings of one of the most important tyrannies of the classical period: the one in Pherae in Thessaly. A closer analysis of Critias' activities in Thessaly might therefore lead to some new answers, or at least help refute some of the earlier hypotheses concerning not only the political developments in Athens at the end of the fifth century BC, but also the origin of the most powerful tyranny in mainland Greece in the fourth century BC.

From Theramenes' last speech in Xenophon's *Hellenica* and a remark of Flavius Philostratus, we know that about 406/5 BC Thessaly witnessed an internal conflict, the first reliably attested conflict in that region in the last third of the fifth century BC.[18] Unfortunately, neither source says anything about Critias' exact whereabouts in Thessaly, or who his fellow fighter Prometheus was, or what the two of them were fighting for. These lacunae have left room for different interpretations and hypotheses. Some historians link Critias' Thessalian exile to the establishment of tyranny in Pherae, some see the Athenian aristocrat as an advocate of democracy or, quite the opposite, of extreme oligarchy.

Arguing that Critias was involved in a conflict where the Thessalian *penestai* were used with the intention of breaking the power of the ruling aristocracy and introducing democracy instead, C. Mossé finds it likely that this activity was connected with the establishment of Lycophron's tyrannical rule in Pherae.[19] H. Berve puts forward the hypothesis that Prometheus used *penestai* in an attempt to establish himself as tyrant.[20] According to E. Meyer, Prometheus might have been Lycophron's predecessor.[21] H. D. Westlake believes that Lycophron's tyranny was established at the time Cri-

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[18] Xen. Hell. 2.3,36; Philostr. soph. 1,501-502.

[19] C. Mossé, *La tyrannie dans la Grèce antique* (Paris 1969), 122 with note 3.

[20] H. Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen* (München 1967), 283; H.-J. Gehrke, *Stasis. Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (München 1985), 375; see also J. Ducat, *Les Pénestes de Thessalie* (Paris 1994), 61.

[21] E. Meyer, *Theopomps Hellenika* (Halle 1909), 251.

tias and Prometheus were pursuing their subversive goals.[22] M. Sordi contends that *penestai*, although free men from 457 BC, remained deprived of all political rights, which was exploited by Critias who used them in Larissa to support the Aleuadae and extreme oligarchy in order to topple the moderate oligarchic government.[23] H. T. Wade-Gery attributes to Critias the authorship of the oration *Peri politeias* and therefore argues that Critias and Prometheus were advocates of moderate democracy.[24]

A more careful analysis of the ancient sources seems to give grounds for questioning some of these views that sway between two extremes, tyranny and democracy. Theramenes' attack on Critias in *Hellenica* should be examined first since it contains at once the most detailed and the most contradictory data. Before the speech itself is looked at, it should be said that it was given amidst the dramatic events unfolding in Athens. The "Thirty Tyrants" led by Critias had been waging a campaign of terror. On the other hand, a group of the exiled democrats had succeeded in seizing Phyle, a stronghold on the slopes of Mount Parnes in north-western Attica, which became a gathering place for the adversaries of the new tyrannical regime. Critias, well-aware that Theramenes disapproved of his extreme policy of repression and was not incapable of changing sides, as evidenced by his conduct in 411 BC, accused him of treasonous intentions before the Council. Theramenes' last speech was in fact a very astute reply to Critias' accusation and it almost saved him, but the leader of the Thirty resorted to overt intimidation and eventually succeeded in bringing about the execution of his opponent.

Theramenes hits back at his accuser by saying that during his Thessalian exile Critias, together with a Prometheus, pushed towards setting up

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[22] H. D. Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.* (London 1935), 47ff.; cf. also H. Beck, *Polis und Koinon. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Struktur der griechischen Bundesstaaten im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Stuttgart 1997), 127 with note 42.

[23] M. Sordi, *La lega tessala fino ad Alessandro Magno* (Roma 1958), 106 ff, 141 ff, thinks that in 457 BC there was a revolt of the aristocracy, who lived in the cities, against the Aleuadae. During this the *penestai* acquired their freedom. Her reconstruction of the date of this supposed revolution is based on Thucydides, according to whom at the battle of Tanagra the Thessalian cavalry fighting for Athens changed sides and allied with the Lacedaemonians (Thuk. 1.107,7). Her view has been disputed by J. A. O. Larsen, "A New Interpretation of the Thessalian Confederacy", *CPh* 55 (1960), 229 ff, 240 ff; J. A. O. Larsen, *Greek Federal States* (Oxford 1968), 13 ff; K.-W. Welwei, *Unfreie im antiken Kriegsdienst*, vol. II *Die kleineren und mittleren griechischen Staaten und die hellenistischen Reiche* (Wiesbaden 1977), 6 ff with note 6, and esp. p. 8; Gehrke, *Stasis*, 186 ff.

[24] H. T. Wade-Gery, "Kritias and Herodes", *CQ* 39 (1945), 19–33.

a democracy and thus armed the *penestai* to rise up against their masters.[25] Theramenes' words do not seem trustworthy for several reasons. To begin with, it is only natural for a person fighting for his life to make use of half-truths and lies. Theramenes' skill to misrepresent reality to his advantage is obvious from his involvement in the downfall of the Four Hundred in 411 BC, his controversial conduct during the Arginusae trial and his role in the capitulation of Athens in 404 BC. Even his contemporaries nicknamed him "Buskin" for it.[26]

The demagogic nature of Theramenes' speech is indicated by the very way in which it is put together. Had he known anything really discrediting about Critias' activities in Thessaly, he would certainly have devoted at least as much attention to it as he did to the extreme measures that Critias and his clique used to consolidate the new regime in Athens. Instead, Theramenes tersely sums up "the truth about Thessaly", and immediately proceeds to warn that the same thing could happen in Athens. In that way he creates the impression that he is simply referring to something that is common knowledge in Athens and, consequently, that his statement matches reality. However, there are good grounds for doubting that the nature and scope of Critias' activities in exile were widely known in Athens. During those last years of the Peloponnesian War Athens was facing some of the greatest challenges in her history and was necessarily inward-looking. Thessaly, on the other hand, was neither a theatre of war operations nor the scene of any other event important enough to resonate beyond the local boundaries. Furthermore, Critias was not in Thessaly on an official mission, but as an exile, and not nearly as famous an exile as, for example, his friend Alcibiades, whose activities can be justifiably presumed to have been an object of interest to his fellow citizens. All this suggests that Critias' activities in Thessaly did not attract any particular attention in Athens, and that the information on him was available to few. This view finds corroboration in the words of Theramenes himself. Namely, he tries to refute Critias' criticism of his role in the Arginusae trial by claiming that Critias is ill-informed of the events because he was in Thessaly at the time.[27] If such an argument appeared

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[25] Xen. Hell. 2.3,36; for the social and legal status of the *penestai*, see K.-W. Welwei, "Neuere Forschungen zur Rechtstellung der Penesten", in P. Mauritsch, W. Petermandl, R. Rollinger and Chr. Ulf., eds., *Antike Lebenswelten. Konstanz–Wandel–Wirkunsmacht*. Festschrift für Ingomar Weiler zum 70. Geburtstag (Wiesbaden 2008), 393–411; K.-W. Welwei, "Ursprung, Verbreitung und Formen der Unfreiheit abhängiger Landbewohner im antiken Griechenland", in E. Hermann-Otto, ed., *Unfreie und abhängige Landbevölkerung* (Hiledsheim–Zurich–New York 2008), 7–14.

[26] Xen. Hell. 2.3,31, 47.

[27] Xen. Hell. 2.3,36.

applicable to one of the biggest scandals in Athenian history,[28] then how much more applicable it would have been to Critias' activities in a faraway region such as Thessaly. There is no doubt that Critias' return and rise in 404 BC increasingly aroused public curiosity about his past. Even so, it seems more likely that only his closest allies and friends had a more detailed insight into his Thessalian days. Namely, the total defeat of Athens in the war against Sparta, the establishment of the new regime and its campaign of terror, the short interval between Critias' homecoming and Theramenes' trial, as well as the fact that little had been known about the leader of the Thirty, seriously impeded the dissemination of accurate information, while creating fertile ground for spreading all sorts of rumours, including most incredible ones. The role of rumours in Alcibiades' downfall in 415 BC or in the coup in 411 BC shows how easily individuals exploited them and how readily the populace took them for granted. It is obviously this property of rumours that Theramenes counted on when he "mentioned" Critias' stay in Thessaly in his speech.

Further, it should be noted that the allegation that Critias was setting up a democracy in Thessaly is one of the main arguments Theramenes uses to rebut Critias' allegation that his egoism threatens the very existence of the regime.[29] Its purpose is to create the impression that it is in fact Critias who unscrupulously pursues his own self-interest, the impression he further enhances by expressing hope that what happened in Thessaly will never happen in Athens. This "warning" fully betrays the demagogic nature of Theramenes' statement as it is in contradiction not only to Critias' current political position but also to Theramenes' criticism of Critias' extremism in the continuation of the speech.[30]

It follows that Theramenes' counterattack was a mere mixture of half-truths, rumours and exaggerations intended to discredit Critias and thus his accusations.[31] Consequently, it cannot serve as conclusive proof that the conflict in Thessaly resulted from social tensions and that its goal was to establish a democratic system.[32]

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[28] See Bleckmann, *Athens Weg*, 509–571, and esp. 569–571; L. Burckhardt, "Eine Demokratie wohl, aber kein Rechtstaat? Der Arginusenprozeß des Jahres 406 v. Chr.", in L. Burckhardt and J. v. Ungern-Sternberg, eds, *Große Prozesse im antiken Athen* (Munich 2000), 128–143, esp. 137; R. A. Baumann, *Political Trials in Ancient Greece* (London–New York 1990), 69–76.

[29] Xen. Hell. 2.3,30–33.

[30] Xen. Hell. 2.3,36–45, 47–49.

[31] Cf. also Xen. Hell. 2.3,45–47; see also Nestle, *Kritias*, 307.

[32] Cf. S. Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae. A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431–370 BC* (Krakow 1999), 32, 34.

Theramenes' portrayal of Critias as a champion of democracy is contradicted by Xenophon himself.[33] In his *Memorabilia* he simply remarks that Critias in Thessaly associated with men who put lawlessness over justice. Since the context of Xenophon's remark is his defence of Socrates against the accusation of having been a bad influence on the future leader of the Thirty, Xenophon points out that it was in Thessaly that Critias first showed his true colours, theretofore kept under control owing to the famous philosopher.[34] Given that both *Memorabilia* and *Hellenica* portray the leader of the Thirty as ambitious, power-loving and violent, it seems safe to believe that Xenophon would not have missed the opportunity to point up Critia's lack of principle by drawing attention to his "fight" for democracy, wherein his Thessalian lawlessness-prone associates could have been used as an additional argument. Instead, Xenophon's Critias remains the ruthless leader of a regime which had tyrannical features, while his brutal removal of democrats is primarily attributed to his character.[35] Hence it seems justified to make a clear distinction between the content of Theramenes' speech and the stance held by Xenophon himself.

Philostratus' portrayal of Critias is even more difficult to reconcile with Theramenes' attack found in *Hellenica*.[36] According to this representative of the Second Sophistic, Critias even urged the Tessalian oligarchs to reinforce the oppression of the people, agitated against all democracies and slanderously attributed outrageous crimes to the Athenians. Although Philostratus makes no mention of Critias' involvement in a direct conflict, he believes that Critias corrupted the Thessalians more than they corrupted him.

Philostratus' account directly contradicts Theramenes' accusations, but it is not inconsistent with Xenophon.[37] Given that Theramenes' claims do not reflect Xenophon's personal stance, Xenophon and Philostratus cannot be said to diverge on the issue of Critias' attitude towards democracy. Besides, Xenophon in his *Memorabilia* does not see Thessaly as the foremost cause of Critias' moral fall.[38] Indeed, he states that Socrates' absence and other opportune circumstances merely helped bring out the vile traits of Critias' character. Such an interpretation is supported by the emphasis on Socrates' role in bridling Critias' ignoble passions. Philostratus' claim

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[33] Xen. mem. 1.2,24; Philostr. soph. 1,501–502.

[34] Xen. mem. 1.2,12–18, 24–26, 29–39.

[35] Xen. Hell. 2.3,12, 14–16; Xen. mem. 1.2,12–16, 39.

[36] Philostr. soph. 1,501–502; cf. Ducat, *Pénestes*, 58–59.

[37] For the opposite view, see Ducat, *Pénestes*, 58–59.

[38] Ibid., 58.

that Critias limited his activity in Thessaly to advice-giving clashes with the picture we find in Xenophon.[39] Even though Xenophon is somewhat vague on this issue in *Memorabilia*, both that piece of writing and *Hellenica* portray Critias as vigorous, resolute and power-loving, a kind of person hardly expected to be satisfied with the role of an advice-giver.

This discrepancy calls for evaluating the trustworthiness of the sources. **It seems obvious from Philostratus' understanding of the regime** of the Thirty, the Thessalians, Critias' upbringing and Socrates, that his portrayal of Critias was strongly influenced by the long-embedded perception of the notorious Athenian.[40] Therefore, Philostratus may be used as a supplementary source, but it is by all means Xenophon that should be considered more credible.

The analysis of the sources conducted above gives clues to what seems to have been the most likely scenario: Critias and the Thessalian Prometheus were involved in an intra- or inter-polis conflict, and at some point in the conflict they used *penestai*. Social tensions and rivalries may have played a part, but that cannot be argued with certainty. What is certain is that Critias did not help set up a democracy anywhere in Thessaly. Another finding resulting from the analysis is that Critias' exile in Thessaly was a crucial factor in his political radicalization. This is obvious not only from the fact that none of the three sources says anything about his previous engagement in politics but also from Xenophon's insistence that it was in Thessaly that Critias' true nature first came to light.

It seems necessary to point out, therefore, that the view advanced by H. T. Wade-Gery, one of the few modern supporters of the hypothesis that Critias was setting up a moderate democracy, is disputable for three more reasons. Firstly, there is no way to prove that Critias authored *Peri politeias*.[41] Secondly, Theramenes would never have criticized the constitution favoured in *Peri politeias* for being democratic since it was largely in agreement with his own political views.[42] Thirdly, in that case it would be difficult to explain why Critias' activity in Athens differed from that in Thessaly, and why everyone, including Theramenes, Xenophon and Philostratus, describe him as a ruthless and power-loving person inclined to use extreme repression. On the other hand, even if we take as a fact that Critias did not fight for democracy in Thessaly, this cannot be used as a proof that he supported the establishment of a tyranny. Namely, had Critias helped either Prometheus or Lycophron to seize autocratic power, Theramenes would certainly have

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[39] Ibid., 58–59.

[40] Ibid., 58–59.

[41] Wade-Gery, "Kritias", 19–33, esp. 24–26; cf. Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae*, 34 ff.

[42] Cf. Ducat, *Pénestes*, 59–60.

used such a piece of information against him. The focus of Theramenes'
speech was the radicalism of the leader of the Thirty resulting in a shift from
moderate oligarchy towards *dynasteia* or collective tyranny.[43] Tyranny was
an object of loathing to oligarchs as much as it was to democrats, because
both equated it with oppression and loss of political rights. Suffices it to say
that the term *isonomia* was forged in aristocratic circles as an anti-tyrannical
slogan.[44]

As regards the thesis proposed by M. Sordi, the question arises as to
how the violent replacement of a moderate oligarchy by an extreme one can
be seen as a democratic undertaking.[45] Another question is why the *penestai*
would fight for a system wherein their rights would be even fewer than be-
fore. Also, it is difficult to understand why the one who gave the speech *Peri
politeias*, a supporter of moderate oligarchy, would bother himself about the
common people in such a political situation.[46]

The identity of the Thessalian Prometheus is yet another relevant
question to this study, as it once again implies Critias' connection with a tyr-
anny. All of the many and various modern attempts to uncover Prometheus'
identity are based on three anecdotes. Plutarch reports of an attempted as-
sassination of the Thessalian Prometheus. The assassin's sword struck Pro-
metheus in the ulcer that was considered fatal and, by lancing it, saved the
victim's life instead of taking it.[47] The same anecdote is told by Cicero and

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[43] I. Jordović, "Did the Ancient Greeks Know of Collective Tyranny", *Balcanica* XXXVI
(2006), 17–33; I. Jordović, *Anfänge der Jüngeren Tyrannis. Vorläufer und erste Repräsent-
anten von Gewaltherrschaft im späten 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Frankfurt am Main 2005),
180–202.

[44] G. Vlastos, "Isonomia", *AJPh* 74 (1953), 337 ff; V. J. Rosivach, "The Tyrant in Athe-
nian Democracy", *QUCC* 30/3 (1988), 47–57; W. Lengauer, "Die politische Bedeutung
der Gleichheitsidee im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. – Einige Bemerkungen über isono-
mia", in W. Will and J. Heinrichs, eds., *Zu Alexander d. Gr.*, Festschrift G. Wirth (Am-
sterdam 1988), 53–87; M. Ostwald, *Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy*
(Oxford 1969), 96–120, 180–182; H. Leppin, *Thukydides und die Verfassung der Polis.
Ein Beitrag zur politischen Ideengeschichte des 5. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Berlin 1999), 22–23;
K. Raaflaub, "Einleitung und Bilanz: Kleisthenes, Ephialtes und die Begründung der
Demokratie", in K. H. Kinzl, ed., *Demokratia: der Weg zur Demokratie bei den Griechen*
(Darmstadt 1995), 49–51; Chr. Meier, *Die Entstehung des Politischen bei den Griechen*,
3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main 1995), 293–294, 297 ff; P. Spahn, "Individualisierung und
politisches Bewußtsein im archaischen Griechenland", in K. Raaflaub and E. Müller-
Luckner, eds., *Anfänge des politischen Denkens in der Antike: die nahöstlichen Kulturen und
die Griechen* (Munich 1993), 359–360.

[45] Cf. Ducat, *Pénestes*, 60.

[46] Cf. Meyer, *Theopomps*, 261, 276–277; Gehrke, *Stasis*, 375 with note 2.

[47] Plut. mor. 89c.

Valerius Maximus, except that in their versions the victim of the attempted assassination is the famous tyrant Jason of Pherae.[48]

The similarity among the anecdotes has led to the early hypothesis that Prometheus was the nickname of Jason of Pherae,[49] which seems untenable for several reasons. Jason's name appears for the first time in the sources in connection with the year 379 BC.[50] In Xenophon, Jason is first mentioned in Polydamus' speech of 375 BC.[51] Polydamus quotes and affirms Jason's assertion that he is able to endure as much strain as his mercenaries who are in their prime and exercising constantly.[52] This portrayal of Jason as a man in the prime of life renders it doubtful that he could have risen to such prominence as to become the leader of a faction as early as 407/6 BC, or thirty years before.[53] If Jason of Pherae was indeed thus prominent and powerful as early as 407/6 BC, then the thirty-year silence of the sources becomes difficult to explain,[54] and so does their indifference to such an interesting issue as an alliance between two so famous and power-hungry figures as Jason of Pherae and Critias would have been.

D. Stephans's hypothesis that Prometheus was the nickname of Lycophron of Pherae[55] implies that both Cicero and Valerius Maximus confused Jason and Lycophron, which seems highly unlikely.[56]

What shakes both hypotheses about the identity of Prometheus is that the Athenians would hardly have believed that a tyrant could be a democratic leader. Moreover, it would have been far more useful for Theramenes' to depict Critias as a tyrant's ally.

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[48] Cic. nat. deor. 3,28; Val. Max. 1.8. ext. 6. According to Pliny the Elder, Jason's ulcer was lanced in a battle (Plin. nat. 7,51).

[49] F. Pahle, "Zur Geschichte der pheräischen Tyrannis", *NJPhP* 93 (1866), 532 ff; for other scholars holding the same view, see. J. Mandel, "Jason: The Tyrant of Pherae, Tagus of Thessaly, as Reflected in Ancient Sources and Modern Literature: The Image of the 'New' Tyrant", *RSA* 10 (1980), 52 ff, esp. 53 with note 21; see also Ducat, *Pénestes*, 55 ff; Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae*, 33 with note 68.

[50] Diod. 15.30,3. For chronology, see Gehrke, *Stasis*, 74 with note 7; Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae*, 3; Berve, *Tyrannis*, 285.

[51] Xen. Hell. 6.1,4–16.

[52] Xen. Hell. 6.1,5–6; cf. also 6.1,15–16.

[53] Mandel, *Tyrant of Pherae*, 52 ff; Ducat, *Pénestes*, 55 ff; Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae*, 32–33.

[54] On Jason's lust for power, see Aristot. pol. 1277a 24.

[55] D. Stephans, "Critias: Life and Literary Remains" (Diss., University of Cincinnati 1939), 38.

[56] Ducat, *Pénestes*, 56; Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae*, 33.

A most recent hypothesis, put forward by B. Helly, is that Prometheus was in fact Polydamas of Pharsalus.[57] Xenophon's approving portrayal of Polydamus in *Hellenica*, however, is in marked contrast to his low opinion of Critias' Thessalian friends given in *Memorabilia*.[58]

The fact that personal names were seldom used as nicknames in ancient Greece may be an argument against the assumption that Prometheus was a nickname. The most famous examples of descriptive nicknames are Buskin and Olympian for Theramenes and Pericles respectively.[59] Moreover, how come that the sources say nothing about a Thessalian whose nickname is purportedly commonly known in Athens. Another noteworthy fact is that not a single ancient source directly associates Prometheus with Jason, Lycophron and Polydamus. Finally, as J. Ducat points out, much as it was rare, the name Prometheus is attested in the sources.[60]

The research done so far suggests that Prometheus is a historical person, but who he was, which region or polis he was from and what his political beliefs were will apparently remain a mystery. What appears almost certain is that neither Prometheus nor Critias were revolutionaries exploiting social tensions to establish a democracy. Given that Theramenes referred to him by name and in conjunction with Critias, he was probably a member of the Thessalian aristocracy. The two of them were apparently involved in power struggles of various aristocratic factions, and they used *penestai* at some point.[61] Nor can their role as Lycophron's allies be completely ruled out. A possible clue may be Critias' prominent role in the turbulent events in Athens in 404/3 BC, the role for which he had no previous political credentials. As there are indications that Lycophron had good relations with the Lacedaemonians at the time, perhaps some sort of collaboration with him had earned Critias such a credential. On the other hand, it is not impossible that the mysterious Prometheus was the one who had good connections with Sparta and shared some interests with her in Thessaly. Whatever the link between Critias and the ruler of Pherae might have been, Critias did

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[57] B. Helly, *L' État Thessalien. Aleuas le Roux les tétrades et les tagoi* (Collection de la Maison de L'Orient Méditerranéen 25, Série Épigraphique 2) (Lyon 1995), 306–307, 350–350.

[58] Xen. Hell. 6.1,2–3, 7–8, 13–14, 18.

[59] Xen. Hell. 2.3,30–31; 47; Kratin frg. 73, 114, 118, 181, 258 K.-A.; Aristoph. Ach. 530; see V. Ehrenberg, *Sophokles und Perikles* (Munich 1956), 105–106; J. Schwarze, *Die Beurteilung des Perikles durch die attische Komödie und ihre historische und historiographische Bedeutung* (Munich 1971), 28–40, 59–60.

[60] Ducat, *Pénestes*, 55.

[61] Cf. Welwei, *Unfreie*, 6 ff, esp. 6 with note 6.

not play a significant part in Lycophron's rise. Had it been otherwise, the sources would not have failed to pay it due attention.[62]

*UDC 94:32](38Athena)(093)"-04"*

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[62] Cf. Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae*, 34.

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## Locating the *Timacum Maius* Station on the Roman Road *Lissus–Naissus–Ratiaria*: New Archaeological Research

**Abstract**: As the exact location of two *Timacum* stations remains an open issue, the results of the latest archaeological investigations in the environs of Svrljig, southeast Serbia, seem to offer some corroborative evidence for the hypothesis proposed in our previous contribution that this might be the location of Roman *Timacum Maius*. A small-scale trial excavation was undertaken on the Roman site at Kalnica in the Niševac village area in July 2008. A trench 4 by 2m was opened in the zone of the site that had yielded plentiful fragments of building debris as well as small finds. A massive wall over 1m thick was found immediately beneath the surface. Built of broken limestone and pebbles bound with lime mortar, it obviously was part of a larger structure. To the northeast of the wall was an area covered with fragmented roof tiles. The discovery of two ceramic *tumuli* embedded in the wall, indicating a wall-heating system so far unregistered on the representative Roman urban and settlement sites in Serbia, gives additional grounds to presume that this was a larger Roman settlement extending over an area of more than 5ha, possibly *Timacum Maius*, a station on the Roman road *Lissus–Ratiaria–Naissus*.

**Keywords**: Niševac, eastern Serbia, archaeological excavation, new results, Roman road, *tubuli*

The Roman itinerary road *Lissus–Naissus–Ratiaria* was, as is well-known, a transversal communication across the central Balkans connecting the Adriatic coast and the Danube Basin. Taking into account the maritime route between the Italic port of *Brundisium* and Lissus, it was the shortest link between the capital of the Empire and the Danubian limes. Namely, the Appian Way led from Rome to Brundisium, and thence ships sailed to the Balkan Peninsula, where an overland route from Lissus continued along the Drim valley and across the highlands of present-day Albania and Serbia (mostly Kosovo and Metohija) to the Niš Basin with the ancient city of Naissus at its centre. From Naissus, the road ran along the Timok river valley, took a northeast turn across Kadibogaz, a pass on Stara Planina (northwestern part of the Balkan Mountain range), and ended at *Ratiaria*, a Roman colony (present-day Archar on the Danube, Bulgaria). In the period of the Empire's expansion and consolidation of the border on the Danube, the road was predominantly used for military purposes, for the transportation of troops and supplies to the Danubian limes. With the onset of mining activities in Upper Moesia, this important road began to be used for exporting ores and thus assumed economic, i.e. commercial, importance.

The famous fourth-century itinerary *Tabula Peutingeriana* records the following stations on the section of the road between Naissus and Ratiaria: *Naisso* XXVII *Timaco Maiori* X *Timaco Minori* XXVII *Combustica* XXVII *Ratiaria*.[1]

The exact location of the two *Timacum* stations being an as yet unresolved issue, this paper seeks to offer further corroboration of the hypothesis put forward in our previous consideration of this subject,[2] this time in the light of the latest archaeological investigations conducted in the area of Niševac, a village near Svrljig.

In July 2008 small-scale archaeological excavation on the ancient site of Kalnica near Niševac was undertaken in order to assess the archaeological potential of the Svrljig area as a prerequisite for planning systematic excavations on proto- and early-historic sites.[3]

Most of Kalnica site stretches between the Kalnica river and the left bank of the Svrljiški Timok, but it also extends across the latter river into the locality known as Selište. Situated in the fertile and flat Timok river valley at an altitude of 350–360m above sea level, the site is sheltered on all sides by hills over 420m in height. The first visible structure from the direction of Svrljig has been registered on the left side of the modern Niš–Zaječar Railway and the Timok, at the locality known as "Bazilika" at the eastern foot of Gravište hill. The structural remains, partly damaged by the construction of this railway in 1920/21, are now overgrown with shrubbery. The original area and size of the building is therefore impossible to establish without excavation, but it obviously was a larger one and built of stone and Roman-sized brick. The *thermae* referred to in our previous paper[4] could not be located. The locals have, however, reported about the remains of a larger mosaic-floored building near the river (Svrljiški Timok), which perhaps are the vestiges of the *thermae* discovered in 1956.[5] The reported structure is

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[1] Miller 1916; TIR, K-34, Naissus.

[2] Petrović and Filipović 2008 (with a bibliography) have proposed a revision to the inter-station distances on the Naissus–Ratiaria section as recorded in the Peutinger Map, namely: Naisso XVII *Timaco Maiori* XX *Timaco Minori* XXVII *Combustica* XXVII *Ratiaria*. The station *Timacum Maius* should be looked for in the area of Niševac, a village near Svrljig, while *Timacum Minus* is commonly associated with the village of Ravna, 8km north of Knjaževac.

[3] The excavation was carried out under the auspices of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the Institute for Balkan Studies and the Local Museum Collection at Svrljig; for the already published preliminary report, see Petrović, Filipović and Milivojević 2008.

[4] Petrović and Filipović 2008, 32.

[5] Kostić 1970, 59; the piece of information obtained from the villagers of Niševac, according to whom the owner (meanwhile departed) re-covered the mosaic-floored struc-

Topographic map showing the possible site of *Timacum Maius*
and the other Roman sites in its environs

probably on the left side of the Svrljiški Timok, opposite Malušnica hill. The survey of the area south of Malušnica, on the localities known as Belovina and Selište, registered fragmented Roman pottery and a few coins dateable to the third and fourth centuries. Niševac has already yielded an altar sacred to Jupiter,[6] dated to the early third century; it was probably discovered in the section of the site along the Kalnica and Svrljiški Timok rivers. It should be noted that from the left side of the Svrljiški Timok and both sides of the Kalnica come many and diverse movable finds; the discovered Roman coins suggest that this part of the site was in existence in the first century BC and continued until the fourth century AD.[7] This Roman site, possibly *Timacum Maius*, is likely to have been founded on the left side of the Svrljiški Timok and to have expanded across the river in the third and fourth centuries.

*Archaeological excavations in 2008*

With all background knowledge and unresolved issues in mind, the site of Kalnica near the village of Niševac was subjected to a small-scale trial excavation. The excavated area was on the left side of the Timok, some 150m west of the present-day river course. A trench 4m by 2m was opened in the section of the site where plentiful building debris and movable finds had previously been registered.[8] Just below the surface, at a depth of only 0.10m, was discovered a massive, more than one-metre-thick wall of undetermined length built of broken limestone and pebbles bound with lime mortar, obviously part of an as yet unexplored structure. It ran to a depth of 0.90m. On the northeast side of the wall was an area covered with fragmented roof tiles, and embedded in the wall were two vertical ceramic pipes (*tubuli*) spaced at 0.30m. Abutting to its east side was a smaller dry stone wall, probably a subsequent addition. South of the dry stone wall and abutting to the structure's exposed wall, at a depth of 0.55m, was an inhumation burial with the deceased laid on a west-to-east axis. The burial pit, lined with larger stones and some brick, is probably later than the structure, but no chronological precision is possible at this point. The skeleton was about 1.55m long, with both

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ture with earth and ceased tilling that parcel of land.

[6] Petrović 1992, 129.

[7] We express our gratitude to Mr Slaviša Milivojević, director of the Local Collection at Svrljig, for assistance and access to the numismatic data. The oldest are the coins of Mark Antony and Octavian August, and the youngest is Valentinian I's piece minted at Thessalonica in 364–367.

[8] The trench was opened on the estate of Ljubiša Rašić; the excavated area coordinates: X–43°26.432´, Y–22°06.137´ and Z–366m, were established with a GPS device Garmin Geko 201.

Wall of the structure with embedded ceramic *tubuli*

elbows flexed, the right hand resting on the chest, and the left on the belly. Apart from soil, grave backfill contained lumps of mortar, fragmented brick and pebbles, and was quite firmly consolidated. No personal adornments or grave goods were found. Finds of prehistoric pottery dateable to the Early Iron Age were discovered below the grave, but not within an identifiable layer of that date. The upper layer of the excavated area yielded numerous movable finds, mostly ceramics and iron nails, but also a bronze fibula with a broken pin and ends in the form of bird's heads, decorated with circular mother-of-pearl ornaments set with four black stones. Preliminary analysis of the ceramic fragments and the bronze fibula suggests that the structure may be dated between the first and third centuries. Given the small excavated area and the lack of a broader context, however, this date should be taken as highly tentative.

The massive wall fitted with ceramic *tubuli*[9] leads to several hypotheses as regards the structure's architecture and purpose. Namely, sporadically perforated *tubuli* embedded in a solid-built wall (stone and mortar) formed part of the hypocaust system for heating a particular room or the whole building.[10] In our case, the *tubuli* appear to be elements of an archaeologically attested wall-heating system, as additionally corroborated by the absence of soot residues inside the *tubuli*.[11] That it was hot air that was carried through the *tubuli* seems clear from analogies found on other sites in the Balkans and across the Empire. For the reason of fire safety the structures with such heating systems as a rule were on the fringes of settlements.[12] Those were mostly public or private baths, whereas heated rooms in villas,[13] which were representative buildings, were very rare.[14] Even in cases where there were wall-heating systems, the *tubuli* were often spaced at long intervals, because the system must have been very expensive. Briefly, the use of wall heating was quite rare. That our building was not a typical bathhouse, but possibly a smaller private bath–*piscina*, is indicated by its distance from the river and the wall's solid waterproof structure. Given that analogous heating systems

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[9] "*Tubuli* are diverse ceramic objects joined to each other. They transmitted the heat given off by flame or vapours." Seneca, Epist. XC, 25.

[10] *RE* 1916, col. 333–336; excavations often discover *in situ* only the *tubuli* embedded in the very wall base, practically between the *suspensura* and the wall, cf. Degbomont 1984, 140–145. Our discovery seems to be one such case. On heating methods in antiquity, see Forbes 1955, 1–100.

[11] Wall *tubuli* as a rule have no soot residues inside, while chimney *tubuli*, naturally, show significant traces of burning, cf. Degbomont 1984, 143.

[12] Degbomont 1984, 51.

[13] *RE* 1958, col. 2139–2159.

[14] On the heating system for villas, see Plinius, Epist. II, 17, 9; Palladius I, 39, 5.

Base plan showing the wall fitted with ceramic *tubuli*
unearthed in 2008

have been only rarely documented in the Balkan provinces of the Empire — e.g. Bansko-Strumica,[15] Bargala,[16] Aquae Iasae/Varaždinske Toplice,[17] the late antique *balneum* in the church of St George in Sofia,[18] Nicopolis ad Istrum[19] — this building may be considered a curiosity. In all the cases listed above, the structures were used for balneological purposes.

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Sites in the immediate vicinity of the excavated area at Kalnica near Niševac (possibly a small part of the larger-sized Roman settlement of *Timacum Maius*, the first station on the road section between Naissus and Ratiaria) and their dates testify to dynamic development processes in Roman times. Some of the sites have already been discussed,[20] but they were resurveyed during the 2008 campaign in order to establish their communicational and chronological connection with the presumed settlement in the Svrljiški Timok valley. Some two kilometres northwest of the Roman settlement (*Timacum Maius*?) is the village of Plužina. As noted earlier, the main Roman road ran past Plužina and continued towards the Timok river gorge, while a branch took a turn towards the settlement in the Kalnica river valley. In the vicinity of Plužina was in 1934 unearthed a milestone dedicated to the emperor Caius Vibius Trebonianus Gallus.[21] The Local Museum Collection at Svrljig has recently acquired Roman coins discovered near the present-day church of St Elijah sited near the beginning of the located section of the Naissus–Ratiaria road.[22] One of these coins is roughly dated to 120 BC, while most date from the third and fourth centuries. This was probably the site of the structure which in late antiquity "guarded" the entrance to the gorge and which had not been there in the first and second centuries.[23] The surviving section of the Roman road runs along the right side of the Svrljiški Timok and ends at Banjica, a site on the river at the foot

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[15] Taseva and Sekulov 2003, 261–272.

[16] Beldedoski 2003, 57–69.

[17] Belančić-Gorenc 1961, 203–206.

[18] Ivanov 2002.

[19] Ibid., 222.

[20] Petrović and Filipović 2008.

[21] Petrović 1979, 131–132, n° 127.

[22] An archaeological survey conducted in 2006 discovered remains of the Roman road Naissus–Ratiaria sporadically cut into the slope between the villages Niševac and Varoš in the Timok river gorge, Petrović and Filipović 2008, 34–35.

[23] The coins suggest the continuous use of this area until the 17th century. The area probably was a salient strategic point for controlling the road.

Eastern part of the foundation wall of the structure with embedded ceramic *tubuli*

of Svrljig Fort. In the area of Banjica several structures have been registered, including the site of the former church of St Stephen that can be reliably dated to late antiquity.[24] From Banjica comes an honorary inscription dedicated to one of the early-third-century emperors,[25] while numismatic finds confirm its uninterrupted use from the first to the fourth century. Svrljig Fort sits on the left side of the Svrljiški Timok, on a tall rock overlooking the inflow of the Belica stream. The recovered archaeological material suggests a long and continuous use of this area from the eight century BC until the nineteenth century AD. The fort has also yielded a marble votive plaque dedicated to Hera Sonketene (Ἥρα Σονκητηνῇ) dated to the middle of the first century AD.[26]

The site at Niševac should be viewed in a broader spatial context as forming a whole with Svrljig Fort and Banjica.

*Concluding remarks*

Taking into account the discovery of wall heating, so far unrecorded on the excavated sites of Roman representative settlements and cities in Serbia, as well as the reported existence of a mosaic-floored structure at Niševac, we believe it reasonable to assume that there was a larger Roman settlement (*Timacum Maius*?) with major structures, some of which might have been used for balneological purposes. Also, given that this is the first excavation ever carried out on this site, and a small-scale one, we cannot propose the date of the settlement, although the coin finds suggest the turn of the BC and AD eras. The presumed existence of the settlement in the first century AD is favoured by the marble votive plaque discovered among the ruins of Svrljig Fort in 1886.[27] The fact that its dedicator was Tiberius Claudius Theopompus (Τι(βέριος) Κλαύδιος Θεοπόμπους), attested as a Thracian strategos in an inscription from Topeiros (Greece) dated between AD 46 and 54,[28] may suggest a Roman military presence at Svrljig Fort as early as the mid first century AD. Whether the settlement at Niševac in the Timok valley was a larger and open-type one is impossible to say with certainty at this point, but the answer is more likely affirmative than negative. On the other hand, the end of occupation at the site of Kalnica near Niševac (*Timacum Maius*?) may, from coin finds, be dated to the last quarter of the

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[24] Bošković 1951.

[25] Petrović 1992, 129–130; Petrović 1995, 128, n° 100.

[26] Petrović 1992, 132; Petrović 1995, 128–129, n° 101.

[27] Petrović 1992, 132; Petrović 1995, 128–129, n° 101.

[28] Ibid.

fourth century. The archaeological evidence is far from being sufficient, but the decline of the Roman settlement was probably related to the Gothic invasion in the late fourth century, which is perhaps evidenced by the find of Valentinian I's coin minted at Thessalonica between 364 and 367. Namely, driven by the relentless Hunnic and Alanic attacks, the Goths crossed into the Empire in 376 and, pressed by famine and destitution, began to plunder crop fields and villas in the Balkan provinces. The first major attack and settlement of the Goths in both Dacias and Moesia Prima came in the autumn of 378, in the aftermath of their abortive sieges of Adrianople and Constantinople, when, according to Ammianus, the barbarians spread over the northern provinces reaching as far as the foot of the Alps.[29]

This investigation suggests that present-day Niševac may be the site of a larger Roman settlement covering an area of more than five hectares, possibly *Timacum Maius*, a recorded station on the Roman road Lissus–Naissus–Ratiaria.

## Abbreviations

TIR, K-34, Naissus      *Tabula Imperii Romani, Naissus–Dyrrachion–Scupi–Serdica––Thessalonice*. Ljubljana 1968.

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[29] Amm. Mar. XXXI.

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# The Triad Zeus, Herakles and Dionysos
## A Contribution to the Study of Ancient Cults in Upper Moesia

**Abstract**: The triad Zeus, Herakles and Dionysos has been attested in Upper Moesia by the relief from the village of Bukovo near Negotin, eastern Serbia. The Roman supreme god was frequently shown in association with other deities, but the presence of Bacchus and Hercules in such associations is Greek rather than Roman in origin. The association of Liber and Hercules was promoted by the emperor Septimius Severus, a native of the city of Leptis Magna whose patron gods were concurrently Liber and Hercules. Septimius even granted the *dii patrii* a sort of official recognition as patrons of the dynasty he founded. The village of Bukovo where the relief was found had not been known as an archaeological site. There is no specific evidence for the worship of Jupiter in that area, while the worship of Herakles is attested on the sites of Rovine and Tamnič near Negotin. The relief is close to north-Macedonian reliefs in style, and reflects Hellenistic and Thracian influence in associating the cults of Dionysos and Herakles. The depicted deities are compatible and close to Septimius Severus' official religion. The central position of the supreme god indicates his importance as well as the fact that the other two deities are associated to him, as his children, patrons of nature and fertility in the underground and aboveground worlds. It is also important to note that the relief confirms Hellenistic religious influences in the area of the Upper Moesian limes.

**Keywords**: cults, triad, Zeus, Herakles, Dionysos, eastern Serbia, Upper Moesia, Hellenistic and Thracian influences

The sacred association of Zeus, Herakles and Dionysos[1] has been attested in Upper Moesia by a relief discovered in the village of Bukovo near the town of Negotin, eastern Serbia. It seems necessary at this point to warn about the confusion surrounding the findspot. Namely, S. Düll included the relief in her book on the monuments from the north of the Roman province of Macedonia,[2] probably misled by the existence of two identical place names (Bukovo), one situated some ten kilometres south of Negotin in what is now eastern Serbia, and the other, southwest of Bitola, near Negotino on the river Vardar, in what is now the FYROM. What may have added to the confusion is the markedly Hellenistic style of the relief and its similarity to the finds of north-Macedonian provenance. N. Vulić, who first published the relief, specified Bukovo "near Negotin in [Negotinska] Krajina" and

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[1] The Greek and not the Roman names of the deities are used because the relief, as research has shown, was created under Hellenistic and Thracian religious influences.

[2] Düll 1977, 317, cat. no 89.

expressly reiterated that locality in another text published some ten years later.[3] His location has been accepted by other interested scholars.[4]

In spite of mutilations, the relief from Bukovo clearly shows three standing deities: Herakles on the left-hand side, Zeus in the middle, and Dionysos on the right. It is now difficult to tell whether Herakles had something in his right hand, perhaps a club, but he obviously holds the apples of the Hesperides in his left. Zeus holds a sceptre in his left hand, pouring out a patera over an eagle with his right. With his left hand resting on the thyrsos, Dionysos pours out a kantharos over a panther with the other hand. The scene is well-proportioned and balanced in composition, and markedly Hellenistic in style.

Given that the Roman supreme god was frequently shown in association with other deities, we shall first take a look at the nature of the connection between Dionysos and Herakles.[5] The two were held in high reverence by Alexander the Great, impressed with their semidivine nature.[6] In a way, they inspired the Stoics as well, and thus Virgil likens Augustus to them.[7] Their semidivine nature is referred to in Cicero's *De natura deorum*, where Bacchus is described as belonging to the group of human beings whose virtue earned them a place on Olympus.[8]

The iconographic association of Bacchus and Hercules is not Roman in origin. Dionysos and Herakles appear together in drama and art from ancient Greek times.[9] Herakles is a favourite character in satyrplay, lending it a burlesque or a grotesque touch.[10] The markedly bacchantic dimension attached to Herakles in ancient Greece is observable even in later periods, as a reminiscence of his involvement in the thiasos. Roman Hercules is also

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[3] Vulić 1931, no 630; Vulić 1941–48, 308, cat. no 8.

[4] Petrović 1968, 52 ff, identifies the relief as Upper Moesian in his study on the provincial depictions of Hercules, as well as Jovanović 2005, 519–520, in his text on the link between Jupiter and Liber, and Bošković-Robert 2008, 212, cat. no R3.

[5] Both were sons of Zeus born by mortal women and both were persecuted by Hera; see Galinsky 1972, 81.

[6] Dušanić 1995, 77–98, with a bibliography.

[7] Virg. Aen. VI, 789, 804, 805; cf. Bruhl 1953, 134.

[8] Boyancé 1937, 306.

[9] Galinsky 1972, 81 ff.

[10] Dionysos and Herakles were often depicted on Greek vases. Galinsky 1972, 46 ff, 81 ff, cites a number of painted vases showing Herakles and satyrs, or satyrs in the image of Herakles. One of oft-shown scenes is the Feast of Dionysos and Herakles or of Herakles and satyrs. At times a curious substitution occurs and Satyr assumes the role of Herakles as slayer of the dragon guarding the Hesperidean tree whose fruit evokes grapes rather than apples.

a wine lover and is depicted in that context.[11] Hercules *Bibax* is frequently shown in thiasic scenes on the sarcophagi, but Collins-Clinton draws attention to the funerary dimension of his presence in such contexts.[12]

In the Roman Empire, the association of Liber and Hercules was fostered by Septimius Severus[13] and, as a result, his reign was quite propitious for the spread of the Bacchic cult. Namely, the emperor was a native of Leptis Magna, a city in north-African Tripolitania whose patrons were at once Liber and Hercules. Septimius remained devoted to the patron gods of his birthplace, *dii patrii*, and even granted them a sort of official recognition by proclaiming them patrons of the dynasty he founded.[14] He dedicated a temple in Rome to them and put their images on his coins.[15] From the Secular Games (*ludi saeculares*) held in 204, the names of Bacchus and Hercules were introduced into the *carmen*, a hymn sung on that occasion.

Inscriptions testifying to the joint cult of Liber and Hercules have been found in Tripolitania (Leptis Magna),[16] Germania,[17] Italia,[18] Dacia,[19] Lower Moesia,[20] Macedonia[21] and, in particular, Thrace.[22] There are two inscriptions from Philippi that, besides Liber, refer to Hercules and a thiasos of maenads,[23] and to Libera and Hercules (*Herculi sacrum*) respectively.[24]

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[11] Many such scenes in mosaic are known from Antioch, cf. Collins-Clinton 1977, 25.

[12] Collins-Clinton 1977, 25.

[13] Bruhl 1953, 167.

[14] Under Septimius Severus, Liber Pater was one of the supreme gods of the Empire, cf. Bruhl 1953, 191; Beard, North and Price 2004, 255 ff.

[15] Excavations at Leptis Magna have discovered Dionysiac motifs in the decoration of the monuments erected by Septimius Severus and his children. After his victory over the Parthians, the emperor had a massive temple built to Liber and Hercules on the Quirinal at Rome. The temple was believed to be the second largest ever built in Rome and, according to the court historian (Cassius Dio, LXXVII, 16.3), a prime example of extravagance, cf. Bruhl 1953, 191; Beard, North and Price 2004, 255 ff.

[16] *IRT*, 289: *Herc]ul[i et] / Libero patri [3] / diis p[at]rii[s] / [*

[17] *AE* 1929, 107.

[18] The inscription from Pompeii: Jupiter, Venus, Liber and Hercules (*AE* 1922, 101); from Rome: Hercules, Liber and Silvanus (*CIL* VI, 294, p. 3756 = D 3464).

[19] *CIL* III, 7681.

[20] *AE* 1901, 48.

[21] Ibid., 1939, 192; 1939, 196; 1924, 53.

[22] Serafov 1963, 177–178; Jovanović 1974, 60.

[23] *AE* 1939, 192. The inscription was discovered, together with the other inscriptions dedicated to the triad Liber, Libera and Hercules, in the ruins of a structure overlaid by the thermae, cf. Jaccottet 2003/II, 60–61, no 25.

[24] *AE* 1939, 196.

The association of the cult of Hercules with that of Liber-Libera seems to derive from the association of the cult of Hercules with Dionysos, which had been known in Thrace from pre-Roman times.[25] Given this Thracian origin, the triads from Philippi may be seen as transcriptions of the cult of Dionysos the Thracian.[26]

Bacchus and Hercules were shown together, but such images were thiasic rather than cultic,[27] whereas their paired images on reliefs or coins convey a different theme.[28] By way of illustration, only some of their joint depictions will be mentioned here. A relief from Napoca in Dacia shows Liber, Hercules and Mercury.[29] Herakles and Dionysos were frequently depicted together in Thrace, which has yielded many reliefs showing either both mythological personages or Herakles alone holding a cup in his hand.[30] A votive relief from Rome shows Jupiter and Herakles;[31] one relief from the Vatican Museums depicts Bacchus and Hercules,[32] another one shows Jupiter, Mars, Mercury and Herakles,[33] while an intaglio shows Jupiter, Mars and Herakles.[34]

Apart from the Bukovo relief, the triad Zeus, Herakles and Dionysos has been registered in other parts of the Empire too. An inscription from Dacian Potaissa shows Jupiter in association with Liber and Hercules.[35] S. Popescu and M. Popescu explain this association by compatibility between the two deities, while seeing it also as an expression of affinity for Septimius Severus' official religion. From Tropeum Traiani in Lower Moesia comes an inscription referring to Jupiter in association with Liber Pater, Hercules the Invincible (*Herculi Invicto*) and Ceres.[36]

To better understand the nature of the triad shown in the Bukovo relief, the various aspects of these deities should be looked at. As has already

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[25] Cf. Jaccottet 2003/II, 60–61

[26] Jaccottet 2003/I, 73.

[27] *LIMC* V, s.v. Herakles, nos 3246–3252; *LIMC* III, s.v. Dionysos/Bacchus, nos 106–108 (Bacchus and Hercules); nos 108–112 (Bacchus and Hercules in the feast scene).

[28] *LIMC* V, s.v. Herakles, nos 3377–3385.

[29] Bodor 1963, 226–227, fig. 9.

[30] Serafov 1963, 177–178; Jovanovic 1974, 60.

[31] *LIMC* V, s.v. Herakles, no 3377.

[32] *LIMC* III, s.v. Dionysos/Bacchus, no 106.

[33] *LIMC* V, s.v. Herakles, no 3378.

[34] Ibid., no 3379.

[35] Popescu and Popescu 1995, 230.

[36] *AE* 1901, 40 = *CIL* III, 14214, 1; here the military aspect of Hercules is emphasized, cf. Ariescu 1977, 186.

been noted, the Bukovo relief is similar to north-Macedonian cult reliefs in style. This is particularly obvious from two differently interpreted reliefs from the borderland region between the Roman provinces of Macedonia and Upper Moesia: one, from Rudnik near Veles, showing the triad Zeus, Hera and Dionysos (Zeus, Liber, Libera or Terra Mater?), the other, from Vataš near Kavadarci, showing Dionysos and Hera (Liber and Libera?).[37] The reliefs may be seen as associating Dionysos with the supreme deity.

As for the deities in the Bukovo relief and their worship in Upper Moesia, it should be noted that the supreme god was held in high reverence in the province under his various aspects — Roman, Greek, Oriental or local — and in various combinations with other deities.[38] Given the vastness of the subject, we shall only remark that an inscription from Guberevac near Belgrade (Singidunum) refers to Jupiter and Hercules,[39] while another one, from Prizren, refers to Jupiter, Hercules, Minerva and Neptune.[40]

Hercules too was worshipped in various contexts in Upper Moesia. His aspects are best reflected in such epithets as *Conservator* (apotropaic aspect),[41] *Κυριω* (master),[42] *Invictus* (invincibility and triumph),[43] *Hercules Naisas* (*Herculi Naisati*, toponymic epithet).[44] His iatrical aspect has been attested at Mediana, a late antique villa near modern-day Niš (Naissus);[45] and possibly also in two inscriptions from Lece, which may have been a natural healing site,[46] although, on the other hand, the two inscriptions may be understood in an apotropaic context relating to mining.[47] The chthonic

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[37] Düll 1977, nos 104 and 111, figs 32 and 33; Jovanović 2005, 509 ff; on the different interpretations of the reliefs, see Pilipović 2006, 86–87.

[38] Bošković-Robert 2008, as the supreme Roman deity (182 ff), with markedly Greek and Oriental (208 ff), and regional elements (238 ff).

[39] *IMS* I, 103.

[40] Vulić 1931, 135, no 325.

[41] *IMS* VI, 51.

[42] Ibid. II, 15.

[43] Ratiaria: *CIL* III, 8082; *AE* 1905, 219; Lece: *IMS* IV, 111.

[44] *IMS* III/2, 102.

[45] Jovanović 1974, 65–78, suggests that some aspects of the connection between Dionysos and Heracles may be sought for in their soteriological-iatrical connection.

[46] IMS IV, 107 and 108; Petrovic 1968, 55.

[47] Hercules might have been worshipped as patron god of miners, mostly because of his stamina, cf. Dušanić 1999, 33; he is also known to have been the patron of quarries, as attested in Dalmatia, Dacia and Germania, cf. Jeličić 1981, 97–103; Munteanu 1973, 73–86.

aspect of Hercules has been attested by a stele showing the return of Alcestis,[48] but also by, for example, the lamps excavated at Viminacium.[49]

Even the third deity from the Bukovo relief, Bacchus, was worshipped in various contexts in Upper Moesia. The surviving inscriptions and depictions suggest that he was worshipped primarily as patron god of agrarian fertility and vegetation, or of wine and vine-growing. This is most explicitly shown by Liber's epithet *laetus* in an inscription from Pusto Šilovo near Leskovac[50] and by Libera's appellation *Hilara* in an inscription from Naissus.[51] It has been suggested that Liber was the patron god of mines and ores,[52] and that he was also worshipped in iatrical contexts.[53] Liber's chthonic aspect has been attested both by funerary monuments[54] and by many cult objects recovered from burials.[55]

The location where the relief showing the triad Zeus, Herakles and Dionysos was discovered — the village of Bukovo a few kilometres south of Negotin in eastern Serbia — cannot be described as a well-known archaeo-

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[48] Ladek, Premerstein and Vulić 1901, 124, fig. 4; *LIMC* I, s.v. Alkestis, no 27; Pilipović 2008, 343, fig. 6.

[49] Korać 1995, scheme on p. 408, cites nine lamps showing the mask of Hercules and eight lamps with his mask on an altar.

[50] *IMS* IV, 109.

[51] *IMS* IV, 25. That vine-growing was well developed in that area is suggested by the surviving grape presses, cf. Jović 2002, 38, no 9; Petrović 1976, 125–126; Pilipović 2006, 84 ff.

[52] In Illyricum and in mining districts across the Roman Empire, Liber was worshipped as one of the deities from the heterogeneous miners' pantheon (Terra Mater, Roma, Tellus, Ceres, Diana etc). Thus Liber and Libera may be assigned to the subgroup of deities of nature (e.g. Silvanus, Diana and Ceres). There is also the subgroup of underworld deities (e.g. Dis Pater, Terra Mater, Orcia, Aeracura), and the one comprising patron gods of mining and metallurgical *officinae* (e.g. Hercules, Vulcan, Neptune), Dušanić 1980, 13, note 28; cf. also Dušanić 1999, 131; and 2003, 259, note 56, and 264, note 107; Pilipović 2006, 91.

[53] The iatrical aspect of Dionysos is best evidenced by the statuary from the late antique villa at Mediana, cf. Jovanović 1974, 61 ff.

[54] The best confirmation for Liber's chthonic aspect is found on the so-called Jason Sarcophagus showing a very descriptive scene of the Bacchanalia, cf. Pilipović 2004, 65–78, with bibliography.

[55] E.g., the necropolises of Viminacium have yielded, among other finds, a terracotta of Bacchus (Cvjetićanin 1995, 167, fig. 7/2), a mirror showing the hierogamy of Dionysos and Ariadne in relief (Spasić 2001, no 1, figs 2–3), numerous lamps with Dionysiac themes such as the Bacchus mask, satyrs, maenads, sileni (Korać 1995, Pl. on p. 408); Ratiaria has yielded terracotta lamps showing the mask of Bacchus (Kuzmanov 2002, nos 2 and 3), etc.

Zeus, Herakles and Dionysos. Relief from Bukovo, eastern Serbia
(Photo: National Museum, Belgrade)

logical site. So far it has yielded two fragmentary statues and a stamped brick, published by N. Vulić as early as the 1930s.[56] No evidence for Jupiter's worship in that area has survived into our times, but the worship of Herakles has been attested on the sites of Rovine[57] and Tamnič in the environs

[56] Vulić 1931, published the following finds from Negotin: the lower portion of a marble male figure seated on a chair with an eagle to his left, a lamb by the right leg of the chair, and, on the left side, a small and a big ram (no 238); a stone lion (no 239); and a stamped brick bearing *DICI* and *AQUIS* (no 240). An archaeological site that is much better known is situated north of Negotin, at the village of Miloševo, Vidrovac: *Ad Aquas* – a station on the Danubian road.

[57] A standing bronze statue of naked and beardless Hercules with a club and the lion's skin, cf. Veličković 1972, 50, no 70, fig. 70.

of Negotin.[58] Moreover, the same area has yielded the fragment of a statue showing Bacchus or a satyr,[59] and a bronze appliqué showing Bacchus (Prahovo).[60] Bukovo is in a region known for vine-growing, which may suggest a possible way of looking at the function of these deities or the function of Dionysos. Jovanović has suggested a possible link between the relief and the nearby mines.[61] Bošković-Robert has summed up these ideas in her suggestion that the depicted deities were associated with Zeus in their capacity as patrons of nature and fertility both on earth and in the underworld.[62]

In conclusion, it may be said that the relief showing the triad Zeus, Herakles and Dionysos is closely related to those from northern Macedonia both in style and in the manner of arranging the deities. It reflects Hellenistic and Thracian influences, as well as influences of the joint cult of Herakles and Dionysos. It shows compatible deities, closely connected with the official religion of Septimius Severus. The supreme god's central position suggests his primacy and, consequently, the fact that Herakles and Dionysos are brought into association with him.[63] They are associated as his offspring united by their semidivine nature, as patrons of nature and fertility, but also of physical and moral strength. On the other hand, the relief is important insofar as it confirms Hellenistic and Thracian religious influences in the area of the Upper Moesian limes.

**Abbreviations**

ABJ      Lj. B. Popović, Dj. Mano-Zisi, M. Veličković and B. Jeličić, *Antička bronza u Jugoslaviji* (Belgrade: National Museum, 1969).
AE       *L'année épigraphique.*
CIL      *Corpus inscriptionum Latinorum.*
IMS      *Inscripitons de la Mésie Supérieure* I, II, III/2, IV, VI (Belgrade 1976–1995).
IRT      *The Inscriptions of Roman Tripolitania.*
LIMC     *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* I–VIII.
         (Zurich–Munich 1981–1997); VIII (Zurich–Düsseldorf 1997).

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[58] Hercules with the lion's skin seated on a rock, *ABJ*, 96, no 105.

[59] Tomović 1993, 111, no 157, fig. 41/3.

[60] Drča 1991, 24, no 14, fig. 14.

[61] Jovanović 2005, 520.

[62] Bošković-Robert 2008, 212.

[63] In a way, this is reiterated in the iconography of the villa at Mediana, whose owner was probably of Thracian origin, see Jovanović 1974, 65–67.

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# Moses as a Role Model in the Serbian Charters after 1371
## Changing Patterns

**Abstract**: The aspects of the Old Testament figure of Moses highlighted in the charters of post-Nemanjić Serbia, or under the Lazarević and Branković dynasties (1371–1459), testify to a changed attitude towards Old Testament role models. While members of the Nemanjić house such as the archbishop Sava I and the rulers Stefan of Dečani and Dušan look up to Moses as a "religious leader", a prayerful intercessor before God and a victorious warrior, all of that for the sake of the "chosen" people, the role he is assigned in the arengae of the charters issued by prince Lazar and despots Stefan Lazarević and Djuradj Branković is completely different. In the universal Christian context of the post-1371 arengae Moses figures as a "prophet" and the builder of the Tabernacle — a prefiguration of the Church, thereby epitomizing a major stage in the salvation history of humankind. The role of Moses, as well as that of David, the only other Old Testament figure still referred to in the charters of the period, has a universal, ecclesiologically interpreted, significance. This new pattern of interpreting Moses implies that the ruler's main virtue now becomes his concern for the "true faith" and the houses of God. The practice of the Nemanjićs as regards selection and interpretation of Old Testament themes is reestablished by the titular despots of the Branković dynasty. In their charters, the first part of the Bible with Moses as a popular leader reassumes a "national" character and becomes part of the ideological apparatus intended to posit the Serbs as a "New Israel".

**Keywords**: medieval charters, post-Nemanjić Serbia, Branković and Lazarević dinasties, politico-theological interpretation, arengae, Old Testament, Moses, national leader, actor in salvation history

The medieval ideology of state and society, in its various manifestations, often made use of biblical models in creating the sacral identity of contemporary institutions and political personages.[1] Quoting, paraphrasing and reformulating portions of the biblical text in order to transplant their messages into new contexts, a phenomenon known in modern scholarship as *rewritten Bible*, is not specific only to narrative sources; it also occurs in documents, most of all in the arengae of charters.[2] The medieval Serbian

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[1] There is an ample bibliography on the subject, to mention but two classical contributions: P. E. Schramm, "Das Alte und das Neue Testament in der Staatslehre und Staatssymbolik des Mittelalters", in *La Bibbia nell'alto medioevo* (Spoleto 1962), 229–255; J. Le Goff, "Royauté biblique et idéal monarchique médiéval: saint Louis et Josias", in *Les Juifs au regard de l'histoire. Mélanges Bernhard Blumenkranz* (Paris 1985), 160–167.

[2] On the "rewritten Bible", see U. Becker, *Exegese des Alten Testaments* (Tübingen 2005), 89.

sources, from biographic-hagiographic literature and wall-painting to the documentary material, make extensive use of biblical metaphors, which is a field of research where much systematic work has already been done by Serbian scholars, especially as regards the ideology of the Nemanjić dynasty.[3] Their work has shown that the role the medieval Serbian ideologists assigned to Old Testament figures and events was much more prominent than that of New Testament ones. One of the most important Old Testament characters referred to relatively frequently in the charters is the ancient Jewish leader, prophet and lawgiver, Moses. His reception in the medieval Serbian environment, much like that of any other actor in "sacred history", depended on politico-ideological and theological trends, as also shown by the examples registered in the extant diplomatic record.

In the political ideology of medieval Europe the biblical figure of Moses carried polysemic symbolism. The basis for comparing Byzantine emperors to Moses was laid by Eusebius of Caesarea. In his *Vita Constantini*, Eusebius likened Constantine's victory at the Milvian Bridge to the Jewish crossing of the Red Sea under the leadership of Moses (Ex 14).[4] Byzantine charters made ample use of the "New Moses" motif, portraying the emperor as a lawgiver, rescuer of his people from bondage, and defeater of a stronger enemy, all of that in accordance with the qualities attributed to the Old Testament Jewish leader.[5] That Constantine, and the subsequent emperors, thought of him as an example worthy of being emulated may be seen from the important role that the staff of Moses played in Byzantine court ceremonial.[6] The medieval Serbian hagiographies and services used various aspects of Moses' image in likening members of the Nemanjić

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[3] V. J. Djurić, "Slika i istorija u srednjovekovnoj Srbiji", *Glas Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti* 338, Odeljenje istorijskih nauka 3 (1983), 118–123; S. Marjanović-Dušanić, *Vladarska ideologija Nemanjića* (Belgrade 1997), 190–233; see also V. J. Djurić, "Novi Isus Navin", *Zograf* 14 (1984), 5–17; S. Marjanović-Dušanić, "Motiv loze Jesejeve u doba Uroša I", *Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta* 18A (1994), 119–126; Ž. Vujošević, "Stari zavet u arengama povelja Stefana Dušana", *Stari srpski arhiv* 2 (2003), 227–247.

[4] H. Hunger, *Prooimion. Elemente der byzantinischen Keiseridee in den Arengen der Urkunden* (Vienna 1964), 201; Eusebius uses the same comparison in his book on ecclesiastical history *Istorija Crkve* (Šibenik 2003), 244–245, available in English *Eusebius. Ecclesiastical History and Martyrs of Palestine* I–II, 2nd. ed. (London 1954), eds. H. J. Lawlor and J. E. L. Oulton; on Constantine as a New Moses in medieval art and literature, see A. Grabar, *L'Emperuer dans l'art byzantin* (Paris 1936); E. Ewig, "Das Bild Constantins des Grossen in den ersten Jahrhunderten des abendländischen Mittelalters", *Historisches Jahrbuch* 75 (1956), 1–46.

[5] Examples in Hunger, *Prooimion*, 201, note 97.

[6] G. Dagron, *Empereur et prêtre* (Paris 1995), quoted after the Serbian edition *Car i prvosveštenik* (Belgrade 2001), 109–110.

dynasty to him. For example, the aspect of Moses as prayerful intercessor was associated with archbishop Sava I (r. 1219–33) (in Domentijan [Domentianus] and Teodosije [Theodosius]), while the royal pattern of *imitatio Moysi* was usually based on the Jewish leader's military triumphs, the most important of them being his victory over the Amalekites described in Ex 17:8–13.[7] Thus the campaigns of grand *župan* Stefan Nemanja (r. 1166–96) against Byzantium, the triumph of king Stefan of Dečani (r. 1321–31) over the Bulgarians at Velbuzhd in 1330, and king Dušan's (king 1331–46; emperor 1346–55) successful defence against the Hungarian onslaught in 1335, inspired hagiographers to glorify the Serbian rulers' warlike virtues in terms of Mosaic triumphs.[8]

The same patterns of comparing the Nemanjićs to Moses occur in the diplomatic material. Elements of equating Stefan of Dečani and Stefan Dušan with the ancient Jewish leader used in the foundation charter for the monastery of Dečani (1330) and in the charter appended to the Code of Law (1349) have been recognized and explained more than once.[9] To these examples another one may be added, namely the portrayal of Sava as a "second Moses" in the arenga of the charter of archbishop Nikodim [Nicodemus] for the *Kellion* of St Sabas at Karyes dated 1321.[10] Just as God had sent Moses to the Israelites in Egypt, so Sava was sent to the Serbian land, to "our race": the former had delivered the Israelites from their bondage to the pharaoh, and the latter delivered the Serbs, as their archbishop, from their submission to idols and showed them the path to orthodoxy.

> …ꙗко Мѡисеꙗ дроугаго вь Югупьть, кь срьпс'цѣ земли кь своеплемен'ныкомь к' намь посилаеть, не ꙗко Израиⱚⰾⱙ

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[7] Domentijan, *Život Sv. Save i Sv. Simeona*, transl. L. Mirković (Belgrade 1938), 193–199; Teodosije, *Žitija*, vol. 5/1 of *Stara srpska književnost u 24 knjige*, ed. D. Bogdanović (Belgrade 1988), 101, 183, where there is an account of how Sava himself emulated Moses during his pilgrimage to Sinai; on Moses as a role model for the Nemanjić rulers, see Marjanović-Dušanić, *Vladarska ideologija*, 218–222.

[8] For the victories of Nemanja as a New Moses, see Stefan Prvovenčani, *Sabrana dela*, ed. Lj. Juhas-Georgievska and T. Jovanović (Belgrade 1999), 39; Domentijan, *Život Sv. Save i Sv. Simeona*, 240–241; *Danilov Zbornik* [Daniel's Collection] refers to Stefan of Dečani and Dušan in much the same way, see *Danilovi nastavljači. Danilov učenik. Drugi nastavljač Danilovog zbornika*, vol. 7 of *Stara srpska književnost u 24 knjige*, ed. G. Mak Danijel (Belgrade 1989), 34, 44–45, 76.

[9] Marjanović-Dušanić, *Vladarska ideologija*, 220–221; eadem, "Elementi carskog programa u Dušanovoj povelji uz 'Zakonik,'" *Prilozi za književnost, jezik, istoriju i folklor* 65–66/1–4 (1999–2000), 15–16; eadem, *Sveti kralj. Kult Stefana Dečanskog* (Belgrade 2007), 305–306, 386.

[10] Edition and commentaries: D. Živojinović, "Akt arhiepiskopa Nikodima I za keliju Svetog Save u Kareji", *Stari srpski arhiv* 4 (2005), 23–50.

ѡт плин’та и плѣвь работи кгип’тскык избавити, нь ѡть
прѣльсти идольскык и нечистихь и мрьскыих жрьтвьь и
бѣсовьскыихь капищь нас из’бавити.[11]

This pattern of likening Sava to Moses certainly relied on the fact that both were religious leaders. But what was implied as well was the idea of the Serbs as God's chosen people, a "New Israel", which is also observable in the Serbian literature and art of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.[12] The historico-eschatological parallel with the ancient Israelites is threaded through the whole text of the arenga: God, who once had fed "bread and birds" to those fleeing across the desert, who had "parted" the sea and had drawn water from a rock, now sent Sava, as a "second Moses", to the Serbs, to take his people to the promised land.[13]

Thus, the exemplary figure of Moses in the charters of the Nemanjićs was interpreted in national and dynastic terms until the mid fourteenth century. This also goes for other Old Testament figures, whose "role" in creating an ideal image of the Nemanjić sacral monarchy has largely been examined by Serbian medievalists.[14] In the final years of Dušan's reign, however, the emulation of role models drawn from the ancient Jews' sacred history disappeared from documents, as if Old Testament motifs had lost relevance with the transformation of a "national" state into a "universal" one.[15] They did reappear later, but conveying a completely different message, which is particularly conspicuous in the charters that refer to Moses.

After the extinction of the Nemanjić dynasty in 1371, a theologico-ecclesiological interpretation of Old Testament motifs became predominant. Not that such interpretation had been altogether lacking in the documents of the Nemanjić era. There is an example of "pure" theology involving Moses: the lengthy arenga of king Milutin's (r. 1282–1321) charter for the monastery of Banjska dated 1314–16 which refers to St Stephen the Arch-

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[11] Ibid., 33.

[12] Djurić, "Slika i istorija", 120–122; D. Gill, "Mit 'izabranog naroda' u staroj srpskoj književnosti", in *Srpska književnost i Sveto pismo* (Belgrade 1997), 97–102; cf. D. Bogdanović, "Politička filosofija srednjovekovne Srbije. Mogućnosti jednog istraživanja", *Studije iz srpske srednjovekovne književnosti* (Belgrade 1997), 125–127; for the examples in hagiography, see Domentijan, *Život Sv. Save i Sv. Simeona*, 71; Teodosije, *Žitija*, 49, 75, 84, 88.

[13] Živojinović, "Akt arhiepiskopa Nikodima I", 29; the Old Testament references allude to the Hebrew journey from Egypt to the Promised Land: "bread and birds" are evocative of the food God provided in the form of manna and quail (Ex 16); the saving division of the sea took place while the Jews were pursued by the pharaonic army (Ex 14:16–27); helped by God, Moses drew water from the rock at Horeb (Ex 17:6).

[14] See note 3 above.

[15] Vujošević, "Stari zavet u arengama", 246.

deacon as patron saint of the monastery church.[16] Likening St Stephen to Moses, it emphasizes, however, that God honoured him more than the Old Testament Jewish leader. Moses had been deigned worthy to see God "from the back" (Ex 33:21–23), while the Christian protomartyr was granted the privilege to see "the heavens opened" and "the Son of man [Christ] standing on the right hand of God" (Acts 7:55–56).

> …и сего паче Моисеа прославлаю, не бо такоже Моиси
> зад'наа Божиа видѣ въ камени, нь Доуха светаго испльнѥнь
> и лицемь тако ангель… Небеса wтвараѥма и Wтьца сѣдещаа и
> Сына…[17]

This example, however, remains lonely not only in the pre-1371 period, but also after 1371, when the emulation of the ancient Jewish leader consistently follows a different pattern.

The role Moses plays in the post-Nemanjić documents is neither a military victor nor a prayerful intercessor for his people before God any more. Namely, the charters issued by the rulers of the Lazarević and Branković dynasties (1371–1459) refer to Moses' aspect as religious leader and prophet who, at God's command, had built the Tabernacle — a prefiguration of the Church.[18] In the arenga of prince Lazar's (r. 1371–89) foundation charter for the monastery of Ravanica, dated 1380/1, this motif occurs in the exposition of God's plan for the Church.[19] In the earliest stage of salvation

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[16] Edition: Lj. Kovačević, "Svetostefanski hrisovulj", *Spomenik Srpske kraljevske akademije* 4 (1890), 1–10.

[17] Reading after *Srpski diplomatar* 25 (under preparation).

[18] The presence of this motif in king Dušan's charter for the monastery of Treskavac issued in 1342 (?) has already been pointed to in Vujošević, "Stari zavet u arengama", 242: Moses placed in a context characteristic of the documents issued by the Lazarevićs and Brankovićs deepens the already raised doubts about the authenticity of the charter, the arenga of which may be of a later date. The groundwork for the Tabernacle-Church typological model in Christian exegesis was laid in the Pauline Epistle to the Hebrews 8:2; 9. Being the dwelling place for divine presence, the Tabernacle, and the Ark of the Covenant inside it, is interpreted as prefiguring the Virgin as well, cf. *Leksikon ikonografije, liturgike i simbolike zapadnog kršćanstva*, ed. A. Badurina (Zagreb 1979), 338; cf. also Irmoi in Tone 4 sung on the feasts of the Presentation of the Virgin and Annunciation, where the epithet the "ensouled shrine of God" is used to describe the Virgin, and Beatitudes in Tone 8 sung at the liturgy, where the Virgin is described as the "Ark of the New Covenant", *Zbornik crkvenih bogoslužbenih pesama* (Belgrade 1971), 156, 273; 64. On the depiction of the Tabernacle in religious art, see M. Gligorijević-Maksimović, "Skinija u Dečanima: poreklo i razvoj ikonografske teme", in *Dečani i vizantijska umetnost sredinom XIV veka*, ed. V. J. Djurić (Belgrade 1989), 319–337.

[19] Edition and commentaries: A. Mladenović, *Povelje kneza Lazara* (Belgrade 2003), 49–127.

history, the leading role was played by Moses, who was given the Law and ordered "by the Holy Trinity" to set up the Tabernacle (Ex 26:30):

Прѣбезначелнаа Троице… Иже законь полагаеи Мѡѵсеѡ, повелѣ сътворити скѵнїю…[20]

Further below, other "key actors" in that history are also mentioned: the apostle Peter as the "corner stone" of the Church (using a quotation from Mt 16:18), and the "pious kings" whose devoted care of churches is emulated by the Serbian prince who is now erecting his foundation. In this and other original arengae of prince Lazar's charters an idea prevails which was virtually non-existent in those issued by the Nemanjićs: the salvation of all peoples gathered into the Church of Christ. It is conveyed through some previously unexploited Old Testament motifs in three analogous arengae, those of the charters for the Athonite monasteries of Great Lavra (1375/6 and 1381) and Hilandar (1379 ?), and for the nobleman Obrad Dragosaljić (1388), where the divine plan for the Church is described in a concise and articulate manner: the prophets, "illuminated by the spiritual light", foresaw the future, as testified by the words of the "*prophet*" David that "all the nations shall come and worship before thee, O Lord" (Ps 86:9). And this came to pass in the Church that gives hope of a future life.[21] A somewhat different arenga is found in the charter for the monastery of Ždrelo (Gornjak), which briefly paraphrases Genesis 1–2 on the creation of the world and man as an introduction to the promise of salvation to all humankind.[22] In all these texts, the issuer, prince Lazar, expresses his personal wish not to be denied God's grace promised to all humankind, but he also emphasizes his regal responsibility to uphold the "true faith". This ideological content of the arengae originating from prince Lazar's chancery was developed by the highest ranks of the Serbian Church, which becomes obvious if they are compared with the thematically and expressively similar charters: of monk Dorotej [Dorotheus] for the monastery of Drenča (1382) and of patriarch Spiridon [Spyridon] to the nobleman Obrad Dragosaljić (1388).[23]

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[20] Ibid., 52.

[21] Edition and commentaries: Mladenović, *Povelje kneza Lazara*, 17–21 (Great Lavra, 1375/6); 129–138 (Hilandar); 171–175 (Great Lavra, 1381); 201–208 (Obrad Dragosaljić).

[22] Edition and commentaries: Mladenović, *Povelje kneza Lazara*, 23–40.

[23] Edition and commentaries: Mladenović, *Povelje kneza Lazara*, 177–190 (Drenča); 209–214 (patriarch Spiridon's charter). The monastery of Drenča was granted charters both by the prince and by the patriarch, but they have not survived. Several patriarchal confirmations of the princely charters are known, which testifies to the two leaders' close cooperation in chancery practice, cf. F. Barišić, "O poveljama kneza Lazara i patrijarha Spiridona", *Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta* 12-1 (1974), 357–377.

Moses placed in the same universally Christian context can be found in the charters of despots Stefan Lazarević (r. 1389–1427, from 1402 as despot) and Djuradj Branković (r. 1427–56) issued to the Great Lavra on Mount Athos.[24] The arenga of Stefan's charter of 1407 opens with a story of the Old Testament Tabernacle (there called *Sen* instead of the term *Skinija* used in the fourteenth-century charters), set up at God's command by "the great of the prophets", Moses.

> ...ВЕЛИКЫИ ВЬ ПРОРОЦѢХ ПРОѠБРАЗОУЕ МѴѴСИ, НИКАКОЖЕ
> НИКОМОУЖЕ НЕСЬДАТНОУ БЫТИ ВЬ СЬСТАВЛЮНЇЕ ВЕТХЫЮ ѠНОЕ
> ЗАКОННЫЕ СѢНИ ѠБРАЗНОИ НЃПАШНОИ, ВСЕМОУ СЬ'НМОУ СЃНѠВЬ
> ҊЙЛЮВЬ ПОВЕЛѢВАЕТЬ ЮЖЕ НА ГОРѢ СИНАИСЦѢИ ѠБРАЗНѢ
> СЬТВОРИТИ СКАЗОУЕ БЃ, САМОМОУ МѠѴСЕѠВИ ЗАКОНОПОЛАГАЕ РЕⷱ
> ЗРИ, СЬТВОРИШИ ВСА ПО ѠБРАЗОУ ПОКАЗАННОМОУ ТИ НА ГОРѢ...[25]

The motifs from Exodus (25 and 26) combined with the Christian interpretation from Hebrews (8:2–5) lay emphasis on the exegetic type Tabernacle-Church, which is followed by a passage on the God-pleasing work of building and adorning churches: just as the ancient Jews used to make donations to their Holy, so the "pious kings" in the Christian world erect and make donations to churches in the hope of being rewarded by the "Universal Lord". The issuer follows their example and makes a donation to the Athonite monastery. A somewhat broadened version of the same arenga, in Djuradj's charter of 1452, describes the role of Moses in salvation history even more explicitly. In "His ineffable mercy and love for man", God has always shown concern for the wellbeing of humankind. Thus, in the *Old Testament* He had commanded the Jewish leader to set up the Tabernacle as a prefiguration of the "heavenly *Sen*" (Church) which He built upon Peter in the *New Testament* (another quotation from Mt 16:18). The way "Moses served" God has been emulated by the "Christ-loving kings" in their hope of eternal life, and the issuer follows in their footsteps by becoming the second *ktetor* of the Great Lavra.

