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The origin of the Institute goes back to the Institut des Études balkaniques founded in Belgrade in 1934 as the only of the kind in the Balkans. The initiative came from King Alexander I Karadjordjević, while the Institute’s scholarly profile was created by Ratko Parežanin and Svetozar Spanaćević. The Institute published Revue internationale des Études balkaniques, which assembled most prominent European experts on the Balkans in various disciplines. Its work was banned by the Nazi occupation authorities in 1941. The Institute was not re-established until 1969, under its present-day name and under the auspices of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. It assembled a team of scholars to cover the Balkans from prehistory to the modern age and in a range of different fields of study, such as archaeology, ethnography, anthropology, history, culture, art, literature, law. This multidisciplinary approach remains its long-term orientation.
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The history of the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts has seen two distinct phases but linked by one underlying idea: fostering scholarly interpretation of the past of the region and encouraging the Balkan nations to learn more about and get to better know one another. Within a span of eighty years the Institute was inactive for more than a quarter century: from 1941, when it was closed down at the order of the Nazi German occupying authorities, until 1969. In the first phase of its work the Institute was subsidized by King Alexander I Karadjordjević of Yugoslavia, in the second by the Republic of Serbia through the Serbian Academy of Sciences as its most prestigious scientific institution. Since the pre-war Institute was seen as a royalist establishment by the new communist regime, its post-war successor was given a somewhat more up-to-date name to highlight the scholarly dimension of balkanology, a field of study that brings together various disciplines of humanities and social sciences.¹

It is interesting that the name of the new Institute (Balkanološki institut) in French and English was the same as the name of the old Institute (Balkanski institut). To indicate continuity between the two institutions which share the same mission and more or less the same concept, the new Institute has retained the already widely known logo of the old one. It has been a continuity discreetly suggested, and implicitly confirmed by the scholarly orientation of the new Institute for Balkan Studies. Today, eighty years since the founding of the original Institute, the continuity becomes quite obvious if one compares the themes studied, the titles of monographs, edited volumes and conference publications or the contents of the Institute’s journal. The former Revue internationale des études balkaniques has been re-

named *Balcanica*, again to avoid being ideologically objected to for continuing traditions of the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia, something the Titoist regime would not have allowed. Since the interwar Institute was perceived as a personal project of King Alexander, whose vision was the vision of a pacified Balkans steadily advancing through a team effort in an atmosphere of reconciliation and cooperation, it was necessary that the new Institute should have no association, at least not an obvious one, with the old Institute. As we have seen, this association was discreetly suggested nonetheless, and readily decipherable by those who knew about the interwar Institute and its work. So it happened that all unsold copies of the interwar Institute’s publications were stored in the successor Institute and, in the following years, carefully distributed to interested scholarly institutions in the region and in the world wherever the past of the Balkans was studied.

King Alexander I of Yugoslavia gladly accepted the proposal by the journalist Ratko Parežanin of founding an institute for Balkan studies and became its main sponsor, setting aside as much as 400,000 dinars, a handsome sum at the time. Namely, a need was felt to challenge the widespread stereotypes about the Balkans as a “powder keg” in the backwoods of civilized Europe and draw attention to regional values and achievements which were little known or thought little of in the western world. The idea of starting the Institute essentially revived the old nineteenth-century slogan “Balkans to the Balkan peoples” and coincided with King Alexander’s own political programme of concluding a Balkan pact and establishing lasting peace in the Balkans. But the King was assassinated in Marseilles in October 1934, at the very beginning of his visit to France, by a conspiracy of Croat and Bulgarian nationalists abetted by Hungarian revisionists and sponsored by Mussolini.

The assassination of King Alexander and the French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou, the first victims of fascism on the European international scene, marked the beginning of undermining every effort at intra-Balkan rapprochement and cultural unity which the Balkan Institute was to promote. Its founders, Ratko Parežanin and Svetozar Spanačević, did not throw in the towel though. It is not quite clear whether the financial support of the Court continued or not, but the Institute operated and was receiving a certain government subsidy as an institution of strategic significance. It should be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that authorities interfered in the editorial policy of the Institute, and the contents of the Institute’s journal and books seem to confirm that they did not. The published issues of the *Revue internationale des études balkaniques*, jointly edited by Milan Budimir, a classical philologist and Professor at the University of Belgrade, and Petar Skok, a Romance philologist and Professor at the University of Zagreb, both scholars of international renown, show a journal of
independent scholarly profile with contributors from all Balkan and European countries selected for their widely recognized scholarly achievement. Intended for foreign rather than domestic publics, it was mostly published in French with a few contributions in German and English by the most distinguished balkanologists of the period, from archaeologists and historians to linguists and ethnologists to specialists in folklore studies, anthropology and political geography. The editors selected topics of broader interest to the Balkan and European readers and, in addition to original research studies, occasionally published review articles on some events from national history which were not duly covered by the available literature in world languages.

In the years between the assassination of King Alexander and the invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941, the Institute depended on government funding and, according to the available sources, Parežanin managed to secure government purchase not only of the journal but also of the representative edited volume *Book on the Balkans* in Serbian and other monographs mostly intended for foreign publics. According to Parežanin himself, to cover the costs of printing and honoraria, they needed to sell at least six hundred copies of the *Revue internationale des études balkaniques* out of a press run ranging between 1,300 and 1,600. On the other hand, the subscribers came from all Balkan countries except Albania, and the direct sale of the Institute’s journal and other publications in foreign languages was assisted by the legations of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. There are some indications that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia made donations to the Institute and that it was exempted from some taxes. Such incentives helped the editors and authors to retain most of their independence despite the logistic and financial support provided by the government.

Apart from the *Revue internationale des études balkaniques*, which was intended for a specialist readership, the Institute’s particularly worthy publication was the 800-page two-volume *Book on the Balkans* in Serbian printed in as many as 3,000 copies. It contained seventy odd articles, some reprinted from the journal, others, more general in nature and written in a style accessible to a broader public, the aim of which was to provide an overview of scientific developments and overall cultural circumstances in the Balkans. The *Book on the Balkans* was widely distributed on the recommendation of the Ministry of Education with a view to raising the high school and university students’ awareness of belonging to the Balkan community and of common values shared by the Balkan nations, and to overcoming prejudices and stereotypes the Balkan nations harboured about one another.

The Institute published some exceptionally important editions in Serbian, and in a large press run, such as *Borba za nezavisnost* [The Struggle for Independence] by Vladimir Đorđević, a Serbian polyhistor, and *Jugoslovenska misao* [The Yugoslav Idea] by Ferdo Šišić, a leading Croat historian.
Both books made use of illustrative examples to show that the Balkans in the past had usually been a pawn in the conflicts of great powers with little room for making decisions about its own future, and suggested that it had only been the creation of the common Yugoslav state that made it possible to overcome much of earlier particularisms and lay a sound basis for faster progress in all areas. The Institute also published pamphlets on other Balkan countries, for instance, Turkey; namely, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had maintained friendly relations with Atatürk’s Turkey since King Alexander’s times. Not even such publications had a political dimension to them; they brought statistical overviews of the economic, cultural and scientific progress made in particular areas and their purpose was mainly informative.

Envisioned to be the central publication devoted to contemporary issues, the *Economic Encyclopaedia of the Balkans* under the editorship of Svetozar Spanačević was an ambitious project thwarted by the 1941 Nazi attack on Yugoslavia.

After the invasion of Axis powers and the ensuing dismemberment of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941, the operation of the Institute was banned by a Gestapo order of 27 August 1941, and its archives, publications and a library of 15,000 books were handed over to the German Institute in Belgrade for safekeeping. A particularly painful thorn in the side of the German occupying authorities was a history of Belgrade published by the Institute shortly before the war, at first in Serbian and then in English and French. In 1940 the German Legation in Belgrade had judged it as emphatically anti-German because it lauded the Serbian First World War victories over the Austro-Hungarian and German invaders. On the eve of the war, Yugoslav authorities were compelled to comply with the demarche of Nazi Germany: the edition was withdrawn and the remaining copies burnt. Thus the first Institute for Balkan Studies, which enjoyed the reputation of one of the best scientific institutions in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, was extinguished on account of Serbia’s struggle for freedom.

From the founding in 1962 of the AIESEE, a Balkan-wide association for South-East European studies based in Bucharest under the auspices of UNESCO, there was an encouragement to establish an institute for Balkan studies in Yugoslavia. The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art took the decision to establish the Institute for Balkan Studies (*Balkanološki institut SANU*) in May 1967 and the Institute began operation in July 1969. At its head was the historian Vasa Čubrilović (1897–2000), Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Belgrade, and its first members were archaeologist Nikola Tasić, historian Dimitrije Djordjević, ethnologist Dragoslav Antonijević, medievalist Dragoljub Dragojlović, historian Klime Džambazovski, historian Dušan Lukač, art historian Verena Han, legal scholar Djurica Krstić, Hellenic philologist Miodrag Stojanović,
historian Petar Milosavljević. In the following decades attracted a number of contributors to the journal *Balcanica* and other publications from the country (Hazim Šabanović, Hasan Kaleshi, Milenko Filipović, Milutin Garašanin, Dragoslav Srejović, Dimitrije Bogdanović, Alojz Benac, Bogdan Brukner, Fanula Papazoglu, Milorad Ekmečić, Andrej Mitrović, Dragoljub R. Šević, Bogumil Hrabak, Milka Ivić, Aleksandar Matkovski etc) and abroad (Ivan Dujčev, Nikolaj Todorov, S. A. Nikitin, V. Karasiev, Wayne Vucinich, Dimitrije Djordjević, a founding member of the Institute and subsequently Professor at the UC Santa Barbara, Richard Plaschka, Robert A. Kann, Vladimir Dedijer, Nicolae Ciachir, Gabriela Schubert, Aleksandar Fol, Ioannis Papadrianos and many others).

The founding documents of the Institute specified its scholarly priorities: “To use scholarly methods in researching, studying and resolving issues in the area of balkanology, notably in archaeology, history, linguistics, ethnology, sociology, literary and art history, economics and law, which pertain to at least two Balkan nations or one Balkan and one non-Balkan nation”. The need was also emphasized to intensify cooperation with related institutions in the Balkans and the world. High in the list of priorities was organization of scholarly conferences devoted to Balkan-wide topics in the cited disciplines.

The first issue of the journal *Balcanica* was released in 1970, showing the orientation of the Institute towards multidisciplinary and comparative study of the Balkans from the paleo-Balkan, Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman periods to the age of national revolutions and emergence of independent Balkan states. The first scholarly conference, organized in 1971, was devoted to *Customary law and self-government in the Balkans and south-east Europe*. The journal published on a regular yearly basis assembled a wide circle of distinguished contributors from Europe and the USA, bringing articles in Serbian (Serbo-Croatian) and several foreign languages (English, French, German, Russian), while its Reviews section provided an authoritative critical overview of the current literature in the field of Balkan studies. The Institute published a series of monographs and conference publications, cooperated with all regional Balkan studies centres (Thessaloniki, Sofia, Bucharest) except for Albania, where the Stalinist regime of Enver Hoxha refused all communication with Belgrade for political reasons.

In January 1979 the head of the Institute became Radovan Samardžić (1922–1994), a distinguished historian, Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Belgrade, member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences, widely recognized expert for the period of Ottoman dominance in the Balkans and the Mediterranean dimension of Balkan studies. Under his directorship the Institute continued its series of monographic publications and conferences, expanding its network of connections to almost all centres
Foreword: The Eightieth Anniversary of the Institute

for Balkan studies in the world, from Russia (USSR), Germany and Austria to Italy, France and the USA. During his tenure as Director, Samardžić edited ten issues of Balcanica and twenty monographs, and organized and played host to several international conferences, including the very successful Congress of the AIESEE in 1984 in Belgrade which brought together several hundred participants. The publications of the Institute which met with a particularly positive response were *La culture urbaine des Balkans* and *Migrations in the Balkans*, while its particularly productive cooperation was with the Thessaloniki-based institute of the same name (IMHA), with which several bilateral conferences were held and five volumes of conference proceedings on Serbo-Greek relation over the centuries published (1976, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1987).

In the difficult times of the break-up of the Titoist Yugoslavia and on the eve of the civil war among its peoples, in 1990, the head of the Institute became Nikola Tasić, a distinguished archaeologist, one of the founding members of the Institute and member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Despite all difficulties, the Institute under his directorship did it best to maintain its scholarly connections and cooperation, even after June 1992 when the harsh international sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) even involved a ban on scientific and academic cooperation and exchange of publications. Owing to personal connections and friendships some publications did manage to find their way to Belgrade from the West, while colleagues from Greece and some other countries in the European East, from Russia to Romania, continued to send their journals and other publications, demonstrating disagreement with the first ever international embargo on scientific cooperation in European history. Steering the Institute wisely, Nikola Tasić succeeded in preserving vital channels of international communication and cooperation, and *Balcanica* almost regularly had foreign contributors, while Institute members were guest lecturers abroad and occasionally contributed to foreign journals. Under the directorship of Nikola Tasić, ten regular issues of *Balcanica*, a commemorative issue devoted to the Institute (2000) and thirty-five monographs were published, several conferences were organized, and five Institute members represented the Institute at the AIESEE Congress in Thessaloniki in 1994. An extensive history of Belgrade was published in 1994. In 1996 a conference of directors and representatives of the institutes for Balkan studies from the region (Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey) was held in Belgrade under the auspices of the Institute for Balkan Studies to discuss the attained level of cooperation and set directions for future cooperation.

After democratic changes in Serbia and the FR Yugoslavia in October 2000, regular international cooperation and exchange of publications
has been gradually restored. Nikola Tasić remained in post until his election as Director of the National Museum. He was succeeded as Director of the Institute for Balkan Studies by Ljubinko Radenković, a distinguished ethnologist and folklorist. Under his directorship the operation of the Institute was reorganized in conformity with a new legislation on scientific research. In 2005 D. T. Bataković, a historian, member of the Institute and lecturer at the University of Belgrade, was elected Director of the Institute and remained in office until 2007, when he was appointed to a diplomatic post, but remained the editor of Balcanica even while serving as Ambassador to Canada and France. As Director, he sought to enhance the visibility of the Institute in the international scholarly community and make the work of domestic scholars more readily accessible to foreign publics: a modern website of the Institute in Serbian and English (www.balkaninstitut.com); the annual Balcanica published in English and French; more monographs published in foreign languages. Towards the end of 2007 Nikola Tasić was re-elected to the post of Director and, continuing the productive trend of international cooperation, remained in office until early 2013. Since 2005 Balcanica has improved its national and international rating, attracting new distinguished contributors from France, the USA, Greece, Russia and other centres. Re-elected as Director of the Institute upon his return to Serbia, D. T. Bataković has been in office since February 2013.

Today the Institute for Balkan Studies has a staff of thirty-six researchers, the largest since its foundation, working on six Balkan-oriented interdisciplinary projects that assemble historians, archaeologists, anthropologists, art historians, linguists, legal scholars and folklorists. Each project team includes outside members coming for the most part from the Faculties of Philosophy and Philology of the University of Belgrade as well as foreign scholars from several Balkan and European centres. The Institute is actively engaged in several bilateral and regional projects (Greece, Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, France) and a few European programmes of digitization of written European cultural heritage (ENArC).

Under the earlier statutes and the new Law on the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts of 2010, the Institute for Balkan Studies operates under the auspices of the Department of Historical Sciences of the Academy. This is the reason why most contributions to this issue which commemorates the eightieth anniversary of the Institute come from Serbia’s distinguished scholars, mostly Academy members, and senior research fellows of the Institute.

Editor-in-Chief
Some Reflections on the Migrations of Palaeo-Balkan Peoples in Pre-Roman Times

Abstract: In the history of the central Balkans prior to the Roman conquest migrations of people had manifold importance. The recognition of these migrations has been the basis for distinguishing between different periods of prehistory. Various analyses of the material culture offer information on the social contact between the invaders and the autochthonous populations. They reveal details of the transfer of elements of culture and technological knowledge from one region to another. Of particular significance in this respect are migrations over vast territories, sometimes from as far as the Ural mountains in the east, the Alps in the west and the Pindus in Greece to the south. Investigations into the models of the migrations open up possibilities for determining the variation in, and different forms of, human movement from one geographic area to another.

Keywords: palaeo-Balkan peoples, pre-Roman period, migrations, cultures

"Migrations, movement of people from one region to another" has been a recurring theme of a number of scientific symposia, congresses and conferences; it has remained a matter of debate and argument between scholars from different fields — from archaeologists, historians, and anthropogeographers to contemporary demographers. Migrations were the topic of one of the round tables at the 7th Congress of the Association for South-East Europe that took place in Thessaloniki in 1994. The number of participants was small, but they were of very diverse scientific backgrounds and this demonstrated the exceptional complexity of the issue of migrations, underlining the fact that it cannot be addressed within a single discipline — for instance, using only archaeological evidence, or written sources, or linguistic studies, or historical data. The tracking of the course of migration movements and the research into their multiple aspects, their causes and purposes, require amalgamation and considerations of all relevant interconnected information, including those emerging from anthropological studies. The further we travel into the past, the more we need assistance from other sciences. In the context of large-scale population movements, usually across a vast territory, it is difficult and often impossible to identify all the ethnic groups that are involved in the migrations. One group of migrants prompts another, and jointly they make a journey toward the “promised land” that they have been hearing about from former soldiers or political leaders. It was like this in times before recorded history. Time after time, the will to live and improve the life of a population triggered migration...
waves the scale of which was at first unforeseen, and which swept over immense areas stretching from the Urals and the Caspian Sea in the east to the central and south-east Europe in the west. Up to the time of the Roman conquest of the Balkans, numerous migrations took place, big and small, into and across the region.