> СЇЕ БОЖЇЕ ПОВЕЛѢНЇЕ И МѠѴСЕѠВО СЛѸЖЕНЇЕ ИЗЬѠБРАЖЕНЇЕ ГЛАГОЛЮ
> ѠНО БЛАЖЕННѢИШЇИ И ХРИСТѠЛЮБИВѢИШЇИ ЦАРЇЕ СЬМОТРИВШЕ...[26]

Ecclesiological themes predominate even in the other documents issued by these two rulers. The charters of Stefan Lazarević for the Athonite

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[24] Edition and commentaries: A. Mladenović, *Povelje i pisma despota Stefana* (Belgrade 2007), 237–253 (Stefan Lazarević); S. Ćirković, "Dve srpske povelje za Lavru", *Hilandarski zbornik* 5 (1983), 91–100 (Djuradj Branković).

[25] Reading after D. Anastasijević, "Srpski arhiv Lavre Atonske", *Spomenik Srpske kraljevske akademije* 56 (1922), 11.

[26] Ćirković, "Dve srpske povelje", 94.

monasteries of Hilandar (1392–1402) and Great Lavra (1394/5 and 1398, where the issuer is Stefan's mother Evgenija [Eugenia]) and for Hilandar's *pyrgos* of St Basil (1394–1402) make use of prince Lazar's abovementioned arenga and its providential motif of the Church of Christ (prophecy through Ps 86:9).[27] Adherence to the Church and hope of salvation constitute the central theme in the original lengthy arenga of the reigning family's charter to Dečani (1397–1402).[28] The charters of Djuradj Branković fully rely on despot Stefan's programme for their ideologico-theological themes, and re-iterate almost all formulae from Stefan's arengae.

The cited examples show that the ideological mainstay for the post-1371 rulers of Serbia was the "Orthodox faith" and the Church of Christ bringing salvation to "all peoples". Conformed to that context, the role of Moses became that of the Tabernacle builder. As such, he was a role model not as a national leader, warrior or prayerful intercessor, but as one who takes care of the "Church" and "true faith".

Moses as a role model reassumed national-dynastic connotations in the age of the titular despots of the Branković dynasty, who in the late fif-teenth and early sixteenth centuries, by which time Serbia had already been conquered by the Ottomans, administrated their estates in Srem [Syrmia] as vassals to the king of Hungary. In emulation of the Nemanjićs, their docu-ments elaborated the chosen people idea based upon the Old Testament. A remarkable example is the arenga of the charter issued to the monastery of Hilandar by despotess Angelina, with her sons Djordje and Jovan, in 1496.[29] It glorifies "the God of Israel" for having shown the Serbian race the path to salvation through "our holy fathers Simeon and Sava". Just as Moses had led "the Jewish people" out of Egypt and "ushered" it into the promised land, so they enlightened their people by pulling it out of "the sea of passion", setting it free from heresy and strengthening it in its faith in the Holy Trinity, and showed it the way to the heavenly kingdom.

> ... ꙗкоже дрєвлє родъ Єврєискыи Моисеомь отъ работы
> Фараоновы провєдъ сквозѣ чермное море и введе въ землю
> обѣтованїꙗ. Тако и сїи премꙋдрїи свѣтилницы отъ мора
> страсти извлекше наставивше въ царство небесное.[30]

[27] Edition and commentaries: Mladenović, *Povelje despota Stefana*, 155–162 (Hilan-dar; cf. M. Šuica, "Povelja kneza Stefana Lazarevića kojom se Hilandaru prilaže crkva Vavedenja Bogorodičinog u Ibru", *Stari srpski arhiv* 3 [2004], 107–123); 223–228 (Great Lavra, 1394/5); 229–235 (Great Lavra, 1398); 163–173 (Pyrgos of St Basil).

[28] Mladenović, *Povelje despota Stefana*, 391–398.

[29] Edition: K. Nevostrujev, "Tri hrisovulje u Hilandaru", *Glasnik Srpskog učenog društva* 25 (1869), 274–277.

[30] Ibid., 274–275.

This form of *imitatio Moysi* used to portray the founders of the Serbian State and Church — Sts Simeon (Nemanja) and Sava — as national leaders fitted into the ideology of the Brankovićs of Srem. By assuming care of the monastery of Hilandar as a national shrine and by referring to its sainted *ktetor*s, they sought to point up their continuity with the medieval state of the Nemanjićs.[31] In that sense, the arenga had a programmatic character because the parallel drawn between the ancient Jews and the Serbs encompassed virtually the entire histories of the two peoples. The opening relevant metaphor associating Moses with Simeon and Sava finds its counterpart in the concluding biblical prefiguration of the Serbian despots' exile in a foreign land: the Jewish diaspora embodied in three (in fact four) young men in Babylon (Dn 1 and 3) who "abide by the laws of their fathers". So now the representatives of the Serbian people, reliving the fate of God's biblical people, make a donation to Hilandar, hopeful that "God will bethink Him of His mercy … and make us heirs of our fatherland", and await salvation as a New Israel.

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The case study into the reception of the Moses figure in the medieval Serbian diplomatic sources reveals the varied politico-theological interpretation of the Old Testament resulting from the local environment's changing attitude towards the Old Testament setting as a model of ideology and action. The charters of the Nemanjićs interpret the Old Testament in dynastic and national terms. The monarchy is headed by the monarchs who are likened to Old Testament leaders, whereby they become incorporated into the biblical framework of sacred history and their realm and people become a New Israel. The Old Testament characters used as *exempla* are portrayed in the light of their historical roles. Thus, the Moses figure with its multifaceted symbolic potential is used under its different aspects: for Sava, as "deliverer of his race", for Stefan of Dečani, as prayerful intercessor in the battle against the enemy, and for Dušan, as victorious warrior. With the extinction of the Nemanjić dynasty, the emulation of the models derived from the sacred history of the ancient Jews disappears from the charters, and the Old Testament assumes a universal Christian meaning.[32] The only Old Testa-

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[31] K. Mitrović, "Povelja despota Djurdja Brankovića o prihvatanju ktitorstva nad Hilandarom", *Stari srpski arhiv* 5 (2006), 235–236; cf. D. Bogdanović, "Srpska književnost izmedju tradicije i hronike svoga vremena", in *Istorija srpskog naroda* II (Belgrade 1982), 496–498.

[32] On the new ideological patterns promoted under the Lazarević dynasty, see S. Marjanović-Dušanić, "Dinastija i svetost u doba porodice Lazarević: stari uzori i novi modeli", *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta* 43 (2006), 77–95.

ment figures retained in the documents issued by prince Lazar and despots Stefan Lazarević and Djuradj Branković are David and Moses, but no longer portrayed as embodying the many aspects of the exemplary ruler, but as meta-historical actors in God's plan for the salvation of all peoples in the Church of Christ. Accordingly, David features as one of the prophets, while the role of Moses becomes limited to that of the builder of the Tabernacle which prefigures the Church and thus anticipates divine grace as revealed in the New Testament. The bearer of political and sacral identity is neither the state nor the holy dynasty any longer, but the Church as a community of all believers. On their way to the promised grace, the issuers of the charters no longer emulate Old Testament rulers and leaders; instead, their models are "Orthodox kings". National and dynastic connotations become "restored" to the Old Testament by the Brankovićs of Srem. Their role models are Sts Simeon and Sava, "our holy fathers" who set their people on the salvific path, just as Moses had delivered the Jews from bondage and showed them the way to the promised land.*

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# Basic Philosophical Texts in Medieval Serbia

**Abstract**: Medieval Serbian philosophy took shape mostly through the process of translating Byzantine texts and revising the Slavic translations. Apart from the Aristotelian terminological tradition, introduced via the translation of Damascene's *Dialectic*, there also was, under the influence of the *Corpus Areopagiticum* and ascetic literature, notably of John Climacus' *Ladder*, another strain of thought originating from Christian Platonism. Damascene's philosophical chapters, or *Dialectic*, translated into medieval Serbian in the third quarter of the fourteenth century, not only shows the high standards of translation technique developed in Serbian monastic scriptoria, but testifies to a highly educated readership interested in such a complex theologico-philosophical text with its nuanced terminology. A new theological debate about the impossibility of knowing God led to Gregory Palamas' complex text, *The Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*. Philosophical texts were frequently copied and much worked on in medieval Serbia, but it is difficult to infer about the actual scope of their influence on the formation and articulation of the worldview of medieval society. As a result of their demanding theoretical complexity, the study of philosophy was restricted to quite narrow monastic, court and urban circles. However, the strongest aspect of the influence of Byzantine thought on medieval society was the liturgy as the central social event of the community. It was through the liturgy that the wording of the translated texts influenced the life of medieval Serbian society.

**Keywords**: medieval Serbian philosophical legacy, Byzantine philosophy, terminology, translation schools, medieval Serbian society, liturgy

*Introduction*

Any approach to medieval Serbian philosophy needs to take into account its almost complete dependence on Byzantine philosophy.[1] Medieval Serbian philosophy looks up to its Byzantine models and may in fact be described as Byzantine philosophy in the medieval Serbian language. It took shape mostly through the process of translating Byzantine texts and revising the

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[1] Until recently it has been widely accepted that the beginnings of Serbian philosophy cannot be traced further back than the late 18th century and the influence of the Enlightenment. As S. Žunjić, "Likovi filozofije u srednjovekovnoj Srbiji" [Aspects of philosophy in medieval Serbia], in *O srpskoj filozofiji* (Belgrade: Plato, 2003), 233, puts it: "The earlier philosophical tradition has been largely neglected not only in overviews of the already well-known high achievements of medieval Serbian art, but also in historical overviews of Serbian philosophy. The belief that philosophy did not emerge in Serbia until the break with the Church-Slavic tradition ("Byzantinism") and the radical turn towards modern Western philosophical literature persists in our culture even today."

Slavic translations. Although the philosophical texts in medieval Serbian were not locally produced nor were they original in the modern-day sense of the word,[2] they played an exceptionally important role in embracing complex Orthodox theological thought, in mediating the Hellenic philosophical legacy and, particularly, in building a Serbo-Slavic philosophical terminology.[3] Owing to that work, which was centred mostly on translation and interpretation — beginning with early translations of excerpts and manuals in the tenth century and being crowned with extensive translation projects in the fourteenth century — the millennial intellectual and spiritual tradition of Byzantium was introduced into Serbia and became an integral part of its culture and philosophy. This process, on the other hand, enabled Serbia to participate actively in the intellectual and cultural life of the Byzantine "commonwealth".[4]

This paper will take a look at the most important Byzantine texts that were translated into medieval Serbian and thus played a decisive role in forging a language for abstract thinking.[5]

### The reception of Byzantine philosophy in Serbia

In medieval Serbia, the adoption of written culture entailed the adoption of Byzantine state ideology and cultural legacy.[6] Literacy was widespread

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[2] In this connection, the distinctly Byzantine understanding of originality should be borne in mind. Originality as we understand it today was little valued. Byzantine thought sought to conform to the ultimate paradigm in much the same way as the Byzantine visual arts did. The purpose of the icon as well as of the text was a likeness of the prototype.

[3] Žunjić, "Likovi filozofije", 236.

[4] D. Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth* (London 1971); G. Ostrogorski, *History of the Byzantine State* (Rutgers University Press, 1986); Lj. Maksimović, "The Byzantine 'Commonwealth': an early attempt at European integration?", in *The Idea of European Community in History* I, eds. E. Chrysos, P. Kitromilides and C. Svolopoulos (Athens 2003), 99–109; specifically on Byzantine-Serbian relations, see G. Ostrogorsky, "Problèmes des rélations byzantino-serbes au XIVe siècle", in *Main Papers* II, Thirteenth International Congress of Byzantine Studies (Oxford 1966), 41–55; Lj. Maksimović, "Byzantische Herrscherideologie und Regierungsmethoden im Falle Serbien. Ein Beitrag zum Verschtändnis des byzantinischen Commonwealth", in *ΠΟΛΥΠΛΕΥΡΟΣ ΝΟΥΣ. Miscellanea für Peter Schreiner zu seinem 60. Geburtstag* (Munich–Leipzig 2000), 174–192.

[5] The focus of the paper is on Serbia under the Nemanjić dynasty (from the 12th century) and their successors. As far as is known, there was no significant, if any, development of philosophical thought in early medieval pre-Nemanjić Serbian states, including Dioclea (Duklja) and Bosnia.

[6] S. Averintsev, *Poetika rannevizantiiskoi literatury* (Moscow 1977), 35; D. Bogdanović, *Istorija stare srpske književnosti* [History of old Serbian literature] (Belgrade 1991), 35.

in Byzantium and it was appropriated mostly in lower schools attached to monasteries and churches. Higher learning was reserved for the highest social ranks.[7] How the school and education system in medieval Serbia was organized is unknown. There were no secular universities, and the number of second-level schools is unknown. Even in Byzantium such schools were mostly in Constantinople. What is known, however, is that highest education was acquired mostly in Byzantium or under private tuition provided by foreign teachers, whilst further educational opportunities were provided by monastic centres such as Mount Athos, and there notably the Serbian monastery of Hilandar[8] with its renowned translation school. Thus, there were in the centres of medieval Serbia sophisticated writers and connoisseurs of many languages trained in the liberal arts (i.e. grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, astronomy, geometry, arithmetic and music), as well as scribes, who, just like those in Byzantium, were trained for secular and ecclesiastical administrative duties as well as for commerce.

In the early medieval period differences among the Slavic languages were relatively insignificant.[9] In the 860s brothers Cyril (Constantine) and

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[7] On education in Byzantium, see J. M. Hussey, *Church and Learning in the Byzantine Empire, 867–1185* (London: Oxford University Press, H. Milford, 1937); R. Browning, "Byzantinische Schulen und Schulmeister", *Das Altertum* 9 (1963), as well as his text "The Patriarchal School at Constantinople in the twelfth century", *Byzantion* 32 (1962), 167–202 and 33 (1963), 11–40; C. N. Constantinides, "Higher Education in Byzantium in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries (1204 – c. 1310)", *Texts and Studies of the History of Cyprus* XI (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1982); F. Fuchs, "Die höheren Schulen von Konstantinopel im Mittelalter", *Byzantinisches Archiv* 8 (Amsterdam 1964); M. Medić-Čanak, "Teorijska sprema i stepen obrazovanja srednjevekovnih graditelja" [Theoretical knowledge and practical skills of medieval builders], *Zbornik zaštite spomenika kulture* XVIII (1967); G. Tsampis, *Byzantine Education: Its Theory and Practice* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 1965).

[8] Mount Athos, the holy mountain on the Athos peninsula in northern Greece, is a unique monastic state of Orthodox Christianity. In the 12th century it was the main centre of Eastern monasticism, with monasteries and monks of various nationalities. Besides the most numerous Greek monasteries, there were also Georgian, Russian, Bulgarian and Serbian. In the scriptoria of the main monasteries Byzantine theological and literary works were copied and translated and the translations sent to their native countries. Hilandar, which ranks fourth in the Athonite hierarchy of monasteries,  was founded in the late 12th century by Stefan Nemanja, grand *župan* of Serbia, and his son Sava.

[9] P. Ivić, "Standard language as an instrument of culture and the product of national history", in *The History of Serbian Culture* (Porthill Publishers, 1995), 41, illustratively put it: "…probably smaller than the differences among modern German dialects in Switzerland."

Methodius created the first Slavic written language,[10] based on the Slavic speech used around their native town of Thessalonica, in order to be able to translate the most important religious books as a necessary tool in their evangelizing mission to the Slavs. Old Slavic (and Church Slavic) remained for a thousand years comprehensible to the educated reader for whom it was intended, functioning as the lingua franca of the Slavic world.[11] Thus the terms characteristic of philosophical thinking were for the first time written down or translated:[12] for example, the Greek term *logos* was translated into Slavic as *slovo*, the ancient philosophical term *arche* was first translated as *iskoni*, but over time the latter gave way to *načelo*, which was more easily combined to form compound words typical of the Greek language. Briefly, the missionary work of Sts Cyril and Methodius in the ninth century laid the groundwork for articulating philosophical thought in Serbia.

Medieval Serbian philosophy was based on patristic literature, such as the writings of Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, Maximus the Confessor, John of Damascus, Gregory Palamas and others. Of the greatest importance for Serbian philosophical terminology was the translation of Theodore of Rhaithu's *Preparation* and John Damascene's *Dialectic*. Theodore of Rhaithu's *Preparation*, a kind of a dictionary containing basic philosophico-theological concepts, was translated with reliance on several Greek texts and included in *Svyatoslav's Miscellanies*.[13] The *Codex* is encyclopaedic in nature and consists of 383 texts of well-known authors (e.g. Basil the Great, Justin the Philosopher, Athanasius of Alexandria) on a variety of subjects such as astronomy, mathematics, biology, philosophy and theology. Theodore's *Preparation* predates the text of John of Damascus, but its Slavic translation from the Greek original included certain portions of the *Dialectic*. Despite some terminological inconsistencies, the basic philosophical terms are already established in *The Preparation* (*rod*, *lice*, *vidъ*), but it is the translation of the full text of Damascene's *Dialectic* that played a

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[10] According to the 9th-century monk Hrabar's (*Chernorizets* Hrabar) text *On letters*, prior to the mission of Sts Cyril and Methodius the Slavs had no letters, cf. A. Knežević, *Filozofija i slavenski jezici* [Philosophy and Slavic languages] (Zagreb 1988), 189; for Cyril and Methodius, see A.-E. Tachiaos, *Cyril and Methodius of Thessalonica: The Acculturation of the Slavs* (St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001).

[11] Bogdanović, *Istorija stare srpske književnosti*, 51.

[12] Some of the terms (e.g. word, spirit, reason) can be traced back to proto-Slavic.

[13] The *Miscellanies*, the third-oldest dated Slav book (copies of 1073 and 1076) to the *Novgorod Codex* (first quarter of the 11th c.) and the *Ostrimir Gospel* (1056 or 1057), was initially translated from Greek (913—919) for the Bulgarian Emperor Simeon; 150 years later, it was copied for the ruler of Kievan Rus Iziaslav Yaroslavich, whose name was later erased and replaced by that of Svyatoslav Yaroslavich, Prince of Kiev.

crucial role in creating Serbian philosophical terminology. Apart from the Aristotelian terminological tradition, introduced via the translation of the *Dialectic*, there also was — under the influence of the *Corpus Areopagiticum* and ascetic literature, notably of John Climacus' *Ladder* — another strain of thought originating from Christian Platonism. Some modern scholars believe that this caused a duality in thought which has marked the entire subsequent history of Serbian philosophy.[14]

*Corpus Areopagiticum*

Distinctiveness of the *Corpus Areopagiticum*[15] mostly resides in its synthesis of Neoplatonism and Cappadocian doctrine. The influence of Plato's school,

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[14] M. Djurić and S. Žunjić, "Philosophie in Serbien – Ansätze zur Entwicklungsgeschichte und zum heutigen Stand", in M. Djurić and S. Žunjić, eds., *Die serbische Philosophie Heute* (Munich 1993), 14.

[15] The identity of the author of the *Corpus Areopagiticum* has been a long-standing controversy, but none of the many theories has been proved correct. It remains unknown who hides behind the name of Dionysius the Areopagite, a disciple of the Apostle Paul (Acts 17:34), figuring at the bottom of the text. Although it cannot be said with certainty what led the author to conceal his identity, the work does not derive its renown from the name of its writer, but from its content, which is obvious from the fact that the authority of many other texts claiming to have originated in apostolic times was later rejected. The *Corpus* enjoyed undivided respect and had a strong impact on both Greek and Latin patristic authors. Having been analyzed and interpreted in complex and long-lasting theological disputes, the *Corpus Areopagiticum* became included in the Byzantine higher education curriculum. The *Corpus Areopagiticum* was early transmitted to the West. The large number of translations, copies and commentaries in both East and West led G. Florovsky to conclude that "without taking into account the influence of the *Areopagitica* the whole history of medieval mysticism and philosophy remains misunderstood"; for an English translation, see *Pseudo-Dionysius. The Complete Works*, transl. C. Luibheid, foreword, notes and transl. collab. P. Rorem, preface R. Roques, introd. J. Pelikan, J. Leclercque, K. Froehlich (New York: Paulist Press, 1987); on the *Corpus*, see H. Müller, *Dyonysius, Proklos, Plotinus* (Munich 1926); V. Lossky, "La notion des 'analogies' chez le ps.-Denys l'Ar.", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* V (1930); V. Lossky, "La théologie négative dans la doctrine de Denys l'Ar.", *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* XXVIII (1939); R. Roques, "Symbolisme et théologie négative chez le ps.-Denys", *Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé* 4 (March 1957); I. P. Sheldon-Williams, "The pseudo-Dionysius", in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge 1967); P. Rorem and J. C. Lamoreaux, *John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus: Annotating the Areopagite* (Oxford University Press, 1998); C. Schäfer, *The Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite: an Introduction to the Structure and the Content of the Treatise* On the Divine Names (Leiden: Brill, 2006); E. D. Perl, *Theophany. The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007).

by then a thousand years old, including the influence of Plotinus and Pro-
clus, can be seen particularly well from the use of typically Neoplatonic
terms such as *hen* (one), *henas* (unity), *proodos* (emanation, procession), *kal-
lon* (beauty), *agathon* (good), *extasis* (a step out, ecstasy). The One emanates
into the world of things and thus becomes multiple, while remaining one
without dispersing into multiplicity when outpouring its goodness. The
One and Hyper-essential, as perfect Good, Beauty and Light, is the cause
and the final aim of all things. Evil is the privation of good and does not
have a positive existence.[16] On the other hand, the Areopagite's strong link
with Cappadocian doctrine (Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory
the Theologian) is best seen in *The Mystical Theology*, which is the most im-
portant Areopagitical text in methodological terms because it describes the
apophatic method developed by the Cappadocian Fathers. Unlike the de-
ductive cataphatic method which begins from the whole and gradually de-
duces particular from general affirmative statements, the apophatic method,
which prevailed in later Byzantine thought, uses negative statements in its
"ascent" from the particular towards the general. The mystagogic character
of the apophatic method stems from its inductive character, as reflected in
its demand for using the experience of believing and thinking as reference
points in the quest for truth. The mysticism of the *Corpus Areopagiticum*
does not imply an emotional isolation in unravelling mysteries, but a bind-
ing awareness of the impossibility of ever fully knowing the truth, because
the truth resides in the "hyper-essential darkness". Laying an emphasis on
"leaplike" ecstasy as the last step in the gradual journey toward the "Hyper-
essential" and issuing a warning, similar to that of Plato's in his *Seventh Let-
ter*, to exclude the uninitiated and ill-prepared, who believe they can under-
stand the essence of the "hyper-Divine", *The Mystical Theology* further points
to a dialectical relationship between the apophatic and cataphatic methods.
While the essence of the Unknowable and Transcendent is impossible to
understand or know, it is possible (through its actualizations) to attribute
affirmative statements to the Unknowable by generalizing the knowable
attributes, because negations (*apophaseis*) are not simply the opposites (*an-
tikeimenai*) of affirmations (*kataphaseis*) since "beyond privation [*steresis*] is
He who is beyond any subtraction and placement [assertion, *thesis*]" (Mi-
gne PG 3, 1000BC). Differentiation between the two methods originated
with Proclus, entered Christianity via the *Corpus Areopagiticum*, and sub-
sequently the apophatic method became predominant in the East, while
the cataphatic or positive method, developed as the fundamental method

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[16] The understanding of evil as the privation of good is shared by Plato, Neoplatonists,
Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, the Areopagite, Gregory Palamas (*Exposition of the Orthodox
Faith*).

of Aquinas' philosophy, culminated in rational philosophy and theology in the West.[17] After commenting on the necessity of preparation and cathartic experience for reaching the situation propitious for knowing, the apophatic "ascent" from the last to first negations is compared to the sculptor's taking away the excess of the material to reveal the "hidden features" of a statue. The cause of all sensory is not sensory (*aisthesis*) (it is not a body, nor is it a form, nor appearance) and the cause of all noumenal is not noumenal (*nous*) (it is not a soul, nor mind, nor truth), because above every thesis is: "...the unique cause of all and beyond all subtraction is the pre-eminence of Him who is simply [*haplos*] free from all and transcendent to all [*holon*]" (Migne PG 3, 1048B). This teaching about God's transcendence, characteristic of the Areopagite's apophatic method and of the Cappadocian Fathers (fourth century), is shared by Maximus the Confessor (seventh century), Symeon the New Theologian (tenth century) and Gregory Palamas (fourteenth century), thereby becoming a lasting feature of the Byzantine mode of thought. The claim of Gregory of Nyssa that "if the subject is the essence of God it is time to keep silent, but if the subject is His works then it is time to speak..." is embraced in the *Corpus Areopagiticum* and Palamas' writings, particularly when the emphasis is on the difference between God's essence (*ousia*) and God's actualizations (*energeiai*).

Relying on these basic tenets of Orthodox theology, the fourteenth-century Hesychasts encouraged interest in reading, interpreting and translating the *Corpus Areopagiticum*, which thus became a cornerstone of medieval Serbian philosophy, culture and learning, and directly influenced the society's worldview. The Dionysian corpus was translated into medieval Serbian on Mount Athos about 1371, by monk Isaiah (*Inok* Isaija, also known as Isaiah of Serres, and *starac* or elder Isaiah),[18] and under the influ-

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[17] That the Byzantines were aware that the apophatic method had been used by Neoplatonists as well can be seen from Barlaam of Calabria's statement that "the Greeks understood that the hyper-essential and nameless God is above knowledge, science and all other achievements" (Migne PG, 151, 1365), a view shared by Gregory Palamas, who says that some classical philosophers accepted the monotheism of a hyper-essential God and apophatic theology. "If you want to find out if the Greeks understood that the hyper-essential and nameless God transcends knowledge, science and all other achievements, read the works of Pythagoras' disciples […] Philolaeus, Charmides and Phyloxenus addressing this subject. You will find there the same expressions that the great Dionysius uses in his *Mystical Theology* ... Plato also understood the transcendence of God" (*Triads* II, 3,67, Migne PG, 151).

[18] Monk Isaiah, a Serb born in Kosovo c. 1300, entered the Serbian monastery of Hilandar on Mt Athos sometime before 1330; in 1349 he was appointed abbot of the Russian monastery of St Panteleimon; in 1353– 63, he was in Serbia, actively contributing to relaxing the strained relations between the Serbian Church and the Constantinopoli-

ence of the Hesyhast movement whose teaching was largely based on the Areopagitical texts. The Serbian translation of the corpus (*Mystical Theology*, *Divine Names*, *Heavenly Hierarchy*, *Ecclesial Hierarchy* and *Ten Letters*) was accompanied by the *scholia* attributed to Maximus the Confessor[19] and the translator's commentaries. The large number of both Bulgarian and Russian copies testifies that the texts were popular and much read.[20] Their influence was particularly furthered by the Hesychasts active on Mount Athos and in the Slavic south, after they emerged victorious in the dispute with the Latinophrones (those reasoning in a Latin way) in 1352, and after the Ottoman conquest of the southern parts of the Balkans caused the migration of monastics towards Serbia.[21]

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tan Patriarchate; in 1366, he became advisor to Despot Uglješa, master of the Serres region; he was commissioned by Theodosius, Metropolitan of Serres, to translate the *Corpus Areopagiticum*; in a note about the Battle of the Maritsa (1371), Isaiah says that he began working "in good times" and finished "in the evilest of all evil times", brought about by the Ottoman invasion. For more on Isaiah, see Dj. Trifunović, *Pisac i prevodilac inok Isaija* [The writer and translator monk Isaiah] (Kruševac 1980); V. Mošin, "Zhitie startsa Isaii, igumena russkogo monastiraya na Afone" [The Life of Elder Isaiah, Abbot of the Russian Monastery on Mount Athos], in *Yubileinyi sbornik Russkogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva v Korolevstve Yugoslavii* 3 (Belgrade 1940), 125-167; B. St. Angelov, *Iz starata balgarska, ruska i srbeska literatura* II (Sofia 1967); see also S. Radojčić, *Uzori i dela starih srpskih umetnika* [Old Serbian artists' models and works] (Belgrade 1975), 260–262.

[19] It is most likely that Maximus (7th century) compiled and systematized all extant "scholia", adding his own commentaries to the collection, which is why it has commonly been attributed to him; for commentaries on the *Corpus Areopagiticum*, see B. R. Suchla, "Die sogenannten Maximus-Scholien des Corpus Dionysiacum Areopagiticum", *NAWG* (1980), 33–66; Rorem and Lamoreaux, *John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus*.

[20] E. Afonasin, "Corpus Dionysicaum Slavicum", *ΣΧΟΛΗ, Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition* II/1 (2008), 111, observes: "The Ottoman occupation and the destruction of many centres of education in the Balkans determined the further destiny of the *Corpus Dionysiacum Slavicum*. Fortunately, the victory in the battle on Kulikovo-Field and the establishment of Metropolitanate in Moscow opened the great possibilities for the development of Christian culture in Russia, and the *CD* found its place in this process. In fact, these writings became very popular in Russia from the time of the Metropolitan Cyprian (d. 1406), who is said to have brought a copy of Isaiah's translation here and possibly was personally acquainted with the translator, Starets Isaiah."

[21] On Hesychasm, see G. Ostrogorski, "Svetogorski isihasti i njihovi protivnici", *Sabrana dela* V [The hesyhasts of Mount Athos and their opponents, *Complete Works* V], 203–223; J. Meyendorff, *Introduction à l'étude de Grégoire Palamas* (Paris 1959); J. Meyendorff, *St Gregory Palamas and Orthodox Spirituality* (Faith Press, 1974); A.-E. Tachiaos, "Le monachisme serbe de Saint Sava et la tradition hésychaste athonite", *Hilandarski zbornik* 1 (1966), 83–89; for a bibliography on Hesychasm, see *Isikhazm: annotirovan-*

## The Divine Ladder

Judged by the number of its copies and translations, *The Divine Ladder* was the most popular text in medieval Serbia.[22] It is a strict monastic handbook based on the tenets of some of the systematizers of the erstwhile monastic teachings and the tradition of Sinaitic monasticism. John Climacus built a complex phenomenological system of thirty levels with strict rules for passing from one level to the next.[23] The number thirty symbolizes the thirty years of Christ's life before the revelation of the Gospel, so Climacus invites monks to reach: "…the measure of the stature of Christ", who, "baptized in the thirtieth year of his earthly age, attained the thirtieth step on the spiritual ladder" (Migne PG 88, 1161A). Other numbers also have symbolic and mystical meaning, such as three (the Holy Trinity), four (the number of the Gospels), five (purification of the five basic senses through repentance), eight (eight levels of passion) and so on. *The Ladder* is structured as a coherent system of ascetic ascent on the "ladder of virtue", where each step has its *basis*, *bathmos* and *anabasis*.[24]

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*naya bibliographiya*, ed. S. S. Khoruzhii (Moscow: Publishing Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, 2004).

[22] John of the Ladder or John Climacus (c. 525–608) entered the Sinai monastery at the age of 16; after some time in the monastery and forty years of anchoritic life, he became its abbot, but then withdrew into the desert again, cf. *Dictionnaire de la Spiritualité* VIII, s.v. Jean Climaque, Saint, by G. Couillean (Paris 1972); J. Chryssavgis, *John Climacus: From the Egyptian Desert to the Sinaite Mountain* (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2004); for an English translation, see John Climacus, *The Ladder of Divine Ascent*, transl. C. Luibheid and N. Russell, introd. K. Ware (New York: Paulist Press, 1982); on the reception of John Climacus in medieval Serbia, see D. Bogdanović, *Jovan Lestvičnik u vizantijskoj i starijoj srpskoj književnosti* [Jean Climaque dans la littérature byzantine et la littérature serbe ancienne] (Belgrade 1968).

[23] R. Lawrence, "The Three-Fold Structure of the Ladder", *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 32/2 (1988), 101–118.

[24] From renunciation, as the first step and the basis of monastic *askesis* (I), derives impartiality (II) through separation from the world and alienation (III) from everything that the soul has thus abandoned. Alienation is followed by obedience (IV), the complete renunciation of self-will, and penitence (V), expressed through remembrance of death (VI), crying (VII) and the absence of anger (VIII), whereby the victory over the eight levels of passion is achieved. As anger generates vengefulness, the next step entails unvengefulness (IX), followed by nonjudgementalness (X), and by silence (XI), as verbosity breeds lies, and thus should be overcome (XII). Verbosity also generates despondency (XIII). Gluttony should be overcome (XIV) because it leads to debauchery (XV), after which greed (XVI) should be overcome and poverty voluntarily accepted (XVII). Insensibility (XVIII) and sleepiness (XIX) should be overcome to achieve bodily and spiritual vigil (XX), and to defeat fearfulness (XXI). Once these passions are overcome, there follow the more sophisticated ones, such as vainglory (XXII) and pride

The basic conceptual pair virtue (*arete*) — passion (*pathos*) is simultaneously present on every step of the *Ladder* because there is an intrinsic interdependence between suppression of passion and advancement in virtue. Rather than discussing sin as an act, John of the Ladder looks at passion as a propensity for making typical mistakes. Passion as illness is a consequence of man's fall, and hence the body, which is neither good nor evil by nature, succumbs to a certain tendency towards evil: "We have turned the positive traits of the soul into passions. … By nature we have in us anger, but to use it against the serpent, and we have used it against our neighbour. We have in us ardour to work towards good but we work towards evil. It is natural for the soul to long for glory, but for glory in Heaven" (Migne PG, 88, 1068C-D). When defining the passions, John Climacus takes into account the experience of monastic life and the works of the great systematizers of asceticism, such as Evagrius Ponticus,[25] according to whom "the natural purpose of anger is to fight against demons", and John Cassian, who sees gluttony and debauchery as "natural" passions, for they are extensions of natural needs. Apart from their natural origin, some responsibility for the passions also falls on the power of habit: [Passion is a] "sin which has over time passionately nestled in the soul, and which has through habit become its natural characteristic, until the soul of its own accord clings to it" (Migne PG, 88, 897A). Passion does not arise all of a sudden, but gradually, through an encounter with a thought; coupling or communication with the thought; assent to pleasure; captivity as the seduction of the heart by the object which injures the soul; and the struggle between the attacker and the attacked, the outcome of which is either victory or defeat (i.e. passion).

Although John of the Ladder expands the list of eight basic passions (gluttony, debauchery, greed, anger, sadness, sloth, vanity and pride),

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(XXIII). If pride, the worst passion, is overcome, one can achieve meekness, simplicity and innocence (XXIV), humility (XXV) and discernment (XXVI). After these steps comes *hesychia* (XXVII) which is achieved in prayer (XXVIII). The reception of divine actualizations in hesychast prayer leads to the state of dispassion and perfection (XXIX), which is a prerequisite for the basic triad of virtues: faith, hope and love (XXX), as the aim of the whole ascetic way.

[25] Evagrius Ponticus (†399), a friend and disciple of the Cappadocian Fathers and teacher of Macarius the Great is the first serious systematizer of monastic teachings; his teaching was condemned by the Fifth Ecumenical Council in 553, for he claimed, following Origen, that the spirit frees itself from matter in prayer in order to reach God; his work, misattributed to St Nilus of Sinai, influenced Eastern monasticism nonetheless. See A. Guillaumont, *Les"Kephalaia Gnostica" d'Evagre le Pontique et l'histoire de l'origenisme chez les Grecs et chez les Syriens* (Paris 1962); J. Bunge, "Origenizmus-Gnostizismus, Zum geistgeschichtlichen Standort des Evagrios Pontikos", *Vigiliae Christianae* 40 (1986).

he sees all passions as deriving from two basic ones: gluttony and pride. Combinations of the two basic passions produce all others, which, despite the fact that John of the Ladder does not follow John Cassian's strictly logico-psychological method, have a certain hierarchy and causes.[26] Passion as a hereditary propensity for evil can be overcome through dedicated and perseverant practice and through a disciplined advancement in virtue. Opposite to the passions is a life in virtue as a permanent tendency towards good, with the monastic ideal of "godliness" as its final aim. By practice (*askesis*) we acquire certain spiritual characteristics which gradually become a permanent tendency toward good and virtue. The final aim is reached, according to John of the Ladder's aretology, through transformation of suppressed passions ("love is to be suppressed by love"). While discussing love as the place in which the mystery of becoming God-like (*theosis*) is hidden, he does not refrain from terming love not only *agape* but also *eros*. "It is not in the least unseemly to compare longing and fear, ardour and dedication, serving and love of God, with what we can usually see in people. Blessed is therefore the man who loves God like an infatuated lover loves his beloved one" (Migne PG, 88, 1156B-C).

The one who has attained the highest step of virtue experiences the mystical states of joyous crying, ecstasy, illumination, resulting from the "change of mind" (*metanoia*). What these states have in common is the vision of the Divine light (*fos theou*), or Divine actualizations (*energeiai*). This highest spiritual experience is easy to confuse with illusions (Slav. *prelest*), and only the most experienced are able to tell one from another. John of the Ladder therefore advises caution as regards mystical experiences: "With a modest hand push away joy as if you were not worthy of it, so that you would not be deluded into receiving a wolf instead of the shepherd" (Migne PG 88, 813C-D).

*The Ladder* was very early translated into Slavic (ninth or tenth century). The oldest surviving manuscript is in Russian redaction with traces of a Bulgarian original.[27] The influence of this monastic handbook on Serbian culture does not, however, begin with its translation into the medieval Serbian language. It is observable even earlier, in the *typika* for the Serbian monasteries (such as Hilandar and Studenica) written by St Sava of Serbia.[28] King Stefan the First-Crowned obviously had in his library a copy of *The Ladder* and referred to it in the *Life of St Simeon* (Nemanja)[29] he wrote be-

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[26] Cf. Lawrence, "Structure of the Ladder".

[27] For the surviving copies of the *Ladder*, see Bogdanović, *Jovan Lestvičnik*, 25.

[28] For St Sava, see note 28 below.

[29] Stefan Nemanja, grand *župan* of Serbia (1166/68–96), the founder of the Nemanjić dynasty which ruled Serbia until 1371. In 1196 he gave up the throne for his second son

fore 1216. A Serbian redaction of the translation was done in Serbia around 1370, but it seems that the transcription differences raised doubts as to the accuracy of some portions of the text. Despot Djuradj Branković[30] ordered therefore that a Greek version and other Slavic translations be procured, and so various excerpts were collected in Constantinople and on Mount Athos. Under the guidance of Metropolitan Sabbatius (Savatije), the translation was corrected, the result of which is the *The Ladder of Braničevo*, so called because the work was completed in Braničevo in 1434.[31]

The cause of the great popularity of the *Ladder*, initially intended only for coenobitic monks, resides in the special preference for this strict monastic handbook shown by the ruling house of medieval Serbia. The text provided guidance to the medieval reader as regards the types of sins and virtues, explored under the perfect conditions of complete commitment to acquiring goodness and virtue. As most secular situations could be explained through ascetic phenomenology, the monastic ideal was not limited to the monastery (after the example of St Sava), but was posited as an ideal that everyone should strive for (after the example of St Simeon Nemanja).[32]

## *John of Damascus'* Dialectic

John of Damascus was the first to conduct a synthesis of the Eastern Christian tradition and to present it systematically in *The Fountain of Knowledge*, a philosophico-theological encyclopaedia in three books.[33] In its first part

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Stefan (grand *župan* 1196–1217; king 1217–28) and withdrew to Hilandar, where he died as monk Simeon in 1199. His youngest son Rastko (c. 1175–1236), in monkhood Sava, the first archbishop of the autocephalous Serbian Church (1219), is one of the central figures in the history of medieval Serbia. For St Sava, see D. Obolensky, *Six Byzantine Portraits* (Oxford 1988), 115–172. The well-known late 12th-century *Miroslav's Gospel* was written and illuminated for Stefan Nemanja's brother Miroslav, who ruled the Hum region of medieval Serbia.

[30] Djuradj (George) Branković, Serbian Despot (1427–56), grandson of Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović and Milica Nemanjić, succeeded his uncle, Despot Stefan Lazarević, on the throne of Serbia thereby becoming the first ruler of the House of Branković (1427–1502).

[31] See Bogdanović, *Jovan Lestvičnik*, 175.

[32] On the ascetic writings, see B. Milosavljević, "Monaško-asketski spisi u srpskoj srednjovekovnoj filozofiji" [Monastic-ascetic writings in Serbian medieval philosophy], *Srpska filosofija*, *Gledišta* 1–2 (1999), 78–93.

[33] John of Damascus or John Damascene (c. 676–c. 750) was born in Damascus into a distinguished and influential Christian family which held a high hereditary office under both Byzantine and (after 636) Arab rule, and he obviously inherited his father's office; at some point he resigned and withdrew to the monastery of St. Sabas to devote

commonly known as *Dialectic* he outlines Aristotle's categories, antepredicaments, postpredicaments, and Porphyry's *Introduction* to Aristotle's categories. In the second part (which was not translated into Serbo-Slavic), he gives an account of one hundred heresies, while the third volume, *Dogmatic Chapters*, is devoted to Orthodox dogmatics, or the anthropological, Christological, soteriological and eschatological teachings. In its content and structure *The Fountain of Knowledge* is a combination of a philosophical propedeutics and true philosophy, i.e. Orthodox theology. John of Damascus claims in his introduction that in presenting the "best thought of the Greek wise men" he will accept "all that is in accordance with truth", and reject "all that is wrong and close to quasi-knowledge". When discussing the importance of philosophy, he uses the Aristotelian argument that the one who questions philosophy has already accepted its relevance. Because of its comprehensive, systematic and easy-to-follow presentation, *The Fountain of Knowledge* was often copied and translated in the Byzantine world, either entirely or in part. The *Dogmatic Chapters* were translated into Slavic as early as the late ninth or early tenth century, within the large-scale translation project undertaken under the Bulgarian Emperor Simeon. The leading figure of the project, John Exarch, in fact translated just one part of John Damascene's dogmatics, but it was him who found the first terminological solutions in a Slavic language. Damascene's philosophical chapters, or *Dialectic*, were translated into medieval Serbian in the third quarter of the fourteenth century. This translation, a product of the Hilandar school, does not show only the high standards of translation technique developed in Serbian monastic scriptoria; it also testifies to a highly educated readership interested in such a complex theologico-philosophical text with its nuanced terminology. While Exarch's translations show a certain freedom in terms of adding and omitting portions of the text, the Serbian method is iconographically true to the Greek original not only in lexical but also in syntactic terms. An advantage of such a method is the precision of the translated text,

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himself to reflection and asceticism; as a theologian, he took an active part in the fight against Iconoclasm. For an English translation, see F. Hathaway Chase, ed., *Saint John of Damascus. Writings* (Washington 1999); for a German translation, see B. Kotter, *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos* I (Berlin 1969); on the *Dialectic*, see G. Richter, *Die Dialektik des Johannes von Damaskos* (Ettel 1964); E. Weiher, *Die Dialektik des Johannes von Damaskus in kirchenslavischer Übersetzung* (Wiesbaden 1969); A. Louth, *St John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology* (Oxford University Press USA, 2005); S. Žunjić, "The definitions of philosophy in the *Dialectica* of John Damascene: their ancient sources and their Byzantine meanings", in *Philosophy and Orthodoxy*, ed. K. Boudouris (Athens 1994), 294–323; for the reception of the *Dialectic* in medieval Serbia, see S. Žunjić, "Damaskinova *Dijalektika* u srpskoj filozofiji" [The *Dialectica* of John Damascene in Serbian philosophy], *Istočnik* 9 (Belgrade 1994), 43–77.

which was checked and rechecked over and again in order that it might be true to the original. On the other hand, the Serbian translation of the *Dialectic* is often very difficult to understand without the original, and not only to the modern reader, but also to the medieval one. The Greek text of Damascene's "philosophical chapters" survives in two versions, one shorter, *Dialectica brevior* (50 chapters), the other longer, *Dialectica fusior* (68 chapters). It is usually assumed that Damascene himself authored both versions. The fourteenth-century Serbian translation is in fact the shorter version to which some chapters from the longer version are added. The extraordinary importance of this translation for Serbian philosophical culture consists in the creation of appropriate terminology, whereby Serbian philosophical thought became capable of communicating at the highest academic and intellectual level.

The Serbian translator's terms for the basic philosophical disciplines follow closely the etymology of Greek words. The only term that is not translated in accordance with the previous practice of Exarch's school is "philosophy": instead of being translated as *l'ubomudrije* (love of wisdom), it is simply transcribed from Greek. From the literally translated names of philosophical disciplines, only the adjective *bogoslovno* (theological) has survived until this day, while the rest were at some point replaced with Greek words, following the term philosophy (*filosofija*). According to a division of philosophy after the Aristotelian model, philosophy is divided into theoretical (*zritelnoje*) and practical (*delatnoje*) knowledge (*znanije*). The theoretical knowledge is further subdivided into theological (*bogoslovnoje*), physical or natural (*jestъstvъnoje*), and mathematical (*učitelnoje*), while the practical knowledge is subdivided into ethical (*običajъnoje*), economic (*domostroitelnoje*) and political (*gradnoje*). Although the translator closely followed the rule that a compound word should be translated with a compound word, the term wisdom (*mudrost*) is translated in accordance with the older tradition as *premudrostъ*, which has remained in liturgical usage until this day.

The *Dialectic* recounts the contents of Porphyry's *Introduction*, Aristotle's *Categories*, antepredicaments and postpredicaments, and its terminology is therefore based on the terms contained in these logical texts. Basic ontological concepts from Damascene's text are translated quite successfully, and correspond grammatically to the Greek language: Greek *on*, the present participle of the verb "to be" (*einai*) is translated as *suštъ* (today commonly *biće*, *bivstvujuće*, *bitujuće*); *ousia*, derived from *ousa*, the feminine participle of the same verb, as *suštъstvo*, earlier also as *suštije* (today *suština*, *bivstvo*); and the infinitive of the verb "to be" (*einai*) as *suštestvovati* and *bytije* (today usually *bivstvovanje*, *bitak*, *biće*, *bitovanje*). Opposite of *suština* (essence) is *slučajъ* (accident; Gr. *symbebekos*).

After the division and several different definitions of philosophy, the considerations of the terms *being*, *essence*, and *accident*, the explanation of logical concepts of division and subdivision, the definition of concept, John of Damascus presents Porphyry's predicables, for the translation of which a high level of proficiency in grammar and logic was required. The term *genos* is translated as *rod*, which remains unchanged until this day, while *eidos*, species, is etymologically correctly translated as *vid*.[34]

The consideration of the predicables in the *Dialectic* is followed by antepredicaments, which establish relations between things and concepts. In contrast to Aristotle's three relations, the *Dialectic* describes five (synonyms, homonyms, polyonyms, heteronyms, paronyms), and in the way it was done in Plato's Academy and in subsequent Neoplatonic schools. The antepredicaments are followed by Aristotle's ten categories: *suštьstvo* (*ousia*), *količьstvo* (*poson*), *kь česomu* (*pros ti*), *kačьstvo* (*poion*), *gde* (*pou*), *kogda* (*pote*), *ležati* (*keisthai*), *imeti* (*ehein*), *tvoriti* (*poiein*), *stradati* (*pashein*). The concluding part of John of Damascus' text deals with postpredicaments, i.e. the different forms of opposition (contradiction, contrariety), types of statements (negation, affirmation) and syllogism. Apart from logical concepts, the *Dialectic* also explains philosophical and theological concepts such as hypostasis (Slav. *sьstav*), person (*lice*), etc. It is obvious that the purpose of this work was to introduce the reader to logic and basic philosophical concepts, without which it was impossible to proceed to more advanced philosophical and theological topics.

The most important achievement of the Serbian translation of the *Dialectic* was the creation of philosophical terminology in Serbian. It was not the first medieval translation of a philosophical text, but terminologically it certainly was the most diversified one. John of Damascus' work was much read in both translation and original, copied and worked on many times. Its first three chapters were translated anew in the early fifteenth century. A certain number of Bulgarisms have led to the assumption that this new translation was done by Constantine the Philosopher, the author of the earliest Serbian philological study *Skazanija o Pismenah* (*A Story of the Letters*) and of the *Life of Despot Stefan*.[35] It did not introduce any change as regards terminology, and therefore the reason for the undertaking remains obscure. Later translators did not rely on the Hilandar translation, but either "Serbianized" Russian translations (e.g. Gavril Stefanović Venclović in

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[34] Because *eidos* has the same root as *oida*, a perfect with the meaning of present (I have seen=I know), which is coradical with Slav *vedeti*, *vem*.

[35] Constantine the Philosopher, a medieval writer and chronicler who, following the Ottoman conquest of Bulgaria in 1393, found refuge in Serbia, at the court of Stefan Lazarević (Prince 1393–1402, Despot 1402–27).

the first half of the eighteenth century), or translated from Greek or Latin (e.g. Bishop Dionisije Popović, whose translation done in 1827 introduced different terms for several basic concepts). In her translation of Aristotle's logical texts, Ksenija Atanasijević (1894–1981)[36] used by then widely accepted Latin terminology, which soon almost completely replaced medieval Serbian terms (*supstancija*, substance, instead of *suštьstvo*; *subjekt*, subject, instead of *podьležešteje*; *definicija*, definition, instead of *ustavь*).

*Palamas'* Exposition of the Orthodox Faith

The basic tenet of the *Corpus Areopagiticum* and Cappadocian doctrine of the impossibility of knowing God except through His works is rekindled by Gregory Palamas.[37] A new debate about this topic, which began in Byzantine academic and monastic circles after the long-lasting disputes about the Hesychast practice of "mental prayer" and the possibility of seeing Divine actualizations (*energeiai*), led to his complex text, *The Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*, eventually accepted by the Council of Constantinople in 1351. Characteristic of Palamas' teaching is his theoretical articulation of the traditional monastic notion of "becoming God-like" (divinization) and the vision of the Divine light, which is uncreated but not identical to God's essence. Presenting the distinction between essence (*ousia*) and actualization (*energeia*), Palamas uses the concepts discussed in detail in Aristotle's philosophy, because they make it possible to understand the relationship between that which can, i.e. has potency (Gr. *dynamis*; Sl. *sila*) to, become

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[36] Aristotel, *Organon*, transl. K. Atanasijević (Belgrade: Kultura, 1965).

[37] Gregory Palamas (1296–1359), was son of a courtier of Emperor Andronicus II and he received education at the imperial court; his whole family with servants entered a monastery in 1316; on Mount Athos Palamas studied theology and embraced Hesychast monastic practice, served as abbot of the monastery of Esphigmenou, and was the official representative of the Athonite monastic community in the dispute with Barlaam; although the Council of 1341 accepted Hesychast teaching, Palamas was imprisoned in 1344 because of his alleged involvement in a coup; he was rehabilitated and appointed archbishop of Thessalonica in 1347; the 1351 Council of Constantinople included his *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* among the official texts. On Gregory Palamas and Hesychasm, see Ostrogorski, "Svetogorski isihasti", 203–223; G. Florovsky, "St Gregory Palamas and the Tradition of the Fathers", *Sobornost* 4 (1961), 165–176; A. Jeftić, "Prolegomena za isihastičku gnoseologiju" [A prolegomena to Hesychast gnoseology], and "Živi i istinski Bog Svetog Grigorija Palame" [The living and true God of St Gregory Palamas], in *Filozofija i teologija* (Vrnjačka Banja 1994); Meyendorff, *Introduction à l'étude de Gregoire Palamas;* Meyendorff, *St Gregory Palamas and Orthodox Spirituality*; S. Yiagazoglou, "The Demonstrative Method in the Theology of St. Gregory Palamas", *The Fifth International Conference of Greek Philosophy* (Samos–Patmos 1993), 6–8.

something (a form), and that which has become a form, i.e. has been actualized.[38] In the context of Hesychast theory, the unknowable Divine essence as the first cause has potency for different knowable actualizations, such as the Incarnation or the uncreated "light of Tabor" seen during the Hesychast prayer.[39] Seeing the Divine light does not imply understanding or knowing the unknowable Divine essence, but only its actualizations, knowable because of the potency of the essence to become accessible through actualization (*energeia*), through God's work (*ergon*).

Barlaam of Calabria's criticism of Palamas' teaching calls into question the uncreatedness and eternity of the Divine light, and argues that only the Divine essence is uncreated.[40] If we accept that the light is uncreated, then the light is the Divine essence itself, which implies that seeing the Divine light is the same as seeing the Divine essence, and that in the final analysis the Hesychast teaching is the same as that of Thomas Aquinas:[41] "Thomas, and everyone who reasons like him, thinks that there is nothing out of reach for the human mind" (*Paris. gr.* 1278, fol. 137). On the other hand, since it is only the Divine essence that is uncreated, then the light seen during prayer cannot be the uncreated "light of Tabor", which then casts doubt on the Athonite monastic practice. Since both Palamas and

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[38] See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1002b32–1003a5 ff.

[39] Hesychasm (from *hesychia*, meaning silence, quietness), an influential monastic movement in the Byzantine world in the 13th and 14th centuries, combined the communal and anchoritic ways of monastic life, and laid emphasis on the constant individual practice of mental prayer, which may or may not involve particular psychosomatic techniques, and on the duty of participating in the liturgical life of society. According to Hesychast teaching, monastic practice enables a spiritual conversion (divinization or "becoming God-like") through the vision of the Divine light. Hesychasm can be traced back to 5th-century sources and its teaching is based on the experience of Eastern monasticism, particularly the Sinai school (7th century) and the work of Symeon the New Theologian (11th century).

[40] Barlaam of Calabria, a learned Greek monk from southern Italy, came to Constantinople c. 1330 and joined the University of Constantinople to teach about the *Corpus Areopagiticum*. As a representative of the Byzantine Church he took part in negotiations about union with the Roman Church. He was the opponent of the famous historian Nicephorus Gregoras in a scholarly debate which ended in his defeat (decided by the audience). In this debate, Barlaam argued for the importance of syllogism in understanding theological and philosophical teachings, while Gregoras favoured Plato over Aristotle, and argued against the adequacy of the syllogistic method as an additional logical tool for solving fundamental philosophical problems. According to Gregoras, the syllogistic method could only be overrated by the Latins, unenlightened as to higher spiritual spheres. See Ostrogorski, *Sabrana dela* V, 210–211. For Barlaam's use of the syllogistic method, see Yiagazoglou, "Demonstrative Method", 6–8.

[41] See V. Lossky, *The Vision of God* (Faith Press, 1973), 10–11, 16–17.

Barlaam referred to the Areopagite in stressing the impossibility of know-
ing the Divine essence, their dispute ended up being about the distinction
between essence and light (or actualization). Barlaam and his followers de-
nied the possibility of such distinction, claiming that it would endanger Di-
vine unity and simplicity, implying a "second", "lower" god. Palamas replied
by claiming that the multiplicity of God's manifestations and apparitions
(*ekphaseis*) does not affect the unity of God who is above the whole and
the part: "Goodness is not one part of God, Wisdom another, Majesty and
Providence still another. God is wholly Goodness, wholly Wisdom, wholly
Providence and wholly Majesty. He is one, without any division into parts,
but, possessing in Himself each of these energies [actualizations]. He re-
veals Himself wholly in each by His presence and action in a unified, simple
and undivided fashion."[42] If we do not accept the teaching about Divine
essence and Divine actualizations, then there is no link between God and
the world, because, Palamas says, such God would be non-actualized (*anen-
ergeton*), and could not be called Creator since that "which has no potency
or actualization, does not exist, either generally or particularly". To deny a
distinction between essence and actualization would therefore result in an
atheistic position.

The most important terminological distinction for understanding
Palamas' teaching is the conceptual pair *potency–actualization*, because the
essence is what has potency for actualization through a particular act. Po-
tency is the capacity for (actualization), because, Palamas makes a further
distinction following Gregory Nazianzen, between that which has inten-
tion (desire) as permanent potency and particular intentions (desires) by
which actualizations take place, or in other words, the potency of birth, and
the actualization of birth as act. Through potency the essence sets in motion,
and the act itself is motion and, eventually, actualization.[43]

Palamas' distinction between essence and actualizations, based on
the teachings of the Church Fathers, particularly of the Cappadocians and
Maximus the Confessor, has implications for the understanding of the Eu-
charist as the central theme of Orthodox theology and the basis of the litur-
gical practice.[44] Hesychast emphasis on the monastics as a critical force in
society and adamant resistance to non-Orthodox political pressures, shaped

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[42] Palamas, *Writings* II (Thessaloniki 1966), 209.

[43] Palamas, *Writings* III (Thessaloniki 1966), 384, 5.

[44] If we reject the distinction between the essence and actualization, even the Eucharist
or Holy Communion becomes impossible: "Since man can participate in God and since
the superessential essence of God is completely above participation, then there exists
something between the essence that cannot be participated and those who participate,
to make participation in God possible for them" (*Triads*, III, 2, 24, Migne PG 687).

the Eastern Christian understanding of society, not only because of the po-
litical strength of this movement, but also because Hesychasm was the final
form of one thousand years of Byzantine thought.

Hesychast teaching was embraced by the Serbian Church as early
as the fourteenth century, and Palamas' writings, notably his *Exposition of
the Orthodox Faith*, were translated and copied.[45] Hesychasm left a strong
imprint on Serbian medieval literature and art, which is evident already in
the works of Domentianus (Domentijan) and Theodosius (Teodosije),[46] but
most prominently in the writings of Daniel (Danilo) of Peć, monk Ephrem
(Jefrem), Silouan (Siluan),[47] and Monk Isaiah. Its prolonged influence on
both the state and church hierarchies and amongst the people was largely a
result of the activity of the Sinaiti.[48]

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[45] Several copies of the Serbo-Slavic translation have survived, such as *Codex of Vladis-
lav Gramatik*, Ms 80 (1469), Archive HAZU, fol. 562–564; Hilandar Ms 469 (end
of 15th century), fol. 182–185; Mss 82 and 83 (16th century), Bulgarian Academy of
Science, 301–304 and 67–69 respectively, and possibly also some other copies in mon-
asteries, libraries and academies.

[46] Domentijan (mid-13th c.) and Teodosije (end 13th–first half of 14th c.), both mem-
bers of the monastic community of Hilandar, writers of hagiographical literature. The
former wrote the *lives* of St Sava and St Simeon, the latter the *life* of St Sava, services
to St Sava and St Simeon, several eulogies, services and canons. Cf. Bogdanović, *Istorija
stare srpske književnosti*, 157, 169–170.

[47] Danilo, Archbishop of the Serbian Church (1324–37), founder of several churches,
political mediator, writer of several hagiographies of the canonized members of the
Nemanjić dynasty (kings Uroš, Milutin and Dragutin, Queen Jelena), and church heads
(archbishops Arsenius I, Ioannicius I and Eusthatius I) and two services (to Arsenius
I and Eusthatius I), cf. Bogdanović, *Istorija stare srpske književnosti*, 175–176; monk
Ephrem, Serbian patriarch (1375–79 and 1389–91) of Bulgarian origin, writer of the
canons (hymns) to Christ, the Virgin and the so-called Canon to the Emperor, cf.
Bogdanović, *Istorija stare srpske književnosti*, 182–183; monk Silouan (second half of
14th–early 15th c.), Athonite Hesychast, writer of the *lives* of St Sava and St Simeon.
The so-called Epistles of Silouan (1418) to Athonite monks shed light on the intensive
communication between Mount Athos and Serbia, cf. Bogdanović, *Istorija stare srpske
književnosti*, 185–187.

[48] For the Hesychasts in Serbia, traditionally known as Sinaiti, see A. Radović, "Sinaiti i
njihov značaj u životu Srbije XIV i XV veka" [Sinaiti and their importance in the life of
Serbia in the 14th and 15th centuries], in *Spomenica o petstogodišnjici manastira Ravanice*
(Belgrade 1981); Bogdanović, *Istorija stare srpske književnosti*, 202–205; D. Bogdanović,
"Preteče isihazma u srpskim zbornicima XIV veka" [Precursors of Hesychasm in 14th-
century Serbian collections], *Cyrillomethodianum* V (1981); D. Bogdanović, "Neopla-
tonizam u isihastičkoj književnosti kod Srba" [Neoplatonism in Serbian Hesychast lit-
erature], *Pravoslavna misao* 32 (1985).

*The influence of Byzantine philosophy on the Serbian medieval state and society*

The great translation project and the revisions of translations of both the most important liturgical books (gospel books, epistle lectionaries, psalters) and the texts crucial for the development of Serbian philosophical thought, is closely connected with the liturgical reforms that began in the first half of the fourteenth century. In the Serbian monastic scriptoria such as that at Hilandar, texts were translated from Greek, earlier translations were corrected and improved, and more suitable terminological solutions were usually found. An exceptionally important feature of this project, commenced under King Milutin (r. 1282–1321), was a powerful Hesychast influence. Athonite spirituality influenced both the style and method of codifying sacral texts, and the Serbian translation school, which embraced the strict, "iconographically" correct, approach to translating the most complex Byzantine texts. That the translation effort was part of a comprehensive scholarly and educational reform can also be seen from the selection of texts for translation. At first only informative edifying texts were translated (such as Theodore of Rhaithu's *Preparation*), but the fourteenth century saw the translation of texts of encyclopaedic character (John of Damascus' *Fountain of Knowledge*), collected works (*Corpus Areopagiticum*) and texts of current interest such as Palamas' *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*.

This thought-out approach to the work of translation obviously had a deeper meaning. Namely, according to Byzantine scholarly methodology, whose main characteristic is systematic and consistent thought, in order to understand the "true philosophy" it was necessary to successfully climb several rungs of the ladder of knowledge. For understanding dogmas, which are the final expressions of cataphatic thought, it is first necessary, according to the highest authorities (Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, John of Damascus etc), to discipline the mind on the Greek texts on logic and philosophy. Given that the basic dogmatic statements remain obscure without background knowledge of complex Platonic and Aristotelian terminology, the fourteenth-century effort to translate the philosophical chapters of Damascene's *Fountain of Knowledge* is understandable. In addition to the already mentioned characteristics of Byzantine philosophy (systematic thinking, consistency, influence of classical philosophical terminology), being true to the original is yet another of its major features. The originality of the author in the modern sense of the word did not exist in the Byzantine world. Original is only one immutable truth, while individual authors, continuing the work of previous thinkers, are only able to come more or less close to it.

Philosophical texts were frequently copied and much worked on in Serbia, but it is difficult to infer about the actual scope of their influence on the formation and articulation of the worldview of medieval Serbian society. As a result of their demanding theoretical complexity, study of philosophy

was restricted to quite narrow monastic, court and urban circles. However, the strongest aspect of the influence of Byzantine thought on medieval society was the liturgy as the central social event of the community. It was through the liturgy that the wording of the translated texts influenced the life of medieval Serbian society. They were important for understanding the Eucharist itself, as well as for understanding the celestial, ecclesiastical and state hierarchies, which was particularly evident during the Hesychast dispute. In the liturgical texts themselves, mainly of prayerful nature, there are ontological formulations and statements[49] that are crucial for understanding the liturgy and essential for understanding Byzantine thought.

Apart from large-scale translation projects, the immediate influence of Hesychasts and direct communication with liturgical texts, medieval Serbian society could encounter philosophical terminology in legal texts and in more popular readings such as collections of maxims of "wise men" and philosophers (*gnomae*, *melissae*).

Chapter 61 of the Serbian *Nomocanon* (*Krmčija*), a collection of canon and secular law put together by archbishop Sava about 1220, contains a paragraph on some of the most prominent ancient Greek schools of philosophy. This widely known text, which Sava either translated himself or borrowed from some previously translated collections, refers to the teachings of the Pythagoreans, Platonists, Stoics and Epicureans.

The *Life of Despot Stefan Lazarević*, penned by Constantine the Philosopher,[50] contains sayings attributed to Orpheus, Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle. The Byzantine *melissae* (bees) which were in use in the Serbo-Slavic-speaking areas as early as the twelfth century and continued to be copied until the eighteenth century, contain maxims of "wise Hellenes" (Socrates, Pythagoras, Democritus, Epictetus, Plutarch). Just as widespread in medieval Serbia were also the *gnomae* compiling reflections of classical philosophers and writers on a variety of life's issues (Euripides, Menander, Democritus, Socrates, Epictetus). Some of these sayings, whose ancient Greek origin sank into oblivion, have survived in Serbian folk wisdom and poetry.

## Medieval Serbia's forgotten philosophical legacy

This particular case of oblivion is closely connected with the history of the Serbian language. Unlike Latin, Church Slavic was not as incomprehensible to the medieval population as it might be assumed from its subsequently

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[49] E.g. the (Nicene) Creed; "It is truly right to bless you"; or statements such as: "Thine own of Thine own we offer You on behalf of all and for all".

[50] For Despot Stefan Lazarević and Constantine the Philosopher, see note 34 above.

growing difference from the Serbian, Russian and Bulgarian vernaculars.[51] Apart from the literary language into which philosophical texts were translated, the vernacular was used in writing as well, mostly for laws and royal charters, and there was also a vernacular written literature (chivalrous romance) and history (chronicles).

The Ottoman expansion into the Balkans began in the fourteenth century and eventually all parts of the former medieval Serbian state were conquered. The conquests, however, had no impact on the relationship between the literary language and the vernacular. The diglossia survived. Ottoman rule in fact conserved the state of affairs as it had been in the middle ages.[52] The texts that were copied or printed in the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were in fact earlier Church Slavic translations. With the fall of the medieval state and its secular rulers, the only leaders left, and formally recognized by the Ottomans, were ecclesiastical leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Under Ottoman rule, the liturgy remained the central social event and, due to the distinctive features of Ottoman administration as well as geographical and historical circumstances, Serbian society lived its own and largely independent life.

It was the eighteenth century that brought about some significant changes leading to the eventual suppression of medieval philosophical tradition. In 1783 the central figure of eighteenth-century Serbian literature, Dositej Obradović,[53] proposed his language project. Inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment, he opted for a pragmatic approach: written language was supposed to be fully comprehensible to the reader. At first some Church Slavic and Russian, mostly abstract, words were spared because they had no vernacular equivalents, but they also were expelled eventually.

With the First Serbian Insurrection in 1804 statehood was restored. As recent research has shown, medieval tradition played a role in creating state institutions and in lawmaking.[54] During the first half of the nine-

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[51] Ivić, "Standard language", 43.

[52] In many Serbian charters, especially donation charters to monasteries, the opening text expounding the donor's God-pleasing act, is written in Church Slavic. One could speak of and address God only in the hallowed church language, while the profane language was only acceptable for profane themes. In fact the use of both languages in one text shows that they were not seen as two different languages, but as functional varieties of a single language.

[53] M. Kostić, *Dositej Obradović u istorijskoj perspektivi* [Dositej Obradović in Historical Perspective] (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka, 1952).

[54] In writing the first laws of restored Serbia, Prota Mateja Nenadović (1777–1854) drew from the *Krmčija of St Sava* (*Nomocanon*), a collection of canon and secular law put together by archbishop Sava about 1220. Cf. *The Memoirs of Prota Mateja Nenadovic*,

teenth century, however, the increasingly prominent role of Western models resulted in, among other things, an uncritical rejection of earlier traditions. As Serbian society and culture changed, so did its literary language: it was no longer shaped by the Church, and there was a general orientation shift from Russia towards Western Europe.

Once the principles of Vuk Karadžić's language reform prevailed,[55] Church Slavic became reduced to the language of worship. As a result, the thousand-year-old literary language sank into oblivion and, with it, the entire medieval philosophical legacy.

The Enlightenment belief in the rule of reason, the uncritically accepted Western misunderstanding of the Byzantine world viewing it as utterly mystical and theocratic, and the rejection of the "dark clerical burden of the past", helped the cultural amnesia to spread. Once the wars of liberation and the struggle for the use of the vernacular in public education ended victoriously, the emerging Serbian intelligentsia turned enthusiastically to modern Western Europe and its positivist science. The centuries of Old Slavic literacy sank into oblivion almost overnight. The Byzantine (philosophico-theological) worldview rapidly gave way to the philosophical effort of "celebrating the power of reason, moral autonomy and the benefits of a secular culture".[56] Attitudes towards this legacy swaying between disparagement and complete lack of interest continued into the twentieth century.[57]

Academic interest did not revive until the last decades of the twentieth century. The interest in medieval theological thinking was encouraged by the School of Orthodox Theology,[58] while the first impulses to study the medieval beginnings of Serbian philosophy came from Belgrade's School of Philosophy. Apart from new translations and fresh analyses of medieval

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ed. and trans. Lovett F. Edwards (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969). Cf. also Z. Mirković, *Karadjordjev zakonik* [The Code of Karageorge] (Belgrade 2008), 13.

[55] Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (1787–1864), the Serbian philologist who reformed the literary language and orthography by moving it away from Church Slavic and Russian and bringing it closer to the spoken language, more specifically to the Shtokavian dialect of the Serb-inhabited eastern Herzegovina. Cf. Lj. Stojanović, *Život i rad Vuka Stef. Karadžića* (Belgrade: Srpska knjiga, 1924); D. Wilson, *Life and Times of Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic, 1787–1864: Literacy, Literature and National Independence in Serbia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).

[56] Žunjić, "Likovi filozofije", 234.

[57] The first comprehensive overview of the history of Serbian philosophy, made in the late 1960s, finds that "sadly, the middle ages in Serbian culture lasted until the eighteenth century", cf. D. Jeremić, "O filozofiji kod Srba", *Savremenik* 5–12/1967, 1–2/1968, repr. in D. Jeremić, *O filozofiji kod Srba* (Belgrade 1997), 9.

[58] Reincorporated into the University of Belgrade since 2004.

texts,[59] there have been more or less successful attempts to take a comprehensive look at medieval philosophical thinking, and studies are underway into the scope and impact of translated philosophical writings and the building of philosophical terminology.

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[59] For the translations of the *Mystical Theology*, John Climacus' *Ladder*, Palamas' *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* and the first ever translation of Damascene's *Dialectic* into modern Serbian, see B. Milosavljević, ed., *Vizantijska filozofija u srednjevekovnoj Srbiji* (Belgrade 2002). For studies on the medieval Serbian philosophical legacy, see *Istočnik* 9 (Belgrade 1994); *Filozofija i teologija* (Vrnjačka Banja 1994); I. Marić, ed., *Srpska filosofija, Gledišta* 1–2 (1999); Milosavljević, ed., *Vizantijska filozofija*; I. Marić, ed., *O srpskoj filozofiji* (Belgrade: Plato, 2003).

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# Clothing as a Symbol of Charity and Soul Salvation in Late Medieval Kotor (Cattaro)

Religious practices in late medieval Kotor included charitable acts of donating clothes to the poor as a form of *imitatio Christi*. The model of charity for the faithful to follow was set in the vitae of widely-favoured saints such as Sts Martin of Tours, Francis of Assisi and Catherine of Sienna, whose portraits were painted on the walls of Kotor's church of St Anne in the second half of the fifteenth century. Evidence for the practice and purpose of this particular form of charity is found in the surviving wills of the citizens of Kotor. Apart from giving clothes to the poor out of concern *pro remedio animae*, the motif of clothes features in the deceased's testamentary instructions for burial in the habit of a mendicant order.

**Keywords**: *caritas*, Kotor (Cattaro), the poor, wills, clothing, saints, stigmatization, *imitatio Christi*

Two Christian concepts — poverty and charity, assumed their full notional, symbolical and practical significance in late medieval Roman Catholic religiosity. *Caritas*, the greatest Christian virtue, was manifested in public life in founding community institutions for the care of the poor, while individual believers expressed their concern for the *pauperes Christi* and other marginal groups mostly through their bequests. Giving clothes to the poor was a widespread form of charity, inspired by the example set by the saints who were highly revered at the time, such as St Martin of Tours, St Francis of Assisi and St Catherine of Siena whose fresco portraits were painted in the church of St Anne in Kotor, a coastal town in modern Montenegro, in the second half of the fifteenth century. The analysis presented here of the significance of clothing as a symbol of charity and soul salvation in the religious practice of the late medieval inhabitants of Kotor is based on the written sources (wills) and the painted decoration of the church of St Anne.

Though posited in the Bible, the concept of charity did not receive its doctrinal formulation and codified implementation in Catholic practice until the emergence and activity of the Franciscan order in the thirteenth century. According to Matthew 25:35–40, there are six "works of mercy": the care of the hungry, of the thirsty, of strangers, of the naked, of the sick and of the imprisoned. In the thirteenth century, this list was expanded to include a seventh moral requirement: to bury the dead. On the Day of Judgement the righteous shall stand at the right hand of the King in glory: "For I was an hungered, and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave

me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me in: I was naked, and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me: I was in prison, and ye came unto me." Christ describes almsgiving as one of the three pillars of a righteous life, along with fasting and prayer (Mt 6:1–18). As a source of heavenly reward, almsgiving should be selfless and unobtrusive, because it is Christ himself that we encounter in our fellowmen in need (Mt 6:2–4; 25:31–36). It is important to note that Christian teaching does not see almsgiving merely as an act of love for man; it should be a religious act. Serving the poor reflects one's love of Christ. By helping the poor one helps Christ himself, whose coming in glory is awaited. *Caritas* is therefore interpreted as the love that unites man to God, at once *amor Dei* and *amor proximi*. This teaching brings love of God into closest connection with compassion and care of the neighbour.[1] The groundwork for the medieval interpretation of the theological and cardinal virtues was laid down by Thomas Aquinas. The greatest of all virtues, *caritas*, was likened to an ever-burning flame. From St Francis and the example set by his lifestyle, the ascetic principle of poverty and the honouring of the principle of charity in everyday life became a widely accepted Christian imperative. From the thirteenth century, poverty and charity were given a strong impetus in the teaching and practice of the Catholic Church. In keeping with the new moral values exemplified by St Francis, St Bonaventure highlighted the virtue of *caritas*, describing it as light and a burning flame.[2]

With the founding of the mendicant orders, the development of their theology, and their great success among the laity, *caritas* began to be exercised in an organized way in the everyday life of medieval townships. The Church oversaw and directed the flow of material aid intended for the poor of Christ, distributing it mostly through fraternities and hospitals. The widespread practice of almsgiving stemmed from the fact that, in addition to masses for the dead and indulgences, acts of charity were believed to be instrumental in bringing about the salvation of the soul. The

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[1] Synonymous with almsgiving is the Greek term *eleemosyne*, which initially denoted divine mercy or human compassion for one's neighbours, and later assumed the meaning of material aid and almsgiving, cf. *Vocabulaire de théologie biblique*, ed. X. Léon-Dufour (Paris 1962), also available in English (*Dictionary of Biblical Theology*).

[2] In the visual arts *caritas* is usually shown as a female figure holding in one hand a flame, a candle or a burning heart offering it to God as a symbol of love, and in the other a bunch of flowers or a fruit basket symbolizing profane love and earthly mercy; *caritas* is also shown as a mother breastfeeding two babies, cf. A. Woodford, "Medieval Iconography of the Virtues. A Poetic Portraiture", *Speculum* 28/3 (1953), 521–524; M. Meiss, *Painting in Florence and Siena after the Black Death. The Arts, Religion and Society in the Mid-Fourteenth Century* (Princeton 1978), 114–116; J. Hall, *Dictionary of Subjects and Symbols in Art* (Icon Editions, 1979), 64.

*Golden Legend* lists four possible ways of saving the souls of the dead from purgatorial tortures: prayers offered by the living, almsgiving, masses, and fasting.[3] The understanding of the earthly life of Christians as *peregrinatio*, the stage of their journey during which they were to become deserving of eternal life, implied honouring the moral principle of charity. Thus, salvation required going beyond the spiritual realm in order to address practical human needs in the way required by *caritas*. The believer was instructed how to live a proper Christian life by a sort of guides to that earthly pilgrimage. For that reason, there was a hierarchy of charitable acts as well as the proper times to do them. Although one was expected to do charity throughout one's lifetime, posthumous gifts seem to have been the most frequent form of charity. According to theologians, the spiritual value of a charitable act decreased as death drew nearer. It was only through renouncing one's worldly possessions in one's lifetime that one could fulfil the true meaning of *caritas*. To give away money posthumously, i.e. when it was of no use to the giver, was as good as worthless. *The Golden Legend* quotes St Augustine's reflections on deathbed repentance, and his distinction between repentance prompted by the fear of death and punishment, and repentance out of love of God. Only those who lived a repentant life could be confident of their salvation.[4] The vita of St Elizabeth of Hungary included in *The Golden Legend* interprets the work of charity done in one's lifetime as the *vita activa*, prototypically led by Martha, but noting that an exemplary Christian life should also involve prayer or the *vita contemplativa*, such as was led by Mary.[5]

In late medieval Kotor charity was highly organized in institutional terms, ranging from individual bequests to the charity work of fraternities and hospitals. In addition to bequests of money for liturgical commemoration, the citizens of Kotor bequeathed money and other property to charity — for the poor, hospitals, lepers, orphans, or for poor girls' dowries. These post-mortem gifts should be seen as reflecting the mores of the time and place rather than the free choice of medieval man. The will was a codi-

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[3] J. de Voragine, *The Golden Legend* (Princeton University Press, 1993), vol. 2, 282–287. It is interesting to note that the will of a citizen of Kotor, Fr Petar Gizda, guardian of the monastery of St Francis Outside the Walls, dated 1400, referred to *The Golden Legend* as "*unus liber voraginis*" in his rich library. The inventory made after his death included the books found in his cell (33 in personal ownership and 14 monastic), see D. Medaković, "Prilozi istoriji kulture u Boki Kotorskoj", *Spomenik SAN* CV (1956), 19; R. Kovijanić, *Kotorski medaljoni* (Belgrade 1980), 155–156.

[4] De Voragine, *Golden Legend*, vol. 2, 280–290.

[5] Ibid., 311. On living an exemplary Christian life in accordance with the virtue of *caritas*, see R. N. Swanson, *Religion and Devotion in Europe, c. 1215 – c. 1515* (Cambridge 1995), 191–234.

fied public document of judicial-notarial nature combining the testator's personal need to do charity with the rules and expectations of the Church and the community. Drawn up under the shadow of death, the wills clearly reflected the testators' hope that their charity, which was expected from them as a principle they were inculcated with all their lives, would help them on their path to salvation.

Analysis of the wills drawn up in Kotor gives not only an idea of the economic situation of the citizens and inheritance customs and rights, but also of many aspects of the testators' religiosity. In addition to the belief in the effectiveness of charitable acts, prayers and memorial masses, the wills vividly reflect the testators' belief in the intercession of particular patron saints as well as their trust in particular priests, religious orders and churches. The content and form of the wills depended on the testators' socio-economic and professional status, but they were also gender-dependent. What they have in common is the obligatory bequest of money to various charitable purposes, while the value of bequests depended on individual circumstances. These various bequests to charity included gifts of rash or some other cloth, or gifts of money for providing clothing for the poor, the sick and the lepers. The citizens of Kotor usually stated the reason for the charitable gifts: *pro remedio animae*. What makes two wills from the first half of the fifteenth century stand out is the number of charitable and other bequests. The last will of Marin Druško, a very rich and influential citizen of Kotor of humble birth, was drawn up in 1438. Apart from the standard formulaic phrases and instructions, the will contains some intimate and quite distinctive bequests, which makes it a particularly useful source in studying the complex question of the manifestation of piety in the late middle ages. The opening of the will reads: *Sr. Marinus de Druscho de cataro per dei gratiam sanus mente loquele et intellectu licet corpore lancedere sed sua facta ordinate relinquere*, while the reason for drawing up the will was the testator's concern for the salvation of his soul: *Et volens saluti sue anime providere suum ultimum testamentum et suam ultimam voluntatem in hunc modum condidit et ordinavit*. The testator recommends his soul to the Creator and His glorious mother Virgin Mary and St Michael the Archangel and the whole celestial court (*Primo recomandans animam suam altissimo conditori et sue gloriose matri Virgini Marie et sto Michaeli archangelo et toti curie celesti*), and beseeches the poor to pray for his soul: *Rogans dictas pauperes personas de rogent deum pro anima sua*. Firmly believing in the effectiveness of their prayers, he leaves them money so as to relieve their poverty. Among other charitable bequests is his instruction to clothe thirty paupers in rash (*Item ordinavit vestiri triginta pauperes personas de rassia pro anima sua*).[6] According to a court rul-

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[6] Istorijski arhiv Kotor, Sudsko-notarski dokumenti [Historical Archives, Kotor, Court-Notarial Documents] (hereafter IAK SN) V, 821–823. The document is published in

ing of 1440, the executors of the will of Radula, widow of a Marin Simonov, were to allot part of the income from the bequeathed vineyard to the lepers living in Šuranj near the Franciscan monastery just outside Kotor's southern gate (*extra portam Surane*). Another portion of the income was intended for the hospitals of the Holy Cross and the Holy Spirit. Radula's gift to the lepers and the two hospitals included wine vessels, barrels, and the money for their clothes (*pro eorum vestimentis*).[7] In 1550, Petruša, a Franciscan tertiary, bequeathed fine rash cloth (*rasa sutil*) to the tertiary sisters dwelling near the church of St Michael.[8] In 1505, Trifon, son of the late Tomasius Grubonja, left the money for clothing six paupers.[9]

For its clear and understandable message, the motif of donating clothes was frequently used in sermons, hagiography and religious painting. In the context of the late medieval system of beliefs, both the secular costume and the monastic habit were symbols of charity and salvation closely connected with the veneration of relics, with the way of life and visionary experiences of monks and ascetics, and with funerary practices. In addition to its basic material meaning, clothing had a complex spiritual one. In the saints' visions, it symbolized a charitable gift and heavenly reward. The belief that the charitable acts of giving clothes to the poor were soul-saving was a two-way street and involved both the giver and the recipient. The example for charity was shaped in the lives of the medieval saints who enjoyed particular popularity among the faithful. Thus, in the second half of the fifteenth century, images of St Martin of Tours, St Catherine of Siena and St Francis of Assisi were painted in the town church of St Anna. On the eastern wall near the main altar are the portraits of St Catherine and St Martin along with the votive fresco inscriptions by the donors Katarina and Maruša, while the southern wall shows St Francis Receiving the Stigmata pulled out of its narrative context and shown as a separate scene with a manifest theological meaning. What connects the three saints is an analogous episode from their lives. The model of St Martin giving his cloak (*paludamentum*) to a poor knight was later revived in hagiography, especially from the founding of the Franciscan and Dominican orders. Christ in the figure of a naked pauper begging for clothes

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I. Stjepčević, "Prevlaka", *Arhivska istraživanja Boke Kotorske* (Perast 2003), 142–144, 157–160, a book assembling the writings of Don Ivo Stjepčević created between 1926 and 1941 (Vodja po Kotoru; Prevlaka; Lastva; Kotorsko propelo; Katedrala Sv. Tripuna u Kotoru; Kotor i Grbalj).

[7] IAK SN VI, 617, 618.

[8] Quoted after L. Blehova-Čelebić, *Hrišćanstvo u Boki 1200–1500. Kotorski distrikt* (Podgorica 2006), 241 (IAK SN XXIII, 626).

[9] IAK SN XXIV, 758.

came to symbolize earthly charity as a requirement for deliverance of the
soul from purgatorial tortures and eternal suffering. It was this connection,
now beginning to be established, between the almsgivers and the *pauperes
Christi* that was developed in the vitae of the contemporary saints, espe-
cially St Francis and the prominent Dominican and Franciscan tertiaries
Sts Catherine of Siena and Elizabeth of Hungary respectively. In their
visions Christ appeared as a poor man to whom each gave a piece of her
clothes, which provided clear guidelines for the faithful. The vitae also con-
tain descriptions of divine appearances involving the habits of the religious
orders to which the saints belonged. The usual symbolic meaning of the
monastic habit as a path to salvation was expanded to include secular dress,
which became a symbol and object of charity. Symbolically, by renouncing
the inherited secular dress and taking a religious habit instead, St Francis
renounced his worldly life and embarked on a new one. In the asceticism
of St Francis, poverty and charity are emphasized as central virtues. Many
episodes from the life of the founder of the Franciscan order reflect the
idea of *caritas* and are interpreted as a series of steps leading to his final
conversion. The ascetic life of St Francis set the example, and St Bonaven-
ture, in his *Apologia pauperum*, upheld and harmonized with the official
doctrine of the Church the concept of *nudissima paupertas* as a Francis-
can vow and ultimate moral principle. According to Bonaventure, several
events were conducive to St Francis's decision to renounce the material
world and devote his life to God. All of them symbolized *caritas*, from
the initial one, giving his father's property to a poor priest of the church
of San Damiano, to his giving his cloak to a poor knight and his visit to
the lepers. The principal tenets of Franciscan ideology are presented in
the *Legenda maior* in word, and in the Upper Church at Assisi, in image.
This extensive and well-thought-out iconographic programme affirmed a
compact ideology, which was of utmost importance for the spread of Fran-
ciscan teaching and for the role of the order within the Church. The scene
showing St Francis giving his cloak to a poor man comes as second in the
cycle painted at Assisi and is emphasized as the initial stage of the saint's
spiritual growth. The connection established between this charitable act
of the saint and God's reward is emphasized in the *Legenda maior* where,
the same as in Assisi, the episode is followed by the Dream of the Palace,
i.e. the reward for St Francis's compassion for the poor knight. In his *Vita
secunda*, Thomas of Celano, another biographer of St Francis, recorded as
many as seven episodes of the saint's giving away his clothes to the poor. In
addition to clothing as a caritative symbol, one of the episodes emphasizes
the symbolism of clothing (i.e. religious habit) as a relic. Namely, asked by

a friar minor to give him his tunic, probably wanted as a relic, St Francis gave it away and remained naked in the cold.[10]

The motif of clothing used to symbolize a charitable gift occurs in several episodes from the life of St Catherine of Siena too. In a street of her hometown the Dominican tertiary was approached by a half-naked man begging for clothes. That night Christ appeared in her dream in the figure of the very same beggar. From the wound in his chest he took and returned to her the clothes she had given him the day before. This gift, invisible to others, was meant as a promise of the heavenly reward she was going to be given for her charity. In another of her visions, Catherine of Siena was symbolically shown her future life of devotion through being given a choice of one of the habits offered by Sts Dominic, Francis and Augustine.[11]

The presence of the portrait of St Catherine of Siena in a church in Kotor testifies to the veneration of this Dominican saint in medieval times. Even before she was canonized in 1461, her cult was fostered by the Dominican Observants of Venice, which had become the suzerain of Kotor in 1420.[12] In the context of the issue discussed here, it should be noted that the saint's relic enshrined in the Dominican church of St Nicholas in Kotor was in fact a piece of her clothes.[13] The presence of this relic undoubtedly reflected the trends in Kotor's religious life and the prominent role that charitable activities played in it. St Catherine promoted them by setting an example, of which we can learn from several events described

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[10] The principal tenets of Franciscan teaching are laid down in Bonaventure's *Legenda maior*, in *Legenda monacensis S. Francisci* and in Thomas of Celano's *Vita prima* and *Vita secunda*. On the biographies of St Francis, see J. R. H. Moorman, *The Sources for the Life of St. Francis of Assisi* (Manchester 1940); R. E. Lerner, "A Collection of Sermons Given in Paris c. 1267, Including a New Text by Saint Bonaventura on the Life of Saint Francis", *Speculum* 49/3 (1974), 466–498; J. Le Goff, *Saint Francis of Assisi* (London–New York 2004). The painted cycle of St Francis at Assisi and its literary sources are looked at in detail by A. Smart, *The Assisi Problem and the Art of Giotto. A Study of the Legend of St. Francis in the Upper Church of San Francesco, Assisi* (Oxford 1971).

[11] On the role of donating clothes in the creation of medieval devotional practices and the example of St Catherine of Siena in particular, see C. Warr, "Clothing, Charity and Visionary Experience in Fifteenth-Century Siena", *Art History* 27/2 (2004), 187–211.

[12] On the development of the cult of St Catherine of Siena, see A. Vauchez, *Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge 1997), 87–88, 209–219, 385 and passim. The fact that the cult of this local saint began to spread from the early 15th century, prior to her canonization, has not been taken into account in dating her fresco portrait in Kotor, where she is shown haloed and designated in the identifying inscription as saint, cf. V. Živković, "Freske iz XV veka u kotorskoj crkvi Svete Ane. Ikonografska analiza", *Zograf* 28 (2000–2001), 133–138.

[13] S. Krasić, "Nekadašnji dominikanski samostan Sv. Nikole u Kotoru (1266–1807), *Prilozi povjesti umjetnosti u Dalmaciji* 28 (1989), 138.

in her hagiography. Her mysticism and visionary experiences powerfully influenced the development of her cult in Kotor as well. It should be noted that she belonged to a lay order which was very active in religious and everyday life in Kotor in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. That is why her portrait at St Anne's in Kotor should be seen as evidencing the religious practice of the tertiaries, which amply relied on the principle of *caritas*. By founding the third order for lay men and women, the Franciscans and Dominicans put the central idea of their teaching into practice. The mendicant orders promoted a new form of religiosity which was meant to be closer to the faithful keen on expressing their piety in an established and ecclesiastically accepted form. The foundations for the emergence of tertiaries had been laid by St Francis. He developed the *triple militia* model consisting of the first and second orders for friars and nuns respectively, and the newly-founded third order for lay persons. Female tertiaries living a semi-monastic life are found in Kotor quite early, in the first half of the fifteenth century, under the name *bizoka*s.[14] Kotor's later fifteenth- and sixteenth-century sources use more frequently the Venetian term *piçocara*.[15] The pious women who opted for a semi-monastic way of life had the opportunity to structure their everyday life round markedly pious activities. In practice, that meant that most of them engaged in charity work at hospitals, at shelters for the poor and at orphanages, and practised needlework (usually embroidery and lace-making). The Dominican and Franciscan models of charitable work, mysticism and asceticism offered to lay women were two canonized tertiaries, St Catherine of Siena and St Elizabeth of Hungary respectively.

The manner in which St Catherine was portrayed at St Anne's may be the reason for looking at yet another theological meaning of charity. St

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[14] For a preserved law of 1321 pertinent to the economic status of *bizoka*s, see *Monumenta Montenegrina*, vol. VI/1 *Episkopi Kotora i Episkopija i Mitrpolija Risan*, ed. V. D. Nikčević, transl. A. Klikovac (Podgorica: Istorijski institut Crne Gore, 2001), 124–125.

[15] The same as the Italian *piçocara*, those in Kotor had the status of tertiaries, i.e. they were affiliated to the Franciscan or Dominican orders. In other European countries, these pious women were not necessarily affiliated to a religious order. On the female religious and monastic movement in medieval Europe, and especially on the beguines, see C. Opitz, "Life in the Late Middle Ages", in *A History of Women in the West*, ed. C. Klepisch-Zuber (Harvard University Press, 1992), 305–317. For the influence of women on religious life and the origin and expansion of the beguines, see R. W. Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages* (London 1979), 309–331; C. Walker Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast. The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women* (University of California Press, 1988), 17–20, and passim; M. H. King, *The Desert Mothers Revisited: The Mothers of the Diocese of Liege*, http://www.peregrina.com/matrologia_latina/DesertMothers2.htll (accessed 25/01/2007).

*Above*: Virgin enthroned and St Francis receiving the stigmata, Church of St Anne, Kotor

*Right*: St Martin of Tours, Church of St Anne, Kotor

*Far right*: St Catherine of Siena, Church of St Anne, Kotor

Catherine is shown with the stigmata, of which golden flames on her feet remain today. The southern wall of the church shows St Francis at the moment of receiving the stigmata.[16] Franciscan and Dominican theologians, and the biographers of the saint whose body showed the Lord's wounds, promoted the idea about a special connection between the stigmata and the virtue of *caritas*. In late medieval theology *caritas* was interpreted as a form of *imitatio Christi*. The affirmation of devotions to the body and blood of Christ, i.e. to his human nature and corporality, found its full expression in a cult closely related to devotion to the Host and the dogma of transubstantiation. Devotion to Christ's five wounds (*quinquepartium vulnus*) formed part of Christocentric piety and the concept of imitation of Christ, particularly fostered from the time of St Francis. How strong if not central the idea of *caritas* was in the teaching of St Francis is shown by Thomas of Celano, who lists three spiritual gifts: divine love (*caritas*), almsgiving (*amor proximi*), and sinlessness, which are also seen as symbolizing the three pairs of seraphic wings from which St Francis received the marks on his body.[17]

The connection between giving clothes to the poor and receiving the stigmata is observable in the religious practice of medieval Kotor as well. A remarkable testimony to attaching a religious significance and *imitatio Christi* symbolism to an individual act of charity can be found in a document from the end of the fifteenth century. In his will drawn up in 1496, Luka, son of the late Marin Bolica, bequeathed money for clothing five paupers *di vestimenti di rasica* in honour of Christ's five wounds.[18] This is a valuable source, rare in its explicit demonstration of a form of religiosity which was characteristic of late medieval Catholicism.

Apart from the underlying idea of charity, the episodes from the lives of St Francis and St Catherine of Siena about their giving clothes to the poor carried yet another meaning connected with concern for the salvation of the soul. Namely, the garb of religious orders, especially Franciscan and Dominican, had funerary and eschatological significance for the faithful. The practice of burying lay persons in the habit of a mendicant order became a favoured expression of concern *pro remedio animae*. This post-mortem expression of penitence was encouraged by the Church. Under the thirteenth-century popes Urban IV, Clement IV and Nicholas IV, those who chose to be buried in the Franciscan habit were granted the

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[16] For the iconography of the surviving frescoes at St Anne's, see Živković, "Ikonografska analiza", 133–138.

[17] For the symbolism of the scene of the Stigmatization of St Francis, see Meiss, *Painting in Florence and Siena*, 120.

[18] IAK SN XXIV, 734.

remission of one third of their sins. In the following century, Alexander VI and Leo X extended this practice to include the women buried in the Clarissan habit, while John XXII granted five-year indulgence to anyone who should kiss the Franciscan habit.[19] From the fifteenth century on, it was not uncommon for a person to express the last wish to be buried in the habit of a mendicant order. The examples come from Kotor's partly processed archival material dating to the early years of the fifteenth century. In his will dated 1503, Marko, son of the late Luka Pelegrin, chose the Franciscan Observant church of St Bernardino of Siena at Kotor as his burial place and instructed that he be buried in the Franciscan habit.[20] Drawn up in 1504, the last will of Kata, *predisegna* of the sons of Zuan Buća, instructed that she be dressed in the Dominican habit and buried in the fraternity tomb in the church of St Nicholas *di fiume* outside the town's north wall.[21] The same Franciscan Observant church was to be the burial place of Katna, daughter of Dabišin Radosalić of Marcevasto. As stated in her will dated 1505, she wished to be buried in the Bernardinian habit.[22] Kotor's town physician Jacob de Ponte (*Jacobus de Ponte* or *Pontanus*) drew up his will in 1522. The opening paragraph commending his soul — *In primis animam suam commendavit omnipotenti Deo piissimo domino nostro Jesu Christo, redemptori nostro, beatissime Dei Genetrici, Virgini Marie, beatissimis apostolis Petro e Paulo, beato Hieronymo ac beato Francisco et omnibus sanctis Dei* — is followed by his instructions as to the place of burial and burial garb: *in capella purissime conceptionis beatissime Virginis Marie apud sanctum Bernardium, in habitu seraphice religionis sancti Francisci*.[23]

The written and artistic sources discussed above seem to give grounds to conclude that the symbolism of clothing should be seen as having been closely connected with charity, poverty, the concept of *imitatio Christi* and funerary customs. Within the context of concern *pro remedio animae*, clothes — usually of plain rash cloth, or the habit of a mendicant order — had the spiritual significance of heavenly reward. The connection between a charitable earthly life and the salvation of the soul was inspired by the examples of favourite saints, such as St Francis of Assisi or St Catherine of Siena whose portraits were painted in a prominent place near the

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[19] On the practice of burying the dead in the religious habit, see Warr, "Clothing, Charity and Visionary Experience", 196.

[20] IAK SN XXIII, 595.

[21] IAK SN XXIV, 724.

[22] Ibid., 727.

[23] IAK SN XXV, 235 (published in S. Mijušković & R. Kovijanić, *Gradja za istoriju srpske medicine. Dokumenti kotorskog arhiva* [Belgrade 1964], 225).

altar in the church of St Anne at Kotor in the fifteenth century. On the other hand, the charity practised by these saints was an example to Kotor's citizens in their personal devotional practices as expressed in their bequests to the poor.

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## The Medieval Cemetery outside the Eastern Gate of Gamizgrad (*Felix Romuliana*): A Paleodemographic Interpretation

**Abstract**: The medieval cemetery was archaeologically investigated between 1981 and 1992. It consisted of 91 graves containing 95 anthropologically identified skeletons. Further anthropological analysis has established 31 reliably or highly likely adult males, 31 reliably or highly likely adult females, 3 poorly preserved and therefore unsexed adult skeletons, and 30 children, most of whom died within the first ten years after birth. From the paleodemographic viewpoint, this would be the necropolis of a single medieval community showing a dearth of children of all age groups, which may be interpreted in several ways, ranging from reduced procreation to inadequate archaeological excavation.

**Keywords**: anthropology, archaeology, paleodemography, historical demography,  sexes, age groups, individual age, population size, hypothetical settlement size

Even in its first issue, the oldest anthropological journal, *Bulletin de la Société d'Anthropologie* published in Paris since 1860, brought demographic contributions and anthropological papers containing demographic data. Indeed, demography and anthropology have been going hand in hand ever since they became established through their societies, journals and university departments. This combination is not surprising, given that at first the main emphasis of anthropology was on the biology of human populations, looked at both diachronically and synchronically, and that demography is defined as a broad study of population.[1] In their further development, the quantitative demographic and the qualitative anthropological aspects became increasingly integrated. Anthropological issues are combined with statistical data about past populations or population groups as well as with qualitative effects of demographic processes. They are examined and interpreted theoretically and empirically during the research process itself. This may be illustrated by abundant examples, one of which will be the subject of this paper: the medieval cemetery outside the eastern gate of Gamzigrad, which in fact is one of the earliest models in domestic practice of how any archaeologically explored cemetery should be analyzed.

It should be added that paleodemography is the study of ancient populations which addresses issues such as the size and structure of a population in the past. It looks at a particular micro- or macro-region, but most

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[1] I. Schwidetzky-Rösing, "Demographie und Anthropologie", *Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungforschung* 26 (1982), 7–15.

of all, at a particular necropolis. It supplies information about the size of the settlement associated with a given necropolis, about average life spans and mortality frequencies, about the ratio of males and females and their relation to the number of children, about social or marital patterns, about migrations. Briefly, paleodemographic studies are based on human osteological material which should be excavated jointly by anthropologists and archaeologists in order to reconstruct the biological basis, as well as the social background and structure of ancient populations.[2]

The prefix paleo in the term paleodemography is used to indicate that the study is concerned with human osteological material from different periods of the past, that is that it seeks to infer about prehistoric, protohistoric and historical populations (usually up to the sixteenth century) from their preserved and excavated skeletal remains.[3]

Every paleodemographic analysis is based on the data obtained by anthropological methods. To be exact, the data pertain to the sex and biological age of every individual skeleton from an archaeological site. As for the medieval necropolis outside the eastern gate of Gamzigrad, the sex and age of the skeletons were established according to the criteria European anthropologists agreed upon at Szarospátak, Hungary, as early as 1978. The criteria were formulated and published in the form of a manual by D. Ferembach, I. Schwidetzky and M. Stloukal in 1980.[4]

Of course, apart from sex and age assessment for each of the 95 skeletons found in 91 graves, a full anthropological processing was carried out, which means all available osteometric measurements of the skulls and post-

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[2] G. Ascadi and J. Nemeskeri, *History of Human Life Span and Mortality* (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1970).

[3] At the University of Belgrade and in Serbia in general demography is much more institutionalized than physical anthropology. Since 2000, the Department of Demography of the School of Geography in Belgrade offers a programme of basic studies in demography, and at the Institute of Social Sciences operates Demographic Research Centre. Within that framework, historical demography covers the period between the sixteenth century (from the earliest records, namely the Ottoman defters) and the modern age, while paleodemography is only partially covered through anthropological courses. At the School of Philosophy, the Department of Sociology teaches social demography as a separate subject, and the Department of Archaeology covers paleodemography insomuch as it offers courses in physical and social anthropology.

[4] D. Ferenbach, I. Schwidetzky and M. Stloukal, "Recommendations for age and sex diagnoses of skeletons", *Journal of Human Evolution* 9 (1980), 517–549.

cranial skeletons,[5] hereditary markers,[6] paleopathological changes on the preserved bones and teeth[7] etc. The obtained paleodemographic results are shown in Table 1.

| Grave | Sex | Age |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | child | *ca* 4 |
| 2 | unidentified | up to 60 |
| 3 | female | up to 23 |
| 4 | male | up to 50 |
| 5 | male | *ca* 50 |
| 6 | child | 0–1 |
| 7 | child | early months |
| 8 | child | *ca* 2 |
| 9 | male | up to 40 |
| 10 | female | up to 45 |
| 11 | unidentified | adult |
| 12 | child | 6–8 |
| 13 | female | up to 30 |
| 14 | child | 0–1 |
| 15 | male | up to 45 |
| 16 | female | adult |
| 17 | female | up to 40 |
| 18 | female | up to 60 |
| 19 | child | up to 8 |
| 20 | child | early years |
| 21 | male | up to 40 |
| 22 | child | up to 5 |
| 23 | male | up to 21 |
| 24 | male | up to 50 |

| Grave | Sex | Age |
|---|---|---|
| 25 | child | 8–10 |
| 26 | male | up to 45 |
| 27 | male | up to 45 |
| 28 | male | up to 45 |
| 29 | male | up to 50 |
| 30 | male | up to 40 |
| 31 | female | up to 30 |
| 32 | female | up to 30 |
| 33 | male | up to 40 |
| 34 | male | up to 40 |
| 35 | child | *ca* 8 |
| 36 | female | over 50 |
| 37 | male | up to 50 |
| 38 | male | up to 40 |
| 39 | male | up to 50 |
| 40 | female (probably) | adult |
| 41 | male | up to 30 |
| 42 | child | up to 6 |
| 43 | male | up to 45 |
| 44 | male | up to 40 |
| 45 | female | up to 40 |
| 46 | male | up to 40 |
| 47 | child | up to 4 |
| 48 | child | 4–6 |
| 49 | female | up to 21 |
| 50 | male | up to 50 |
| 51 | male | up to 30 |
| 52 | female | up to 35 |
| 53 | male | up to 40 |

[5] R. Martin and K. Saller, *Lehrbuch der Anthropologie* I (Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer Verlag, 1957).

[6] A. C. Berry and R. J. Berry, "Epigenetic variation in the human cranium", *Journal of Anatomy* 101 (1967), 361–379; G. Hauser and G. F. de Stefano, *Epigenetic variants of the human skull* (Stuttgart: Nägele und Obermiller, 1989).

[7] A. Lovrinčević and Ž. Mikić, *Atlas of osteopathological changes of the historical Yugoslav populations* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1989).

| Grave | Sex | Age |
|---|---|---|
| 54 | child | up to 6 |
| 55 | female | adult |
| 56 | female | up to 60 |
| 57 | female | up to 30 |
| 58 | male | up to 45 |
| 59 | child | 0–1 |
| 60 | female | up to 30 |
| 61 | female | adult |
| 62 | female | up to 30 |
| 63 | adult and child in early months | |
| 64 | adult male and child in early years | |
| 65 | female | up to 40 |
| 66 | male | up to 40 |
| 67 | female | up to 35 |
| 68 | female | up to 40 and neonate |
| 69 | female | up to 45 |
| 70 | child | up to 2 |
| 71 | child | 8–10 |
| 72 | female | over 40 and child up to 12 |

| Grave | Sex | Age |
|---|---|---|
| 73 | male | up to 40 |
| 74 | child (male) | 15–19 |
| 75 | child | up to 12 |
| 76 +76 /1 | probably adult female + child in early years | |
| 77 | child | early months |
| 78 | female | up to 60 |
| 79 | female | up to 35 |
| 80 | child | up to 15 |
| 81 | child | 12–15 |
| 82 | child | 0–1 |
| 83 | male (probably) | adult |
| 84 | male (probably) | adult |
| 85 | female (probably) | adult |
| 86 | male (probably) | adult |
| 87 | female | adult |
| 88 | child | 0–1 |
| 89 | female (probably) | adult |
| 90 | female | adult |

A remark to be made about Table 1 concerns grave numbering. Namely, in the excavator's plan of the necropolis, which was published post-humously in 2000,[8] Grave 76 occurs twice in two different places about ten metres apart. In order not to disturb the numbering established during the

[8] S. Jovanović, "Romulijana — srednjovekovna nekropola ispred istočne kapije", *Razvitak* 203–204 (2000), 106; the text was prepared for publication by Dj. Janković, M. Sladić, M. Ružić and V. Manojlović-Nikolić.

excavations (between 1981 and 1992),[9] we have resolved the problem by marking the two graves as 76 and 76/1. Thus the total number of excavated graves becomes 91, of which four are double: No 63 (a woman and a child), No 64 (a man and a child), No 68 (a woman and a child), and No 72 (a woman and a child). As can be seen from Table 1, paleodemographic analysis has encompassed 95 individual skeletons from 91 medieval graves.

Given the state of preservation of the skeletons, that is that Table 1 gives a significant amount of bounding data, especially concerning the individual biological age, our paleodemographic calculation of average life spans (specified according to sex and age) will rely on maximum bounding values. As for sex, the obtained results have already been given: of 95 skeletons, 31 belong to each of the two sexes, excluding 3 poorly preserved adult skeletons which could not be assigned to any sex group. The remaining 30 skeletons belong to children, and the age of most is within the first decade of life.

Statistical analysis of the data contained in Table 1 has produced the following results: the average life span for males was about 42, and for females about 40, which means that for some reason women were biologically more compromised than men. The average life span of children was slightly over 5 years. Or, in other words, the average life span of the whole medieval community was nearly 30. The average life span of adults, namely of those who survived the critical first decade of life, was about 41. This does not mean that there were no individuals whose age at death belonged to the *senilis* age group (over 50/55), which is at least 5 individuals, predominantly female (Nos 18, 36, 56 and 78).

The question is how to interpret the obtained paleodemographic results. These results are: assuming that the necropolis is fully or largely explored archaeologically, and that it forms a single burial ground despite the configuration of the terrain, the medieval population group consists of 31 males, 31 females, 3 unsexed adults, and 30 children, which is an obvious deficit. The average life span was below 30, the highest mortality rate was in the first decade of life (in 27 cases, or about 28 percent of the whole group).

If we accept the assumptions about the degree of investigation and about the necropolis as being a single burial area as "the situation on the ground", our interpretation can go in only two directions: if the situation is the result of inadequate archaeological excavation, we do not consider ourselves competent for interpretation. The assumption about a reduced

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[9] Excavations were directed by S. Jovanović, curator of the National Museum at Knjaževac, while the Gamzigrad Project was directed by Prof. Dragoslav Srejović. The team was numerous and comprised archaeologists and archaeology students.

biological reproduction seems more likely, as shown by elementary statistics giving one third to adult males, females and children each (31 : 31 : 30). This detail will be additionally looked at later.

Further, paleodemographic methods make it possible to calculate a cross-section of a population, which is the number of group members at a given point in time, as well as the size of the settlement with which a necropolis was associated,[10] if it has not been established by using archaeological methods.[11] This cross-section of the population is calculated by using the formula $P = D \times E/T + K$; D being the number of burials (or skeletons), E being average life span (in this case 30), T standing for the length of use of the necropolis (in this case, about one century). To the value of this fraction is then added a constant coefficient (K), which is usually 10 percent (of the obtained value). It should include various dropouts from the group, ranging from marital combinations and various disappearances to possible archaeological blunders (shallow burials, erosions etc.). In some cases this coefficient can rise to a maximum of 20 percent. In our case, with the coefficient K = 10%, the average number of coexisting individuals is 31. On the other hand, if the coefficient is increased to its maximum of 20 percent, the coexistence rises to 34 members of the medieval population group.

Given the average life span of about 30, the deficit in children and the mortality rate of women much before the end of their reproductive period, no more than three generations could coexist regardless of combinations. This would mean, then, that this community needed 10 to 12 houses, apart from economic buildings (depending of the type of their economy). Given that Gamzigrad at the time abounded in building material or even in suitable dwellings, their accommodation only required a small area of the intramural zone. Of course, the inference is at odds with the chronologically synchronous necropolises (or a necropolis) within the walls. The question posed by S. Jovanović[12] as to the exact period of the eleventh century and the circumstances under which the two necropolises at Gamzigrad were formed, "one in front of the eastern gate, the other within the walls", can

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[10] J. Nemeskeri, "Contributions à la reconstruction de la population de Veszprém, Xe et XIe siècles", *Ann. Nat. Mus. Nat. Hung.* n. s. 8 (1957), 367–435.

[11] There is some discrepancy concerning the number and location of cemeteries and settlements at Gamzigrad in the 10th–11th centuries between D. Srejović, Dj. Janković, A. Lalović, V. Jović, *Gamzigrad — kasnoantički carski dvorac*, Exhibition Catalogue (Belgrade: SANU, 1983) and Jovanović, "Romulijana". In addition to this necropolis, the author of this contribution has anthropologically processed the intramural one excavated between 1974 and 1980, as well as the intramural one abutting to the southern wall excavated in 1984.

[12] Jovanović, "Romulijana", 119.

now be answered. If the two are simultaneous with each other, then there were two small communities which used different burial grounds and different zones of Gamzigrad and therefore should not be defined as connected by kinship ties. Their morphological characteristics can be the object of further anthropological analysis.

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## To Crimea via Belgrade
## Thomas Fonblanque to Lord Raglan 1854–1855

**Abstract**: Eleven letters sent to Lord Raglan, Commander-in-Chief of British troops in the Crimea in 1854 and 1855, by Thomas Fonblanque, British Consul General at Belgrade, constitute a little known group of documents that provided useful information for the Allied campaign in the Balkans and the Crimea. The paper, however, pays special attention to the Consul's "Sanitary Memorandum", as it reflects the scope of interest and range of knowledge of the average British diplomat at the time.

**Keywords**: Raglan, Fonblanque, Crimean War, Sanitary report, diplomatic relations, Serbia, Great Britain

The Crimean War (1853–1856) was the greatest war of the nineteenth century. It ended the domination of the conservative "Holy Alliance" in Europe by pitting Russia against France, Great Britain, the Ottoman Empire and Piedmont. The Crimean War marked the beginning of Russia's confrontation with the "West", intermittently continuing into the present day. Moreover, this Great War of the nineteenth century finally established the balance of influence in the Balkans and made an alliance between Russia and Austria permanently impossible.

Even though it was waged in the territory of the Balkans only in its initial phase, the Crimean War marked a great change in Russia's policy towards the Balkan Christians. After 1856, St. Petersburg increasingly supported national, and even democratic, movements in the region. After the Congress of Paris, Great Britain and France entered the interior of the Balkans for the first time, as together with the other Great Powers they had become international protectors of the autonomous status of the Danubian principalities – Wallachia and Moldavia, and Serbia.[1]

Although the Principality of Serbia was not involved in the war, by maintaining neutrality (which according to its international status it was not entitled to do), it saw its international status fundamentally change. As Serbia stayed out of the war, she attracted little attention from the Great Powers, notably Great Britain and France, and especially after 1854 when the theatre of war was transferred to the Crimea, the White Sea and the

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[1] W. Baumgart, *The Crimean War* (London 1999); A. J. P. Taylor, *Struggle for Mastery in Europe* (London 1994[?]); J. Ristić, *Srbija i Krimska vojna* [Serbia and the Crimean War] (Belgrade 1931).

Pacific.[2] A very important place in the archives of Lord Raglan,[3] Commander-in-Chief of the British armed forces in the Crimea, is occupied by his correspondence with Thomas Fonblanque,[4] British Consul-General in Belgrade, which is the material that has been largely neglected.

In the course of one year Fonblanque sent eleven letters to Raglan.[5] He advised him on the political situation in the Balkans, and also on military and health issues, which were particularly important for the British army as it was involved in a war in Eastern Europe for the first time. Fon-

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[2] Č. Antić, *Neutrality as Independence: Great Britain, Serbia and the Crimean War* (Belgrade 2007); B. Lory, *La Serbie et la Guerre de Crimée*, in *Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874)*, proceedings of the international conference held 9–10 December 1987, in commemoration of 175 years of Garašanin's birth (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1991).

[3] Lord Raglan (Fitzroy James Henry Somerset, Lord Raglan 1788–1855) was the Commander-in-Chief of British troops in the Crimea during the war between Russia and the allied forces of France, Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Raglan had fought in the Napoleonic wars. In the 1820s and 1830s, he had taken part in several missions to St. Petersburg and Constantinople. He was a Member of Parliament. Although he had never led troops in a war, he was entrusted with the command of the British forces at Varna and the Crimea. Despite the victorious battles of Alma and Inkerman (after a one-year siege), the public blamed Raglan for the sufferings endured by the British soldiers in the Crimea. Immediately after the abortive general attack on Sevastopol on 28 June 1855, Raglan succumbed to dysentery. Cf. Ch. Hibbert, *The Destruction of Lord Raglan* (London 1963).

[4] Thomas de Grenier de Fonblanque (1792–1860) was the Consul General of Great Britain at Belgrade form 1841 to 1858/60. This short-tempered and often obstinate British diplomat was Lord Raglan's peer, had also fought in great wars in his youth and later embarked on a diplomatic career, but apart from that, Fonblanque was no match for Raglan in terms of either origin or career. After two short-term positions in Europe and the USA, Fonblanque was sent to Belgrade in 1841, and served there until he was retired in 1860. In spite of his desperately prolonged stay in Belgrade, Fonblanque had never lost hope that he would progress his career and do some extraordinary things. Regardless of his contempt for Serbia and local politicians and the fact that he had never believed in the long survival of the Ottoman Empire, Fonblanque tirelessly concocted plans for reforming the Ottoman Empire (its federalization, the establishment of a Serbian vice realm, the introduction of the parliamentary system or economic reform). During the Crimean War, he endeavoured to help the war effort of his diplomacy harbouring expectations that surpassed the abilities of a deft diplomat and diligent civil servant inspired by a patriotic feeling. Fonblanque's correspondence from that period clearly shows his expectations that his providing helpful service to important Foreign Office diplomats (e.g. Hamilton Seymour or Earl Clarendon) would finally earn him promotion or at least transfer from Belgrade.

[5] Letters are kept in London, National Army Museum, Department Archives, Photographs, Film and Sounds, Fonblanque to Raglan, Rev. Ref. 6807/279–305 [hereafter NAM].

blanque's letters to Raglan went further than regular diplomatic reports to the Foreign Office.

Although Fonblanque stayed in the Balkans for more than a decade, this British diplomat is remembered as a representative of the traditional British, and Western, perception of the Orient. His reports to Raglan can be described as a religious, political and ethnical sketch of the Balkans and Ottoman Empire. But rather than being a meticulous analysis of the situation in the countries where British troops were to wage a war for two whole years, they reflect the viewpoint of members of the diplomatic elite and one particular civilization. Among the documents created by Fonblanque, the *Sanitary Report* attracts special attention as it illustrates perfectly a British diplomat's understanding and expectations with regard to the Balkans, and the East as a whole.

Initially Fonblanque sent copies of his reports to the Foreign Secretary, Clarendon. On 20 April 1854, he wrote to his superiors about the prospects of importing horses and cattle for the British army. He claimed that horses could only be purchased in Habsburg Transylvania, which became viable only after relations between Vienna and St. Petersburg cooled. He expected a better outcome for the purchase of pigs and sheep from Serbia, claiming the pigs were "of the best quality" and estimating the possible annual import at 20,000–30,000 pigs and 20,000 sheep. Although he believed pork was detrimental to the health of soldiers (especially during the summer), he urged the authorities to close the deal as soon as possible, since shipping to Constantinople could take four to five weeks. This report was forwarded to Lord Raglan.

In the report of 25 April 1854, the first he addressed directly to the British General, Fonblanque rated Ottoman troops very low, claiming that they could only have success in defence. On the last day of April 1854, he described the situation on the borders of the Ottoman Empire, expressing his opinion that for the first time in a long time it was clear that the Austrian army's dispositions were not directed towards the Ottoman Empire. Fonblanque's correct judgement was based on his belief that Austrian units could march into Ottoman provinces only with the Western allies' consent.[6]

On 27 May, the British Consul General at Belgrade reported on the withdrawal of the Austrian army from the Serbian border and the concentration of about one hundred thousand troops on the Carpathian border of Wallachia and Moldavia. On the same day, he stated his assessment of Serbian weaponry, which, in his view, was not intended for defending the Principality, but rather for waging a war for Austria's South-Slavic areas. He

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[6] Fonblanque to Raglan, Belgrade, 30 April 1854, NAM, Rev. Ref. 6807/279-305.

reiterated his mistrust of the Serbian government, due to Serbia's connections with Russia and their war preparations, estimating that the Serbian army could count on between one hundred and one hundred and fifty cannons. Fonblanque believed, however, that the Serbs would not be able to use more than just one tenth of their arsenal, for which he blamed the French engineer[7] charged with conducting the Serbian armament programme.[8] He also reproached the French for having appointed an inexperienced representative to Belgrade.

At the end of June, Fonblanque passed the report of a Moldavian informer from the town of Jassy on to Raglan. The news from Moldavia was incomplete (since the Russians used to shoot suspicious persons on sight) but very favourable: the Russian troops were in bad shape and utterly demoralized. The British Consul General's further estimation was that the Austrian troops under Archduke Albrecht's command were capable of repulsing a possible Russian attack in Transylvania.[9]

On the same day Fonblanque sent another report to the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in the Crimea. It was a report on the numerical strength of Russian troops, and it was based on the exaggerated figures reported by Colonel Radosavljević, the Austrian Consul General in Serbia. The British Consul General believed that instead of "Eastern exaggeration" one should rather expect the Russian command to hide the number of its troops. He expected to get some news from the British diplomatic agent in Bosnia, Calhune, who was about to travel to Vidin.[10]

During the retreat of the Russian army, Fonblanque became Raglan's important source for the situation in Wallachia and Moldavia. On 28 June 1854 he reported that the Council of Boyars in Bucharest had requested an explanation from the Russian command as to whether the mobilization order for the Wallachian militia was to remain in force and whether its units were to cross into Bessarabia if the Russians were to retreat. The Russian commander was not authorized to answer, although it was certain that the Russian troops were in retreat (heavy artillery and the wounded were heading north using three hundred wagons) and harassed by the Ottoman cavalry.[11]

Once the Russian army withdrew from the Danubian Principalities, Fonblanque's reports lost importance. In the summer of 1854 the British

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[7] Charles Loubry.

[8] Fonblanque to Raglan, Belgrade, 27 May 1854, No 28.

[9] *Ibid.*, 22 June 1854.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] Fonblanque to Raglan, 28 June 1854.

army disembarked in the Crimea. In the course of the following year, until Raglan's death, Fonblanque sent five reports. The first three were only regular notifications he had sent to the Foreign Office.[12]

In a letter to Raglan dated 21 April 1855, Fonblanque warned the British commander of the risks involved with Montenegrins and other Orthodox joining General Beatson's volunteer units. Namely, he was convinced that once they were paid and armed they would go over to the Russian side. He only trusted Roman Catholics and Bosnian Muslims, and believed that the only method for differentiating between these very similar ethnic groups was to subject them to a religious instruction test.[13]

Fonblanque believed that neither the population of the Serbian Principality nor the Bulgarians[14] would be willing to take part in a war against Russia: the former because of their sympathies for Russia and their leisurely way of life, and the latter because of their Russophile attitude and general backwardness.

In his last report to Raglan, written in June 1855, Fonblanque warned that the volunteers arriving in great numbers in the Crimea through his consulate had not been subjected to the test. He specifically referred to some Prussian subjects who had come to him via the Prussian consulate and whom he had found suspicious and directed to the command authorities where they were supposed to be examined.[15]

* * *

The "Sanitary memorandum"[16] highlights the less obvious problems that the army expedition was facing in the Balkans and the Crimea, and was probably the most significant report that Fonblanque sent to the British Commander-in-Chief in the East. The memorandum was quite short and divided into three segments relating to nutrition, bathing and medical treat-

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[12] Fonblanque to Raglan, 14 June 1854; Fonblanque to Raglan, 27 November 1854, No 63; Fonblanque to Raglan, 18 January 1855 (Fonblanque to Radcliffe, 18 January 1855).

[13] It was in 1853 that Władysław (Ladislas) Czartoryski tried to organize a Serbian volunteer unit to support the Ottoman war effort on the Danubian front.

[14] "The Bulgarians are a more pastoral branch of Servian family" (ibid.).

[15] Fonblanque to Raglan, 18 June 1855.

[16] Sanitary reports and memoranda became especially visible in Great Britain after the adoption of social laws in the 1830s. Chadwick's report on the sanitary conditions was particularly important. E. Chadwick, *Report on the sanitary condition of the labouring population of Great Britain. A supplementary report on the results of a special inquiry into the practice of interment in towns. Made at the request of Her Majesty's principal secretary of state for the Home department*, London 1843.

ment. Fonblanque was a professional soldier of his time, and had no specialist medical education or training, but he nevertheless stated his opinion and knowledge on health issues in the region. This long-serving consul in Serbia, who at the beginning of the Russian occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia reported to the Foreign Office on the Russian army's poor nutrition and the weakness of Russian soldiers' skulls (!), sought to express his knowledge and understanding of the region in his report, hopeful that he would impress the influential Lord Raglan.

It was only Raglan's death that stopped the diligent Fonblanque in his enthusiastic struggle to contribute to the British war effort by sending reports and offering advice. One of his letters was written on 18 June, only ten days before Lord Raglan's demise. Fonblanque's reports certainly did not help the British army in the faraway Crimea in any significant way, but they did address very important topics. By the end of the war, the British expedition, part of the victorious army, had lost more than 21,000 men. More than seventy-five percent of the lives were lost to infection![17]

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[17] At the end of the war 2,755 British soldiers were killed, while 2,019 died of wounds. A total of 16,323 deaths were caused by infection. J. Sweetman, *Crimean War, Essential Histories 2* (Osprey Publishing, 2001); *The Encyclopaedia of Military History* (Macdonald and Jane's, 1970), 829; Baumgart, *The Crimean War*, 215–216.

*Appendix*

## Sanitary memorandum

Dietetic-Precautions for officers- and Remarks on Bathing.-

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Ices and sherbets should be taken with caution. When heated by exercise, a (Turkish) cup of black-coffee is a safe restorative.

Avoid eating pork, unless in winter and at no time allow lard to be used in frying or broiling. Where butter cannot be procured, <u>oil</u> is the best substitute.

Never drink porter or any other kind of beer, after wine. - The German precept "Wein nach Bier", - "Lass es seyn," is peculiarly applicable to a hot climate where there is miasma.

The coldest fruits in Turkey are strawberries, currants, peaches, apricots, gooseberries and melons (excepting water-melons), oranges, grapes, figs, raspberries and mulberries may be eaten without danger: - but cherries and all kinds of plumes, apples and pears are safest <u>en</u> <u>compote</u>. Cucumber salads are almost certainly hurtful.

Fish has a worse character than it deserves, as a <u>cause of Indigestion</u>.

<u>Bathing</u>-

Turkish Baths are debilitating <u>always</u> and frequently dangerous, - as they induce pleurisies inflammations of the lungs etc. Even among commercial - men, who have been for long years in the East we constantly hear of fatal results from this cause.

Cold Bathing incomparably the best preservative against every variety of marsh-fever, but it should be suspended when there is any sense of distension about the stomach and abdomen, headache, pain in limbs, and when the nails look bluish on pressure.- of course it is understood that persons who have found, in other places, cold bathing produced shivering, discoloration of the skin,- any indication, in short, of revulsion not being immediate – they will abstain from it wholly, and bathe in tepid water.

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<u>Curative means</u>

Unless as a consequence of some great imprudence or excess, it is rare that another Foreigner is visited with Danubian fever, in any severe form of it, unless he has been exposed for more than a year to the cause of the endemic. Slight cases of Fever are very often cured by lying in bed, under an equable temperature, for a day or two, taking cooling drinks, little food and no medicine.

With robust people, Epson and Carlsbad Salts frequently cure intermittents, without luisiane.

When luisiane has been given with some success, it should be repeated eleven days after the last paroxysm as there is nearly always a tendency for the fever to return at a later date, though it is not always of the same type as before. The most important objective is to guard against the degeneration of intermittents into remittents, especially where large bodies of troops have been in movement.

A week after the French Troops quitted the Town of Braŭnsberg, on their retreat through Prussia in 1813, nine tenths of its adult population had died of Typhus, and in Semlin during the Hungarian War eight Austrian medical officers fell victim by attending military patients whose fevers had become malignant (although they were rarely so in the first stages). In the worst forms of Danubian Fever our medical officers will observe that the brain is attacked without any advance warning symptoms whatsoever. It might easily be mistaken for an apoplectic seizure. In the early treatment of such cases, calomel[18] offers the only hope of recovery, but hope should not be strong. There is one variety of fever (located at Roustchouk and Nicopoli, I believe) which has an interval of twenty-days between bouts, followed by two paroxysms the day after. If the third attack cannot be prevented the patients have never been known to survive it and many die soon after the first and second attacks.

It may reasonably be hoped that dropsy – as a consequence of the Danubian Endemics – will be of much less frequent occurrence with the British Troops than it is with the Austrian Military; firstly because our diet is better than theirs', and secondly, as the German Physicians have a prejudice against the use of calomel as a treatment for liver disease in its incipient stages.

Thos. De Gr. De Fonblanque
Belgrade, 27 June 1854

                                                    *UDC 94:355](477.75)(093.32)"18"*

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[18] Mercury(I) chloride, $Hg_2Cl_2$.

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# Ilija Garašanin on Serbia's Statehood

**Abstract**: A subject usually neglected in the historical work on Ilija Garašanin's role as a statesman has been discussed. Attention has been drawn to the legal status of Serbia at the moment Garašanin entered civil service and how it changed during the thirty years of his political career (1837–67). The first part of the paper looks at his views against the background of three vitally important issues for Serbia's legal status at the time: the constitutional issue, the issue of hereditary succession and the issue of internal independence. His views on the three issues reflect his understanding of the existing status of the Principality of Serbia. The second part of the paper looks at how he envisaged a future Serbian state. Its largest portion is naturally devoted to the ideas put forth in the *Načertanije* (1844), the first programme of nineteenth-century Serbia's national and foreign policy. It also looks at Garašanin's attempt, made through the Serbian representative at the Porte in the revolutionary year 1848, to achieve the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire into a dual monarchy with the Serbian United States (or a Serbian vice-kingdom) as a constituent state. Finally, attention has been paid to the creation of a Balkan alliance through agreements concluded by Balkan states.

**Keywords**: Ilija Garašanin, Principality of Serbia, statehood, Ottoman Empire, *Načertanije*, foreign and national policy programme

## *The legal status of Serbia during Garašanin's political career*

The statehood of the Principality of Serbia was founded upon three types of legal documents: 1) international agreements; 2) Ottoman documents (*firman*s, *berat*s and *hatt-i sherif*s); and 3) Serbia's acts passed after she achieved internationally guaranteed autonomy within the Ottoman Empire in 1830, such as constitutions, laws, agreements, etc.[1] Legal documents of the second type stemmed from the obligations the Ottoman Empire undertook under Russia's pressure to protect Serbia. International agreements concerning the autonomy of Serbia will only be listed: the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), the Akkerman Convention with its Separate Act (1826), and the Treaty of Adrianople (1829). They paved the way to the restoration of Serbia's statehood as a principality as much as the resulting Ottoman legal acts. It should be pointed out that Russia, through these agreements, had coerced

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[1] As a newly-created political entity Serbia had also been founded on the results of the uprisings of 1804 and 1815. For more, see R. Ljušić, *Istorija srpske državnosti* [History of Serbian Statehood], vol. II: *Srbija i Crna Gora, novovekovne srpske države* [Serbia and Montenegro, Serb States of the Modern Age] (Novi Sad 2001).

Ottoman Turkey into solving the Serbian question raised by the Serbian Revolution of 1804. Russia, from 1830 a guarantor of the internationally protected autonomy of the Serbian Principality, was instrumental in establishing modern Serbia's institutions.

The Ottoman Empire established Serbia as a vassal principality under the following legal acts: the so-called Eight *firman*s of 1815/6; the *hatt–i sherif*s of 1829, 1830 and 1833; the *berat* of 1830; the *firman* on free salt trade of 1835; the *firman* on the Prince's release from Constantinople of 1835; the *ferman*s on the flag and coat of arms of 1835 and 1839; the *firman* on establishing the Serbian Agency in Bucharest of 1835; the *firman* on trade of 1837; and the Concordat with the Ecumenical Patriarchate at Constantinople of 1831 with an appendage added in 1836. Towards the end of the first reign of Prince Miloš Obrenović (1815–1839), the Sublime Porte issued yet another *hatt–i sherif* to Serbia, which is known as the "Turkish Constitution" (1838). Under these acts, Serbia was granted the status of an autonomous principality under Ottoman suzerainty. The Principality had its territory, its own administration from the highest (prince) to the lowest (village mayor) level, as well as some elements of statehood (flag, coat of arms, diplomatic representative at the Sublime Porte, agencies, consuls). To be added here are the acts issued by institutions of the Principality of Serbia bolstering Serbian statehood, such as decrees, decisions, regulations and the short-lived 1835 Presentation-Day (or Candlemas) Constitution (*Sretenjski Ustav*).[2]

The early process of statehood restoration culminated with the enactment of the Constitution of the Principality of Serbia in 1835, an action undertaken on the grounds of the rights obtained by the *hatt–i sherif*s on internal autonomy. By 1835 Serbia had obtained all rights of an autonomous state, with the exception of some further minor amendments that were effected by the end of Prince Miloš's first reign. But only a month after the 1835 Constitution was adopted Serbia was forced by both Russians and Ottomans to suspend it as too liberal. This was the first case that Serbia was unable to defend one of her basic rights conferred under the acts on autonomous self-government. Later that year, the Sublime Porte degraded yet another of the Principality's vital rights: the *firman* on the Prince's visit to the Sultan termed the Serbian ruler *baş-knez*, reducing him to the first among

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[2] *Pregled međunarodnih ugovora i drugih akata od međunarodnopravnog značaja za Srbiju od 1800 do 1918* [Overview of international agreements and other acts of international legal importance to Serbia from 1800 to 1918] (Belgrade 1953); M. Gavrilović, *Miloš Obrenović*, vols. I–III (Belgrade 1908, 1909, 1912); R. Ljušić, *Kneževina Srbija (1830–1839)* [Principality of Serbia 1830–1839] (Belgrade: Serban Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1986).

his peers. That was the reason why this *firman* was not made available to the public and remained hidden amongst Prince Miloš's confidential papers.[3]

Those were the results of the twenty years of Prince Miloš's policies towards the Ottoman Empire aimed at obtaining autonomy, if not independence, for Serbia. Therefore, it was in an autonomous but still dependent Serbia that Ilija Garašanin, a member of the next generation of Serbian notables, entered civil service. In the next thirty years (1837–1867) Garašanin grew into one of the most prominent Serbian politicians and statesmen. During the thirty years of his active political career, the obtained legal status of the Principality of Serbia at first was reduced, and then gradually re-established. The autonomous rights of Serbia were reduced under the Constitutionalist regime (1838–1858), with Garašanin as one of its pillars. The beginning of that process may be traced back to the last years of Prince Miloš's first reign, when an oligarchic opposition, which was to become known as Constitutionalists, sought to undermine the autocratic rule of Miloš Obrenović. Serbia's autonomy was narrowed by the following acts: *berat*s issued to Serbian Princes (Milan Obrenović in 1839; Mihailo Obrenović in 1839 and 1860; Aleksandar Karadjordjević in 1842 and 1843; Miloš Obrenović in 1859); *firman*s: on the approval of the First Regency (1839); on sending a imperial commission to Serbia (1840); on the deposition of Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjević (1843); on the appointment of the Prince of Serbia (1843); on the Supreme Court (1844); and on regulating customs revenues (1845). The Sultan's *hatt-i sherif* of 1853 neither impaired nor improved the legal status of the Principality. There were only three acts that strengthened the Principality's legal status: the Treaty of Paris (1856), the *firman* on implementation of the Kanlidja Conference Protocol, and the *firman* on transferring six fortresses to Serbian control (1867). Under the first of these acts, Russian patronage was replaced with the "joint guarantee" of six Great Powers and any Ottoman armed intervention in Serbia without their consent was banned; under the second, the Ottoman Muslim population living within the walls of the six fortresses was to withdraw with the Ottoman garrisons, and the fortresses of Soko and Užice were to be demolished; under the third act, the fortified towns were to be eventually handed over to the Principality of Serbia.[4]

If two phases of the history of nineteenth-century Serbia are compared, that of 1815–1835, and that of 1837–1867 — during which Ilija Garašanin's pursued his political career — it becomes clear that the former

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[3] Archives of Serbia (hereafter: AS), Belgrade, Mita Petrović Collection (hereafter: MPC), 2343.

[4] Other acts, such as trade and other agreements of the Sublime Porte, as well as acts passed by the Principality of Serbia, have not been taken into consideration.

was a period of success in struggling for and obtaining autonomous rights, while the latter was marked by a laborious and often unsuccessful defence of those rights, which were consolidated, and not fully, only towards the end of that period. The first period was, therefore, the one of re-establishing the state and its institutions; the second was for the most part limited to its preservation. The first period may be described as the concluding stage of the Serbian Revolution started by the first uprising in 1804; the second, despite some stagnation, paved the way for a new foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire, leading to full independence in 1878. Garašanin's role in shaping that policy was of major importance.

The period in which Garašanin was engaged in state affairs could be divided into two — the Constitutionalist (1838–1858) and the Obrenović second reign (1859–1867). The former was characterized by violations of the rights conferred upon the Principality of Serbia (with the exception of the 1856 Treaty of Paris), while the main characteristic of the latter was the exercise and further extension of those rights.

Garašanin's views on Serbia's statehood in both periods will be looked at and an attempt will be made to answer the following questions: What was his judgement of the autonomy created by Prince Miloš? What were his ideas for furthering Serbia's statehood status? What did he, as a prominent Serbian statesman, accomplish in that regard?

Under constant pressure to find solutions to numerous problems in Serbo-Ottoman relations, Garašanin obviously had to examine all legal documents that formed the basis of modern Serbian statehood. He left no writings specifically addressing these issues, but wrote about them while dealing with a particular problem in Serbia's relations with the Sublime Porte. In order to be able to make viable proposals to the Ottoman side, Garašanin had to refer to various Ottoman *firman*s, *hatt–i sherif*s, *berat*s or the Russo-Ottoman peace treaties. While studying these documents, Garašanin used to make notes and analyze their contents, without making general assessments either of a particular document or of the corpus of documents relevant to Serbia's autonomy. Garašanins writings only rarely, if ever, describe Serbia as a modern nation-state of revolutionary origin. Only once, in a draft text, did he make a remark that the obtainment of these documents was backed by Serbian weapons, meaning that modern Serbia originated in a national revolution.[5]

Garašanin often invoked different legal documents or their particular provisions when he considered them as necessary during direct negotiations with the Sublime Porte.

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[5] AS, Belgrade, Ilija Garašanin's Papers (hereafter: IGP), 855, 930.

*The constitutional issue*

The Principality of Serbia's constitutional situation provides a solid background for looking at her legal status. Serbia had been granted powers of self-government under the Sultan's *hatt-i sherif*s of 1830 and 1833. When a rebellion (*Miletina buna*) against the autocratic rule of Prince Miloš broke out in January 1835, the Prince's enlightened secretary, Dimitrije Davidović, assured the ruler that the autonomous rights conferred upon Serbia under the *hatt-i sherif*s included the right to proclaim her own constitution.[6] Given that no major step had theretofore been taken in Serbia without the assent both of the Porte as the suzerain power and of Russia as the guarantor of Serbia's autonomy, the passing of a constitution was bound to provoke a reaction both in Constantinople and in St. Petersburg. Promulgation in 1835 of the Presentation-Day Constitution (*Sretenjski Ustav*),[7] without Russia's and Ottoman Turkey's consent, was the last step towards Serbia's full internal self-government and a step further in strengthening her semi-independent position. The Constitution, however, was promptly suspended under the joint pressure of Russia, Austria and Ottoman Turkey. Although the Constitution did not suit his autocratic style, Prince Miloš stood up for it in order to thwart further Russian and Ottoman involvement in Serbia's internal self-government.[8]

Unable to find common ground on the constitutional issue between 1835 and 1838, Prince Miloš and the Constitutionalist opposition eventually agreed, at the suggestion of the British consul and with Ottoman approval, that a new Serbian constitution would be drafted in Constantinople. That turned out to be a significant error, which could not be rectified until 1869. Pursuant to the agreement reached between Russia, Ottoman Turkey and the Serbian deputation, in 1838 the Sublime Porte issued a fourth *hatt-i sherif* to Serbia, which is better known as the "Turkish Constitution". This decree reduced some of the previously granted rights, such as designating Serbia a *province* instead of a *principality*, and authorizing the Porte to intervene in her internal affairs, in particular in the event of conflict between the Prince and the seventeen oligarchs appointed life members of the newly-created Council.[9]

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[6] J. Živanović, "Nekoliko primečanija na knjigu Slaveni u Turskoj od Kiprijana Roberta" [A Few Notes on the book *Slavs in Turkey* by Cyprian Robert], *Spomenik Srpske kraljevske akademije* (1890), 63.

[7] The text of the Constitution was drawn up by Dimitrije Davidović.

[8] For more, see R. Ljušić, *Kneževina Srbija (1830–1839)*, 148.

[9] Ibid., 190–191.

The members of the Council, known as Constitutionalists, includ-
ing the young and not yet very influential Ilija Garašanin, sacrificed some
clearly defined autonomous rights in order to curb the autocratic rule of
Prince Miloš. If they wanted their struggle against the Prince to succeed,
and they resolutely did, they needed support from both Russia and Otto-
man Turkey, who in turn skilfully manipulated the growing discord among
high-ranking Serbian politicians. While Prince Miloš kept defending all
the powers conferred upon Serbia and her ruler until his deposition in 1839,
the Constitutionalists tended to criticize them even when there was no par-
ticular political justification for the criticism.[10]

The 1838 "Turkish" Constitution was formally in force for thirty
years, coinciding with the thirty years of Garašanin's active role in Serbian
politics. Disputed even before its official proclamation in February 1839,
the Constitution remained a source of misinterpretations and rivalries until
it was replaced by the Regency Constitution in 1869. Not even the Consti-
tutionalists under the First Regency (1839–1840) were satisfied with some
its provisions and sought to negotiate their modification with the Sublime
Porte. Apparently, their intention was to ensure modifications to the consti-
tutional provisions that contradicted the Council Organization Act (1839)
in order to enhance the powers of this body in relation to the powers vested
in the Prince.[11]

The Constitutionalists were in particular criticized for their sympa-
thetic attitude towards the Ottomans, but, as it has been noted, they acted
"out of purely political necessity, not out of conviction".[12] Having left Serbia
in the wake of a conflict with young Prince Mihailo Obrenović (first reign
1839–1842), the Constitutionalists actively lobbied in Constantinople for
firming up the powers of the Council as defined by the 1838 Constitution.
Garašanin's opinion on the constitutional issue is obvious from his corre-
spondence with leading Constitutionalists. In his letter to another Consti-
tutionalist Stojan Simić of 17 April 1841, he underlines that a new Council
"will bind the Prince to honour the Constitution sacredly and it will make
sure that others honour it as well". Two years later, the Constitutionalist
regime was established but not yet firmly, and Garašanin informs Stevan
Knićanin: "Reports on the position of Serbia coming from all quarters can-
not be more desirable than they are. They all say that we govern the people

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[10] For details, see ibid., 219–220.

[11] R. Ljušić, "Pitanje dinastije u vreme Prvog namesništva 1839–1840" [The dynastic
issue during the First Regency 1839–1840], *Zbornik Istorijskog muzeja Srbije* 19 (1982),
139.

[12] V. J. Vučković, *Srpska kriza u istočnom pitanju (1842–1843)* [*Serbian Crisis in the East-
ern Question* 1842–1843] (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka, 1957), 43.

well and by the Constitution, so we can be cock-a-hoop about it."[13] As a representative of a political group that sought to consolidate its power, he had to advocate abidance by his country's fundamental law as the source of basic political rights.

In his major text on the foreign policy of Serbia, written in 1844 (*Načertanije*), Garašanin made no reference whatsoever to the legal documents on which modern Serbian statehood was founded. He merely noticed that restored Serbia had made "a fortunate start" and then referred to the firm foundations of the medieval Serbian empire, thereby completely disregarding the achievements of the previous generation (Karageorge and Miloš Obrenović). Garašanin saw the future Serbian state as being founded on the sacred historic right and its citizens as true heirs of "our great [founding] fathers". The founding fathers he had in mind were those of medieval times. The heroes of the modern age were not eligible for his list because they were involved in a state-building process based on the natural right — a national revolution. On the other hand, he believed that Serbs would fare better if their medieval empire were restored, with the Principality of Serbia as its core. He doubted that it could have a stable future unless it contained "a seed of a future Serbian empire".

Being a draft of Serbia's foreign and national policy, the *Načertanije* made no mention of a constitution either. Obviously, the system of government of the future state that was supposed to grow into a renewed Serbian Empire was not an issue Garašanin considered as being of essential importance.

Once firmly-seated in power, the Constitutionalists were not particularly interested in constitutional issues until the final years of their rule. From a period before Garašanin himself took interest in these issues comes a draft text on the "Turkish Constitution" he wrote in 1848. In the revolutionary year 1848, Garašanin was reluctant to consider any modification to the Constitution, which "practically until yesterday was presented to the people as their holy of holies by all ministers". Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjević, in his turn, at the National Assembly held on St Peter's Day (*Petrovska skupština*) in July 1848, stated that he would not allow any violation of the Constitution "even if I have to relinquish princedom". As the relations between the Prince and the Council grew tense, mostly as a result of contradictions between the Constitution and the Council Organization Act, Garašanin addressed this topical question as well: although Serbs were entitled to pass a constitution of their own, the 1838 Constitution was granted by Ottoman Turkey backed by Imperial Russia. The involvement of the two

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[13] *Prepiska Ilije Garašanina* [Correspondence of Ilija Garašanin], ed. G. Jakšić, vol. I: *1839–1849* (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka, 1950), 20.

great powers in this matter was the consequence of the Constitutionalists' impatient striving to limit the power of the Prince. Garašanin admitted that it had been "a very critical political mistake and [that] its rectification must be a matter of utmost priority". Such a "huge mistake made out of necessity", he believed, must never be made again. Should it prove necessary, however, to modify the Council Organization Act and those provisions of the Constitution that hindered progress, Garašanin advised a gradual ("bit by bit") process of rectifying past mistakes; and if that could not be done using the usual procedure, then the general assent of the people, who "have the right to enact their own laws and regulations", would be required. The bottom line was not to allow Ottoman Turkey and Russia to interfere in the autonomous Principality of Serbia's internal affairs.[14] Garašanin's political shift was obvious. He was not an unconditional defender of the "Turkish Constitution" any more. Now firmly in power, the Constitutionalists did not find strict abidance by the 1838 Constitution as indispensable as they had in the early 1840s.

Garašanin became increasingly concerned with constitutional issues in the 1850s, especially between his fall from power in 1853 and the Assembly held in December 1858 on St Andrew's Day (*Svetoandrejska skupština*). Garašanin's papers include three constitution drafts — two written by his hand and one by the hand of Jovan Marinović, Garašanin's influential, Paris-educated assistant. Garašanin's correspondence sheds light on this concern of his. In a letter to Marinović of 1855 he wrote about the ongoing wrangle between the Prince and the Council over the Constitution and the Council's organization. Garašanin's advice to Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjević (1842–1858) was that political activities should not focus on bringing the two documents into agreement because the time was not right for that. Focusing on that particular issue would be like "trying to find a cure for a corpse that we are about to bury". Garašanin once more expressed his concern over foreign involvement in Serbian politics and explicitly warned the Prince that both the Constitution and the Council Organization Act "have endured through the years of practice" and that the Prince should be careful not to "transgress the law" in any way.[15] Only two years later, now as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Garašanin resolutely stood up for a modified and amended Council Organization Act, thereby defending the Constitutionalists' powers from the Prince.[16]

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[14] AS, IGP, 302.

[15] *Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinoviću* [Ilija Garašanin's Letters to Jovan Marinović], ed. St. Lovčević (Belgrade: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1931), vol. I, 277.

[16] Ibid., 408.

Two of the three abovementioned documents preserved among Garašanin's papers are certainly constitution drafts. The form of the third, however, rather suggests the draft of a *hatt-i sherif* regulating the relationship between the Principality of Serbia and the Ottoman Empire, and, as such, is a quite valuable source for our analysis. It is quite unlikely that its provisions could have been included in a constitution promulgated by the Principality's National Assembly or, even less, by the Sublime Porte. Here is what it envisioned, in eleven points, for the Principality of Serbia: 1) Serbia remains a tributary principality paying tribute to the Porte as decreed by the *Hatt-i sherif*; 2) Principality of Serbia enjoys "*perfectly independent internal self-government*"[17] in matters of law-making, religion, trade and river faring; 3) Serbia has her national coat of arms and flag;[18] 4) "The existing form of government, constitutional monarchy, is to be preserved"; 5) Principality has the right to a sufficient number of national soldiers to maintain internal security and defend the borders of the country from "any attack"; 6) "In case of war between the Sublime Porte and any other state, no armies are permitted to enter or cross Serbia";[19] 7) To forestall the above-stated, the Ottoman garrisons should be moved out and the fortifications destroyed; 8) "All Turks"(Ottoman Muslim population) should move out, according to the "*Hatt-i sherif* of 1830", except for those who should choose to stay and submit themselves to Serbian rule, thereby becoming equal in rights to Serbs and enjoying the freedom of religion; 9) The Serbian government has the right to establish relations with foreign governments and to conclude customs and other agreements relevant to the wellbeing and further development of the country; 10) All previous agreements concluded by the Sublime Porte should be examined and rectified if in disagreement with international law or if violating Serbia's autonomy; 11) All areas defined by the "*Hatt-i sherif* of 1833" should be incorporated into Serbia if they remained within Ottoman Turkey through abuse in border demarcation.[20]

This source quotes the rights Serbia was granted by the Sultan's decrees during the first reign of Prince Miloš, but in a somewhat expanded form. The only controversial issue would be that of succession to the Serbian throne, as it was not explicitly addressed. The document not only envis-

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[17] Underlined in the original text kept in Archives of Serbia (AS), Varia, 782.

[18] The further text reads: "according to the *hatt-i sherif*s of 1835 and 1838". These in fact were the *firman*s of 1835 and 1839. See R. Ljušić, *Kneževina Srbija (1830–1839)*, 291–295.

[19] This suggests that the document may be dated to the time of the Crimean War.

[20] See R. Ljušić, *Kneževina Srbija (1830–1839)*, 40–43. Three copies of this document have survived: AS, IGP, 862; V, 782; Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (hereafter ASANU), Belgrade, no. 14233/g.

aged the removal of Ottoman garrisons but also the demolition of the forts. According to it, the Principality would further enhance its autonomy by declaring void all agreements concluded by the Ottoman Empire if harmful to her autonomous status, by effecting minor territorial enlargement, by precluding the entry of foreign troops into her territory and by partially modifying the scope of the acquired rights, especially in relation to Ottoman Turkey.[21] Serbia was supposed to remain a tributary principality, but with a more complete and improved internal self-government. The question of the Porte's privilege to intervene as regards the Council members was not addressed, which left room for undermining the powers of self-government.

Garašanin's constitution draft was not made until after the Treaty of Paris was concluded in 1856. The draft had no title and was divided into three sections: 1) Political rights of the Principality of Serbia (11 articles); 2) Civil rights of Serbs (10 articles); 3) Central government (one article): a) On the authority of the Prince (19 articles); b) On the State Senate (19 articles); and c) On the Principality Council (8 articles). The draft consists of sixty-eight articles, is undiversified and quite conservative. The following articles of the first section deal with Serbia's relationship with Ottoman Turkey. — Serbia is a "Principality dependent on the Sublime Porte", paying an annual tribute of 2,400,000 grossi. — It enjoys "independent national self-government" reflected in the freedom of religion, law-making, trade and river faring, in accordance with the previously issued imperial decree. — The princely title is hereditary in the Karadjordjević family and based on the principle of primogeniture. Should the Prince be without male heirs, he can adopt a son from either male or female sides of the family. Only if even this option fails are the people allowed to elect another princely family. — Serbia has the right to have a representative in Constantinople and agents at "guaranteeing courts". With the Porte's assent, she can establish trading agencies in the Empire and beyond. — The Serbian Orthodox Church remains under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Ecumenical patriarch and is autonomously administered by the Metropolitan of Belgrade. — Serbs are free to trade and travel with their passports throughout the world. — Where there are no Serbian agents, Serbian merchants are represented by the Ottoman consul and, where there is no Ottoman consul, by the consul of a guarantor state [reference to the Treaty of Paris]. — Free use of the coat of arms and flag. — The Serbian government may post a "national guard" at the border on the Sava and Danube rivers, which will prevent "the enemy of the suzerain [Ottoman] court" from crossing into her

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[21] Serbia had been granted a limited right to establish foreign relations even under the Constitution of 1838.

territory. — National Assembly will not convene except for the purpose of electing the ruling family.[22]

The outlined legal status of Serbia is considerably more reduced than the one envisaged in the previous document. Nonetheless, the draft fully conforms to the basic ideas of the Constitutionalist movement, as best evidenced by the article precluding the National Assembly's convening. Sessions of the National Assembly had not been provided for by the 1838 Constitution either, but Prince Miloš swiftly rectified the blunder by issuing in 1839 a decree providing for its regular convening in accordance with customary law.[23] There is no mention of resettling the Turkish population from Serbia or of some other points contained in the previous document. On the other hand, an attempt is observable to ensure the renewal of the right to the hereditary princely title and its transfer to the new ruling House of Karadjordjević. Whatever Garašanin's reference points in drawing up this draft were, his attitude towards the Porte was obviously moderate and cautious. It is difficult to see from the available documentary material whether Garašanin meant for this new constitution to be promulgated at home, with or without the knowledge of Constantinople, or "granted" to the people of Serbia by the Porte.

The next draft contained in Garašanin's archives, handwritten by Jovan Marinović, conceded to the Sublime Porte the privilege of granting a constitution to Serbia.[24] It is known that in late 1858 Marinović asked Garašanin for copies of the Council Organization Act and of the 1835 Constitution. Given that Marinović's draft, unlike Garašanin's, makes no mention of the Karadjordjevićs, it may be assumed that it was drawn up in 1859. Sending the requested copies, Garašanin wondered: "But then, is it possible to maintain a constitution which has already sustained so much damage that, judging by the current situation, it will only survive on paper? I have an opinion about that but dare not express it, and I am even more

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[22] AS, IGP, 656, handwritten by I. Garašanin.

[23] R. Ljušić, *Kneževina Srbija (1830–1839)*, 186.

[24] It is more elaborate and contains ten sections: 1) Political rights of the Principality of Serbia; 2) Civil rights; 3) On the government of Serbia; 4) On the Prince; 5) On the State Council; 6) On the ministers; 7) On the Administrative Council; 8) On courts; 9) On administration; and 10) Conclusion, with a total of 92 articles. The title of the first section and most articles are the same as in the previous draft, which indicates the identical views of the two Serbian politicians and, possibly, their working together. The draft is kept in AS, IGP, 1682. For a reference to this draft as Garašanin's creation, see D. Popović "Garašaninov ustavni nacrt iz 1858. godine" [Garašanin's constitution draft of 1858], in *Ilija Garašanin 1812–1874*, ed. V. Stojančević (Belgrade: Naučni skupovi, vol. 54, Odeljenje istorijskih nauka, vol.16, Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1991), 167–178.

unwilling to express it as I hope that my role in these affairs of state will end soon."[25] Garašanin's predictions that Prince Miloš would not abide by the Constitution of 1838 — which is the main reason why he had been forced to give up the throne and leave Serbia in 1839 — soon proved justified. Miloš reassumed the throne in 1858 and Garašanin resigned soon afterwards, thus putting an end to his work on constitutional issues.

A short note of Garašanin's on the constitutional issue might have been written at about that time. Similarly to what he wrote in the letter to Marinović quoted above, Garašanin had his doubts: "How can it be that the Porte imposes a constitution, which is the source of all laws in Serbia, when Serbia enjoys independent self-government? Turkey gives with one hand but snatches away with the other. Serbia will not be able to have a good legislature until she obviates that influence." The following quotation is quite characteristic: "Both Russia and the Porte made a mistake by imposing this [1838] constitution on Serbia, but Serbia too made a mistake by accepting it, and it is now up to the Guarantor powers to rectify it."[26]

Prior to St Andrew's Day Assembly, which deposed Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjević, Garašanin had actively worked towards dethroning the Prince, while defending other achievements of the Constitutionalist regime.[27] On his return to the throne in 1858, Prince Miloš rejected the "Turkish Constitution", but he sent a delegation to Constantinople trying to ensure that Serbia could promulgate her constitution independently of the Sublime Porte. As the delegation failed, both he and his successor, Prince Mihailo, resorted to issuing separate laws, whereby the Constitution of 1838 was practically suppressed. In 1860 Prince Miloš raised the issue of succession to the throne at the Porte, an opportunity Garašanin used to draft a "confidential document" to revisit constitutional issues. According to him: "This Constitution is either completely derogated or, to put it mildly, it has been interpreted as the Prince and the people have believed to be for the better, in every respect contrary to the way it has heretofore been understood and interpreted. I am not a supporter of the Constitution as it is now." He believed that neither the European powers nor the Serbian people would oppose changing it provided that the change was carried out in a way that would not be "defiant towards the Porte"; the old Constitution should be honoured until the required change was made; the Porte would defend the old Constitution because its suppression violated the Porte's basic right in relation to Serbia; the Powers would be on the side of Ottomans, and

[25] *Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinoviću* II, 17.

[26] AS, IGP, 1153.