Our scientific disciplines have a task before them — to determine the causes of migrations, trace their routes and directions, recognise the resulting changes in the material and symbolic culture, and identify new civilisations rising from the integration of the elements of culture and identity of indigenous and incoming (invasive) populations. Among the reasons behind human migrations, the primary ones would be of economic nature, including the pressure exerted by the strong upon the weak, the movement of pastoralists across their Balkan paths from prehistory up to medieval times; a host of other reasons can be assumed for the movements of variously-sized groups of people from one area to another. An important question arises regarding the internal cultural development of a community: at what stage in the communal life, and in which circumstances does a community, often guided by the desire to lay hands on the wealth of the neighbours, start to expand over adjacent and distant territories? Large-scale migrations are most often initiated by a community displaying high biological potential, but lagging behind in the cultural development compared to the population in the areas to which its movement is directed. There are numerous examples in prehistory and early history of this tendency, for instance the movement of steppe pastoralists (“shepherds”) towards central and south-east Europe; the migrations of Cimmerian and Scythian horsemen into the Danubian region or Asia Minor; the invasions of the Danube region in Serbia, and further, of Hellenistic Greece by the militant Celts from central Europe; incursions into Roman and, later, Byzantine territories by the Sarmatian, Avar, Hun, proto-Bulgarian, Finno-Ugric and many other tribes. The one thing in common to all of these migrations and invasions is the demographic boom characteristic of underdeveloped tribes keen on attaining favourable living areas as well as appropriating the wealth owned by others.

Several chief models of migrations of pre-Roman period can be discerned through the analysis of various causes of movement and relocation of people, of economic or any other nature (transhumance, war migrations, raiding). The first to recognise them was Gordon Childe in his book *The Danube in Prehistory* (Oxford 1929) and some other of his works. One of the most renowned theoretician of prehistoric archaeology (e.g. *The Dawn of European Civilisation*, 1925; *Progress and Archaeology*, 1954; *Social Evolution*, 1951), Childe strongly supported the theory of the development of cultures through migrations. Opposing him are the advocates of autoch-
thronism, that is, gradual evolution of prehistoric cultures from one phase to another. These two conflicting views on the emergence and developments of human cultures have also been manifested in prehistoric archaeology. Admittedly, the polarisation in the opinions was not significantly deep and some scholars adopted both theories as equally possible (for instance Miloje Vasić, Milutin Garašanin, Alojz Benac). In terms of the genesis of prehistoric cultures, of interest is the evolution of Dragoslav Šrejović’s opinion on this. Prior to the discovery of Lepenski Vir, in many of his papers he maintained the migrationist theory when discussing the development of Neolithic cultures (e.g. Vincă and Butmir cultures). Following the investigations at Lepenski Vir, he realised that the ex oriente lux approach cannot be taken for granted, and so he searched for the roots of European civilisation in the central Balkan Danube area.

Without doubt, the unidirectional thinking on the origin of prehistoric cultures in central and south-west Europe, and the inclination toward one of the concepts while excluding the other, is far from being productive. Further, there were dramatic transformations in the material and symbolic cultures in the post-Neolithic period, at the end of the fourth and beginning of the third millennium BC, that indicate changes in the ethnic structure which must, and could, have only been caused by migrations. We, therefore, support viewpoints that take account of both of the methodological and theoretical approaches to the origin of cultures; the role and importance of indigenous developments versus the influence of migrations are likely to have been different between individual cases.

This paper is concerned with the migrationist view of cultural development and we will single out cases that can be directly linked with the movements of people in prehistory. The mechanisms of these movements are sometimes similar regardless of the period with which they are associated — whether distant prehistory or recent transhumance, for example in the area between the Carpathians to the north and the Pindus in the south, or between protohistoric Mycenae and Asia Minor. It would be erroneous, however, not to point out the diversity of migrations and the existence of varied models of population movement which were shaped primarily by the diversity of reasons behind the migrations. Here we shall analyse only some of the most important types of migration using the examples that in the best way illustrate the link between the cause and the effect of these movements.

We have already mentioned migrations that took place across vast geographic areas and which derive from the nature of animal-based economy of prehistoric and proto-historic communities. One finds evidence for these in the fact that the same or similar elements of the material culture were attested in different, often very distant areas, as well as in ancient my-
Some important pieces of information can be found in the earliest written sources. For instance, writings in Linear B script on Knossos tablets describe flocks of sheep (that were sometimes as big as several thousand sheep) and their routes from central Greece and the Peloponnese, across Thrace and into Asia Minor. It is interesting that the owners of sheep flocks would shear their sheep, sell the fleece or even whole flocks, and then return home, only to embark on the same journey to Asia Minor in a few years time. P. Iliyevski speaks about numerous texts from the Mycenaean archives, particularly those that refer to sheep flocks (e.g. 800 of them from Knossos). Long before this, especially from the beginning of the third millennium BC, pastoralism became the major constituent of the prehistoric economy; not local transhumance, practiced within a single region, but fully mobile pastoralism, in constant move between the Carpathians in the north, all the way to the Pindus and the Peloponnese in the south. One of such routes of migration, deriving from the end of the fourth and the start of the third millennium BC, was identified by mapping the archaeological sites representing a unique culture. The elements of this culture can be traced and followed in the area extending from the southern Carpathians and the Oltenia Plain in south-west Romania, across the Danube, over the Homolje mountains, up the Timok valley to the confluence of the Nišava and the South Morava, then stretching over Prepolac into the Kosovo plain, and further to the south, following the foot of the Šara mountain towards Pelagonia, all the way to the Pindus. The culture that developed along this route is in archaeology known as Bubanj-Sâlcuţa-Krivodol complex which also includes Crnobuki-Bakarno Gumno culture in Pelagonia and the sites around the town of Florina in Greece. Pastoralists moved seasonally across this central Balkan “highway” throughout prehistory, and even in medieval times. On these roads we later see the Aromanians, the Šarakatsans, the Karakachans and their flocks, and many other tribes; the origins of their economy and ethnic continuity lay in the distant past.

The Carpathian-Pindus route was only one of possible directions of movement of pastoralists across the Balkans. There were, obviously, other roads which started in the Pindus; one of them led across Epirus and southern Albania, towards the west through Montenegro, reaching the pastoral areas in the far north-west Balkans, thus connecting Dinaric pastures with Greece. In Greek mythology, this direction was known as the road of Kadmos. One other route is relevant for the understanding of the subsequent territorial distribution of the palaeo-Balkan tribes. This one connected Thracian coast of the Aegean Sea (as well as Thessaly and the Pindus) with the Lower Danube and the south-west Carpathian zone, transversing the
Rhodopes and the Balkan highlands. The movements of people and cultures from one region to another, particularly after the great migration of the “steppe pastoralists” to which we shall return below, resulted in the constitution of some of the most influential Palaeo-Balkan peoples: the Illyrians in the west; the Paonians and the Dardanians in the central part; the Triballi, who shared ethnic origin with the Daco-Moesians, in the north; and, lastly, the Thracians, who occupied eastern part of the Peninsula. Initially organised as pastoralist tribes, they were separated by mountain ranges, not rivers. Thus, the pastures on the eastern slopes of the Durmitor and Šara mountains, for example, belonged to one tribe, and those on the western slopes — to the other. The property rights were established via non-written rules which were maintained through customary law, with some likely modifications over time, until the disintegration of the patriarchal society.

The model of “successive migrations” or “gradual movements” has recently been introduced; a version of it was applied in earlier reconstructions of the expansion of some of the Near Eastern Neolithic cultures or Eneolithic steppe cultures from the north-Pontic areas. Essentially, this model assumes the gradual movement of people from one place to another and, in parallel with the existence of primary core areas, the formation of secondary or tertiary centres. Another major trait of these migrations are the three phases of the process: first, the gradual penetration and diffusion of a culture; second, driving the local populations out of the newly occupied land or assimilation of the inhabitants; and third, translocation of the communities that refused to be assimilated, which led to a chain reaction — movements of greater groups of people across a wider area. How this model functioned in practice is best illustrated by the fourth millennium BC migrations of the nomadic steppe pastoralists, in archaeological literature known as the Indo-European migration. This relocation took place over an immense territory extending from, in the east, the Eurasian divide between the Urals and the Caspian Sea, i.e. the area of the Orenburg steppe, to the Pannonian plain and the large part of the Balkan Peninsula in the west. The migrants can be identified primarily by their distinct burial customs, the nomadic economy similar to the extant pastoral systems found in Kyrgyzstan and former Soviet republics and, finally, the limited material culture which is in agreement with the high level of mobility of nomadic pastoralism. The characteristics of the funerary cult and associated rituals are highly recognisable; those displayed by the kurgans (tumuli) in the east are entirely analogous to those observed in the lowlands of the Carpathian basin (the Tisza valley, Banat, the Danube area in Serbia and Romania, and also to the south of the Danube). Tumuli (large earthen mounds) were usually dedicated to a single person, e.g. tribal chief, shaman and the like. In the grave, cut in the centre of the mound, the body of the deceased was placed in a
flexed position on a matting (which is a clear steppic element) and covered in red ochre. Wooden planks were put on top and the earthen mound built, forming a kurgan of about 40 m in diameter and 2 m in height. Animal burials, such as interments of one or more horses alongside the deceased, or chariot burials (such as at Plachidol in Bulgaria) also testify to the nomadic character and mobility of these people. The whole cultural complex and culture were named after this specific burial custom, e.g. “Jamnaja” in Russian, “Jamna” in Serbian, “Pitgrave” in British, “Grubengrab” or “Ok-ergrabkultur” in German literature. This large-scale migration over a huge territory in eastern, central and south-eastern Europe is considered crucial for further development of prehistoric society in Europe and the formation of palaeo-Balkan communities later recorded and described in the earliest written sources. Even if not always directly, this great migration had a far-reaching impact on the subsequent distribution of tribes in the Balkans. The new, Indo-European populations had initially set foot in the Lower Danube and from there they spread into the Carpathian Basin and to the south of the Danube, into Bulgaria and Serbia. Here they indirectly caused movements of the autochthonous people that then, under pressure of hardly benevolent incomers, retreated to the south where they formed new, kin-based communities. This area was already familiar to the natives — it lay on the previously described pastoralist route that they had commonly used; the territorial distribution of the already mentioned tribes (the Illyrians, the Dardanians, the Paeonians, the Triballi, the Thracians and others) was the same as described above.

Another great wave of migration happened in the first millennium BC. This time it was the Cimmerians (Kimmerians) who were driven southward and westward by the Scythians. Their final destinations were the same areas in which the preceding “Indo-European migration” commenced. Given that they were horsemen, the Cimmerians moved swiftly over large expanses of land and so this later migration took place within the shorter period of time than the previous movements of the kind. Other than the material culture, the migrants did not leave much evidence behind. Numerous pieces of horse equipment were discovered in the Pannonian plain, in Srem (Adaševci, Šarengrad, Ilok) and Banat (Ritiševo), as well as in parts of Serbia south of the Sava and the Danube (Sinoševci, Rudovci, Zlotska cave near Bor and so on) and Kosovo (Janjevo). The movement of the Cimmerians was likely the result of a pressure exerted on them by the Scythians who forced them out of the forest-steppe zone of southern Russia towards the Pannonian plain and the Balkan Peninsula. Literary sources describe three directions of the migrations: the north road over the Carpathians towards the upper Tisa/Tisza course and further to the Pannonian plain; the south route which led to the Danube Delta and Dobruja and then westwards to
the southern edges of the Carpathian Basin, branching out to the south and
the north of the Danube; finally, as confirmed in the ancient sources, a mi-
nor route that followed the Black Sea coast from Dobruja to the Bosphorus.
According to some linguists, the name “Bosphorus” is of Cimmerian or
Thraco-Cimmerian origin.

The Scythian tribes that subsequently arrived in the region rapid-
ly advanced along the Danubian and the Carpathian routes, looting and
destroying villages of the native populations on the way. Besides ruins of
indigenous settlements, they also left behind traces of their distinctive ma-
terial culture; above all, weaponry of specific shapes (the “akinakes” dagger,
the trilobate-type arrowheads) and the characteristic jewellery inspired by
animal symbolism.

At the end of the first millennium BC the last major migration in the
south-east Danubian area occurred. This time it was Celtic tribes who, from
the Gaul region (Gallia), set on the “journey without return”. By the fourth
century BC they reached, and spread over most of the Pannonian plain.
After the settling-in period, they invaded Macedonia and Thrace and, ulti-
mately, Hellenistic Greece, with the aim of raiding and robbing the wealth.
These incursions were not merely military actions; accompanying Celtic
warriors were their families, which had not been the case in earlier conflicts
in the region, such as the wars between the Illyrians on one side and the
Macedonian, Thracian and Greek states on the other. Thus Celtic incur-
sions can justifiably be considered as migrations. As recorded in the Greek
written accounts, the defeat at Delphi in 279 BC and the related events
confirm this. Following the defeat, Celtic chief Brennus took his own life in
a ritual manner. One Celtic group crossed into Asia Minor and constituted
their official entity: Gallatia. Another group returned to where they had
started off the invasion; there, in Srem, they founded their state — Civitas
Scordiscorum — as described by Justinus and Ateneus. The Scordisci could
not survive for long in this insecure region, surrounded by the territory of
the Amantini, the Breuci, the Triballi, the Dacians. The initially high war
capacity, reflected in the level of destruction along the Celtic military trail,
plunged; however, there is a considerable body of evidence of their presence
in the area during the second century BC. It includes fortified settlements
of Taurunum and Singidunum, whose names remained the same in Roman
times; the graves of soldiers in Karaburma and Rospi-ćuprija, in Singidu-
num (Belgrade), near Osijek, and in Pećine near Viminacium; a number
of workshops producing and exporting the characteristic Celtic grey ce-
ramic ware — for instance Gomolava in Hrtkovci; several Celtic oppida
in Vojvodina, i.e. hillforts protected by earth walls still visible today, such
as Čarnok near Vrbas, and Židovar near Vršac — the settlement closest to
the territory of the warlike Dacians. As many as nearly fifty more-or-less
investigated Celtic sites are found in Vojvodina and along the Sava and the Danube in Serbia. Exhausted by the wars, the Celts/Scordisci lost their independence around AD 10, when Tiberius conquered the interfluves of the Sava and the Danube. This marked the end of an epoch in Celtic history of intensive warfare and migration, the epoch filled with great successes as well as defeats. It started with invasions and movements from Gallia, then continued with conflicts and settling in the Danube area, and subsequent migrations further to the south. The extremely strong and, from the military aspect, well-trained alliance of Celtic tribes only began to weaken after the disaster at Delphi. Nevertheless, even after they had lost their importance as a powerful force, the Celts were welcomed as mercenaries in Macedonian, Thracian and Greek armies; there are also records, though rare, of Celtic presence in Roman legions.

Migrations and moving of populations in the pre-Roman south-east Europe were of key importance for the subsequent developments and life of people settling in this part of the world. The nearly five centuries-long Roman rulership introduced a sort of equality between many different areas, but some similarities and differences were retained, and they were continuously fuelled by inter-tribal confrontations and the contrasting religious beliefs of the early middle ages.

The divide between Balkan geotectonic units running west from the Drina river served as a boundary between different cultures throughout prehistory of the region. For example, it divided the Balkans into the eastern painted-pottery complex and the western impresso-style ceramic ware — into the Neolithic Vinča complex in the east and the Danilo-Butmir culture complex in the west. This duality was by and large (ab)used for the purpose of gaining political power, a tendency also present in modern times. This, however, is a double-edged sword. Assertions by some modern nations that they descend from palaeo-Balkan peoples have been definitively refuted by the evidence presented in the new research. Claiming territorial rights on Thracian, Dacian, Illyrian, Dardanian, Paeonian or any other land can hardly be justified through presenting it as a quest for ethnic origins. The derogatory reference to the Balkans as a “vegetable medley cooking pot” can, in a way, be upheld by numerous well-documented migrations in the Balkans, mergings and assimilations of peoples, and countless combinations of anthropological types. The findings of recent anthropological research leave no doubt about it.
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The Eastern Celts and their Invasions of Hellenistic Greece and Asia Minor

Abstract: During the fourth century BC the Celts expanded into the Balkan Peninsula and the Carpathian Basin. After the major defeat at Delphi, in Greece, the surviving Celtic tribes formed an alliance under the name Scordisci. They settled in the wider territory around the confluence of the Sava and the Danube, which became a base for their subsequent invasions into Thrace and beyond. The Celtic presence in the region has been best documented by the necropoles in Karaburma (Singidunum) and Pećine (Viminacium). These graveyards had a complex arrangement of burials into groups and sections. The warrior graves contained pieces of weaponry showing decorative elements of both Western and Eastern Celtic art tradition. Some of the female graves contained rich personal adornment such as the coral bracelet and the Münsingen-type fibula in a grave in Pećine. Until the Roman conquest, the Scordisci remained the most powerful military force in the region.

Keywords: Celts, central Balkans, Scordisci, necropoles, warrior graves

The presence of the Celts in western and central Europe came into the focus of Roman and Greek authors only after the Celts had started expanding their territory in the fifth and fourth century BC. The Celtic homeland between the Rhône, Rhine and Danube stretched over an arch-shaped area that included the Alpine foreland in northern Italy and western Austria, and the Danube basin in Moravia. As the nearest northern neighbours, they soon got acquainted with, and started importing various luxury goods from, Rome, Etruria and the Greek colonies. As early as the fifth century BC, the wealth of the southern neighbours and their own enhanced military power inspired the Celts to make risky attempts at conquering the bordering areas of northern Italy.

The surprisingly powerful strike of Celtic armies resulted in first military successes, such as taking control over a large part of the region, making assaults upon Rome, collecting substantial taxes from the local communities, and permanent settling in the newly-conquered territories. There followed, however, a series of wars with the powerful Roman Republic up until the latter half of the second century BC when the alliance of the Celtic tribes of Taurini, Senones and Boii was completely subdued and driven out of its territories.

A century after the incursions of the Western Celts into northern and central Italy, the Eastern Celts consolidated their forces and started
pushing their way into the areas of the modern-day Czech Republic, Moravia and western Slovakia. In the course of the fourth century, they moved southwards into the Balkan Peninsula and occupied the Carpathian Basin and eastern Transylvania, including the areas along the Danube. Towards the end of the fourth century, the Eastern Celts started preparations for invading the eastern and southern Balkans, but this time without any clear strategy for migrations and settling in the potentially occupied territories. The first military campaigns in Thrace and the Aegean coast were unsuccessful and they slowed down the initial wave of expansion. The Celts used this delay in their movement across the peninsula, in the late fourth and early third century BC, to muster a powerful army and concentrate along the Danube in the northern Balkans. This particular period in the history of Celtic settlement in the Balkans is archaeologically documented by the excavation of two large necropoles of the Eastern Celts: Karaburma, in Belgrade, and Pećine, on the very site of the future urban centre of the Roman province of Upper Moesia, Viminacium.

Soon afterwards, the Celts started invading Thrace and conducted several small operations, some of which ended in defeat. Sources state that, in the battle at Lysimachea on the Aegean coast, diadoch Seleucos won a victory over Celtic army by deceiving them. If this was about assessing enemy’s military forces, then the attack on the great oracle of Delphi in central Greece, and the cross-over to Asia Minor, were all about showing off Celtic self-confidence, rather than elements of a well-designed war strategy. Written sources report in detail on these invasions and their outcomes, and describe the complete debacle of the Celts. In 279 BC near Delphi, the Celts were beaten and driven off; the invasion on Asia Minor also ended in defeat and, subsequently, the Celts became mercenaries of the Hellenistic rulers.

Gloating over the failure of the Celtic attack on Delphi, which forced the defeated Celts to retreat northwards, the antique sources provide a good deal of information on the invasion itself and the subsequent developments. The surviving Celtic troops established a new alliance of tribes under a previously unknown name of Scordisci; they settled in the occupied territory at the confluence of the Sava into the Danube. The written sources also provide the name of the seat of the alliance — Singidunum — and this is the earliest identification of the precise geographic position of Belgrade. Leaving aside the historical consequences of the foundation of a Celtic centre in this region, the importance of its location is manifold. The fact that Celtic military campaigns were launched from the Danube region in modern-day Serbia has direct implications for detecting the material evidence of their military presence in the area, and this is a crucial aspect of the research focused on this particular period in prehistory.
Given the continuous efforts of the Celts to conquer new territories through invasions and attacks, it is not surprising that there are no traces of their permanent settlements from this early phase. Celtic cemeteries, on the other hand, constitute definite evidence of their uninterrupted presence in the region. The recent investigations of Celtic sacral structures reveal that differences between the graves of warriors and the female graves rich in grave goods directly reflect the organisation and spatial distribution of burials in the cemeteries from the period of military expeditions. The excavated warrior graves contained major types of weapons of the Eastern Celts from the time of the great invasions. The female graves as a rule contained an assortment of jewellery accessories that can be precisely chronologically determined and that often belonged to two or more generations.

The excavations of the Karaburma necropolis in Singidunum, which partially overlapped with the excavations in Pećine, were conducted during the intensive modern-day building activity in the homonymous part of Belgrade. As a result, the ninety-five Celtic graves discovered in Karaburma, of which some were inhumations, were largely destroyed or damaged by the construction works.

The excavated area of the Early La Tène burial site in Pećine near Kostolac encompassed forty-three graves: seventeen inhumations, seventeen cremations and nine burials of individuals from the local, indigenous populations of the Central Balkan's Iron Age. Within the excavated zone of the necropolis, three different groups or micro-zones of graves were identified. In addition, within each of the groups, several smaller subgroups of burials (e.g. Ia – If) were recognised, probably incorporating members of the same family or inhabitants of the same settlement.

Based on the distribution of individual graves and the type of burial, both Pećine and Karaburma belong to the same class of cemeteries where graves were located on separate ground plots and organised within small or large sub-groups. They, therefore, represent agglomerations of independent micro-zones composed of groups of burials that were in some way connected. The necropolis in Karaburma extends over a much larger area than the one in Pećine. Although it was not completely excavated, the reconstruction of the distribution of burial micro-zones was possible. The necropolis in Pećine was only partially investigated. There the burial plots were located at some distance from one another, a pattern that suggests that the designated cemetery area was not limited. The investigated section of the Pećine necropolis seems to have been in use over a relatively short period. The grave offerings show similarities, but their origin, typology and style appear very diverse, perhaps reflecting individuality of the communities to which the burials belong (Fig. 1).
Apart from the regular offerings of food and drink, warriors were also buried with pieces of personal weaponry which bear stylistic characteristics of both Western and Eastern Celtic populations. The typical, double-edged swords were protected by light scabbards made of iron and worn suspended from a waist-belt ending in iron chains or spindle-shaped links that formed the two sides of a clasp. The scabbard from grave No. 1791 in Pećine still displays its ornamentation — the incised dragon-pair motif in the form of opposed S-shapes with heads facing inwards, resembling a lyre (Fig. 2).

In the history of Celtic art, the dragon-pair motif like this one has been interpreted as symbolising Celtic universal well-being. In art it takes on two patterns: one called “cheerful obstacle racers”, the other labelled “a pair of opposed hippocampi”. Both patterns are associated with the swords from the period of Celtic invasive migrations. As much as they appear restrained in form, they vary in the decoration. The scabbard referred to here is an exceptional example of the latter and later pattern, recognisable by the vegetal or elongated floral ornament, and bearing elements attributed to the early phases of its development. Grave No. 29 of a warrior buried in the cemetery in Karaburma yielded a similar scabbard, though in this case featuring a decoration conforming to the former of the two ornamental patterns.

An important component of the Celtic women’s jewellery sets were fibulae (brooches for fastening clothing) which were highly valued decorative applications. Their form and style varied greatly. In the fourth and third century BC, two types of fibulae seem to have been very popular among Celtic women: the type made in Münsingen (south-west Switzerland) with the characteristic ornament in the form of a rosette inlaid with coral, and the fibulae from the western Czech Republic (the Duchcov type — after the site of Duchcov) recognisable by their knob-decorated back-bent foot that touched the corrugated bow or was wrapped around it. These two types of fibulae are indisputable diagnostic elements crucial for determining the relative and absolute chronology of La Tène artefacts and structures.

The most valuable item in the rich personal adornment from female cremation grave No. 378 in Pećine (Fig. 3) is a bracelet decorated with coral bead embroidery, interred after the funeral. The bracelet is embellished with delicately shaped coral beads incised with symbols and ornaments symmetrically arranged around the central rosette. The most curious aspect of this unique composition is the cuff that served as a foundation on which the beads were fitted. Contrary to the usual practice of creating the cuff out of a piece of bronze sheet, this one is made of iron. As a result, the cuff is fairly heavy and not quite suited for fixing the beads into a solid arrangement; also, through time, beads got covered in a thick layer of rust (Fig. 4a-b). The conservation treatment of the bracelet has improved the visibility of the
ornamental composition depicting stylised skulls surrounded by multiple rows of beads engraved with triskelion motifs. The skull cult and the marked use of the skull motif in the decoration of a single piece of jewellery, along with the high quality of craftsmanship and the ritual message conveyed by the composition, are so far unique in the art of the Eastern Celts. The way in which coral and bronze parts were modelled in the Münsingen-type fibula found among the offerings in female grave No. 982 in Pećine presents an entirely different picture (Fig. 5).

After over a century of rule in Thrace, the sudden split of the Eastern Celts into two factions decided the future of Celtic presence in the Balkans. Until the arrival of the Romans in the early first century BC, the Scordisci remained highly influential and maintained their status as the most powerful military force in the region. At the same time, the Celts in Galatia struggled to maintain their territory established after the migration into Asia Minor in the third century BC. The historic significance and identity of the Galatians would have been lost in conflicts and dynastic wars between the diadochs, in which the Celts took part as hired soldiers, had they not been a well-organised, independent group that stood out from the rest of the Celtic groups mercenaries.

Encouraged by the initial success in the battles they fought as allies of the Hellenistic rulers and interfering in local conflicts, the Galatians went so far as to decide on the amount that the Greek cities in Asia Minor were paying in return for hiring Galatian soldiers. This move led to a revolt of the Hellenistic rulers which, now united under the leadership of the kings of Pergamon, turned against the Galatians and inflicted several severe defeats on them. Eventually, the Galatians ended up confined to the infertile areas of central Anatolia where they settled permanently in the territory of Galatia. However, their adversaries — the Pergamon kings Attalus I and Eumenes II — treated the defeated enemy in an unusual way: they erected a number of triumphal monuments to celebrate their victory, but accorded the central place in the artistic depictions to the Galatians. They are shown as fierce soldiers, and at the same time as accepting the final and inevitable defeat with dignity. This respect for the tradition of the Galatians and their willingness to sacrifice themselves are portrayed in sculptures of the monumental Pergamon Altar, in the monuments of the Acropolis of Athens, and in the frieze in Ephesus, all created in the mid-second century BC. These representations also show typical weapons of the Galatians, that is, of the Eastern Celts and thus serve as a key piece of authentic archaeological evidence.

Ultimately, the territory of Galatia marked the southern border of the expansion of the Eastern Celts. In the central Balkans, they occupied an area from which they prepared their invasions of Greece and Asia Minor.
— the area along the Danube. This historical delineation remained more or less unchanged over the period of three centuries, up to the Roman conquest of the Balkans. Along with the growing domination over the Balkans, the Roman Empire rapidly expanded across Asia Minor, gaining control of the Hellenistic states. Galatia lost its independence and its status as an autochthonous La Tène cultural phenomenon, and was gradually absorbed by Roman provincial culture.

There are now even more arguments to support the claim that the burials of the Galatians’ ancestors in the necropoles of Singidunum, Karaburma and Pećine serve as distinctive documents of the beginning of a short coexistence of three leading cultures in the Balkans of the time: Hellenistic Greece, the militant Romans and the invasive, protohistoric Celts of central and south-east Europe. To the impressive longevity and monumentality of Viminacium has now been added a new aspect through the archaeological reconstruction of its origin, firmly embedded in protohistory.

Bibliography


Fig. 1 Pećine: Layout of burial groups I-III with subgroups a-f
Fig. 2 Pećine: Offerings from warrior grave G 1–3 1791
Fig. 3 Pećine: Offerings from female grave G 1–3 378
Fig. 4a-b Pećine: Coral bracelet with an iron cuff from female grave G 1–3 378
Fig. 5 Pećine: Fibula decorated with a coral rosette from female grave G-3 982
Sava Nemanjić and Serbia between Epiros and Nicaea

Abstract: The authors analyze Serbia's position and politics in relation to the Greek states of Epiros and Nicaea which emerged after the fall of the Byzantine Empire in 1204. The available sources show that Serbia under Stefan the First-Crowned and his successors wisely used the rivalry between the two Greek states, which both sought to present themselves as the lawful successor of the fallen Empire of the Romans, and thus safeguarded her independence. Acting as an adviser to Stefan the First-Crowned and his successors, his brother Sava played a prominent role in conducting this realistic policy.

Keywords: Sava Nemanjić, Stefan the First-Crowned, Serbia, Nicaea, Epiros, Byzantine succession

The Fourth Crusade, ending in the disintegration of the Byzantine Empire (in April 1204) brought about significant political changes in the Balkan Peninsula. In what once was Byzantine territory new states emerged, ruled by Latin rulers or by what was left of the elites of the fallen Empire. Of the newly-created Greek states, two gained some stability and survived through this period: Nicaea under the Laskaris dynasty, which soon became an empire (1208), and Epiros, which took considerably longer to rise to the same status (1225–27).1 Virtually from their very inception, the two rivals sought to present themselves as lawful successors of the Empire of the Romans and to get the upper hand in the struggle for its restoration.2

Of course, the other Balkan states could not escape the maelstrom of upcoming events. Serbia found itself in a very delicate position which required a review of foreign policy and considerable diplomatic skill. And

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2 On the struggle between Epiros and Nicaea for Byzantine legacy, see Alkmini Stavridu-Zafraka, Νίκαια και Ήπειρος τον 13 ούατον, Ιδεολογική αντιπαράθεση στην προσπάθεια του να ανακτήσουν την αυτοκρατορία (Thessaloniki: Bάννας, 1990), which cites the relevant literature.
it was at that time that she managed to gain two extremely important international recognitions which strengthened her position and status fundamentally: in 1217, Grand Prince (veliki župan) Stefan was crowned king by Pope Honorius III, and in 1219 his younger brother, Archimandrite Sava, secured autocephaly for the Serbian Church in Nicaea and was ordained as its first archbishop.

These achievements testify to the political skills of both Stefan Nemanjić and his brother Sava, who was directly involved in shaping Serbia’s foreign policy for decades, and “to whom Stefan [...] entrusted matters of the utmost political sensitivity.” The famous letter of protest against Sava’s consecration as archbishop filed in May 1220 by Demetrios Chomatenos, Archbishop of Ohrid, seems to provide clear evidence for Sava’s diplomatic activity: “Love of his country has taken hold of him and tore him away from the fortress of the Holy Mountain [Mount Athos], and so he returned to Serbia; it has turned a hermit into an administrator of worldly affairs, and made him an ambassador to the neighbouring rulers, and so he sacrificed the seclusion of monastic life to secular intercourse. He is immersed utterly in worldly concerns and worldly vanity, and he takes [...] many servants with him, struts around in cavalcades [...] with his diverse retinue.” These lines clearly show how embittered Chomatenos was, his pride hurt by the secession of the Serbian Church, but they also gives a glimpse of the real political role of Sava, who led many diplomatic missions in a completely secular fashion.

These missions certainly formed part of Serbia’s relations with the Byzantine successor states, and it is only natural to assume that such relations were first established with neighbouring Epiros. In this area, however,
our knowledge amounts to next to nothing. It has been proposed by more recent research to date the wedding between an unknown sister of Stefan Nemanjić and Manuel, brother of the ruler of Epiros Michael I Angelos,\(^6\) to 1207/8. Since earlier scholarship placed this wedding around the year 1216, the reference point being the date of a synodal act of the Archbishopric of Ohrid, this change in the timeline would shed a new light on the nature of Serbia’s relations with the founder of the Epirote state, Michael I Angelos (1205–1214).\(^7\) Namely, it would mean that the wedding took place at a time when, after the death of the Bulgarian Tsar Kaloyan in October 1207, Serbia secured an ally in the southeast, his nephew Strez, which would all suggest that Serbian diplomacy had been gathering strong momentum.

Yet, we are treading on uncertain ground here. Serbia’s earliest reliably documented contacts with Epiros were hostile, as both states laid claim to territories in Albania. The expansion plans of Michael I Angelos were directed towards the north, and in 1212/3 he conquered most of Albania, including Durazzo and Scutari.\(^8\) Since Stefan Nemanja had already permanently conquered Upper and Lower Pulati, as well as Doclea (Duklja), it is not surprising that Stefan the First-Crowned, in his *Life of Saint Simeon*, describes how Michael, “of Greek imperial lineage”, has risen up against him. With the south-eastern border of his realm attacked by the Latin and Bulgarian emperors, Henry I and Boril, Stefan Nemanjić tried to persuade his new enemy to give up the conquered territory, but to no avail. It is not quite certain who acted on behalf of the Grand Prince in this endeavour, but it is known that Archimandrite Sava was still in Serbia at the time, before leaving for Mount Athos again. Having realized the futility of his efforts, Stefan asked his sainted father, St Simeon, for help. St Simeon, in turn, prayed for the intercession of Saint George, and so, in late 1214, it came to

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\(^6\) There is a reference to this marriage in a synodal act of the Archbishopric of Ohrid which also describes the intention of Stefan Nemanjić to marry Maria, daughter of the late Michael I Angelos, but the intention was impracticable due to the degree of kinship between the Grand Prince of Serbia and the Epirote Princess. Cf. Pitra, *Analecta Sacra*, no. 10, col. 49 ff.

\(^7\) For the earlier dating of the marriage (1216), see Marin Drinov, “O nekotoryh trudah Dimitria Homatiana”, *Viz. Vremennik* 1 (1894), 331, n. 2. This dating was accepted by Ljubomir Kovačević, “Žene i deca Stevana Nemanjića”, *Glas SKA* 60 (1901), 6 and 8, and Jireček, *Istorija I*, 167. For the dating to 1207/1208, see Miodrag Purković, *Princeze iz kuće Nemanjića* (Windsor: Avala, 1956), 12 ff; Ferjančić, “Srbija i vizantijski svet”, 107 ff.

pass that Michael I Angelos was murdered by a slave,\textsuperscript{9} which was almost a re-enactment of an event that had taken place earlier that year: Strez, a local lord in Macedonia, died mysteriously after a failed diplomatic mission of Sava Nemanjić.\textsuperscript{10}

Michael was succeeded by his half-brother Theodore I Doukas Angelos Komnenos (1214–1230), an energetic and ambitious ruler whose ultimate goal was to recapture Constantinople and restore the Empire of the Romans. By then, Epiros had been significantly enlarged with territories in Thessaly and Macedonia, so now the attention of the new ruler turned to Thrace.\textsuperscript{11} In such circumstances, understandably enough, the mighty Epirote ruler wanted peace on his border with Serbia. As the other side wanted more or less the same thing, relations between Serbia and Epiros were about to undergo a radical change.

The conciliatory character of this change is attested by a piece of information contained in a document originated by the Archbishopric of Ohrid. It speaks of the wish of Stefan Nemanjić — this time dated with greater precision — to establish marital ties with the Epirote house of Angelos. Namely, Stefan made steps to arrange the marriage of his firstborn son, Radoslav, and Theodora, the daughter of the late Michael I Angelos, during the tenure of Archbishop John Kamateros, i.e. between 1214 and 1217, most likely in 1216/7. Therefore, an embassy of Serbian noblemen (archontes) was sent to Ohrid.\textsuperscript{12} No churchmen were mentioned, which suggests that Sava was not a member of the embassy. Presumably, he had already been on his way to Mount Athos. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Serbian clergy were not aware that this marriage would have been in contravention of canon law, since the would-be spouses were related. As the document clearly states, the Archbishop of Ohrid denied his assent, stating that he had forbidden the marriage between Stefan and Maria, the daughter of Michael Angelos, for the same reason.