[27] S. Jovanović, *Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila 1858–1868* [The Second Reign of Miloš and Mihailo 1858–1868] (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1923), 6.

had the matter been handled differently, they now would be on the side of Serbia. "Someone might say that I, being so sceptical, have little faith in our rights," Garašanin stressed, but added that the only thing he was sceptical about was "our strength to carry it through". Believing that "law alone helps little in politics and a convoluted one not at all", Garašanin suggested reliance on the guarantor powers for resolving the whole issue.[28]

For a few years the constitutional issue seems to have remained outside the scope of Garašanin's interest. It was only the Constitution of 1869 that motivated him, already retired and aged, into writing "My Reflections", a text in which he took a critical look at this important document for Serbia's nineteenth-century statehood building. Garašanin made an overview of Serbia's entire constitutional development. The first thing he wanted to challenge was the appropriated right to promulgate a constitution: "It is not at all the merit of the Pentecost Assembly that the new constitution ended the Porte's privileges that the latter had included in the old constitution," but stressed that the Porte's privileges had already been effectively derogated by Prince Mihailo's laws of 1861. He recognized the merits of Prince Miloš in restoration of Serbia, but he also emphasized the benefits the Principality had gained from the "Turkish Constitution". Still, Garašanin dared point to its greatest weakness — a Council member's responsibility had to be proved at the Porte — and described it as "entirely unpopular". He admitted that it was on the grounds of that privilege that Edhem Pasha had been able to come to Serbia and save Stefan Tenka Stefanović, the instigator of a failed attempt to overthrow the Obrenović dynasty in 1857. After all, had the Prince not ousted him, Garašanin, from office at Russia's behest? Garašanin tried to find a justification for his own political party by stating that the Constitutionalists had not requested that such a provision on Council members be included in the Constitution of 1838. The provision had been included in the Sultan's decree of 1830, which Prince Miloš had accepted without being denounced as traitor for that. Garašanin consciously chose not to mention the difference in the provisions on the responsibility of Council members between the two decrees. Besides, Prince Miloš had not been willing to establish the Council until Mileta's Rebellion (*Miletina buna*), not even according to the much more favourable provision contained in the Decree of 1830. Garašanin also took a look at the 1835 Constitution and emphasized that the Constitutionalists had been instrumental in its promulgation, trying to prove that the 1835 Constitution had been suspended due to "certain" circumstances rather than due to the Constitutionalists' "longing for a foreign constitution".[29]

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[28] AS, IGP, 1133, dated February 1860.

[29] AS, IGP, 1702.

In his letter to Marinović dated August 1869 Garašanin repeated some of these views by criticizing the regents for being satisfied with form, while the content of the Constitution brought no novelty. However, the way the Constitution was adopted and presented to Ottoman Turkey was a significant step towards independence, and there is no doubt that it contained novelties: "The wellbeing of the people depends on those who govern, and progress could and can be achieved both ways, under the old and under the new constitution alike. Honest intention is the best constitution and no other form can compare with it." The way Garašanin treated Serbia's fundamental law on equal terms with "honest intentions" lacking tangible guarantees were obviously the views of an aging conservative bureaucrat.[30]

### The issue of hereditary succession

Hereditary succession to the princely title was an important ingredient of the constitutional issue and played an important role in the legal relationship between the Principality of Serbia and the Ottoman Empire. What was Ilija Garašanin's stance towards the issue? He changed his stance at least twice in the course of his long political career. In the 1830s, as a young Constitutionalist and especially as a Council member and the highest ranking military official, he supported this significant accomplishment of Prince Miloš. When in 1839 the Porte changed its position and deprived the Obrenović family of hereditary right, the Constitutionalists complied with the decision of the suzerain court. They were unable to exert any influence on the Porte as regards the contents of the *berat* on succession issued to Milan, the oldest son of Prince Miloš.[31] However, at the moment the Porte showed willingness to recognize the right of hereditary succession to Prince Milan, the Constitutionalists, through their leaders Toma Vučić Perišić and Avram Petronijević, managed to persuade the Porte into limiting the right to his heir. Since Milan never married and had no children, the right expired with his death. This interpretation of the right of succession suited the Porte and was fully in accordance with the *Berat* of 1830. Under the *berat*s issued to all succeeding princes (Milan and Mihailo Obrenović, Aleksandar Karadjordjević, and anew Miloš and Mihailo Obrenović during their second reigns), the princely title was non-hereditary. It should be noted that under the Constitution of 1838 the *Berat* of 1830 was kept in force, and thus the right of succession as stated therein.

[30] *Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinoviću* II, 256–257.

[31] Milan Obrenović was severely ill and died only a few weeks after being officially appointed prince in 1839. He was succeeded by his younger brother Mihailo (1839–1842).

Serbia's vulnerability stemming from her no longer being a hereditary principality was noticed by Polish émigrés as well.[32] Thus, Prince Adam Czartoryski's advice was that Serbia should regain hereditary right from the Porte, avoiding foreign mediation in the process. Czartoryski's suggestion was accepted and additionally underscored both by his representative in Belgrade, Franz Zach, and by Ilija Garašanin: "*But it must be represented and established as an essential and fundamental law of the state that the princely title is hereditary*" (emphasis R. LJ.). "Without this principle, through which unity becomes embodied in the dignity of the highest office, a permanent and stable union between Serbia and her Serbian neighbours cannot even be imagined." Garašanin only slightly, but essentially, modified Zach's project. Namely, Zach had in mind the Karadjordjević family as the hereditary dynasty. Garašanin's version, on the other hand, omitted this specification and extended the concept into a general principle. Having witnessed the frequent change of rulers, he deemed it best not to link the principle of hereditary succession to any particular dynasty.[33] Yet another fact is important in analyzing Garašanin's view on this issue. In the 1844 *Načertanije* he advocated Serbian support for autonomy to Bosnia, which would make it possible for Serbia and Bosnia to become "more closely associated". The autonomous rights thus obtained were not supposed to include the right of hereditary succession, as that could be an obstacle to a union between Serbia and Bosnia.[34]

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[32] Zach wrote to Croatian leader Ljudevit Gaj in January 1844: "So we accept Serbia as a starting point, but Bosnia should act on her own; Serbia and Croatia should only give advice and moral support; Austrian intervention must be forestalled. Since Bosnia has to be assimilated into Serbia, Serbia being the centre for all Slavs to gather together one day, no new centre should be established in Bosnia, that is, a separate principality with a dynastic family should be avoided there. They should be content with a council headed by someone elected for a term of several years. Should succession be established there, there would be power struggle between two dynastic families, from Bosnia and from Serbia." See V. Žaček, "Češko i poljsko učešće u postanku 'Načertanija'" [Czech and Polish Roles in Creating the "Načertanije"], *Historijski zbornik* XV/1-4 (1963), 43.

[33] This may support the assumption that Garašanin did not present Zach's *Plan* and his own *Načertanije* simultaneously to Prince Aleksandar as the Prince would have noticed the difference easily. In all probability Prince Aleksandar had no knowledge of Zach's *Plan*. Cf. D. Stranjaković, "Kako je postalo Garašaninovo 'Načertanije'" [The Origin of Garašanin's *Načertanije*], *Spomenik SAN* XVI/87, 106. See also D. Mackenzie, *Ilija Garašanin. Državnik i diplomata* (Belgrade: Prosveta 1982), 75. The original monograph was published in English: D. MacKenzie, *Ilija Garašanin. Balkan Bismarck* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

[34] Stranjaković, "Garašaninovo 'Načertanije'", 88. Prior to the influence of the Polish emigration, Garašanin's views on succession to the throne were quite different. Zach or Tschaikovsky referred to that in a letter to Czartoryski: "He hasn't fully grasped the sig-

Garašanin informed Prince Aleksandar about Czartoryski's *Counsels* in 1845. It was probably this that encouraged the Prince's friend and influential Council member, Stefan Petrović Knićanin, to raise the issue of succession to the throne of Aleksandar Karadjordjević, at first before the National Assembly and then at the Porte. Knićanin suggested the method used by Prince Miloš. Minister of the Interior at the time, Garašanin did not accept the suggestion: "Prince Miloš obtained hereditary right or, to be more precise, Serbia obtained it for her ruler, in a much better and firmer way than the one you suggest, and yet it was later lost in specific circumstances as if it had never been." Aware of the importance of this privilege, he added: "Without being confirmed by the Suzerain Court, hereditary succession … would have no validity at all." A proposal submitted to the Porte through Avram Petronijević was rejected in early 1848, one of the stated reasons for the rejection being Garašanin's disapproval of it.[35] This shows that Garašanin was well aware of the importance of the right of hereditary succession for Serbia. This right, however, was hardly reconcilable with the Constitutionalists' pro-Ottoman policy pursued at the time, whose interest was a feeble ruler, such as the one bearing a non-hereditary title.

It was only once more that Garašanin took interest in the issue during the reign of Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjević — in his already discussed constitution draft. Although the draft envisaged the Karadjordjevićs as hereditary dynasty, it appears obvious that the issue was of secondary importance to the Constitutionalists, and therefore to him. To clarify, the Constitutionalists sacrificed a state right to their political goals, the foremost being to strengthen the powers of the Council in relation to the ruler. It should be noted here that Jovan Ristić was aware of the divisions within the Constitutionalist leadership over the succession issue: Knićanin sided with Avram Petronijević, whereas Garašanin "objected, arguing that the best way for a prince to ensure succession for his offspring is to bring them up properly".[36] There seems to have been a direct link between this view of Garašanin's and the accusations that he harboured the ambition of becoming a prince himself.[37]

The succession issue became particularly important after the Obrenovićs reassumed the throne in 1858. In his capacity as Prime Min-

nificance of Slavs yet or the need [of Serbia] for a [hereditary] dynasty, but he is capable of figuring it out." In Mackenzie, *Garašanin*, 75.

[35] AS, IGP, 250, 255; *Prepiska*, 134–136; Ljušić, "Pitanje dinastije", 118–119.

[36] J. Ristić, *Spoljašnji odnošaji Srbije novijeg vremena 1848–1860* [Foreign Relations of Serbia in Recent Times 1848–1860] (Belgrade 1887), vol. I, 106–107.

[37] See D. Stranjaković, "Ilija Garašanin", unpublished biography, ASANU, 99–107; Mackenzie, *Garašanin*, 245 and *passim*.

ister (1861–1867) during the second reign of Prince Mihailo, Garašanin must have dealt with it, but there is little evidence in the surviving documentary material. In one of his letters to Marinović, Garašanin reported that the Prince wanted him "to discuss the issue of succession with you and to submit an opinion on what should be ordered and how".[38] A law passed in 1859 ensured succession to the throne for the Obrenovićs, whereby the formal aspect of the issue was resolved, and therefore this question was not raised at the Porte during Garašanin's mission to Constantinople in 1861. In reality, however, the issue was irresolvable because Prince Mihailo had no offspring. Towards the end of Prince's Mihailo reign Garašanin brought up the issue before the cabinet: "Serbia is intent on becoming the leader of a Yugoslav state in the east and on keeping that position for good." He believed that the goal was unattainable "without a practically secured dynasty", an issue that should be resolved promptly if Serbia intended to preserve the prestige she had acquired among the South Slavs. Garašanin believed, then, that a strengthened and firmly established dynasty meant better prospects for Serbia to accomplish "South-Slavic unification".[39]

Never before in his political career had Garašanin been as resolute to resolve a problem as he was about the succession issue. But only two days after he divulged his proposal, and partly as a result of it, Garašanin was ousted as both Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. It should be noted that he deemed feeble and non-hereditary rulers more suitable for his political purposes than powerful and hereditary. At any rate, Garašanin's attitude towards Serbian rulers remains a most controversial and little studied topic.[40]

### Internal independence

The constitutional and succession issues were closely linked to that of preservation of internal independence. In his capacity as long-time head of the Interior, Garašanin must have been concerned with this important issue. A threat to internal independence could come not only from Ottoman Turkey

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[38] *Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinoviću* II, 116.

[39] AS, IGP, 1623; V. J. Vučković, *Politička akcija Srbije u južnoslovenskim pokrajinama Habsburške monarhije 1859–1874* [Political Actions of Serbia in the South-Slavic Provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy 1859–1874] (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1965), 317–319; Mackenzie, *Garašanin*, 433; G. Jakšić and V. J. Vučković, *Spoljna politika Srbije za vlade kneza Mihaila. Prvi balkanski savez* [Foreign Policy of Serbia during the Reign of Prince Mihailo. The First Balkan Alliance] (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1963), 430–436.

[40] See Stranjaković, "Ilija Garašanin", 108–144.

but also from other states, most of all the Habsburg and Russian empires. He saw Austrian and Russian influences as potentially the most dangerous for Serbia's national autonomy. It was quite early in his career that he (in the *Načertanije* of 1844) put forward his assessment that Austria "will be a permanent enemy of a Serbian state". His refusal to accept an Austrian medal was in keeping with Serbia's foreign policy, and was meant to demonstrate that it was not the Habsburgs but the Serbian cause that he had supported during the 1848 revolutions.[41] Garašanin repeated many times in his correspondence that "Austria means to use her power to endanger the small and weak Serbia". Frustrated at Austria's repeated meddling in Serbia's internal affairs, carried out via the Austrian consul and the domestic pro-Austrian supporters, among whom he occasionally included Prince Aleksandar himself, Garašanin refused in 1854 to become engaged in state affairs just because "Austria has assented" thereto.[42] The Austrian influence on Serbia's affairs after the 1856 Treaty of Paris he saw as the greatest evil that could befall the Principality.[43]

While proving beneficial to Serbia's foreign affairs, Russian patronage stifled her internal independence; as if Russia sought to turn the Principality of Serbia into just another Russian province.[44] Garašanin particularly emphasized this point in the *Načertanije*: "The more autonomously Serbia is governed, the less confidence Russia will have in her." Russia would seek to change that and "to disparage Serbia's independent policy".[45] One of Garašanin's notes betrays his anger at Russia for not respecting the right of the Serbs to travel with "the Prince's passport", a right granted by the Sultan's Decree of 1830. Russian consuls were the only who took away the Prince's passports from Serbian travellers, even from distinguished politicians, replacing them with Russian ones, thereby violating a major right in the area of international relations.[46]

Although Garašanin was inclined to cooperation with Western Powers, he soon became disappointed with them as well. "One particular event made me never trust Russians, and I did not trust them and was right not to trust them. This now is enough to make me distrustful of others as well", he wrote to Marinović in June 1854 upon hearing the unconfirmed news

[41] S. Jovanović, "Spoljašnja politika Ilije Garašanina" [Foreign Policy of Ilija Garašanin], *Političke i pravne rasprave* [Political and Legal Treatises] (Belgrade 1932), vol. II, 347.

[42] *Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinoviću* I, 182, 192–193, 201, 227.

[43] Jovanović, "Spoljašnja politika", 349.

[44] Ibid., 345.

[45] Stranjaković, "Garašaninovo 'Načertanije'", 82–83.

[46] AS, IGP, 1401.

that a secret agreement between the Western Powers and the Ottomans had given the green light to Austria to enter Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Albania and Serbia. However, the final disappointment came after the Treaty of Paris. "Europe acts the same as Russians have been acting, but sometimes some good can come out of a great evil … Thanks to Europe for acknowledging our achievements, it is nice and fair of her; she could just as well have taken away something", he wrote to Marinović sarcastically. Apparently, Garašanin had expected a more significant Western support for the strengthening of Serbian statehood in the Paris Treaty process. In an outline text analyzing the provisions of the Treaty, Garašanin reasserted his gratitude to Europe for taking upon herself to guarantee the acquired rights of the Principality of Serbia. He considered the statehood of Serbia as being the result of negotiations between the Serbian side and Ottoman Turkey and Russia. "These negotiations and agreements had, when necessary, been accompanied by arms until the present rights of the Serbian People were established." Few Serbian politicians had as serious reservations about the Treaty of Paris as he did.[47]

Garašanin emphasized that Serbia was not a "children's ball" for others to play with: "Serbia shall not obey the unconditional orders of any power, nor shall she acquiesce in anything under duress, because it would mean depriving her of all merit, and that would be understood here as a humiliation to the nation and could entail difficulties unprovoked by Serbia in any way."  Should the Principality prove unable to resist pressure from the powers: "If there has to be a master to rule over Serbia, all Serbs favour [Ottoman] Turks and nobody else." In Garašanin's view, the politics aimed at defending Serbian statehood faced many a danger.[48]

During his long political career Garašanin was in a position to promote Serbian statehood by furthering internal self-government. At the beginning of the Constitutionalist regime he was convinced that Serbian citizens "believe they enjoy the best possible rights". In the revolutionary 1848, however, he suggested to Prince Aleksandar to act accordingly and launch a "more effective" policy towards the Porte. Without the Prince's knowledge, he began working towards the establishment of a Serbian vice-kingdom within the Ottoman Empire through the Serbian representative at Constantinople Konstantin Nikolajević. The Grand Vizier's criticism aimed later that year at the National Assembly's convening elicited his bitter response in a letter to Acika Nenadović: "We have found ourselves standing on thin ice more than once because of their [Ottoman] lame politics and we have had trouble getting rid of it; they should at least let us run our in-

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[47] Ibid., 1011; *Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinoviću* I, 215–217, 303–304.

[48] *Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinoviću* I, 118, 196, 203, 307.

ternal affairs the way we know best." He took this move of the Porte as the greatest insult to Serbia, because it violated the ancient custom-based right to convene a popular assembly. Yet, Garašanin only stood up for this right in relation to Ottoman Turkey. Whenever this issue was not in the focus of Serbo-Ottoman relations, he ignored it completely. Before the National Assembly Act was passed in 1860, Garašanin stood up for the Assembly's right to convene only twice (1848, 1858), on the two occasions the Assembly did convene.[49]

In the first phase of their regime the Constitutionalists were unwilling to spoil relations with the Porte by raising the issue of Ottoman withdrawal from Serbia. They raised it only in 1846 by invoking the stipulations contained in the *hatt-i sherif*s. In the summer of 1848, they were expecting a favourable decision from the Porte and a new Sultan's decree, planning to announce it at St Peter's Day Assembly.[50] It was this issue that most burdened Serbo-Ottoman relations in the following years, and it was paid special attention during the second reigns of Prince Miloš (1858–1860) and Prince Mihailo (1860–1868), when it was Ilija Garašanin's responsibility.

Until the end of the Constitutionalist period, there was no significant shift in Garašanin's attitude towards the Porte as regards securing the Principality's state rights. Serbia was granted yet another *hatt-i sherif* (1853), which simply confirmed the existing arrangement. Prince Miloš rejected it, as he occasionally did with legal acts that were to no betterment to the statehood of Serbia. Threatened by Austria the following year, the Constitutionalists, Garašanin included, drew up a memorandum requesting protection from the Porte.[51]

Garašanin was generally opposed to any direct involvement of the Porte in Serbia's internal affairs. In a letter to Marinović from Vienna (1853), he asked: "For God's sake, what is Shekib Effendi doing down there again?" In Garašanin's opinion, national rights were jeopardized whenever the Porte wanted to exercise its privileges inside Serbia.[52] A few years later, the Porte for the first time exercised the right it had under Article 17 of the "Turkish Constitution" to intervene in a conflict between the Council and the Prince. There is no evidence that Garašanin, who held the office of Minister of the Interior, was against the visit of an Ottoman pasha to Serbia. After all, Edhem Pasha was coming to the Constitutionalists' aid. In the

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[49] The sessions of the Assembly that elected Aleksandar Karadjordjević Prince of Serbia have not been taken into account.

[50] Matica Srpska, Novi Sad, Rukopisno odeljenje [Department of Manuscripts], No. 25276; *Prepiska*, 35, 37, 98, 104, 133, 197, 372–374.

[51] *Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinoviću* I, 163, 167, 190, 245.

[52] Ibid., 139, 401.

eyes of many, the representatives of the Constitutionalist party, headed by Garašanin, did not take a very dignified stand. They received Edhem Pasha in front of the city walls with fezzes on their heads, and Garašanin kept the fez on while riding with the pasha about the town in the princely carriage. The guest was accommodated in the inn called "The Serbian Crown", but the signboard was removed. It made a bad impression on the younger generation who believed that the Treaty of Paris had strengthened Serbia's autonomous rights. Jovan Ristić pointed out: "These fezzes signal the political course for the Opposition better than any flag."[53]

The stand taken by the Constitutionalists may be justified by the necessity of resolving the conflict between the Prince and the Council, but their performance undoubtedly undermined Serbia's statehood. Garašanin must have been aware of that because it was as early as then that he suggested a change to the article of the 1839 Council Organization Act stipulating that a Council member could not be ousted without the Porte's knowledge. His suggestion was accepted. Not much later he defended, also before the Porte, the right of Serbia to convene a session of the National Assembly (the one held on St Andrew's Day). In doing so, however, he did not invoke the right that the Principality had been granted in 1839 in accordance with customary law, but claimed that the right had not been denied by the Constitution. Garašanin was instrumental in dethroning Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjević in 1858, but this time, in order to avoid further Ottoman involvement in Serbian affairs, he sought no aid from the Porte in the form of a *firman*.[54] Even so, the fact remains that Garašanin, guided by the current political agenda and obviously inconsistently with his *Načertanije*, handed the Serbian ruler over to the Ottoman garrison in the Belgrade fortress. When the Obrenović dynasty reassumed the throne in 1858, Serbia's policy towards the Porte completely changed. The Constitutionalists, as their representatives, had not ensured any additional privilege for Serbia, except for the patronage of the guarantor powers, and they had lost her right to the hereditary princely title.

It was not easy for Garašanin to cast off deeply rooted Constitutionalist ideas. When the Porte and Prince Miloš appointed a temporary government until the ruler's return to the country, he stood up against it as a violation of the people's privilege. He complained to Marinović that no one had ever considered Stevča Mihailović's acceptance of the office of *kaymakam* a major transgression, but had he, Garašanin, taken the office (and he was accused of harbouring such an ambition), everyone would have

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[53] J. Ristić, *Spoljašnji odnošaji Srbije* [Foreign relations of Serbia] (Belgrade 1882), vol. I, 253–259.

[54] Stranjaković, "Ilija Garašanin", 89.

considered it a "major transgression". Ottomans thought of him as their greatest foe, and he, in turn, named a "Turk" every person who should "violate Serbia's rights".[55] There was nothing left to Garašanin but to resign as Minister of the Interior.

Prince Mihailo knew how to put Garašanin's political skills to a good use. Already in 1861 he entrusted him with a mission to Constantinople in order to resolve the issue of Ottoman withdrawal from Serbia. Garašanin tried to give the issue a more modern form. The instructions he received insisted on basing his position in negotiations on the clear stipulations of the Sultan's Decree of 1830. The new way of enforcing this unexercised right was to be as follows: "The Turks in Serbia living out of towns would submit themselves to the Serbian authorities and would have equal rights and duties to Serbs," while the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire would be limited to towns. According to this compromise solution, Serbia would give up resettling Turks from Serbia and the Porte would surrender control over the Ottoman-held part of Belgrade. Following his instructions, Garašanin submitted a memorandum to the Porte, and notified foreign representatives in Constantinople of its contents. The memorandum was written in a moderate tone.

Garašanin must have thoroughly studied both *hatt-i sherif*s. Some of his notes show how much effort he had put into finding the most appropriate solution to the problem. The Decree of 1830 was more favourable to Serbia than the one of 1833. Garašanin claimed that the unfavourable clauses of the latter should be contested on the grounds of the former being the result of an agreement between the Porte and the Serbian representatives. However, both decrees came as a result of the same process and in both cases Russia mediated, with the difference that in 1833 she supported a solution that was more favourable to the Ottoman side.

Garašanin was told by the Ottoman Grand Vizier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Serbian proposal was moderate, but his mission failed nonetheless, and due to a number of reasons, to mention but the insufficient support of the Great Powers, the change on the throne and a freer approach of Belgrade's press. Moreover, the Porte was unwilling to give up control over the fortress of Belgrade, and that was the most controversial point in negotiations, apart from the issue of compensation to the Muslim population who had already left Serbia and the issue of boroughs. In Garašanin's opinion, previously made concessions had not helped resolve the problem.[56]

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[55] *Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinović* II, 1–2, 27–28, 31.

[56] AS, IGP, 1147, 1161, 1177, 1183, 1192, 1204, 1213; *Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinoviću* II, 87, 91; Jakšić and Vučković, *Spoljna politika*, 66–71.

The issue of Ottoman withdrawal from Serbia was addressed more resolutely after the bombardment of Belgrade in 1862. Garašanin was not satisfied with the resulting Kanlidja Conference Protocol (1862), as evidenced by the outline of a text preserved in his archives.[57] The Serbs insisted on the *hatt-i sherif* of 1830, the Ottomans on the one of 1833. Garašanin wrote about that in 1863: "And besides, Serbia has law on her side. The *hatt-i sherif* of 1830 proves it most clearly. If the Porte invokes a later decree, it just repeats its earlier injustice towards Serbia because it had no right to abolish an already acquired Serbian right without Serbia's consent, and since Serbia did not consent and she never will under any conditions or urging, the relevant clause of the *firman* can have no validity to Serbia."[58]

Such a resolute stance, taken not only by Garašanin but by Prince Mihailo as well, was bound to bear fruit. A Serbian representative in Constantinople, Jovan Ristić informed Garašanin about his talks with the British ambassador to the Porte (Bulwer), who suggested that the Prince should come to Constantinople, and promised him he would get everything except towns. Garašanin made a comment about the British diplomat's suggestion in a letter to Marinović: "Can this advice be taken as anything but derision? The Prince, having read the cable, laughed wholeheartedly and said in jest: 'Cable to Ristić that the Prince is ready to go to Constantinople any time and that he asks for nothing but the towns'." The shift in the Principality's stance on the issue is obvious. Serbia went a step further from her initial request for assuming legal authority over her Muslim population, and requested control over the towns, which was not envisaged under the *hatt-i sherif*. Ristić submitted an official document to the Porte and it was the first time that Serbia voiced an extension of her autonomous rights. By surrendering the Ottoman-held fortresses, the Porte was supposed, according to Garašanin, to repay Serbia a "debt of thirty odd years with no interest charged". This policy soon bore fruit and in 1867 the Ottoman garrisons withdrew from six towns they still held. According to the *firman*, the towns were entrusted to the Prince for safeguarding, and Ottoman suzerainty was represented by Ottoman flags flied next to Serbian.[59] That was the greatest success of Serbian diplomacy during the second reign of Prince Mihailo and Garašanin's last triumph. After Miloš's achievements in the 1830s, that was the most significant step towards re-establishing Serbia's statehood.

As Garašanin is known to have been "more a man of great ideas than of great deeds,"[60] his vision of a future Serbian state deserves a more elabo-

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[57] AS, IGP, 1245.

[58] Ibid., 1163.

[59] *Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinoviću* II, 115, 147, 173, 190.

[60] Jovanović, "Spoljašnja politika", 352.

rate approach. That Ilija Garašanin showed a constant concern for the future and unification of the Serb nation is illustrated by his letter to Jovan Marinović of 21 May 1860: "I shall be concerned with the destiny of our areas as long as I live, you know that."[61] What were Garašanin's ideas for the future? The best evidence can be found in the *Načertanije.*

*Notions of the state in the* Načertanije

It is a fact that the Constitutionalists came to power showing a sympathetic attitude towards the Ottomans. Garašanin's pro-Ottoman stance is quite obvious at the time he drew up the *Načertanije.* The same year (1844) he wrote to Toma Vučić Perišić: "The present government is quite enthusiastic about the Porte."[62] Over time the sympathy paled. After all, it had stemmed from the Constitutionalists' political interest to depose the Obrenović dynasty and establish their regime rather than from a distinct political belief. Garašanin's *Načertanije,* then, appeared at a time the Constitutionalist regime had not yet been established firmly enough and Garašanin's sympathetic attitude may in fact be interpreted as a cover for his national strivings.

Garašanin wrote the *Načertanije,* a programme of Serbian national policy, while holding the office of Minister of the Interior, which is not an irrelevant fact. The *Načertanije* would probably not have been drawn up at all had it not been for the involvement in Serbian affairs of the Polish emigration. Preparing a conspiracy against Russia, Polish patriots, led by Prince Adam Czartoryski, reached the Principality of Serbia as well. The moment was right given that relations between the Constitutionalists and Russia were quite strained. Even so, Garašanin was reluctant to join the conspiracy and sought not to let Polish agents draw Serbia into an open conflict with Russia. Although quite young — he was thirty-two in 1844 — Garašanin was perceptive enough to realize that the adversary of his people was Ottoman Turkey rather than Russia. The Poles felt quite differently.

Ilija Garašanin's *Načertanije* has received varied interpretations in Serbian, Yugoslav and international historiography. Most of the time it has been seen either as a pro-Yugoslav — Dj. Jelenić, F. Šišić, D. Stranjaković, Lj. Aleksić, V. J. Vučković and V. Žaček, or as a pro-Greater Serbian project — J. D. Mitrović, P. Šimunić, M. Valentić, J. Šidak, V. Čubrilović, Ch. Jelavich, N. Stančić, P. Hehn, S. Murgić, D. Poll, O. Kronsteiner, W. Petrich,

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[61] *Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinoviću* II, 64.

[62] *Prepiska Ilije Garašanina,* 104.

and D. Mackenzie. [63] Only R. Perović and J. Milićević see the *Načertanije* as a Serbian programme, though with "some Greater-Serbian elements", as well as D. T. Bataković,[64] but without the latter remark. More recent work of Croatian and other foreign historians and politicians has added to the "Greater-Serbian" interpretation of the *Načertanije* by alleging that it was the source of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, the purported cause of Serbian expansion and ethnic cleansing in the late twentieth century. Arguing for one interpretation of Garašanin's *Načertanije* or another authors often disagree on many essential points, but not all are exclusive-minded. For example, Mackenzie claims that Garašanin was at once an advocate of Greater Serbia and "the spiritual father of the Yugoslavia of 1918".[65] Characteristically, all but one Croatian historian interpret the *Načertanije* as a basis for an alleged Greater-Serbia policy, moreover, as a basis for Serbian

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[63] See e.g., Dj. Jelenić, *Nova Srbija i Jugoslavija. Istorija nacionalnog oslobodjenja i ujedinjenja Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca od Kočine krajine do Vidovdanskog ustava (1788–1921)* (Belgrade 1923); F. Šišić, *Jugoslovenska misao* (Belgrade 1937); D. Stranjaković, *Jugoslovenski nacionalni i državni program Kneževine Srbije 1844* (Srem. Karlovci 1931); idem, "Garašaninovo 'Načertanije'"; V. J. Vučković, "Knez Miloš i osnovna politička misao sadržana u Garašaninovom 'Načertaniju'", *Jugoslovenska revija za medjunarodno pravo* I/3 (1954), 44–58; idem, "Prilog proučavanju postanka 'Načertanija' (1844) i 'Osnovnih misli' (1847), *Jugoslovenska revija za medjunarodno pravo* VIII (1961), 49–79; Lj. Aleksić, "Šta je dovelo do stvaranja 'Načertanija'", *Historijski pregled* I/2 (1954); Žaček, "Češko i poljsko učešće"; J. D. Mitrović, "Dr. Dragoslav Stranjaković: Srbija od 1833 do 1858 god.", *Glasnik Jugoslovenskog profesorskog društva* XIX (1938–39); P. Šimunić, *Načertanije: Tajni spis srbske nacionalne i vanjske politike* (Zagreb 1944); M. Valentić "Koncepcija Garašaninovog 'Načertanija' (1844)", *Historijski pregled* VII (1961); J. Šidak, "Hrvatsko pitanje u Habsburškoj monarhiji" I, *Historijski pregled* IX (1963); V. Čubrilović, *Istorija političke misli u Srbiji XIX veka* (Belgrade 1958); Ch. Jelavich, "Garasanins Nacertanije und das grosserbische Programm", *Südostforschungen* XXVIII (1968); N. Stančić, "Problem 'Načertanija' Ilije Garašanina u našoj historiografiji", *Historijski zbornik* XXII-XXIII (1968–69); P. Hehn, "The Origins of Modern pan-Serbism: The 1844 Nacertanije of Ilija Garasanin", *East European Quarterly* 2 (1975); S. Murgić, T. Bogdanić, S. Budimir, *Kontrapunkt slobodi. Kritika "Načertanija" Ilije Garašanina* (Zagreb 1997); D. Poll, in *Die slawische Sprachen* 29 (1992), 55–156; O. Kronsteiner, "Die geheime Programmentwurf Ilija Garašanins für eine serbische Politik, *Die slawische Sprachen* 31 (1993), 39–89; W. Petrich, Karl Kaser, Robert Pichler, *Kosovo, Kosova, Myten, Daten, Fakten* (Klagenfurt, Vienna, Ljubljana, Tuzla, Sarajevo 1999); Mackenzie, *Garašanin*, passim.

[64] J. Milićević, in *Istorija srpskog naroda* V-1 (Belgrade: SKZ, 1981), 269–273; R. Perović, "Oko 'Načertanija' iz 1844. godine", *Istorijski glasnik* I (1963); D. T. Bataković, "Načertanije: baština ili hipoteka", preface to *Načertanije Ilije Garašanina*, ed. M. Josić-Višnjić (Belgrade 1991) and idem, in *Nova istorija srpskog naroda* (Belgrade 2000). Cf. also D. T. Bataković, "Ilija Garašanin's Načertanije: A Reasessement", *Balcanica* XXV-1 (Belgrade 1994), 157-183.

[65] Mackenzie, *Garašanin*, 83.

expansionism in the last decade of the twentieth century. There also are historians who have not attempted to define what the main objective of the *Načertanije* was (Vladimir Ćorović, Vasilj Popović, Milorad Ekmečić).[66] Indicatively, between the two world wars the *Načertanije* was seen as a Yugoslav project and after the Second World War it has been increasingly seen as Greater-Serbian and invasive. Historiography has obviously been under the sway of shifting politics, notably during the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Of course, this does not go for all researchers, especially not foreign, but it is a fact that most have been unable to detach themselves from the political needs of the regimes in power. The age-old Austro-Hungarian claim that the Principality, and later Kingdom, of Serbia pursued a Greater-Serbia policy, a claim subsequently adopted by the Comintern — though, of course, in a changed, interwar, setting — has been influencing historical thinking about Garašanin's *Načertanije* until this day.

In analyzing the *Načertanije* it is important to determine what kind of a Serbian state Garašanin envisaged, and to identify what elements of this at once disputed and praised document may be described as Serbian, Greater-Serbian and Yugoslav.

The *Načertanije* was preceded by two documents: Czartoryski's *Counsels* and Zach's *Plan*. The *Načertanije* was an elaborate draft of Serbian national policy. It consists of an introductory part and two chapters: "Politics of Serbia" and "On the means to achieve the Serbian cause" (divided into five subchapters). The introduction and the first chapter are the core of the document as they contain Garašanin's ideas on a future Serbian state. The rest of the document offers guidelines for Serbian propaganda policy.

Garašanin's motivation was that Serbia needed "*a plan for her future*" (emphasis R. Lj.), that is that she needed to set her foreign policy on a course that should be pursued "over a longer period". As Garašanin set no deadline for the realization of the goal, it remains uncertain what his estimations were. Given that he envisaged preparations for accomplishing the goal to unfold "while Serbia is under Turkish rule", it may be assumed that he did not expect its realization until the cessation of Serbia's vassal status at the earliest. Whatever his expectations may have been, he insisted that faith in the future had to be kept. It was only four years after Garašanin's death that the Principality became fully independent (1878), but that country was nowhere near his vision.

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[66] V. Ćorović, *Istorija Jugoslavije* (Belgrade 1933) and *Istorija Srba* (Belgrade 1992); V. Popović, *Politika Francuske i Austrije na Balkanu u vreme Napoleona III* (Belgrade: Srpska Kraljevska Akademija 1923) and *Evropa i srpsko pitanje u periodu oslobodjenja 1804–1918* (Belgrade: Geca Kon 1940); M. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790–1918*, vol. I (Belgrade: Prosveta 1989).

Garašanin's starting point in creating his foreign policy strategy was the fact that Serbia was a small country and that it was dependent on Ottoman Turkey. Such a position of Serbia directed her foreign policy towards the idea of expanding her territory by "*embracing all Serbian peoples that surround her*" (emphasis R. Lj.). Unless she expanded by unifying the Serb nation, Garašanin believed**,** Serbia as it was would have no future and the first European storm would push it onto a rock and it would break as a derelict boat.

The title of the first chapter of the *Načertanije* is subtitled "Remarks on the partitioning of the [Ottoman] Empire". It contains two important points — an assumption about the imminent collapse of Ottoman Turkey and the restoration of the Serbian state. Garašanin believed that the Ottoman Empire would inevitably disintegrate, and with either of two outcomes: it would be partitioned between Austria and Russia, or Christian states would be established in its former territory. It hardly seemed likely to him that the two interested powers would allow a "Christian empire" to be built on the ruins of the Ottoman one, but the Western Powers might support such an outcome. This seems to be a general and simplified framework for the fate of Ottoman Turkey in which Garašanin was seeking the space for a future Serbian state.

The core of Ilija Garašanin's *Načertanije* relates to establishing a new Serbian state "in the south". What state did he have in mind? He did not specify its territory, but it can be identified. Its core area was supposed to be the *Principality of Serbia*, subsequently united with *Bosnia*, *Herzegovina*, *Montenegro* and *Old Serbia* (*Northern Albania* in his text); in other words, the predominantly Serb-inhabited areas of the Ottoman Empire. Such a state, in his view, not only had "its basis and firm foundations in the Serbian Empire" of the fourteenth century but also in a more remote glorious past. The Principality of Serbia was entitled to invoke its historic rights and come before Europe as the rightful heir to "our great fathers, doing nothing more than restoring its patrimony". This idea, that "the Serbian people, its nationality and statehood are protected under the aegis of the sacred historic right", required a link to the past. The Serbian people, he believed, had good roots, whose branches were cut off by the Turks, but the roots survived and would send forth a new blossom of Serbian statehood. Some of the great European powers — he dared not specify which — envisaging a great future for Serbia was one more reason why the Principality should not remain within its current borders as that would kill the seed of a modern Serbian empire.

The second part of the *Načertanije* is concerned with the accomplishment of the goal set in the first. Modern Serbia as envisaged by Garašanin was supposed to be restored on the grounds of historic legitimacy. What

Garašanin wanted to demonstrate by invoking historic rights was that the Serbs were not asking for anything new or unfounded, that they only claimed what once had been theirs, and without resorting to a coup or a revolution. What means did Garašanin propose to terminate a declining empire and build a new one in its European part? "To put it briefly — Serbia must seek to chip away at the edifice of the Turkish state, *stone by stone*, in order to use this good material to rebuild *a new great Serbian state* upon the good old foundations of the ancient Serbian empire" (emphasis R. Lj.). Garašanin obviously was cautious and his idea of how to unite Serb-inhabited lands obviously was conservative. On the other hand, he made no reference to the results of the Serbian revolution. There are only two indirect references to the revolution as an event that could play a role in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire: his remark that the restoration of Serbia's statehood made a "fortunate start", and his statement that only Serbs of all South Slavs "fought for their freedom with their own resources and strength". As many other nineteenth-century Serbian politicians, he was unaware that the modern Serbian state originated from revolution. A revolutionary state, such as the Principality of Serbia had been at its founding, and the restoration of Stefan Dušan's Empire on the grounds of historic right, were two completely irreconcilable concepts. It is difficult to conclude whether Garašanin took both options into account; if he did, he eventually gave precedence to Dušan's Empire over the revolutionary Serbia of Karageorge and Miloš. Such a choice of his was influenced by the conservative Poles and his own pro-Ottoman stance. A plan such as he drew up could hardly have originated at the time of Kargeorge or Prince Miloš. One of the probable reasons why it could come into being in the Constitutionalist age is the fact that the influence of the revolution was fading as was the memory of the uprisings in which Garašanin's own father had taken part. The existing political circumstances, the Constitutionalist regime's pro-Ottoman stance in particular, the suggestions of the Polish emigration and the living tradition of the medieval empire, provided powerful enough reference points for Garašanin to embrace the idea of founding the claim to restoring statehood on the historic right.

In the second and much more extensive part of the *Načertanije*, Garašanin set guidelines for national propaganda in South-Slavic areas. He handled the matter so efficiently that it alone would suffice to secure him a prominent place in Serbian history. Propaganda was to be organized on the territories of both empires, Ottoman and Habsburg, and in the following provinces: Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Old Serbia, Slavonia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Srem, Banat, Bačka, and Bulgaria (Bulgaria was omitted in this part of the text but was given a special sub-chapter later on). One of the tasks of agents of the Serbian government in these areas would be to

find out "what the people expect from Serbia". His proposal to the heavily enslaved Bulgarians was Serbia's support in the field of education for students and priests, book printing and *liberation*. It is important to emphasize that Garašanin was advocating freedom for Bulgaria, not her union with Serbia. He then described in detail what propaganda actions should be undertaken in the areas that were supposed to unite with the Principality of Serbia (Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Old Serbia). It should be noted that Garašanin envisaged the policy of opening Serbia's borders to the enslaved co-nationals, as well as the freedom of religion, education and autonomous rights for all immigrants. In his view, an important factor in achieving union (*sojuz*) was a Serbian dynasty. He showed his farsightedness by accepting Czartoryski and Zach's concept of hereditary princely title but, unlike them, without linking it to any particular Serbian dynasty. Garašanin obviously gave precedence to Serbian unification over dynastic rivalries. Garašanin believed that a new trade road between Belgrade and Ulcinj (Dulcigno) on Adriatic coast would economically tie Serb-inhabited areas more firmly together.

The propaganda effort discussed in the *Načertanije* did not include Croatia, while Srem, the Banat and Bačka were just cursorily mentioned. Garašanin devoted only a few words to "union with the Czech Slavs", but described it is as "impractical" and thus ended his text without adding any particular conclusion.

The analysis of the document clearly shows that Ilija Garašanin was drafting a future *Serbian state*. That state was supposed to comprise the Principality of Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Albania (*Old Serbia*). It was supposed to be a monarchy with the prospect of becoming an empire under certain historical circumstances. Stefan Dušan's medieval empire would be renewed, then, but this new empire would be different in territorial terms.

The second part of the *Načertanije* is somewhat confusing. Garašanin referred to Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia as areas where Serbian propaganda should also be conducted, but did not elaborate it anywhere in the text. He had omitted that portion of Zach's *Plan* and kept the subchapters relating to the Serbs in Southern Hungary, Bulgarians, Czechs and Slovaks. Although he did not specify it, it may be assumed that those areas were also meant to be united with Serbia under favourable historical circumstances. Otherwise it would be impossible to explain the reason for undertaking the propaganda effort in those provinces.

The first step, then, was supposed to be the unification of the Serbs in Ottoman Turkey, followed by the Serbs in Habsburg-held Southern Hungary. The state thus created would still be a Serbian state. Through union with Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia it would lose its Serbian distinctiveness

and gain a South-Slavic (Yugoslav) one instead. Should Bulgaria join in as well, it would truly become a South-Slavic state. (It was of lesser importance whether Croatia or Bulgaria would unite with Serbia first.) This second step in the unification process was not Garašanin's explicitly expressed option, but it cannot be ruled out. What may be taken as certain is that he had plans for a new Serbian state, leaving room for a South-Slavic one (Serbian-Croatian-Bulgarian). Garašanin was clear and specific about the former, and imprecise and vague about the latter. The first state was something that the Serbs had to fight for and win if they wanted to survive; the second was a matter of favourable political circumstances. In any case, with its focus on the unification of the Serbs in the Ottoman Empire, Garašanin's *Načertanije* was a programme of Serbian national and state politics. Once achieved, it would be followed by union with the Serbs in Austria, Croats and Bulgarians. A South-Slavic state, if it were created, would also be the result of Serbia's foreign policy means and goals.

Should the plan of Serbia's national policy be termed Serbian or Greater-Serbian, in other words, did Garašanin advocate the creation of Serbia or Greater Serbia? It has been established long ago that Garašanin changed some terms contained in Zach's *Plan*. Thus the words Slavic, South-Slavic and South Slavs were replaced with Christian, Serbian and Serbs respectively. Here are some examples, the first being from Zach's *Plan*, the second from Garašanin's *Načertanije*: "to other South Slavs"— "to other surrounding peoples" (twice); "Slavic politics of Serbia" — "politics of Serbia"; "an independent and self-reliant Slavic state" — "an independent Christian state"; "a new South-Slavic, Serbian state" — "a new Serbian state in the south"; "On the means to achieve the unification of all South Slavs"— "On the means to achieve the Serbian cause"; "to build a great new Slavic state" — "to build a great new Serbian state"; "to the South Slavs"— "to this people". This shows that not even Zach had a perfectly clear idea about the things he wrote about: his thinking sways between a Slavic and a South-Slavic state. At one point he stated that Serbia should pursue a *"South-Slavic"* policy, and at another that a "Slavic empire" should arise from Ottoman Turkey. This deserves attention because the Czech-born Polish agent Franz Zach devoted an entire subchapter to an "association with Czech Slavs". It may be assumed therefore that Zach advocated the idea of a South-Slavic state which would need to show consideration for other Slavs as well, primarily Czechs and Slovaks, who would then join an unspecified association. Relevant historiography research has confirmed that Zach's ambitious *Plan* was quite unrealistic for the vassal Principality of Serbia to achieve. Well-aware of that, Garašanin made modifications to it, quite often by changing a single word, but effecting essential change.

It has been shown that what Garašanin opted for was a united Serbian state. He used the attribute "great" only once and not even then in a Greater-Serbia context but in the context of "a great new Serbian state" to be rebuilt on the foundations of the medieval Nemanjić Empire. Rather than that, what might support the interpretation of his programme as Greater Serbian is his emphasis on the future state as an empire and, partly, his reference to Stefan Dušan's Empire. The modern Serbia as Garašanin saw it was supposed to encompass other peoples as well. In his times, however, these ethnic groups were still far from having well-developed identities as modern nations. The question may be posed as to whether this state created by the unification of Serbs would have been achievable at all without having other ethnic groups within its borders. Should such a state be qualified as "Greater Serbian", especially in the light of the fact that the majority of Serbs living inside the Habsburg Monarchy were supposed to remain outside its borders? A state that could rightfully be termed "Greater Serbia" (and the policy of the Principality of Serbia as "Great Serbian") would have had to encompass a vast majority of the Serbs, both from Ottoman Turkey and from Habsburg Austria, as well as the minorities who lived amongst them. A Serbia comprising all Serb-inhabited areas in Ottoman Turkey cannot be described simply as Greater Serbia. Consequently, Garašanin's programme should be defined as Serbian rather than purported Greater Serbian.

According to Garašanin, a state encompassing the Serbs from Turkey-in-Europe was to be the first phase in uniting the Serb nation. The second phase was to include the Serbs from Austria (Habsburg Monarchy), but he neither elaborated it nor set a time limit. Garašanin was aware that such a union would entail the inclusion of other peoples and that such a state would not be entirely Serbian. In order to achieve unification with Serbs from Austria, he was willing to allow for *a big step from a Serbian to a South-Slavic state* precisely because such a state would include Croats as well. Rather than proposing a Greater Serbia, Garašanin was thinking of a new "South Slavia" that would encompass Serbs, Bulgarians and Croats. Moreover, Garašanin was willing to sacrifice a freshly restored Serbia to a future South-Slavic union of Serbs, Croats and Bulgarians. Should more be expected from a young Serbian statesman, especially when we know that statehood ideas were still in their initial phase among both Croats and Bulgarians?

Garašanin's foreign policy strategy set two objectives: 1) unification of the Serbs from the Ottoman Empire into an independent Serbia; 2) unification with the Serbs from the Habsburg Empire, along with the Croats, and with the Bulgarians from Ottoman Turkey, into a larger South-Slavic

(i.e. Serbian-Croatian-Bulgarian) state. Garašanin gave precedence to the first objective and thought of the second as an untimely possibility.

Garašanin's *Načertanije* has been assessed as more realistic than Zach's *Plan*. One can pose the question as to how realistic it really was. Garašanin based his plans on the impending dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. As it turned out, however, his belief that "Turkish power is broken and destroyed" was rash. The mid-nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire was still a resilient power. Where his predictions proved to be nearer to reality was the case of Austria, which, in his view, "will be a permanent enemy of a Serbian state". Garašanin went far beyond the Polish emigration and their Czech representative in Belgrade, F. Zach, when he modified their stance on relations between Russia and the South Slavs, notably Serbs. His position was quite unambiguous: "There is no easier way for Serbia to achieve her cause than in accord with Russia." He took a step further by claiming that it was in the interest of the Western Powers, as a result of their rivalries with Russia and Austria, to support the establishment of a new independent state in the Balkans. This is not to say that Garašanin meant to ally with France or England, rather that he left his options open for asking for their support to the state-building process in the future. Prince Miloš, though only briefly (1837–1839), had also relied on the Western Powers for support, which cost him the throne. Fully aware of that fact Garašanin chose to proceed with caution.

Garašanin obviously articulated demands that were feasible at some point in the future. Yet, the unification of the Serbs followed a different path from the one defined by the *Načertanije*: 1) Modern Serbia was not re-established on historic rights grounds nor was it further built upon them; 2) The further state-building process, in terms of both unification and independence, was not based on the renewal of Stefan Dušan's Empire, an idea taken into account before Garašanin both by Kargeorge and by Miloš; 3) Serbia, independent since 1878 and enlarged as a result of the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, did not reach the territorial extent envisaged by the *Načertanije*; 4) the Yugoslav state created in 1918 did not coincide with Garašanin's "South Slavia"; it was the common state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, while Garašanin had had in mind a union of Serbs, Croats and Bulgarians.

It appears therefore that Garašanin's ideas did not materialize. Historical circumstances tied the Serbs, and other South-Slavic nations, into a different union from the one envisaged by the *Načertanije*. Garašanin's contemporary critics denounce his path to Serbian unification. His expressions such as "to adjoin", "to annex", "to chip off", however, form part of the typical wording of the period, but he obviously did not eschew a different option either. That option explicitly referred to Bosnia, but did not exclude

other provinces. Serbia was supposed to support the autonomous rights for Bosnia upon which Bosnia "could associate with Serbia more closely". For that reason he, quite foresightedly, believed that the obtainment of the right of hereditary succession for Serbia should be delayed until after this association materialized seeing it as a potential obstacle. He also emphasized that the upbringing of the young people in Turkey should imbue them with the "*life-saving idea of all-embracing union and progress*" (emphasis R. Lj.). As such a position is not contained in Zach's *Plan*, it seems reasonable to assume that Garašanin did not favour the simple act of annexation through military force over peaceful unification through association.

Garašanin's *Načertanije* was a secret document, and it remained unknown to European politicians until the late nineteenth century and to the Serbian public until the early twentieth century. Little is known about the extent to which the successive Serbian rulers were informed of its contents, even less about what their stance as regards its central ideas might have been. Many unknowns surround this document. It is unknown which Serbian politicians were acquainted with its contents, and it remained hidden for too long to be able to influence a wider public. It may be said, therefore, that the overall influence of the *Načertanije* was not significant, moreover, that Ilija Garašanin was practically the only political actor who pursued the agenda proposed in this plan. That line of his political activity was quite significant, especially in 1848/49 and in 1861–1867. In a way, the second part of the *Načertanije* may be said to have been more effective than the first, given that the guidelines for the Principality of Serbia's propaganda effort among the South Slavs laid out in it were put into practice. Garašanin's *Načertanije* was not a conservative document, although some conservative ideas, such as the historic rights concept, ran through it. Nor was it revolutionary. What seems to be its closest definition is that the *Načertanije* was a modern programme of Serbian foreign policy whose main goal was the creation of a Serbian state first, and then of a South Slavic one. The fact that the *Načertanije* was the first articulation of nineteenth-century Serbia's foreign policy and that Garašanin was the first to become aware that such an articulation was needed should be taken into account in assessing the significance of his role for the Serbs and South Slavs.[67]

Four years after the *Načertanije* was drafted Garašanin got the opportunity to start working along its lines. The revolutions of 1848–1849 created a propitious setting. Garašanin's attention was focused on the Serbian and South-Slavic communities in the Ottoman and Habsburg empires alike. The Austrian Serbs got involved in the European revolution, while their co-nationals in Ottoman Turkey were suffering under much worse econom-

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[67] All quotations from Stranjaković, "Garašaninovo 'Načertanije'".

ic and political conditions. That situation strongly influenced Garašanin's stance on supporting the Serbs in both empires. He backed the Habsburg Serbs in Southern Hungary in establishing an autonomous Serbian Duchy (*Srbska Vojvodina*, *Vojvodstvo Srbije* or, abbreviated, *Vojvodina*), and continued diplomatic efforts for an autonomous province for the Serbs in Ottoman Turkey.

The idea of a Serbian vice-kingdom, a brainchild of the Serbian representative in Constantinople Konstantin Nikolajević, arose at an early stage of the 1848 Revolution. Nikolajević and Jovan Marinović, the latter serving as an informal Serbian representative in Paris at the time, kept warning Garašanin that Serbia could not afford to stay away from the revolutionary movements in Europe because "she might die from inactivity".[68] In mid-March 1848, Nikolajević drew up "a political draft … just to kill loneliness": "Although I haven't had the time to do it a little better, I am taking the liberty of submitting it to you [Garašanin] for consideration, if nothing else than as a theory to think about now that all of a sudden many a theory is being put into practice."[69] In his letter of 7 May, Nikolajević expressed his belief that the developments in Europe "give us hope that we shall be able to restore our fatherland".[70] Garašanin gave his opinion about Nikolajević's idea in his letter of 22 May: "We all like your ideas for the Slavs in Turkey very much and it seems to us that it is only through such a policy and its successful outcome that our fatherland can be honoured and the old glory of the Serbian people restored, but we now need to work on it diligently and only from here, and in a way chosen as the most appropriate for it." He complained that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Avram Petronijević, "has neither the energy nor the ways needed for overseeing such a serious effort", but nevertheless instructed Nikolajević to find a way for his ideas to reach the Porte without being taken as an official proposal of the Serbian government: "Think it through carefully, talk it over with your friends if you find it fit, and then take a step, with reasonable caution, of course, so that we might at least find out where we stand with the Porte … Besides, and above all, keep me posted about your ideas on the matter, and I shall be able to put them to good use. I have to make yet another remark here — on her own, without the Porte, Serbia can hardly put this policy through." Serbia was peaceful, Garašanin added, but there was a vague sense of discontent over the government's passive attitude towards the compatriots in Ottoman

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[68] AS, IGP, 340.

[69] A draft of a Serbian vice-kingdom was enclosed with his letter of 24 March: AS, IGP, 350.

[70] Archives of the Historical Institute, Belgrade (hereafter: AII), Konstantin Nikolajević Fund (KNF), V/5.

Turkey. He ended the letter with a promise that he would send Nikolajević "some drafts [of his] relating to the Porte and the Christian population in Turkey".[71]

In the spring and summer of 1848, the exchange of letters between Garašanin and Nikolajević intensified. In a letter dated 5 June, Garašanin discussed the political situation in the Ottoman Empire in detail, stating his belief that the Porte was about to face "a great danger" which could only be removed if its "Christian peoples were granted the rights that match today's mores and outlooks"; that the Porte's simple *firman*s were no longer enough to deceive its peoples; that the Slavs across the Sava and Danube rivers [in Habsburg Monarchy] were "on the threshold of a beautiful future", and that therefore the Porte should promptly make concessions in order to win over its Christian subjects. "Your project seems to be our only hope; anything else is just a stopgap and of no use. With that, we would be safe from any storm that might befall us, but can we hope for that?" He emphasized again that the proposal should reach the Porte in a roundabout way, through "friends". Garašanin enclosed with this letter a project drawn up by Jovan Marinović, suggesting that it also should "be proposed to the Porte indirectly, not so much in order that it may be accepted, as it would not be very helpful right now, but rather in order not to let the Porte think that, just because we keep quiet and make no proposals, we are engaged in something more important".

Garašanin did not fail to take a look at the position of Serbia in the context of the events unfolding in Europe. Insisting that Serbia should think of her future, especially in the light of "this battle fought by kindred peoples", he stated that she should neither hesitate nor expect charity. "It is unbefitting to the spirit of the Serbian people and to the memory of their former historical life to accept charity extended by others out of mercy." Serbia should "define her role", especially as regards her union with other South Slavs. "Serbia does not find a perfect guarantee of her nationality in a union of all [South] Slavs, but, if there is no other way, she will have to accept it, and many thus-minded spirits have already been arising among the people."[72]

In a letter dated 3 July, Nikolajević informed Garašanin about having been told by "a friend" that the vice-kingdom project "would find its way to the Sultan".[73] Even though this "friend", either an Ottoman official or one of the Polish émigrés in Constantinople, failed to accomplish the

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[71] AII, KNF, I/17.

[72] AII, KNF, I/17. A larger part of this letter was published in J. Milićević, "O Bosni" [On Bosnia], *Istorijski glasnik* 1 (1973), 102–105.

[73] Milićević, "O Bosni", 109.

mission, Garašanin did not throw in the towel. Well-aware of the wide-spread discontent over the government's inactivity, on 14 September he addressed a letter to Prince Aleksandar: "The Porte knows what we are after … and we shall never give it up".[74] On 9 October, Nikolajević finally informed Garašanin that things were going from bad to worse, and that they "should not count on the Porte in any way anymore, or practically on anyone else".[75] Thus the diplomatic effort of Nikolajević and Garašanin towards creating a Serbian vice-kingdom ended with no tangible result. The correspondence between Garašanin and Nikolajević reveals that there were in fact two different projects: Nikolajević's project for a Serbian vice-kingdom and Marinović's project of civil reforms in Turkey-in-Europe. Marinović's project, which Garašanin forwarded to Nikolajević on 5 June, consisted of a lengthy introduction and only two points, suggesting reforms that would improve the position of the Christians in Turkey by granting them the right to elect their own local (*nahiye*) administrators (*oborknez*) who then would be confirmed by the Ottomans. Marinović also suggested some improvements to the church organization, primarily the appointment of Serbs instead of Greeks as bishops and metropolitans.[76]

What were the central ideas of Nikolajević's memorandum? Convinced that the Empire's half-measures gave it no prospect of pulling out of the crisis, he suggested the following: 1) Serbia's union with Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Upper Albania (i.e. Old Serbia); 2) Together they constitute "a Serbian state" within Ottoman Turkey; 3) That state has its "ruler and independent internal administration", while the Porte remains the suzerain power; 4) The united provinces enjoy the same political rights as those currently enjoyed by the Principality of Serbia; 5) The new state enacts the constitution and laws without interference from the Porte or any other power; 6) It has the right to establish its own army to defend its borders but also the borders of the Ottoman Empire; 7) The Serbian and Turkish states within the Ottoman Empire each meets the costs of its "internal and independent administration" from its own revenues. Only tariff revenues go to the Sultan; 8) The "Serbian united states" have a diplomatic office in Constantinople through which the Serbian ruler maintains contact with the Sultan; 9) Turkey cannot conclude any agreement with a foreign power without the consent of the Serbian diplomatic representative in Constantinople except when "the necessity forces the Sultan to do so

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[74] AII, KNF, L/17; *Prepiska*, 286.

[75] Milićević, "O Bosni", 109.

[76] R. Ljušić, "Marinovićev memoar o hrišćanima u Turskom carstvu iz 1848. godine" [Marinovic's Memorandum of 1848 on Christians in the Ottoman Empire], *Istorijski glasnik* 1–2 (1976), 161–170.

to save his states from peril"; 10) Muslims and Orthodox Christians have equal rights in the Serbian united states; 11) Religious freedom for both Orthodox and Muslims, the latter being under the spiritual jurisdiction of Turkey; 12) the Bulgarians that remain in the Turkish state become equal to the Muslims; 13) They become entitled to enter public service; 14) Trade is free within "both united states in the Ottoman Empire". No tariffs are paid on their common border except duties on transit goods; 15) The Serbian state has the right to open consulates in Turkey and foreign countries, and their jurisdiction must not be political, only commercial.[77]

The underlying idea of the memorandum was that of restructuring the Ottoman Empire into a dual monarchy. The Empire was supposed to consist of two states — "Asian Turkey" and "Serbian United States" — each with its own ruler, government, administration and territory. Foreign policy was the only area where the Serbian United States was to have limited independence. The draft was imprecise in many points, but obviously the two states within the Ottoman Empire were not to be completely equal, the Turkish state remaining the "suzerain power", and, accordingly, the Sultan remaining the nominal head of the Empire, in other words, of both states. The document's many ambiguities make it difficult to infer exactly what the legal position of the new Serbian state was supposed to be. Undoubtedly, it would have been more favourable than the vassal position of the Principality of Serbia.

The plan was obviously unrealistic, especially given that the powers that were supposed to make it happen did not have the strength. Ottoman

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[77] AS, IGP, 227, 465; published in M. Ekmečić, "Garašanin, Čartoriski i Mađari 1848–1849. godine" [Garašanin, Czartoryski and Hungarians 1848–1849], *Srpsko-mađarski odnosi i saradnja 1848–1867,* ed. V. Krestić (Belgrade: Naučni skupovi, vol. 34. Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1987), 29–31. D. Stranjaković, who was the first to point to this plan in his paper "The first political agreement between Serbs and Croats in 1860" (published in Belgrade in 1941, but only partially due to the breakout of the war), either had a different version of the plan or a different plan. Since he did not publish it as a whole, we are unable to discuss the differences. Only its first point is known, which reads: "Restoration of a Serbian vice-kingdom within the borders it had in the mid fourteenth century, towards the end of Dušan's reign, when the Ottomans first began to break it, that is, comprising the following provinces of present-day European Turkey: Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Albania (South Serbia and Old Serbia), Roumelia (up to the river Maritza from its confluence to Edirne, and from Edirne, by land, to Burgos on the Black Sea), and Bulgaria." Based on these data, Ekmečić has been convinced that there were two plans for a Serbian vice-kingdom, one with and the other without Bulgaria (p. 32). Since the manuscript of the plan used by Stranjaković has not survived and no other sources have so far provided a clue, this remains an open question. Apparently, the text quoted in Stranjaković's paper is not authentic. – My gratitude to Prof. Vasilije Krestić for making Stranjaković's manuscript available to me.

Turkey would not have agreed to it even in the worst crisis, and the revolu-
tions of 1848/9 did not affect her to the point of producing such a crisis.
Nikolajević acquainted the Polish emigration, French diplomats and the
Porte with the memorandum, and Garašanin believed in the full backing of
France.[78] But such an ambitious project, which would have diminished the
sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, needed much stronger support than
the one that could have been provided by the Polish emigration and France.
Not only did Garašanin and Nikolajević not expect support from Russia,
they sought to suppress her influence in the Ottoman Empire and even
explicitly renounced Russia's patronage.

They did not stop on the idea of restructuring the Ottoman Empire,
but made further plans, as evidenced by a letter of Nikolajević to Garašanin
dated 9 October: "The Slavic future presupposes the disintegration of the
Habsburg monarchy. All German provinces should be united into the Ger-
man Confederation, and the Czech, Moravian, Slovak and Polish Slavs
into another confederation." The South Slavs, together with the Magyars
and Wallachians, should create "a federal state union which then should
unite with European Turkey, thus forming a complete and purely Yugo-
slav [South-Slavic] empire". This empire should either be united with the
"Asian-Turkish" one or "become completely independent of it under a new
native dynasty. It is only through such an all-Slavic idea that Serbian feeling
can be stirred and the ideal of Serbian patriotism fulfilled; anything short
of it would be just Russian or alien affair." He then linked this idea with
the idea of a Serbian vice-kingdom. "In this respect, I have [sent] you my
previous draft on the restoration of a Serbian vice-kingdom in Turkey-in-
Europe, and if we were able to grab that much from the weak Porte and
from the diplomacy that can still support it, I would be less doubtful about
the triumph of *that greater idea and that greater ideal*" (emphasis R.LJ.). This
greater ideal would be the union of all South Slavs. The steps required, in his
view, were the secession of Hungary and Corniola from Austria and their
union under either the Hungarian or the Croatian crown. All South-Slavic
provinces of the Habsburg Empire should form a separate vice-kingdom —
"South Slavonia". This vice-kingdom was not supposed to include the Mag-
yars and Wallachians, but Nikolajević did not rule out the possibility either.
He expected that when Serbia's plan of reorganizing the Ottoman Turkey
would materialize, "the two vice-kingdoms would naturally come to a point
where they would make an agreement about their final union and, guided
by their own best interests, choose the ruling dynasty, be it Habsburg, Otto-
man or native". Without elaborating any further, Nikolajević merely stated

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[78] Garašanin to Acika Nenadović, 3 September 1848: "I can see that the French agree
with what I've been stirring up", in *Prepiska*, 272.

that for the time being the establishment of a Serbian vice-kingdom should be given precedence.

Although some of the concepts Nikolajević used are vague, even contradictory, his plan may be summed up as follows: Serbia succeeds in bringing about the restructuring of the Ottoman Empire into two states, an Asian Turkish and a European Turkish (or Serbian United States or Serbian Vice-Kingdom). She then works towards the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire, on whose territory a new vice-kingdom, South Slavonia, becomes established.[79] Serbian United States and South Slavonia then become united into "a complete and purely Yugoslav empire". Then the ruling dynasty becomes agreed upon, the Habsburg, the Ottoman or a native one. It is not explicitly stated, but this Yugoslav empire would have obviously been independent and sovereign. The reference to the Habsburg and Ottoman dynasties may be taken as implying moderation, but a "native" dynasty was clearly preferred.

Nikolajević's plan is a very general one. It leaves many important points in obscurity, especially the way of carrying it through. Given Serbia's geographic position, statehood and political role, however, he saw her as the champion of the unification process and the core of a future Yugoslav empire. Nikolajević's idea of a future South-Slavic state may now be described almost as visionary. His Yugoslav empire and the 1918 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are quite similar. Both, one virtual, the other real, rested on the ruins of the Austrian and Ottoman empires, had almost the same territorial extent and were monarchies.

It should be noted that a similar idea of a Yugoslav empire centred on Serbs and Croats was promoted by members of the so-called "Democratic Pan-Slavic Club", especially by Stevan Hrkalović. The Club was overseen by Garašanin, as indicated by his letter to Stojan Simić dated 2 June 1848: "The goal of both of them down there [Ljudevit Gaj and Hrkalović] is to unite with all South Slavs and create a common empire. I have given him [Hrkalović] an interim approval for the idea."[80]

There are a number of similarities between the plan for a Serbian vice-kingdom and the *Načertanije*: both Nikolajević and Garašanin base their claim on historic rights; hope for the restoration of Stefan Dušan's Empire; delineate the same territorial extent; have the same stance on Bulgaria and, to some extent, on the possibility of creating a South-Slavic state

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[79] In one place he states that the vice-kingdom should encompass Magyars and Wallachians (Romanians), but does not mention them again. On the other hand, the name of the vice-kingdom, South Slavonia, would imply their being left out. This issue, therefore, remains open.

[80] *Prepiska*, 165.

(South Slavia or a Yugoslav empire); argue for two-phased unification of the Serbian people (at first within the Ottoman Empire, then in a Yugoslav state); support the preservation of Ottoman Turkey during the first phase of unification. The skeletons of the two drafts are nearly the same. The available sources do not provide explicit clues as to whether Nikolajević was familiar with the *Načertanije* and with the Polish émigrés' projects submitted to Garašanin, or this project was entirely his own. While there is no evidence to support the former possibility, there are two pieces of evidence for the latter. 1) Sending his project to Garašanin, Nikolajević wrote: "I have taken the risk of enclosing [with this letter] one of my *political drafts* which I *outlined for myself* a few days ago, just to kill loneliness."[81] 2) According to what Tchaikovsky wrote to Czartoryski, Nikolajević "had shown him a project for uniting Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia and Illyria into a vice-kingdom".[82] Lacking any other reliable information, we may only assume that the idea of a Serbian vice-kingdom or Serbian United States is Nikolajević's. That would be a second national and state-building plan of the Principality of Serbia. It was based on the same fundamental premises as the *Načertanije*, but was more elaborate and diversified.

At the heart of both projects lay the restoration of Dušan's Empire, an idea already harboured by Prince Miloš Obrenović during his first reign.[83] Over time, it increasingly took root and was kept secret neither from foreign diplomats nor from Ottoman pashas. Garašanin complained to Knićanin about a Serbian politician "drinking toasts, at the Russian Consulate in front of the pasha and all European consuls, to the creation of a Russian empire and of a grand Serbian empire and so forth. Not that I would mind the latter empire…"[84]

A lengthy manuscript of Garašanin's, which was written in the mid-1850s but has not been preserved in its entirety, contains some of his quite characteristic views on the state in general, and shows that he was familiar with the modern concept and meaning of the "rule-of-the-law state", with Montesquieu's *L'Esprit des lois* and Rousseau's *Contrat social*: "The state is

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[81] AS, IGP, 350 (emphasis R. Lj).

[82] Lj. Durković Jakšić, *Srbijansko-crnogorska saradnja (1830–1851)* [Serbo-Montenegrin Cooperation 1830–1851] (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1957), 88. See also, Ekmečić, "Garašanin, Čartoriski i Mađari", 2, note 2.

[83] "Srbija u godini 1834. Pisma grofa Boa-le-Konta de Rinji ministru inostranih dela u Parizu o tadašnjem stanju u Srbiji" [Serbia in 1834. Letters of Count Bois Le Comte de Rigny to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris on the situation in Serbia], ed. S. Novaković, *Spomenik Srpske kraljevske akademije* XXIV (1894), 37–40; Ljušić, *Kneževina Srbija (1830–1839)*, 383–385.

[84] ASANU, No 7051/1901.

a naturally necessitated condition for the historical existence of a people; beyond a state man can have neither life nor history: therefore any human action only begins with the state".

Garašanin's next writing, discussing the situation in the Ottoman Empire and the position of its Christian population, was predicated on the same premise as the *Načertanije*, namely, that the disintegration of the Empire was imminent and that therefore a new and solid state should be built on its ruins. He emphasized twice that Montenegro, by then being an "independent state for 150 years", had through continuous warfare with the Ottoman Turks begun to harbour "the insolent belief" in its being the bearer of the "Christian and Slavic [i.e. Serbian] state idea […] since the fall of the [fourteenth-century] Serbian Empire". Garašanin strongly suggested that Serbia and Montenegro should connect with one another via the area of Novi Pazar, Peć and Priština: "A single glance at the map of [Ottoman] Turkey reveals how important it is that this should happen." Discussing the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he pointed to a religious rather than ethnic division: "Bosnian Turks or, more correctly, Muslim Serbs are a quite distinctive phenomenon in the Slavic world", but he believed that neither the common people nor the nobility in that province should be isolated, "if only because it is impossible to renounce a shared consciousness of the Serbs". He devoted a lot of space to Bulgarians, describing them as the most peaceful people in Turkey-in-Europe.

Of relevance to our further considerations is how Garašanin understood the role of Serbia in the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the construction of a new state in its wake. He believed that the semi-sovereign status of the Principality of Serbia and its position entitled the Serbs to play the leading role in Turkey-in-Europe. The Serbs had been the first to start the struggle for liberation, whereby "they proved to be the mightiest and the most promising Slavic branch." He saw the Serbs in general and the Principality of Serbia in particular as "the pivot of the South-Slavic world" round which others would gather. This was the first time that he seriously took the legacy of the Serbian revolution into account, though without giving up the historic right argument and the tradition of Dušan's Empire. "Serbia is the product of a revolution of the Slavic element against the Turkish state; — she is a recognized crystallization of fundamental Christian-Slavic interests in the Turkish Empire and basis for their furthering." Thence came Serbia's moral strength and her potential for making an impact on Slavs far beyond her borders. He believed that all Serbs saw the Principality of Serbia as the cornerstone of "their historical being", that Serbia was the mainstay of all Yugoslavs in Turkey, and more than that: she should gather "all Yugoslavs into one state or at least into a union of several states". The Yugoslavs Garašanin had in mind most of all were "Yugoslavs

Serbs" or, in other words, the Serbs in the South-Slavic-inhabited areas of Ottoman Turkey and Austria. Apparently he advocated a state that would encompass all Serbs.

Garašanin also considered the issue of Serbian national integration. "Serbs who are *reaya* in Bosnia and Serbs in the Principality of Serbia or in Montenegro, Serbs in the Croatian and Slavonian Military Frontiers [*Vojna Krajina*] and those in Vojvodina, they all consider themselves as belonging to one people and each part is concerned with that which concerns the whole." What he saw as particularly helpful for the process of national integration was: the existence of Serbian states — Serbia and Montenegro, the activity of the "people's" church, language and folk poetry.

Garašanin did not try to conceal the hostile attitude of the Serbian people towards Ottoman rule. In his plans for undermining the Ottoman Empire he went so far as to expect to see a Serbian flag with the cross flying over Hagia Sophia in Constantinople after the final Ottoman defeat. In his expansionist plans Constantinople figured as "the pearl of the Slavic east … the first city of that Orthodox Serbian empire."[85] Although he now used the term Yugoslavs more frequently than before, here he returned to the idea of a Serbian state once again. This time two points are controversial: claims to Constantinople as the future capital of a Serbian empire on the one hand, and the undefined role of the Austrian Serbs in the future state on the other. The Serbs beyond the Military Frontier and the Duchy of Serbia (Vojvodstvo Srbije – *Vojvodina*) were not even mentioned. In neither case such a state would have been simply Serbian. Historic and natural rights were brought into confrontation here, and although Garašanin gave precedence to historic rights (reconstruction of the Serbian Empire), this was the first time that he acknowledged the revolutionary origin of the modern Serbian state. Even so, he was far from including the revolution as the source of legitimacy for the future Serbian state.


*A Balkan alliance*

The political career of Ilija Garašanin reached its peak during the second reign of Prince Mihailo. It was a most dynamic period of Serbian foreign policy which was steered jointly by Prince Mihailo and Garašanin. Their guiding idea was Serbian unification and the establishment of a Balkan alliance.

On a mission to Constantinople in 1861, Garašanin held secret negotiations with the Greeks. According to the agreed Serbo-Greek draft

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[85] AS, IGP, 855. In this writing, Garašanin wrote about his activities in 1848 as well, but without explicitly referring to Nikolajević's plan.

convention, the "Kingdom of Serbia" was supposed to encompass: Principality of Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Upper Albania (or Old Serbia) and Montenegro provided that the latter "does not staunchly hold onto being a separate and independent principality". This was the territorial extent already delineated in the *Načertanije*. As for Bulgaria, two options were envisaged: 1) to become an independent state like the Serbian and Hellenic kingdoms; 2) to remain within the Ottoman Empire. Garašanin did not rule out a "confederation of several states", or a "Serbian-Bulgarian-Albanian union", but he did not really believe it would be acceptable to European diplomacy. His priority obviously was a state that would encompass the entire Serbian community in Ottoman Turkey, and he was clear and precise on that point. He had several political options for whatever might come next, the central one being the formation of a Balkan alliance as a tool for bringing the Ottoman Empire down. Historiography has claimed that the draft of Serbo-Greek convention was "just a new edition" of the *Načertanije*. Garašanin accepted the revolutionary principle in resolving the national issue there. A draft agreement on an alliance among Greece, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro was drawn up the same year.[86]

During the last two years of Garašanin's engagement in state affairs (1866 and 1867), much effort was put into building a Balkan alliance. The first such agreement was concluded between Serbia and Montenegro (5 October 1866), and it was hoped that other Balkan peoples would gather round it. It brought nothing new compared to Garašanin's previously articulated ideas: the Serbian people in Ottoman Turkey should be liberated and united in a "future great Serbia" to which Montenegro would join. The rest of the secret agreement was about the internal organization of this future Serbian state. It should be noted that therein the term Great Serbia was used for the first time, and referring to a state that would unite the Serbs in Ottoman Turkey, but not the Serbs in Habsburg Austria.[87]

In terms of ideas the secret agreement between Serbia and Montenegro is very similar to the first part of Garašanin's *Načertanije*, just as the Programme of Yugoslav policy Garašanin proposed to the Croatian bishop and politician Strossmayer in March 1867 is similar to the second part of *Načertanije*. Its proclaimed goal was to unite the "Yugoslav tribes into one federal state", with Belgrade and Zagreb as pivotal points in pursuing the Yugoslav cause. Religion was not to be a hindrance to Yugoslav unification, because the only principle the state should be based on was that of "ethnic-

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[86] Jakšić and Vučković, *Spoljna politika*, 66, 471–478.

[87] Ibid., 486–489; *Srbija i oslobodilački pokreti na Balkanu 1856–1878* [Serbia and Liberation Movements in the Balkans 1856–1878], vol. I, eds. V. Krestić and R. Ljušić (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1983), 489–493.

ity", and "Croatian and Serbian ethnicity is one, Yugoslav (Slav)". The bur-
den of Yugoslav liberation was supposed to be equally shared by all Yugoslav
tribes. Although Garašanin obviously considered an uprising in Bosnia and
Herzegovina to be more urgent than such a state, he clearly believed it pos-
sible for the Austrian South Slavs (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) to gather
together at a suitable moment in a common state or in an association of
South-Slavic states.[88]

It should also be noted that the Bulgarian proposal of April 1867
envisaged a Yugoslav empire as the state of Serbs and Bulgarians in the Ot-
toman Empire. In August 1867 alliance with Greece was concluded, and a
military convention followed in 1868, when the Balkan Alliance was joined
by Romania.[89]

Garašanin pursued his basic idea of a future Serbian state originally
proposed in the *Načertanije*, through the first Balkan Alliance, but he now
enriched it with new elements. By building a Balkan alliance he was also
seeking a key to Serbia's future. One road to it could be a newly-formulated
policy, which had already been the basic guideline of Serbian diplomacy
under Garašanin: *The Balkans to the Balkan peoples*. What was new was an
equal distribution of the burden of liberation from Ottoman rule among all
Yugoslav and Balkan peoples.

*UDC 929:32 Garašanin I*
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[88] Jakšić and Vučković, *Spoljna politika*, 494–504. For more, see V. Krestić, *Hrvatsko-
ugarska nagodba 1868* [Croato-Hungarian Compromise of 1868] (Belgrade: Srpska
akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1969), 348–366, as well as his *Srpsko-hrvatski odnosi i
jugoslovenska ideja* [Serbo-Croatian Relations and the Yugoslav Idea] (Belgrade 1983),
9–82.

[89] Jakšić and Vučković, *Spoljna politika*, 505–521.

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# Valtazar Bogišić and the General Property Code for the Principality of Montenegro: Domestic and Foreign Associates

**Abstract**: Assigned with the task to prepare a general property code for the Principality of Montenegro, V. Bogišić conducted in 1873 a survey on customary law, relying on several local informants who were well versed in the matter and as a rule holders of high military and civil offices. A distinctive group of Bogišić's associates were members of the commission responsible for discussing two drafts of the code, all of them judges of the highest court in Montenegro at the time. In contrast to their contribution which is quite well known, that of his foreign consultants, although significant, is not. In two of his texts, one of which was published posthumously, Bogišić expressed his gratitude for the assistance provided by the eminent French and German legal experts R. Dareste, E. Glasson, C. Bluntschli, J. Neubauer and K. Dickel.