\textsuperscript{10} On Strez, his rule and his relations with Stefan Nemanjić, see esp. Radić, “Oblasni gospodari”, 223–234 (with relevant earlier literature).

\textsuperscript{11} On Theodore I Angelos’ policy of conquest, see Nicol, Despotate, 59 ff; Kosta Adžievski, “Potčinuvane na Makedonija od strana na Teodor I Angel i formirane na Solunskoto carstvo”, Istorija XVIII/2 (1982), 125 ff.

\textsuperscript{12} Pitra, Analecta sacra, no. 10, col. 49 ff.
These failed attempts to establish marital ties between the two ruling families did not, however, discourage Grand Prince Stefan. Having been made king, he managed to marry his son Radoslav to Ana, the daughter of Theodore I Angelos. It is obvious that the purpose of this political marriage was to secure the protection of the increasingly powerful Epirote ruler for the heir to the Serbian throne. How important this marriage was for Serbia can be clearly seen from the fact that it is explicitly mentioned only in the Serbian sources. Setting aside Teodosije (Theodosios), who only parenthetically — and erroneously — says that Radoslav is married to the daughter of Theodore I Laskaris, Domentijan (Domentianos) explicitly reports as significant the news that it was Sava who married Radoslav to Ana. Do- mentijan’s claim has tended to be interpreted as the loyal disciple’s desire to extol his teacher in every possible way. But if the whole body of source materials on Sava’s diplomatic activity, which is the focus of our interest here, is taken into account, it seems that Domentijan’s words should be given more credence. Even more so as the more recently proposed and already widely accepted date of the wedding of Radoslav and Ana make Sava’s active role in the event more plausible.

The prevailing view in older scholarship was that the wedding ensued after the conquest of Thessalonike by Theodore I Doukas Angelos in 1224. A more recent careful study of the correspondence of John Apokaukos, Metropolitan of Naupaktos and Theodore’s close associate, has opened the way to new lines of interpretation. The Metropolitan’s letters suggest that the wedding of Radoslav and Ana was celebrated in late 1219 or early 1220, and certainly before the Great Lent, which began on 9 February 1220. The betrothal had probably been celebrated a year before (late 1218 or early 1219).

It should be noted that the degree of kinship between the spouses would have been an obstacle to their marriage under canon law. However, if it is self-explanatory that Theodore I paid no heed to such matters in pursu-

ing his political interest, the silence of Chomatenos, Archbishop of Ohrid, is quite unusual, and quite telling. He did not object to the marriage, but he was to object to the autocephaly of the Serbian Church, although the two events were obviously interconnected and practically simultaneous. And it is exactly this interconnection, i.e. a purely political rationale that made the Archbishop of Ohrid’s restraint on the issue of the marriage a more recommendable stance. But the Archbishop could not display the same restraint when it came to the autocephaly of the Serbian Church. On the other hand, Sava’s part in the marriage of Radoslav and Ana, whatever it may have consisted in, was probably more effective than Chomatenos’ silence, which may be taken as a quite clear indicator of a predominantly political rationale behind, and complexity of, the course of action Serbia followed in the crucial year of 1219.

The new dating of the wedding of Radoslav and Ana is invaluable for better understanding the principles of foreign policy pursued by Stefan Nemanjić and Sava, and the complexity of their political manoeuvres. The effort put into reaching an understanding with Epirus does not mean that Serbia lost sight of the importance of Nicaea. Although still relatively distant from Serbia at the time, Nicaea was exceptionally important in the Orthodox world because it held the imperial and patriarchal crowns. It is not surprising therefore that, in 1219, Sava set off for Nicaea to negotiate autocephaly for the Serbian Church.

What happened in Nicaea was of historical importance for Serbia — the Serbian Church was granted the status of autocephalous archbishopric, and Sava was ordained as its first archbishop. The extensive descriptions of the event by both of Sava’s biographers, Domentijan and Teodosije, match up in many respects. Both claim that the central figures were Emperor Theodore I Laskaris and Sava, who obviously headed the Serbian embassy. Sava, who was received with great respect and honours, told the Emperor of Serbia’s troubles caused by her not having her own archbishop, and asked him pleadingly to order the Patriarch to ordain one of the attendant ecclesiastics as archbishop. The Emperor believed that Sava himself was the worthiest of the office, and Sava agreed, albeit after some prodding. The rite of ordination was performed by Patriarch Manuel Sarantenos, erroneously referred as Germanos by the biographers, and in the presence of Emperor Theodore. As Domentijan puts it, Sava was ordained as archbishop “by the hand of His All-Holiness Patriarch of Constantinople Germanos and by the command of the Emperor Kyr Theodore Laskaris”.

\[17\] Domentijan, 217–222; Domentijan Translation, 113–117; Teodosije, 126–131; Teodosije Translation, 122–125. For basic literature, Cf. Ferjančić, “Srbija i vizantijski svet”, 120, n. 87.
It has been widely accepted that Sava was instrumental for the success of the mission.\(^\text{18}\) It is beyond doubt, however, that it was a diplomatic and ecclesiastical step undertaken as part of a policy agreed upon between, and led by, sometimes literally jointly, the two sons of Stefan Nemanja. It may even be assumed that Sava’s embassy to Nicaea was preceded by an exchange of letters between Stefan Nemanjić and Theodore Laskaris.\(^\text{19}\) The leadership of Serbia were wise enough to realize that ecclesiastical independence could not be obtained from the Archbishopric of Ohrid, since some bishoprics in Serbia were under its jurisdiction. Nicaea, on the other hand, could gladly meet Serbia’s aspirations, seeing such a gesture as a proper way of continuing the political and ecclesiastical ideology of the shattered Empire of the Romans. Nicaea confirmed her right to this ideological legacy, and Serbia significantly elevated her international position and prestige.\(^\text{20}\)

The obtainment of autocephaly from Nicaea and Prince Radoslav’s marriage to Ana Doukaina, the daughter of the ruler of Epiros, should be viewed as a consistent expression of Serbia’s balanced policy towards the politically fragmented Byzantine world. Serbia needed to preserve good relations with all of them, to get each of them to help her achieve her goals which were realistic and attainable, and which certainly were of vital importance for her. There is no doubt that Stefan and Sava pursued a wide-ranging and flexible policy, and the results of such a political strategy were soon visible. On the other hand, Serbia’s Byzantine partners — Epiros and Nicaea, in competition for the Constantinopolitan legacy and threatened by

\(^{18}\) This has been clearly outlined by Joanis Tarnanidis, “Koliko je sv. Sava kao ličnost mogao da utiče na avtokefalnost srpske crkve”, in Vojislav Djurić, ed., Sava Nemanjić – sveti Sava, istorija i predanje: medjunarodni naučni skup, decembar 1976 (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1979), 55–63.


\(^{20}\) The twofold effect of this important act is highlighted by Obolenski (Šest vizantijskih portreta, 155 ff): “Eager to prove their claim to the Byzantine succession, Nicaean authorities saw the Slavic peoples in Eastern Europe as not only their natural but also necessary allies. By granting ecclesiastical privileges to Serbia, Bulgaria, and Russia, the emperors of Nicaea achieved two objectives: they strengthened the loyalty of these churches to the Patriarchate, and gained precious support against the challenge posed by the rulers of Epiros.” As for Serbia, she now had a church which was “de facto if not entirely de jure autocephalous, which immensely increased her international prestige and status. King Stefan the First-Crowned himself strengthened the ties with the ruler of Nicaea, recognized by most Greeks and Slavs as the lawful Emperor of Byzantium.”
the Latins and the Bulgarians — necessarily sought to secure support from the rising Serbian power.\(^{21}\)

Sava could obtain autocephaly for the Serbian Church, as the necessary spiritual counterpart of the Serbian Kingdom, only from Nicaea, the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarchate at the time. And the holders of power in Nicaea did not miss the opportunity to expand their influence. But, as has already been pointed out, it was the Emperor, Theodore I Laskaris, rather than the Patriarch, who played the leading role in receiving, and conferring honours on, the Serbian spiritual leader. It was him who first conversed with Sava, and it was him who made the decision with which the Patriarch concurred. As so many times in Byzantine history, the Church abided by the reason of State.

That the Byzantine world primarily saw Sava’s success in Nicaea as a political phenomenon belonging to the realm of state interest can be seen from the conduct of Epiros. Of course, Demetrios Chomatenos, the Archbishop who lost jurisdiction over the Serbian Church, vehemently protested and cited violation of canon law (in May 1220). But, on the other hand, even before this vehement reaction, Theodore Angelos had given his consent to another contravention of canon law: the engagement, and then marriage, of his daughter Ana to Radoslav (in late 1219 and early 1220 respectively). Thus, Chomatenos’ somewhat belated reaction remained restricted to canonical issues. The discrepant attitudes of the two Epirote loci of power were undoubtedly facilitated by the fact that the Archbishopric of Ohrid, although the most important Church in Epiros, was not the state church in the sense in which the Church of Nicaea and, from that time on, the Church of Serbia were.\(^{22}\) The only reason Theodore I was crowned emperor by the Archbishop of Ohrid was that the Metropolitan of Thessalonike, Constantine Mesopotamites, refused to do it in spite of all pressures, claiming that the Empire and the Patriarchate had already existed.\(^{23}\)

Political interest, i.e. raison d’état, also determined the conduct of the Serbian side in church relations within the Orthodox triangle Nicaea–Epiros–Serbia. Obvious both prior and immediately before the decisive year of 1219, Serbia’s effort to maintain good relations with both Greek

\(^{21}\) The rivalry between Epiros and Nicaea is discussed at length by Stavridu-Zafraka, Νικαιακαί Ήπειροςτον, but apart from a few cursory facts, this useful book accords no special attention to the position of Serbia between the two opposing sides.

\(^{22}\) In the early thirteenth century, there were several mutually independent ecclesiastical centres in Epiros: Ohrid (autocephalous archbishopric), Naupaktos (metropolitanate), Thessalonike (metropolitanate), Kerkyra (metropolitanate); Cf. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros*, 77 ff.

\(^{23}\) Cf. Stavridu-Zafraka, Νικαιακαί Ήπειροςτον, 71 ff.
states did not abate; it remained a political constant. Its spiritual component was not a *conditio sine qua non*, even though a crucial role in it was played by a spiritual leader, Sava. By the way, Chomatenos himself, in his already mentioned statement about Sava’s neglect of monastic vows, observed that the spiritual dream of the leading Serbian figure could not hide the political motivation of his approach.

If it might have seemed in 1219/20, and especially after Chomatenos’ protest, that Serbia had turned to Nicaea, and primarily for ecclesiastical reasons, reality soon proved to be more complex than that. The establishment of marital ties between the ruling houses of Serbia and Epiros did not go without effect. Whether a mere coincidence or not, the Epirote son-in-law Radoslav became, probably soon afterwards, the co-ruler of Serbia with his father, King Štefan Nemanjić.\(^{24}\) As the King himself pointed out, he issued his second charter to Žiča: “with Our most beloved firstborn son Radoslav, whom We have blessed as King of all of this state.”\(^{25}\) This was a novelty in the structure of supreme authority but then again the royal title itself was a novelty. Therefore, positing a direct causal link between Radoslav’s marriage and his new title would seem too bold, especially because he, as the King’s firstborn son, was destined for the highest honours. But, as some of Radoslav’s subsequent actions show, it is certain that his marital ties with the house of Angelos could only contribute to good relations between Serbia and Epiros. The stage for further developments was set. Taking this as the point of departure, and in order to present a comprehensive picture of relations between Serbia, on the one hand, and Epiros and Nicaea, on the other, in the period between the obtainment of autocephaly and Radoslav’s accession, we shall now turn to two particularly significant points: 1) relationship between Sava and Radoslav; and 2) the royal ideology of the wall-painting in the monastery of Mileševa.

1) As is well known, Serbian historiography had long assumed, at times even claimed with certainty, that the reason for the Archbishop Sava’s long journey in the Christian East in 1229 was his discontent with the Grecophile policy of the new king, Štefan Radoslav. The assumption was, however, inferred from a somewhat later correspondence between King Radoslav and the Archbishop of Ohrid, Demetrios Chomatenos, concerning

\(^{24}\) For a comprehensive overview of how the notion of such a status of Radoslav grew to maturity, see Ferjančić, “Srbija i vizantijski svet”, 123–126.

some canonical matters, and from the even later signature Στέφανος ῥήξ ὁ Δούκας.26

The fallaciousness of the arguments explaining a chronologically earlier phenomenon via a later one set aside, it is clear today that none of these arguments is valid in the proposed sense. Sava’s biographers give no ground whatsoever for speculating on Sava’s indisposition towards King Radoslav at the time of his departure for the Holy Land. On the contrary, they highlight the harmonious relationship between the uncle and the nephew, without giving us any reason to doubt the truth of their claims.27 The alleged correspondence between King Radoslav and Chomatenos has been brought into question both in recent and older studies, be it by casting doubt on its authenticity or, at least, by challenging its usefulness for drawing inferences about the main directions of the King’s foreign policy.28 As for the signature containing the name Doukas, its very date (Radoslav was already a king in exile) a priori reduces the possibility of speaking of its political significance.29 Its ideological significance, on the other hand, is unquestionable and far more important than any possible link it might have had with what


27 Domentijan, 262; Domentijan Translation, 150; Teodosije, 166; Teodosije Translation, 159. Cf. Ferjančić, “Srbija i vizantijski svet”, 137, n. 63 (literature).


was the current political orientation. The fact that Radoslav issued the coinage bearing the name Doukas, thereby emulating his grandfather Alexios III Angelos and not some other contemporary emperor of the Romans, as well as the fact that this name had been used much earlier on his engagement ring, mean nothing more than that he was proud of his descent from the imperial family. This was in full conformity with the Byzantine tradition and did not imply any particular political attitude.

2) Apart from the usual portraits of Constantine the Great and his mother Helena, there is in the monastery of Mileševa the portrait of yet another Byzantine emperor, which is quite unusual in Serbian monumental painting. His attire is identical to Constantine’s, but the fresco is damaged around the head and the identifying inscription is illegible, which has given rise to a number of different suggestions as to the emperor’s identity. What seems certain, however, is that the presence of this portrait did not come as the result of relations existing in the sphere of practical politics, but rather that it was a materialization of a more general ideological vision of the hierarchy of rulers, and in an area which was especially important to Serbia and her ruling dynasty. This approach, which the Byzantine world would have found so easy to understand, is of especial importance for grasping the reality of relations in the triangle Serbia–Epiros–Nicaea.

Various attempts to determine the identity of the imperial figure portrayed in Mileševa have apparently ended in identifying the emperor as John III Vatatzes (1222–1254). This identification is favoured by the youthful appearance of the portrayed figure — for Vatatzes was thirty or a little younger at the accession — and by the prestige Nicaea gained in Serbia by having granted autocephaly to her Church. The reigning emperor of Nicaea or, from a formal legal standpoint, of the Roman Empire, would therefore figure in Mileševa as the supreme, ideal protector of the Serbian Church. This seems to carry even more weight in the light of a recently proposed hypothesis that the first Serbian Archbishop, Sava, was the true

points to a more general ideological rather than political background to this form of address.


33 For the most recent paper on this issue, see Vojislav J. Djurić, “*Srpska dinastija i Vizantija na freskama u manastiru Mileševi*”, *Zograf* 22 (1992), 13–27, and specifically on the identification of the Emperor John III Vatatzes, 19–20.
architect behind the construction and fresco programme of Mileševa, the foundation whose creation may best be explained by its intended purpose as the archiepiscopal mausoleum.34

However convincing, and hence widely accepted, the proposed interpretation may seem, it is not the only possible one. Given the fact that Byzantine emperors, except Constantine the Great, were not portrayed in Serbian medieval painting, it is reasonable to assume that the Mileševa exception depicted an emperor held to be of special consequence in the eyes of the Nemanjić.35 When it comes to Nicaea’s merits, the young John Vatatzes in the early years of his reign could not be a “rival” to Theodore I Laskaris. If the young age of the depicted person is an undisputable fact, the latter would, due to his age, have to have been represented in a different way after the illustrious year of 1219, i.e. with a much longer and more prominent beard. Of course, such iconographic details could not be taken as relevant if the portrayed person is not the Emperor of Nicaea, but some other, either contemporary or close to the date of the fresco. But, is such a hypothesis deducible at all?

On the north wall of the narthex, exactly opposite the mysterious emperor, is the portrait of Stefan the First-Crowned in royal attire, with a partially preserved inscription describing him as “son of Saint Simeon Nemanja, son-in-law of the Greek Kyr Alexios”.36 In this way Stefan, some twenty years after the downfall of Alexios III Angelos (1203), continued the tradition set by the circular inscription in the dome of the monastery of Studenica (1208/9), where Nemanja himself is posthumously referred to as “svat [father-in-law of the daughter] of the Greek Emperor Alexios” five years after the latter’s downfall.37 Radoslav would also continue this tradi-

34 Ibid. 23–25.

35 The uniqueness of the Mileševa portrait is not contradicted by the fact that the Byzantine emperors Andronikos II, Andronikos III and John V were portrayed in the narthex of the katholikon of the Monastery of Hilandar. For these portraits and their meaning, see Gordana Babić, “Ikonografski program živopisa u pripratama crkva kralja Milmüntina”, in Vizantijska umetnost početkom XIV veka (Belgrade: Filozofski fakultet, 1978), and her text in Istoriija srpskog naroda I, 480 ff. The three emperors were also portrayed in an Athonite church, which is to say in the territory of the Empire and under the general jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople (from 1312). In making concrete political moves in that area, the Serbian rulers Milutin and Dušan were always careful to take into account the concrete imperial and ecclesiastical rights of Byzantium. Mileševa, situated in the middle of Serbia, was completely unaffected by corresponding ideological connotations.


tion of invoking Alexios III, albeit in a slightly different manner. He would issue the coinage modelled after that of Alexios, occasionally mentioning St Constantine, just as his grandfather had. In Mileševa, Radoslav is depicted next to his father Stefan, wearing the crown of a co-ruler, but the inscription is not legible any more. Therefore the question remains unanswered: do the first Serbian king and his heir stand facing the emperor, their father-in-law and grandfather respectively, to whom the dynasty owed so much? The dynasty which, it should not be forgotten, considered itself virtually from the very beginning as self-governing and hence de facto independent of the rulers of Epiros and Nicaea.