**Keywords**: Valtazar Bogišić, Property Code, Principality of Montenegro, domestic associates, foreign consultants, Russia

*Introduction*

Of the many works of the Serbian scholar Valtazar Bogišić (1834–1908), the one for which he is best known is his magnum opus: *General Property Code for the Principality of Montenegro* (Opšti imovinski zakonik za Knjaževinu Crnu Goru) of 1888. This is a *civil* code which does not include *family* and *inheritance law*, and has therefore been designated as *property code*.[1]

After the Second World War, interest has begun to grow in the genesis of the Code. Scholarly work based on the material from Bogišić's archive at Cavtat[2] has resulted in extensive studies such as those by N. Martinović,

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[1] The Code was formally proclaimed on 26 April 1888 in the Montenegrin capital, Cetinje, and came into force on 1 July the same year by Prince Nikola's decree. See Bogišić 1980 I–VI.

[2] Bogišić's archives, a library of more than 15,000 books and a museum holding his personal belongings, art collections and other valuable objects, are at Cavtat. They are in ownership of the Institute of Historical Sciences at Dubrovnik, which forms part of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences based in Zagreb. His archives contain more than 160 manuscripts, unfinished texts and notes on various subjects: history of law of the Slav peoples, codification of property law in Montenegro, ethnology, folklore, literature etc. For more, see Djivanović 1984.

W. G. Zimmermann, T. Nikčević, J. Bojović and S. Pupovci.[3] Useful information on the origin of the Code has also come from documents kept in Russian archives[4] and Bogišić's personal correspondence with many renowned figures and institutions (about a thousand) from Belgrade, Novi Sad, Cetinje, Zagreb, Dubrovnik, Split, Djakovo and several European centres, of which only a small part has been published.[5] That work has shed much more light on a number of people who assisted Bogišić in the process of preparing the Code, and whose contribution had for a long time been unknown or neglected, resulting in all the credit for the Code being attributed to Bogišić. The contribution least examined is the one made by eminent experts in civil law from Vienna, Berlin, Munich, Paris, as well as members of the state codification commissions in Berlin and Budapest. This paper will, therefore, shed more light on the broader context of this cooperation and the professional profile of these associates of Bogišić's.

### 1. Bogišić's education and career prior to his codifying mission

Bogišić's codifying mission in Montenegro began in late 1872. Nikola I, Prince of Montenegro and the Highlands (*Crna Gora i Brda*), which was the official name of the country in 1796–1878, made a request to the Russian Tsar to send Valtazar Bogišić, professor at the Novorossiski University in Odessa, to Montenegro. By that time Montenegro had regained Russian support withdrawn during the Crimean War and the Prince was receiving annual financial aid from Russia.[6] In this revival of pro-Russian feeling, he found solid support in the Russian consul in Dubrovnik, Alexandr S. Yonin. Meanwhile, military and administrative reforms had been carried out in Montenegro, but, not even following the demarcation of her borders with the Ottoman Empire under the aegis of the European powers (1859/60) was Montenegro internationally recognized as an independent country and Prince Nikola needed to put the legal system on a more solid footing in order to demonstrate his country's credibility before the European powers.[7] Thus Bogišić found himself in the service of Russian-Montenegrin political relations, in fact in the orbit of Russia's Balkan policy.

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[3] Martinović 1958 and 1964; Zimmermann 1962; Nikčević 1967; Bojović 1992; Pupovci 1996 and 2004.

[4] See Pupovci 1996; Montenegrin Codes III; Bogišić 1999

[5] See Jagić 1930; Novak 1960; Ivanišin 1962; Nedeljković 1968.

[6] Jovanović 1977, 181; Popović 1995, 314–316.

[7] Martinović 1958, 55–60; Pupovci 1996, 20; Montenegrin Codes III, 289–290.

Bogišić's life, which led to his being sent to Montenegro, was an un-usual one, and by then he had already become a scholar of some repute in the Slav world.[8] Valtazar Bogišić was born at Cavtat in 1834, into a Catholic family originally from the Dubrovnik hinterland region of Konavle, "on the border between Herzegovina and the one-time Republic of Dubrovnik".[9] He had no regular education before he entered university. Both his grand-father and father were seamen and traders, and had made a sizable fortune. The young Bogišić kept his father's business books and drew up business-related legal documents in Italian. In that way he gained practical legal ex-perience and at the same time learnt German and French. Having settled family business and property matters following the sudden death of his father in 1856, Bogišić completed an accelerated secondary school course in Venice in 1859. He then began law studies and read the first two semes-ters in Vienna, the third in Berlin, and the fourth in Munich, and attended several lectures in Paris. He completed the final two years (four semesters) of law in Vienna, simultaneously studying philosophy. In the course of his studies, Bogišić mastered several languages and became a polyglot.

Bogišić's professors in Vienna were the law professors Unger, Gla-ser, Arnddts, Siegel, Stein and Neumann, the historians Jäger, Sieckel and Aschbach, and the philologists Miklosich, Bonitz and Vahlen. His Berlin teachers were the jurists Dirksen and Stahl, the German philologist Be-seler, the canon law scholar Richter, the founder of comparative linguistics Bopp, the historian Droysen and the philosopher Michelet. His professors in Munich were the jurists Windscheid and Bluntschli, the church historian Dölinger and the art historian Lützov. In 1862 he received doctoral degree in philosophy from the university in Giessen,[10] where he had also attended lectures of the prominent Roman law professor Ihering. In Heidelberg he attended lectures of the renowned scholar of civil law, Wangerow.

In 1863, Bogišić found employment at the department for Slavic books of the Court Library (Hofbibliothek) in Vienna, while completing his law studies and receiving a doctoral degree in 1864. His work at the Court Li-

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[8] During his employment at the Court Library in Vienna, Bogišić published two works: *Legal Customs of the Slavs*, the first of its kind in the Slav world, and *A Guide to Describ-ing Living Legal Customs*, in fact a questionnaire containing 352 questions and intended only for the South Slavs. The *Guide* was translated into Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Slovenian and (partially) Czech, but it soon gained popularity beyond the Slav world. Bogišić spent a few years busily collecting customary law and from the abundant material col-lected prepared a *Compilation of Contemporary Legal Customs of the South Slavs. Material from Various Parts of the Slavic South* (1874).

[9] Bogišić provides information about himself, his family and origin in three autobio-graphical texts, see Bogišić 1938 [1902]; and Bogišić 1938.

[10] Bogišić 1938 [1902], 5, 74; Bogišić 1938, 51.

brary brought him multiple benefits. He was in constant contact with schol-
ars from different Slavic countries, to mention but the Pole Wacław Ma-
ciejowski; Russians Izmail Ivanovich Sreznevsky, Nil Alexandrovich Popov,
Mikhail Fyodorovich Rayevsky; Serbs Djura Daničić, Jovan Gavrilović, Sto-
jan Novaković and Vladan Djordjević; Croats Franjo Rački, Vatroslav Jagić
and Imbro Ignjatijević Tkalac.[11] In Vienna he made contact with liberals
from Serbia, a connection that would prove useful to him later on.[12]

It was in Vienna that Bogišić embraced the then widespread notion
of Serbs and Croats as being "two halves of a single people", and remained
faithful to it for the rest of his life, although he was never politically active.[13]
He expressed his Serb national feeling and his affiliation to the Catholic
tradition, two constituent elements of his identity from his youth days in his
hometown of Cavtat and contacts with the intellectual circle round Niko
Veliki Pucić in Dubrovnik.[14] He called his own language Serbian, and he
also used the terms Serbo-Croatian and Croatian.

After five years at the Court Library, Bogišić entered the Austro-
Hungarian Ministry of Defence, and was appointed Temesvar-based school
supervisor for the Banat and Srem regions of the Military Frontier (*Vojna
Krajina Militärgrenze*), which had a large Serbian community. For a time,
Bogišić lived in Novi Sad, where he used to meet up with Jovan Hadžić,
author of the *Civil Code of the Principality of Serbia*. He also used to visit
Belgrade, where he met up with Djura Daničić, Jovan Gavrilović, Stojan
Novaković, Janko Šafarik and other prominent figures in Serbia's cultural
life. In Belgrade he also met the Austro-Hungarian consul Benjamin von
Kállay, subsequently the Austro-Hungarian governor of Bosnia-Herzegov-
ina and author of a *History of the Serbian People*. Bogišić kept track of events
in the Serbian capital, and when preparations began for the 1869 Constitu-
tion of the Principality of Serbia, he submitted, together with a conational
from the coastal region ("two southern Serbs"), a proposal for some of its
clauses.[15]

Yet, Bogišić thought of leaving the Habsburg Monarchy, which in
the wake of the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 underwent essential internal
change: in 1867 it became a dual monarchy. Having been granted the first
ever honorary doctorate from Odessa University (Novorossiski), which had
been founded in 1865, and elected full professor at its Law School and

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[11] Bogišić 1938 [1902], 79.

[12] Nedeljković 1968, 65; see Bogišić 1938 [1902], 106.

[13] See Bogišić 1938 [1902], 106.

[14] For a detailed account of the Serbs in Dalmatia between the fall of the Venetian Re-
public and the formation of the Yugoslav state in 1918, see Bakotić 1938.

[15] Bogišić 1938, 50; Nedeljković 1968, 28–29.

chair of the History of Slavic Legal Systems, Bogišić set out for Odessa. He arrived there in early January 1870, became a Russian citizen and was granted the title of state advisor.[16] Although he taught for no more than five semesters, he continued to be officially considered professor of Odessa University until his retirement in late 1889. The request for his mission to Montenegro arrived at a point when his research into the Slavic customary laws and legal systems had gained a fresh momentum: in the summer of 1872 he was doing a research in the Caucasus, which was part of the Russian Empire at the time.[17]

## 2. Bogišić's codification concept and method

Prior to his mission to Montenegro, Bogišić had not been specifically concerned with theoretical, methodological and practical problems of codification.[18] Now that he had to cope with them, he was left to his own devices. The kind of work that lay before him was being done by teams of many members and over many years in countries such as Germany, Switzerland and Japan. The mission was therefore a turning point in his life. The assignment he was allotted by the Russian authorities was completely different from anything he had done so far, and he had to find a formula to carry it out.

The prolonged length and content of Bogišić's codification mission was influenced by several factors. As time went on his pragmatism came increasingly to the fore: he adjusted the task entrusted to him to his own scholarly views and personal plans, used it to enhance his scholarly reputation and to solidify his official status with the relevant Russian ministries. Bogišić's propensity to live a life of ease and to travel much, and not always for official purposes, did not go unnoticed.[19] As a result, his work on the Code took more than fifteen years (1872–1888). Bogišić's preparatory work on the Code was validated by two Russian ministries (of Foreign Affairs and of National Education) and the Tsar himself, and the prolongation of his Montenegrin mission was approved several times in a row.[20]

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[16] Bogišić 1938 [1902], 87.

[17] Bogišić described his time in the Caucasus in his *Autobiography*, see Bogišić 1938 [1902]; see also Novak 1960, 211–215; Nedeljković 1968, 62–63.

[18] As already pointed out by Pupovci 1996, 27.

[19] Novak 1960, 95.

[20] For more detail, see Pupovci 1996.

Bogišić first arrived in Cetinje in early April 1873, but already in May he was a member of Prince Nikola's suite on his visit to Vienna.[21] He remained in Montenegro until January 1874, which is when he carried out his famous survey on customary laws in Montenegro, Herzegovina and northern Albania. The concept of the Code was defined during his two stays in 1875, in July and in August–September respectively.[22] Late in May 1881, he arrived in Cetinje once again in order to discuss issues surrounding the Code project, and stayed until February 1882, but during that period he visited Dubrovnik seven times to prepare there for the next stage of his work. He made his last stay in Montenegro in the interval between June 1885 and January 1886, but apart from three months, he spent most of the time in Dubrovnik. All the remaining months and years of the fifteen-year-long preparation of the Code, then, Bogišić spent out of Montenegro.

With the consent of the Russian Minister of Education, Bogišić settled in Paris in November 1874. Apart from the rich libraries and the possibility of consulting legal experts, he had some private reasons for settling in the French capital,[23] where he spent most of the time until the proclamation of the Code, although he frequently travelled. Saint Petersburg was the place of his second longest sojourn. The material kept in Russian archives (primarily the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire and the Russian State Historical Archive in Moscow)[24] elucidates the position of Russia's highest government bodies and persons towards Bogišić and Montenegro. At the end of Bogišić's codifying work, a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry said in Saint Petersburg that Bogišić's work should be seen as a "monument to Russia's historical and civilizational role in the Orthodox East".[25] Russia had financed Bogišić's work on the Code from beginning to end, including its printing and its author's pension.[26]

Besides Paris, Bogišić made stays of varying length in Vienna: in September 1879, May 1881, May and June 1883, July and August 1884,[27] the spring of 1885, and June and July 1886.[28] He travelled to Berlin in March 1877, July 1878, May and June of 1880, April and May of 1881,[29] April

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[21] Medaković 1998, 293.

[22] Novak 1960, 252–253.

[23] Ibid., 247.

[24] Cf. Pupovci 1996, and 2004, 41–62, 237–279; Montenegrin Codes III.

[25] Pupovci 1996, 57.

[26] For a detailed account, see Pupovci 1996; partly also Martinović 1958, 236.

[27] Novak 1960, 304–305.

[28] Novak 1960, 3, 311 ff; Nedeljković 1968, 154.

[29] Novak 1960, 281.

1882, the autumn of 1883, and July and August 1884. He paid somewhat shorter visits to other capital cities that were of interest for his codifying work, such as London (July and August 1880), Heidelberg (April 1881), Munich (June 1883), Prague (May 1881) and Budapest (October 1874 and September 1884).[30] In 1877, sent by the Russian government to join the Russian troops in Bulgaria during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78, Bogišić drew up the "Provisional rules of the organization of courts" in Bulgaria.

Bogišić believed that collecting and studying customary law was a necessary "preliminary" to his work of codification. It was a way to learn about and appraise the nature of what he called the "indigenously developed" laws of the people in order to avoid the mechanical and anachronous transplantation of institutes of Roman law into contemporary legislation. Bogišić's views were encouraged by the work of the so-called Warsaw School of Law, notably the pan-Slavic historian Wacław Maciejowski, with whom he had established friendly relations and maintained a long-standing correspondence.[31] Contending that customary law was very much alive in the traditional patriarchal structure of Montenegrin society, and that, by contrast, written laws were very few, especially in the domain of civil law, Bogišić designed an extensive questionnaire (2,000 questions) to cover customary practices in both public and private laws, and used it in the survey he carried out in the course of 1873.[32]

Bogišić visited Belgrade in 1874 to acquaint himself with the thirty years of implementation of the *Civil Code of the Principality of Serbia*.[33] His proposal to draw up a single civil code for Serbia and Montenegro on identical principles was not accepted in Belgrade.[34] During Bogišić's stay in Cetinje in mid-1875, he convinced Prince Nikola and the Senate to agree to his concept of the Code,[35] by demonstrating that what Montenegro needed most at the moment was a regulation in the field of civil law. In that way, the initial broadly conceived *general national code* (which would have included public law as well) became reduced to a *civil* one, which in turn, lacking family law and the law of inheritance, became a *property code*.

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[30] Novak 1960; Nedeljković 1968.

[31] Bogišić 1938 [1902], 102; Nikčevič 1967, 8.

[32] For more on the 1873 survey, see Martinović 1958, 72–167; Martinović 1964; Bogišić 1984; Nikčević 1984.

[33] Sirotković 1989, 69; Luković 1994, 49.

[34] For more, see Nikčević 1971.

[35] For more, see Bojović 1992; Luković 2004.

### 3. Bogišić's associates

The names of Bogišić's associates in preparing the Code are known. They can be divided into two categories according to their origin. Because of the peculiar nature of his codification mission, however, it is not always simple to make a clear distinction between domestic and foreign. Namely, in Montenegro Bogišić represented the Russian "side", while at the same time being treated as "one of us", a Serb from the neighbouring Dubrovnik area. He had a few associates playing various roles in Montenegro, and they unambiguously are domestic. However, some of his key associates were subjects of Austria-Hungary (as was Bogišić himself prior to his departure for Russia), on the one hand, and Serbs or Croats or "Serbo-Croats" by nationality, on the other. They also seem entitled to be categorized as domestic associates, as are those from the Principality/Kingdom of Serbia. As Bogišić's truly foreign associates may be considered citizens of France, Germany, Switzerland, Hungary, and even those of Austria-Hungary who were not of Serb, Croatian or "Serbo-Croatian" nationality.

### 3.1. Domestic associates

When, in 1873, Bogišić designed the questionnaire for surveying legal customs in Montenegro, Prince Nikola appointed informants for particular areas of Montenegro, but also for some of the neighbouring areas, such as Herzegovina and northern Albania.[36] The informants were high-ranking military and civilian officials knowledgeable about customary law: *Vojvoda* Djuro Matanović, Senator Jole Piletić, ex-Senator Vido Bošković, *Vojvoda* Djuro Cerović and *Vojvoda* Marko Miljanov, while the informant for church relations was Archimandrite Visarion Ljubiša.[37]

Members of the commission on two code drafts may be described as a distinctive category of associates: Djuro Matanović, Jagoš Radović and Gavro Vuković, judges of the Grand Court (the highest court in Montenegro at the time). Bogišić commended them in his reports to the Russian ministries for their exquisite knowledge of the customary legal practices in

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[36] Following the Congress of Berlin in 1878, these areas became part of Montenegro, with the exception of Malesija (Tuzi, Hoti and Grude areas east of Podgorica), which were to be incorporated into Montenegro after the Balkan War of 1912. See Martinović 1958, 63.

[37] Montenegrin Codes III, 335.

Montenegro, although only Gavro Vuković was a trained jurist.[38] Prince Nikola himself took part in the final reading of the draft.[39]

Bogišić's domestic associates did not only include authorities on customary law. Once his concept of the Code was accepted in 1875, he decided to call in philologists to help resolve issues of terminology. Several philologists from the South-Slavic areas, also knowledgeable about folk life, answered the call.[40] Their contribution to his codifying work is less known even though at the end of his unfinished manuscript "Method and System of Codifying Property Law in Montenegro", Bogišić expresses his gratitude to those who helped him resolve problems of terminology, mentioning by name: Fran Miklosich, professor at Vienna University; Vatroslav Jagić, university professor in Saint Petersburg; Stojan Novaković, professor at the Great School in Belgrade ("presently a minister"); Jovan Pavlović, former assistant professor at the Belgrade Great School;  Laza Kostić, former secretary of the Serbian diplomatic mission to St Petersburg; professor Pero Budmani from Zagreb; professors Luko Zore and F. Kastrapeli from Dubrovnik; and "the late Vuk Vrčević, vice-consul [resting] in peace in Dubrovnik".[41]

### 3.2. Foreign associates

Least known, however, is the contribution made by Bogišić's foreign associates. In two texts, one of which was published posthumously, Bogišić expresses his gratitude to the five foreign legal experts who helped him with the preparation of the Code and cites their names and posts: R. Dareste, advisor to the Court of Appeals and member of the Institut de France, Paris; C. Glasson, professor of law and member of the Institut de France, Paris; C. Bluntschli, professor of law in Heidelberg during the last years of his academic career; J. Neubauer, advisor to the Appeals Committee for the editing of the German civil code; K. Dickel, professor of law in Berlin. The first time that Bogišić expressed gratitude to his foreign associates, as well as friends who helped him with technical terms, was in a text published in Brussels in 1901 by the *Révue de Droit international et Législation compare*. These names of Bogišić's helpers are also mentioned in his uncompleted

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[38] Ibid., 426, 427.

[39] On discussions of the two drafts of the code, see Bojović 1992; Luković 2004.

[40] Hence the epistolary form of Bogišić's text "Stručno nazivlje u zakonima" [Technical Terminology in Laws] and its subtitle: A Letter to a Philologist Friend. The text was contributed to the magazine *Pravo* (published in Split) in 1876, see Bogišić 1967, 152, 153, and 1986, 87–99.

[41] Bogišić 1967, 152–153.

study, edited and published by T. Nikčević in 1967 under the title *Method and System of Codifying Property Law in Montenegro*.

Most information on Bogišić's collaboration with "foreign" legal experts can be found in W. Zimmermann[42] and S. Pupovci,[43] who have done most to reconstruct his biography from the archival material. This particular issue is best elucidated from documents kept in the Russian archives, as Bogišić sent the Russian ministries detailed progress reports.[44]

Zimmermann notes a "surprising connection" between the Montenegrin Code, the historical school of law and the *Privatrechtliches Gesetzbuch für den Kanton Zürich* of 1854–56[45] drawn up by Bluntschli[46] as a continuation of F. L. Keller's work of 1840. Bluntschli's Code was the greatest contribution to Swiss nineteenth-century legislation, succeeding as it did in bridging the gap between Swiss legal tradition and contemporary civil law. It is devoid of abstractions and couched in simple language, which is also characteristic of Bogišić's Code. From 1877 to 1879, Bluntschli was a member of an expert committee for Swiss contractual law. In April 1881, Bogišić met with Bluntschli for three days of consultation on "some important and contentious issues".[47] However, Bluntschli's death in October the same year deprived Bogišić of further assistance of this acknowledged expert.

Bogišić had a longstanding collaboration with Wilhelm C. Neubauer, a member of the German Appeals Court and secretary to the commission working on the German civil code. The possibility of collaboration was discussed in Berlin as early as July 1878, as Bogišić wished to be kept informed on the progress of the German commission.[48] In May 1880, he revisited Berlin for a fortnight to consult with Neubauer. The following year, there were further three-day consultations "on some important and contentious issues". He then left for Prague, spent four days there consulting with the professor of civil law Anton Randa, and then travelled to Vienna for four

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[42] See Zimmermann 1962.

[43] See Pupovci 2004.

[44] Cf. Montenegrin Codes III, 449-451; Pupovci 2004, 255-279.

[45] Zimmermann 1962, 5.

[46] Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808–1881), a practising lawyer and university professor (Zurich, Munich, Heidelberg), advocated the introduction of "local" (German) law in place of Roman law which had held precedence until then; cf. *Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie*. Bogišić attended Bluntschli's lectures in Munich for a semester, which greatly helped to crystalize the main direction of his studies, cf. Zimmermann 1962, 38.

[47] Montenegrin Codes III, 450; Zimmermann 1962, 189, 471.

[48] Montenegrin Codes III, 450.

days of "negotiations" with professor L. von Stein,[49] whose student he had been in Vienna.[50]

While in Montenegro to discuss the first draft of the Code, sometime between May 1881 and February 1882 Bogišić received the first chapters of the draft of the German civil code from Neubauer.[51] He returned to Paris in February 1882, and in May he was again in Berlin in order to "confer on some issues that had arisen during discussion of the first Montenegrin code" with Neubauer and other members of the German codification commission.[52] In October 1882, Bogišić had separate consultations with high-ranking officials of the Russian ministries on his further work on the Montenegrin Code, at which time a special protocol was adopted. According to it, Bogišić undertook to translate the final version into German or French, and to discuss the draft with distinguished European lawyers.[53]

Bogišić designates Neubauer as his chief consultant. In March 1883, on Bogišić's return voyage from Saint Petersburg to Paris, the two of them met in Berlin so as to "set the time and place for discussing the draft".[54] At the end of April, Bogišić hurried off to Vienna, where he engaged three students from the South-Slavic regions for the purpose of translating his draft of the Code into German.[55] The German codification commission commended Bogišić's draft.[56] However, that year Neubauer was only able to spare "two weeks" for him in late August and early September. Immediately prior and subsequent to his consultations with Neubauer, Bogišić discussed the draft in Berlin with "a judge engaged in theoretical work".[57] The judge was Karl Dickel.[58] When the Code came into force in 1888, Dickel gave its

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[49] Lorenz von Stein (1815–1890), jurist, politician, university professor, lectured in the national economy; opposed to the integration of Schleswig-Holstein into the Kingdom of Denmark; actively involved in the German nationalist movement 1848/49 in Kiel, his hometown, but, deprived of professorship, left his homeland; for some years a journalist in Augsburg, moved in 1855 to Vienna, where he taught as a very influential university professor for more than thirty years; cf. *Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie*.

[50] Zimmermann 1962, 189, 471.

[51] Montenegrin Codes III, 431, 432.

[52] Ibid., 433, 455.

[53] Pupovci 2004, 264.

[54] Montenegrin Codes III, 439.

[55] Ibid., 440.

[56] Martinović 1958, 219; Zimmermann 1962, 498; Montenegrin Codes III, 442.

[57] Montenegrin Codes III, 440–441.

[58] Karl Philipp Dickel (1853–1920), a judge in the area of civil law in various types of courts in Berlin; from 1890, senior lecturer at the Forst-Akademie in Eberswalde, and

detailed presentation before the Society of Jurists (*Juristenverein*) in Berlin in early 1889.[59]

Upon his return to Paris, Bogišić spent the time until July 1884 putting the finishing touches to the Code, visiting Berlin for five-day consultations on "some issues which have not been resolved in correspondence".[60] In September he visited Budapest for four days, where he received the complete draft of the new Hungarian civil code, the result of the fifteen-year work of a special commission. According to Bogišić, it did not provide "anything of interest to his task".[61]

Although Bogišić's official reports to the Russian ministries make no specific reference to his collaboration with French law experts, in January 1875 he announces his choice of Paris as the place of his further residence since it "provides the best working conditions." Apart from the rich National Library and the specialized library of the Société de la Législation comparée, there also were "several acquaintances among the good professors of law".[62] Bogišić was indeed in lively contact with French law experts, of whom, however, he mentions only two by name: Dareste[63] and Glasson.[64]

Legal experts in Paris had been following Bogišić's work on the Code and he himself wrote of his work. He published a booklet in French *On the Montenegrin Civil Code — A Few Words on the Principles and Methods Used in Drafting*, subtitled: *A Letter to a Friend*,[65] first in Paris in 1886 and then

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from 1899 professor of German civil and procedural law at the Univerity of Berlin; cf. *Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie*.

[59] Pupovci 2004, 300, 388.

[60] Montenegrin Codes III, 451, 457.

[61] Ibid., 451, 457.

[62] Ibid., 355.

[63] Rodolphe-Madeleine Cléophas Dareste de la Chavanne (1824–1911), lawyer and philologist by education, author of numerous works in the field of law; in 1847–1877 worked as a lawyer, in 1877–1899 as counsellor and judge of the Court of Appeals in Paris; very active in barristers' and legal associations, president of the Société de législation comparée and  member and president of  the Académie des sciences morales et politiques of the Institut de France in Paris; cf. *Notices biographiques* 1907.

[64] Ernest Désiré Glasson (1839–1907), lawyer 1860–1865; subsitute professor (suppléant) at the Faculty of Law and the lycée in Strasbourg; in 1865–1907, he practised law and lectured at the Faculty of Law in Nancy, and in 1867–1907 was professor of civil and procedural law and the history of law at the University of Paris; for a time he was a professor at the Ecole libre des sciences politiques; he was a member of the Conseil supérieur de l'instruction publique and member and president of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques of the Institut de France; cf. *Notices biographiques* 1907.

[65] The "friend" was in fact Dareste, at the time secretary to the Société de la législation comparée in Paris, of which Bogišić was a foreign member.

in Brussels in 1888.[66] Another study published in Brussels was devoted to a section of the Code: "On the rural family type known as *Inokosna* among the Serbs and Croats".[67] In 1884, he became a corresponding member of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques[68] of the distinguished Institut de France and his reputation grew in that country. Thus in May 1888 we find Dareste reading a report on the Montenegrin Code before the Institut de France and expressing himself very favourably on Bogišić's work.[69] In 1892, Dareste and Albert Rivière published a French translation of the Code.[70]

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[66] V. Bogišić, *A propos du Code civil du Monténégro. Quelques mots sur les principes et la méthode suivis dans la codification du droit civil au Monténégro. Lettre à un ami* (Paris 1886); the text was also published in the *Bulletin de la Société de législation comparée* 17 (Brusells 1887/88), 483–497.

[67] V. Bogišić, "D'une forme particuliére dite Inokosna de la famille rurale chez les Serbes et les Croates", *Révue de droit international et législation comparée* 16 (1884), 374–409.

[68] Montenegrin Codes III, 443.

[69] Pupovci 2004, 300, 388.

[70] Martinović 1958, 277.

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# In the Shadow of the Macedonian Issue

### International Re-alignments and Balkan Repercussions
### from the Greek-Yugoslav Agreements of 18 June 1959
### to the 1960 Crisis in Relations between Athens and Belgrade

**Abstract**: The 1960s were a decade of important developments in the Balkans. Skopje's stirring up of the issue of the supposed "Macedonian" minority led to a series of diplomatic clashes between Greece and Yugoslavia, culminating in the 1960–1962 crisis. A major role in developments in the Balkans was played by the Soviet Union, which, directly or indirectly, greatly influenced the shaping of Yugoslav foreign policy. The crisis began in August 1960 when, for the first time since 1950, the Yugoslavia Foreign Ministry publicly raised the question of protecting the rights of the "Macedonian minority". While the Athens-Belgrade crisis was not serious enough to lead them to break off diplomatic relations, it did have a catalytic effect on the shaping of Bulgarian policy with regard to the Macedonian question. After the restoration of democracy in Greece (1974), and despite her need for support from Yugoslavia on the Cyprus issue, the Karamanlis government did not repeat the "mistakes" of 1959. Belgrade, having secured in 1975 a renewal of the agreement on the free zone in the Port of Thessaloniki, did not insist on signing a border agreement. The Macedonian question had become of no more than academic interest in the discussions of politicians on both sides of the border, and the crisis of 1960–62 merely a forgotten flare-up.

**Keywords**: Balkans, Yugoslavia, Greece, Macedonian issue, 1960s crisis, Bulgaria

The 1960s were a decade of important developments in the Balkans.[1] Skopje's stirring up of the issue of the supposed "Macedonian" minority led to a series of diplomatic clashes between Greece and Yugoslavia, culminating in the 1960–1962 crisis. A major role in developments in the Balkans was played by the Soviet Union, which, directly or indirectly, greatly influenced the shaping of Yugoslav foreign policy.

After the death of Stalin, the new Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, embarked on a de-Stalinization campaign in order to secure his position in the Soviet Union and the Socialist camp in general. In order to prevent Yugoslavia from adhering more closely to the West, he restored Soviet-Yugoslav relations, a move that was formalised with the signature of the decla-

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[1] This paper has resulted from my broader research into twentieth-century Balkan history, published in part in my book *In the Shadow of the Macedonian Issue* (Thessaloniki 2007). The documentary sources and bibliography are quoted at the end of the paper.

rations of Belgrade (1955) and Moscow (1956), by which the Soviet Union recognised Yugoslavia's different road to Socialism. Nonetheless, Yugoslavia did not adhere to the Warsaw Pact, and Yugoslav foreign policy was based on the doctrine of maintaining an equal distance from East and West.

It was not long, however, before relations between Moscow and Belgrade soured. In October 1956 the reform movement in Hungary, fruit of that country's de-Stalinization campaign, turned into an anti-Communist revolution; this was snuffed out by two Soviet military interventions. Yugoslavia's attitude to the Hungarian question displeased the Soviets. Tito condemned the use of armed force, arguing that the first Soviet intervention was not necessary and the second was a necessary evil. The fate of Nagy and the other Hungarian political figures who sought asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy was a fresh cause of tension in Yugoslav-Soviet relations.

A typical example of the coolness between the two countries was Yugoslavia's refusal to sign the "Declaration of the 12 Governing Communist Parties", which called for the Communist and Workers' Parties to coordinate their common struggle for peace, democracy and socialism and indirectly recognised the Soviet Union's leading role in the Socialist world. The Bulgarian government, which appeared to benefit from the tension that had been created, encouraged Bulgarian historians to trumpet the "distortions their history had suffered at the hands of Skopjian historians". Another green light was given in Khrushchev's address to a congress of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, when he called Tito a "Trojan horse of imperialism".

While this negative climate was chilling relations between Moscow and Belgrade, the latter's co-operation with Athens was visibly increasing. Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey had entered into a Balkan Friendship and Cooperation Agreement in 1953. Relations between the three were governed by the spirit of this Balkan Pact until the deteriorating climate between Greece and Turkey caused by the Cyprus conflict virtually extinguished it. Greece and Yugoslavia, on the other hand, had their own separate reasons for wanting to strengthen it. Greece, sure of Yugoslavia's support in the Cyprus problem, believed that a rapprochement between the three countries would help resolve the matter. Yugoslavia, meanwhile, wanted to revive the Pact primarily for defensive reasons. Turkey, however, had turned its attention toward the Middle East in 1955 and was no longer interested in the Balkan Pact.

This Pact notwithstanding, the Greek and Yugoslav positions with regard to international and Balkan affairs were not the same. Greece and Yugoslavia reacted in different ways to US President Dwight Eisenhower's decision to deploy missiles in NATO countries. The Karamanlis government wanted to strengthen NATO, arguing that this was necessary in the

climate that had developed after the signing of the Zurich and London agreements "for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict". When Romanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica proposed a "missile-free Balkans", the Greek government rejected the idea. In 1959 Soviet policy in the Balkans focused on preventing the deployment of NATO missiles in Greece. The Soviet Union threatened to install nuclear bases in Albania and Bulgaria if Greece gave in to American pressure, the aim being to frighten Greece, whose relations with those two countries were not good. Yugoslavia, however, fearing a stronger Soviet presence in the Balkans, supported Stoica's proposition.

Despite the differences in their positions in international affairs, Greece and Yugoslavia continued to develop their bilateral co-operation. In June 1959 the two countries signed twelve agreements, fruit of the "Mixed Commission on Economic, Cultural and Technical Affairs" that had been set up in 1958. These agreements, most of them economic and technical, were accepted by the Greek political world without reaction, except for that on cross-border communication. This agreement provided that the border cards to be issued to facilitate freedom of movement in the predetermined border zone would be printed in the official languages of both countries. In practice this meant using the "Slav-Macedonian" tongue, which was one of the official languages of Yugoslavia. Greek opposition politicians, largely for reasons of domestic opposition policy, accused the Karamanlis government of recognising the "Slav-Macedonian" language and underestimating the Slav danger. The Karamanlis government replied that all it was recognising was the Yugoslav constitution. Greece could not prevent the use of the "Slav-Macedonian" tongue within Yugoslavia, but would in no case issue border cards in Greece in that language. As for the danger of Skopjian propaganda, Yugoslav foreign policy was, it stressed, determined in Belgrade and not in Skopje. The local authorities in some villages in Western Macedonia reacted very strongly: conditioned by the anti-Slav syndrome of the post-civil war era, they organised oath-taking ceremonies in which Slav-speakers swore never to use the Slav idiom again. These, however, were just isolated incidents, and were not instigated by the Greek government, which assured the Yugoslav government that it condemned such actions. In any case, Athens told Belgrade, and whatever the reaction, the agreements would be ratified.

Greece, however, which had placed its hopes in Yugoslavia to ensure the smooth functioning of cross-border communication and to prevent Skopje from stirring up any minority issues, was belied. In 1960 new factors on the international scene and in the Balkan region led to a cooling in relations between the two countries.

In 1960–61 the Cold War was heating up. The Soviet downing of an American spy plane taking photographs of military installations in the

Soviet Union sparked a fiery war of words and led to the failure of the Paris Peace Summit in May 1960. In this climate of international tension the Soviet Union decided to impose a radical solution on the Berlin issue by building a wall through the city (August 1961). In international matters concerning collective security (a missile-free Balkans, the Berlin question) Yugoslavia supported the Soviet Union, although it had already embarked on an independent foreign policy path.

The years 1960–61 also saw the break-up of the Socialist camp, with breaches between the Soviet Union and China and between the Soviet Union and Albania. The souring of relations between Albania and the Soviet Union led to a blossoming of Albania's relations with China and a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia condemned China's opportunism and supported the Soviet Union, which in Tito's view posed no threat to his country.

These new circumstances had an impact on relations between Greece and Yugoslavia. When Skopje decided to revive the question of the "Macedonian minority" in Greece, Belgrade did not react. There were a number of reasons behind the stirring up of this issue. With the cooling-off in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the Bulgarian organisation MPO (Macedonian Patriotic Organisation) had become very active in America, denying the existence of a Macedonian ethnicity and raising the issue of the protection of the rights of the Bulgarian minority in Greece. The basic position of this organisation was a "united and independent Macedonia". By raising the Macedonian question as a Bulgarian issue, the MPO gave Greece an argument against Skopje's claims regarding a Macedonian ethnicity and Macedonian minorities, regardless of the fact that the Bulgarian factor differed only formally from the Slav-Macedonian. In the early months of 1960, perhaps influenced by the signing of the Greek-Yugoslav agreements, the action of the Bulgarian-Macedonians in America was stepped up and the Western Macedonian Greek communities in Canada and America devoted themselves to the struggle to combat Bulgarian propaganda. This was a blow to Skopje, since the MPO, as an anti-Communist, Bulgarian-nationalist organisation, was a feared rival, until Communist Bulgaria overcame its ideological complex sufficiently to counter-attack. The press in Northern Greece frequently cited both the Bulgarian propaganda the organisation was conducting in America and the defensive activity of the Greeks living there.

The issue of the return of Slav-Macedonian refugees from the Eastern countries, particularly from Poland, was complicated by the fact that Yugoslavia could not absorb them in large numbers, while the Bulgarian government offered to resettle them in Bulgaria and to that end sent agents to Poland to win them over. The dispute between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia

over the ethnic identity of the Slavs of Macedonia had moved beyond the narrow confines of the Balkans.

In April-May 1960 a *cause célèbre* came up before the Permanent Court Martial in Athens, when a large group of Greek Communists were accused of spying for the international Communist movement. The defence statements attacked both the stance of the CPG on the Macedonian issue and the role of Yugoslavia in the Greek civil war, and most of the accused stressed the need for respecting the rights of the "Macedonian minority".

In response to this trial, the Central Committee of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia met on 18 May 1960 specifically to discuss the Macedonian question and Greek-Yugoslav relations. The position adopted by both Skopje and Belgrade was expressed by the Speaker of the House and former Premier of the FPR Macedonia, Lazar Koliševski, who stated that "the objective of the trial of the Communists in Greece was to strike fear into and to silence the Macedonian population, so that they would deny their ethnic identity". He also opined that the Greek side "was abusing its relations with Yugoslavia so as to erase the Macedonian question" and, in closing, argued that it was a duty of the Yugoslav government to act vigorously in the matter, since Greece and Bulgaria were doing the same.

A number of other political figures aligned themselves with Koliševski, among them Foreign Minister Koča Popović and Deputy Prime Minister Edvard Kardelj. By the time the conference closed, a coordinated policy, to be followed by Belgrade and Skopje, had been worked out: the Skopjian press would have a relatively free hand to stir up the minority issue and the federal government would pursue an active campaign through political announcements, without however seeking to cause a rupture in the country's relations with Greece.

The crisis began in August 1960 when, for the first time since 1950, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry publicly raised the question of protecting the rights of the "Macedonian minority". A war of words promptly broke out between Greece and Yugoslavia, with both countries holding fast to their positions. Greece maintained that there was no question of a "Macedonian" minority in its territory and that the remaining Slav-speakers there considered themselves to be Greeks. Yugoslavia, for its part, accused the Greek government of essentially bringing the issue to the foreground (through the oath-taking ceremonies and the trial of Communists) and demanded the immediate recognition of the "minority".

A meeting between Averoff and Popović held on the island of Brioni in July 1960 seemed to mark the beginning of a relaxation of the diplomatic and political tension that had been created. Averoff and Popović reached their first "gentlemen's agreement", which provided simply for mutual efforts to prevent the issue from escalating into a serious dispute, but did

nothing to assuage the Greek government's worries that Skopje would exploit the aspects of the agreement concerning cross-border communication. In a memorandum delivered to the Yugoslav Ambassador, the Greeks attempted to direct the Yugoslav government's attention to what was going on in the border zone. It cited the uncontrolled activity of certain Slav-Macedonian circles, whose behaviour was an affront to the inhabitants of Western Macedonia: they were urging bilingual Greeks to declare themselves as "Macedonians", encouraging them to speak "Slav-Macedonian", and collecting oral accounts of the period of the Axis occupation and the civil war for a "national history of Macedonia". The chief agents were the Slav-Macedonian refugees from Greek Macedonia in the FPRM, who had become a pressure group working on the government in Skopje.

The Karamanlis government might not have attached such importance to this sort of incidents had they not been accompanied by Yugoslav politicians' official speeches insisting on the issue of the protection of the rights of the "Macedonian" minority. A characteristic example was Koliševski's historically inaccurate speech at the Socialist Union Congress in October 1960, which further inflamed the spirits. Once again the Speaker of the House in Skopje openly accused Greece of indifference to its obligations toward the "Macedonian" minority within its borders, which according to him had been established by the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. He also accused the Greek press of supporting the activity (in America) of the MPO, which presented the Macedonian question as a Bulgarian issue and rejected Skopje's position on the existence of a "Macedonian" nation.

Koliševski's speech caused a political storm in Athens when it became known that it had been made in the presence of Kardelj. The Greek diplomats considered this speech a breach of the Averoff-Popović gentlemen's agreement and hastened to demand explanations from the Yugoslav government. The Karamanlis government indeed had serious reasons to be worried about its survival, for the political statements that were issuing from Skopje were providing fuel for the opposition.

The Yugoslav government replied that the episodes in the border zone were isolated incidents and that Greece had no reason for concern, and promised to admonish the Yugoslav people to refrain from any political activity in Greece.

These developments in the Balkans also affected the final position of the Karamanlis government in the matter. As has been said, 1961 was the year when Albania broke off its relations with the Soviet Union, a development that hastened the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. These re-alignments naturally affected Greek policy towards Albania; 1961 was also a year of intense activity of the Associations of Northern Epirotes, who felt that the moment had come for the liberation of Northern

Epirus. References to the Greek minority abounded in the Greek press. Athens hinted that it would find some formula for ending the state of war with Albania and extend financial help to the country if a solution to the (minority) issue of Northern Epirus was found.

Greece's interest in the Greek minority in Northern Epirus spurred Skopje to publicize a similar interest in the "Macedonian minority" in Greece; and so, in November-December 1961, Skopje and Belgrade once again raised this issue. Skopje's continual stirring up of a matter for which a compromise solution could have been found, coupled with Yugoslavia's insistence on acting as Skopje's custodian, forced the Karamanlis government to halt the work of the Mixed Committee and unilaterally suspend cross-border communication in December 1961.

While Yugoslav politicians made no new public pronouncements regarding the "Macedonian minority" in 1962, their role was taken up with a vengeance by the press on both sides of the border. The crisis of 1960–62 was brought to an end by the second Averoff-Popović gentlemen's agreement, in December 1962. On the basis of this agreement the two countries could adhere to their respective positions but had to avoid any kind of action that might disturb relations between them.

While the Athens-Belgrade crisis was not serious enough to lead them to break off diplomatic relations, it did have a catalytic effect on the shaping of Bulgarian policy with regard to the Macedonian question. Premier Zhivkov's government, fearing pressure from Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union to recognise a "Macedonian minority" in Bulgaria, officially decided in 1963 that there was no "historic Macedonian nation" and noted that the "Macedonian consciousness" in Yugoslav Macedonia should develop on an anti-Bulgarian basis.

In November 1964 George Papandreou's government reactivated the border agreement, largely because he needed Yugoslavia's support as regards Cyprus. The price he paid for this support was a general tolerance of the activity of the Slav-Macedonians who crossed into Greek Macedonia under the terms of the border agreement. The turbulence in Greek political life in 1965–66 and the ongoing conflict in Cyprus distracted Athens' attention from the Macedonian issue. As long as Yugoslav politicians refrained from making public declarations, Athens could relax.

One of the first actions of the dictatorship proclaimed on 21 April 1967 was to denounce the border agreement. The reason given by the Kollias government for this action (May 1967) was the systematic activity carried out by Slav-Macedonian refugees. The nationalist policy adopted by the Greek dictatorship left no room for discussing a "Macedonian" language or minority.

Nor did the Karamanlis government after the restoration of democracy (1974), and despite Greece's need for Yugoslavia's support on the Cyprus issue, repeat the "mistakes" of 1959. Belgrade, having secured in 1975 a renewal of the agreement on the free zone in the Port of Thessaloniki, did not insist on signing a border agreement. The Macedonian question had become of no more than academic interest in the discussions of politicians on both sides of the border, and the crisis of 1960–62 merely a forgotten flare-up.

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## Expressing Time in the Autobiographical Discourse
## of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) from Kosovo and Metohija

**Abstract**: The oral corpus of recorded conversations with displaced persons from Kosovo and Metohija was formed in 2003. The transcript of a three-hour conversation with a female interlocutor originally from the environs of Suva Reka (Metohija) has been subjected to discourse analysis, an oft-used technique within linguistic anthropology. The focus of the contribution is on the interlocutor's ways of expressing time. Her autobiographical discourse, as well as that of displaced persons from Kosovo and Metohija in general, shows that the war/bombing/displacement functions as a temporal divide, as a time marker in relation to which the past, present and future are expressed. The results of this pilot study into time expressions may be used as the starting point in studying the entire oral corpus.

**Keywords**: anthropological linguistics, reconstruction, expressing time, autobiographical discourse, timer marker, time localizer, Vantage Theory, male and female time, Kosovo and Metohija, displaced Serbs

*Introduction*

As political scientists have already observed in reference to the political status of internally displaced persons, the state tends to treat its citizens differently by social distinctions such as ethnicity, class, caste, religion and region. The forced movement of people within a nation state also challenges the traditional understanding of citizenship rights as equally distributed to all citizens.[1]

During the civil war in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, researchers of the Zagreb-based Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research analyzed interviews with Croatian refugees. According to Maja Povrzanović, "from the professional point of view, writing about the war became a learning process — a process of rethinking some fundamental issues in anthropology of which the relationship between insider and outsider scholars was but one. War ethnography is used here as a general term for articles on war-related issues".[2]

Political and military events in Serbia in 1999 led to the displacement of Serbs from Kosovo to other parts of Serbia: many ended up in refu-

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[1] Braun 2003, 377.

[2] Povrzanović 2000, 151.

gee camps; others were accommodated by relatives and friends; and some were able to arrange for private accommodation. Academics responded in ways they felt would best contribute to preserving some of the tradition and culture now threatened with extinction. In 2002, two institutes of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA), the Institute for the Serbian Language and the Institute for Balkan Studies, started a UNESCO-supported project: *A Study of Slavic Speeches in Kosovo and Metohija*. The project resulted in an archive of audio recordings made both with displaced persons and with those still living in enclaves in Kosovo.[3] The collected material was partly published in three edited multidisciplinary volumes: *Refugee Kosovo* (2004), *Life in the Enclave* (2005) and *Kosovo and Metohija: Living in the Enclave* (2007), as well as in many individual articles in various publications. This paper also makes use of the recorded material.

The analysis presented here forms part of a more comprehensive research aimed at identifying and examining a certain stereotype of time in the discourse of displaced persons from Kosovo recognized in the placement of chronological facts in a subjective coordinate system, as well as at identifying specific ways of expressing subjective time in relation to objective time and to "cult" time, i.e. time as perceived in traditional folk culture. This discourse analysis of time expression is only a pilot study within more extensive research involving the displaced persons from Kosovo.[4]

## 1. Research method

The main goal of the research project *Study of Slavic Speeches in Kosovo and Metohija* was to record, and thus to preserve, the endangered dialects and speeches in the wake of the events of the 1998/99; hence the project's predominantly dialectological focus. The methodology of traditional dialectological studies requires recording interviews with elder persons as bearers of autochthonous speeches. These usually lack formal education, were born in, and usually have never left, the place whose speech is studied. These eligibility criteria are met mainly by women, who are therefore considered preferred collocutors. With the Institute for Balkan Studies joining the project, the approach to language became interdisciplinary in nature. The interviews were designed in such a manner that the material collected should not be representative only in dialectological terms, but also useful for linguistic pragmatics, linguistic anthropology, ethnolinguistics, anthropological and folklore studies. For the same interdisciplinary reasons, there was no insis-

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[3] The archive is now stored at the two SASA institutes.

[4] The paper presents preliminary results of my doctoral research "Stereotype of time in the discourse of internally displaced persons from Kosovo and Metohija".

tence on the criteria insisted upon by traditional dialectology; instead, the main requirement for collocutors was that they be typical bearers of local culture. The questionnaire most frequently used in the course of this research was the questionnaire for the ethnolinguistic study of the Balkan Slavic area developed by Ana Plotnikova (1996). The interviews with displaced persons accommodated in collective centres and those still living in the Kosovo-Metohija enclaves did not, however, end with Plotnikova's questionnaire, but expanded to include their autobiographies, stories of their displacement and related tragic events. All the characteristics of the conversations conducted affirm the interdisciplinary nature of the project.

The research team of the Institute for Balkan Studies employ the method described above in their anthropolinguistic fieldwork, modifying it in response to their individual scholarly concerns and the distinctive cultural features of the area under study.[5]

## 2. A woman participant from Suva Reka

The participant was born in the village of Movljane in 1935, and she married in the village of Sopina (Municipality of Suva Reka, Metohija). Interviews providing four hours of recorded material were made at the *Ugrinovačka* refugee camp in Zemun (Belgrade, Serbia) in the spring of 2003, four years after she had fled Kosovo. She attended only primary school and she married very young, in accordance with local traditional custom at the time. The interview touched upon a number of topics: everyday life, the traditional local calendar system, her own life and her reflections on moral principles and values.

The conversation was guided by the researcher's questions. I insisted on topics related to traditional culture, but the transcribed material clearly shows the participant's autobiographic interpolations into the formal discourse. The "ideal model of a ritual" was reconstructed, but it was mixed with the model practised over a certain period in the past. By the "ideal model of a ritual" I mean the whole set of traditional elements supposed to be contained in one ritual in a given community. The obligatory set of rituals undergoes gradual change in response to changing times, place, and a number of other factors.

Bearing in mind that in ethnolinguistics a huge part of the material is based on the reconstruction as related by participants, it is difficult to

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[5] Work on the project *Ethnic and Social Stratification of the Balkans* carried out by the Institute for Balkan Studies, SASA, includes interdisciplinary fieldwork conducted by Annemarie Sorescu-Marinković, Tanja Petrović, Marija Ilić, Marija Vučković and myself, under the direction of Biljana Sikimić.

document complex rituals properly using ethnographic techniques. However, these rituals, which reflect a complex action code, are an object of interest for linguistic anthropology. The "objective" description of a ritual in a traditional culture is replaced by personal interpretation, where deliberate evasion or spontaneous omission of details may be of some importance. It is clear that an "objective" description of a ritual or event with a complex action code can only be captured by the camera (the audio-visual method).[6]

Field research on the traditional wedding has also been done by two other members of the team of the Institute for Balkan Studies, Marija Ilić and Tanja Petrović. Ilić worked in the Serb-inhabited villages Szigetcsép and Lórév in Hungary, and Petrović interviewed the Serbs of Bela Krajina in Slovenia. The two regions honour different culture codes and each has its own distinctive features, but the questions concerning the choice of spouse were answered in an almost identical manner, and discourse analysis shows an almost identical cultural difference between the researcher and the participant, which is the cause of their mutual misunderstanding. In one of her interviews, the linguist Ilić[7] asked a question she believes to be asked by most researchers, namely: To what extent the participant's own wedding matched the model usually referred to and believed to be traditional? Ilić's paper is based on the material from the Serb-inhabited village of Szigetcsép in Hungary, but my material from the refugee camp shows that the question is quite justified. At first the participant does not understand the question about the choice of spouse or the possibility of a girl deciding whether she would marry the man chosen by her parents; so further clarification is needed:

> (And, for instance, has it ever happened that *a girl didn't want to take a boy?*) **That what?** (Well, that *a girl doesn't want to take a boy, that she doesn't want to marry him?*) **When, now?** (No, no, before.) Before, **in our time, we were given away by our parents**.

On the one hand, her failure to understand the question may favour the conclusion that the choice of spouse and parental decision were unquestioningly accepted facts, and that the absence of resistance was part of traditional local upbringing.[8] On the other hand, her failure to understand

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[6] Sikimić 2004, 854–855.

[7] Ilić 2003, 71.

[8] Ćirković 2004, 89. As the sociolinguist T. Petrović 2007, 51–52, states, the "subordination of young women was most obvious when decisions about their marriage were made. They usually had no influence on the choice of a husband [...] when the interviewed women talk about their non-voluntary marriages, a kind of conflict between their personal and social identities becomes observable: belonging to a certain social structure, they accept it and consider themselves part of it. But personally, they disagree

the question may be assumed to result from her inability to abstract facts from the supposed ideal model of a ritual, in this case the wedding. The latter is the case when the participant answers the researcher's "neutral" question by speaking in the first person and citing an example from her own experience:

> (Well, yes, and could a girl say that she did not want to marry?) Well, she could, but she had respect. (So, she had to?) She had respect. **I mean, I had a chance to go wherever I liked, but where my father gave me away, that's where I am. And, whether I had to or not, I didn't want to shame him, I mean, that is how it was back then.** He gives you away, so how can you go off somewhere else. And it turned out all right, it wasn't bad.

As already stated, the researcher's emphasis is on reconstructing the ritual under study. Many rituals have lost some of their components over time and the participants are aware of that. So these changes frequently crop up. The process of remembering is always heavily dependent on the moment at which the act of remembering takes place. Speaking about their own past, about the time of their youth, the women were aware of changes that had meanwhile occurred in family structure and values.[9] Autobiographical discourse typically consists of statements describing events, followed by personal comments which as a rule refer to differences between "their own" time and the present.[10] With people in a refugee camp, dislocated from their place of origin (Kosovo) where most of their habitual activities used to take place, interviews focusing on questions such as: "What was life like then?" or "How did you use to celebrate Christmas?" become a reconstruction of a reconstruction.

The whole conversation with the participant from Suva Reka has been transcribed, but this analysis will be limited to the ways of expressing time in autobiographical discourse, a topic I am particularly interested in because I believe that in the autobiographical discourse of the displaced persons from Kosovo and Metohija the war/bombing/displacement play the role of a boundary event, the point in time in relation to which the past, present and future are expressed. On the other hand, I shall cite other examples (also from autobiographical discourses) which may be seen as completely individual ways of expressing time, and which I believe to be important because they show which categories of time are involved in my collocutors' worldviews housed in language. Although in the latter case one

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with their position as imposed by rural patriarchal society and see it as a very bad and humiliating state".

[9] Petrović 2007, 48–49.

[10] Ibid., 50.

may speak about idiolectal ways of expressing time, this analysis might suggest which categories of time in the discourse of the displaced persons are amenable to study, and open the way to comparative and contrastive studies of time categories in the discourse of both the displaced persons and those still living in the enclaves in Kosovo and Metohija.

In order to facilitate translation into English, I first had to "translate" the dialect into standard Serbian. It is a fact that translation from a dialect into a standard language, and especially from one language into another, necessarily entails the loss of the dialect's distinctive features. Therefore, my analysis of time categories in these examples cannot be fully presented (e.g. the use of tenses, the meaning and use of prepositional phrase patterns etc).

### 3. Expressing time in autobiographical discourse

From the oral data obtained from my collocutor from Suva Reka, different aspects of expressing time emerge. It is possible to study the binary oppositions such as "now and then" or the usage of temporal adverbials such as "today", "tomorrow", "the day after tomorrow", but the analysis of utterances denoting temporal markers used as boundaries to determine the past, present and future can be of exceptional importance (e.g. *jedan dan pre rata*, "one day before the war"; *jedan dan pre bombardovanja*, "one day before the bombing", and so on). Bearing in mind that the linguistic sciences classify temporal adverbials as a morphosyntactic category, this type of analysis should be based on local vernacular syntax.

By way of introduction, I shall quote some recently suggested ideas, namely, that many studies have distinguished different time dimensions, such as historical, social or process time. An important time dimension is social time, a time perspective in which the actual behaviour of people is guided by rules and norms for relations with other people. The time frame that people have may influence their daily life in a direct manner. We hypothesize that a local time-path calendar allows people to think in their own time frame.[11]

Because of the forced spatial dislocation of displaced persons, I believe it very important to research the manner in which the past, present and future are expressed in their discourse, as well as whether a "shift" has occurred in the meaning of adverbs of time, such as now, tomorrow, yesterday etc. in relation to, according to my hypothesis, a new point of reference. I therefore believe that in analyzing these time relations the linguistic con-

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[11] Haandrikman et al. 2004, 340.

text is as important as extralinguistic ones. As the linguist Carlotta Smith argues:

> We have known that the interpretation of the tense requires information from context at least since demonstration of its anaphoric nature. The type of text passage in which a sentence appears determines the interpretation of tense in the sentence. Within a sentence tense interacts with other temporal expressions to establish a time for temporal interpretation. Almost every combination of temporal expressions is well-formed grammatically. But the meanings depend on tense, other temporal expressions in the syntactic context, and the mode of discourse of the passage.[12]

Context can provide information essential to locating a situation in time.[13] In some of her previous papers, Smith shows that text passages realize one of five discourse modes: Narrative, Report, Description, Information and Argument, and that there are three temporal modes: Narrative, Report and Description (2001; 2003).[14] Each has a different principle of advancement according to the predominant entities and how they are organized.[15] Citing patterns of tense interpretation and describing each of the temporal modes, Carlotta Smith only takes written text into consideration. The Discourse Modes are formulated for written texts. The main ideas hold for spoken discourse as well, but not all cases are covered: it does not account for conversation.[16]

The examples analyzed in this paper differ from Smith's Discourse Modes (narrative continuity of events is repeatedly interrupted by digressions), but they also show similarities, so we can only partly apply their characteristics to our material.

In this paper, I shall use two terms related to expressing time: the time marker and the time localizer. Although they are effectively synonymous, they will be used to denote two different concepts. The marker denotes the abstract concept, part of the participant's time map, the idea of expressing time and creating time categories. The localizer is grammatical, expressed in time adverbials and expressions or in the patterns of prepositional phrases used to define time adverbially.

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[12] Smith 2007, 420.

[13] Ibid., 424.

[14] Quoted after Smith 2007, 424.

[15] Ibid., 425.

[16] Ibid., 424.

*3.1. Use of the traditional calendar*

I shall focus only on some examples from the recorded conversation that illustrate a specific way of expressing time that is closer to the methods of linguistic anthropology. According to Jacques,[17] time can be divided into chronological time, measurable by clocks, called "Chronos", and the human and living time of intentions and goals, called "Kairos".[18]

In the discourse focused on the participant's personal drama — the killing of her son just one day before the bombing of Kosovo began in 1999 — and yet incorporated into the complex of social events, I note her use of the feast-days of the traditional Orthodox Christian calendar as her own time markers. The event she recounts is temporally defined in relation to a certain feast-day, a special date from which the counting of a new personal time begins. In the following example she mentions the traditional feast of *Mladenci* along with some typical rituals, but the exact date of the feast, which is the 22nd of March, is not mentioned at all:

> *That day I was making the* pogača [round bread] *and cooking fish, it was* **Mladenci**, *my daughter-in-law was preparing the* pogača, *I made this* tavče [baked beans] *and we were waiting for him to come.*

The exact day of the week — Monday — specifying the time of the tragic event, is also related to the same traditional feast:

> *They killed my son* **on a Monday, on Mladenci Day***.*

The same traditional feast is the time marker for the past, but it continues to function in the present. In the following sentence the interval between these two points in time is expressed:

> **This Mladenci Day**, it's four years. (***Sad ove Mladence što je, četiri godine.***)

As translation of the statement does not indicate the precise meaning of the verbal tense, my analysis will not go into the meaning of the tense used. However, the relation between the tense used and the adverbial of time, and their relation to the time of speaking would certainly show that the speaker's centrality implies an organizing consciousness, a temporal perspective from which the speaker invites the audience to consider the event.[19]

The traditional feast of *Mladenci* becomes the stimulus triggering the participant's memory of a tragic event. That the tragic event, death of her

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[17] Jacques 1990 [1982].

[18] After Haandrikman et al. 2004, 345.

[19] Taylor 1977, 203, quoted after Smith 2007, 421.

son, constitutes a very important part of her autobiographical story is indicated by her repeated digressions to the tragedy elicited by various segments of the interview.[20]

On the other hand, other events from the participant's autobiography are also located in time through the use of the traditional calendar — her own wedding took place on St George's Day.

> *Time passed, some two years later, it was autumn,* **St George of wintertime**, *there was the wedding. It was a big wedding, with horses, there were thirty odd horses, wedding guests, you know.*

I believe it important to note that this statement does not specify the year of the wedding; instead it uses a traditional feast as the time localizer. In the Orthodox Christian calendar two days of the year are dedicated to St George: *Djurdjevdan* (23 April/6 May) and *Djurdjic* (3/16 November). Given that Djurdjic is celebrated in the second half of the year (November), and that with the way time is now counted winter does not officially start until the 22nd of December, this division of the year into summer and winter is obviously dependent on rural elements, such as agricultural work in the fields.[21]

In the statement *it was autumn, St George of wintertime*, I encounter two different time categorizations of the event. On the one hand, there is the categorization of time according to the contemporary, mathematical, counting of time, since St George — Djurdjic (3/16 November) falls on an autumn date. On the other hand, the participant places the traditional feast in a category which she has adopted along along with the cultural code of the environment into which she was born and in which she lived until the displacement.

In this way, time localizers are added to the already defined time categories (winter vs. summer), defined according to the usual jobs con-

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[20] Ćirković 2004, 91.

[21] Although this paper looks at time categories as linguistic ones, the issue of the origin and existence of conceptual and thus linguistic categories is associated with human cognitive activity and the projection in language of knowledge about extralinguistic reality (Popović 2008, 153). This extralinguistic reality and temporal categorization have been looked at from the anthropological perspective by Otilia Hedeşan. In her study on the Bayash of Trešnjevica (central Serbia), Hedeşan 2005, 66, states that the observance of rituals and holidays implies the group's sedentary season, while the failure to observe them indirectly points to the group's nomadic season. Our case is different, i.e. on this occasion we are not speaking of the frequency or omission of holidays, but rather of the division of the calendar year into two periods depending on natural factors, which again, impose the organization of time.

nected to the seasons of the year. This idea of categorization is based on the Vantage Theory. Its founder Robert MacLaury explains:

> Vantage theory concerns the method by which people construct, maintain, and change categories. They do so by coordinating inherently fixed images (or ideas) with inherently mobile (or changeable) recognitions of similarity and difference of perceived experience to the images. Vantage theory poses that categorization consists not only of the viewer recognizing similarity and difference but of the viewer coordinating these recognitions with a fixed gist that he has extracted from some gamut of experience that he has selected. In Vantage theory, this coordination of fixed and mobile reference points derives by a deep-seated analogy with the process through which a person makes sense of his own position in space-time by reference to fixed landmarks and degrees of slow and fast motion.[22]

> People construct any category around a quintessential example or typical member; other members pertain to the degree that they share attributes with that prototype. Membership is based on shared essential properties; an entity either belongs or does not belong, and all members pertain at equal value. Categories are applied via logic to the natural order of an observer-independent world, either correctly or incorrectly.[23]

To be able to draw further inferences about the division of the year into winter and summer, however, I need material that is both more extensive and thematically more diverse. Therefore, I shall confine myself to the hypothesis inspired by the example cited above: *Time passed, some two years later, it was autumn, **St George of wintertime**, there was the wedding*. The examples also indicate the time location of certain community rituals: *They go to fetch earth, is it Thursday*[?]*, the Thursday after the Holy Trinity* [Pentecost]. *I used to know what this day was called, a Thursday, but is it called Ljudovdan, Vidovdan* [St. Vitus' Day]*, it was a Thursday, but Vidovdan. And we go to get earth*.

For Sacks,[24] calendars can also be customized or personalized by marking dates which are privately apposite and peculiarly relevant to the individual calendar user. According to him,[25] this personalized use ensures that time becomes organized in relation to an individual's "relationships or biography".[26]

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[22] MacLaury 2002, 285–286.

[23] MacLaury 1991, 55.

[24] Sacks 1987.

[25] Sacks 1992, 36–37.

[26] Quoted after Hogben 2006, 329.

*3.2. Daily chores as time markers*

A research into local expression of time recently developed in Taiwan seems interesting for our purpose. The researcher noticed the expression of everyday time in accordance with events considered as being of primary importance for the local community. In Taiwan, housewives observed that the time their children came home from school every day was also the time they started to prepare supper. Therefore, housewives invented a new word to name this time (about 5 pm): *pinokayan no mitiliday* (the time students come home from school). As soon as they saw homebound students, they knew it was time to cook, a habit still kept by the housewives.[27] Through the different aspects of social life in the present-day village, it seems that the villagers are attempting to combine their own cultural traditions with certain cultural elements of "superior" others, and striving for a better future.[28]

In the case of our Kosovo refugee, the time of day the tragic event occurred is marked by everyday female chores. The supposed duration of these chores marks the exact time when the son was expected to return from work. The following part of the discourse shows the temporal sequence of events, that is the organization of daily activities in relation to the usual time of the son's return from work, the location of events in relation to the everyday timetable and, finally, an unexpected tragedy instead of the expected arrival:

> *That day I was preparing the* pogača [round bread] *and I was cooking fish, it was* Mladenci, *my daughter-in-law was preparing the* pogača, *I made this* tavče *[traditional dish] and we were waiting for him to come. I am waiting for him to have lunch, we fast on* Mladenci *Day, you know, I made a full baking pan of fish, with rice, and I told her: "Daughter-in-law, I say, can you make a small cake, I will make a pan, my son Bogi will come now, he will have his lunch, I say, it is* Mladenci *today."*

It is open to discussion whether the event described, an integral part of the narrated autobiography, is connected with the *Mladenci* Day ritual, or with one of its parts. Even if it is expressed in terms of everyday routine, ritual time cannot be equated with everyday time because its function within ritual is a specific one.[29] Moreover, in this example verbs are used whose meaning is that of everyday actions. They can be understood as representing

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[27] Huang 2004, 326.

[28] Ibid., 335.

[29] Within Slavic studies, for ethnological and anthropological views of time categories in folklore material, see Risteski 2005, and the edited volumes V*remya v prostranstve Balkan* (Moscow 1994) and *Zemljevidi časa* (Ljubljana 2001). These views may encourage linguists to conduct an analysis which might show the ways in which these time categories are reflected in language.

everyday routine, but it should be borne in mind that this is a reconstruction of a ritual, even if it is a ritual in which the collocutor herself took part.

My collocutor uses daily chores not only to describe recent events, but also as a time marker to describe other, in this case reconstructed, rituals. The researcher's intention, as previously stated, is to obtain the "ideal model of a ritual" (wedding) from the participant, but the participant describes her own wedding instead. However, in doing so she uses the third person singular in the present tense: *brings water, sits down, waits for the guests to arrive*, or the present tense of the third person plural *and they play music, they prepare lunch, they dance*. It may be assumed that the participant's reply has been elicited by the researcher's "neutral" question: *And what happens then?*

The description of actions the traditional wedding procedure involves is framed by daily chores, with one of them — the bringing of water — being part of the wedding ritual.

Music and dance form an integral part of the wedding, but in the discourse of my collocutor, a daily chore is "inserted" into this set of ritual tasks as well — the preparation of lunch, which in the time organization of the wedding day, and based on the discourse of successive actions, takes up the central place:

> (And what does she do then?) *Nothing. She **brings water**, sits down, waits for the guests to arrive, you know, the* izviđajci [the bride's relatives who arrive after the bride's departure to the bridegroom's house]*, as* prvičari [same meaning]*, who arrive for the first time, she waits for them, all dressed up. And they play music, **prepare lunch**, dance.*

The genuine daily chores functioning as time markers in language are found in the following statement:

> And ***I get up*** *at one o'clock, **light the fire**, **dry the** **opanci** [traditional rural footwear made of pig leather]*, *the **socks, I dry them for everyone**, for them when they get up in the morning.*

Also, individual daily chores also represent the time frame of other, collective, daily activities. Used in the discourse, these duities indicate the organization of the time of the participant herself.

The successive verbs *get, light, dry* by which the situation is expressed give the sequence of events round which the discourse is formed, and thus help organize the rhythm of the text. Their meaning can also indicate the beginning and end of the situation described, and in this way segmentize the statement. Used in this manner in discourse, the verbs might perhaps be seen as a kind of discourse marker. Since the joint function of discourse markers is to segmentize the text, and the text as an event phenomenon has its procedural and thus also temporal dimension, the discourse markers in one way or another and to varying degrees, help form the rhythm of the

text and its temporal configuration. In signalling boundaries, the discourse marker as internal temporal localizer (i.e. the temporal definition of the boundary parts of the text as opposed to its whole) plays the part of temporal localizer with two markers which are basic on the time axis: the anterior and the posterior marker (e.g. clichéd beginnings and endings of epistolary discourses).[30] By segmenting the discourse, the markers shape it, above all by stressing the starting and ending boundaries, or by stressing continuity, or by stressing its duration.[31]

In the examples quoted I encounter Carlota Smith's temporal characteristics of narratives:

> Narrative primarily introduces particular event and state entities into the universe of discourse. Narrative consists of a sequence of consequentially related events and states. The order in which they occur is crucial for understanding. In narrative, events and states are related to each other temporally. The first sentence established a time, actual or fictional; after that, events and states are given in sequence or they are simultaneous with previous times in the text. This is the basic narrative pattern: there are other cases as well, e.g., events are not always recounted in the order in which they appear; there are changes of level; etc.[32]

### 3.3. Occurrences in the outside world as time markers

In the description of her daily tasks, my collocutor uses occurrences from the outside world (the crowing of roosters) as time markers. Compared to nowadays, these markers can certainly be called traditional. As the recorded material shows, they are connected to the modern measuring of time in hours, and they are probably used in conversation so as to familiarize the researcher with this time dimension.

> (So, the bride[33] is the last to go to bed, and the first to rise?) *Yes, oh poor me, there were no watches then like now, you've been wearing one for thirty years already, there was no clock. **When the roosters crow, when the roosters start to crow, I know it's one o'clock. And I get up at one o'clock**, I light the fire, dry the* opanci*, the socks, I dry them for everyone, for them when they get up in the morning.*

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[30] Popović 2000; Piper 2001, 198–199.

[31] Piper 2001, 210.

[32] Smith 2007, 425.

[33] In Serbian traditional culture the term *mlada* (literally "young") is not used only to denote the woman on her wedding day, the bride, but also the woman during her first year of marriage or the youngest daughter-in-law in the household.

However, if the statement is analyzed, it can be assumed that the connection between the traditional way of telling time (the crowing of roosters) and the modern counting of time (one o'clock) is very recent in her time map. It might rather be assumed that the traditional marker in the period when it was the only valid one was connected to the chores to be done, and that the time interval that begins with the crowing of the roosters and ends with the rising of the family members in the morning was both necessary and sufficient for the completion of all chores, which is all that matters in a traditional way of life.

In this statement, the present tense is used to express the past, thus producing a narrative dynamism and bringing the situation to life. In the same statement *When the roosters crow, when the roosters start to crow, I know it's one o'clock*, the verb is used both in its imperfective aspect [Serbian: *pevaju*] and in its perfective aspect [Serbian: *zapevaju*]. I can assume that the imperfective verb is used to mark some general, unspecified time — "back then people used to get up with the first roosters", while the perfective verb marks personal time, i.e. the personal commencement of the described situation. However, for me to reach valid conclusions on this hypothesis, I believe this use of imperfective and perfective verbs has to be confirmed by further examples; otherwise, this example may be considered an unintentional self-correction in stating a situation.

### 3.4. Historical events as time markers

In addition to using traditional holidays, occurrences from the outside world and daily chores to define the time dimension of our collocutors, events in their autobiographical discourse are also localized in time in relation to "global" historical events. By this I mean events and changes outside the personal life of my collocutors, events which they could not have influenced themselves. There are two such events: the rule of Josip Broz Tito and the beginning of the bombing in 1999.

It is observable that Tito's rule does not have a time frame in the discourse, although it is important because it marks a period of our participant's personal history and localizes it in time:

> *Well, sure, they put up the flag. That was, **Tito ruled at that time, when I got married**. It was Tito. It was Tito's flag.*

Even though the event is related to a personal history defined in time by Tito's rule, a person uninformed of historical events cannot know which pe-

riod this was. We build relationships by sharing experiences from our pasts with others and by listening to memories that others share with us.[34]

This example [*Well, sure, they put up the flag. That was, **Tito ruled at that time**, when I got married. It was Tito. It was Tito's flag.*] also confirms, like several previously quoted (such as not specifying the year of the wedding but only a holiday from the traditional calendar; the roosters crowing as a time marker for getting up), that the mathematical or modern measuring of time in the perception of time and time periods does not have the same meaning for members of another generation and from another cultural area (i.e. the researcher).

The modern, mathematical, measuring of time finds linguistic expression in the participant's statement where recent political events are used as time markers for events from her private history. So for the first time in the discourse we can find the year in which a certain event is located:

> *Well, it's only **this ninety-nine** that evil has befallen me, **up to that time** we were doing really well.*

Here the year ***this ninety-nine*** is a time localizer, and as the sentence continues, the anterior situation is expressed by the anaphora ***up to that time***.[35]

It has been noted in the part of the discourse relating to recent events from personal history that the time marker for these events is "war". The idea is verbalized not only by the lexeme *war*, but also by the lexeme *bombing*. The idea of "war" is connected to the refugee period, so that the idea of political events in Kosovo in 1999 is generally expressed by constructions in which displacement is a time marker.

In my collocutor's time map, the temporal propinquity of the war and bombing is expressed by the demonstrative pronoun *ovaj* "this":[36] ***Well, up to now we were doing well, then this war came***, and precise time is expressed by the construction ***one day before the war, one day before the bombing, I lost***

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[34] Bauer et al. 2003, 27.

[35] As I have already noted, this is a dialect discourse adjusted to standard Serbian in order to facilitate translation into English, and I am not going here into formal-language discourse analysis or an analysis of the patterns of prepositional phrases by which time is expressed.

[36] As stated by D. Klikovac in her paper on the use of demonstratives in standard Serbian, psychological proximity to the subject of conversation is expressed by the pronoun *ovaj* 'this' (Klikovac 2006, 136). In her analyses of demonstrative pronouns in Croatian, S. Kordić arrives at the same conclusions as Klikovac. Kordić analyzes the use of the demonstrative pronoun *ovaj* 'this' in expressing spatial relations, and states that objective space can be replaced by subjective proximity and distance, which entirely depend on the speaker's emotions (Kordić 2002, 73).

*my son*. I also find an inclusion of emotional elements and a subjective position in the use of the time adverbs "now" and "tomorrow". Even though the conversation took place in 2003 or four years after the bombing and the displacement of the Kosovo Serbs, the participant used the time adverb "now" with the past tense, so as to bring the events connected to her personal history and recent events closer together in time:

> *Well, thank God, all was well, it's only **now** that evil befell me, because of this son that they now killed in the war; well, **up to now** we were doing well, then this war came; ... it was good, but now evil befell me when we fled. **Up to now**, up to this time, I baked bread in the* crepulja [pottery vessel]. *Before we fled, before the bombing.*

As Carlota Smith suggests, confirming the hypothesis of the necessary presence of emotional elements in the subjective position within a discourse, the present "now" indicates subjectivity, a mind present at the past time; it does not change the temporal interpretation.[37] The adverb of time "now" obviously does not convey a meaning connected to speech time, but is used in the context of reference time.[38]

The time adverb "tomorrow" in my collocutor's discourse adds dynamism to the situation, bringing the event closer to the researcher and showing the perspective from which she observes the situation of which she is speaking. The shift in perspective is reflected in the shift in the meaning of "tomorrow", which in relation to the use of the past tense which points to reference time, refers to situation time.

> *They killed my young son, one day before the war, that was the last day of work, and the **bombing began like tomorrow**.*

Although N. Norrick speaks of potential lacunae in memory, he points out that as tellers retrieve information, they get back in touch with scenes from the past, and they may comment on the clarity of the images recalled, as

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[37] Smith 2003, 2007, 430.

[38] I use the terms "speech time", "reference time" and "situation time" in the meaning in which they are used by the linguist Carlota Smith: Speech Time is the centre of the system and is the basic default orientation point for temporal expression; Reference Time represents the temporal perspective of a sentence; it is simultaneous with, before or after Orientation Time, which is Speech Time unless otherwise noted; Situation Time is the time of occurrence of a situation: it is simultaneous with, before or after Reference Time (Smith 2007, 421). Smith takes on the cited definitions by following Reichenbach's (1947) triad, which reflects the mutual relation of verbal tenses and aspects in the description of an event. The importance of this theory also stems from its being implemented in linguistic studies of temporality, and even in foreign languages teaching. For more, see Ašić 2007; Stanojević 2007; Popović 2008a.

well as on difficulties in remembering.[39] It is obvious in our example that the participant has to go back into the past so as to specify the situation in time, and that she uses the temporal adverb "tomorrow" from this perspective.

Besides data from the participant's personal history which are temporally defined by political events, her discourse also shows that daily chores, which were an integral part of life in the area from which she fled, are defined by these same political events:

> I made bread, I baked it in the crepulja *until recently. Until now, until this time, I baked bread in the* crepulja. **Before we fled, before the bombing**.

The sequence of sentences in this part of the conversation can show the perception of time between events: the first sentence uses the temporal adverbial "until recently", which is a substitute for the adverb "now", and the following one explicates the thus used temporal adverbial "until now" and, consequently, the perception of the adverbials used — "before we fled", "before the bombing". The last phrase *Before we fled, before the bombing* may be seen as defining the use of the temporal adverbials: *until recently*, *until now*, *until this time*. This way of defining and expressing time best shows the participant's perception of time and her relation to it.