Both issues discussed above show — and that is why we have dwelt on them a little longer — that the scarcity and incompleteness of the available sources may require that a note of relativity be introduced into the discussion. Yet, from whatever aspect the overall situation is looked at, there is no corroborative evidence for the claim that Serbian policy towards Nicaea or Epiros, shaped by Sava to a large extent, gave a preference to one or the other claimant to the Byzantine legacy. The key to understanding the whole situation is the ideological and statehood legacy of Byzantium after its disintegration in 1204.

In that divided and fragmented world — without taking into account the distant and quite distinct Trebizond which staked no claim to universal Roman dominion — for almost twenty years there was only one orthodox emperor, in Nicaea, and one ecumenical patriarch at his side. It was therefore understandable — moreover, it could not be any other way — that Sava looked to Nicaea in matters that were considered to fall under the jurisdiction of the emperor and/or the patriarch. When it came to political matters, however, the approach was far more pragmatic.

The situation became more complex when, after 1225/6, another emperor, albeit without a patriarch at his side, arose in Thessalonike: Radoslav’s father-in-law, Theodore Doukas Angelos. Serbia’s reaction to the new

\[\text{godine: medjunarodni naučni skup povodom 800 godina manastira Studenica i stogodišnjice ŠANU, septembar 1986 (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1988), 44 ff (with earlier literature).}\]

\[38 \text{Cf. Gordana Babić, “Vladislav na ktitorskom portretu u naosu Mileševe”, in Vojislav Djurić, ed., Mileševa u istoriji srpskog naroda: medjunarodni naučni skup povodom sedam i po vekova postojanja, 1985 (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1987), 14; Djurić, “Srpska dinastija i Vizantija”, 18, and fig. 5.}\]

\[39 \text{Cf. Maksimović, “L’idéologie du souverain”, 36.}\]

\[40 \text{Theodore Doukas Angelos seized Thessalonike towards the end of 1224, but was proclaimed emperor later, towards the end of 1225 or sometime in 1226, perhaps even after September 1226, and was crowned only in late May or early June 1227. For this}\]
situation had to be cautious and flexible. Although no details of a consistent conduct are known, Sava’s journey to the East in 1229/30 provides a good glimpse of what its essence was.

Having made his pilgrimage to the holy Christian places in Palestine, the Serbian Archbishop left for Nicæa, and then, on his way home, visited Thessalonike. The political motivation of such an itinerary, meant to express respect to both important Greco-Byzantine centres, is quite obvious. The warm reception with which Sava was met in both was not only a sign of respect for his person; it was also an expression of concurrence with Serbia’s balanced political approach, i.e. an attempt to exert an influence on it. According to Domentijan’s extensive, and Teodosije’s somewhat more concise, account, the expressions of goodwill towards Sava were numerous, and generously supported. A remark made by Teodosije deserves special attention: ημεις χαίνει τιναίναι και ταμία τα βλέπει με τον εξολοθρευτικό του Ράδοσλαβού κράτος με την πρέβελετα τιναίναι και τα περιεχόμενα του Μανδάλα Μακάριου [The emperor and the metropolitan spoke much to the holy man [Sava] about the devout king Radoslav living in love and peace with them].

This remark has already been discussed in scholarship and interpreted in the light of the difficult position Emperor Theodore was in at the time of Sava’s visit; namely, shortly before his conflict with the Bulgarians which ended in his shattering defeat at the Battle of Klokotnitsa in 1230. We believe, however, that a different interpretation may be offered, since, as we have already mentioned, all indications in the sources suggest that the ruler of Epiros, unlike the Archbishop of Ohrid, was friendly disposed to Serbia. In this perspective, it may be indicative that during Sava’s visit to Thessalonike Theodore was not in company with Demetrios Chomatenos, who had crowned the ruler of Epiros, but with the Metropolitan of Thessalonike. It is believed today that just as indicative is the chronology of changes on the throne: some time after the fall of Emperor Theodore of Thessalonike, his son-in-law, Radoslav, was also deposed.

On the other hand, the difference in the way in which Domentijan and Teodosije, accurately quoting the basic regnal titles, refer to the rulers dating, after much controversy in Byzantine studies, see Stavridu-Zafraka, Νίκαια και Ήπειρος, 69–71 (with earlier literature).

41 Domentijan, 276–279; Domentijan Translation, 161 ff; Teodosije, 171 and 173; Teodosije Translation, 163 and 165. Cf. comments by Ferjančić, “Srbija i vizantijski svet”, 137–139.
42 Teodosije, 173.
mentioned in connection with Sava’s journey may also be of some significance. For Domentijan, Emperor John Vatatzes, his predecessor Theodore Laskaris and King Radoslav are pious, while Emperor Theodore Doukas is a friend (of Sava’s).45 For Teodosije, Emperor John Vatatzes and King Radoslav are devout, while no epithets are attributed to the emperors John II Asen and Theodore Doukas.46 It should be noted that in 1243 Domentijan concludes Sava’s Life with the statement that he has written it in the reign of “devout Emperor Kyr Kaloioannis of Greece”, just as he will conclude Nemanja’s Life in 1264 with the statement that he has written it in the reign of “devout Greek Emperor Kyr Michael Palaiologos.”47

The key to understanding Teodosije’s remark on the talks in Thessalonike would, therefore, lie in the ideological sphere rather than in the sphere of so-called Realpolitik. In other words, Theodore Doukas Angelos in all likelihood advised Sava that Serbia recognize his ascension to the imperial throne. What such a demand might have entailed is an open question, but making assumptions is an unrewarding task, unnecessary in fact; for the Battle of Klokotnitsa solved any dilemma that there may have been. When King Vladislav, protégé of the Bulgarian Emperor John II Asen, made his appearance on the stage, Serbia’s relations with Epiros and Nicaea were temporarily relegated to the background. Consequently, there are no original reports on such relations from the period of his reign. But, some kind of Sava’s political legacy seems to have lived on in the fact that King Uroš I pursued a pragmatic policy of balance of power towards Epiros and Nicaea.

Bibliography and sources


45 See n. 41 above.
46 See n. 41.
47 Domentijan, Život Svetoga Save, 344; Domentijan Translation, 216; Život Svetoga Simeuna, 116; Domentijan Translation, 317.


Smičiklas, Tadija. *Codex diplomaticus regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae* III. Zagreb 1906.


Abstract: The focus of the paper is on the eulogiae that Sava of Serbia, on his pilgrimage in the Holy Land, sent to the abbot of Studenica, Spyridon: a little cross, a little belt, a little towel and a little stone. In his letter accompanying the gifts, the earliest surviving work of Serbian epistolary literature, Sava points to their prayer and protective function. Sava’s eulogiae are looked at against the background of Eastern Christian devotional practices.

Keywords: eulogiae, pilgrimage, Holy Land, St Sava of Serbia

The letter that St Sava of Serbia while on his pilgrimage to Jerusalem sent to Spyridon, abbot of the monastery of Studenica, contains the following lines: “And here is what I’ve found in this place; I’m giving you, as a blessing, a little cross, to wear it as a memento, and a little belt, for I’ve laid it onto the Sepulchre. Pray with this cross, wear it always round your neck, even if you have another icon, wear it always. And the little belt, put it on, let it always be around your hips, for I’ve laid it onto the Sepulchre, the little belt, and the little cross. And I’ve put together such a prayer that I wish to God every Christian may pray for me in that way! And I’m giving you the little towel I’ve been given here, now I’m giving it to you as a blessing for your soul and body. And a little stone, which I’ve found, to serve many a need of yours, and for you to carry it on you.”1 Even though this reference to the eulogiae that St Sava acquired in the Holy Land is the only such in medieval Serbian religious practice and offers variously interesting information, it has not elicited much scholarly attention.2 Therefore, Sava’s eulogiae by all means deserve a separate essay.

The topic at hand needs to be placed in a broader context, the context of the centuries-old Christian custom of making pilgrimages to the Holy

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2 See the preface of D. Bogdanović to the Collected Writings of St Sava, 19; T. Jovanović, ed., Sveta zemlja u srpskoj književnosti od XIII do kraja XVIII veka (Belgrade: Čigoja, 2007), 10.
Land. Its original meaning, essentially unchanged since its inception, is the need for an “exile”, a temporary abandonment of one’s own identity and everyday habits in pursuit of holiness and closeness with the divine. There have been in the Christian world many loca sancta, places of extraordinary charisma where the divine force is believed to manifest itself more potently. The most highly revered of them all was the Holy Land, the space made sacred through the presence of Christ himself, and through the actions of the leading protagonists of biblical history. A special status, needless to say, was enjoyed by Jerusalem, a scene of biblical history, a city where the historical memory of Christians was transformed into an eternal, eschatological reality. Scores of pilgrims from all corners of the world who, over the centuries, embarked onto the long and hazardous journey to the Holy Land were led by the firm belief in the possibility of immediate, physical contact with the past and sanctity. This belief opened the way for their empathic participation in the events of biblical history and their “real” partaking in the mystery of the Incarnation and Passion of Christ.3

Pilgrims to the Holy Land were not just partakers in sanctity. They believed they could take “pieces of sanctity” with them back home. These “pieces” were distinctive souvenirs known as eulogiae or “blessings” (benedictiones).4 The notion itself was quite broad. The eulogia could be immaterial and consist in contact with a relic — through kissing, prostrating or any other form of physical contact. It has already been remarked that, unlike the modern tourist whose main motive is “sightseeing”, what the medieval pilgrim considered important was not only the visual but also the tactile aspect of his journey. Exemplary in that sense is the statement of Paulinus of Nola that the “principal motive which draws people to Jerusalem is the desire to see and touch the places where Christ was present in the

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 Yet, eulogiae as a rule belonged to material reality: natural matter such as earth, dust, water or stone, or substances in everyday use such as oil and wax. Unlike the relics in the narrow sense, where the possibility of their being broken into smaller pieces was limited, and so was their distribution, eulogiae — “secondary relics” consecrated through contact with “true” relics — could be endlessly multiplied, thereby becoming available to broad layers of people. The theological doctrine of God’s power being present in each and every particle of the matter that had been in contact with a relic lay at the heart of the belief in the miraculous, notably prophylactic and healing, powers of eulogiae. How strong and widespread this belief was can be seen from the fact that relics and eulogiae became part of everyday life and an important ingredient of popular piety already in early Christian times.6 Convincing proofs of the powerful spiritual experience of the pilgrim who possessed them, and of his exceptional status of a “chosen person”, these objects travelled all around the Christian world, at times in quite simple, unadorned “containers”. Yet, the need to ensure that pilgrims can take them home with them gave rise, in the vicinity of some holy places, to entire industries of cult objects — such as leaden or terracotta ampullae, votive plaques and stamps with appropriate inscriptions and images — commonly termed “pilgrimage art”.7

St Sava of Serbia (1175/6–1236), the first head of the autocephalous Serbian Church and one of the most remarkable figures of the Eastern Christian world in the early decades of the thirteenth century, was well aware of the manifold significance of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, to which his biographers left us more than one enlightening reference. Programmatic in character is the statement of his first biographer, Domentijan (Domentianos), that Sava set two paths for his “fatherland” to follow: besides the

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“large and wide” path to Mount Athos, he “restored the most glorious path to Jerusalem, ever preparing all for heavenly life … desiring that all may be brought to the heavenly kingdom”. In this way the learned writer emphasizes the notion of Jerusalem as the supreme model of sacredness — a messianic city and a link between Old and New Testament history — as well as the role of that model in the process of sanctifying a collectivity, i.e. of creating a “perfect”, historically legitimate people. The notion of Jerusalem at the heart of which lies the idea of the heavenly city — eschatological and soteriological in its nature and ultimate purpose — had its physical counterpart, the real Jerusalem and its holy places and relics. According to the biographers, Sava of Serbia had a “genuine desire” to make a pilgrimage to the holy city, and to “honour the saving and life-giving tomb of Christ our God, and all other holy places”. It is worth noting that Sava's motive for pilgrimage was interpreted in terms of the original Christian idea of *peregrinatio* as a distinctive form of “exile” which involves leaving one’s own local environment and abandoning all that is “one’s own” to offer veneration to the holy places. It is exactly in these terms that Domentijan's claim should be understood that Sava thought of himself as being a “stranger on earth”, which was the reason why he decided to follow Christ and to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem and its holy places, i.e. “to live through this treacherous life and to suffer at least a little in emulation of his Lord”. Sava of Serbia made two pilgrimages to the Holy Land, in 1229 and 1234/5. His first journey has recently been given a detailed study, considerably expanding our knowledge about not only his itinerary, the holy places

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11 Domentijan, *Život*, 170–171; on the original notion of pilgrimage, Cf. the literature cited in n. 3 above.
he visited and the persons he met but also about the influence his firsthand experiences would likely have had on the Serbian architecture and art of the period.\textsuperscript{12} At any rate, with his journeys the practice of pilgrimage to the Holy Land was established in Serbia. In later times, this practice, along with a sojourn on Mount Athos, became something of a pattern, a desirable if not mandatory stage in the career of the heads of the Serbian Church.\textsuperscript{13}

As the surviving sources clearly suggest, on his journeys in the East Sava put particular effort into acquiring various valuable and holy objects — relics, icons and sumptuous church objects — for which he obviously had a marked affinity.\textsuperscript{14} Central to the success of his effort were the circumstances in which the Christian world found itself after the fall of Constantinople in 1204, when the capital city’s treasures became the object of not only unprecedented looting but also of a very lucrative trade. The ways in which Sava came in possession of various valuable objects are related in detail by his biographers. In several places they mention sumptuous gifts he was given by the prominent secular and ecclesiastical figures he met.\textsuperscript{15} No doubt the most precious of all was a sliver of the True Cross he was given as a gift by John III Vatatzes.\textsuperscript{16} Some of the gifts, even though they did not belong to the category of holy objects, were highly valued because their exotic Eastern origin made them difficult to acquire. Such were the gifts of the sultan of Egypt: “balm oil, and a large chunk of valuable aloe wood, and sweet-smelling Indian aromata, confections and dates.”\textsuperscript{17} Yet, the sources clearly suggest that Sava, availing himself of the wide array of “goods” offered on the market, “collected” most of the valuables “by purchase”. Domentijan mentions “various eastern holy objects, apostolic honours and patriarchal attires, nice-smelling censers”.\textsuperscript{18} Teodosije (Theodosios) goes into more
detail. Apart from speaking generally about “holy church needs”, he lists “holy church vessels”, “holy vestments”, “golden candlesticks set with precious stones and pearls”. Sava particularly focused on acquiring relics of the saints.\textsuperscript{19} Given the Serbian archbishop’s repute, connections and financial standing, it seems quite likely that he had plenty of opportunity to procure some really precious relics of proven origin and authenticity.

The ultimate purpose of Sava’s systematic collecting of Christian objects and relics during his journeys in the East is described by Teodosije: “the holy archbishop, if he found something honourable or holy, he would buy it, intending to take it to his fatherland”. Sava’s motives for these acquisitions should be interpreted in a broader context, above all in the light of his wish to furnish the ruling Nemanjić family’s newly-built foundations with prestigious church objects and relics. On the other hand, given that the archbishop was familiar with the higher, theological significance and ideological function of \textit{ars sacra} objects, it cannot be a coincidence that he put particular effort into procuring highly-venerated Christian relics. The purpose of his undertaking can perhaps be most clearly read from the testamentary instruction he gave on his deathbed in Turnovo, that the collected valuables be taken to Studenica — the royal mausoleum, and to Žiča — the cathedral and coronation church, i.e. two major state and dynasty centres of Serbia at the time.\textsuperscript{20} The highest point of the programmatic use of relics to emphasize the sacral legitimacy of the Nemanjić dynasty was the programme carried out at Žiča, which involved the most highly venerated Christian relics — those associated with Christ, the Virgin, St John the Baptist, and other eminent protagonists of biblical history.\textsuperscript{21} As is well known, in the context of a new balance of power that was emerging after the demise of Byzantium (1204), such programmes had a particular significance. The “transfer of sanctity”, in its various forms, served the purpose of confirming royal identity, dynastic representation and the legitimacy of the new polities that emerged on the ruins of the Empire of the Romans.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{19} Teodosije, Žitija, 246–248.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.