### 3.5. *Autobiographical datum as a time marker*

In the participant's discourse new events belonging to the sphere of everyday life are localized in time in relation to important events from her personal history:

> Er, if there had been television like this, radio, there was nothing. **Until recently** *there was nothing. When I was already married,* **perhaps ten years after the wedding**, *television and radio arrived*.

Speaking of the past, the participant says that daily life involved no radio or television, and she localizes the advent of both radio and television in the same period.[40]

In the two successive sentences, my collocutor looks at past events from two completely different angles and, as a result, their locations in time differ. On the one hand, if I assume that in order to describe past events my collocutor must use memory to transpose matters into the time in question, then her use of the time expression "until recently" becomes understandable;

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[39] Norrick 2005, 1819.

[40] I shall not deal with the facts about radio and television and the time of their introduction in Serbia, and especially in the villages in Kosovo.

from the past perspective, television and radio are recent developments. On the other hand, if I look at this in relation to her wedding — "ten years after the wedding" — then the introduction of television and radio is a remote past.

The relativity of localizing technical developments may be seen from the time in which the conversation took place: it was recorded in 2003, the participant could have married in the 1950s, and television broadcast first appeared in Serbia in the 1960s. If I take into account that many events occurred in her life in the remote and recent past, I may ask what the period from her wedding up to the moment of the conversation looks like in the participant's time map. Any discussion of what "until recently" could mean to the participant and what to the researcher, who belongs to another generation and thinks in another cultural code, faces an entanglement of different and non-comparable angles of time perception.

However, if I take into account that during the interview the researcher insists on the reconstruction of past events or practices which the participant may not even remember, but instead reconstructs them from stories heard from her elders, then the appearance of television and radio can be considered recent in relation to the remote past.

### 4. Possibilities for further research: male vs. female time

The material I gathered in various places (not only in Kosovo and Metohija) in the course of my research has led me to ponder on the gender division of interview topics, on the ways we approach field research and on the extent to which the analysis of the material is gender dependent. In one of my earlier papers,[41] I find that a precise line could not be drawn between the types of topics in field interviews, even though practice indicated that the topics usually discussed with my male collocutors concern history and genealogy, *gusle*-playing (traditional one-stringed instrument), traditional crafts, myths and legends, while with my female collocutors usually discussed weddings, folklore heritage related to weddings, children, incantations and folk medicine.

And yet, the existence of a gender division in traditional culture as a concept can be taken as a subject to reflect upon and research further.[42] According to Carrasco and Mayordomo, analysis of the behaviour of men

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[41] Ćirković 2008.

[42] Feminists A. Leburić and I. Zalović-Troskot 2002, 235, believe that feminist research differs from other kinds of research not only in method but also in the viewpoints which form a constituent part of the researcher's theoretical approach. Feminists share their methods with other researchers, but what is unique to them is the fact that women and

and women throughout the human life cycle is fundamental to any study of the effects of work times on either sex. In a gender analysis of labour, there are some other significative variables such as educational level, occupation category and socio-economic status. Both the availability of individuals and their time distribution possibilities vary depending on responsibilities in terms of caring for others. The rhythm of work of women responds to what we could call a "natural rhythm" (governed by need): they work more in proportion to the number of dependents in the home.[43]

Bearing in mind the traditional organization of time typical of the Serbian community in Kosovo where my participant used to live, I may suggest that the discourse expresses local "female time concept". Male participants, even those coming from the same background, probably could organize the same time period in a different way and locate the same event in relation to different time markers. Unfortunately, the hypothesis about the possible existence of a local "male time concept" cannot be tested because I do not have a comparable recorded material with a male refugee participant. Any kind of relevant conclusions concerning the male and female time concepts, therefore, requires a better and more detailed research.

*Conclusion*

Military and political events in Serbia in 1999 led to the displacement of Serbs from Kosovo. Many Serbs found themselves in refugee camps in other parts of Serbia, staying with relatives or friends or in private accommodation. Because of the forced spatial dislocation, I believe it exceptionally important to study the ways in which the past, present and future are expressed in the discourse of displaced persons, as well as whether a "shift" has occurred in the meaning of adverbs of time (such as now, tomorrow, yesterday) in relation to, according to my hypothesis, a new point of reference.

The focus of my analysis of the autobiographical discourse of a collocutor originally from Suva Reka was on the time markers that seemed most striking to me. Thus, for example, the traditional calendar, used for time markers, triggers her recollection of a tragic event from her recent past. But the traditional calendar is also used for time markers both for other autobiographical events (e.g. her wedding) and for rituals involving the whole community. This use of the traditional calendar fits in with MacLaury's Vantage Theory about constructing categories and adding new elements to the existing ones.

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their problems are placed at the centre of the research carried out about them and for them.

[43] Carrasco and Mayordomo 2005, 238–239.

Also, my analysis of the autobiographical discourse encompassed traditionally female daily chores referred to by my collocutor, but the analyzed examples show that they form part of a ritual and that thus used cannot be analyzed for their real use. As potentially interesting in further research, I suggest the study of male and female time with respect to everyday activities given their existing division into male and female in traditional culture at large (not only in the culture of the displaced persons from Kosovo and Metohija).

Elements from the outside world used as time markers in the analyzed autobiographical discourse may be defined as traditional by comparison with the modern measuring of time, but the discourse shows a combination of the traditional and modern systems. Therefore, my collocutor's time map cannot be defined as strictly traditional and archaic. Remote or recent historical events are also used as time markers, but in the whole autobiographical discourse the boundary event relative to which past and present are determined is the war and bombing.

The analyzed discourse is but a pilot study within a more extensive research on expressing time in the discourse of the displaced persons from Kosovo and Metohija. A larger corpus of examples would likely show more clearly and systematically the realization of time categories and the use of time markers. Given the double "translation" of the original discourse — from dialect into standard Serbian and from standard Serbian into English — it is possible that the analysis of verb forms and their transposition would show different results.

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# On Dealing with the Past, Transitional Justice and Archives

*The archive: if we want to know what this will have meant,*
*we will only know tomorrow. Perhaps.*
Derrida, *Mal d' Archive*[1]

**Abstract**: This paper aims to explore initiatives in dealing with the past in South East Europe, particularly with regard to archives, and to reflect on discussions about the documentation of atrocities and sufferings and the shift from war to peace, ongoing in the Balkan countries affected by the 1991–1999 wars while the countries are still struggling to find the best way(s) to deal with the past and its consequences. Transitional justice may be framed as opening up different approaches to create collective memories, to share and to transfer these through time-space. New technologies used in archiving are assumed to open new avenues to democratization and accountability, in communication and free circulation of information, and to create a much broader negotiating process, with significant opportunities for the preservation of memory(ies), documentation and contestation — a far more multi-sited, multi-scalar and multi-level board where novel alliances, formations and mediations might arise. One particular case is that of the digitization and public accessibility of the tribunals' archives, which are supposed to constitute an important legal and cultural heritage that belongs to the world community, as well as to the states and the citizens involved. The information contained in these archives is expected to be made available for new forms of use, such as scientific research and investigation by/for surviving relatives, while respecting different legal constraints. The archives would also serve the advancement of the international justice system by explaining the workings of the tribunals to the general public. Consequently the important question that arises is the ownership of these archives. The reciprocal "production" and "consumption" (shaping) of the colonial narrative of history and identity entail that the former colonizers and colonized are a community of records, sharing a common archival heritage. Therefore, what in Western archival practice is called the subject of the record has to be reconsidered as a full partner in the record-creating process, as a co-creator of the record. These archives thus seem to constitute a "joint heritage" shared by a number of "communities of records", contributing to the possible formation of new identities and politics.

**Keywords**: South-East Europe, transitional justice, archives, record-creating process, community of records, collective memories, colonizers/colonized

Transitional justice may be framed as opening up different ways to create collective memories, to share and to transfer these through time-space. In different locations (physical and virtual) people have recently developed various practices to enact, translate and resist communities' memories. This

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[1] J. Derrida, *Mal d'Archive, Une Impression Freudienne* (Paris: Galilee, 1995), http://www.hydra.umn.edu/derrida/arch.htmi, Peter Krapp 1995.

paper aims to examine initiatives in dealing with the past in South-East Europe, particularly in the case of archives. In the countries of the Balkans most affected by the 1991–1999 wars discussions have been ongoing about the documentation of the wars, as countries are still struggling to find the best way(s) to deal with the past and its consequences, and to rebuild intra-society trust and good neighbourly relations.

New technologies used in archiving are assumed to open new avenues for democratization and accountability, in communication and free circulation of information, and to create a far larger negotiating process, with significant opportunities for the preservation of memory(ies), documentation and contestation — a far more multi-sited, multi-scalar and multi-level board where novel alliances, formations and mediations might arise. The concept of (global) commons, or global public goods, is of central importance to the development of the information society. In terms of the three-part definition of the International Task Force on Global Public Goods, commons are public goods which are deemed important to the international community; they cannot, or will not, be adequately addressed by individual countries; and are thus best addressed multilaterally and collectively. In the light of this definition the demise of the traditional dichotomy of private participation and public control becomes nowhere more apparent than with regards to society in the information age. Yet, while the natural and social dimensions of commons have been pointed out, the informational dimension of commons is yet to become a topic of intensive international discourse.[2]

One particular case is that of tribunals' archives, which are supposed to constitute an important legal and cultural inheritance that belongs to the world community, and must therefore be secured for future generations. While respecting different legal constraints, the information contained in these archives is expected to be made available for new forms of use, such as scientific research and investigation by/for surviving relatives. Furthermore, the archives would serve to explain the workings of the tribunals to the general public, and consequently the advancement of the international justice system. Their digitization and public access has been widely discussed. The next important question that arises is who owns these archives. What in Western archival practice is called the subject of the record has to be reconsidered as a full partner in the record-creating process, as a co-creator of the record. The reciprocal "production" and "consumption" (shaping) of the colonial narrative of history and identity entail that former colonizers

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[2] This explains why the two World Summits on the Information Society (WSIS), one held in Geneva in 2003, the other in Tunisia in 2005, paid little attention to the concept of commons.

and former colonized are a community of records, sharing a joint archival heritage. So these archives too seem to constitute a legacy, a "joint heritage", shared by a number of "communities of records".

What conclusions could be drawn from the documenting of atrocity and suffering and the shift from war to peace? This paper is concerned with challenging categorizations and disputing some of our conventional approaches to the problems of social experience. It will attempt to explore beneath the totalities we seek to impose on the disparate material experience, the lived history constituting the archives, thus the inscription of history on the body and in subjectivity, to look anew at this dispersion and to incorporate in this gaze that which appears discontinuous with itself, that which is not concordant with the ways in which it orders, categorizes, and contains.

*Memory, history and archives*

The role of memory in different cultures and collectivities, and the ways of dealing with memory (trans)formation has been questioned, and the relation between individuals' memories and collective memories and the eventual subsistence of a "collective memory" analyzed. The different ways of memory construction and transmission and how collectivities' memories are manifested in historical and fictional narratives, visual artworks, laws and constitutions, commemorative practices, or landscapes, is under investigation, as well as the influence of political, social, economic, cultural or religious concerns on collective memory, considering that some events are lamented or celebrated across generations, but some are quickly forgotten, trying to answer the question: "What (or, who?) has the power to guide the processes of remembering?"

What are the ways in which memories of social, political and violent military encounters have been transmitted within twentieth- and twenty-first-century European culture? What roles are played by those who mediate the memory of conflict (first-hand witnesses, historians, journalists, writers, filmmakers)? What kinds of interactions and tensions are visible between public and private discourses of memory? In what ways are memories of conflict (or their absence) shaped by the political, economic and social parameters of the present? To what ends are such narratives of the past deployed?

Memory has become a heterogeneous and transnational object of research. Historians are facing a fundamental challenge, as Philipp Ther ar-

gues in his "The burden of history and the trap of memory",[3] claiming that the concepts of remembrance and memory depend upon what a national collective imagines when it thinks back over the past. Agreeing with the Austrian cultural historian Moritz Csaky, he also stresses the transnational character of remembrance, and that the lost cultures of the east can in many places be understood as mixed cultures rather than being imprinting with their national stamp, mentioning the example of the German expellees who remember places that have long since ceased to be German, in just the same way that Polish expellees refer to places that today belong to Ukraine or Lithuania.

Pierre Nora in his "Reasons for the current upsurge in memory"[4] underlines very succinctly some of the immediate effects of this recent surge, such as a significantly increasing ways in which the past is used for political, commercial and tourist purposes, the sharp rise in the number of commemorative events, all intended to show that the past has ceased to have a single meaning and that a present that is overlaid with an awareness of its own history necessarily allows for several possible versions of the past:

> The second effect of this change in the way memory is organised has been to deprive the historian of the monopoly he traditionally enjoyed in interpreting the past. In a world in which you had collective history and individual memories, the historian exercised exclusive control, so to speak, over the past. … Today, the historian is far from alone in manufacturing the past; it is a role he shares with the judge, the witness, the media and the legislator. All the more reason, therefore, to speak out loud and clear today on behalf of the "duty towards history", rather than the "duty to remember", the need which a few of us were proclaiming some twenty or twenty-five years ago.

> For the real problem raised by the sacred aura with which memory has now been invested is to know how, why and at what moment the otherwise positive principle of emancipation and liberation on which it is based backfires and becomes a form of closure, a grounds for exclusion and an instrument of war. To claim the right to memory is, at bottom, to call for justice. In the effects it has had, however, it has often become a call to murder.

The literature on archives during the recent years explores the role and possibilities of the archive and questions its functions as an a priori container of memory, demonstrating thus the extent to which thinking about archives is embracing new realities and new possibilities. Traditionally ar-

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[3] First published in *Transit* 30/**2005/2006 (German version) Eurozine, Published** 2006–08–21, Original in German, Translation by Simon Garnett, Contribution by Transit.

[4] First published in *Transit* 04/2002 (German version), www.eurozine.com

chives have been seen as preserving memory and as holding the past. This orthodoxy has increasingly been questioned, unfolding the ways in which archives construct, sanctify and bury pasts, showing how remembering can never be separated from forgetting, and arguing that the archive is also about the future rather than just the past. Quoting from Jacques Derrida:

> And the theory of the archive is a theory of this institutionalisation, that is to say of the law, of the right which authorises it. This right imposes or supposes a bundle of limits which all have a history, a deconstructible history, and to the deconstruction of which psychoanalysis has not been foreign, to say the least. In what concerns family or state law, the relations between the secret and the non-secret, or, and this is not the same thing, between the private and the public, in what concerns property or access rights, publication or reproduction rights, in what concerns classification and ordering (what comes under theory or under private correspondence, for example? what comes under system? under biography or autobiography? under personal and intellectual anamnesis? in so-called theoretical works, what is worthy of this name and what is not? should one rely on what Freud says about this to classify his works, and believe for example that it has to do with a novel when he speaks of a "historical novel", etc.?), in each of these cases, the limits, the borders and the distinctions have been shaken by an earthquake from which no classificational concept, no implementation of the archive, can be sheltered. Not a single order.[5]

Achille Mbembe takes the thought further when, claiming that examining archives is to be interested in that which life has left behind, in debt and debris, he argues that both the historian and the archivist inhabit a sepulchre. The historian is also engaged in a fight against another remnant of death, the spectre(s), which find, through written texts, a path to an existence that no longer unfolds according to the same modality as in their lifetime; thus historiography, and the very possibility of a political community (polis) are only conceivable on condition that the spectre should remain silent, should accept that from now on it may only speak through another, or be represented by a sign, or by some object which, not belonging to any one in particular, now belongs to all. It is by the bias of this act of dispossession — this leaving out of the author — that the historian establishes his/her authority, and a society establishes a specific domain: the domain for things which, being shared, belong exclusively to no one (the public domain).

> And this is why the historian and the archivist have long been so useful to the state, notably in contexts where the latter was set up as an appointed guardian of that domain of things that belong exclu-

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[5] Derrida, *Mal d'Archives*.

sively to no one. In fact, both the historian and the archivist occupy a strategic position in the production of an instituting imaginary. One might ask what their role from now on may be, especially in contexts where the process of democratising a chronophagic act – that is, the abolition of the archive – is at an advanced stage.

The curious thing is the long-held belief that the state rested on something other than on this desire to abolish the archive, to free itself of debris. What could be more noble? But perhaps it is a condition for the existence of all societies: the need permanently to destroy the 'debris' – the taming, by violence if necessary, of the demon that they carry.[6]

### Colonialism and mass violence in Europe

Memories and recollections of the past are often contested and the past is painstakingly constituted through the interplay of collective construction, political bargains, reversals, rationalizing of refusals to come to terms with it, as well as attempts to recognize the past and cope with it. The process of building societies which are not just ethno-culturally heterogeneous but also open to all diverse groups has been contingent to coming to terms with the past. While engaging in ordering, grouping and negotiating the past, new relationships of participation, exchange, dialogue, new meanings, disagreement and compromise, possibly trust and respect, could be established. Europe has arrived at a point where its own historical relationship with the world is part of a lively debate not only about the past, but also about the future. Discussion about the European empire(s) seems to be resurfacing as part of a European discourse of self-understanding and self-reassurance during the European Union's integration process.

Colonialism was central to the discourse on national identity, to the continent's understanding of itself as a (or numerous) world power(s). As postcolonial studies have shown, colonial engagement neither started nor ended with formal colonial rule. Whereas certain parts of Europe experienced the traumatic violence of decolonization, others believed that they had nothing to do with the colonial exploitation of large parts of Africa, Asia or South America. They were innocent — so many believed — of the devastations brought about by European colonialism and could therefore engage with the new postcolonial world without the dark shadow of a colonial past. Some observers have termed this "colonial amnesia".

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[6] A. Mbembe, "The Power of the Archive and its Limits", in C. Hamilton, V. Harris, J. Taylor, M. Pickover, G. Reid & R. Saleh R., eds., *Refiguring the Archive* (Cape Town: David Philip, 2002), 19–26.

In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Hannah Arendt argued that there was an inextricable causal link between the establishment of European overseas colonial empires in the late nineteenth century and the murderous anti-Semitism of the Nazis in the twentieth. Imperialism came home to Europe, she argued, through the rapid spread of racial anti-Semitism beginning in the late nineteenth century, and reached its final stage in the attempted annihilation of the Jews. More recently the extremes of racial politics in Europe, culminating in the Holocaust, have been located in the earlier imperial experience outside of Europe. To understand the ways in which Europe's colonial past shaped discourses, mentalities, and politics in Europe, we need to examine the personnel active in the imperial realm before 1919 and their roles in subsequent decades and especially in the Nazi era. If any group carried the direct experience of "handling" populations in the imperial realm back into Europe in the middle decades of the twentieth century, it would be the soldiers, civilian officials, and scientists who moved back and forth between the two worlds. It is important to provide empirical evidence and to specify the institution and cultural mechanisms by which ideas and practices developed in the imperial realm were transmitted back to Europe and became the bases for policies instituted decades later.

Colonialism also played a central role in the thinking and work of the Polish-Jewish specialist in international law Raphael Lemkin (1900–1959) who coined the term "genocide" in 1944. It was not only the study of colonial mass murders that provided Lemkin with a conceptual framework for analyzing the German policy of occupation and extermination in Eastern Europe during the Second World War. Until recently, however, most scholars have ignored the relationship between the phenomena of colonialism and genocide. Colonial atrocities such as, for example, the "first genocide of the twentieth century" against the Herero and Nama in German Southwest-Africa (today's Namibia) 1904–1908, or the wars of extermination against indigenous peoples in both Americas and in Australia, are often still labelled as "pre-modern mass murders".

As Reinhart Koessler explains in his paper "Genocide, Apology and Reparation — the linkage between images of the past in Namibia and Germany",[7] the relationship between Namibia and Germany is a special one — not just by a resolution of the Bundestag saying so upon Namibia's in-

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[7] R. Koessler, "Genocide, Apology and Reparation – the linkage between images of the past in Namibia and Germany", July 2007, Paper presented at: AEGIS European Conference on African Studies "African Alternatives: Initiative and Creativity beyond Current Constraints". AEGIS related journals panel: Africa's contested memories, July 11, 2007 to July 14, 2007, Leiden, The Netherlands, http://www.freiburg-postkolonial.de/Seiten/koessler-linkage-2007.pdf

dependence in 1990, but on account of a number of linkages, both historic and current. He explores some of the ways in which this connection finds expression in the frequently controversial ways of negotiating a past which, on account of sometimes acrimonious exchanges, does not appear quite as bygone as might be suggested by some hundred years that have elapsed since some key events to which people still refer to took place. His key thesis is that discourses and debates around the past in both countries mutually function as sounding boards as it were, throwing impulses and themes back and forth. In a way, this may be considered as a specific case of an "entangled history",[8] relating social actors and public discourses within both the former colony and the former colonial power in an intricate web of repeated and ongoing interaction. In Namibia, the concerns voiced in this context remain pressing for many groups even today.

The notion of mass violence refers to collective human destructiveness, the causes of which are mainly political, social and cultural. "Mass violence" does not cover aggression among combatants, but rather violence that occurs in wartime and peacetime directly or indirectly affecting civilian populations. State and non-state actors in conflict frequently evoke past massacres (documented or not) to justify and legitimize their own violence. The role of mass violence in modern times has acquired a special character, transforming itself in a tool of social control used to discipline populations and to transform social relationships. Genocides have also found a strong echo in the repressive experiences of the "outside of Europe", Africa, Asia, Latin America. Genocidal social practices in these regions have scarcely been dealt with, and have not been systematically connected to previous European experiences of genocide or to the experiences of war and postcolonial counter-insurgency.

There is a lot of current research on the motivations of the "ordinary", non-pathological, perpetrators of political violence, ethnic strife and genocide, yet the social origins of mass violence, the causes of wars and civil wars and other forms of mass violence taking a political form, such as nationalism, religion, gender, are yet to be explored in depth and correlated. Most situational explanations of the perpetrators' aggressiveness focus on either economic or ideological factors. What is lacking is a research question that can operationalize the comparison of different cases of violence. Perhaps

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[8] Cf. S. Randeria, "Entangled histories of uneven modernities: Civil society, caste solidarities and legal pluralism in post-colonial India", in *Unraveling Ties: From Social Cohesion to New Practices of Connectedness*, eds. Y. Elkana, I. Krastev, E. Macamo and S. Randeria (Frankfurt and New York 2002), 284–311, and "Civil society and legal pluralism in the shadow of caste: Entangled modernities in post-colonial India", in *Hybridising East and West: Tales beyond Westernisation*, eds. D. Schimmer, G. Saalman and C. Kessler (Berlin 2006), 97–124.

— as the Amsterdam sociologist De Swaan has recently suggested — we are asking a wrong question here. Perhaps we should not ask why people kill, but rather how they — in different types of societies with different political systems — deal with the fact that they kill, or have killed recently. This more functionalist approach (as the logical opposite of the traditional "intentionalist" Holocaust research of the past) could enable us to link this topic to the larger topic of transitional justice.

As far as sources are concerned, historians almost exclusively deal with two types of sources, namely judicial sources (as for example the ICTY or the Nuremberg documents), or with oral history based upon fieldwork (in Rwanda, Cambodia, etc.). This calls for input from specialists in cultural anthropology or ethnography, or/and for input coming from researchers from conflict areas, thus overcoming language and cultural barriers. Some of the best researchers to be consulted come from the former colonial powers. There also is a lot of research by social scientists on how conflicts are mitigated or played down. They often focus upon middle classes, often racially or ethnically mixed middle classes, who play an important role in local elites and can make conscious efforts to reduce tensions (as in South Africa during the end of Apartheid or in the Southern and Western regions of Rwanda). The need to "repair" these societies, the obligation to protect, is now felt as a global responsibility, whereas mastering the unmasterable past in the case of Germany (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*) was basically seen as a problem to be solved by the Germans themselves. Local research communities are to be included more often in this type of research, because they can help identify the limitations of European perspectives. Local experts can see possibilities for restoring peace which others fail to identify. There is a consensus that the law cannot solve all of the problems, that, to quote Alex Boraine, "it is necessary to embrace a notion of justice that is wider, deeper, and richer than retributive justice".

*South–East Europe*

Everyday lives and their imaginings during the processes of transition in the Balkans emerging in the last decade from state socialism, war, and ethnicized nationalism are very heterogeneous. Multiple crossings occur, as changes and political transformations take place in the region in the context of globalization, transnationalism and Europeanization. International actors exert influence on national policies to varying degrees and in several and diverse ways, while states redefine their role in this "multi-level and multi-actor" process. Understanding how the various spatial scales at which changes operate are socially constructed and discursively represented is an important key to better theorizing transitional justice practices. While post-

colonialism is often associated with the "Global South", the paper argues that postcolonialism as a critical theoretical stance can be used to understand the transition in South-East Europe.

Robert Donia tells the story of the obliteration, segmentation and privatization of memory in Bosnia.[9] Bosnia's institutions of memory have undergone a major transformation since the multiparty elections of 1990, as illustrated by the fate of those located in the city of Sarajevo. During the war and prolonged siege of 1992–1995, key institutions of memory were destroyed while others were left largely untouched. But the peace agreements and post-war political structures have devastated many of those that survived the wartime destruction. Nationalist elites have trifurcated libraries and cultural societies while smothering through neglect many institutions that are not dedicated to nationalist causes. The post-war political structure has orphaned the most important institutions of memory in Bosnia and Herzegovina, fragmented many of them, and weakened those that have not been divided. The privatized world of memory is becoming a highly selective one, and it is increasingly challenging to preserve the historical record apart from those themes deemed urgent by the nationalist elites. There is no possibility of replicating the wartime global outrage provoked by images of libraries and museums aflame and in ruins. In any case, that outrage did not translate into meaningful financial support from outside Bosnia for reconstitution of the lost collections. The nationalists are on the verge of prevailing in their effort to reformulate the fundamental sources of historical inquiry for future generations. It remains uncertain whether they will exercise their newly-acquired control for the benefit of all or only to advance the interests of their particular constituencies.

In the Western Balkan post-war context emphasis on firmly formatted and often dislocated conflict resolution training, adhering to set frameworks of Western knowledge, tended to marginalize the importance of direct community engagement with local power structures and the creation of opportunities for locally relevant social development. Particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina this debate continues to be of high relevance to the people, organizations and institutions, as new mechanisms (the War Crimes Chamber) and other transitional justice approaches (such as a truth commission) have recently been put in place, though rarely attempting to pose the fundamental question as to the goals that should be pursued in the process of dealing with the past. Additionally, in the other two countries involved, similar, mainly civil society initiatives on documentation have been taking place. Peace building as social politics is a long-term process which

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[9] R. J. Donia, "Archives and Cultural Memory under Fire: Destruction and the Post-war Nationalist Transformation".

engages actors from different organizational and institutional backgrounds (including local government agencies and social service providers, civil initiatives and nongovernmental organizations with different ideologies, politicians, as well as international organizations active in local contexts) in a set of joint efforts aimed at devising locally relevant social and economic development of their communities and relating the practices that promote social integration of the micro-level to their impact at the macro-level of social structuring and politics.

Amongst the recent efforts, over the last few years the National Library of Serbia is being drastically modernized in material, financial, mentality and operational terms, and is involved in various international networks, e.g. with the Library of Congress and EU projects. Most importantly, close contact and collaboration with the relevant Library in Sarajevo has been established. The National Library has organized a network of NGOs as partnering beneficiaries, including most well-known ones, e.g. Centre for Humanitarian Law, providing them access to services and information. The Library is also hosting the NGO Documentation Centre Wars 1991–1999, working on documentation projects for a number of years, such as collecting more than 300 oral histories from victims (with partners in both Croatia and Bosnia), documentaries, an extensive library on related issues, a project on camp inmates, future plans for addressing war crimes perpetrators integration. Another initiative is that of the Research and Documentation Center Sarajevo in cooperation with its partners, the Humanitarian Law Center in Serbia and Documenta in Croatia. Worth noting is the will to overcome the accumulated grievances, bitterness and guilt. There is an increasing awareness of the ideological use(s) of history and that transforming narratives of atrocities into personal and historical myths will seriously damage any possibility of peaceful coexistence in the region and beyond. The very significant work undertaken by civil society organizations in all countries at times strives to rid itself of negative experiences of the past with the understanding that limiting dealing with the past to blame attribution, mere retribution/punishment, means to lag behind the effort of repairing social bonds, rebuilding trust and attaining social justice.

*The ICTY archives*

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 was established by United Nations' Security Council resolution 827 (passed on 25 May 1993) to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991.

A key component of the ICTY Completion Strategy concerns appropriate disposition of its paper and electronic records.

The primary purpose of the ICTY records is serving the primary purpose of the Tribunal[10] to bring to justice persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. ICTY archives have a significant secondary value for reasons analogous to the arguments recently proposed by Bruce Montgomery with regard to the archives of human rights NGOs,[11] namely that the archival record is important for historical accountability, which will be "used by researchers, prosecutors, and victims alike with the aim of analyzing and making known the dimensions of particular human rights violations"; the archival evidence "is important for the memory of the thousands of victims and survivors of human rights abuses, their relatives, and others who must individually confront the truth of what transpired. Retaining the memory of victims and survivors is also important to preserve at least some semblance of identity for those who suffered extreme depredations…"; and that "archival records of human rights abuses will likely assume new and critical importance as this evidence becomes pivotal in the adjudication of cases. Post-authoritarian governments can only be helped if they confront the crimes of the past and end impunity with the aim of building new democratic societies based on the rule of law."

Eric Ketelaar asks the question: Who owns the ICTY archives?[12] Legally, either the Tribunal or its parent body, the United Nations, is the owner of the assets of the Tribunal, including documents and other materials. Intrinsically, however, one has to recognize the rights of other parties to the primary functions of the Tribunal. I argue that some principles and propositions developed with regard to the archives of colonizers and colonized peoples should be applied to the ICTY archives.

What in Western archival practice is called the subject of the record has to be reconsidered as a full partner in the record-creating process, as a co-creator of the record. And are there not other co-creators, such as indictees and witnesses?  Not only the individual co-creators have a legitimate interest in the records. The right to know is not simply the right of any individual victim: it is also a collective right: "A people's knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its heritage." The reciprocal "production"

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[10] http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm [this and all other web pages cited hereafter consulted 24 July 2005]

[11] B. P. Montgomery, "Fact-Finding by Human Rights Non-Governmental Organizations: Challenges, Strategies, and the Shaping of Archival Evidence", *Archivaria* 58 (2004), 21–50.

[12] E. Ketelaar, A Joint Heritage, Shared by Communities of Records.

and "consumption" of the colonial narrative of history and identity entail that former colonisers and former colonised are a community of records, sharing a joint archival heritage. ICTY's archives too constitute a legacy, a "joint heritage", shared by a number of "communities of records". These communities consist of stakeholders occupying different positions, depending on the degree of their involvement in the core business of the Tribunal. The interests of stakeholders change over time: some stakeholders will not have an immediate interest; stakeholders' interests may gradually increase or decrease. It is important to take these different spatial and temporal positions into account when devising policies for custody, appraisal, access, use, preservation, etc. of ICTY's legacy.

## Justice, reconciliation and memory

According to Security Council's resolution 827 (1993), the ICTY was established "for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia". The central purpose of the ICTY, as of any criminal court, is the deterrence of, and retribution for, serious wrongdoing. Anything more, like establishing a historical record of what happened, or contributing to healing individuals' and communities' traumas, or to reconciliation — may be a side effect of a trial, but only if, as Mark Osiel puts it,[13] the game within the courtroom and in society at large is well-played: if the trial is staged and dramatized as a "secular ritual of commemoration".[14] In the words of the ICTY's first president Antonio Cassese, one of the Tribunal's aims is to help create "an historical record of what occurred during the conflict". Cassese added: "thereby preventing historical revisionism", making it clear that the objective is not so much contributing to historiography, but to prevent denial.[15]

The Tribunal's records, however, do contain "the truth" — they describe, just as any other record, what the recorder believed or construed to be the truth, the reality. Long before post-modern thinkers have started to question "the truth" or the impartiality of the record, lawyers and legal scholars found that the truth is a legal construction. Defendants, witnesses, juries, prosecutors and judges tell, hear and record a version, their version of what happened in a particular case, a particular trial, within the legal con-

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[13] M. Osiel, *Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 293.

[14] Ibid.

[15] A. Cassese, "The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality", *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 2 (2004), 585–597.

text of that time. It is, for example, well known — but often misunderstood — that the Nuremberg Tribunal framed — had to frame — Nazi crimes against humanity as an offence punishable only in connection to the crime of waging aggressive war.[16] The term "genocide" was only used once during the trial. An example of this "framing" is the documentary film showed in Nuremberg in evidence of mass killings. It was not filmed in any of the extermination camps, it did not try to explain what we now term the Holocaust, but was construed to underpin a story of political terror and war excesses. What is recorded is never simply "what happened".[17]

To understand fully the significance and the meaning of these tribunals, one has to acknowledge that they necessarily have to be selective as any trial of war crimes and mass violation of humanitarian law has to be selective.[18] Only a small portion of all perpetrators — not to mention bystanders — can be indicted. The Nuremberg Tribunal tried only 24 Germans in the first instance, and later another 185 war criminals were tried. These 209 stood for the thousands involved in knowingly causing the deaths of more than twenty million people and the suffering of many millions more. The ICTY has made its contribution to reconciliation, mainly through an impressive outreach programme (mostly funded from non-UN sources). One has to acknowledge, however, that reconciliation is not achievable through ICTY activities only.

Truth commissions have a much larger mandate and, therefore, more opportunities to involve victims and their families.[19] The South-African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was addressed by 22,000 people. All their stories were recorded and are in principle accessible in the TRC's archives. Two thousand people were carefully selected to tell their story in public. Seven thousand perpetrators of the Apartheid regime applied for amnesty, which was awarded in roughly half the cases. Many of the stories of victims and perpetrators were interwoven, a beginning of a shared "truth-

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[16] L. Douglas, "Film as witness: screening 'Nazi Concentration Camp before the Nuremberg Tribunal", *Yale Law Journal* 105 (1995), 449–481.

[17] C. B. Trace, "What is Recorded is Never Simply 'What Happened': Record Keeping in Modern Organizational Culture", *Archival Science* 2 (2002), 137–159.

[18] Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*, 31, 40–45, 122.

[19] P. Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths. Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions* (New York and London: Routledge, 2002); T. Huskamp Peterson, *Final Acts. A Guide to Preserving the Records of Truth Commissions* (Washington DC and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and The John Hopkins University Press, 2005) [ http://www.wilsoncenter.org/press/peterson_finalacts.pdf ].

telling" which is indispensable for reconciliation.[20] "Truth" in the aftermath of traumatic events is not a historical truth or a juridical truth: it is a psychological truth.[21] Sharing experiences and emotions[22] connects not only victims and perpetrators, but bystanders too: "Their discomfort with the truth is a symptom of their shame and that, too, makes them victims."[23]

Such truth-telling, according to Payam Akhavan, a legal advisor of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY, is not feasible within the confines of a courtroom of the Tribunal "necessarily restrained by the limits of the judicial process". The Tribunal can establish a factual record of what happened, but sometimes, according to former President Cassese, "proceedings are even having an adverse effect and are ultimately rekindling nationalism and ethnic animosity".[24] The Tribunal generally "has left the various ethnic groups still firm in their differing views of how the war started, its aftermath, and the concept of collective and individual responsibilities for actions taken in it."[25] National reconciliation can not be achieved if the record of what happened "is not recognized and internalized by the peoples of the former Yugoslavia".[26]

According to today's liberal-democratic agenda, the process of "Truth and Reconciliation" (T&R) seems to be the most desirable way of dealing with the historical legacy of wars and bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia. In order to secure the lasting peace and prosperity in the region it is necessary to reach the objective truth about the painful reality of the wars, to come to a basic consensus on "what really happened". Only in that way might it be possible to overcome conflicting and particular visions of any

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[20] P. Akhavan, "Justice in The Hague, peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal", *Human Rights Quarterly* 20 (1998), 737–816

[21] Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*, 129. Michael Ignatieff uses the term "moral truth": Akhavan, "Justice in The Hague", 770.

[22] V. Christophe and B. Rimé, "Exposure to the social sharing of emotion: Emotional impact, listener responses and secondary social sharing", *European Journal of Social Psychology* 27 (1997), 37–54.

[23] Ariel Dorfman in conversation with Richard Goldstone: Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*, xii; see also Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*, 121; Akhavan, "Justice in The Hague", 325, 348: "Those who were mere spectators in the face of humanity are also part of the equation."

[24] Cassese, "The ICTY".

[25] C. Burns, L. McGrew and I. Todorovic, "Imagine Coexistence Pilot Projects in Rwanda and Bosnia", in A. Chauyes and M. Minow, eds., *Imagine Coexistence. Restoring Humanity After Violent Ethnic Conflict* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003), 85–101.

[26] Akhavan, "Justice in The Hague", 742, 770, 783–784.

respective national group. Yet, Slobodan Karamanic wonders whether the concept of T&R represents an effective alternative to the division of historical truth among different nationalist interpretations of history, or whether it is rather inevitably caught within the same limits of national imaginary.[27] The T&R norm of objectivity entirely depends upon the category of nation. As the discourse of T&R indicates, objective truth can be derived only from the framework of national truth: every particular nation which has been involved in conflicts should accept a part of the responsibility for the crimes committed in its name. Consequently, the problem of T&R is understood as a problem of national consciousness. The central ideological mechanism of reconciliation therefore takes the form of national recognition, the recognition of one's own share of national responsibility or blame. Within this structural limitation, the concept of T&R functions as another type of historical revisionism in a double sense: on the one hand, desingularizing the very political nature of the "post-socialist" nation, and, on the other, neglecting or denying a whole set of contradictions, tensions and violence that came up during the course of the second historical encounter of the principles of nation-state with the complexity of the Yugoslav situation.

Martha Minow writes that "the idea of accessible court records that speak for themselves … is problematic".[28] Indeed, records do not speak for themselves; they echo the user's interests, hopes and fears. This empowers the user to re-create in his/her own way what is found in the records that were created by the court in its way. That is why archives are never closed and never complete: every individual, every generation, is allowed its own interpretation of the archive, is allowed to re-invent and to re-construct its view on the past. That is to say, in Hanna Arendt's words, "it has the right to rearrange the facts in accordance with its own perspective; we don't admit the right to touch the factual matter itself."[29]

### *Appropriating the past*

The court's verdict is final, but its reading of the historical event is not. Court records have, therefore, no more value than other records. Law's closure has to be rejected in favour of History's and Memory's recurrence. Memory is never "finished". As James Booth writes, "the legal expression

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[27] 16 September 2007, Slobodan Karamanić, "Truth and Reconciliation" as Historical Revisionism.

[28] Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*, 125.

[29] H. Arendt, "Truth and Politics" (1954), *Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (Hammondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), 227–264.

of memory-justice does not exhaust the claims of the past on us".[30] "Past victims and perpetrators, or our memory of them, have the ability to return almost unbidden."[31] A trial punishes the guilty leaders, and the rest of society is freed of any burden of responsibility. But this is a premature closure, the prematurity partially explaining why the legacy of the Second World War still disturbs Europe, despite trials and purges of those most directly accountable. "The sense of incompleteness is not principally due to any perpetrators left unpunished but to the limited way that legal action weaves the past into the national biography, into the memory of a community."[32] It is not only the victims and their families who have to come to grips with the past: society at large has to acknowledge the past.

As an individual, one determines one's own identity, but "using building materials" from history, geography, collective memory, power apparatuses, religious revelations etc., and all that within the constraints of the community one is in.[33] As John Stuart Mill argued, the strongest cause for the "feeling of nationality" is "identity of political antecedents: the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past."[34] The common past, sustained through time into the present, is what gives continuity, cohesion and coherence to a community.[35] The search for roots and belonging[36] may contribute to making the community into a "community of memory". But that will also contribute to marking the limits to other groups and their members. This "dual process of inclusion and exclusion"[37] may — as the events in the former Yugoslavia

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[30] W. J. Booth, "The Unforgotten: Memories of Justice", *American Political Science Review* 95 (2001), 786.

[31] Ibid., 785.

[32] Ibid., 787.

[33] M. Castells, *The Power of Identity*, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA, Oxford and Carlton Vic: Blackwell, 2004), 7; P. Roberts, "Identity, reflection and justification", in B. Haddock and P. Sutch, eds., *Multiculturalism, Identity and Rights* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 142–157.

[34] J. S. Mill, "Considerations on representative government", chapter XVI: R. B. McCallum, ed., *On liberty and Considerations on representative government by J. S. Mill* (Oxford: Basil Blakckwell, 1946; repr. 1948), 291.

[35] D. Morley and K. Robins, *Spaces of identity: global media, electronic landscapes, and cultural boundaries* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995).

[36] G. Delanty, *Community* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 189.

[37] P. Hamilton, "The Knife Edge: Debates about Memory and History", in K. Darian-Smith and P. Hamilton, eds., *Memory and history in twentieth-century Australia* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994), 23.

that led to the creation of the ICTY have shown so poignantly — generate intolerance, discrimination, cleansing and usurpation.

Legally, either the Tribunal or its parent body, the United Nations, is the owner of the assets of the Tribunal, including documents and other materials. Intrinsically, however, one has to recognise the rights of other parties to the primary functions of the Tribunal. What in Western archival practice is called the subject of the record has to be reconsidered as a full partner in the record-creating process, as a co-creator of the record.[38] In several cultures people consider records about them as records owned by them. Moreover, in many jurisdictions legislation on data protection and on medical files acknowledges specific rights of the "data subject" to be respected by the creating agency.

Jeannette Bastian has enriched archival discourse with the notion of a "community of records".[39] Bastian refers to a community both as a record-creating entity and as a memory frame that contextualises the records it creates. According to Bastian, the records of a community become the products of a multi-tiered process of creation that begins with the individual creator but can be fully realized only within the expanse of this creator's entire society. The records of individuals become part of an entire community of records.[40] Communities, she argues, are defined through the relationship between actions and records, the actions creating a mirror in which records and actions reflect one another. A community of records may be further imagined as an aggregate of records in all forms generated by multiple layers of actions and interactions between and among the people and institutions within a community.[41]

Colonial archiving "shaped" local communities in the colonizer's taxonomies, while these communities "asserted their identity and agency in response to the authority of colonial rule".[42] This reciprocal "production" and

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[38] M. Piggott and S. McKemmish, "Recordkeeping, Reconciliation and Political Reality", in S. Lloyd, ed., *Past Caring? What does Society Expect of Archivists?* Proceedings of the Australian Society of Archivists Conference, Sydney 13–17 August 2002 (Canberra: Australian Society of Archivists, 2002), 111–122, also available at http://www.sims. monash.edu.au/research/rcrg/publications/piggottmckemmish2002.pdf

[39] J. A. Bastian, *Owning Memory. How a Caribbean Community Lost its Archives and Found Its History* (Westport Conn. and London: Libraries Unlimited, 2003), 3, 5.

[40] Ibid., 3.

[41] Ibid., 3, 5.

[42] S. Mathur, "History and anthropology in South Asia: rethinking the archive", *Annual Review of Anthropology* 29 (2000), 95; A. L. Stoler, "Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance", Archival Science 2 (2002), 87–109; B. Joseph, Reading the East India Company, 1720–1840. Colonial Currencies of Gender (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004).

"consumption" (shaping and, what Wertsch calls "mastery")[43] of the colonial narrative of history and identity entail that former colonizers and former colonized are a community of records. The same is true for other mutually associated groups, for example indigenous people and immigrants. Thus the stakeholders in the ICTY's legacy constitute several communities of records, partly overlapping each other: victims and convicted, the ICTY staff and defence counsel, witnesses and prosecutors, the UN and governments.

Interestingly, Achile Mbembe's definition of the postcolony[44] as a timespace characterized by proliferation and multiplicity seems to be of use in exploring the case of transitional justice in the Balkans today. According to Mbembe, the postcolony as a temporal formation is definitely an era of dispersed entanglements, the unity of which is produced out of differences. From a spatial point of view, it is an overlapping of different, intersected and entwined threads in tension with one another. The notion of the "postcolony" refers to a timescape which is simultaneously in the process of being formed and of being dissolved through a movement that brings both the "being formed" and the "being dissolved" into collision. The term "postcolony" indicates the desire to take very seriously the intrinsic qualities and power of "contemporaneousness", while firmly keeping in mind the fact that the present itself is a concatenation of multiple temporalities. Because of the entanglement of these multiple temporalities, the space is evolving in multiple and overlapping directions simultaneously. But there is no way we can overcome the neurosis of victimization if, by transforming the past into our subjective present, we root our identities in injury alone. For the past to become a principle of action in the present, we have to manage to admit the reality of loss as that which must sustain human dialogue and stop living in the past instead of integrating it into the present. In any case, the complete restitution of the past is not only terrifying, but also a clear impossibility.

Yet, most importantly, the archive lies within and beyond. To quote Derrida again:

> In an enigmatic sense which will clarify itself perhaps (perhaps, because nothing can be sure here, for essential reasons), the question of the archive is not, I repeat, a question of the past, the question of a concept dealing with the past which already might either be at our disposal or not at out disposal, an archivable concept of the archive, but rather a question of the future, the very question of the future, question of a response, of a promise and of a responsibility for tomorrow. The archive: if we want to know what this will have meant,

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[43] J. V. Wertsch, "Narrative Tools of History and Identity", *Culture & Psychology* 3 (1997), 5–20.

[44] A. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

we will only know tomorrow. Perhaps. A spectral messianicity is at work in the concept of the archive and like religion, like history, like science itself, this ties it to a very singular experience of the promise.[45]

Furthermore, the performance of law, which erects an authority whose exercise of power is mystifying rather than regulative, could be interrogated. Following Judith Butler's suggestion, one could reflect on the laws that the authority's inquisitorial call itself embodies and on the demands that mandate the authority's performance of juridical command. Informed by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's work on mimetic representation, Yaakov Perry proposes a model for reading the performance of authority whose juridical vision is distorted each time it is purported to be literalized, and exemplifies how the very claim to originality in certain postcolonial sites of power, where no forces are immune to the burdens of mimetic representation, is itself always already bound to a simulacral economy of representation.[46]

Thus this paper has sought to examine, to hold against this type of embodied history, the archive, some theories and assumptions about the nature of social experience, and to examine the ways in which this lived history, this inscription of history on the body and in subjectivity, speaks to and refutes our conventional understandings. It has also sought to recover the subject in history, the subject in the archives about the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and in this recovery of subjecthood, to urge for the recovery of the subject in social intervention.

This is a subject, present or absent, speaking or/and silenced, who is complex, dispersed, who offers no easy unanimities of purpose, action, subjectivity or intention. These are subjects who appear in the narratives of archives, in extraordinary but ultimately mundane complexity. These are subjects who are both inscribed and inscribe themselves in changing networks of power. The atrocity and excess of power during the period of politicized contention could give way to new regimentations of power, in which the new citizen in the post-Yugoslav countries, scarred and burnt, attempts the constitution of a new subjecthood, within reconfigured power, and seeks unities of selfhood that would trace meaningful lineaments, connections, a teleology of life, in full cognisance of the complexity of history and of the subject in history, the possibility of change, of agency and of a new type of citizenship.

Such a perspective would also enable us to develop a non-Eurocentric awareness of the role of Europe in the world by taking a view of Europe

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[45] Derrida, *Mal d'Archive*.

[46] Y. Perry, "Law's violations: the formalization of authority in Achille Mbembe's reading of the postcolony", *Postcolonial Studies* 10/3 (September 2007), 243–256.

as a project of becoming, that is, partly, constituted through its many outsides; taking a post-colonial approach to Europe as being always relationally produced and, also partly, as having produced and producing its outsides; taking a view that "making Europe" is a project in which many agencies are invested, spatially distributed, connected and concretized in particular locations; and (possibly) understanding that its outsides may also be insides (the non-Europeanness of its migrant citizens/would-be citizens, the disaffected nationals versus Europe).

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## Kosovo and Metohija:
## Serbia's Troublesome Province*

**Abstract**: Kosovo and Metohija, the heartland of medieval Serbia, of her culture, politics and economy (1204–1455), experienced continuous waves of spiralling violence, forced migration and colonization under centuries-long Ottoman rule (1455–1912). A region which symbolizes the national and cultural identity of the Serbian nation as a whole now has an Albanian majority population, who consider it an ancient Albanian land, claiming continuity with ancient Illyrians. Kosovo was reincorporated into Serbia (1912) and Yugoslavia (1918) as a region lacking tradition of inter-ethnic and inter-religious tolerance and cooperation. The two rivalling Kosovo nations, Albanians and Serbs, remained distant, maintaining limited interethnic communication throughout the twentieth century. The mounting national and ideological conflicts, reinforced by the communist ideology, made coexistence almost impossible, even after the 1999 NATO bombing campaign and establishment of KFOR-secured UN administration. Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 is a dangerous attempt to establish a second Albanian state extended into the heartland of Serbia, a failed state cleansed of both Serbs and other major non-Albanian communities.

**Keywords**: Serbia, Kosovo, ethnic strife, nationalism and communism, Kosovo crisis, NATO bombing, war against Yugoslavia, international protectorate

*Imagining Kosovo: opposing historical views*

Even the word *Kosovo* (*kos* means "blackbird" in Serbian) has opposing significance to the rival ethnic communities. The Serbs see Kosovo (with Metohija) as the Serbian "Holy Land", whose impressive cultural and economic rise in medieval times was brought to a halt by the Ottoman conquest. For the Serbs, the Battle of *Kosovo* — or more precisely *Kosovo Polje* (Blackbird Field) — fought between the Serb and Ottoman armies in 1389, and marked by the death of both rulers, Prince Lazar and Sultan Murad, came to symbolize their plight under foreign rule and their struggle for freedom.[1] During the centuries of Ottoman domination, the sacrifice sus-

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[1] S. Marjanović-Dušanić, "Patterns of Martyrial Sanctity in the Royal Ideology of Medieval Serbia. Continuity and Change", *Balcanica* XXXVII (2006), Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2007; T. A. Emmert,

tained in the Battle of Kosovo and subsequent hardships acquired legend-
ary proportions and were immortalized in Serbian epic poetry.[2] Seen as a
sacred land, a medieval source of Serbian culture, art, spiritual and politi-
cal traditions, Kosovo became a pillar of modern Serbian identity. Further-
more, Kosovo has been traditionally perceived as a holy land from which
Serbs were repeatedly driven out in the past and from which they are being
expelled by a rival ethnic group even today. This situation resulted, as evi-
denced by Serbian sources, from an organized and systematic action, perpe-
trated primarily by Muslim Albanians who had been settling in the region
as legal and illegal immigrants, and for social, religious and political reasons,
at various periods during the rule of the Ottomans, the Italian fascists and
Tito's communists.[3]

        The ethnic Albanians are fond of Kosovo as the stronghold of their
main national movement, "Albanian League", founded in Prizren in 1878
on the eve of the Congress of Berlin. All Albanians, including the Kosovo
Albanians, see Kosovo as symbolizing an "ancient Albanian land", Dardania,
which directly, in ethnic terms, links the ancient Illyrians with the modern-
day Albanian community in the province. This romantic historical notion,
originally concocted in Austria-Hungary in the late nineteenth century for
the political purpose of finding a common denominator uniting the divided
Albanian tribes,[4] was additionally elaborated between the two world wars,
and eventually the Illyrian theory was fully embraced by Albanian historians,

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"The Kosovo Legacy", in *Kosovo*, ed. W. Dorich (Alhambra, California: Kosovo Char-
ity Found, Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Western America, 1992). For more, see R.
Mihaljčić, *The Battle of Kosovo in History and the Popular Tradition* (Belgrade: Beograd-
ski grafičko-izdavački zavod, 1989).

[2] S. Koljević, *The Epic in the Making* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); N. Ćurčija-
Prodanović, *Heroes of Serbia. Folk Ballads Retold* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1963); C. Stewart, *Serbian Legacy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1959).

[3] *Documents diplomatiques. Correspondance concernant les actes de violence et de brigand-
age des Albanais dans la Vieille Serbie (Vilayet de Kosovo) 1898–1899* (Belgrade: Min-
istère des Affaires Etrangères, 1899); Dj. Slijepčević, *Srpsko-arbanški odnosi kroz vekove
s posebnim osvrtom na novije vreme* (Himelsthür: Eparhija zapadnoevropska, 1983); D.
Bogdanović, *Knjiga o Kosovu* (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1985);
M. Rakić, *Konzulska pisma 1905–1911*, ed. A. Mitrović (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1985); A.
Urošević, *Etnički procesi na Kosovu tokom turske vladavine* (Belgrade: Srpska akadem-
ija nauka i umetnosti, 1987); *Zadužbine Kosova. Spomenici i znamenja srpskog naroda*
(Prizren–Belgrade: Eparhija raško-prizrenska, 1987); *Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji
1852–1912*, ed. D. T. Bataković (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1988); *Le Kosovo-
Metohija dans l'histoire serbe*, ed. R. Samardžić (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1990); D. T.
Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles* (Belgrade: Plato, 1992).

[4] S. Skendi, *Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912* (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1967).

becoming an official ideology under the communist dictator Enver Hoxha.[5] The Illyrian theory views Albanians as direct descendants of the pre-Roman Illyrian tribe and labels Serbs as "Slavic invaders" who did not begin to settle in this ancient Albanian land until the seventh century AD.[6]

The Serbian monasteries and churches in Kosovo and Metohija — including four UNESCO World Heritage Sites of Serbia in Kosovo[7] — built in unusually large numbers between the early thirteenth and late fifteenth centuries, were, according to Albanian propagandists, constructed on the foundations of earlier "Illyrian churches". Some of them indeed were built on earlier foundations, but those were the remains of Byzantine-era churches, which is a phenomenon typical of the "Byzantine Commonwealth".[8]

The Serbian position is supported by tangible evidence. Apart from written historical sources, foreign and domestic, attesting to Serbian presence in the area, there still are in Kosovo thirteen hundred Serb Orthodox Christian churches, monasteries, monuments, and archaeological sites.[9] The

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[5] Nathalie Clayer, *Religion et nation chez les Albanais aux XIXe–XXe siècles* (Istanbul: Les Éditions ISIS, 2002).

[6] *Albanians and Their Territories*, ed. A. Buda (Tirana: 8 Nëntori, 1985); *The Truth on Kosova* (Tirana: Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Albania, Encyclopaedia Publishing House, 1993). For a recent analysis see *Albania and the Albanian identities*, ed. A. Zhelyazkova (Sofia: International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, 2000); *Albanian Identities: Myth & History*, eds. S. Schwandner-Sievers and B. J. Fischer (London: Hurst & Co, 2002).

[7] The Monastery of Visoki Dečani was the first that was listed as a World Heritage site (2004), and the extension in 2006 included the Patriarchate of Peć, the Monastery of Gračanica, and the Church of the Holy Virgin of Ljeviša in Prizren (Serbia: Date of Inscription: 2004; Extension: 2006, Criteria: (ii)(iii)(iv); Property: 2.8802 ha; Buffer zone: 115.3879 ha Autonomous province of Kosovo; N42 39 40 E20 15 56; Ref: 724bis). UNESCO describes them as follows: "The four edifices of the site reflect the high points of the Byzantine-Romanesque ecclesiastical culture, with its distinct style of wall painting, which developed in the Balkans between the 13th and 17th centuries. The Dečani Monastery was built in the mid-14th century for the Serbian king Stefan Dečanski and is also his mausoleum. The Patriarchate of Peć Monastery is a group of four domed churches featuring series of wall paintings. The 13th-century frescoes of the Church of Holy Apostles are painted in a unique, monumental style. Early 14th-century frescoes in the church of the Holy Virgin of Ljevisa represent the appearance of the new so-called Palaiologian Renaissance style, combining the influences of the eastern Orthodox Byzantine and the Western Romanesque traditions. The style played a decisive role in subsequent Balkan art." (http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/724/)

[8] For more see G. Subotić, *Art of Kosovo: The Sacred Land* (New York: Monacelli Press, 1998).

[9] Comprehensive documentation available in *Zadužbine Kosova. Spomenici i znamenja*, passim.

process of ethnic change unfolding from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, by which Albanians gradually replaced Serbs as Kosovo's majority population, is well documented as well. Among its causes, the primary one was foreign oppression, which often obtained Albanian support. On the other hand, there is no tangible scholarly evidence for ethnic or cultural continuity between ancient Illyrians and modern Albanians: the relevant historical sources of the sixth to eleventh centuries remained completely silent on this matter.[10] Plentiful place-names in Kosovo (including the name of the province) are of Slavic, i.e. Serbian origin. Nothing of this was enough to prevent the creation of a modern Albanian mythology based on the purported continuity with ancient Illyrians, a theory strongly supported by a number of foreign scholars in an often biased and bizarrely passionate way.[11]

What the Serbs in the case of Kosovo have almost entirely on their side is historical accuracy, while the current demographics are heavily on the Albanian side. It is no wonder then that the contemporary Albanian interpretation of Kosovo's past is not guided by the historical accuracy motive. Rather it is a case of historical revisionism that, by projecting the current demographic situation back into the past, seeks to provide its legitimacy and thus discredit any claim, past or present, Serbia might lay to Kosovo.[12] The

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[10] *Illyriens et Albanais*, ed. M. Garašanin (Belgrade: Académie serbe des Sciences et des Arts, 1990); cf. G. Jandot, *L'Albanie d'Enver Hoxha 1944–1985* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994), 25–26, quoting Alex Buda, President of the Albanian Academy of Science, on discontinuity between Illyrians and Albanians.

[11] See N. Malcolm, *Kosovo. A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), and the review by A. Djilas, "Imagining Kosovo: A Biased New Account Fans Western Confusion", *Foreign Affairs* (September 1998). For a less biased but still incomplete history of Kosovo, see M. Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian. A History of Kosovo* (London: Hurst & Co., 1988). In French-speaking countries, for an example of ardent support to the Albanian hard-line position, see M. Roux, *Les Albanais en Yougoslavie. Minorité nationale, territoire et développement* (Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1992).

[12] D. T. Bataković, *Kosovo. La spirale de la haine* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1998); two useful insights into the different and essentially irreconcilable Serbian and Albanian positions on Kosovo can be found in the proceedings of two conferences held under the auspices of European mediators: *Kosovo-Kosova. Confrontation or Coexistence*, eds. G. Duijzings, D. Janjić and S. Maliqi (Peace Research, University of Nijmegen, Political Cultural Centre 042, 1996), and *Kosovo. Avoiding Another Balkan War*, eds. Th. Veremis and E. Kofos (Athens: Eliamep, University of Athens, 1998). See also *Kosovo. Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions*, ed. W. J. Buckley (Grand Rapids, Michigan and Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2000). For a German pro-Albanian view, see *Kosovo/Kosova. Mythen, Daten, Fakten*, eds. W. Petrich, K. Kaser and R. Pichler (Klagenfurt–Vienna: Wieser Verlag, 1999). More balanced is a standard Italian

final objective is to secure international recognition of the area of 10,887 square kilometres of this troublesome Serbian province as a new country of "Kosovars", allegedly a new nation. In actual fact Kosovo is a second Albanian state ethnically cleansed of both Serbs and other non-Albanian communities, a second Albanian state extended into the medieval heartland of contemporary Serbia.

*From Ottoman dominance to a Serbian and Yugoslav realm*

Once a Roman and subsequently Byzantine possession, the region known as Kosovo and Metohija was the central part of medieval Serbia, and the homeland of two of her five medieval dynasties. It was the hub of her culture and her religious centre. From the late thirteenth century the see of the Serbian Orthodox Church was at Peć, in Metohija, a region known for the many church-owned Serbian royal endowments.[13] The Battle of Kosovo in 1389 marked a turn of the tide. The Ottoman Turks gradually conquered the area. Kosovo and Metohija, part of the Despotate of Serbia, was conquered in 1455, and the rest of the Serbian Despotate fell only several years later (1459).[14]

Frequent wars fought between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires led, on the one hand, to forced migrations of the Serbs from Kosovo, Metohija and adjacent areas — later subsumed under the name Old Serbia — the most massive being those of 1690 and 1739, and, on the other, to a mass inflow and settlement of Albanians from Albania proper.[15] The whole region, in which tribal and feudal anarchy reigned supreme, remained under Ottoman rule for almost a century longer than the areas of central and northern Serbia. The Old Serbia (*Vilayet* of Kosovo) was liberated in the First Balkan

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overview covering the contemporary period, M. Dogo, *Kosovo. Albanesi e Serbi: le radici del conflitto* (Lungro di Cosenza: Marco, 1992). Balanced and accurate among the latest works is J.-A. Dérens, *Kosovo. Année zéro*, preface M.-A. Nowicki (Paris: Paris-Méditerranée, 2004). See also a very useful book, A. Troude, *Géopolitique de la Serbie* (Paris: Elipses, 2006).

[13] C. Jireček, *La civilisation serbe au Moyen Âge*, transl. from German L. Eisenmann, preface E. Denis (Paris: Bossard, 1920); M. Lutovac, *La Metohija. Etude de géographie humaine* (Paris: Institut des Etudes Slaves, 1935); *Cultural Heritage of Kosovo and Metohija*, ed. M. Omčikus (Belgrade: Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments of the Republic of Serbia, 1999); Z. Rakić, *The Church of St. John the Baptist at Crkolez* (Belgrade: Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments of the Republic of Serbia, 2007); *Visoki Dečani Monastery*, ed. by the Dečani monks (Dečani: Visoki Dečani Monastery, 2007).

[14] S. M. Ćirković, *La Serbie au Moyen Age* (Paris: Zodiaque, 1992).

[15] O. Zirojević, *Srbija pod turskom vlašću (1459-1804)* (Novi Pazar: Damad, 1995).

War in late 1912. Kosovo was reincorporated into the Kingdom of Serbia, while the eastern part of Old Serbia, known as Metohija, went to another Serb state, the Kingdom of Montenegro. The two areas, Kosovo and Metohija, were reintegrated when Montenegro united with Serbia at the end of the First World War. Serbia was fully restored and additionally strengthened by her important military contribution to the final Allied victory.

In December 1918, Serbia responded to the demands of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs of the defunct Austria-Hungary, and created a new entity, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, from 1929 known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. During the interwar period Kosovo and Metohija remained an integral part of Serbia, belonging to several of her administrative and political units (*oblast*s or *banovina*s). The implementation of extensive social and agrarian reforms led to the repopulation of the area by roughly 60,000 Serb colonists.[16]

The questionnaires used in two official interwar censuses (1921 and 1931) contained questions about religious affiliation and native language, rather than ethnic origin or national identity. Even so, present-day Kosovo and Metohija had a relative Albanian majority in demographic terms, a fact that strongly contradicts all propagandistic allegations, both inter-war and post-war, about a mass migration or mass expulsion of Kosovo Albanians (1919–1941). According to the 1921 Yugoslav census, Kosovo had a population of 436,929, with Albanians (i.e. Albanian-speaking inhabitants) accounting for 64.1 percent, while in 1931 Albanians accounted for 62.8 percent of a total of 552,064.[17]

Recently made estimates, which are based on the 1921 and 1931 censuses and take into account internal military documents created in 1939, show an increasing trend for the Serbs within the present-day boundaries of the province in both relative and absolute terms: according to the 1921 census, they accounted for 21.1 percent; in 1931 — 26.9 percent; and in 1939 — 33.1 percent or 213,746. The Albanian population also increased: from 288,900 in 1921 to 331,549 in 1931, and to 350,460 in 1939. The

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[16] B. Krstić, *Kosovo. Facing the Court of History* (New York: Humanity Books 2004), 80–95.

[17] Interwar censuses quoted by H. Isljami, "Demografska stvarnost Kosova", in *Sukob ili dijalog. Srpsko-albanski odnosi i integracija Balkana* (Subotica: Otvoreni univerzitet, 1994), 39–41. Within the French-inspired *banovina* system introduced by King Aleksandar I Karadjordjević in 1931, the distribution of ethnic Albanians was as follows: 16 percent in Zetska *banovina* (most of Metohija and today's Montenegro with Dubrovnik); 3.36 percent in Moravska *banovina* (central Serbia with northern Kosovo); and 19.24 percent in Vardarska *banovina* (eastern and southern Kosovo, Prizren and the Gora region, and Slavic Macedonia). As for ethnic Turks, they accounted for 7.91 percent of the population in Vardarska *banovina*, mostly in the Prizren area.

third largest ethnic group, Turks, decreased from 6.3 percent in 1921 to 3.8 percent in 1939.[18] The increase in the number of Serbs did not result only from the inflow of settlers. The figure also includes some 5,000 state-appointed officials and technical personnel.[19]

*Regional rivalries and nationalist movements*

After 1918 Italy emerged as a new regional power and assumed the role of Albania's main protector and certified interpreter of Albanian interests. Rome continued its old policy of stirring Serb-Albanian strife, now rivalling the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes for supremacy in the Eastern Adriatic. For several years (1918–1924) Kosovo and Metohija remained a restless border area constantly threatened by Albanian outlaws (*kaçak*s) supported by the "Kosovo Committee", an organization of Albanian emigrants from Kosovo whose struggle for a "Greater Albania" involved frequent terrorist incursions into the Yugoslav territory.[20]

In security terms, the whole area sustained frequent outlaw raids from Albania, which often targeted Serb colonists and Yugoslav state officials, in particular in the Drenica area.[21] The Serbian Orthodox Church, in the Ottoman period racketeered by local Albanian chieftains for armed protection against their fellow tribesmen, remained the preferred target of *kaçak* attacks, to the extent that in the 1920s both the Monastery of Dečani and the Patriarchate of Peć had to be placed under military protection. The royal Yugoslav authorities, struggling to build a long-term security, responded with severe and often brutal military and police measures against the local outlaws and the raiders from Albania, and occasionally retaliated against the local Albanian civilians as well.[22]

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[18] M. Vučković and G. Nikolić, *Stanovništvo Kosova u razdoblju 1918–1991. godine* (Munich: Slavica Verlag, 1996), 80–82; J. A. Mertus, *Kosovo. How Myths and Truths Started a War* (Berkeley: University of California, 1999), 315–318.

[19] Dj. Borozan, "Kosovo i Metohija u granicama protektorata Velika Albanija", in *Kosovo i Metohija u velikoalbanskim planovima 1878–2000* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2001), 125–126.

[20] For more see M. Dogo, *Kosovo. Albanesi e Serbi*, passim.

[21] In 1922 alone, Albanian outlaws (*kaçak*s), who were celebrated by the local Albanian population as national heroes, committed fifty-eight murders, eighteen attempted murders, thirteen assaults and seventy-one robberies. In Metohija alone there were at least 370 active *kaçak*s, led by Azem Bejta in the Drenica area. Cf. D. Maliković, *Kačački pokret na Kosovu i Metohiji 1918–1924* (Leposavić–Kosovska Mitrovica: Institut za srpsku kulturu, 2005).

[22] Ample documentation available in Lj. Dimić and Dj. Borozan, *Jugoslovenska država i Albanci*, 2 vols. (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1998); for the Albanian, mostly romantic,

The "Kosovo Committee" was financed and armed by different Italian governments. The Albanians in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the same as in pre-war Serbia (1912–1915, 1918), were an ethnic minority who largely harboured a hostile attitude towards the new state ruled by their former Slavic serfs. Yet, the influential Albanian beys of Kosovo and neighbouring areas reached an agreement with Belgrade concerning the preservation of their own privileges, and found the guarantee of religious rights for their clansmen satisfactory enough. They showed no interest in improving their inadequate minority rights, in providing secular education and broader cultural activities in their native language.[23] As a predominantly conservative patriarchal community, Kosovo's Muslim Albanians more often than not preferred religious to secular schooling, and Islamic to secular institutions.[24]

Muslim beys from Kosovo, Metohija and north-western Macedonia founded in 1919 a Muslim-oriented political party. The *Çemijet* entered into direct arrangements with Belgrade, offering political backing in exchange for a partial exemption from the agrarian reform. Supported by the local Muslim population (mostly Albanian, Turkish and Slavic), the *Çemijet* obtained twelve seats in the Yugoslav Parliament in the 1921 elections, and two more seats (14) two years later. Initially serving religious and social rather than political interests, the *Çemijet* gradually evolved into an organization that combined religious affiliation with distinctly national goals. As early as 1925, however, the party was banned by the royal Yugoslav authorities on the grounds of its clandestine ties with the remaining *kaçak* groups and the anti-Belgrade government in Tirana. For a certain period of time it continued to operate clandestinely and to recruit followers, mostly young men, for the Albanian national cause.

In the long-run, however, Belgrade proved unable to rival Mussolini's growing influence in the region, Albania included. Under Ahmed Zogu, a former protégé of Belgrade and future king of Albania Zog I, Albania was drawn back into the political and economic orbit of fascist Italy.[25] The

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perspective on the *kaçak* movement, see L. Rushiti, *Lëvizja kacakë në Kosovë (1918–1928)* (Pristinë: Instituti Albanologjik i Prishtinës, 1981).

[23] Under the Treaty of Saint-Germain (1919), minorities in Serbia within the borders of 1913 (including Kosovo-Metohija) were excluded from international protection; cf. R. Rajović, *Autonomija Kosova. Pravno-politička studija* (Belgrade: Ekonomika, 1987), 100–105.

[24] Roughly five percent of Kosovo Albanians, concentrated mostly in the Prizren area, and an insignificant number scattered elsewhere, are Roman Catholics while the rest are Muslims by faith, originating from the Albanian tribes of northern and central Albania.

[25] Ž. Avramovski, "Albanija izmedju Jugoslavije i Italije", *Vojnoistorijski glasnik* 3 (1984), 153–180; R. Morrozzo della Rocca, *Nazione e religione in Albania (1920–1944)* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990), 151–166.

conflict with Mussolini's Italy and the Rome-controlled Albanian national movement were given fresh impetus as the Second World War drew near. Under Mussolini's patronage, Albanian emigrants from Kosovo and Metohija, the pro-Bulgarian IMRO movement in Yugoslav Macedonia, and the Croatian fascist forces (*Ustasha*), coordinated their guerrilla actions against the multinational and politically vulnerable Yugoslav kingdom.[26] Belgrade's ambitious plan to remove the growing threat to the stability of its southwestern border by means of arranging with Turkey (1938) a mass resettlement of the Albanian and Turkish populations from both Kosovo and Slavic Macedonia (*Vardarska banovina*) was never implemented due to the death of Kemal Attatürk, the fall of Milan Stojadinović's cabinet (1939), unsettled financial terms with Ankara and the outbreak of the Second World War.[27] The growing discontent of the Kosovo Albanians, expecting to receive decisive support from the fascist camp after Italy's occupation of Albania in 1939, remained a latent threat to Yugoslavia's security.[28]

*The Second World War: persecution, forced migrations, Albanization*

After the Yugoslav kingdom was dismembered by the Axis powers in April 1941, the Serbs, perceived as the main culprits for anti-Nazi resistance in the western Balkans, were severely punished by Hitler, in contrast to the Albanians, who were fully recompensed. By the decree of King Victor Emanuel III of 12 August 1941, most of Kosovo-Metohija was annexed to a fascist-sponsored "Greater Albania", a possession of the Italian crown. The new fascist rulers granted the Kosovo Albanians the right to fly their own flag and to use Albanian as a medium of instruction in schools. The newly-acquired national symbols received an enthusiastic response from the mostly tribal and rural Albanian population of Kosovo. Nevertheless, the Kosovo Albanians were not willing to restrict their activities to the cultural and political domains. There ensued a full-scale revenge against the Serbs,

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[26] Cf. G. Zamboni, *Mussolinis Expansionspolitik auf dem Balkan. Italiens Albanienpolitik vom 1. bis z. 2. Tiranapakt im Rahmen d. italien.-jugoslaw. Interessenkonflikts u. d. italien. imperialen Bestrebungen in Südosteuropa* (Hamburg: Burke, 1970), 301–338.

[27] Individual proposals concerning mass resettlement or even expulsion of ethnic Albanians from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, such as the infamous one proposed by the historian Vasa Čubrilović in 1937, were neither discussed nor accepted by the Yugoslav government which remained focused exclusively on the bilateral agreement with Ankara. Contrary to what is often strongly suggested by most Albanian and some Western scholars, there is no evidence in either the Serbian or Yugoslav military and civilian archives for any connection between Čubrilović's proposal and Yugoslavia's official policy.

[28] B. Gligorijević, "Fatalna jednostranost. Povodom knjige B. Horvata *Kosovsko pitanje*", *Istorija XX veka* 1–2 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1988), 185–192.

perceived as oppressors under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.[29] At least 10,000 perished and roughly 100,000 were expelled.

Moreover, as early as 1941 a project was launched to settle Albanians from northern and central Albania on the abandoned farms of both native Kosovo Serbs and Serb colonists: "The Italian occupation force encouraged an extensive settlement program involving up to 72,000 Albanians."[30] At various points during the Second World War, Kosovo was a real bloodbath, involving conquering armies and Albanian extremists. Large-scale destruction of Serb colonist villages was a major component of a strategic plan: to demonstrate to any potential post-war international commission responsible for drawing new borders that Serbs had never lived in Kosovo. A prominent Kosovo Albanian leader, Ferat-beg Draga, solemnly announced in 1943 that the "time has come to exterminate the Serbs [...] there will be no Serbs under the Kosovo sun."[31]

In September 1943, after Mussolini was defeated and Italy capitulated, Kosovo came under the direct control of Nazi Germany. Albanian nationalism was spurred on by the creation of the "Second Albanian League", while the infamous Albanian-staffed SS Waffen "Scanderbeg" division launched a new campaign of violence against the remaining Serbian civilians.[32] According to the first, although incomplete, post-war Yugoslav estimations, there were in Kosovo and Metohija 5,493 killed or missing persons and 28,412 imprisoned or disabled persons, most of them Serbs.[33]

The Yugoslav communists were instrumental in bringing the Albanian communists to power. In the membership of the newly-established Communist Party of Albania (formed and organized under the supervision of Yugoslav instructors Miladin Popović and Dušan Mugoša), there were numerous advocates of the Greater Albanian idea. Its leader, Enver Hoxha, had taken the first step towards an agreement concerning the creation of a post-war Greater Albania. Albanian communists joined forces with the

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[29] The Italian government supplied the Kosovo area with an Albanian volunteer militia, initially 5000-strong — *Vulnetari* — to help the Italian forces maintain order as well as to independently perform surprise attacks on the largely unarmed Serb population.

[30] M. Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 123.

[31] H. Bajrami, "Izveštaj Konstantina Plavšića Tasi Diniću, ministru unutrašnjih poslova u Nedićevoj vladi oktobra 1943, o kosovsko-mitrovačkom srezu", *Godišnjak Arhiva Kosova* XIV–XV (1978–1979), 313; cf. also J. Pejin, *Stradanje Srba u Metohiji 1941–1944* (Belgrade: Arhivski pregled, 1994).

[32] D. T. Bataković, *Kosovo Chronicles*, 13–17; for a detailed account see L. Latruwe and G. Kostic, *La Division Skanderbeg. Histoire des Waffen SS albanais des origines idéologiques aux débuts de la Guerre Froide* (Paris: Godefroy de Bouillon, 2004).

[33] Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia], Belgrade, vol. 54-20-47.

*Balli Kombëtar*, an active nationalist organization, but the agreement between the two movements reached in 1943 turned out to be a short-lived one.[34]

Furthermore, the Bujan Declaration of the Kosovo Albanian communist representatives (including numerous representatives of Albania), issued on 2 January 1944, called for union of Kosovo and Metohija with Albania after the victory of the communist guerrilla.[35] This idea was promptly dismissed by the Yugoslav communist leadership under the Moscow-appointed Secretary-General Josip Broz Tito. Tito considered the Bujan Declaration as premature and damaging to the common communist goals in the decisive phase of the Second World War.

A large-scale Albanian rebellion against communist Yugoslavia in late 1944 highlighted the necessity of maintaining Kosovo and Metohija within Serbia even under the new Soviet-type federal system. In November 1944, this area of Serbia was liberated from Nazi occupation by Tito's communist forces, the partisans. The *Balli Kombëtar* supporters and other Albanian units, rearmed and recently recruited into partisan formations, organized a large-scale uprising, attacking Tito's partisan forces. The Albanian revolt, which managed to mobilize roughly 40,000 nationalists in January 1945, as well as an undetermined number of those Albanians who had been settled in Kosovo from Albania proper during the wartime years, was brutally crushed only when additional Yugoslav troops were brought in and military rule was set up in Kosovo and Metohija between February and May 1945. Furthermore, after a series of bloody clashes and significant losses on both sides, the Albanian revolt in certain areas, such as Drenica, assumed the proportions of a small-scale civil war over Kosovo.[36]

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[34] *Balli Kombëtar* (National Front) was an Albanian nationalist military organization led by Midhat Frasheri and Ali Klissura. Its main political objective was not only integration of Kosovo-Metohija into an Italian-sponsored "Greater Albania", but ethnic cleansing of the region of all, or at least of the majority, of its Christian Orthodox Serb population in order to secure the safe development of this region as exclusively Albanian in the future. The short-lived agreement with the CPA and the Balli Kombëtar of 1942 became irrelevant after the full collaboration of Ballists with the Nazis following the capitulation of Italy in September 1943.

[35] *Konferenca e Bujanit* (Tirana: Akademia e Shkencave e Republikës së Shqipërise, Instituti i Historisë, 1999).