This overview, somewhat lengthier, of the pilgrimages of the first Serbian archbishop and his acquisitions seems a pertinent framework for discussing the actual topic of this paper: the Holy Land eulogiae that St Sava sent to the abbot of Studenica. The “souvenirs” listed in the letter to abbot Spyridon — the little cross (κριτσάκι), the little belt (παμκάκι), the little towel (ούμπρακι) and the little stone (καμικάκι) — were objects very different from Sava’s precious acquisitions in nature and purpose, especially from the famed relics intended as instruments of representation, dynastic as well as ecclesiastical. These eulogiae belonged to the domain of private piety and their intended function was protective and prophylactic. The fact is telling in itself that the nouns denoting all four eulogiae are in diminutive form. This does not simply suggest their small size, but rather their distinctive, private nature. It is well known that wearing an “amulet” or an apotropaic object was a widespread custom in the Byzantine world, deeply rooted in the tradition of Greco-Roman magic. Carrying such objects next to the body was believed to protect against evil spirits, illness and all manner of perils.23

Let us take a quick look at each of the four eulogiae. The little cross, which is at the top of the Serbian archbishop’s list, has since the earliest Christian times been the most commonly used “lucky charm”. The form and craftsmanship of this piece of “religious jewellery” ranged from the simplest shape and material to ornamented encolpia and sumptuous pectorals enclosing a relic. Research, archaeological most of all, has shown that crosses were frequently worn together with other protective “charms”, encolpia in particular. Very popular from the twelfth century on, and especially in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, were rectangular or round encolpia, in fact small icons worn next to the body. These favourite artefacts of private and popular piety were believed to protect their owners, inciting them to prayer at the same time.24 It is exactly along these lines that Sava’s message


to Spyridon: “Pray with this cross, wear it always round your neck, even if you have another icon”, should be interpreted.\textsuperscript{25} Sava does not fail to emphasize, and twice, that he has laid the little cross — and the little belt — on the Lord’s sepulchre. As we have already said, tactile contact with the holy was an essential element of pilgrimage, for such physical contact was believed to be the source of charismatic spiritual strength. The belief in its “transmittability” is convincingly illustrated by the eulogiae from illustrious holy places: the earth and dust from around the column of St Symeon Stilites, the oil from the lamps on the grave of St Menas, the dust-manna from the grave of St John at Ephesos, the \textit{myron} from the grave of St Demetrios of Thessalonike etc.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, objects consecrated through contact with a highly revered ascetic, one enjoying the status of a holy man, were also considered to be eulogiae.\textsuperscript{27}

Yet, contact with the Lord’s sepulchre, the most highly venerated “contact relic” of Christendom, provided a eulogia with exceptional charisma and protective powers, and its owner with particular respect. The still living practice of laying various objects on the Lord’s tomb is referred to in many written sources. Thus, for example, Gregory of Tours (sixth century) notes down that the earth around the sepulchre is being sprinkled with water and shaped into small balls which then are distributed across Christendom.\textsuperscript{28} One of the best known testimonies is left by an anonymous pilgrim from Piacenza (sixth century). He describes the custom of bringing earth into the edifice of the Lord’s sepulchre so that “those who enter can take it with them as a blessing”, and then describes the preparation of holy oil through contact with the relic of the True Cross.\textsuperscript{29} Many later sources also refer to various objects consecrated through contact with the

\textsuperscript{25} Sveti Sava, \textit{Sabrani spisi}, 138.


\textsuperscript{27} This is documented in the case of St Lazaros of Mt. Galesion: the \textit{eulogiae} received from his hands were considered to grant Lazaros’ blessing and protection, Cf. R. Greenfield, \textit{The Life of Lazaros of Mt. Galesion: An Eleventh-Century Pillar Saint} (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 2000), 162–165, 203; R. Greenfield, “Drawn to the Blazing Beacon: Visitors and Pilgrims to the Living Holy Man and the Case of Lazaros of Mount Galesion”, \textit{DOP} 56 (2002), 213–241.

\textsuperscript{28} Translation in R. Van Dam, \textit{Glory of Martyrs} (Liverpool University Press, 1988), 27.

holiest of Jerusalem’s relics, above all the oil from the many lamps that were burning there all the time, but also bands and pieces of textile of the exacts size as the tomb on which they were laid.\textsuperscript{30} Being able to cling closely to the holy, textiles were especially suitable eulogiae, and it is not surprising that they frequently figure as such in the sources.\textsuperscript{31} Sava’s brief description does not give us a clue as to the material from which the “little belt” he laid on the Lord’s sepulchre was made. Nonetheless, that it must have been an extraordinary gift follows clearly from his words to Spyridon, “put it on, let it always be around your hips”.\textsuperscript{32} We have no particulars of the “little towel” either, or of the holy relic to the action of which it was exposed, but we have the important piece of information that Sava received it as a gift — which was part of the usual religious practice in the Holy Land, especially when distinguished persons were involved. Equally indicative is Sava’s message that he is sending Spyridon the “little cloth” “as a blessing for the soul and body”, which contains the literal translation of the word “eulogia” into Old Serbian (\textit{blagoslovenje}).

The last of the four “souvenirs” is quite interesting. Namely, the “little stone” was not a gift and it was not in contact with any particular holy relic. As Sava says himself, he “found” it — apparently somewhere along the way from one Jerusalem’s holy place to another. So, in a sense, this eulogia bears the most personal imprint and communicates an innermost feeling. Incidentally, stones from the Holy Land, especially from Jerusalem, were the most usual but no less valued type of eulogiae. In this case, an “ordinary” piece of natural matter assumed “extraordinary” and supernatural qualities — not only by virtue of the immanent holiness of the locality whose integral part it was, but also by virtue of the way believers perceived it or, more precisely, by virtue of the immense religious fervour and veneration that they infused into it. The substance had a symbolic meaning and an emphatically biblical connotation as well. The rock on which Christ built the church (Mt 16:18) was a universally understood symbol of firm, unswerving faith and, also, a personification of the apostle Peter, while the “spiritual rock” from the First Epistle to the Corinthians (10:4) was a metaphor for Christ himself.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{31} Bagatti, “\textit{Eulogie Palestinesi}”, 131–132; Maraval, \textit{Lieux saints}, 238; Frank, “\textit{Loca Sancta}”, 194; the relationship between textiles and relics has been discusses by M. Martiniani-Reber, “Le rôle des étoffes dans le culte des reliques au moyen âge”, \textit{Bulletin du CIETA} (1992), 53–58; C. Metzger, “Textiles and the cult of relics”, \textit{Antiquité Tardive} 12 (2004), 183–186.
\textsuperscript{32} Sveti Sava, \textit{Sabrani spisi}, 138.
\textsuperscript{33} On the stones from the Holy Land, see Bagatti, “\textit{Eulogie Palestinesi}”, passim; S. Lerou, “L’usage des reliques du Christ par les empereurs aux XI\textsuperscript{e} et XII\textsuperscript{e} siècle”, in \textit{Byzance et
How popular and venerated this type of eulogiae was can be seen from the fact that some were enshrined in sumptuous reliquaries. Certainly the best known of these is the small wooden chest (made in Syria or Palestine in the sixth century) which enshrines stones collected from a number of sites associated with the central gospel events. Each of the stones bears a “tag” of origin, and has its visual equivalent in the scenes painted on the lid of the chest. Small stone fragments from the Holy Land were sometimes kept in encoplia, and in staurothekai, together with particles of the True Cross. Such reliquaries, needless to say, were rare and prestigious objects affordable only by members of social elites. Stones, on the other hand, were there for all to take, even the humblest pilgrim. Available in virtually limitless quantities, yet possessing extraordinary qualities, and easily transportable, these small stones were more than Holy Land memorabilia, they were considered a sort of amulets. Sava’s message to Spyridon, that the stone he is sending him should serve “many a need” of his, and the advice to “carry it on him”, should be understood along these lines. Sava’s gesture calls to mind associations that go far beyond his own time and its motivations. Understandably enough, close similarity between the medieval and contemporary liking for simple, “elementary” Holy Land memorabilia, especially for stone of diverse types, provenance and degrees of crafting, has already been noticed and commented. Notwithstanding all differences, the basic impulse of the medieval pilgrim and the modern tourist has one thing in common: the

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37 Sveti Sava, Sabrani spisi, 138.

38 C. Coleman & J. Elsner, Pilgrimage. Past and Present in the World Religions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Robinson, “From Altar to Amulet”, 111; characteristic in this sense is a rich internet offer of souvenirs, including crosses and other accessories made from the stone from the Holy Land. One of particularly characteristic ads is posted by The Jerusalem Stone: “Keep a piece of the Holy City with you ... And hold her spirit and her soul forever” (www.holylandstone).
urge to bring back home a tangible piece of sanctity as a lasting memento and an effective talisman.

At any rate, the intended purpose of Sava of Serbia’s Holy Land eulogiae is noticeably different from his usual approach to the relics of Eastern origin. Namely, as we have seen, the approach of the first Serbian archbishop and main ideologist of the early Nemanjić period was markedly programmatic, the ultimate goal having been to secure the sacral legitimation of the state and dynasty. Judging by the available sources, his motives were much the same when it comes to important eulogiae. A good example in that sense is the myron flowing from the grave of his sainted father, St Simeon. The exudation of myron was the main manifestation of Simeon’s miracle working power and therefore an essential element of the cult of the founder of the dynasty and first Serbian saint. The glass vial containing St Simeon’s myron that Sava, according to his biographers, used in some at once delicate and momentous political situations was a “secondary relic”, more precisely, a eulogia. Its prototype was the ampullae with the myron of St Demetrios — Simeon’s role model as a saint in several essential aspects, especially that of a “fatherland lover”, i.e. the saintly protector of the state. In this sense, the function of that eulogia certainly had an emphatically ideological dimension.

Unlike the examples cited above, the eulogiae that Sava sent to the abbot of Studenica were a personal gift intended for private piety. And his whole letter strikes the same tone — outspoken and chatty, heartfelt and warm. In this first example of the epistolary genre in old Serbian literature, Sava tells his “dearest beautiful son” and “sweet child” about the previous stages of his journey and his further plans, about his visits to holy places, but also about the illness that is affecting him and his retinue because the “laborious travelling” is taking its toll. Even from as far from home as he

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40 The glass vial (staklenica) containing the myron of St Symeon is mentioned by Domijan, Život, 306–307; and Teodosije, Žitića, 15 and 159.

is, Sava expresses a genuine fatherly concern for Spyridon himself and for the whole monastic community of Studenica. The emotions emanating from the letter and the selection of Holy Land memorabilia offer a singular glimpse of the “human side” of a man who, in his times, was the holder of highest titles and the embodiment of most important institutions.

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— *Relikvija Časnog krsta u srednjovekovnoj Srbijii* (in press).


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A Millennium of Belgrade (Sixth–Sixteenth Centuries)
A Short Overview

Abstract: This paper gives an overview of the history of Belgrade from the reign of Justinian I (527–565), i.e. the time of Slavic settlement, to the Ottoman conquest in 1521. The millennium can be divided into three thematic and chronological units: the Byzantine era (up to 1204), the Serbian era and, finally, the Ottoman era (fifteenth–sixteenth centuries). Within the Byzantine cultural orbit, and especially during the twelfth century, the city played a major role in the relations between the Byzantine Empire and Hungary. Byzantine emperors sojourned in Belgrade on multiple occasions. The city reached its peak during the reign of Despot Stefan in the early fifteenth century. After his death in 1427, the Ottoman threat cast its shadow over the city. Its inhabitants, the Serbs, defended Belgrade for almost a century (1427–1521), thus defending the whole of Central Europe. Belgrade’s fall into the Ottoman hands was followed by the demise of the Kingdom of Hungary in 1526. Even Vienna was threatened by the Ottomans, in 1529.

Keywords: Belgrade, history, Byzantine Empire, Serbian capital, King Dragutin, Despot Stefan Lazarević, Hungary, Serbs and Ottomans

The Byzantine Era

At the time of the migration of populations, Singidunum was attacked by various peoples crossing the Balkan Peninsula in their campaigns or halting in the nearby Danube and Tisa basins. The Huns came first, in 441, followed by the Ostrogoths and the Heruls. Their looting raids came one after another, causing great tribulation in the settlements on their paths. Devastation and destruction caused immense damage and gradually threatened the very survival of the late Roman order in this region. It became clear that only a complete reconstruction of the defence system could save the Empire. Justinian I (527–565) tried to do just that; he took steps to adapt the isolated border fortresses on the Danube to the possibilities of the time and the needs of the land. He renovated old fortresses and built new strongholds. The society of the sixth century was not capable of defending the large military camp in Singidunum. During this period, like elsewhere in Europe, new smaller strongholds were being built inside Roman fortifications. The partially destroyed military camp of Singidunum was also
renovated and, it seems, made smaller.\(^1\) The city underwent other changes too. Due to the innovations introduced by Emperor Justinian I, as well as to developments in everyday life, bishops assumed the role of greater importance in the region that had gained some administrative rights. With the co-operation of a small body made up from the ranks of prominent men and administrative officials, they obtained various tax and judicial functions in the town. The Bishop of Singidunum played an active role in the events of 579, particularly in the negotiations with the neighbouring Avars.

But a new danger was to threaten Singidunum in the second half of the sixth century. The Avars entrenched themselves in the territory of Pannonia and started, together with the Slavs, to attack the neighbouring areas. In 568–569, the Prefect of Illyricum, Vitalian, was forced to save the Danube basin after an abortive Avar attack on Sirmium, while, in 573–574, the Empire agreed to pay a permanent tribute to the Avars. When Sirmium fell into their hands in 582, an attack on Singidunum became a matter of time. It was conquered in the summer of 584. Somewhat later, the Empire managed to win back Singidunum, but another fierce Avar attack followed in 596. It was only thanks to the help of the military leader Priscus that the fortress held strong. Reconstruction began, requiring great effort.

Attacks from Slav tribes began in the 540’s. Sources record that there was a particularly powerful onslaught in 550–551 encompassing the area of Naissus before penetrating far to the south of the Balkan Peninsula. From that time, the Slav tribes contributed, alone or in cooperation with other peoples, to the devastation of Illyricum. The fortresses continued to withstand their attacks, although, as a rule, they were not heavily garrisoned.

The wave of Slav settlement assumed great proportions in the early seventh century. It encompassed mainly the rural areas but also the more important towns. It was during the time of Emperor Heraclius (610–641) that Singidunum, Viminacium, Naissus, Serdica and Salona fell. Constantine Porphyrogenitus mentions Serbs in Belgrade on the occasion of events that may be dated to around the year 630.\(^2\)

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The town appeared under a Slav name in the ninth century (Belograd, Beograd), and it was under Bulgarian rule in the ninth and tenth centuries. It was not until the beginning of the eleventh century that the Byzantine Empire succeeded in reconquering the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula. Defeating the Emperor Samuel, it conquered Belgrade and Srem. That frontier area became included in the Empire’s military and administrative system. It was entrusted to one of the most capable Byzantine military leaders, Constantine Diogenes, while the Bishopric of Belgrade was placed under the authority of the Greek Archbishopric of Ohrid.

A period of long Hungarian-Byzantine battles in the region of Belgrade began in the second half of the eleventh century. The Hungarian army attacked the city for the first time in 1071 under the command of King Coloman himself. Bitter fighting waged for over two months, the crews of the Byzantine ships on the rivers putting up fierce resistance. The attackers made use of siege-breaking devices and managed to cause large-scale fires in the town. Belgrade could not withstand without considerable reinforcements, and the Byzantine military commander of Belgrade, Nicetas, surrendered the town. In their withdrawal, the defenders took with them a particularly revered icon of the Mother of God. Sources recorded that the Hungarian army obtained rich spoils and later continued its raid towards Naissus.

Somewhat later, the Byzantine Empire recaptured Belgrade, while Zemun was to stay permanently under Hungarian rule. And that was how an important inter-state border separated two neighbouring towns for a long time and to a great extent determined their histories. Only occasionally could the inhabitants of those settlements achieve some form of relatively close cooperation. One such occasion was in 1096, when large numbers of ill-equipped Crusaders arrived at Zemun. In search of food and booty, divisions under the leadership of Peter the Hermit started a true siege of the town. After several days of battle, they conquered Zemun, leaving absolute devastation in their wake. The Byzantine commander of Belgrade was then cooperating with the authorities in Zemun and, when it was assessed that there could be no successful resistance to the attackers, he ordered the army and the people to withdraw towards Naissus (Niš) and safer locations.

Relations between Hungary and the Byzantine Empire deteriorated sharply at the beginning of the twelfth century. Hungary was implementing its policy of vanquishing the Balkan peoples systematically. It had subjugated Croatia and, somewhat later, Bosnia too. Its major rival was the

Byzantine Empire, which was then undergoing a renewal of its military strength. Under the Comnenus dynasty, the Byzantium was vigorously intensifying its presence in the Balkan countries. A conflict with Hungarian interests in the same region was inevitable, while the central Danube basin, and particularly Belgrade, became the focal point of that conflict. Few economic contacts that linked Belgrade to Zemun and the Hungarian hinterland were cut. Clashing over a wide area, the Byzantine Empire and Hungary most frequently waged war in the frontier zone. The Hungarian King Stephen II (1116–1131) started his offensive by attacking Belgrade in 1127. The city was captured and, as ordered by the Hungarians, razed to the ground. Judging by an account of these events, it seems that part of the stone from the demolished ramparts of Belgrade was hauled to Zemun to be used for the restoration of its walls. The Hungarian army then attacked Braničevo and penetrated to the south along the river Morava.

The Byzantine emperor John II Comnenus (1118–1143) hastily put up a counter-offensive. A huge army was sent up the Morava valley towards the banks of the Danube, expecting the ships that had been sent from the Black Sea. The Byzantine Empire then took the fighting onto Hungarian territory. The war ended with a peace treaty, whereby Belgrade remained under Byzantine rule.  

However, peace was short-lived. A new Hungarian-Byzantine war flared as early as 1149, but this time on a far larger scale and with more complex objectives. Serbia, siding with Hungary, joined the large anti-Byzantine coalition of European powers. The strengthened Byzantium under Emperor Manuel I Comnenus (1143–1180) immediately went over to the attack. After a victory over the Serbs in autumn 1151, the Byzantine ruler directed all his forces against Hungary. Belgrade became a large military camp where preparations were carried out for upcoming battles in Srem. Emperor Manuel I Comnenus himself was there, and it was from Belgrade that attacks went out into Srem. Zemun was conquered after bitter fighting. A Hungarian counter-offensive was then undertaken, in the name of the ruler, a Serb, ban Beloš. He tried to force the Byzantine army into retreat by

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attacking Braničevo. After a successful takeover a truce between the warring sides was soon concluded.

Fighting restarted in 1152 and 1153, although not in Belgrade. However, everything that was happening on the border had a direct effect on life in the city. Byzantine emperor Manuel introduced a major administrative change. He entrusted the administration of the frontier region towards Hungary to his relative Andronicus Comnenus. It seems that the region encompassed the towns of Belgrade, Braničevo and Niš. Andronicus, known for his unsettled personality, allowed himself to be led into treachery because of his disagreements with the Byzantine Emperor and his personal ambition. After taking over his position on the border, he negotiated both with Hungary and Germany, searching for allies and military support in his struggle for imperial power. Andronicus offered the regions under his control to the Hungarian King Geza II, but he did not succeed: his activities were uncovered and at the end of 1153 he was arrested. However, the Hungarian king went over to the attack and besieged Braničevo in 1154. Emperor Manuel personally led an army that via Niš headed towards the theatre of war. Upon hearing that the enemy was approaching, the Hungarian army halted its attack on Braničevo and retreated towards Belgrade, in order to cross over the Sava into Srem. A section of the Byzantine army pursued the attackers and, under the command of Basil Cinciluk, the pursuing forces entered into battle with the enemy forces in the vicinity of Belgrade. They suffered a heavy defeat, and the commander himself barely escaped.

All these developments had the effect of transforming the internal conflicts in Belgrade into a veritable uprising. Some of the inhabitants rebelled in order to free the city from Byzantine rule. Many were killed, and many fled the city. Emperor Manuel was therefore forced to entrust John Cantacuzenus with a broad spectrum of powers and to send him with an army to stifle the rebellion and punish the culprits. When that had been done, the fortress was supplied with reliable manpower. The Byzantine Empire did not allow anyone to jeopardise its authority in Belgrade. Somewhat later, a peace treaty concluded between Hungary and the Byzantine Empire confirmed such a stand.

But, the balance of power was to change in the Danube basin in the 1160s, for the Byzantine Empire returned to the offensive. There were many reasons for that. By meddling adroitly in the internal affairs of Hungary, and particularly in the complex dynastic relations, Emperor Manuel tried to extend his rule over Central Europe too. He gave assistance to pretenders to the Hungarian throne and sent an army to support them. Emperor came himself to Belgrade. It was during his reign that the reconstruction of the city’s fortifications was carried out. Several towers and new ramparts were
built according to the principles of Byzantine military architecture. A citadel was created on the strategically most important part of the Kalemegdan plateau. It was an irregular deltoid in shape approximately 135 metres long by 60 metres wide. The remnants of that citadel have recently been discovered. The ramparts were between 2.60 and 2.80 metres thick, while the width of the walls around the tower was between 2.20 and 2.50 metres. The fact that the Byzantine Empire was carrying out building works in Belgrade demonstrates its interest in that region. Those works were, for a while, directed by the Emperor’s relative Constantine Angelus and by Basil Tripsih.4

Emperor Manuel stayed in Belgrade once again in 1163. He negotiated through envoys with the Hungarian court in Buda. He offered to establish family links with the Hungarian court, proposing that his daughter Maria marry Bela, the son of King Geza II of Hungary, with the stipulation that Croatia, Dalmatia and Syrmia (Srem) be conceded to the Emperor’s son-in-law. The contract was concluded, but the Hungarian court was not prepared to give what was called Bela’s heritage to the Emperor. That led to a war that lasted from 1164 to 1167 and once again brought fighting to the border regions. Emperor Manuel visited Belgrade in 1165. After much effort, his army managed to take Zemun. Defeated in Srem once again, Hungary in 1167 agreed to a peace treaty ceding Srem to the Byzantine Empire. That was the greatest territorial change on the Byzantine border by Belgrade.

But changes were to come at the end of the twelfth century. After the death of Emperor Manuel I Comnenus in 1180, Hungary went over to the attack. Hungarians took Belgrade and Braničevo as early as 1182, and then, in alliance with Stefan Nemanja, the ruler of Serbia, continued the conquering of Byzantine territories. Somewhat later in 1185, Byzantine Emperor Isaac II Angelus succeeded in winning back Belgrade by diplomatic means and negotiations with the Hungarian court in Buda. The last time a Byzantine emperor was to visit Belgrade was late in the autumn of 1190.5 A

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weakened Byzantine Empire no longer had the strength to defend the border on the Danube and, as early as 1192–1193, King Bela III of Hungary was preparing to reconquer the Danube towns.

The Byzantine Empire suffered a catastrophe at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Crusaders conquered Constantinople in 1204, after which the Byzantine Empire ceased to exist for many years. Its authority over Belgrade vanished forever. The city came under the rule of Hungary, which held it with short interruptions throughout the thirteenth century. It seems that Belgrade entered into the newly created banovina of Mačva (banat, province), which was formed by the Hungarian king in the middle of that century.

In the course of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Belgrade had been known as an important stopping point on the land route between Central Europe and the Middle East. Many travellers, pilgrims and even entire armies stayed in the town or just passed by Belgrade. The strengthening of Christianity meant that more people from Hungary and the Slav countries could use that route, as registered in 1026 when Prince William of Angouleme travelled along it. The travellers would usually obtain food and other supplies en route. Trading did take place, but so did looting, and there were many conflicts. Zemun and Belgrade faced particularly great trials in 1096, when a huge number of Crusaders made their way by land towards Constantinople. Completely unprepared for such a venture, they inflicted enormous damage on the settlements on their path. Some crusaders committed a massacre in Zemun, while others relentlessly seized livestock from the inhabitants of Belgrade. The population opposed the attackers and fled wherever they could.

Some extremely prominent travellers were to stay in Belgrade for a short time. An army of French landed gentry led by Godfrey de Bouillon, his brother Baldwin and other knights passed in the late autumn of 1096. In the twelfth century there passed the large army of the German King Conrad III, who also had a considerable number of ships. That same year (1147), King Louis VII of France stayed in Belgrade with his lavish and colourful retinue. These were all looked upon with great distrust by the Byzantine border authorities. And, finally, there was the German Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa in 1189. Sources recorded that Belgrade, half-destroyed, was in a miserable condition.⁶

Serbia and Belgrade

Belgrade came under Serbian rule in the thirteenth century. That important change was rendered possible by the close family links between Serbian King Stefan Dragutin and the Hungarian court. King Stefan Dragutin was married to Catherine, the daughter of Hungarian King Stephen V. After having abdicated in 1282, Stefan Dragutin administered part of Serbian state territory to the north and the west. Those territories included Mount Rudnik with the surrounding area. Two years later, in 1284, the Hungarian ruler made him governor of Mačva and Belgrade. Serbian sources call Stefan Dragutin the “Sremski kralj” (King of Sirmya), for Srem, at that time, also encompassed regions south of the Sava, the whole region of Mačva and part of northern Serbia.

Belgrade was under rule of Stefan Dragutin for over thirty years. He often stayed there and encouraged its overall development. Combined with its natural hinterland, the town obtained exceptionally favourable living conditions. The settlement spread to beyond the ramparts, and traces of it were recently discovered in Dorćol, near today’s Cara Dušana Street. It was in Stefan Dragutin’s time that an Christian Orthodox cathedral was built, where the highly revered silver icon of the Mother of God was kept. During the reign of King Stefan Dragutin, the Serbian church in Belgrade was very active in spreading Orthodoxy. New churches were built in the surrounding areas in which services were performed by Orthodox priests. News of these changes reached Rome and provoked protest by Pope Nicholas V, who called the Bishop of Belgrade a schismatic and had only words of condemnation for his activity. The Serbian Queen Simonida, the wife of King Stefan Milutin, visited the Belgrade Metropolitan church during her stay in the town in 1314.7

A dispute concerning Belgrade arose after the death of King Stefan Dragutin in 1316. Serbia wished to keep the city, while Hungary demanded that it be ceded. Dragutin’s successor on the throne of Serbia King Stefan Milutin (1282–1321) tried in many ways to prevent Belgrade from falling into the Hungarian hands, including the strengthening of the city’s fortifications and preparing its defence. Hungary attacked Serbia in 1319. After several months of fighting and particularly bloody clashes in Belgrade, the Serbian army was forced to retreat. The city suffered great devastation. It once again went to Hungary and was made part of the banovina of Mačva.

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Fourteenth-century Serbian rulers waged war with Hungary on several occasions. Despite occasionally proving themselves stronger, neither Emperor Stefan Dušan (1331–1355) nor Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović (1371–1389) managed to change the state of affairs to any great extent. That was a time when Belgrade had little opportunity for peaceful development. Everything created under King Stefan Dragutin was brought into jeopardy. Hungary had always considered Belgrade as a fortress of exceptional strategic importance in that part of the Balkan Peninsula, and everything was accommodated to its war requirements.

It was not until the beginning of the fifteenth century, when Belgrade once again came under the rule of Serbia, that many significant changes occurred in Belgrade. Negotiations between Despot (Prince) Stefan Lazarević and King Sigismund settled relations between Serbia and Hungary on a vassal basis. Consequently, at the end of 1403 or the beginning of 1404, Belgrade was conceded to the Serbian ruler. The city had been, sources tell us, devastated and abandoned, with visible traces of previous battles. It required much effort and a great deal of resources to change that state of affairs. With the incorporation of Belgrade into the Serbian state, the old borders vanished. Life returned to the old fortress. The changes were so rapid and so profound that it seemed to the contemporaries that a new city had sprung up.

Serbia obtained a new capital. Despot Stefan systematically constructed the city as the new centre of the country. On the northern borders of his state, far from the regions directly threatened by the Ottomans, he tried, through his overall policy towards Hungary, to ensure suitable conditions for Belgrade’s peaceful development. Despot Stefan consistently and persistently maintained the contractual relations with the Hungarian king. In time he even expanded them, linking Serbia with European politics. He encouraged his country’s economic links with regions north of the rivers Sava and Danube. Due to an agreement he concluded with King Sigismund, Serbian merchants from Belgrade gained the right to trade in Hungary under favourable terms. They traded in nearby regions and in all the more important markets in the country.

Despot Stefan devoted particular attention to populating Belgrade. He induced his subjects to settle in the city by applying a series of economic measures granting special rights. He officially acknowledged those special rights by granting a charter to the city. He exempted the settlers from various tax and corvée obligations that were customary at that time. He allowed them to move freely across the country and granted them the right to trade without paying tariffs and other duties. Such measures truly put the inhabitants of the new capital into a privileged position. In a short time the city was completely changed. It was in Belgrade that people gathered from all regions of Serbia, as well as from Bosnia and the coastal towns, particularly from Kotor (Cattaro) and Dubrovnik (Ragusa). There were also Venetians and other foreigners. Merchants, having obtained particularly favourable terms for plying their wares, built their homes and shops in the city. Ragusans were there in the greatest number, and they extended their dealings to Belgrade and beyond. Of particular prominence were merchants with large amounts of capital and extensive business links, those who provided the Court and the Serbian nobility with valuable textiles, jewellery, artisan products of the highest quality, weapons and other luxury merchandise. The most frequent objects of trade were silver and other precious metals, salt, spices, household objects, etc.\(^9\)

Sources recorded that during the time of Despot Stefan construction activity was particularly impressive in Belgrade. It started at the beginning of the fifteenth century and continued, unabated, until the death of Despot Stefan Lazarević in July 1427. It had not taken much longer than two decades to build, at the cost of great investment and effort, the largest Serbian fortress of the pre-Ottoman era. And its fortifications illustrate the degree to which Serbia was threatened in the century. The new capital was divided into the Upper Town and the Lower Town. The Upper Town was situated on Kalemegdan hill above the confluence of the rivers Sava and Danube. That was part of the area that had formerly been covered by the Roman military camp (castrum), which was used to only a small extent in the Middle Ages. The Lower Town lay at the foot of Kalemegdan hill, below the Upper Town. During the reign of Despot Stefan, it extended over the area bordered by the bluffs of the slope and the banks of the Sava and Danube.

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Despot Stefan undertook the construction of Belgrade in an extremely systematic manner and in several phases. There was first the renewal of the existing fortifications. In the western part of the Upper Town there were the so-called interior fortifications. It was there that the Byzantine Empire had built a citadel in the twelfth century and, although that citadel had been small in size, it had been located at the most favourable spot from a strategic point of view. Part of those ramparts was preserved and adapted to the new concept of fortification. The gate that had connected the stronghold to the area on the slope was walled up, and a new system of fortifications built around the new gate of the inner stronghold. Archaeological explorations have shown that the stronghold was, during the time of Despot Stefan, accessed by a drawbridge, that is through a powerfully defended entrance tower. During the same construction phase, the Nebojša Tower (Noli timere) had been completed. It was the most important tower in medieval Belgrade. As a part of the partition wall, it separated the inner fortifications into two parts: the western part, in which the Despot’s palace was located, and the eastern part, which had a marked defensive function together with the entrance gate. The Nebojša Tower played an important role in the life of the city. It was the last refuge for defenders during enemy attacks; it served as an observation post at times of war and peace; it put fear into the hearts of the enemy; and it was admired by all who visited the town. The Italian Giovanni Tagliacozzo, who sojourned in Belgrade in 1456, recorded that the citizens were informed about the course of an Ottoman attack by the ringing of a bell in the Nebojša Tower. It was also there that the guns were positioned with which the defenders pounded Ottoman positions in 1456. That tower no longer exists in the Upper Town. Its name has been assumed by another tower, an eight-sided structure in the Lower Town, on the banks of the Danube.10

The court of the Serbian ruler was located near Nebojša Tower, as were the court chapel and treasury. It was, unfortunately, that very part of the city that was repeatedly devastated in the past. It fell finally in 1690, during an Ottoman siege, when a large gunpowder magazine was blown up and destroyed all the interior fortification buildings. In the fifteenth century, the so-called postern, or back door, was situated there, through which retreat was possible in case of immediate danger, or reinforcements could be

brought during times of war. That “back door” was used several times during the large-scale Ottoman attacks on the city.

The entire interior part of the city was surrounded by a trench, so approach was possible only via the drawbridge, and it was on that bridge that the fiercest fighting took place throughout the Middle Ages.

The second phase of the works during Despot Stefan’s reign was marked by the beginning of the construction of powerful ramparts to protect the entire Upper Town. Such a defence was particularly important as the land approaches to the town were the most easily accessible. There were no natural barriers from that side, and that was where the greatest threat came from. Despot Stefan, the son of Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović, having been present at the Battle of Kosovo (1389) and having witnessed the trials and tribulations to which Serbia had been subjected after that battle, was well acquainted with the Ottoman method of warfare. It was with all branches of the land army that they would make their attacks, the rivers not yet having been mastered. That was why the greater part of the building works was carried out on the land-facing ramparts. They have been preserved up to the present day despite subsequent reconstructions of Belgrade.

With the construction of the ramparts, the Upper Town covered an area of 300m by 160m, relatively rectangular in shape. The so-called inner fortification, or inner town, was located in the western part of the area. It was named the “inner” part only after the construction of all the Upper Town ramparts. Or, as witnesses confirm, there was a small internal stronghold in the large Upper Fortress.

The Upper Town ramparts were mostly built along the remnants of the walls of the ancient military camp. That was particularly noticeable in the case of the north-eastern rampart. Only the south-eastern rampart of the Upper Town was built along a completely new line.

Belgrade was encircled with a system of double ramparts. On the north-eastern, south-eastern and south-western sides, they comprised the main rampart of some 7m in height and a lower, external rampart with a slanting stone scarp. The external rampart was crenellated. Towers were built along the ramparts, the number of towers depending on the degree to which the city was threatened. A wide ditch ran around the external side of the ramparts, over which there were drawbridges at the city gates. One side of the ditch was made up of the scarp of the external rampart.

The Upper Town had four gates, named after the four points of the compass, as was customary at that time, that is to say the gates were located on the east, south, west and north sides. The most important was the South Gate, which was part of the south-eastern ramparts, alongside a tower. It was located on the main communications direction that extended along today’s Kneza Mihaila Street. The East Gate was very important too. It was
reached by a road that went along the Danube through the present-day
neighbourhood of Dorćol, and was defended by a tower constructed along-
side it. Of somewhat lesser importance was the West Gate (near today’s
Kralj kapija or King Gate), as the terrain made access difficult. The North
Gate linked the Upper Town to the Lower Town and was located at the
site of Defterdarova kapija (Defterdar’s Gate), on the path leading down the
Danube slope of the Kalemegdan hill.

The third phase of Despot Stefan’s construction works in Belgrade
were on the fortifications of the Lower Town. The so-called western Lower
Town on the Sava slope was situated there. That part of the Lower Town
had previously been fortified, and it protected the passage between the Up-
ner Town and the river. It was necessary to build ramparts on all sides to
ensure the peaceful development of the settlement that had grown up there
over the course of time. Given the configuration of the terrain, the im-
perative was to build the north-eastern rampart for the Lower Town. There,
along the Danube, over the plain, ran an important road for the settlement.
Under the supervision of Despot Stefan, ramparts were built along a length
of some 330 metres. They ran from Tower VIII in the Upper Town down
the slope towards the riverbank, with two gates and four approximately
equidistant, rectangular towers. The ramparts there were some 2.60 metres
thick and they were somewhat thinner (2.10 m) on the slope.11

The city was also protected by ramparts on the river-facing side, but
these were smaller and thinner (about 1.50 m). There seem to have been
one large and several smaller towers there. The city then had two landing
places, one on the Danube, and a smaller one on the Sava. It was there
that ships were sheltered at times of war, and they were mainly used to
transport troops, weapons and equipment. It is not known if there were any
major river battles by Belgrade before the middle of the fifteenth century.
It was not until later that the Ottomans started to jeopardise shipping on
the Danube.

A settlement of merchants and artisans grew up in the Lower Town.
Over the course of time, it also extended beyond the ramparts covering the
area of present-day Dorćol, and then the area of today’s Orthodox cathed-
ral. It seems to have extended along all the approaches to the fortified city.
There was one Serbian church there, as well as one Ragusan church. How-
ever, it was that settlement that suffered the greatest damage in the Otto-
man attacks, and, unlike the intramural area, it did not enjoy the continuity
of occupation.

11 See Marko Popović, Beogradska tvrdjava, 2nd ed. (Belgrade: JP “Beogradska tvrdjava”,
Arheološki institut and Zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture grada Beograda, 2006), cit-
ing archeological literature.
The comprehensive and rapid development of Belgrade was reflected in all domains of life. It became the country’s cultural centre. It was the seat of the Metropolitan of Belgrade, who had a very prominent role in the country’s life. Metropolitan Isidor left a visible mark in the period of the Despot Stefan’s reign owing to his eminence in the church and his influence in the country’s general affairs. The Ragusans looked to him for help and support at the Serbian Court in their endeavour to gain favourable conditions of trade or compensation for their citizens.