[36] The official communist version, including some original documents, is available in the memoirs of the commander of Titoist troops involved in suppressing the Albanian revolt: S. Djaković, *Sukobi na Kosovu*, 2nd ed. (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1986), 225–236; according to confidential military reports quoted in the same book (pp. 236–237), between 10 February and 15 April 1945 casualties on the side of Albanian rebels were

*Communist Yugoslavia: failed reconciliation*

After the war and the communist takeover, Yugoslavia was restored as a Soviet-style communist federation, with a constitutional system inspired by the 1937 Soviet Constitution. Serbia became one of six Yugoslav federal units, and the only one internally federalized: with one province (Vojvodina) and a region (Kosovo and Metohija) within her borders. Moreover, a major privilege was granted to communist Albania, still dominated by Yugoslav communists: a decree of 6 March 1945 issued by Yugoslav communist authorities banned the return of Serbian inter-war colonists to Kosovo and Metohija, a decision that made most of 60,000 Kosovo Serb civilians, waiting to be resettled elsewhere, temporarily homeless or internally displaced persons.[37] In contrast, most of roughly 75,000 ethnic Albanians from Albania colonized during the Italian Fascist and Nazi Germany occupation remained living within Serbia after 1945, settled in vacant Serbian possessions in fertile plains of both Metohija and Kosovo. In most cases, the old and new settlers from Albania in Kosovo, whose number has never been accurately established, were granted the citizenship of Serbia within the Yugoslav federation.[38]

Kosovo and Metohija was given the status of a region (*oblast*) in 1946, and was elevated to an autonomous province (*pokrajina*) in 1963, a status granted to Vojvodina in 1946 within federalized Serbia. J. B. Tito, the lifetime dictator of the second, communist and federal, Yugoslavia, had been raised in the Habsburg atmosphere of constant fear of the alleged "Greater Serbian danger". Furthermore, Tito was politically structured under the ideological pattern of Lenin's doctrine that the nationalism of larger nations is more dangerous than the nationalism of smaller ones. Thus, from

393 killed and 490 wounded, and on the side of Tito's partisans, 82 killed and 117 wounded.

[37] "Privremena zabrana vraćanja kolonista u njihova ranija mesta življenja", No 153, *Službeni list DFJ* 13 of 16 March 1945; "Zakon o reviziji dodjeljivanja zemlje kolonistima i agrarnim interesentima u Makedoniji i u Kosovsko-metohijskoj oblasti", *Službeni list DFJ* 56 of 5 August 1945; cf. also *Službeni list FNRJ* 89, 1946.

[38] According to the 1948 census, the total number of Albanians, despite the heavy war losses reported by Albanians themselves, had augmented by 75,417 within nine years; cf. P. Živančević, *Emigranti. Naseljavanje Kosova i Metohije iz Albanije* (Belgrade: Eksportpress, 1989), 78. The latest research, based on official although incomplete documentation, scales down the number of political immigrants from Albania in the 1950s, given that they used Yugoslavia mostly as a transit country towards Western Europe, cf. B. Hrabak, "Albanski emigranti u Jugoslaviji", *Tokovi istorije* 1–2 (1994), 77–104. However, the movements of peasants from Albania crossing the border and settling in border villages in Metohija or in Kosovo, do not seem to have been accurately tracked, at least after 1968.

the communist takeover in 1945 until the end of his lifetime dictatorship in 1980, J. B. Tito remained consistent in rooting out any visible, symbolic or real, manifestation of "Serbian hegemony". Most of the Serbian pre-war elites had been destroyed during the communist "red terror" (1944–1947), and post-war Serbia was placed under the rule of Tito's confidants from the ranks of Serbian communists. From 1945 the alleged Serbian hegemony, an obsession of the Yugoslav communists (most senior Serbian party members included), was perceived as the embodiment of the Serbian-led regime of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as well as a permanent ideological threat to communism.[39]

Although Tito described inter-republican boundaries established in 1945 merely as lines on a granite column bonding nations and minorities into communist "brotherhood and unity", it was obviously an ideological *langue de bois*. In an interview to the Paris daily *Le Monde* in 1971 the prominent Yugoslav dissident Milovan Djilas did, however, confess that the post-Second World War partitioning of the Serb-inhabited lands in Yugoslavia into five out of the six constituent republics had been aimed at reducing the "centralism and hegemonism of the Serbs" seen as the main "obstacle" to the establishment of communism.[40]

Royal Yugoslavia (1918–1941) had been a French-inspired nation-state marked by the Serbian, Jacobin and centralist, vision of Yugoslavism, whereas communist Yugoslavia (1945–1992) was based on an opposite model: federal, Croat vision of Yugoslav unity. Within such a context, the Albanian minority of Kosovo and Metohija was to play an important political role. National integration of Albanians lagged a whole century behind the other Balkan nations. The Albanians remained in communist Yugoslavia against their will, but they shared with other nationalists in the communist ranks some strong anti-Serb interests, highly compatible with the main ideological goals of the ruling Communist Party.[41]

During the period of centralism in Yugoslavia (1945–1966) in reaction to Tito's split with Stalin in 1948, Albania was part, until 1961, of the Soviet bloc which was hostile towards Yugoslavia. Tito entrusted control over Kosovo, and the rest of Yugoslavia, mostly to communist Serb cadres, as they represented the ironclad guarantee of Yugoslavia's integrity. On the other

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[39] D. T. Baraković, "Twentieth-Century Kosovo-Metohija: Migrations, Nationalism and Communism", *Serbian Studies* 13:2 (1999), 1–23; D. T. Baraković, "Kosovo à l'époque titiste: entre nationalisme et communisme", *Les Annales de l'autre Islam* 7 (2000), 205–224.

[40] *Le Monde*, Paris, 30 December 1971.

[41] D. T. Baraković, "Frustrated Nationalism in Yugoslavia: from Liberal to Communist Solution", *Serbian Studies* 11:2 (1997), 67–85.

hand, after the reconciliation with Moscow (1955), and as part of the efforts towards reconciliation with Albania (1968–1971), Tito tended to favour the Kosovo Albanians in spite of recurrent upsurges of their nationalism.

Also, between 1966 and 1974 a process of decentralization was unfolding, for the most part based on the plans of Tito's main ideological advisor, Edvard Kardelj. The Constitution of 1974 marked a significant transfer of power to the federal units. The whole process, which institutionalized *national-communism*, eventually led to a renewal of interethnic tensions in the intricate mosaic of nations and confessions of Yugoslavia. Through the model of national-communism shaped by E. Kardelj, the power of federal jurisdiction came to reside in the ruling oligarchies of the republics. Thus the Party *nomenklatura*, becoming sovereign in their respective republics, came to represent the majority nationality. As the only federal republic with two autonomous provinces, Serbia was an exception, since, under the 1974 Constitution, the provinces could use their veto power against the rest of Serbia.[42]

National-communism introduced majority rule for the majority nation in each of the six republic and two provinces of the federation. As a result, discrimination against small-in-numbers nations or national minorities within the boundaries of each republic or province continued, to a greater or lesser extent. That was the context in which the status of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija was significantly upgraded by the constitutional amendments of 1968 and 1972, and finally defined by the 1974 Constitution: it gave Kosovo Albanians the main say in political life.[43] The policy of entrusting rule over Kosovo to Albanians was endorsed by Tito, anxious to placate the growing Albanian nationalism in Kosovo. Being a renowned leader of the non-aligned movement and a high-ranking statesman on the international scene, Tito could ill afford to have in his neighbourhood a small Stalinist Albania continuing her violent ideological attacks on Yugoslavia, thereby challenging both her ideology and her state unity. Only several years after the 1968 Albanian demonstrations praising Albania's leader Enver Hoxha in Priština and two other towns of Kosovo, did Tito allow closer cooperation between Priština and Tirana in the vain hope that this rapprochement would appease the national discontent of the Yugoslav Albanian community.[44]

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[42] D. T. Bataković, "Nationalism and Communism: The Yugoslav Case", *Serbian Studies* 9:1–2 (1995), 25–41.

[43] Cf. legal documentation in a bilingual Serbian-English edition *Kosovo: Law and Politics. Kosovo in Normative Acts before and after 1974* (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 1998).

[44] The most prominent Kosovo scholar, the orientalist Hasan Kaleshi, was among the first to condemn in the 1970s the propagation of ethnic hatred in textbooks and re-

The Kosovo Albanians interpreted the new party policy launched in 1968 not as an additional opportunity for furthering their national and cultural development but rather as a long-awaited occasion for an ultimate historical revenge against the Serbs, still considered as archenemies keeping Albanian Kosovo under occupation.[45] Furthermore, from 1968 the ideological and national model embraced by the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija became Enver Hoxha's Stalinist-type of rigid ethno-nationalism, promoted by imported textbooks and visiting professors from Tirana at Priština University, and above all by numerous Sigurimi agents from Albania. They all professed a simplified nationalistic ideology imbued both with a Stalinist hatred towards enemies and with old Albanian fanaticism, directed mainly against the Serbs. An Albanian-dominated assembly of Kosovo removed the term "Metohija" from the province's official name as early as 1968, for it sounded too Serbian and too Christian. It was a classical case of historical revisionism used as a tool to advance a political agenda in the present. The process involved repeated cases of discrimination against the Kosovo Serbs throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, and eventually escalated into large-scale Albanian demonstrations. The Kosovo Serb communist *nomenklatura*, with few exceptions, accepted this policy of institutionalized discrimination, and was rewarded with higher positions in republican or federal institutions.

The enhanced status of Kosovo and Metohija within Serbia was the last but fatal legacy of the declining Titoist system. In spite of the disagreement openly expressed by some Serb cadres and the well-founded prediction by some members of the academic community[46] that the new constitutional arrangements would lead to the inevitable disintegration of Yugoslavia, the final result of the centrifugal process was the adoption of the Constitution of 1974. Thus a constitution that left no room for a non-

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lated historical writings in Albanian. He died a few years later under dubious circumstances. Cf. H. Kaleshi, "O seobama Srba sa Kosova krajem XVII i početkom XVIII veka, etničkim promenama i nekim drugim pitanjima iz istorije Kosova", *Obeležja* VI:4 (1976); see also M. Mišović, "Ko je tražio republiku Kosovo", *Književne novine*, 1987.

[45] The defiant Kosovo officials, both Serbs and ethnic Turks (e.g. Kadri Reufi), who dared denounce ethnic discrimination, were punished and expelled from the Communist Party. On the other hand, some Serbian officials who cooperated with the Albanian leadership on their new policy of replacing Serbs by Albanians in all important offices in Kosovo's provincial institutions were rewarded with high posts in federal or diplomatic bodies, and thus left Kosovo forever; cf. D. T. Bataković, *Kosovo Chronicles*, 70.

[46] Most prominently by Prof. Mihailo Djurić and a group of law professors and researchers from the Law School of Belgrade University.

violent dissolution of post-Titoist Yugoslavia remained the country's legal framework after Tito's death in 1980.[47]

What ensued in Kosovo as its direct consequence was a series of administrative pressures, including judicial discrimination, police harassments and occasional physical attacks against the Serbs by the Albanians. Once the new party policy was tacitly endorsed within the federal leadership, the discrimination and harassment of the Kosovo Serbs intensified, leading to their forced migration from Kosovo to inner Serbia. The process unfolded silently, and although many high political and army officials were fully aware of it, few ever dared speak publicly. The result of this silent process of ethnic cleansing — not just tolerated, but even encouraged by the federal communist leadership — the Serb population in Kosovo and Metohija, despite a relatively high birth rate, was dramatically reduced by nearly a half: from 23.6 percent according to the 1948 census to 13.2 percent according to the 1981 census. The Montenegrin population in Kosovo was also decreasing: from 3.9 percent in 1948 to 1.7 percent in 1981.[48]

*The population of Kosovo and Metohija*

| Nationality | 1948 | 1953 | 1961 | 1971 | 1981 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albanian | 498,242 | 524,559 | 646,168 | 916,168 | 1,226,736 |
| Serb | 171,911 | 189,869 | 227,016 | 228,264 | 209,497 |
| Montenegrin | 28,050 | 31,343 | 37,588 | 31,555 | 27,028 |
| Turk | 1315 | 34,343 | 25,764 | 12,244 | 12,513 |
| Muslim | 9679 | 6241 | 8026 | 26,357 | 58,562 |
| Gypsy | 11,230 | 11,904 | 3202 | 14,593 | 34,126 |
| Others | 7393 | 9,642 | 15,787 | 14,512 | 15,978 |
| Total | 727,820 | 807,901 | 963,551 | 1,243,693 | 1,584,440 |

This ethnically motivated persecution also targeted the Serbian Orthodox Church, perceived as the pillar of Serbian identity in the Province: bishops, priests, monks and nuns were attacked, graveyards desecrated and agrarian landed property usurped. Numerous instances of continuous persecution by both Albanian nationalists and Albanian provincial bureaucrats were reported to the Serbian Orthodox Church by the Bishopric of

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[47] For Yugoslavia, more in S. K. Pavlowitch, *The Improbable Survivor. Yugoslavia and its Problems 1918–1988* (London: Hurst & Co, 1988); D. T. Bataković, *Yougoslavie. Nations, religions, idéologies* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1994).

[48] R. Petrović and M. Blagojević, *The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and Metohija. Results of the Survey Conducted in 1985–1986* (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1992).

Raška-Prizren (covering the whole of Kosovo and Metohija) in May 1969. The Serbian Patriarch German was compelled to request urgent protection from Tito, but not even that brought any tangible results.[49] After fourteen years of their undisputed and discriminatory rule in the Province, in March 1981 the Albanians announced a new phase of their separatist policy: the Albanian extremists set fire to the Patriarchate of Peć, a historic seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church.[50]

The carefully prepared and fully orchestrated Albanian rebellion in March and April 1981, initially described as a genuine student revolt, evolved within weeks into a large-scale nationalistic movement demanding the status of a seventh federal republic for Kosovo within Yugoslavia. The demanded status involved the right to self-determination, a Leninist constitutional provision reserved for the constituent communist republics. Put forth in 1981, only a year after Tito's death, the Albanian demand disturbed the sensitive balance of power in the federal leadership and challenged the sustainability of the whole system established in 1974.[51]

None of the attempts to pacify the Albanian revolt both by means of the regular communist practice of successive party purges and by repression (actions of the federal military and police forces against Albanian protesters, large-scale legal prosecution and punishment afflicting mostly younger age groups) yielded expected results. On the other hand, the League of Communists' simultaneous effort to minimize the problem of discrimination against the Serbs and of their forced migration from Kosovo and Metohija only led to the growing frustration of the Serbs all over Yugoslavia in the years that followed.

Tacitly backing Albanian nationalism, institutionalized by the 1974 Constitution, the Yugoslav federal leadership created dangerous tensions which were difficult to control: on the one hand, from 1981 Albanian protesters were repeatedly prosecuted and sentenced and, on the other, self-organized groups of Kosovo Serbs staged mass protests before Yugoslav federal institutions gaining wide popular support in Belgrade.[52] Kosovo

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[49] The Patriarch's letter is reproduced in *Zadužbine Kosova*, 833.

[50] For American journalists' credible reports on Albanian demands and the difficult position of Kosovo Serbs since 1981, see M. Howe "Exodus of Serbians Stirs Province in Yugoslavia", *The New York Times*, 12 July 1982; J. Diehl "Ethnic Rivalries cause unrest in Yugoslav Region", *Washington Post* Foreign Service Saturday, 29 November 1986; D. Binder, "In Yugoslavia, Rising Ethnic Strife Brings Fears of Worse Civil Conflict", *The New York Times*, 1 November 1987.

[51] N. Beloff, *Tito's Flawed Legacy. Yugoslavia and the West since 1999* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 209–214.

[52] Cf. A. Jeftić, *Od Kosova do Jadovna* (Belgrade: Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva, 1986); K. Magnusson "The Serbian Reaction: Kosovo and Ethnic Mobilization Among the Serbs", *Nordic Journal of Soviet & East European Studies* 43 (1987), 3–30.

Serbs were given both moral and political support by priests, monks and bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which was generally perceived as the archenemy of the communist regime. As a result of its statements and petitions denouncing the situation as a "cultural and spiritual genocide" against the Serbs and the Serbian Christian heritage (desecration of churches, monasteries and graveyards, harassments and attacks on monks and nuns, etc.), widely distributed through the religious press, the Serbian Church ceased to be seen as a parochial and conservative organization, and in public perception reassumed the role it had played under Ottoman rule, that of a quite natural protector of national interests in times of crisis.[53]

Despite often severe repression by federal forces during the 1980s, the rising Albanian nationalism made the post-Titoist system unsustainable. It was in fact the Albanian extremists that eventually, in 1987, brought Slobodan Milošević, a Serbian hard-line party apparatchik, to power. He had come to be perceived as "defender" of the Serbian cause, at first in Kosovo and then throughout Yugoslavia. On 26 March 1989, the semi-republican status of the two Serbian provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, was reduced to standard competencies of autonomous regions rather than abolished: the 1989 amendments to the Constitution of 1974 annulled the right of the two provinces to have two separate legislatures, abolished the veto power held by the provincial legislatures over the legislature of Serbia, placed authority over international relations into the hands of the republic, and limited the debate period to six months, after which the matter was to be decided by a referendum.

### Limited autonomy, intensified nationalism, escalating conflicts

The referendum in the whole of Serbia was held on 1 July 1990, but it was boycotted by the ethnic Albanians. Kosovo remained an autonomous province, but with territorial autonomy and a Statute to be enacted by the Parliament of Serbia. Legislative authority was transferred to the parliament of Serbia and executive authority to the government of Serbia. The highest judicial authority was vested in the Supreme Court of Serbia. The name Metohija (erased by the Albanian communists in 1968) reappeared in the official name of the autonomous province.[54]

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[53] "Declaration of the Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church against the Genocide by the Albanians on the Indigenous Serbian Population, together with the Sacrilege of their Cultural Monuments in their own Country", *South Slav Journal* 11:2–3 (40–41) (London 1988), 61–64; 87–89.

[54] "Ustav Republike Srbije", *Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije* 1 (1990).

Claiming that the autonomy of the province was unlawfully abolished, the majority of ethnic Albanians (represented through the members of the dismissed provincial communist Assembly) responded on 2 July 1990 by proclaiming Kosovo a seventh republic within Yugoslavia, and by adopting, on 7 September 1990, their own "Constitution" at a secretly held Albanian assembly at Kačanik. These steps, followed by the widespread Albanian boycott of all official institutions, were assessed by Serbian authorities as a serious attempt at secession. As a result, all Albanians who had voluntarily left their jobs for an indefinite period, thereby contesting the state unity of Serbia, were fired. Another measure was an often harsh police treatment of both armed and unarmed street protesters, mostly younger Albanian population.

Denouncing what they called the "Serbian apartheid", most of the Kosovo Albanians boycotted every major Serbian institution and the Belgrade-appointed administration from 1991. Instead, they organized their own parallel school and health systems, tacitly tolerated by Belgrade.[55] After the Dayton Accord of 1995, Slobodan Milošević, as the main guarantor of the hard-won peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina with unconditional Western support, became the chief negotiator for the Kosovo crisis. Nevertheless, the significant efforts of various international mediators to ensure a peaceful solution to the Albanian issue in Kosovo eventually failed.[56] While Milošević, treating the Albanian issue in humanitarian terms (allowing school facilities to be used), was reluctant to discuss constitutional change, the Albanians in Priština demanded the restoration of the 1974 autonomy status as the foremost concession.[57] Aside from various semi-official Serbian proposals calling for the ethnic partition of Kosovo as the only long-term solution

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[55] For the Albanian point of view see I. Rugova, *Independence and Democracy* (Prishtina: Fjala, 1991); *The Denial of Human and National Rights of Albanians in Yugoslavia*, ed. A. Gashi (New York: Illiria, 1992); *Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993). Roughly ten to fifteen percent of Kosovo Albanians, however, remained loyal to Serbia and the Yugoslav state, which later made them preferred targets of Albanian terrorist groups.

[56] D. T. Baktović, "Kosovo-Metohija Question: Origins of a Conflict and Possible Solutions", *Dialogue* 7/25 (1998), 41–56.

[57] The Milošević–Rugova agreement on education in Kosovo, signed under the auspices of the Community of St Egidio, never came into effect due to different interpretations: *Naša Borba*, Belgrade, 3 and 4 September 1996. For an overview of different initiatives with associated documentation, see *Conflict in Kosovo: An Analytical Documentation, 1992–1998*, ed. S. Troebst (Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues, Working Paper No 1, 1998).

to the problem, the Serbian democratic opposition put forward a range of transitional solutions, from regionalization to cantonization of Kosovo.[58]

In the early 1990s the Kosovo Albanians pursued the policy of non-violent, passive resistance, symbolized by Ibrahim Rugova, and of the tacitly tolerated coexistence of two parallel systems in Kosovo, Serbian and Albanian. At least fifteen percent of Albanians still loyal to Serbia, as well as the loyalty of Kosovo's minorities, spared the province from large-scale inter-ethnic conflicts, such as those raging in other parts of the former Yugoslav federation between 1991 and 1995. Yet, the same period witnessed a yearly rhythm of six to twelve terrorist attacks on the Serbian police by smaller armed groups of Kosovo Albanians. This low-intensity conflict, more like testing the police force in preparation for large-scale actions, went on until the middle of 1996, when the number of attacks tripled. The reported score of thirty-one ambush attacks in 1996 rose to fifty-four in 1997.[59] The UÇK (or KLA/Kosovo Liberation Army) emerged as an organized force in 1998. In Kosovo, it was seen as a national liberation group by the ethnic Albanians, and as an oppressor by non-Albanian ethnic groups. Purely Albanian, the UÇK was the military wing of one of many pro-communist guerrillas, often of Stalinist or Hoxhaist inspiration, tied to the Albanian narco-mafia and political radicals in the diaspora. Trained and armed in neighbouring Albania, and sponsored from abroad, the UÇK started attacks on Serb policemen and civilians, but also on the Albanians loyal to Serbia.[60]

The full-scale war instigated by the UÇK and their sponsors in 1998 led, after the failed negotiations held at Rambouillet, to the unilat-

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[58] D. T. Bataković, "Progetti serbi di spartazione", Kosovo: Il triangolo dei Balcani, Limes 3 (1998), 153–169. For views of Serbian experts from the democratic opposition ranks, see "Kako rešiti kosovsko pitanje" [How to solve the Kosovo issue], in Belgrade's Književne novine no 973 of 1 May 1998, and no 974 of 15 May, with the discussion of the following participants: D. T. Bataković, S. Samardžić, D. M. Popović, Z. Lutovac, Z. Radović, S. Ugričić and M. Perišić.

[59] According to Belgrade's data, thirteen police officers, nine Albanian terrorists and twenty-five civilians, mostly Serb, were killed, and sixty-seven persons were wounded. Moreover, in 1997 there were twenty-seven registered attacks on the Yugoslav army, hitherto uninvolved in operations against rebel groups. Also observed during 1997 was intensive smuggling of both drugs and ever-larger quantities of weapons from Albania, where the looted army barracks (700,000 pieces of small arms were stolen) became a source for the illegal export into Serbia, notably into Kosovo and Metohija, of tens of thousands of Kalashnikovs and other weapons, usually of Chinese, Soviet and Albanian provenance.

[60] T. Hundley, "Kosovo Serbs Live in Fear of Future", Chicago Tribune, 22 February 1999. The Albanian version in P. Denaud and V. Pras, Kosovo. Naissance d'une lutte armée UCK. Entretiens avec Bardhyl Mahmuti représentant politique de l'armée de libération du Kosovo (Paris: Harmattan, 1999).

eral NATO intervention in March 1999: 78 days of NATO bombing of Serbia and partially of Montenegro, the other member-state of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, the bombing campaign (38,000 combat sorties flown between 24 March and 10 June 1999) lacked legal endorsement of the United Nations and was strongly opposed by many international players, including two permanent members of the UN Security Council, the Russian Federation and China. Ethnically motivated violence remained the prevailing practice in Kosovo even after the establishment of UN administration and KFOR military control in June 1999.[61]

*UN administration since 1999*

The 1999 war over Kosovo, which was not, as confirmed later, a "genocide", as claimed during the NATO bombing, took the lives of roughly 10,000 Albanians and 2,000 Serbs in Kosovo alone, plus several thousands Serb, mostly civilian, victims in other regions of both Serbia and Montenegro. The bombing campaign was eventually terminated in early June 1999. Serbia gave assent to peace only after the NATO and Russian mediators had assured her that Kosovo would be placed under UN administration and that Yugoslavia would retain sovereignty over it. The UN Security Council Resolution 1244/99, under which Kosovo was entrusted to the United Nations, calls for establishing democracy, multicultural society and "substantial self-government" for Serbia's southern province torn by spiralling cycles of interethnic violence.

    In spite of some, though unsatisfactory, efforts of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and an unparalleled international military presence (a 45,000-strong "Kosovo Force" or KFOR for an area of only 10,887 sq km and less than two million inhabitants, scaled down after nine years to a still strong contingent of 16,000 NATO-led troops), the position of the Serbs and other non-Albanians continuously deteriorated.[62] The Albanian-dominated provisional institutions of Kosovo (president, government and parliament) not only failed to prevent large-scale persecution of Serbs and other non-Albanians, but gave a tacit approval to all kinds of ethnically motivated crimes.[63]

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[61] See rather critical analyses of the evolution of the Kosovo crisis and NATO operations in *La nouvelle guerre des Balkans*, eds. I. Ramonet and A. Gresh, *Manière de voir* 45, *Le monde diplomatique*, May–June 1999 (a collection of previously published articles).

[62] For more see I. King and W. Mason, *Peace at Any Price. How the World Failed Kosovo* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006).

[63] H. Morris, "Church warns over attacks on Serbs", *Financial Times*, 29 June 1999, 1; cf. also D. François, "La KFOR confrontée à la violence albanaise. Les représailles se

   In the months following the quick and safe return in the summer of 1999 of hundreds of thousands of displaced Kosovo Albanians, a reverse process ensued: mass expulsion (according to the UNHCR) of 246,000 Serbs, Roma, Gorani (Muslim Slavs) and other non-Albanians by Albanian extremists.[64] Besides, more than 40,000 houses and flats owned by non-Albanians were burned to the ground or usurped by ethnic Albanians, including many illegal immigrants from Albania who plundered the property of the expelled non-Albanian owners. Furthermore, since 10 June 1999, there are another 1,300 Serbs killed and 1,300 considered missing.[65] Since 10 June 1999, Priština, capital city of the Kosovo province, has lost one-fourth of its pre-war population (250,000): the city's pre-war Serbian community of 40,000 (including 8,000 students and professors of the Serbian-language section of Priština University) has been reduced to barely above zero, a few dozen KFOR-guarded families, mostly elderly people.

   The same horrendous fate befell the large, at least 10,000-strong urban and suburban Roma population of Priština, presently the only ethnically cleansed provincial capital in the whole of Europe, and the same goes for all major urban centres in Kosovo. The only exception remained to be northern Kosovska Mitrovica, which strongly resisted frequent Albanian attacks from June 1999. The predominantly Serb-inhabited municipalities north of Mitrovica (Zvečan, Zubin Potok, Leposavić), still resist the Albanian authorities in Priština, recognizing only UNMIK and the Serbian government. Ten years after the end of the war, more than sixty percent of the Kosovo Serbs are still internally displaced persons (a euphemism for 200,000 refugees living in both Serbia and Montenegro since 1999), as well as seventy percent of the Roma and seventy percent of the Gorani. So it was only after a decade of successive campaigns of ethnic cleansing that the Albanians became a ninety-percent majority in Kosovo. This percentage

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multiplient contre les minorités serbe et rom", *Libération*, 29 June 1999, 8; "Sad Serb", *The Economist*, 31 July 1999, 41.

[64] According to the UNHCR data, between the beginning of June and 26 July 1999, 172,061 persons fled Kosovo and Metohija, ninety percent of whom were Serbs. There were 132,789 officially registered refugees in Serbia and Montenegro, and 22,811 fled to Montenegro alone (the data reproduced in *Danas*, Belgrade, 27 July 1999, 2). For other on-the-spot reports that were published, see M. O'Connor, "Rebel Terror Forcing Minority Serbs Out of Kosovo", *New York Times*, 31 August 1998; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Kosovo Rebels Make Own Law", *Washington Post*, 24 November 1999; P. Worthington, "NATO's Reputation a Casualty of War", *The Toronto Sun*, 18 November 1999; cf. also M. Boot, "U.N. Discovers Colonialism Isn't Easy in Kosovo", *The Wall Street Journal*, New York, 2 November 1999.

[65] Cf. detailed documentation on 932 missing persons in *Abductions and Disappearances of non-Albanians in Kosovo* (Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Center, 2001).

remains conjectural given that the Albanians refused to organize a population census in the province after 1999.[66]

To add to this appalling human rights record, 156 Serbian Orthodox churches, of which one third are important medieval monuments, were razed to the ground, burned down or severely damaged by local Albanian extremists.[67] This was a systematic effort to obliterate any trace of previous Serbian presence in the area in pursuit of further legitimization of post-war Kosovo as an exclusively Albanian-inhabited land.[68] As stressed by a Western observer, "this demolition cannot be just 'revenge' — NATO's usual excuse for the destruction under its auspices. You do not just fill with rage and spend days gathering explosives to blow up churches. This is vandalism with a mission."[69]

This "vandalism with a mission" undoubtedly is an integral part of every standard practice of ethnic cleansing. Two of the four major Serb monasteries in Kosovo — the Patriarchate of Peć and, to a lesser extent, the monastery of Visoki Dečani — until recently sustained occasional shelling by Albanian extremists from the surrounding hills. The whole of Metohija — save for a thousand Serbs still living under siege in the enclaves of Goraždevac and Velika Hoča, and a few hundred Serbs isolated in scat-

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[66] Important personal testimony is provided by T. Judah, *Kosovo. War and Revenge* (Yale University Press, 2000).

[67] R. Fisk, "Nato turns a blind eye as scores of ancient Christian churches are reduced to rubble", *The Independent*, 20 November 1999; "French Troops Feel Anger of Albanian Kosovars", *International Herald Tribune*, 9 August 1999, 5. Cf. also the bilingual Serbian-English publication *Crucified Kosovo. Destroyed and Desecrated Serbian Orthodox Churches in Kosovo and Metohija (June–August 1999)*, ed. Fr. Sava Janjić (Belgrade 1999). A revised and updated Internet edition available at: *www.kosovo.net*

[68] "The Serb church has issued its own list of destroyed or partly demolished buildings. Between 13 June — when NATO troops entered Kosovo — and 20 October, they say, seventy-four churches have been turned to dust or burnt or vandalised. The fifteenth-century monastery of the Holy Trinity above Mušutište, constructed in 1465, has been levelled to the ground by the planted explosives. The monastery of the St. Archangel near Vitina, built in the fourteenth century, has been looted and burnt. So has the church of the St. Archangels in Gornje Nerodimlje. The church of St Paraskeva, near Peć, and the church of St. Nicholas in Prekoruplje — razed and its nine sixteenth-century icons lost, including that of the apostle Thomas. The rubble of [Serb] Orthodox churches across Kosovo stands as a monument to Kosovo Albanian vandalism and to NATO's indifference or — at the least — incompetence. After declaring that Kosovo must remain a 'multi-ethnic society', 40,000 troops from K-For cannot, it seems, look after its historical heritage against the violence of those whom its spokesmen treated as allies in the war against Yugoslavia's President, Slobodan Milošević, only five months ago." *The Independent*, 20 November 1999.

[69] Ibid.

tered villages — is effectively an ethnically cleansed part of the province of Kosovo and Metohija.

The destruction of at least 117 Serbian cultural sites between 1999 and 2004, mostly churches and monasteries, one third of a medieval date, passed almost unnoticed, or was mildly criticized everywhere except in Serbia, Russia or Greece. Nonetheless, ethnic purity as envisaged by Kosovo's Albanian extremists is not a concept that can be accepted as a legitimate basis for either democracy or state independence. It has become evident that none of the values of the West will be able to eventually take root in the lawless, illegal trafficking paradise of a mafia-ruled Kosovo, "Balkan Colombia" as it has often been described by renowned international experts for drug-trafficking routes leading to Western capitals.[70]

Most of the remaining Serbs and non-Albanians throughout Kosovo, with the exception of the Serb-inhabited area north of the Ibar River, in Kosovska Mitrovica, live in squalid conditions in smaller or larger ghetto-like enclaves (Gračanica and Lipljan, Štrpce, Šilovo, Parteš, Klokot, Novo Brdo, Orahovac and Velika Hoča, Goraždevac), often surrounded by barbed wire and always under the protection of international forces. They practically have no freedom of movement. The appalling ethnic discrimination they have been suffering is well-documented in the reports of both Serbian and relevant international organizations.[71] The post-1999 ghetto-like situation remains a rule for smaller Serb communities (villages, parts of villages or groups of villages). For example, the village of Cernica in the Gnjilane area once had 85 Serb and 400 Albanian households. From 2000 to 2003 the Serb villagers sustained frequent attacks by the local Albanian extremists: five families lost their members, including a child; dozens were wounded, their houses were burned or destroyed, and the church of St Elijah was largely devastated. At the end of 2003, the score showed 6,391 ethnically motivated attacks by Albanian extremists, 1,192 Serbs killed, 1,303 kidnapped and another 1,305 wounded. Nevertheless, few perpetrators of these ethnically motivated crimes have ever been identified, let alone arrested and prosecuted.[72] The Albanian-dominated provisional institutions of Kosovo

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[70] D. T. Bataković, "Serbs and other non-Albanian Communities in Kosovo and Metohija: Appalling Conditions and an Uncertain Future", *Review of International Affairs* LVII:1122 (2006), 13–15.

[71] A comprehensive analysis is available in *Kosovo and Metohija. Living in the Enclave*, ed. D. T. Bataković (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2007).

[72] By way of illustration, let me present just one of many examples: on 12 April 2003 Albanian extremists planted a 40kg explosive device under the railway bridge Ložište near Banjska and Zvečan. Due to a mistake made in planting and activating the de-

not only did nothing to prevent these tragic events, but effectively gave them a tacit approval. The perpetrators have not been brought to justice.

The spread of the Kosovo war model of ethnic domination, first to the mixed Serb-Albanian municipalities in Preševo Valley in southern central Serbia in 2000, and then to the predominantly Albanian-inhabited areas of neighbouring Slavic Macedonia (FYROM) in 2001, demonstrated the essence of the aspirations of the anachronous concept of Albanian nationalism in the region. Contrary to the way they are presented to the public and international institutions worldwide, these aspirations are not motivated by a struggle for human, civil, collective or any other internationally sanctified rights, but by a long-term project of achieving full and uncontested ethnic domination over a territory through systematic persecution, pressure and discrimination of all other and numerically weaker ethnic groups.

*The March pogrom 2004*

In March 2004, it became obvious, to unbiased international observers at least, that certain Kosovo Albanian leaders believed that the Province could be cleansed of all the remaining Serb population in a few violent campaigns, and that they could present the international community with a *fait accompli*. They were encouraged in that belief by a mild international reaction to the ethnic cleansing campaign which had expelled two-thirds of Kosovo's Serbs from the middle of June 1999 onwards. Although Kosovo's Serbs had for years been warning of the real nature of Albanian nationalism in Kosovo, both the UN and the West assumed they were exaggerating, only to receive a confirmation for almost all Serbian claims within just two days of orchestrated violence — the  March pogrom, Kosovo's *Kristallnacht*.[73]

Busloads of Albanians were transported to Serb-inhabited areas, clashing occasionally with KFOR units on their way, and targeting in particular those enclaves that stood as an obstacle to controlling the main transport and railway routes in Kosovo. During the two-day pogrom additional thirty-five Serb churches and monasteries were destroyed or damaged. The only still functioning Serb Orthodox Church in Priština, St Nicholas, dat-

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vice, the bridge was only slightly damaged, but both explosive planters, members of the "Kosovo Protection Corps" and the "Albanian National Army", were killed. A UNMIK police investigation established that the objective of the attack was to blow up the train carrying Serbs from the central-Kosovo enclaves to Leposavić in the north, on its way to its final destination, Belgrade.

[73] Cf. analysis by D. Krnjevic-Miskovic, "Kristallnacht in Kosovo. The burning of churches raises questions about independence", 19 March 2004 (*www.Nationalinterest. com*)

ing back to 1830s, was finally set ablaze, another act of denying the very possibility of Serbs living or returning to the provincial capital.[74] Furthermore, four thousand Serbs were displaced by Albanian mobs from strategically important areas of Kosovo, most probably intended for Albanian settlement in the future.[75]

Kosovo Albanians failed to fulfil the minimum international demands set after 2000, that "standards before status" should be implemented as regards the basic human rights, the freedom of movement, democracy, the rule of the law and property rights, in particular for Serbs and other non-Albanians. Furthermore, according to the reliable data gathered by the German Intelligence Service (BND), filed in the sixty-seven pages of a confidential report of 22 February 2005, partly published by the Swiss weekly *Weltwoche*, the leading political figures among Kosovo Albanians, former KLA warlords Hashim Thaçi, Ramush Haradinaj and Xhavid Haliti, had for years been deeply involved in organized crime in the province, from arms and drugs smuggling to human trafficking and money laundering.[76] The same report included the statement of Klaus Schmidt, chief of the European Mission for Police Assistance of the EU Commission in Albania (PAMEC), that "through Kosovo and Albania 500 to 700 kilos of drugs are smuggled daily, and that a part of it is refined in Kosovo laboratories".[77] Lack of control over the borders and movement of people and goods between UN-controlled Kosovo and Albania additionally strengthened organized crime, which became a trademark of Kosovo in the eyes of internationals observers.[78]

*UN–sponsored negotiations*

Despite a series of Western reports that Kosovo remained a major centre of drug-smuggling and women-trafficking in Europe, and that it made no

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[74] Once the news of the pogrom and the burning of churches in Kosovo spread, two mosques, in Belgrade and Niš, were attacked and sustained damage. In contrast to the way the crisis was handled in Kosovo and Metohija, the Serbian authorities deployed police forces, which however, were not entirely successful in dispersing the enraged mob. In Belgrade, a bishop of the Serbian Orthodox Church joined Muslim clerics in an effort to prevent the crowd from attacking the mosque.

[75] *Kosovo and Metohija. The March Pogrom* (Belgrade: Ministry of Culture, 2004).

[76] J. Roth, "Rechtstaat? Lieber nicht!", *Weltwoche* 43/2005, 48–50.

[77] Ibid.

[78] For more details see X. Raufer (with S. Quéré), *Une menace pour l'Europe. La mafia albanaise. Comment est née cette superpuissance criminelle balkanique?* (Lausanne: Ed. Favre, 2000).

progress in fulfilling the standards regarding democracy, tolerance, minority protection and the rule of the law, set as a prerequisite for talks on the final status of the province, negotiations on the future status of Kosovo commenced under UN auspices in early 2006.[79] Apparently promised independence prior to the beginning of the negotiating process, the Kosovo Albanians did not feel obliged to engage seriously in the status talks.

Although Serbia offered the Kosovo Albanians the broadest autonomy possible, "more than autonomy, less than independence", except a UN seat and their own armed forces, they, fully confident of the support they enjoyed in certain influential capitals, practically refused to negotiate seriously about the status and demanded nothing short of independence. In order to find mutually acceptable topics, the Serbian delegation in Vienna status talks on Kosovo, offered serious and sustainable proposals concerning non-status issues, such as decentralization, establishment of new Serb-inhabited or mixed municipalities, new competencies of these municipalities, as well as the protection of the endangered Serbian religious and cultural heritage, with special protected zones for the most important patrimonial sites.[80]

All these issues, addressed by the Serbian delegation with utmost accuracy, and their sustainable proposals drafted in accordance with the Kosovo Serbs were either rejected or scaled down to the level of becoming unacceptable for the Serbian side. Furthermore, the UNOSEC — UN office in Vienna in charge of organizing bilateral meetings and providing mediation— was perceived by many analysts as rather slow, inefficient and, in most cases, biased. In order to additionally fortify the positions and demands of Kosovo Albanians, it tended to present the Serbian negotiating

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[79] Kosovo's record is at best disappointing after years of supposed tutelage in democracy by the "international community". The ethnic Albanian leadership has been implicated in an explosion of organized crime, including drug dealing, money laundering and sex trafficking. Some have referred to Kosovo as the "black hole" of Europe. At a 2006 congressional hearing, Charles English of the State Department stated: "Discrimination remains a serious problem. Access to public services is uneven. Incidents of harassment still occur. Freedom of movement is limited. And too many minorities still feel unsafe in Kosovo." Similarly, Joseph Grieboski of the Institute on Religion and Public Policy argued that "the present record of rule of law, protection of the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, and the return/resettlement of internally displaced people by the Provisional Authority of Kosovo – all of which are indispensable for democratic governance – have been gravely unsatisfactory." D. Bandow, "Kosovo a Year Later", *The American Spectator*, 23 February 2009.

[80] D. T. Bataković, "Kosovo: Negotiated Compromise vs. Chaos and Instability", *The Bridge* 1 (2007), 48–51.

team (in cases they rejected a pointless or even humiliating proposal made by Kosovo Albanians) as the only responsible for non-cooperative attitude.

At the end of the eighteen-month-long UN-sponsored talks on the future status of Kosovo, the UN-appointed mediator Martti Ahtisaari produced a plan for a "supervised independence" of Kosovo.[81] His plan, however, contained solutions of which roughly sixty percent had never been tabled, let alone discussed, by the involved parties during the Vienna negotiations, including crucial provisions regarding basic security, freedom of movement and military protection for Serb patrimonial sites.[82] The entire Ahtisaari plan was therefore resolutely rejected jointly by Belgrade officials and Kosovo Serbs as being both biased and unsustainable. Moreover, the Ahtisaari plan lacked approval from the UN Security Council and thus could not be legally implemented. The time-limited extension of status talks under the UN Troika (USA, Russia, EU) in late 2007 brought no tangible results, despite Serbia's renewed offer of a broadest possible autonomy (including the Hong-Kong model) exclusive of a UN seat and armed forces.[83]

Furthermore, the unilateral proclamation of independence at the Kosovo parliament session of 17 February 2008 was boycotted by the non-Albanian MPs, including dozens of self-appointed Serbs and the legitimate representatives of the Gorani and Roma communities. Their boycott underlined that the declaration of independence approved by a *de facto* mono-ethnic Kosovo parliament had no legitimacy in the eyes of Kosovo's non-Albanian communities. Unilateral declaration of independence, lacking consent both of Belgrade and of Kosovo's Serbs and non-Albanians, is considered by many experts in both politics and international law to be an inadequate basis for building a tolerant, multiethnic and democratic society, despite any lip service paid to such ideals.

### A failed state based on discrimination

Deficient in legitimacy and parliamentary approval from any of Kosovo's significant non-Albanian communities (including 140,000 remaining and 200,000 displaced Serbs who are a constitutive nation, not a minority, in Kosovo as elsewhere in Serbia), the decision of Kosovo's mono-ethnic provisional parliament does not represent the will of a multiethnic society; rather, it is an entirely Albanian project meant to satisfy Western demands

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[81] J. Preston, "United Nations report urges independence for Kosovo", *The New York Times*, 26 March 2007.

[82] www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html

[83] For more on Vienna negotiations and their continuation after June 2007 see D. T. Bataković, *Kosovo. Un conflit sans fin?* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 2008), 273–287.

in word but not in deed, while in reality being founded on brutal and irrevocable ethnic discrimination and continuous orchestrated violence against the other national and ethnic communities, as repeatedly confirmed by the international Kosovo Ombudsman, various reports to the UN and relevant international human rights groups.

The Kosovo Albanians' unilateral proclamation of independence of 17 February, celebrated not only in Kosovo but in all Albanian-inhabited areas of the Balkans as well, was immediately declared void by the Serbian Parliament in Belgrade. After the USA and most European states recognized the independence of Kosovo, Serbia has reaffirmed her commitment to reject any kind of *fait accompli* as unacceptable. Unilateral independence of Kosovo, as seen by Serbia, is an obvious violation of both international law and basic human rights, disregarding the UN Charter, the Final Helsinki Act, the Constitution of Serbia and UN SC Resolution 1244, the latter, according to international law, being the only valid legal document defining the status of Kosovo after June 1999. Furthermore, Serbian officials have expressed readiness to remain fully committed to a compromise negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations, a process currently supported by two-thirds of the world's sovereign states, including China, Russia India, Brazil, Indonesia, Argentina, South Africa, Mexico, Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Greece, Cyprus, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria etc.

The celebration of Kosovo's independence on 17 February 2008, as reported by the Serbian media, was marked by the attack of three Albanians extremists on an 83-year-old Serb women in the Gnjilane area in eastern Kosovo.[84] Since then the Serbs in their enclaves all over Kosovo, including students, doctors and policeman (suspended for recognizing UNMIK as the only legal authority) have been protesting on a daily basis against the illegal and imposed independence, considered as a further extension of Albania into the historic heartland of Serbia. The independence of Kosovo was proclaimed and embraced solely by the Kosovo Albanians against the will of other nations and ethnic groups in the province, lacking legal authorization of both the United Nations and Serbia. The repeated statements of Serbian officials that since its unilaterally proclaimed independence Kosovo has remained a failed state, based on discrimination and denial of both human and property rights, have been duly confirmed by numerous independent monitoring groups.[85]

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[84] B92, Belgrade, 17 February 2008.

[85] See, e.g., I. Bancroft, "The flight of Kosovo's minorities. The EU insists that Kosovo is a tolerant and multi-ethnic society. So why are its minorities leaving?", *The Guardian*, 5 June 2009: "The report of Minority Rights Group International (MRG) maintains that members of minority communities are beginning to leave Kosovo over a year after its

However, Serbia has continued to pursue her position by launching new initiatives. It was in October 2008 that Belgrade eventually obtained the backing of the United Nations Security Council for a Serbian-drafted resolution asking for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice at Hague concerning the legality of the independence of Kosovo.[86] Only six countries objected — among them the USA, Albania and four microstates in the Pacific, whilst some other important European states abstained.[87] Furthermore, prior to the deployment of the special EU mission in Kosovo (EULEX) in December 2008, Serbia had reached an agreement with the United Nations on a Six-point plan, intended to ensure the sheer survival of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia. The plan was in line with UNSC Resolution 1244, and was intended to guarantee that EULEX would remain status-neutral, operating solely under the authority of the United Nations. Thus, the Ahtisaari Plan, which the Kosovo Albanians, encouraged by the recognition of Kosovo by fifty-three states, considered as their main legal pillar, was not destined to be implemented. In contrast to the Belgrade Six-point plan, the Kosovo Albanians of Priština proposed their own four-point version as a substitute, whereby EULEX would be deployed according to the mandate of Kosovo's declaration of independence, the Ahtisaari Plan and the Constitution of Kosovo.

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unilateral declaration of independence, due to persistent exclusion and discrimination ... The report, *Filling the Vacuum: Ensuring Protection and Legal Remedies for Minorities in Kosovo*, concludes that Kosovo 'lacks effective international protection for minorities, which is worsening the situation for smaller minorities and forcing some to leave the country for good'. These minorities include not only Kosovo's Serbs, but also Ashkali, Bosniaks, Croats, Egyptians, Gorani, Roma and Turks, who together make up around five percent of the population of Kosovo according to local estimates ... a 2006 report, *Minority Rights in Kosovo under International Rule*, describing the situation of minorities as the worst in Europe and 'little short of disastrous'; the international community having allowed 'a segregated society to develop and become entrenched'. Despite these and other warnings from human rights organisations, the international community has continued to not only ignore the difficulties faced by minority communities in Kosovo, but to regularly proclaim success with respect to minority rights protection." See also *Rapport 2008 sur le Kosovo-Metochie* du Collectif Citoyen pour la Paix au Kosovo-Metochie au Parlement Europeen, avec le Groupe Independence et Democrate, Bruxelles, Groupe Independence et Democrate 2008, 115 p.

[86] T. Barber, "A partial UN victory for Serbia. The consequences of recognition of Kosovo will be with the Balkans, and the EU, for many years to come", *Financial Times*, 22 October 2008.

[87] The four microstates are Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru and Palau.

The position of the Kosovo Serbs, however, has continued to deteriorate on the ground, especially in the enclaves south of the Ibar River, surrounded by Albanian settlements and pressured by Kosovo Albanian officials, police and paramilitaries. A year after Kosovo's independence was proclaimed, the Union of Serbian Municipalities in Kosovo, at its session held on 17 February 2009 in Zvečan in northern Kosovo, adopted a declaration which once more firmly rejected the Albanian-proclaimed independence of Kosovo: "Under the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244, the United Nations Charter, Helsinki Final Act and other binding legal acts, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is part of a single and inseparable territory of the sovereign state of Serbia."[88]

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[88] KosovoCompromise Staff, 18 February 2009 (*www.KosovoCompromise.com*).

\* *Source*: www.kosovocompromise.com (31 December 2008)

*Appendix*

## The chronology of Kosovo-related events in 2008*

**January**
- Deep division in the EU and the UNSC on the issue of Kosovo's possible secession
- Russia warns of a Kosovo precedent for South Ossetia and Abkhazia
- Presidential elections in Serbia. Victory of Boris Tadić

**February**
- EU foreign ministers agree on Joint Action to send the EULEX mission
- The ethnic Albanian leadership in Priština proclaims Kosovo's unilateral secession from Serbia
- The decision of the ethnic Albanians declared void by Serbia
- Serbs worldwide protest against Kosovo's independence; violent riots in Belgrade leave one dead, dozens injured; clashes also in Republika Srpska, the Serbian entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Kosovo Serbs protest, burning down newly-established customs posts between Kosovo and central Serbia; quit Kosovo police; more than 20 injured in clashes
- Condemnation of the move in non-Western countries worldwide, as well as by various political parties and intellectuals in Western countries
- The US leads recognition wave; coalition of "friends of independent Kosovo" form International Steering Group
- Kosovo's secession inspires "independence daze" as separatist movements worldwide call it a clear precedent

**March**
- Belgrade rejects deployment of EU mission without UN backing
- Serbian government falls over disagreement on future EU policy on Kosovo
- Riots in Kosovska Mitrovica leave one Ukrainian policeman dead and 150 people injured

**April**
- Former ICTY prosecutor Carla del Ponte reveals in her book *La Caccia* details of a hidden 1999 case of several hundred Serb prisoners abducted by the KLA, victims of trade organs trade in Albania
- India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Brazil, Argentina and other regional powers worldwide underline strong opposition to Kosovo's secession

**May**
- Macedonian government falls after the Albanian coalition partner quits
- NATO announces plans to train "Kosovo Security Force"; harsh opposition from Serbia, Russia

**June**
- Elections in Serbia, including local elections in Kosovo
- Formation of a Kosovo Serb assembly

• Kosovo constitution, based on the Ahtisaari Plan, enters into force

**July**

• New Serbian pro-European government vows to pursue the same policy on Kosovo
• Donors' Conference in Brussels: 1.2 billion pledged for Kosovo
• Recognition of Kosovo slows down dramatically; US President George W. Bush urges the world to continue recognizing Kosovo

**August**

• Georgian invasion of South Ossetia leads to Russian military intervention
• South Ossetia and Abkhazia seek independence based on the Kosovo precedent
• Moscow recognizes independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia

**September**

• Serbia's diplomatic initiative underway to secure enough votes on its ICJ initiative; the US, France and the UK express dissatisfaction

**October**

• The UN General Assembly votes in favour of sending Serbia's initiative to determine the legality of Kosovo's secession to the International Court of Justice; only the US, Albania and four microstates in the Pacific oppose the initiative
• Macedonia and Montenegro recognize Kosovo under pressure, a day after the UN General Assembly's positive decision on Serbia-proposed plan for ICJ; Serbia expels their ambassadors in response
• 34 injured in protests against Kosovo recognition in Montenegro
• Talks intensify between Belgrade and the UN (Six-point plan), as well as between Belgrade and the EU on reconfiguration of the UNMIK mission which would allow for the deployment of EULEX
• Five Serbs injured in a clash with Albanians in Kosovska Mitrovica
• FIFA, UEFA, FIBA and other sports organizations reject Kosovo's membership candidacy

**November**

• The UN Security Council unanimously backs a presidential statement putting EULEX under the UN umbrella and supports the Six-point plan agreed between Belgrade and New York
• Priština rejects the UN-proposed Six-point plan
• Explosive device goes off in front of the EU office in Priština: three members of the German intelligence service (BND) arrested over the affair released following a row between Berlin and Kosovo Albanian authorities

**December**

• EULEX begins its mandate under the UN umbrella
• Martti Ahtisaari is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
• Kosovo Albanians name the central street in Priština after US President George W. Bush

• Serbian police arrests ten former Albanian KLA members for 1999 war crimes
• Tensions in Kosovska Mitrovica following the stabbing of a 16-year-old Serb boy
• By the end of 2008, Kosovo's secession from Serbia recognized by 53 out of 192 members of the UN

**Scott Taylor**

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# Bridging the Great Divide: Contested Kosovo Span is a Symbol of International Failure[1]

**Abstract**: The paper offers a first-hand insight into the situation in Kosovo shortly after its unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 and takes a look at the unexpectedly poor results of the UN interim administration of Kosovo. Arguing against recognition of Kosovo's independence, it draws attention to the fact that in 2007 a number of UN observers took the unprecedented step of compiling an independent analysis, which they published and circulated without filtering it through the chain of command, and that in the immediate aftermath of Kosovo's declared independence, a large number of UN field officers voiced their concerns about the international community turning a blind eye to the reality of the situation on the ground.

**Keywords**: Serbia, Kosovo, unilateral declaration of independence, international community

In Mitrovica, Kosovo all seems quiet at the north end of the bridge. A pair of NATO patrol vehicles, a handful of French soldiers, a couple of UN policemen and several rolls of barbed wire block access to the roadway.

I take some photographs and start walking back into the Serbian sector of the city. It is only then that I spot a group of young Serbs lingering in the shade of a kiosk. These young men are known as the "bridgewatchers", and since the Kosovo conflict began in June 1999, they have maintained a 24-hour vigil on the Serbian side of this contested span across the Ibar River.

In the summer of 1999, as NATO forces deployed into Kosovo and Serbian security forces withdrew, nearly 800,000 Albanian Kosovars came flooding back into the province after they were displaced during the 78-day NATO bombing campaign. This in turn generated an exodus from Kosovo of approximately 200,000 Serb and non-Albanian minorities who fled in fear of Albanian reprisals.

It was here in Kosovska Mitrovica that the flood of Serb refugees halted at the Ibar River and defiantly laid claim to the northern portion of Kosovo, which is an entirely ethnic Serbian enclave connected to the

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[1] The text is based on my most recent trip to Kosovo in March 2008, one of some fifty visits I have paid to the Balkans since 1999. Cf. also my two books on the Balkans covering the 1999 war over Kosovo and its aftermath: *Inat: Images of Serbia and the Kosovo Conflict* (Esprit de Corps Books, 2000) and *Diary of an Uncivil War: The Violent Aftermath of the Kosovo Conflict* (Esprit de Corps Books, 2002).

Republic of Serbia. Numerous violent encounters have taken place across the Mitrovica bridge between Albanians, Serbs and NATO troops. Located next to the Republic of Serbia, this entirely ethnic Serbian enclave has come to symbolize the failure of the international community to overcome the divide of ethnic hatred in Kosovo.

Following the Albanians' unilateral declaration of independence on 17 February, the Serbs of the Mitrovica pocket and other protected enclaves have refused to accept the authority of the newly proclaimed state of "Kosova".

To demonstrate their resolve, the Serbs took control of the Mitrovica courthouse and installed their own officials. It was this occupation of regional offices by the Serbs that led to a bloody confrontation with NATO troops on 17 March.

When UN police and NATO vehicles rolled in to arrest the violators, the bridgewatchers sounded an air raid siren to summon other Serbs to the scene. The angry crowds clashed with the international security forces and vehicles were set ablaze, shots were fired. One Ukrainian soldier died, 63 NATO soldiers were injured, and an undetermined number of Serbs were seriously wounded.

In a scathing internal memo to his superiors, UN regional representative Jerry Gallucci described the debacle as an "ill-conceived operation (that) has led to the disappearance of law and order in the north (of Kosovo)".

Gallucci was particularly incensed that the international community chose 17 March to launch their operation, as this date coincided with the anniversary of the 2004 pogrom in which three dozen people were killed and Albanians torched more than 800 Serbian homes. In Gallucci's opinion, this timing coupled with the heavy-handed tactic of arresting and transporting the courthouse squatters "seemed almost designed to inflame Serbian sentiments".

When travelling through Kosovo it would be easy for someone to mistakenly believe this region has just become the 51st U.S. state — rather than a self-proclaimed independent country. On most homes the American stars and stripes are fluttering alongside the Albanian flag — even on many public institutions.

Prior to their February 17th unilateral declaration of independence, the U.S. had sponsored a competition that resulted in the selection of a new yellow on blue special Kosovo flag. Thousands of these flags were produced and distributed for free in the hope that they would be a proud visual symbol of the new and distinct state of Kosovo. Unfortunately for the planners in the U.S. State Department, the Albanians living in Kosovo do not regard themselves as a separate Kosovar nation. Instead of flying the new flag, they

continue to display the black double headed eagle on a red background — the official flag of the neighbouring Republic of Albania. They are unrepentant, proud Albanians, and they fly the American flag in recognition of the fact that only through a decade of U.S. military aid and political pressure have they wrested control of a province that is Serbian sovereign territory and proclaimed it as their own.

In addition to the flags, the Albanians pay fawning tribute to former U.S. President Bill Clinton in the form of 70-foot high posters of him hanging in Pristina, the Kosovo capital. It was Clinton who pressured NATO into supporting the separatist Albanian guerrilla force known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in their struggle against Serbian security forces in 1999. Ironically, it was only the year before that the U.S. State Department listed the KLA as a terrorist organization due to their tactics of targeting innocent Serb civilians in order to provoke retaliatory measures from Serbian troops.

However, once NATO air power entered the equation, the tables were turned firmly in favour of the Albanians, and they now have no qualms about publicly showing their appreciation. At the southern end of Pristina, a scale model statue of liberty sits atop the Victory Hotel and even Hillary Clinton has a street in the Kosovo capital named in her honour. Strangely enough, the U.S. scheme to create an independent Kosovo has not garnered much support from Muslim countries. With the notable exception of Turkey and Afghanistan, the majority of Islamic republics have refused to recognize Kosovo for the reason that they see it as an American puppet state.

Although the 1998 U.S. assessment of the KLA as terrorists was an accurate one — that is not how they are being depicted in Kosovo these days. In the course of the 18 month long insurgency and NATO offensive, the KLA did not win a single stand up engagement over the Serbs. Their dubious martial accomplishments include the widespread murder of Serbian civilians and Albanian collaborators after NATO entered the province and became responsible for security.

Nevertheless, there are innumerable monuments erected all over Kosovo to revere these "heroes" and "martyrs". Given that this conflict in Kosovo was a bloody inter-ethnic civil war, and the fact that the original NATO mandate was to provide a safe environment for all Kovoso minorities, many international observers recognize that these monuments to KLA fighters only serve to intimidate non-Albanians.

In the entirely ethnic Serbian enclave of Štrpce in southern Kosovo, the Albanians built a massive monument in honour of their KLA fighters who died trying to capture this same village. Realizing that the Serbs in this enclave may not be too enamoured with a statue of their erstwhile enemies erected in their midst, NATO troops must provide security detachment to

prevent any vandalism. Thus far the newly constructed KLA monument remains unscathed. In comparison, over the past nine years the Albanians have managed to destroy more than 150 Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries — despite the fact that NATO's mandate includes protection of religious sites.

Kosovo was admittedly dependant on the U.S. for its creation, remains independent upon NATO troops for security and protection, requires massive amounts of foreign aid to survive and the Albanian majority openly rejoice in the fact they now live in greater Albania.

In the leadup to, and in the immediate aftermath of Kosovo's declared independence, a large number of UN field officers voiced their concerns about the international community turning a blind eye to the reality of the situation on the ground.

Last year, a number of UN observers took the unprecedented step of compiling an independent analysis, which they published and circulated without filtering it through the chain of command.

The stated intention of the anonymous authors was to illustrate "the divide that exists between (their) first-hand knowledge ... and the rosy picture of the overall situation that is officially presented by top UN officials".

The facts presented in the report show that over the past nine years, the UN has failed to achieve its stated objectives in virtually every category.

To illustrate the international community's failure to provide a secure environment for non-Albanians in Kosovo, they point to the fact that there have been more than 1,000 abductions of Serbs and other minorities since 1999. Of that number, only 253 bodies have been discovered, and yet not a single person has been found guilty for these crimes.

The report also contained a catalogue of allegations including:

• This safe and secure environment for a sustainable return has never been implemented.

• More than 220,000 Serbs and other non-Albanians remain in displacement.

• UNHCR reports 16,000 returns since 1999, of which only 5–6,000 are Serbs; but this does not take into account the continued emigration.

• Many of the remaining Serbs, Gorani, Turks, Roma, based on our field knowledge, are pondering departure under present conditions, and will certainly leave should Kosovo gain independence.

• A majority Albanian community that, since the 1990s, lives in a culture that promotes intolerance with little or no moral obligation toward non-Albanians.

• A discriminatory privatization scheme that has deprived countless Serb, Roma and Gorani workers of compensation.

• Serbian farmers and monks all over Kosovo have no or limited access to their agricultural land for the last eight years.

• Escorts must still be provided for Serbs living in western and southern Kosovo.

• The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government have provided no cooperation in investigation alleged war crimes against non-Albanians or assisting in locating missing non-Albanians.

• UNMIK has consistently failed in providing adequate witness protection to potential witnesses resulting in a number of verified killings of witnesses.

• The recent statement of two UNMIK international prosecutors who claimed to have been pressured by top UNMIK officials with regards to the Ramush Haradinaj case attests to this obstruction.

• The same obstruction could be garnered from testimony by former International Prosecutor in Kosovo (now Judge) Mrs. Renate Winter.

• Two SRSG's openly provided public support to an indicted war criminal, the aforementioned Mrs. Haradinaj.

• This support was extended to other ex-members of the KLA, who were alleged to have committed war crimes. Several senior CIVPOL officers have also testified as to the obstruction they faced from top UNMIK officials when attempting to conduct police investigations into senior ex-KLA members.

In addition to these serious allegations of favouritism and collusion with the senior Albanian leadership, the report notes that under the terms of UN Resolution 1244, which facilitated the entry of NATO into Kosovo, the international community was to take full responsibility for the protection of Serbian heritage religious sites. Despite the presence of more than 20,000 security personnel over the past nine years, Albanian extremists have managed to destroy more than 150 Serbian churches and monasteries — many dating back to the 11th century.

One of the most alarming assessments in the UN field officers' report is that the criminal leadership of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) guerrilla force, which was supposed to be disbanded, has instead assumed positions of power at all levels of Kosovo society. According to their summary, the KLA has simply "transformed into criminal structures, carrying out organized crime activities of drugs and weapons trafficking and prostitution".

As one field officer stated, those guerrillas "are the real power in Kosovo and many of their leaders are now politicians at all levels — including Prime Minister (Hashim Thaci)".

The Kosovo police service is described as "poorly competent" and that, in turn, has resulted in a "culture that promotes intolerance with little or no moral obligation to non-Albanians".

The assessment of life in Kosovo for ethnic minorities is one of limited freedom of movement and constant fear. Also cited in the report is the fact that the international community has failed to protect non-Albanian language rights and that they have allowed the flag of the Republic of Albania to fly on most public institutions since 1999.

In their report's conclusion, the UN officers point out that the Pristina sports stadium is emblazoned with "an enormous picture of an armed, bearded, combat-uniformed KLA leader".

Such an image, they argue, runs counter to the UN's original mission of making Kosovo a secure environment for all residents. Failure to remove the provocative poster demonstrates that the international community is in fact "bowing to the dictates of extremists and warlords".

Although this blunt assessment of the Kosovo situation was presented as a briefing note to the fact-finding delegation of the UN Security Council, the recommendation that the granting of independence would be an "irresponsible act" has now been superseded by the Albanians' February 17 unilateral declaration.

Senior officials working with the UN in Kosovo confirmed that the analysis of this report was accurate, and they are frustrated and disappointed with the sudden elimination of their mandate.

"The original role for the (NATO-led Kosovo troops, or KFOR) was to enforce UN Resolution 1244 — which clearly recognized the Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo," explained Edward Tawii, a Canadian adviser to the UN interim administration police, who has spent the past eight years based there. "Now they say that KFOR will be responsible to provide a secure environment in support of the independence declaration."

While the UN mission continues to function in this interim period, the administrative oversight in Kosovo is slowly being assumed by the European Union. The EU will monitor and assist the newly proclaimed independent Kosovar government and oversee the operation of the Kosovo police service. KFOR troops will remain in place for the foreseeable future, and NATO will continue to train and equip the Kosovo defence forces.

Since Serbia refuses to recognize Kosovo's independence, the government continues to administer services such as the issuing of pension cheques to those residing in non-Albanian enclaves. Despite the presence of so many foreign troops and police officers — 20,000 in a region of only two million inhabitants — this overlapping of responsibility has generated a lot of confusion.

In many cases, the various and diverse national interests of the contributing NATO and non-NATO security forces have been exploited by the criminal elements of the Albanian population. In the village of Orcusa, in the southern Kosovo mountainous region known as Gora, Norbert, a

German master warrant officer, pointed out that the border to Albania here is wide open.

"Between us and the Albanian towns across the valley there is not even a checkpoint, let alone any barriers." According to the German officer, NATO soldiers in this sector refer to the Kosovo border police as the traffic police, since their purpose seems to be in assisting the flow of contraband, rather than impeding it.

In addition to the drugs and weapons smuggled across this border, there are vast tracts of deforested hillside where the Albanians crossed into Kosovo to cut down trees. According to the German, this uncontested exploitation of Kosovo's resources and the open conduit for illegal trade could easily be curtailed.

"We have reconnaissance vehicles with incredible surveillance capability," he said. "Our cameras would be able to pick up the colour of the woodcutter's eyes — right across the valley. And one platoon of troops would suffice to close the border."

Asked why, over the past nine years, this has never been done, Norbert shrugged and said, "because somebody higher than my rank level wants it to remain open."

While international observers on the ground may be highly critical of the way events are unfolding in Kosovo and remain hard-pressed to explain the often contradictory policies and mandates they are asked to enforce, the one thing that is quite clear is that another confrontation is imminent and unavoidable.

A second showdown with the Serbs in Mitrovica is likely to erupt when NATO attempts to make good on their public promise to arrest the Serbian ringleaders of the March 17 incident. Such a policy would ignore the recommendations of UN regional representative Jerry Gallucci. In his report, Gallucci urged his colleagues to offer the Serbs some "contrition or recognition of the mistake (the international community) made."

Instead, it seems that NATO wants to force submission on the Mitrovica Serbs as quickly as possible. One reason for this is that the Serbian parliament has been in limbo during the runup to the May 11 elections, and the fractious parties have yet to form a working government. The primary battle cry throughout the election campaign for both the Serbian Democratic Party and the nationalist Radical Party has been "Kosovo is Serbia".

A solution imposed on Mitrovica while the Serbian leadership is in limbo would encounter far less opposition than after the next government is formed.

The clock is also ticking towards the next general assembly meeting at the UN in September. So far, 34 countries, including Canada, have recognized Kosovo's independence. However, it is Serbia's intention to gain

a consensus at the UN assembly that will declare Kosovo's unilateral independence illegal.

"We will be seeking a solution which will accommodate everyone and still uphold the UN Charter," said Serbian ambassador to Canada Dušan Bataković from Belgrade.

Following Canada's recognition of Kosovo, Bataković was recalled to the Serbian capital.

"While we are firm on Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, we are willing to discuss a power-sharing arrangement," he said, "and we want a renewal of multilateral discussions under UN auspices."

As for Canada's position on Kosovo, Bataković was disappointed there was no parliamentary debate before Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced the decision.

"What exactly is independent about Kosovo? The UN resolution covering its status remains valid, there are thousands of international troops deployed to provide security, and significant numbers of non-Albanian Kosovo minorities are defying this decision."

As the international community engages in a war of words and diplomatic manoeuvring, the bridgewatchers in Mitrovica continue to monitor NATO activity on the far riverbank.

According to a senior NATO intelligence officer, the next confrontation is expected to occur within a matter of "days or weeks — not months".

Following the May 11 Serbian elections and the recent top-level meetings between Russia, China and India in Moscow, it would seem that the Kosovo situation will remain a lit powderkeg for the foreseeable future.

One can only hope that at the UN general assembly meeting in September, Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence is declared illegal. Canada and other countries that were pressured by the U.S. State Department can then use the opportunity to reverse their decision and uphold the UN charter.

**Slobodan Jovanović**
(Slobodan Yovanovitch)

## Sur l'idée yougoslave : Passé et avenir (1939)

*A l'occasion du cinquantenaire de sa mort en exil à Londres, 1958–2008*

Slobodan Jovanović [Slobodan Yovanovitch] (né à Novi Sad le 3 décembre 1869 – mort à Londres le 12 décembre 1958) est l'un des plus éminents historiens et juristes de la Serbie et de la Yougoslavie royale. Fils du chef des libéraux de Serbie, Vladimir Jovanović (1833–1922), il est le premier Serbe à porter le prénom de Slobodan (Liberté). Sa famille s'installe à Belgrade en 1872. Éduqué en Serbie, en Allemagne et en Suisse (après son diplôme à la faculté de Droit de Genève en 1890, il fait une année de spécialisation à la faculté de Droit de Paris), il passe quelques années au service du Royaume de Serbie en tant que diplomate, avant d'enseigner à partir de 1897 le droit constitutionnel à la faculté de Droit de la Grande Ecole de Belgrade (qui deviendra en 1905 l'Université de Belgrade). Durant les quatre décennies suivantes, Slobodan Jovanović écrit une vingtaine de monographies sur l'histoire de la Serbie au XIXᵉ siècle ainsi qu'une dizaine d'ouvrages et des essais sur la théorie du droit, la sociologie politique et même l'histoire littéraire.[1] Tout au long de sa carrière universitaire, Jovanović essaie d'apporter

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[1] Jovanović publiait les ouvrages suivants : *O suverenosti* [Sur la souveraineté] (Belgrade 1897) ; *O dvodomnom sistemu* [Sur le système bicamérale] (Belgrade 1899) ; *Velika narodna skupština* [La Grande Assemblée Nationale] (Belgrade 1900) ; *Srpsko-bugarski rat. Rasprava iz diplomatske istorije* [La guerre serbo-bulgare. Etude de l'histoire diplomatique] (Belgrade 1901) ; *Svetozar Marković* (Belgrade 1903) ; *Osnovi pravne teorije o državi* [Introduction à la théorie de droit d'Etat] (Belgrade 1906) ; *Osnovi javnog prava Kraljevine Srbije* I–II [Introduction à la loi public de la Royaume de Serbie] (Belgrade 1907–1909) ; *Makiaveli* [Machiavelli] (Belgrade 1907) ; *Političke i pravne rasprave*. I–II [Les études politiques et juridiques] (Belgrade, 1908–1910) ; *Ustavobranitelji i njihova vlada* [Constitutionalistes et leur gouvernement] (Belgrade : Académie Royale Serbe, 1912) ; *Universitetsko pitanje* [Question de l'Université] (Belgrade 1914) ; *Vodji francuske revolucije* [Les leaders de la Révolution française] (Belgrade 1920) ; *O državi* [Sur l'Etat] (Belgrade 1922) ; *Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila* [La deuxième règne de

un éclairage sur les phénomènes qui se produisent alors dans la société serbe
en pleine mutation et de décrire, de façon critique et objective, les événe-
ments marquants des grandes étapes de l'histoire moderne de la Serbie.
Jovanović a rarement publié ces études ou articles en langues étrangères,
à l'exception d'une esquisse biographique de Pašić publiée en 1936 à Lon-
dres, car ses ouvrages visaient avant tout le public serbe ou plus largement
yougoslave.

　　　Spécialiste de la vie politique et des mentalités dans la Serbie de son
époque, Jovanović se distingue non seulement par une analyse précise et
complète des conditions sociales, du cadre juridique et des circonstances
politiques, mais aussi par des portraits vivants d'hommes politiques, sou-
vent flamboyants et controversés, des premiers notables (*voïvodes*) de la
Révolution serbe sous Karageorges en 1804 jusqu'aux derniers souverains
de la maison des Obrenović (Obrenovitch) en 1903. Ses portraits histo-
riques, qui font montre d'une analyse psychologique et sociale approfondie,
d'hommes politiques tels que son père Vladimir Jovanović, le chef des pro-
gressistes Stojan Novaković, les leaders des radicaux Nikola Pašić et Milo-
van Dj. Milovanović, ainsi que la biographie tragique du colonel Dragutin
Dimitrijević Apis, le redoutable chef de l'organisation secrète « La main

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Miloch et Michel Obrenovitch] (Belgrade 1923) ; *Ustavno pravo Kraljevine Srba, Hr-
vata i Slovenaca* [Le droit constitutionnel du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovè-
nes] (Belgrade 1924) ; *Vlada Milana Obrenovića*. I–II [La règne de Milan Obreno-
vitch] (Belgrade 1926–1927) ; *Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića* I–II [La règne d'Alexandre
Obrenovitch] (Belgrade 1929–1931) ; *Iz naše istorije i književnosti* [Sur notre histoire
et littérature] (Belgrade 1931) ; *Iz istorije političkih doktrina* [De l'histoire des doctrines
politiques] (Belgrade 1935) ; *Poratna država* [L'Etat d'après guerre] (Belgrade 1936);
*Gledston* [Gladstone] (Belgrade 1938) ; *Američki federalizam* [Le fédéralisme américain]
(Belgrade 1939) ; *Primeri političke sociologije. Engleska, Francuska, Nemačka 1815–1914*
[Exemples de la sociologie politique. Angleterre, France et Allemagne, 1815–1914]
(Belgrade 1940) ; *O totalitarizmu* [Sur le totalitarisme] (Paris 1952).

Ses œuvres posthumes sont : *Moji savremenici* [Mes contemporains] (Windsor, Canada
1961) ; *Jedan prilog za proučavanje srpskog nacionalnog karaktera* [Une contribution à
l'étude du caractère nationale serbe] (Windsor, Canada 1964) ; *Zapisi o problemima i
ljudima, 1941–1944* [Notes sur les problèmes et les hommes, 1941–1944] (Londres
1976).

En 1939/1940 ses *Œuvres complètes* furent publiées en 17 volumes par la maison d'édition
Geca Kon à Belgrade. La réédition des *Œuvres complètes* en 12 volumes, mais avec des
textes supplémentaires, fut publiée à Belgrade en 1991 par Beogradski izdavački grafički
zavod (BIGZ), Jugoslavijapublik et Srpska književna zadruga (SKZ) sous la direction
de Radovan Samardžić et Živorad Stojković. (Cf. plus dans D. T. Bataković, « Naučnik i
pisac. U čast *Sabranih dela* Slobodana Jovanovića » [Savant et écrivain. A l'honneur des
*Oeuvres complètes* de S. Jovanović], *Zadužbina* IV/13 (Février 1991), 1–10).

noire », sont parmi les meilleurs de l'historiographie serbe. Le style littéraire de Slobodan Jovanović reste, même de nos jours, le meilleur exemple du « style belgradois », élégant et vibrant dans ses expressions, très proche du style français.[2]

Son engagement en faveur des sciences et des valeurs démocratiques, des libertés politiques et du droit à l'autonomie de l'Université le range parmi les plus grands défenseurs des libertés acquises dans la vie politique serbe, au début du XXe siècle, quand la Serbie devient le pôle de rassemblement de tous les Slaves du Sud. Tout à la fois patriote et cosmopolite, Jovanović défend les valeurs libérales de son père et ses propres convictions démocratiques, comme en témoigne particulièrement bien son dernière ouvrage qui présente une réflexion sur la nation : « Dès que l'homme s'élève un peu au dessus de l'égoïsme national, il lui apparaît clairement que la nation, par elle-même, ne représente pas ce qu'on appelle en philosophie une 'valeur'. Ce sont les idéaux culturels au service desquels elle s'est mise, qui peuvent, seuls, lui en conférer. »[3]

Célèbre et reconnu dès la parution de ses premiers ouvrages, Jovanović est élu membre correspondant de l'Académie royale serbe (*Srpska kraljevska akademija*) en 1905 et devient académicien en 1908 (promu définitivement en 1911) ; il est également élu membre de l'Académie yougoslave des sciences et des arts de Zagreb (*Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti*) en 1927. Pendant les guerres balkaniques (1912–1913) ainsi que pendant la Grande Guerre, Slobodan Jovanović dirige le bureau de presse de l'Etat-major de l'Armée serbe. Il participe en tant qu'expert aux travaux de la Conférence de la paix à Paris en 1919. Recteur de l'Université de Belgrade à deux reprises (1913–1914 et 1920–1921), Jovanović préside l'Académie royale serbe (1928–1931). Le roi Alexandre Ier Karadjordjević consulte Jovanović lorsqu'il cherche une solution viable pour le système constitutionnel après l'introduction du régime personnel en 1929–1931, bien que ce dernier ne soit pas favorable à la démocratie limitée professée par le roi jusqu'à sa mort en 1934.

Durant la crise croate que traverse la Yougoslavie royale à la veille de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, Jovanović est président du Club culturel

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[2] Radovan Samardžić, « La langue littéraire serbe et l'influence française à la fin du XIXe et au début du XXe siècle », in *Rapports franco-yougoslaves (A l'occasion des 150 ans de l'ouverture du premier consulat français en Serbie)* (Belgrade: Institut d'histoire, 1990), 85–90.

[3] Slobodan Jovanović, « Jedan prilog za proučavanje srpskog nacionalnog karaktera », t. 12 des *Oeuvres complètes* (Belgrade : BIGZ, 1991), 573.

serbe (*Srpski kulturni klub*), une organisation d'intellectuels serbes venus de toutes les provinces yougoslaves peuplées par les Serbes. Ce Club, qui jouit d'une influence grandissante dans la vie politique (1937–1941), se prononce en faveur du rétablissement de la démocratie et de la réorganisation de l'Etat commun en trois unités fédérales regroupant Serbes, Croates et Slovenes.

Après la formation de l'unité fédérale croate le 26 août 1939 (*Banovina Hrvatska*), le Club réclame la création de deux entités supplémentaires, une serbe (englobant plusieurs banovinats à majorité serbe sous le nom de *pays serbes* avec une capitale à Skoplje) et une slovène (*Savska banovina*). Antifasciste et patriote, Jovanović entre comme vice-premier ministre dans le gouvernement du général Dušan Simović, constitué après le putsch du 27 mars 1941, qui renversa le gouvernement précédent dont les représentants, Dragiša Cvetković et Vladko Maček, avaient signé un pacte avec Hitler et les puissances de l'Axe le 25 mars à Vienne.[4]

Historien actif en politique, ayant accumulé une expérience extraordinaire, Slobodan Jovanović s'engage encore une fois, dans la phase finale de sa vie, malgré une situation politique difficile et dans un contexte de relations interethniques très sensibles et complexes, pour servir la cause nationale. Son expertise, son prestige d'intellectuel honnête, lui donnent une place privilégiée parmi les nombreux hommes politiques exilés à Londres à partir de 1941.

Après avoir occupé deux ans le poste de vice-premier ministre du gouvernement yougoslave en exil, Jovanović, sur proposition du roi Pierre II Karadjordjević, devient premier ministre du gouvernement yougoslave royal exilé à Londres (1942–1943). Le général Dragoljub (Draža) Mihailović, chef de la résistance antifasciste royale (*Jugoslovenska vojska u otadžbini*) dans la Yougoslavie démembrée et sous occupation allemande, italienne, bulgare, hongroise et croate, est nommé ministre de la guerre dans son cabinet. En dépit de la guerre civile et du terrible génocide sous le régime pro-nazi des oustachis croates, Slobodan Jovanović reste convaincu que l'Etat commun des Serbes et des Croates demeure la meilleure solution politique pour leur avenir.

A la fin de la guerre civile, quand, avec le soutien crucial de l'Armée rouge de Staline, le régime communiste s'instaure rapidement en Yougoslavie, Jovanović, profondément déçu par l'ordre politique d'après-guerre, choisit de rester à Londres comme la plupart des ex-ministres. En 1946, les

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[4] Voir aussi Dimitrije Djordjević, « Historians in Politics: Slobodan Jovanović », *Journal of Contemporary History* 8 (1973), 21–40.

autorités communistes de Belgrade le condamnent par contumace à vingt ans de réclusion. A Londres, toujours très actif, Slobodan Jovanović préside, de 1945 jusqu'à sa mort en 1958, le Comité national yougoslave (*Jugosloven-ski narodni odbor*), qui réunit des hommes politiques d'avant-guerre et tente, en vain, d'offrir une alternative politique au régime communiste de la Yougoslavie titiste.[5]

En 1950, Jovanović est élu, sur proposition de Paul Bastide, membre de l'Académie des Sciences morales et politiques (de l'Institut) de Paris. Selon certains témoignages, le général de Gaulle, aurait consulté Jovanović, expert reconnu en droit constitutionnel, sur le projet de Constitution de la Cinquième République. Ce fut l'une de ses dernières expertises. Les médias occidentaux, notamment en Grande Bretagne et en France, rendirent hommage à Slobodan Jovanović, savant de renom international et homme politique de premier rang, à l'occasion de sa disparition en 1958.[6]

Les *Œuvres complètes* de Slobodan Jovanović, après avoir été interdites à plusieurs reprises et suscité une série de scandales politiques et une polémique idéologique, furent finalement publiées en 12 volumes en 1991 à Belgrade, dans une Yougoslavie en décomposition politique. Certains ouvrages furent réimprimés à plusieurs reprises, y compris les oeuvres publiées

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[5] La documentation sur Jovanović et son travail à Londres est disponible dans le volume des numéros réimprimés de *Poruka* [Message], la revue politique publiée entre 1950 et 1959 par le Comité national yougoslave. Cf. Jovica Trkulja et Života Lazić, éd., *Poruka. List Jugoslovenskog narodnog odbora. London, 1950–1959 (reprint)* (Belgrade : Službeni Glasnik, 2007).

[6] Cf. « Le Professeur Slobodan Yovanovicth », *Le Monde,* Paris, le 16 décembre 1958 ; « Slobodan Yovanovich », *The Daily Telegraph*, Londres, le 13 décembre 1958 ; « War-Time Premier of Yugoslavia Dies », *New York Herald Tribune,* Paris, le 15 décembre 1958 ; « Professor Slobodan Yovanovich », *The Sunday Times*, le 21 décembre 1958 ; « Professor Slobodan Yovanovich », *The Times*, Londres, le 22 décembre 1958 ; « E morto il prof. Jovanovic capo degli esiliati jugoslavi », *Il Piccolo*, Trieste, 19 décembre 1958 ; « Death of the former Yugoslav Prime Minister, Professor Yovanovitch », *The Illustrated London News*, le 27 décembre 1958. Une trentaine de journaux et hebdomadaires serbes de diaspora, puis quelques croates et slovènes, ont rendu hommage à Slobodan Jovanović. A Belgrade, une notice sur la mort de ce « criminel de guerre » fut publiée dans le quotidien belgradois *Politika*, où dans un supplément consacre à son soixante anniversaire, le 4 décembre 1939, Slobodan Jovanović avait été célébré comme le plus grand savant du peuple serbe (« Umro Slobodan Jovanović », *Politika*, Belgrade, le 15 décembre 1958). Enterré à Londres, fin décembre 1958, Slobodan Jovanović fut récompensé par la ville de Londres par une plaque mémorial portant l'inscription suivante : « Professor Slobodan Yovanovitch. Serbian historian, literary critic, legal scholar, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia ». La plaque se trouve à l'adresse : 39b Queens Gate Gardens, Kensington.

en 1936. La bibliographie scientifique consacrée à Slobodan Jovanović ne cesse de s'agrandir.[7] Avant d'être officiellement réhabilité en octobre 2007, Jovanović fut choisi en 2003 pour figurer sur la plus grande coupure de la Banque nationale de Serbie (5 000 dinars)

*D. T. Bataković*

## L'idée yougoslave : Passé et avenir
## par Slobodan Jovanović

Texte intégral d'une conférence tenue le 4 décembre 1939 au Club culturel serbe. Texte extrait des *Oeuvres complètes* [Sabrana dela], t. 11 (Belgrade : BIGZ, 1991), 567–575.[8]

Le sujet de la conférence de ce soir est l'idée yougoslave : passé et avenir. Quand je dis : passé, je ne pense pas remonter loin en arrière. Je ne parlerai ni du projet yougoslave (*Načertanije*) de [Ilija] Garašanin (1844), ni de la politique yougoslave du Prince Michel [Obrenovitch] (1860–1868) et du Roi Pierre [Karageorgevitch] (1903–1914), ni des opinions yougoslaves

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[7] Radovan Samardžić, « Slobodan Jovanović. Istoričar kao pisac », *Pisci srpske istorije*, vol. III (Belgrade : Prosveta, 1986), 185–207; idem, « Slobodan Jovanović. Delo i pisac », *Pisci srpske istorije*, vol. IV (Belgrade : Prosveta & Tersit, 1994), 109–161 (= « Umesto pogovora », *Sabrana dela Slobodana Jovanovića*, vol. 12, t. II: *Iz istorije i književnosti* (Belgrade 1991), 673–718) ; Aleksandar Pavković, « The State and the Individual in Slobodan Jovanović's *Država* », *Balcanica* XX (1989), 305–328 ; *Delo Slobodana Jovanovića u svom vremenu i danas*, éd. Stevan Vračar (Belgrade : Pravni fakultet, 1991) ; *Slobodan Jovanović : An Unsentimental Approach to Politics* (Boulder–New York : Columbia University Press, East European Monographs 371, 1993) ; Ljubiša M. Despotović et Radivoj Stepanov, *Sociologija demokratije : Slobodan Jovanović kao afirmator političke sociologije* (Novi Sad, Belgrade: Prometej & Tersit, 1996) ; *Slobodan Jovanović u emigraciji : razgovori i zapisi* (Belgrade : Službeni list SRJ – Dosije, 1993) ; Miodrag Jovičić, *Slobodan Jovanović. Ilustrovana monografija* (Belgrade : Vajat, 1997) ; *Slobodan Jovanović – ličnost i delo. Zbornik radova sa naučnog skupa održanog od 17. do 20. februara 1997* [Slobodan Jovanović – sa personnalité et son œuvre. Recueil des travaux de la conférence scientifique organisée du 17 au 20 février 1997], éd. Miodrag Jovičić (Belgrade : SANU, Naučni skupovi vol. 90, Odeljenje društvenih nauka vol. 21, 1998) ; Dragan Subotić, *Slobodan Jovanović u egzilu 1941–1958 : liberal i(ili) konzervativac? Istorijski i pravno-politikološki prilozi za bio-bibliografiju*, vol. 1, *Godine učenja i sazrevanja : 1869-1941*, vol. 2, *Uvod, prolog i epilog nacionalne tragedije srpstva u XX veku : 1941–1958* (Belgrade : Institut za političke studije, 2000) ; Nebojša A. Popović, *Slobodan Jovanović i jugoslovenska država* (Belgrade : Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2003) ; *Slobodan Jovanović – život i delo* (Belgrade : Srpska liberalna stranka, 2006).

[8] Une version plus courte de ce texte fut publiée à Paris dans la revue *Dialogue* 2/7–8 (1993).

de J[osip]. J. Strossmayer et de F[ranjo]. Rački. Je commencerai par un passé beaucoup plus proche de nous, la Conférence de la paix de 1919.

Lors de cette conférence, où il fut question de reconnaître, dans les limites du possible, le droit à l'autodétermination des peuples, Serbes et Croates exprimèrent le désir de vivre ensemble dans un même Etat. Ils ne revendiquaient pas, alors, un territoire étatique propre à chacun d'entre eux. C'est ainsi que, grâce à leur entente, notre Etat [Royaume de Yougoslavie, jusqu'à 1929 Royaume des Serbes Croates et Slovènes] fut créé dans ses frontières actuelles.

Quand, après la Conférence de la paix, fut abordée la question de l'organisation de l'Etat commun, Serbes et Croates entrèrent très vite en conflit. Les Serbes traitaient les Croates de fédéralistes, et les Croates les Serbes de centralistes. En fait, si les Croates étaient tous, déjà à l'époque, des adversaires du centralisme, ils n'étaient pas pour autant tous des partisans du fédéralisme. Seuls, les partis représentant le *banovina* étaient fédéralistes, au sens propre du terme. Les Croates du littoral se satisfaisaient de l'autonomie prévue dans la déclaration de Corfou (1917). En revanche, le Parti paysan [croate] de S[tjepan]. Radić ne se contentait pas d'une fédération. Il voyait la communauté étatique des Serbes et des Croates comme un Etat basé sur une relation contractuelle entre deux peuples souverains, relation si lâche que les Serbes pouvaient vivre dans une monarchie et les Croates dans une république. Par la suite, les Croates, en lutte contre le centralisme, tombèrent tous d'accord sur un programme commun fédéraliste qui réclamait pour le peuple croate plus que l'autonomie.

Le centralisme serbe était le fruit d'une idéologie prônée non par les partis et les hommes politiques de Serbie mais par les « Yougoslaves ». Il faut entendre par là un groupe d'hommes politiques serbes et croates, originaires de la monarchie habsbourgeoise, qui avaient acquis la conviction que Serbes et Croates n'avaient pas d'avenir s'ils ne formaient pas une communauté nationale stable. Aussi devaient-ils oublier tout ce qui, par le passé, les avait divisés s'ils voulaient exister en tant que peuple libre. Les Yougoslaves estimaient que non seulement Serbes et Croates avaient absolument besoin d'un Etat commun mais encore que celui-ci devait être centralisé. Il leur semblait que, sans centralisme, il n'y a ni unité étatique, ni unité nationale. Ils étaient dans l'erreur. Une fédération — et c'est là la différence entre une fédération et une confédération — a une unité étatique, car il n'existe qu'une seule souveraineté, celle de l'Etat fédéral. Quant à l'unité nationale, même si l'on croyait que Serbes et Croates appartiennent à un seul et même peuple — ce que contestent aujourd'hui les Croates — il n'en découlait pas pour autant que leur Etat commun ne puisse être fédéral. Le présent et le passé proche nous donnent des exemples d'Etats organisés selon une ligne

fédérale, malgré leur unité nationale incontestable : tels, l'Empire allemand
à partir de 1871, les Etats-Unis d'Amérique.

Le centralisme prôné par les hommes politiques yougoslaves fut adop-
té. Ce n'était pas celui de tous les hommes politiques de Serbie, mais celui de
ceux dont dépendait la résolution de la question constitutionnelle. Les hom-
mes politiques de Serbie croyaient que le fédéralisme était dangereux pour
l'unité étatique. En luttant, pendant des siècles, pour leur indépendance, les
Serbes avaient acquis un véritable culte du concept d'Etat, et il suffisait de
leur dire que le fédéralisme pouvait mettre en question l'unité étatique pour
qu'aussitôt ils devinssent ses adversaires. Mais il ne faut pas perdre de vue
que c'est les Yougoslaves qui lancèrent cette lutte contre le centralisme, les
Serbes ne firent que leur emboîter le pas. Il est tout aussi erroné de parler
d'une hégémonie serbe. Ces vingt dernières années [1919–1939], les Serbes
ont eu, il est vrai, une influence prépondérante au sein du gouvernement ;
ils ont, cependant, dirigé le pays selon une idéologie yougoslave et non pas
grand-serbe. Aussi serait-il peut-être plus juste de parler d'une hégémonie
yougoslave.

Il est difficile de dire si, dans l'affrontement entre le centralisme serbe
ou, plus exactement, le centralisme yougoslave et le fédéralisme croate, c'est
le centralisme yougoslave qui poussa les Croates à être plus fermes sur leurs
positions qu'ils ne le pensaient au départ, — ou si, au contraire, c'est le fé-
déralisme croate qui incita les Yougoslaves à être plus farouches dans leur
centralisme qu'ils ne l'imaginaient *a priori*. Mais il est certain que cet af-
frontement entre Yougoslaves et Croates attisait le centralisme des uns et le
fédéralisme des autres.

Il s'avéra rapidement que les Yougoslaves avaient tort de vouloir ré-
aliser très vite leur idéal, à savoir, créer chez les Croates et les Serbes une
conscience nationale commune qui servirait de support à leur Etat commun.
Or, cette conscience nationale commune avait à peine pénétré les cercles de
l'intelligentsia serbe et croate et n'avait pas encore gagné les larges masses du
peuple. Au lieu de laisser l'assimilation nationale des Serbes et des Croates
se faire avec le temps, les Yougoslaves en vinrent à l'idée de l'accélérer par
la force du pouvoir étatique. Si, auparavant, ils avaient soutenu que l'unité
nationale devait être le support de l'Etat commun des Serbes et des Cro-
ates, désormais, ils affirmaient le contraire, cet Etat devait créer son unité
nationale.

Au départ, ils espéraient que la yougoslavisation des masses serbes et
croates pourrait s'effectuer à l'aide du centralisme administratif. Le succès
fut maigre. Les Yougoslaves ne comprenaient pas que ce manque de résultat
provenait du fait que le pouvoir étatique était utilisé pour des choses pour
lesquelles il n'est pas fait, à savoir, modifier des sentiments nationaux. Ils
se leurraient en pensant que cette absence de réussite n'était due qu'à la

faiblesse de la pression exercée par les autorités étatiques. Ils insistèrent pour que cette pression soit renforcée, et ainsi on passa d'un centralisme administratif ordinaire à un système de gouvernement, qu'on appelait, dans la Serbie d'avant-guerre, régime personnel. Au départ, dissimulé, déguisé, le régime personnel se transforma en une dictature manifeste.

Cette dictature était totalement inspirée par l'idéologie yougoslave. Elle changea le nom de l'Etat et proclama, à la place du royaume des Serbes, des Croates et des Slovènes, le royaume de Yougoslavie. C'était, d'une certaine manière, une tentative faite pour donner vie, par un oukase, à l'idée yougoslave. Les nationalismes serbe et croate n'étaient plus reconnus, seul le nationalisme yougoslave, nouvellement forgé, l'était. La guerre fut déclarée aux partis serbes et croates. On déclarait qu'ils s'appuyaient sur une base tribale étroite et qu'ils devaient disparaître pour laisser la place à de nouveaux partis qui n'auraient pas une optique exclusivement serbe ou exclusivement croate mais une vision générale, yougoslave. En supprimant, à l'époque du centralisme, l'autonomie des provinces, en poursuivant, à l'époque de la dictature, les partis nationaux, l'idée yougoslave se détacha de plus en plus de la réalité sociale. C'était, désormais, une pure abstraction qui n'avait que l'énergie que pouvait lui fournir l'appareil d'Etat.

Quel fut le résultat final de la dictature yougoslave ? Elle voulait, avant tout, créer un nationalisme yougoslave qui devait remplacer les nationalismes serbe et croate. Et, de fait, apparurent, sur l'invite des autorités, de « véritables » Yougoslaves, des Yougoslaves « intégraux », des Yougoslaves « cent pour cent », qui, soi-disant, comprenaient mieux la Yougoslavie nouvellement créée et qui lui étaient plus sincèrement dévoués que ne l'étaient les Serbes et les Croates qui avaient encore du mal à renoncer à leur appellation nationale. C'était une nouvelle sorte de Yougoslaves, les Yougoslaves d'après-guerre. Les Yougoslaves d'avant-guerre étaient Yougoslaves à une époque ou c'était dangereux ; les Yougoslaves d'après-guerre, eux, n'apparurent qu'à une époque ou l'on récompensait le yougoslavisme. Parmi eux, il y avait des membres des minorités ethniques pour lesquels l'idée yougoslave était la bienvenue pour masquer leur manque de patriotisme serbo-croate. Il y avait, aussi, des individus qui, auparavant, du temps de la monarchie habsbourgeoise, s'étaient montrés de mauvais Serbes ou de mauvais Croates et qui, dorénavant, s'empressaient de faire amende honorable en affichant un yougoslavisme qui ne demandait plus aucun sacrifice. Enfin, dernière catégorie de Yougoslaves d'après-guerre : ceux qui n'étaient pas tant séduits par l'idée yougoslave que par les méthodes dictatoriales. De même que des Yougoslaves sincères avaient opté en faveur de la dictature uniquement par souci de sauver l'idée yougoslave, de même des hommes de droite convaincus s'enthousiasma pour le yougoslavisme, y trouvant un prétexte à la dictature. Ces trois catégories constituaient la majeure partie

des Yougoslaves d'après-guerre. De toute évidence, ils ne pouvaient rendre l'idée yougoslave chère à qui que ce soit. Bien au contraire!

Voyons maintenant quelle fut la réussite de la guerre menée par la dictature aux partis serbes et croates. Elle ne donna jamais les mêmes résultats en Serbie et en Croatie. En Serbie, elle eut plus de succès qu'en Croatie. Les partis serbes étaient des partis politiques ordinaires, adaptés à la lutte électorale et au travail parlementaire. Quand la dictature supprima les élections et dissout l'Assemblée nationale, les partis serbes perdirent leur terrain d'action. Ils étaient comme un magasin à qui il est interdit d'entrer en relation avec le public. Cette cessation forcée d'activité ne détruisit pas les partis serbes mais elle les mit hors jeu, les désorienta et les affaiblit. En Croatie, au contraire, il n'existait pas de partis au sens habituel du terme. Tous les partis y fusionnèrent en un grand mouvement national. La dictature était totalement incapable de casser ce mouvement. On dit, avec un peu d'exagération sans aucun doute, que la dictature désorganisa les partis serbes et renforça le mouvement croate. C'est la raison pour laquelle, quand, récemment, on signa un accord entre Serbes et Croates, les Croates le firent unis, les Serbes divisés.

Pour terminer l'inventaire de toutes les conséquences qu'eut la dictature dans le domaine de la politique yougoslave — les autres ne nous intéressent pas ici — il faut encore signaler que, en dernier ressort, la dictature porta plus préjudice à l'idée yougoslave qu'elle ne lui profita. Celle-ci fut entraînée dans le tourbillon de la politique intérieure. Elle fut assimilée à un régime particulier, le régime personnel qui ne fut jamais populaire parmi les Serbes. Ces derniers le supportèrent un certain temps croyant que c'était nécessaire pour résoudre la question croate ; mais, quand ils virent que celle-ci n'était toujours pas résolue, ils se demandèrent : A quoi sert ce régime qui non seulement n'a pas supprimé les causes du mécontentement en Croatie mais encore a suscité l'insatisfaction en Serbie ?... A la veille de la guerre de 1914, l'idée yougoslave unissait Serbes et Croates ; pendant la dictature, elle alla jusqu'à diviser les Serbes : liée au régime personnel, chaque jour, elle voyait s'ajouter à ses propres adversaires de plus en plus d'opposants au régime personnel.

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Il était à prévoir que, du fait des liens étroits tissés entre le régime personnel et l'idée yougoslave, chaque crise du régime personnel susciterait aussi une crise de l'idée yougoslave. Dès lors, il n'est pas étonnant de voir aujourd'hui les stigmates de ces crises du régime personnel et de l'idée yougoslave. Laissons de côté la crise du régime personnel et tenons en nous uniquement à la crise de l'idée yougoslave. Elle existe en Serbie comme en Croatie, ou elle prend une forme plus aiguë d'ailleurs qu'en Serbie. Aujourd'hui, alors qu'en

Croatie est venu le temps d'un nouveau « souffle national », comme on disait autrefois, cet élan national n'est pas dirigé uniquement contre les Serbes mais aussi contre les Yougoslaves, et, dans certaines régions, plus contre les Yougoslaves que contre les Serbes. Au point qu'hier, lors d'une réunion ici même, un Serbe de Serbie du Sud, d'orientation yougoslave et non grand-serbe, dit : « Il y a un paradoxe dans notre pays, les Yougoslaves ne sont nulle part aussi mal vus que dans la patrie de Strossmayer et de Rački. » Ces propos datent d'hier et nous lisons, aujourd'hui, dans les journaux, qu'un des membres les plus éminents de l'Académie yougoslave de Zagreb a proposé d'appeler à l'avenir cette institution non plus l'académie yougoslave mais l'académie croate. Cela montre que la crise de l'idée yougoslave se fait sentir dans les sommets mêmes de l'intelligentsia croate.

Il existe donc une crise du yougoslavisme, c'est indiscutable. La question est : comment y remédier ? Tout d'abord, il faut séparer l'idée yougoslave du régime personnel. Ce régime n'était qu'un moyen de la réaliser : il s'est avéré que cette méthode n'était pas la bonne, mais il ne faut pas rejeter pour autant le yougoslavisme. Ceci dit, existe aussi l'aspiration inverse, à savoir, abandonner l'idée yougoslave à son sort et sauver le régime personnel, moyen le plus rapide, dit-on, pour créer un accord entre Serbes et Croates. Si un accord devait être associé au régime personnel, nous craignons qu'il ne subisse le même sort que l'idée yougoslave quand elle a été liée à ce régime. N'oublions pas que l'idée de l'unité yougoslave et d'un accord entre Serbes et Croates sous-entend une conception de la liberté qui exclut un régime personnel.

Mais il ne suffit pas de séparer l'idée yougoslave du régime personnel. Il faut, de plus, expliquer à nouveau son sens véritable qui, au fil du temps, a été oublié. Machiavel dit quelque part que le mieux est de ramener un Etat en crise à son principe originel, à son postulat premier. Si l'on suit ce conseil, il faut ramener l'idée yougoslave à son point de départ. En d'autres termes, il faut se souvenir de ce qu'elle signifiait pour les Serbes et les Croates à la veille de la guerre de 1914, quand ils partageaient les mêmes convictions. Aujourd'hui, beaucoup de jeunes gens estiment que ce vieux yougoslavisme, celui d'avant la guerre, était un joli rêve, sentimental et naïf, un rêve de fraternité entre Serbes et Croates que les faits ont réfuté. Les apparences sont trompeuses. L'idée yougoslave était le fruit d'une grande misère nationale, elle contenait beaucoup plus de réalisme politique qu'on ne le pense aujourd'hui. Souvenons-nous seulement dans quelle situation se trouvaient, à la veille de la guerre de 1914, d'une part les Croates, d'autre part les Serbes. Les Croates craignaient de ne pas être en mesure de défendre l'autonomie qu'ils avaient acquise face aux attaques incessantes et systématiques du gouvernement hongrois. Leur région autonome risquait de devenir une prov-

ince hongroise comme les autres. Un conflit sans merci avec les Hongrois était imminent, et, dans cette optique, l'aide des Serbes leur était précieuse.

Tournons-nous maintenant du côté serbe. Sous le règne du Roi Pierre I$^{er}$, les Serbes comprirent qu'ils ne pouvaient s'agrandir. L'Autriche ne le leur permettait pas. Sous le règne des Obrenovic, elle ne nous laissa pas traverser la Drina mais nous permit passer dans la vallée du Vardar. Puis, elle reprit cette vallée, gardant ce territoire des Balkans pour le donner, en partie, à la Bulgarie, en partie, à l'Albanie. Après la crise de l'annexion, un des hommes politiques autrichiens les plus conciliants, Bernreither, vint à Belgrade pour examiner les conditions d'un accord serbo-autrichien. Il assura que l'Autriche était prête à garantir les frontières que nous avions, et, peut-être, à nous accorder un traité commercial avantageux, mais qu'elle ne pouvait soutenir notre expansion territoriale. Nous devions rester une « petite Serbie », coincée entre l'Autriche et la Bulgarie, sans débouché sur la mer, sans indépendance économique, ne disposant que d'une indépendance politique formelle. De même que, pour les Croates, une lutte sans merci avec les Hongrois était imminente, de même, pour les Serbes, un conflit avec la monarchie habsbourgeoise s'annonçait ; de même que l'aide serbe était précieuse pour les Croates, de même l'aide croate était précieuse pour les Serbes. L'idée yougoslave n'était rien d'autre que la conscience de la nécessité d'une coopération politique entre Serbes et Croates. Ce qui s'accompagnait, sans aucun doute, comme d'habitude chez les Serbes et les Croates, d'une bonne dose de sentimentalité. Mais, les Serbes, comme les Croates, avaient une représentation tout à fait exacte de leurs intérêts politiques.

Voilà ce qu'il en était avant la Guerre de 1914. Les circonstances ont-elles changé, après la guerre, au point que Serbes et Croates pourraient se dissocier ? Sont-ils maintenant sûrs de leurs acquis au point de pouvoir vivre les uns sans les autres ?

Voyons d'abord quelle serait la situation de la Serbie si la Croatie s'en était séparée. Elle aurait perdu la plus grande et la plus importante partie du littoral adriatique. Sa position sur la mer adriatique serait plus faible que celles de la Croatie et de l'Albanie. La Serbie serait plus ou moins comme avant la guerre : le seul Etat continental dans les Balkans. Il faut songer aussi que la Croatie, séparée de nous, pourrait entrer, contre son gré, dans la sphère d'influence d'une grande puissance qui ne serait pas bien disposée à notre égard. Si nous prenons tout ceci en compte, alors à ceux qui disent : « Avec les Croates, c'est la catastrophe ! » il faut répondre : « Sans les Croates, ce serait pire! »

Mais la situation des Croates ne serait pas non plus facile. Leur Etat indépendant, par ses dimensions, même s'il comprenait tout ce qui entre dans la composition de l'actuel *banovina* de Croatie, serait un petit Etat. L'époque actuelle n'est pas favorable aux Etats de moyenne taille et encore

moins à ceux de petite taille. Petit Etat, la Croatie aurait à tenir sur la mer adriatique des positions très importantes sur le plan international. Pense-t-elle qu'elle pourrait les conserver ? Unis, comme nous le sommes à présent, nous avons du mal à y installer une défense forte. Les Croates, aujourd'hui, se réjouissent d'avoir réalisé ce qui était leur souhait depuis des siècles : avoir réuni le littoral et le *banovina*. Mais qu'ils se posent la question : comment y sont-ils parvenus ? Sur le champ de bataille ? Lors d'une conférence diplomatique ? Non, ni sur le champ de bataille, ni lors d'une conférence diplomatique, mais par le biais d'un accord avec les Serbes dans le cadre de la Yougoslavie. Aussi doivent-ils préserver la Yougoslavie ! Elle leur est tout aussi nécessaire qu'à nous.

En conséquence, quel que soit l'angle sous lequel on considère les choses, il apparaît que les raisons qui, avant la guerre de 1914, dictaient aux Serbes et aux Croates d'unir leurs forces, existent toujours. La situation ne s'est pas modifiée ; ou, si elle a changé, c'est en pire et non en mieux. Croates et Serbes n'ont plus à se battre contre une vieille monarchie sur le déclin comme l'était l'Autriche avant la guerre, mais à compter avec des éléments dont la vitalité est beaucoup plus grande et les besoins d'expansion beaucoup plus forts. La question n'est pas : Voulons nous, nous, Serbes et Croates, vivre ensemble ? Mais : Y sommes-nous contraints ? Du côté croate, on entend de temps à autre qu'il est inutile de chercher à démontrer que Serbes et Croates sont un seul et même peuple puisque les Croates ne le ressentent pas ainsi... Ni nous ne discutons l'importance de la subjectivité, ni ne nions qu'il faille en tenir compte dans la pratique politique. Mais, si les sentiments subjectifs sont une chose importante, les situations objectives le sont encore plus. Que Serbes et Croates se perçoivent comme un seul et même peuple ou non, leur situation objective est telle que, les uns sans les autres, ils ne peuvent préserver leur liberté nationale.

Dans ces conditions, se pose la question suivante : Que faire ? Je laisse de côté le cas des Croates, — je ne suis pas qualifié pour leur donner des conseils, — mais en tant que Serbe, je pense avoir le droit de dire ceci aux Serbes. Nous devons comprendre que nous devons remplir une double tâche. Premièrement, nous devons défendre le serbisme. Alors qu'une unité ethnique croate se dessine, nous devons aussi fatalement tracer un ensemble ethnique serbe. Il est absurde d'affirmer que, dans cet Etat, seuls, les Croates ont une conscience nationale, qu'eux seuls ont une histoire, tandis que les Serbes n'auraient ni conscience nationale, ni histoire, qu'ils constitueraient une masse amorphe qui se laisse pétrir à loisir. La question croate pose la question serbe. Les Serbes aussi, en joignant leurs forces, doivent défendre ce qui est leur.

Mais, les Serbes feraient une erreur en pensant que leur tâche consiste seulement à défendre le serbisme. Il leur incombe aussi de se préoc-

cuper de l'ensemble étatique. Absorbés par l'aménagement de leur *banovina*, les Croates ont pratiquement cessé de penser à celui-ci. Ils s'intéressent peu à l'organisation du pouvoir central. Elle leur apparaît soit comme un luxe, soit comme quelque chose dont, seuls, les Serbes auraient besoin pour assurer leur hégémonie. Mais c'est justement parce que les Croates ne voient pas la nécessité d'un pouvoir central fort que, nous, Serbes, devons veiller non seulement aux intérêts de le serbisme mais aussi aux droits du pouvoir central. Il faut avoir cela présent à l'esprit. Pour que notre Etat commun soit durable, il ne suffit pas d'avoir une dynastie, une armée et une diplomatie communes, encore faut-il avoir aussi un Parlement élu au suffrage universel représentant le peuple de Yougoslavie dans son ensemble, sans tenir compte des différences existantes entre Serbes, Croates et Slovènes. Ces dernières trouveront à s'exprimer dans les parlements locaux : le Parlement central ne doit refléter que ce qui lie Serbes, Croates et Slovènes et non ce qui les sépare. Des parlements de ce type existent en Suisse et aux Etats-Unis, et, de façon générale, dans toutes les fédérations dignes de ce nom. Même un homme d'Etat aussi conservateur que Bismarck, lors de la fondation de l'Empire allemand en 1871, considérait qu'un parlement de ce genre était absolument indispensable pour consolider l'unité allemande.

Les Serbes peuvent-ils prendre sur eux la responsabilité de la double tâche qui vient d'être décrite ? Peuvent-ils défendre à la fois les intérêts de le serbisme et les droits du pouvoir central ? Cela ne signifie-t-il pas que les Serbes ont deux idéaux contradictoires : d'un côté, l'idée nationale serbe, et de l'autre, l'idée d'un Etat yougoslave... Des voix émanant des cercles yougoslaves ont, à plusieurs reprises, souligné que le nationalisme serbe, comme d'ailleurs le nationalisme croate, ne sont absolument pas compatibles avec le yougoslavisme, même quand celui-ci est compris comme une idée étatique et non comme une idée nationale. Nous estimons que tout le problème vient de ce que l'on tient pour certain que l'idée nationale doit toujours concorder avec l'idée étatique : ce qui implique que le nationalisme serbe ne serait admissible que dans un Etat serbe ; dans un Etat yougoslave, au contraire, seul le nationalisme yougoslave serait possible. L'histoire, cependant, nous fournit des exemples qui montrent clairement qu'il n'est pas indispensable que les idées étatique et nationale coïncident totalement. Il est arrivé qu'une nation serve une idée étatique qui la dépasse, et, inversement, qu'un Etat serve une idée nationale qui le dépasse. Le premier cas est celui des peuples de Grande Bretagne. Anglais, Ecossais, Gallois se perçoivent comme étant des peuples différents, pourtant liés par la même idée étatique, celle d'un Etat de Grande Bretagne. Le second cas est illustré par l'histoire du Piémont et de la Prusse au XIXe siècle. Ces deux Etats ont mené, pour une idée nationale plus large que leur idée étatique, une lutte, qui aurait pu les mener à leur perte. Nous avons un exemple semblable dans l'histoire serbe. A par-

tir de la première insurrection, puis sous les règnes du Prince Michel et du Roi Pierre Iᵉʳ, les Serbes ont eu un programme national qui sortait du cadre de leur Etat. Ce programme est réalisé dans la Yougoslavie d'aujourd'hui. Affirmer que l'idée yougoslave ne peut plus exalter les Serbes, alors qu'elle enthousiasmait leur petit Etat d'avant-guerre, si, préalablement, ils ne cessent d'être serbes, est, pour le moins, une assertion étrange.

Pour conclure, la tentative de créer, à l'aide du pouvoir étatique et dans les plus brefs délais, un nationalisme yougoslave qui étoufferait les nationalismes serbe et croate, n'a pas réussi. Mais cela ne doit pas abattre notre foi en l'avenir de l'idée yougoslave. Si celle-ci, en tant qu'idée nationale, s'est heurtée aux obstacles que constituent les nationalismes serbe et croate, cela ne prouve pas qu'elle doive, en tant qu'idée étatique, rencontrer les mêmes difficultés. Est-il possible de mettre au service de l'idée étatique yougoslave les forces importantes que représentent les nationalismes serbe et croate, tout dépend, finalement, de la clairvoyance et de la tolérance dont feront preuve Serbes et Croates, et le fait qu'ils possèdent ou non ces qualités, dépend de leur éducation politique à qui il faut accorder une importance primordiale. Il faut dire aux Serbes et aux Croates que leur salut n'est pas dans un égoïsme et un fanatisme tribal — qui, depuis des siècles, empêchent la création de grands Etats — mais, que leur salut est dans un Etat commun. Organisons celui-ci de façon à ce que Serbes et Croates s'y sentent chez eux, et, dans le même temps, ouvrons leur les yeux sur le fait que, s'ils ne veulent pas vivre ensemble, ils pourraient bien se retrouver sans chez soi. Le nationalisme serbe et le nationalisme croate ne peuvent, par eux-mêmes, nous conduire sur le bon chemin, pour ce faire, ils doivent se lier à l'idée étatique yougoslave, de même que l'idée étatique yougoslave ne peut être suffisamment forte si elle ne se lie pas aux nationalismes serbe et croate.

*(Traduction du texte de Jovanović par Muriel Ecuer)*

# REVIEWS

*Reviewed by* Annemarie Sorescu-Marinković*

Titles can be deceiving. Those that catch the eye more often than not turn out to be an artful trick the authors use to attract readers, while the texts they announce lack substance. In our case, the opposite is true: behind an unattractive title a capital work hides. Even though the volume is conceived as a collection of studies, it can (and should) be read as a coherent overview of South-East European anthropology under communism. Rethinking/rewriting socialist-era anthropology is a most necessary task and the authors have embarked upon it with great courage. Through these "critical readings that did not happen", to paraphrase one of the Bulgarian authors included in the volume, the contributors do not seek to give a historical overview of the subject, much as such an approach would be useful for each of the countries, but to place the subject in the context of *longue durée*. Being convinced that confining "anthropology during communism" to its communist context would be misleading, they choose to trace "anthropology" back to its "national" beginnings and to (re-)integrate "communist anthropology" into that history.

The volume is a follow-up to an earlier book on anthropology in socialist Eastern Europe from the same series (Halle Studies in the Anthropology of Eurasia), which was devoted to the former German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary and which has attracted much attention, and not only in the countries involved. This volume results from a conference held at the Max Planck Institute in June 2006 producing an eclectic mixture of contributions, ranging from historical overviews of particular institutions and individuals to personal reflections by influential actors to more distanced appraisals by a new generation of scholars. The major innovation of this volume in comparison with its predecessor is that we can hear the voices of some distinguished North-American anthropologists who interacted more or less closely with "local scholars" in the course of their field research during the socialist era.

Concerned with the history of anthropology in three South-East European countries, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria, the editors, Vintilă Mihăilescu, Ilia Iliev and Slobodan Naumović, chose to approach the task ethnographically, i.e. to treat the local anthropologists as a kind of "communities" deserving a proper, first-hand ethnography. The central ques-

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tion uniting all contributions is how locally differing versions of a specific type of intellectual endeavour — national science — functioned under three formally internationalist, but in fact profoundly national, versions of socialism. As a result, encouraging reflection on how various aspects of three respective nations were researched under three national versions of communism, the book is structured into three case studies. But the editors also sought to supply a structure in which the thematic texts would communicate between themselves as intensively as possible, thereby providing clearly outlined and coherent units amenable to further comparison. Thus each case study follows its own inner logic and coherence, while remaining open to inter- and trans-national comparisons.

Compared with their West-European, "empire-building" colleagues, the South-East-European "nation-building" anthropologists had — and sometimes still have — a specific *existential position*. That is, they see themselves as belonging to the group they study, sharing its language, traditions, prevailing values and political interests. As a result, the anthropologist is not facing the famous, in this case anthropological, *distance*, which is supposed to be overcome by long-term participant observation. On the contrary, the anthropologist is from the very beginning supposed to share the "native's point of view", the problem being how to rise above this axiological and emotional proximity, how to distance himself/herself from his/her fellow informants rather than how to get closer to them in order better to understand them. The same "double insider syndrome" also explains the fact that in none of these Balkan countries has anthropology been subjected to a post-national critique similar to the post-colonial one in the West. While working on this volume, the editors had to handle this critical lack of previous research, especially in the case

of Romania and Bulgaria, and then they had to handle the authors' different *existential positions* and their different ways of coming to terms with their "double insider syndrome". A diversity resulting from a generation gap and from the authors' different forms of institutional involvement is obvious: some papers are closer to critical reflexivity, others are a sort of personal insights into the state of the discipline. Some are careful overviews embracing almost the entire period of communism, and thus serving as opening chapters (Otilia Hedeşan, Ilia Iliev and Slobodan Naumović), some focus on representative figures of the discipline (Milena Benovska-Sabkova, Anelia Kasabova, Gordana Gorunović, Ivana Spasić), while others prefer to describe the discipline by focusing on emblematic institutions (Vintilă Mihăilescu, Corina Iosif, Vasil Garnizov, Marina Cvetković, Mladena Prelić).

The first part of the volume, *Romania*, consists of four studies dealing with Romanian "anthropology" under communism. Otilia Hedeşan's contribution is a meticulous historical overview of fieldwork in Romania from the beginning of the twentieth century to the fall of communism in 1989. Hedeşan notes that many researchers made all kind of compromises with the regime in order to keep this central practice of Romanian ethnography and folklore studies alive even in the communist epoch. On the other hand, for the youngest researchers under the communist regime, fieldwork in rural environments was a kind of the rite of passage and, to some extent, a way of escaping urban and institutional daily life. But more importantly, in accordance with a long-lasting trend of the discipline in Romania, the main purpose of this fieldwork was to complete the national archives. Unfortunately, archives were to a large extent the endpoint of the discipline.

Vintilă Mihăilescu's detailed study deals with a national festival known as

"Singing Romania", designed and imposed by the Ceaușescuan brand of national communism, a phenomenon which, two decades since the fall of communism, still lacks real testimonies and research. Although belonging to a large family of national(ist) festivities intended to stage "traditional" peasant culture as a nation-building strategy, as well as to produce and stage a national genealogy of the communist "new man", Singing Romania is quite distinctive because of its all-embracing scale and its lasting social impact: according to Mihăilescu, Romanian folk culture has never recovered from this vast social experiment. Constantin Eretescu's contribution seeks to illustrate how folk studies in the 1950s became a collateral victim of the communist system installed in Romania in the latter half of the 1940s. There was no initial intention to subject this field of study to repression, as was the case with sociology, for instance; on the contrary, folk culture was effectively used for propaganda purposes by the new authorities, but only after imposing a decisive new orientation on it. Corina Iosif analyzes the practices of ethnological museology under communism. In that era, the research institutes of the Romanian Academy and ethnographic museums accumulated the greatest disciplinary and symbolic power and remained centres of major importance to the production of discourse on national identity and, simultaneously, laboratories for the patrimonial construction of the nation state.

The second part of the volume, *Bulgaria*, comprises five studies on Bulgarian "national science" in the socialist era. Ilia Iliev demonstrates that a major feature of Bulgarian ethnology from its very beginning in the early nineteenth century was the influence of its Russian counterpart, and thoroughly analyzes the local uses of three Soviet ethnographic concepts. He argues that the Bulgarian academic institutions and intellectual tools shaped after the Russian model were creatively adapted to suit local needs, while preserving most of the formal characteristics of the original model. Even though local actors were unable to introduce any major change in the field, in the hierarchical structure of Soviet ethnography or in the priorities of the socialist state, they took the opportunities provided within the framework defined by the socialist state and ideology and, on some rare occasions, navigated between the clashing teams "to create relatively independent intellectual spaces outside the raging debates".

Another valuable contribution is that of Vasil Garnizov, which takes a look at the debate unfolding between Bulgarian ethnographers and folklorists during the last decades of socialism and producing far-reaching consequences: the majority of scholars in the field of folklore studies took a liberal position in political terms and a critical position in scholarly terms and, to a large extent, applied their skills in practice when faced with the challenges posed to the individual under conditions of political, economic and social change, while scholars in the field of ethnography oriented themselves more towards studying communities, groups, minorities and their interrelations. Milena Benovska-Sabkova's contribution analyzes the rather contradictory development of academic ethnography and folklore studies in socialist Bulgaria by looking at five leading figures of the period (Mihail Arnaudov, Hristo Vakarelski, Petar Dinekov, Stojan Genčev and Todor Ivanov Živkov) and their impact on the scientific paradigm and institutions. Asen Balikci offers a brief analysis of a *magnum opus*, the authoritative three-volume *Etnografija na Balgarija* [Ethnography of Bulgaria], published between 1980 and 1985 by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Anelia Kasabova's contribution focuses on six life-history interviews with Bulgarian scholars, three men and three women of different gen-

erations and social backgrounds, all from the field of ethnography/ethnology and all having a professional career that unfolded, or at least started, under communism.

The third part, *Serbia*, encompasses six studies by Serbian authors, dealing with different aspects of "anthropology" under communism in this country. Slobodan Naumović, in one of the most comprehensive and most enlightening contributions in the entire volume, intends to turn the "lights" on the politics of Serbian ethnology and anthropology in the "interesting times" of Yugoslav socialism. Naumović contends that in more than a century of its institutionalized history Serbian ethnology functioned under a highly specific local brand of socialism half the time. During this period, "ethnology in Serbia was anything but 'genuinely autonomous' and just about as 'inconstant' as Geertz would expect it to be". Naumović wittily says that before, during and after socialism, Serbian ethnology functioned as a "science of the natives, by the natives, and occasionally for the natives". However, he does not imply that it has remained a national science from the time of its institutionalization and professionalization until today: Serbian ethnology stopped functioning as a national science quite a while ago and during the 1990s successfully resisted the "siren calls" enticing it into returning to its national mission. However, it has remained restricted by the "Own" in two ways: first, during the whole of its history, the study of geographically distant cultures was absolutely marginal, and second, because of that fact, long-term fieldwork itself remained marginal in it. Thus two key constitutive features of anthropological tradition were, and still are, external to the tradition of Serbian ethnology which has recently been renamed anthropology.

Mladena Prelić presents the way ethnology in Serbia was practised, while studying ethnic phenomena, through changes of the paradigm itself, and through the work of the Ethnographic Institute of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. In the case of this institution, the orientation was towards applied research, studies of cultural changes of contemporary society and ethnology's return to its own scholarly tradition. She also shows how ethnology is no longer understood as a *science of people*, but as a *science of culture*. Marina Cvetković, on the other hand, takes a look at the functioning of the Ethnographic Museum in Belgrade during the period of socialism (1945–1990) and shows that most of its research and exhibition activities was focused on various aspects of folk culture, primarily that of the Serbian nation, and only marginally on the cultures of other Yugoslav nations and ethnic minorities. Gordana Gorunović's contribution takes the example of a single author, Špiro Kulišić, to look at how Marxism was applied in Serbian/Yugoslav ethnology. The examination of Kulišić's professional biography and institutional activity, ideological involvement and scholarly work reveals some fundamental properties of ethnology and the application of Marxism in the postwar period and within the political context of Yugoslav socialism. Ivana Spasić deals with another significant figure on the Serbian cultural scene, showing that there were in Serbia approaches to the study of man and culture other than institutionalized ethnology: socio-cultural anthropology, personified most prominently by Zagorka Golubović. Throughout the fifty years of her career, Golubović has argued with remarkable consistency for a specific vision of anthropology. Spasić demonstrates how the social history of this vision, both in its internal, theoretical, aspects, and in the external, political and institutional, ones, is representative of the peculiarities of Yugoslav socialism and the way it shaped the academic study of culture and society. Mirjana Prošić-Dvornić presents the Serbian village culture as the meeting point of American anthropology

and Serbian ethnology, recalling the research done by Joel and Barbara Halpern in Orašac (Šumadija), and her encounter with the American anthropologist in the summer of 1978.

The last part of the volume, *Views and approaches from the West*, is devoted to three interviews with Western anthropologists playing the role of the *representative Other*: David Kideckel, interviewed by Vintilă Mihăilescu; Carol Silverman, interviewed by Chris Hann; and Joel M. Halpern, interviewed by Mirjana Prošić-Dvornić. The volume is furnished with an appendix presenting the timelines for the history of Romania, Serbia and Bulgaria,

as well as for the development of their respective "national sciences".

Writing about anthropology during communism in this part of Europe is a real challenge, not only because of the lack of a critical approach to the history of the discipline in general, but also because of the lack of a "trial of communism" and thus of the possibility of a critical approach to the discipline in the recent past. However, this challenge was skilfully mastered by all the authors of this volume, which can be without exaggeration considered one of the most important South-East European anthropology books of the decade.

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Magdalena Slavkova, *Циганите Евангелисте в България* [Evangelical Gypsies in Bulgaria]. Sofia: Paradigma, 2007, pp. 373

*Reviewed by* Aleksandra Djurić-Milovanović*

The Evangelical movement has been spreading among various ethnic communities in different parts of the world since the early nineteenth century. In the Balkans the growth of Evangelical churches has significantly increased since the fall of Communism.

The recently published book of the Bulgarian ethnologist Magdalena Slavkova, *Evangelical Gypsies in Bulgaria*, can be seen as an introduction to a very important research topic, that of neo-Protestant religious communities and the spread of the Evangelical movement among the Roma in Bulgaria. Based on her field research conducted between 1999 and 2007, Slavkova comprehensively presents different groups of Evangelical Roma, structuring her book into three thematically organized chapters preceded by an introduction and followed by a conclusion and an appendix. The introduction very clearly defines the requirements and goals of the research. Given the heterogeneity of the Roma population in Bulgaria, Slavkova gives a detailed account

of the Roma groups that are members of Evangelical churches: former Orthodox Christians — *Vlaxički tsigani*, *Cucumani*, *Rešetari*, *Džorevci*, *Rudari*, *Lingurari* and *Kopanari*, and former Muslims (both old and recently converted prior to the latest conversion) — *Erlii*, *Kalajdži*, *Ajdii*, *Zagundžii*, *Tatarski tsigani*, *Daalari*, *Xoraxane Roma* and *Kamčibojlii*. In Bulgaria they belong to Charismatic or neo-Protestant churches such as Methodist, Congregationalist, Baptist, Adventist and Pentecostal. The methods Slavkova uses in her research are participant observation, lifestory interviews and the method of visual anthropology. Apart from that, audio and photo documentation, historical and archival sources, as well as reference books in the Romani language are also used.

The first chapter, entitled "Evangelical Gypsies in the course of history", roughly

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estimates the number of the Roma members of Evangelical churches, gives a brief historical overview of Protestantism in Europe, and then takes a look at the emergence and spread of Protestantism in Bulgaria, where Slavkova outlines three historical periods: from the late nineteenth century to 1944; from 1944 to 1989; and from 1989 to the present, which is a chronology that derives from Bulgaria's political timeline. The Evangelical movement among the Roma in Europe began in the nineteenth century, when the London-based International Bible Society produced the first Romani translation of the Bible and began its missionary work among them. Under the Communist regime, the freedom of religious beliefs and practices was restricted, but many Evangelical Roma churches continued to function. After 1989, however, there begins an abrupt growth in Evangelical membership, especially among the Roma, with the intense missionary work of Bible societies. In this period Evangelical tenets have a particularly wide appeal among the poor and marginalized communities and individuals. Examining the process of Evangelical conversion of different Roma groups, Slavkova stresses that the community of Evangelical Roma is a social community, as evidenced by almost daily contacts among the members through church services, at prayer houses, the practice of mutual aid etc. The research was conducted in a number of towns and their rural surroundings in western Bulgaria (Sofia, Vratsa, Lom, Kyustendil, Sandanski), northern Bulgaria (Pleven, Tarnovo, Ruse and Silistra), eastern Bulgaria (Balchik, Burgas, Yambol, Kotel) and central-southern Bulgaria (Zagora, Velingrad).

The second chapter, "Church and pastors", lists the existing Roma Evangelical churches in Bulgaria and specifies their organizational structure. The Evangelicals in eastern Bulgaria are converts from Islam, while in western Bulgaria they converted from Orthodox Christianity. Slavkova de-

scribes the Evangelical forms of worship practices, and pays special attention to sermon, prayer, baptism, communion, fasting and evangelization. The role of pastors is also looked at, especially in Charismatic churches, including their preaching styles and speaking in tongues (*glossolalia*), most often accompanied by music and dance.

The third chapter, "The Evangelical Gypsies: Way of life and performance of identity", looks at the influence of the Evangelical movement on the Roma way of life. As the Evangelical Roma may be defined as a community of those who have embraced a faith different from their traditional one (Orthodox Christianity or Islam), Slavkova describes the changes that have occurred in their everyday life and how they celebrate feasts and festive occasions. For Roma, the acceptance of a new religion means the possibility to worship and serve God in their churches, to have pastors from their own community and to hear God's word in their mother tongues (Romani, Bulgarian, Romanian, Turkish). The religious community is a place of intense social interaction among the members seeing themselves as "brothers" and "sisters". Conversion and baptism are the most important moments, and they mark the end of the old and beginning of a new lifestyle. They willingly change their entire lifestyle and give up everything they believe God would not approve of. The newly-converted Roma make a distinction between the world of the blessed and the world of the earthly. In this chapter Slavkova also looks at how the Evangelical Roma celebrate Christian feasts (Christmas, Easter) as well as family events (weddings, childbirths, funerals), in the light of the fact that their new faith teaches them "to abandon worldly customs".

In her conclusion, Slavkova emphasizes that Evangelicalism has swayed the Bulgarian Roma away both from other Roma groups and from their traditional religions, and ushered them into a new

community where religious identity, rather than ethnic or linguistic, is central. The creation of the community of Evangelical Roma does not exclude, however, the preservation of boundaries between different Roma groups, as well as between the Roma as a whole and the *gadze*.

The volume is furnished with an extensive list of reference books, consulted Internet pages and periodicals as well as a list of Evangelical music CDs. Photographs, mostly made during her field research, are especially interesting and illustrative. It is also important to note that the author used the archival material as well as church records. An appendix at the end of the volume offers a short history of the Evangelical churches included in the study. Seeking to shed light on the complex and challenging issue of the new religious identity of the Roma in Bulgaria, this valuable book can be seen as a useful starting point for future research on small religious communities to which many ethnic minorities in the Balkans belong. On the whole, the volume is a useful and attractive reading, and not only for scholars and experts, but also for a broader public interested in Roma communities and religious affiliations in general.

SMILJA MARJANOVIĆ-DUŠANIĆ, *SVETI KRALJ. KULT STEFANA DEČANSKOG (THE HOLY KING. THE CULT OF ST STEFAN OF DEČANI)*. BELGRADE: INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES, SP. ED. 97 & CLIO, 2007, pp. 655

*Reviewed by* Miroslav Timotijević*

The new book of Professor Smilja Dušanić-Marjanović, holder of the Chair in the General History of the Middle Ages and Auxiliary Historical Sciences at the Department of History, School of Philosophy, Belgrade University, is predicated on the methodological tenets of the "new cultural history" which provides a frame of reference for developing new approaches in the field of medieval studies as well. The adoption of multidisciplinary approaches has thus enabled a new approach to the phenomenon of royal sanctity, a key category of the medieval ideology of rulership. The work of many researchers, to mention but the most eminent, such as Jacques Le Goff, Robert Folz, André Vauchez, Jean-Claude Schmitt and Gabor Klaniczay, has highlighted the multifaceted nature of this phenomenon and its development, as well as religious and political specificities proper to different environments of medieval Europe. Focusing on the religio-political function of the holy king cult, Professor Marjanović-Dušanić in her opening remarks observes its long-term nature and calls for incorporating the results of the new medieval studies into the broader framework set by the new cultural history. The need to interpret the holy king cult as a "changing long-term" phenomenon is clear and simple on the theoretical level, and it involves projecting the phenomenon into the contextualized structure of historical time.

To establish a methodological basis for testing a thesis thus posited is, however, a much more demanding task. Viewed from that perspective, Marjanović-Dušanić's book is exemplary in terms of defining theoretical tenets through exploring a particular historical phenomenon. Interpreting the cult of the holy king Stefan of Dečani (Stefan Uroš III) as an identity *topos* of Serbian public collective memory, it looks at the original historical phenomenon from the perspective of its subsequent use in constructing religious, patriotic, national, official and popular collective mem-

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ory. Drawing upon the theoretical tenets of the French historians of the culture of memory Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora, based in turn on the pioneering work of Aby Warburg and Maurice Halbwachs, Marjanović-Dušanić approaches the cult of Stefan of Dečani through a meticulous historiographic analysis of the history of memory. Her theoretical and thus methodological tenets, however, diverge considerably from the views of Pierre Nora, which were prevailing until recently, and converge to those of his critics, Paul Ricoeur most of all.

Marjanović-Dušanić's enquiry into the complex phenomenon under study is structured clearly in the book. Part One, *The patterns of royal sanctity*, consists of two extensive chapters. The first of the two discusses the origin and development of the institution of royal sanctity in medieval Christian Europe (pp. 17–84). Using the reference literature in a critical way, the author interprets the shaping of the holy king concept in political theology, the creation of different types of royal sanctity, their function and different manners in which they were employed in different European environments until late medieval times. The second chapter is devoted to the patterns of royal sanctity in medieval Serbia (pp. 85–194). The author suggests that the ideological (re)presentation of royal sanctity under the Nemanjićs did not rely on analogies with the Komnenian and Arpadian dynastic patterns, but had its own distinctive character and line of development. The phenomenon of royal and dynastic sanctity in medieval Serbia, initially based on the cult of the founder of the dynasty—St Simeon (Nemanja), later on came to rest on that of the priestly twosome—Sts Simeon and Sava, which helped establish "symphony" between the institutions of state and church and led to the uninterrupted succession of holy kings. The holy ruler ideal, originally based on the "holy root" concept, increas-

ingly gained prominence; the subsequent generations of the Nemanjićs, however, accommodated it to the changing political needs and to the needs of particular saintly cults. As a result, it underwent essential changes over time. Taking into account the fact that the cult of holy rulers in the medieval Nemanjić state played a more prominent and different role than elsewhere, Marjanović-Dušanić argues for developing a separate typology.

Part Two, *The creation of royal memoria*, focuses on Stefan of Dečani. Several strong reasons lie behind the author's choice of this particular holy king for her case study. Firstly, Stefan of Dečani has certainly been among the most popular Serbian saints alongside Sts Simeon and Sava; moreover, his veneration in public memory has gone through all stages from a saintly cult to the cult of a national hero. Secondly, the monastery of Dečani with the holy king's tomb has become an unavoidable place of memory for Serbian religious, patriotic and national identity. Thirdly but no less importantly, the cult of Stefan of Dečani played a significant role not only in the official religion but also in popular piety, group as well as private. This has made it possible for the author to demonstrate the multilevel functioning of the holy king cult over a long span of time from the late middle ages to the present day.

Part Two also consists of two chapters. The first addresses the relationship between the historical, biographical, facts and the king's subsequent hagiographical image (pp. 197–336). In keeping with the view that historical reality and subsequent memory are conflated rather than opposed, the author shows that the Lives of the medieval Serbian rulers, including Stefan Uroš III, are imitative in nature and accommodated to the stereotype of anticipated sanctity. Accordingly, she shows that the historian's primary task is not to test hagiography against biography,

but to look at their interaction whose ultimate outcome is the production of royal *memoria* centred on the saintly cult. Analyzing the stages of the cult's evolution, the author observes that it eludes standard classifications. Initially, the creation of the cult of Stefan of Dečani followed the well-known dynastic cult pattern. In the post-Kosovo period, however, it was transformed into a typical martyrial cult. The transformation was made possible by the historical biographical facts, which were incorporated into the saint's Life as well. The main motivation, however, was to accommodate the saintly royal *memoria* to the current religio-political situation. "The historical and hagiographical accounts," the author stresses, "unfold against the same ideological backdrop", whereby a theological notion of the past becomes a tool for interpreting the present. This changeability stands in contradistinction to the unchanging quality of the place of memory embodied in the saint's relics enshrined in his funerary church at the monastery of Dečani. From the perspective of liturgical time, this unchangeability finds expression in the cyclic annual repetition of devotions to the saint. From the perspective of historical time, it too is liable to constant change, which finds expression in the changing reception of Dečani in public memory.

The second chapter of Part Two offers a detailed interpretation of the process of shaping the cult of Stefan of Dečani and the cult's subsequent transformation in public memory (pp. 337–551). Analyzing the process of including Stefan of Dečani among the saints, the author shows that it unfolded within the established framework of medieval political theology and well-known stereotypes, according to which the death is followed by the revelation of the relics, their translation into another shrine and the proclamation of sanctity. Initially, the cult of the holy king, in the forming of which his son, emperor

Dušan, was instrumental, was predominantly dynastic in nature. The essential change occurred in the aftermath of the Battle of Kosovo (1389). The cult of Stefan of Dečani was then accommodated to a different pattern, that of the martyrial cult of prince Lazar, for the purpose of legitimizing the new Lazarević dynasty. Central role in this ideological reshaping was played by Grigorije Camblak (Gregory Tsamblak), the learned *hegoumenos* of Dečani and the writer of the holy king's Life and Office. His writings laid the basis for the spread of the king's saintly cult, but, as a result of the Ottoman invasion and the fall of the Serbian medieval state and church, it remained local in nature and mostly associated with the monastery of Dečani. The cult did not begin to spread until after the Patriarchate of Peć was restored, under Ottoman rule, when Stefan of Dečani was recognized as the moral model of unswerving faith. With the spread of the cult, accompanied by an ever increasing number of the holy king's visual depictions, the monastery of Dečani increasingly gained repute. The stance of the restored Patriarchate became the mainstay of the newly-established Metropolitanate of Karlovci (Karlowitz) within the Habsburg monarchy. In its baroque-style historicism, Stefan of Dečani retained the role of an ideal model, while Dečani emerged as the *topos* of the golden age of the sacralized Serbian land whose restoration as a sovereign state was promulgated at first within Habsburg dynastic patriotism and then within the popular patriotism of the Enlightenment. Its transformation into a national ideology led to the transformation of the Serbian saints into historical heroes. The turning point was the famous *History* of Jovan Rajić, where the Serbian saints were interpreted and visually depicted as secular heroes. This ushered the cult of Stefan of Dečani into a new structure of progressively understood historical time. The new

notions did not find their full expression until the restoration of the Serbian state, when the glorification of the past and its greats became one of the main identity categories. In official culture's symbolic politics Stefan of Dečani was not assigned an important role, but in public national culture he became a favourite hero, as shown by his central role in many visual depictions and historical plays. The historicization of Stefan of Dečani did not, however, imply suppression of his cult. In the nineteenth century it underwent a revival, especially in private popular piety, and the attention of the faithful became focused on the monastery of Dečani, still an unavoidable *topos* of religious and patriotic pilgrimage.

In its theoretical postulates and methodological approach, the book of Smilja Marjanović-Dušanić belongs to the domain of total cultural history. The introduction of a specifically medieval subject into a broader temporal and spatial frame and its multidisciplinary analysis in the light of the history of memory shows more than convincingly how the "vertical" historical approach can elucidate "horizontal" historical strata. Of course, a productive implementation of such an approach to a period of more than six centuries requires outstanding scholarly abilities and erudition, and these are obvious in every single page of this book. The book is furnished with an English summary (pp. 565–583), list of sources (pp. 585–590), bibliography (pp. 591–620), and index (pp. 621–647). Moreover, its 137 mostly colour illustrations fully contribute to the visual presentation of the phenomenon under study.

## Greek Icon Painters in Bulgaria after 1453

Е. Мутафов, И. Гергова, А. Куюмджиев, Е. Попова, Е. Генова, Д. Гонис, *Гръцки зографи в България след 1453 г.* София: Институт за изкуствознание при БАН, 2008. Е. Моутафωф, Е. Γκεργκова, А. Κουγιυмτξιεф, Е. Попова, Е. Γκενова, Δ. Γονιϲ, *Έλλινεϲ αγιογραφοι ϲτη Βουλγαρια μετα το 1453.* Ϲοфια 2008, pp. 272, ills. 337

*Reviewed by* Ljiljana Stošić*

After the already classical two-volume encyclopaedia of post-Byzantine Greek painters (M. Chatzidakis and E. Dracopoulou, *Έλλινες ξωγράφοι μετά την Άλωση*, Athens 1987/97), a Bulgarian team gathered round the Institute of Art History of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences published a bilingual Bulgarian-Greek catalogue *Greek Icon Painters in Bulgaria after 1453*. The realization of this ambitious project was made possible by the previous ten-year work of collecting the material, published as *The Corpus of Eighteenth-Century Bulgarian Icon Painters* (Sofia 2007).

Apart from the catalogue as its most extensive part, the book offers Elena Popova's precious introductory study on Greek painters in Bulgaria between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, which is chronologically divided into the earliest period or the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries and the eighteenth century, while the nineteenth-century painters are additionally discussed by area: southeast Bulgaria (Nesebar, Sozopol), central Bulgaria (Plovdiv, Asenovgrad) and southwest Bulgaria (Melnik, Kyustendil). For each of the eighty icon painters arranged in alphabetic order there is a short biography with their associates, signatures, works and the basic literature. The painters bearing the same name (e.g.

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Athanasios, Demetrios, Jacob, John etc) are listed chronologically, from the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 to 1912. A distinctive quality of the book stems from the large number of colour photographs, most of them published for the first time and showing details such as the painters' signatures. It has been observed that the use of at least two different languages in the icons resulted in many orthographic or dialectal mistakes and omissions. The extensive listed literature is divided according to the script into Cyrillic (mostly Bulgarian), Latin and Greek. The introduction penned by the authors of the catalogue headed by the project director E. Mutafov, is translated into English to serve as the interested reader's reliable guide.

The criteria for inclusion in this catalogue are that the painter came from what is now Greece or that he signed his works exclusively or predominantly in Greek, that he came from the large Greek community in what is now Bulgaria and bore a Greek name, that he was trained on Mount Athos or in some other Greek centre or that his work honoured Greek traditions (local Greek saints). Research based on these criteria has produced a rapidly increasing number of painters: from the few in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to several tens in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The itinerant painters and workshops followed two main routes: from northern Greece, Mount Athos and the islands of Corfu, Thassos, Chios and Crete to southern Bulgaria, and from Brasov and Bucharest to northern Bulgaria. In contrast to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the eighteenth-century icon painters came in part from what is now Albania (Korca) and painted in the so-called international Athonite style, with Greek manuals (*pop* Danilo, Dionysios of Fourna) extensively copied. Many icons from this period are unsigned. If it is established that some of the many Greek workshops produced them, they will be attributed and published in the catalogue currently under preparation.

In terms of style and iconography, the icons painted by Greeks generally show the use of a gold background, intense colours, baroque-rococo chairs with footrests, and marble floors in chequered patterns, and they favour local saints, such as Sts Stylianos, Elephterios, George of Ioaninna, Theodora of Thessalonica or Febronia, or the cult of the Virgin under her various aspects such as Kykkotissa (of Kykkos), Kecharitomene (Full of Grace) or the Unfading Rose.

In order that the full picture of the activity of Greek icon painters across the Balkans can be obtained, a similar task awaits scholars in Romania, Serbia, Macedonia and Albania. For Romania's and Serbia's distinctive and concurrent openness to Russia, Austria and Venice, their catalogues should include not only Greek but all other foreign icon painters and engravers. The use of well-proven documentation and systematization methods would greatly facilitate the work of collecting and publishing the national corpuses, which, taken together, would constitute the Balkan nations' momentous cultural legacy for the future.

Dušan T. Bataković, *Kosovo : Un conflit sans fin ?* Lausanne:
L'Age d'homme, 2008, pp. 318

*Présenté par* Kosta Christitch*

Depuis qu'il a épousé la carrière diplomatique pour représenter la Serbie à l'étranger — hier à Athènes ou à Ottawa, aujourd'hui à Paris — l'historien Dušan T. Bataković n'a guère tourné le dos à sa vocation première. Il vient de le prouver de belle façon en publiant aux éditions de l'Age d'Homme (sous le titre : « Kosovo : un conflit sans fin ? ») un ouvrage important sur la douloureuse question de Kosovo et de Metochie où Serbes et Albanais s'affrontent depuis trois siècles. Excellemment traduit par les frères Slobodan et Marko Despot, ce livre de près de trois cents pages impressionne au premier abord par la richesse exceptionnelle de la bibliographie qu'il offre. Mais une lecture attentive fera vite apparaître que l'on se trouve probablement en présence de la meilleure introduction historique en langue française sur ce sujet brûlant, parce que l'auteur a su utiliser de la meilleure manière son grand savoir : il a privilégié, en effet, la clarté dans tous les méandres de sa narration et l'éloquence des faits dans ses éclairages et ses mises au point

Dušan T. Bataković ne quitte pas un instant le conflit qu'il entend présenter, mais il ne le relate pas de manière linéaire. Il s'attache à décrire aussi chacun des facteurs qui agissent sur ce conflit, soit en le renforçant soit en lui ajoutant une singularité nouvelle. Et ces différents aspects constituent autant de sujets en soi, comme, par exemple, l'islamisation des chrétiens dans les Balkans sous l'occupation ottomane ; ou encore l'instrumentalisation des Albanais par l'Autriche-Hongrie et, plus tard, par l'Italie mussolinienne pour servir les visées de Vienne puis de Rome dans cette contrée. Or, pour pouvoir procéder de la sorte sur la très longue période examinée — qui va de l'âge d'or de la Serbie

médiévale à partir du XIIIe siècle jusqu'à la proclamation d'indépendance du Kosovo en février 2008 — l'auteur a eu recours à un moyen astucieux et efficace. Il a construit son livre avec de courts chapitres, portant chacun sur un sujet précis et concret, et rédigé tous de manière simple et directe. Il y a ainsi trente-sept chapitres qui dépassent rarement dix pages. L'auteur parvient à restituer la diversité qu'implique son récit, mais après l'avoir utilement débroussaillée. Le lecteur n'éprouve à aucun moment le sentiment d'être noyé par la masse des données, comme c'est souvent le cas dans les études relatives aux Balkans ; et il peut reprendre son souffle à chaque chapitre. Là réside une des qualités de l'ouvrage : il est non seulement complet, mais aussi étonnamment lisible.

Dans un même souci de clarté, Bataković ne néglige aucune occasion de se référer au dernier état des connaissances historiques admises dans le monde, lorsqu'il aborde un thème controversé ou simplement rendu délicat par les passions qui s'y attachent. Un seul exemple fournit une illustration particulièrement éloquente : il a trait à l'ascendance illyrienne que les Albanais s'attribuent pour justifier leurs prétentions sur le Kosovo. L'historien écrit dans sa présentation du livre : « Dans l'idéologie nationale contemporaine des Albanais (…) le Kosovo et la Métochie sont des « terres illyriennes ancestrales », et eux-mêmes, en qualité de prétendus descendants des Illyriens, leurs seuls propriétaires légitimes ». Et il ajoute : « Malgré d'importantes recherches archéologiques, linguistiques, anthropologiques et historiques, il n'existe aucune preuve indiquant que les Albanais sont les descendants des

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* Balkan-Infos, Paris

Illyriens ; au contraire, il existe une longue période d'indétermination historique depuis la disparition des Illyriens au VIe siècle jusqu'à l'apparition des Albanais au XIe ». Pour Bataković, il s'agit là d'un cas typique de tradition inventée au cours du XIXe siècle romantique, comme il y en a eu à l'époque pour d'autres peuples que les Albanais. « Dans cette projection, explique-t-il, les Serbes ou les Slaves installés dans la région depuis le VIIe siècle sont considérés comme des intrus indésirables, usurpant depuis treize siècles cette terre ». La conclusion de l'auteur sur ce chapitre mérite d'être citée : « L'absence de fondement historique de la théorie sur les origine illyriennes du peuple albanais n'a pas cependant empêché son développement en élément constitutif de l'identité contemporaine des Albanais ». C'est la constatation froide et un peu navrée d'un authentique scientifique.

La plus grande partie de l'ouvrage (32 chapitres sur 37) est consacrée à la période qui commence avec la formation de la première Yougoslavie et se poursuit jusqu'à l'année 2008. Ce découpage qui privilégie l'histoire récente (dont la durée réelle est autrement plus courte que la période précédente) s'explique par une raison qui tient à la nature du conflit. Jusqu'au début de cette deuxième partie, le conflit étudié se déroule uniquement au sein de l'empire ottoman et figure, avec d'autres cas semblables, au seul chapitre portant sur le sort des chrétiens à l'ombre de la Sublime Porte. Bataković montre, par les chiffres des recensements, que ce conflit prend vraiment corps qu'à la fin du XVIIe siècle, quand de fortes migrations de tribus albanaises islamisées, venues de hauts plateaux d'Albanie, s'installent dans cette région propice à leur expansion et entreprennent de la coloniser. Les migrants mettent à profit le vide qu'un grand exode de Serbes autochtones a laissé derrière lui en 1690. Toujours remuants et portés à l'insoumission, ces Slaves orthodoxes ont soutenu

la Sainte Ligue (réunissant l'Autriche, le Vatican, la Pologne et Venise) venue combattre en terre serbe les Ottomans. Mais ces derniers mettent en déroute les forces catholiques. La crainte des inéluctables représailles turques détermine une importante masse de Serbes, conduite par leur patriarche Arsène III, de quitter la région et se réfugier, à l'invitation de l'empereur romain germanique Léopold de Habsbourg, dans la Hongrie méridionale. Depuis lors, les migrants albanais arrivent par vagues successives avec la ferme détermination de s'imposer et de mettre pleinement à profit dans leur entreprise la ferme soutien de l'occupant ottoman. La noire période de terreur dans laquelle est plongé le peuple serbe, lamine ses rangs par les exodes qu'elle y provoque, et aussi par de soudaines poussées d'islamisation qui engendrent à leur tour des phénomènes d'albanisation. On ne s'attardera pas davantage ici sur cet aspect, sinon pour dire que le livre de Bataković explique bien comment en deux cents ans — soit tout à la fin du XIXe siècle — les Albanais sont devenus majoritaires au Kosovo et Métochie, et le resteront jusqu'à nos jours.

Dans la période à laquelle l'auteur consacre le plus de temps, le conflit ne change pas de nature, puisque l'antagonisme entre Serbes et Albanais se poursuit sur le terrain, les premiers pour s'y maintenir et les seconds pour y développer leur emprise. Mais le décor est entièrement renouvelé. L'action se déroule désormais au sein de la Serbie, intégrée elle-même à la Yougoslavie. Dans l'environnement immédiat, la Turquie n'est plus présente, l'Autriche-Hongrie a disparu et un Etat indépendant albanais a pris place. Tout dépend maintenant du seul destin que connaîtra l'Etat yougoslave. Et le cours des évènements le démontrera. Aussi l'historien se plie-t-il à cette nécessité en procédant à une restitution de l'histoire du pays, vue sous l'angle précis de ce conflit. Le défi lancé ainsi n'est pas mince quand

on connaît l'extrême complexité du sujet et l'ignorance tout aussi grande dans lequel celui est tenu en Occident ; mais la réussite de l'entreprise est complète et remarquable à tous égards. Bataković possède, en effet, une souveraine maîtrise de toutes les données historiques ; il l'a démontrée dans ses livres précédents publiés en français chez le même éditeur depuis 1993 (d'abord « Yougoslavie. Nation, religions, idéologies », puis « Kosovo. La spirale de la haine » et enfin l'ouvrage collectif « Histoire du peuple serbe »). Avec le temps, son savoir ne repose plus seulement sur les livres et les archives, mais aussi sur les réalités brutes qu'il a éprouvées, dans le cas du Kosovo, comme conseiller de l'Eglise orthodoxe serbe à propos du projet portant sur le statut de la région et la protection de l'héritage culturel serbe ; comme membre aussi de l'équipe de négociation de Belgrade dans les derniers pourparlers de Vienne ; et aussi comme ambassadeur de son pays.

Le livre « Kosovo : un conflit sans fin ? » couronne, en vérité, un travail de plus de vingt ans au service de deux passions : celle que l'historien a nourrie pour son métier, et celle que l'auteur éprouve pour le Kosovo, dont sa famille est originaire et qui est demeurée pour lui la plus belle des provinces serbes en raison de ses trésors spirituels et artistiques. C'est par le Kosovo que Bataković a entamé, en 1983 (il avait alors 26 ans), sa carrière d'historien, et c'est sur ce terrain qu'il a livré ses batailles les plus rudes contre ce qu'il a appelé avec pudeur : « La manipulation des faits historiographiques à des fins politiques ». Son livre constitue à cet égard une somme qui défie toute concurrence et mérite d'être largement connue.

### *In Memoriam* Ioannis A. Papadrianos (1931–2009)

#### *by* Milan Ristović*

Ioannis A. Papadrianos, a historian and balkanologist, passed away in Thessaloniki on the second day of 2009. Throughout his career, from 1961 when he chose to discontinue his postgraduate studies in Munich undertaken a year before and to resume them at the School of Philosophy in Belgrade, Ioannis Papadrianos was closely connected with the Serbian academic community, where his outspoken, warm-hearted nature and unconcealed sympathies for Belgrade and Serbia earned him a wide circle of colleagues and friends.

Papadrianos was born in 1931 at Drepano near Nafplion in the Peloponnesus. His early youth and school days in his birthplace and Nafplion were marked by the hardships and deprivation of the Second World War under the Italian and German occupation, and of the ensuing civil war (1946–1949). In 1951 he enrolled at the Faculty of Philosophy in Thessaloniki to study history and archaeology, and graduated in 1956. What greatly contributed to the thoroughness of his education was the fact that he had the opportunity to attend the lectures of some of the then leading Greek professors of history and archaeology, such as Vakalopoulos, Laskaris and Politis.

Papadrianos completed the postgraduate programme in Byzantine studies in Belgrade (1961–1963), as one of the first Greek holders of a Yugoslav government scholarship. For a few years (until 1967) he was an employee at the Greek Embassy in Belgrade. In early 1968 he was elected a member of the Institute for

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Balkan Studies (IMXA) in Thessaloniki, the institution that most of his activity as a researcher and scholar was associated with. For a time, he taught Serbian at the IMXA School of Balkan Languages.

He was appointed lecturer in Balkan history at the Department of History and Archaeology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki in 1988, and later on continued his academic career at the Democritus University of Thrace in Komotini, wherefrom he retired.

Papadrianos's scholarly interest shifted from the late Byzantine towards later periods, but his focus had always been on relations between the Greek-speaking world and its northern South-Slavic neighbourhood. After the initial interest in Byzantium, he embarked upon lifelong and wide-ranging research into the history of the Greek diaspora in South-Slavic areas. Thus the Greek community in Zemun in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the central subject of his doctoral thesis defended in 1985 at the Department of History and Archaeology of Aristotle University.

Serbian historiography is indebted to Papadrianos for the many reviews of the books of Serbian authors he published in Greek specialist journals. He was among the initiators of cooperation between the Serbian and Greek historians and balkanologists, and a contributor to most of their six joint conferences. Furthermore, his texts published in the Greek press during the 1990s helped the Greek public to understand the complex historical backdrop against which the Yugoslav crisis was unfolding.

In addition to the numerous studies and articles Papadrianos contributed to Serbian scholarly journals, in 2007 he published the monograph *Greeks on Serbian soil* translated into Serbian by M. Stojanović (*Grci na srpskom tlu*). He devoted the last years of his life to working intensively on a multi-volume history of the Balkans, which he unfortunately was unable to finish. Energetic and dynamic both in private and in academic life, he was a true lover of the history of the Balkans. What he leaves behind are not only significant scholarly results, but also many friends and colleagues. His Belgrade friends will remember him with affection and respect.