The Metropolitan Church of the Dormition of the Mother of God, situated in the Lower Town, was reconstructed at the beginning of the fifteenth century. Despot Stefan’s donor inscription is an important testimony to that reconstruction. The church was surrounded by gardens and endowed with estates and incomes. Among other things, the Rudiste mine in the vicinity of Belgrade belonged to it, and it also benefited from the customs duties from the mine. It was there that the famous silver icon of the Mother of God was kept. Most of the church was destroyed in the Habsburg-Ottoman wars at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

As more and more settlers arrived and Belgrade grew, new churches were built. Besides the Metropolitan Church, the Church of St Petka was built and the relics of its patron saint were enshrined in it. One Orthodox Church was designated as the funerary church of the Serbian Metropolitan, while the Church of St Nicholas was located by the hospital and the foreigners dormitory. Besides the Christian Orthodox churches, there was also a Roman Catholic church, which continued to hold services.\(^\text{12}\)

The Serbian capital was also quickly becoming a literary centre. Despot Stefan Lazarević himself was a distinguished poet and book collector. It is quite possible that he wrote his famous poem “Slovo ljubve” (*Word of Love*) in Belgrade. The Court also housed his library containing a large number of books, and that was the first library known to have existed in Belgrade. Part of that library later passed into the hands of his successor Despot Djuradj Branković and his descendants. Writers and manuscript copyists gathered in Belgrade. In his biography of Despot Stefan Lazarević, Constantine the Philosopher, who spent some time in Belgrade, later extolled the Despot’s activities and, particularly, the capital itself. Marvelling at its development, he skilfully described its ramparts, towers, buildings and the Despot’s palace. His richly decorated text is the best monument to medieval Belgrade on the eve of the devastation to come.

Besides Constantine the Philosopher, other writers were fondly working there. Dijak Andreja, ecclesiastic of the Belgrade Metropolitanate, copied one Panegyric upon the order of the Patriarch Nikon in 1424/5, and an anonymous monk copied eight manuscripts for Vojvoda (governor) Radoslav. Those books were later taken to the Radešino monastery. It seems that a Serbian genealogy was also rewritten there. 13

Despot Stefan’s rapprochement with Hungary and opening up of Serbia to the European way of life led to gradual changes in Belgrade too. Despot Stefan himself set the example. He frequently visited the Hungarian Court in Buda, and his own palace in that city was one of the most luxurious buildings of the time. He gathered around him the Hungarian nobility and, in part, adopted the Western European knightly way of life. He was a member of the well-known Order of the Dragon that was founded in 1408 for members of the most prominent Hungarian nobility. He took part, with his retinue, at international tournaments and participated in the gatherings of European rulers. He had the right to grant knighthoods according to the rules of feudal society, and received foreign knights into his service. Some of them were stationed in Belgrade too. Furthermore, King Sigismund visited Despot Stefan’s capital several times.14

Belgrade’s position depended to a large extent on overall Serbian-Hungarian relations. The Serbian ruler had received the administration of Belgrade from King Sigismund when Serbia was a necessary ally to Hungary in the struggle against the Ottomans. Untroubled relations between the two states were requisite for the peaceful development of Despot Stefan’s capital. However, Stefan Lazarević began to ail at an early age, and he had no children. The question of his successor on the Serbian throne became ever more acute and, together with it, the question of the lands that Hungary had granted to the Serbian ruler as a gift. Despot Stefan designated his nephew Djuradj Branković as his heir, and it remained for the Hungarian


king to consent to this and to make a decision on the Despot’s possessions in Hungary. The two rulers began negotiations on that subject during a meeting in Tata, in the Komarom district, in the spring of 1426. Details of their negotiations are not known, but the resulting text has survived in later transcripts. It is certain, however, that King Sigismund accepted Djuradj Branković as Despot Stefan’s heir in Serbia should Stefan Lazarević die heirless, but he demanded that the region of Mačva and Belgrade be returned to Hungary.15

Despot Stefan died suddenly on 19 July 1427. At that time, the Hungarian king was in Wallachia and Djuradj Branković in Zeta. Both set off for Belgrade. King Sigismund stood before Belgrade with his army at the beginning of September intending to ensure that the terms of the Tata agreement were complied with. The Despot’s successor was approaching the town at approximately the same time, and the commander of Belgrade, a Serbian Vojvoda, handed the city over to Djuradj Branković. A true drama was being played out in Belgrade and Serbia at that time. The Ottomans invaded Serbia, attacking Ravanica and other towns, wreaking havoc everywhere. For his part, King Sigismund sent forces into Serbia, not only to suppress the Ottomans but also to exert pressure on the new Serbian ruler. Sources tell us that Hungarians plundered too. Terror reigned throughout the country, attackers penetrating from the north and from the south. It was impossible to fight on two fronts and, under such circumstances, Djuradj Branković sought an agreement with King Sigismund. But that was made conditional upon Belgrade being surrendered to Hungary.

The inhabitants of Belgrade received the news of their inevitable fate with much bitterness. They saw it as a grievous injustice, a disaster, indeed as the descent of darkness, as can clearly be seen from contemporary records. They had long considered that city as their own. The myriad of threads linking it to the Serbian hinterland had made it, according to Constantine the Philosopher, the centre of the country at the time of Despot Stefan. The Despot’s biographer painted distressing scenes of desperation in those days. People believed that Belgrade had been ceded to Hungary out of fear of the Ottomans.

The Serbian army had to leave the city together with the greater part of its inhabitants. The fortified city, first and foremost the Upper Town, was ceded to the Hungarians, who immediately established their own order. The actual takeover lasted some two months (September–October 1427), and for that entire period the Hungarian king was encamped with his army at the foot of the ramparts. King Sigismund proclaimed Belgrade his own city

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at the beginning of November and called upon the inhabitants of Sopron to take up residence there. The city was, once again, forced to assume a new aspect. Serbs were forbidden access to the Upper Town, and Belgrade gradually ceased to function as a capital. That process took place more slowly in the sphere of the economy, but in the domain of cultural creativity the changes were much more rapid. Writers, artists, builders and the Serbian nobility, headed by the Court, left Belgrade. A new refuge was found outside Belgrade. Serbia was compelled to build a new capital in the vicinity, once again on the banks of the Danube and once again on a temporary basis. Smederevo sprang up quickly; it was built within a short time, but it could not have the conditions that Belgrade had.16

The Ottoman Threat (1427–1521)

Hungary attached great importance to the strategic position of Belgrade and to its incorporation into the Hungarian defence system. King Sigismund personally oversaw the ceding of the city. In the autumn of 1427, he spent several months on his country’s southern border and in the vicinity of Belgrade. He agreed to changes in Serbia, and recognised Djuradj Branković as its new ruler, but he kept Belgrade firmly bound to Hungary. The city was incorporated into the region of Mačva, but it had its own commander, directly answerable to the king himself. The overall situation was highly inflammable.

After Despot Stefan’s death in 1427, the Ottomans succeeded in consolidating themselves in Golubac on the Danube. So, for the first time, Ottoman ships gained a stronghold on the Danube and could attack the neighbouring regions. It was in 1433 that the traveller Bertrandon de la Brocquiere saw about one hundred Ottoman ships and boats at Golubac. That large number of vessels was a serious threat to Belgrade, and the city therefore assumed a new role in the defence of the Danube.

After the final Ottoman conquest of Serbia in 1439, Belgrade’s strategic importance grew immensely. The city was surrounded on all sides by Ottoman troops that controlled all approaches to the city, by land and by river. The all-important inter-state border stretched just beyond the city ramparts. Belgrade was cut off from its Serbian hinterland, from which it had received food supplies. And it was the Serbian population that suffered the most. The settlements close to the city became the scene of frequent conflicts. Economic life gradually ceased to exist, with trade in and around

Belgrade falling particularly. As business dropped off suddenly, merchants withdrew to safer places, and inter-state trade gave way to local, small-scale exchange. There was no longer any market for luxury or expensive goods; to survive was all that mattered. Many merchants ceased activity in a country where danger lurked constantly on the roads, taxes were irregular, and violence of all kinds threatened. It was rumoured that the Sultan was preparing to attack Belgrade, and the rumours soon proved to be true.

Sultan Murad II was conducting extensive preparations for war. An army was mustered from throughout the Ottoman Empire. That army, approaching Belgrade in 1440, was a terrifying sight; it numbered tens of thousands of men, including those who did not actually enter into combat. Sultan Murad II embarked upon his conquests with great confidence. Sparring neither effort nor resources, he set out to fulfil his objective. His army was equipped with various siege weapons and cannon, and the problem of strenuous transport was solved by fashioning those weapons on the spot.

The battle started with an operation by the *akiçi* (raiders), a company of plunderers led by Ali Bey, the son of Evrenos. They laid waste the entire area around Belgrade, thus preparing the ground for attack by the main body of the army. Upon arrival, the main force was deployed along all land approaches to the city. The imperial tents and those of the Ottoman commanders were erected on the most favourable sites. Small-scale clashes were taking place with the Christians even then, but the Ottomans prevailed. The cannon were positioned to demolish certain parts of the ramparts and towers and thus open up the way for the Janissary divisions. The defenders would rebuild the damaged ramparts by night, and they also built walls in the city to hold off attacks by the enemy infantry. The Sultan ordered that a tunnel be dug in order to blow up parts of the city’s fortifications. But, thanks to a Serbian message from the Sultan’s camp, the defenders were informed about the plan in advance. Counter-measures were immediately taken, and digging started on another tunnel in the direction of that of the Ottomans. The ensuing explosion and fire destroyed both the tunnel and the soldiers in it.

The Sultan also used other means. He tried to entice the defenders to betrayal with money and promises. But no traitor could be found. The fighting continued unabated, not even interrupted by the attempt of the Hungarian king, at the end of July, to procure a halt to the attack by sending a deputation to the Sultan. Murad II deferred his reply and tried to obtain a victory on the battlefield. The ditch around the town was filled with various materials, while the ramparts were stormed. The Janissaries actually managed to enter the city, but they were forced to withdraw in the face of the fierce resistance put up by the citizens, who were defending every inch of the ground. The Christians finally used their last resource: in
a synchronised action, flaming torches were hurled onto the attackers from the ramparts and towers. The flames enveloped the attackers, the material used to fill in the ditch, and the slope to the ramparts. The attack was finally shattered. After several months of fighting, the Sultan ordered his army to withdraw.17

In the summer of 1442, the Ottomans started the construction of a stronghold near Belgrade aiming to directly control the movements of Hungarian troops in the city. That stronghold was to be located on Mount Žrnovo (today Mount Avala), sixteen kilometres from Belgrade.18

Wide-scale expansion plans were renewed when Sultan Mehmed II (1451–1481) came to power. The Byzantine Empire was to experience the first shock. The Sultan attacked Constantinople which was unable to withstand without major external military assistance. After fierce fighting, the Ottomans conquered the Byzantine capital, and the world received the news with great consternation in the spring of 1453. That was to herald a new era of Ottoman attacks in the Balkans. Ottoman neighbours and adversaries could expect nothing good.

That same year, after the success in Constantinople, the Sultan directed his attention towards the Danube basin. In July 1453, he demanded the surrender of Smederevo and Golubac and, in September, he had the idea of taking Belgrade as well. It seems that 150 galleys and twenty large ships were equipped for that purpose.

Preparations for war had started in Ottoman Turkey during the winter of 1455/6. The Sultan sought military assistance from the Bosnian King, from Herzog Stefan Vukčić, Vojvoda Petar Pavlović and others. Assistance was also amassed from the Asian parts of the Empire, as was customary in case of imperial campaigns. Food and weapons were collected. Everything indicated a large-scale military undertaking of major importance. Once assembled, the Ottoman force appeared to observers like a sea of rippling waves.

Hungary was unprepared for the attack. All attempts to procure foreign assistance had proven fruitless. Only Pope Calixtus III gave his support. The crusade was declared against the infidels. That crusade was announced from the pulpits of churches in several European countries with the aim of mustering divisions of volunteers to be sent to the battlefield. The greatest response was from Germany, Bohemia, Poland, Austria and Hungary, and it came mainly from the lower strata of society. There gathered

17 On the siege of 1440 see Kalić-Mijušković, Beograd u srednjem veku, 110–114, 375-377 (sources and literature).
peasants, the urban poor, students, monks, people of various occupations, the unemployed. They were poorly equipped for war and completely without experience for the forthcoming fighting. They were sent, via Buda, to Petrovaradin, where they assembled, and from there they went to Zemun. Franciscan friar Giovanni Capistrano placed himself at the head of that movement. Janos Hunyadi had deep doubts as to the military capabilities of the crusaders. Right up until the last moment he believed that Hungary would send the necessary reinforcements to the border. Shortages of basic foodstuffs (wheat, barley, etc.) were being felt in southern Hungary and Serbia in the spring of 1456. That was why it was decided in Buda that an army should not be assembled before August, that is, before the new harvest had filled the granaries. That did, in fact, mean renunciation of any action, as the Ottoman preparations for war had made it clear that the battle for Belgrade would be waged before then. King Laszlo finally revealed his intentions: in early June 1456, he left Buda and fled to Vienna. The border was left to the care of Janos Hunyadi and his efforts to assemble the neighbouring gentry. Hunyadi prepared the army himself. In the middle of February 1456 he mentioned a figure of 7,000 horsemen that he could send into battle, and he also offered 10,000 soldiers in the case of international action in the struggle against the Ottomans. Serbian Despot Djuradj Branković provided invaluable assistance in the defence of Belgrade.

The Ottoman army started to arrive before Belgrade in the course of the month of June. Pillaging units sacked the surrounding settlements, and a Serbian church outside the town ramparts was destroyed. By the beginning of July, the city was besieged from all sides. A group of crusaders was taken into Belgrade on 2 July, and all the town’s inhabitants, including the women, were armed.

The Sultan stepped up his pressure on the city from the land, preparing an all-out attack. The damaged ramparts could no longer be repaired and, in the night between 20 and 21 July, even the experienced Janos Hunyadi, having come to the conclusion that the city could not be defended, abandoned Belgrade. The Ottomans proceeded to retaliation and intimidation methods. Prisoners were put to death before the eyes of the townpeople, some torn apart by horses.19

The general onslaught started on the evening of 21 July. The ditch around the city was filled, and the Ottomans directed their attacks particularly to the damaged parts of the ramparts. They climbed the walls us-

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ing ladders and other means. The defenders resisted with fire, arrows and finally in hand-to-hand fighting. Everyone went out to the ramparts, soldiers, citizens, priests, monks, even women. But the Janissaries entered the town. It was at the dawn of the new day, 22 July, that the defenders made their last attempt to counter the attack. Wood, twigs and other material were collected, bundled together, lit and hurled onto the besiegers. The fire halted the Sultan’s troops who were trying to enter the city in the greatest possible number. The attack was suppressed, and then the Ottomans in the town were overcome. The attack had been thwarted, but the losses had been tremendous. Hunyadi had been watching the events from near Belgrade. As soon as he learnt that the city had not been taken, he ordered that there should be no attacks on the Ottoman positions outside the town. Mehmed II himself had been wounded in the fighting. Rumelian beylerbey Karadsa had been killed on the battlefield, as had the commander of the Janissaries. The Sultan ordered a retreat. “They fled the siege like rabbits,” according to Promontorio de Campis.

The news of the Christian victory spread rapidly. The survivors and townsmen exulted in the triumph. No one in Europe had believed that the conqueror of Constantinople would be routed at Belgrade. The news from the battlefield was first received with disbelief, and then with joy. The participants themselves, Janos Hunyadi, Giovanni Capistrano, Giovanni da Tagliocozzo, papal legate Carvajal and others, wrote messages declaring the improbable victory. Letters and messages were sent to Italy, Germany, France, Spain, England, and even Africa. Not one single event in the history of Belgrade has echoed throughout the world as did the battle of 1456. Pope Calixtus III proclaimed 6 August as a day of festivity throughout the Christian world.

Belgrade, though, had suffered immense losses. Besides the large number of dead and wounded, the city itself had been seriously damaged by cannon fire; parts of the ramparts and the walls had been mined; fire had wrought havoc. After the withdrawal of the Ottoman army, the crusaders also left the battlefield.

But fresh misfortune was soon to befall the town. The plague struck, aided and abetted by the huge concentration of men, the shortage of food and the large number of unburied dead. It spread rapidly in the mid-summer heat and in the stench and filth the attackers had left behind them. Its victims were many. The first signs of sickness were noticed in Hunyadi and Capistrano in the first days of August 1456. Hunyadi was taken to Zemun where he died a week later, and Capistrano was taken from Zemun to Ilok, where he ailed until his death in October 1456.

The endless wars between Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, as well as the constant consolidation of the Ottomans in Serbia, also determined to a great extent the policy of the last Serbian rulers. Despot Lazar Branković
died at the end of January 1458. He had no male heirs, and old conflicts revived at his Court in Smedevo. There was a pro-Ottoman party in the country that saw the last possibility of survival in cooperation with the Sultan, while Lazar’s widow, Jelena, and the Despot’s blind brother, Stefan, sought support in Hungary. Divided in such a way, the Branković were bringing Serbia into direct jeopardy.

During the war of 1458, Serbia was virtually reduced to her last capital city, Smederevo. The Ottomans had taken nearly all the fortresses and, finally, the exceptionally important Golubac on the Danube (August 1458). After Smederevo fell in 1459, Belgrade’s position completely changed.

Belgrade was virtually deserted on the eve of the Ottoman attack in 1521. The garrison numbered between 400 and 900 soldiers, including all the services. Wages were monthly sought in vain, even, according to Djordje Sremac, with a delay of two years. A general sense of dissatisfaction reigned; there was even the conviction that Hungary was not concerned about what would happen to Belgrade. The Serbs spoke openly of that. There was not enough weapons or food in the town. The greatest gallantry in the fighting was shown by the city’s Serbian population, but that could not have any great effect on the outcome.

The Ottoman army on that campaign was headed by the Sultan himself, accompanied by extremely experienced military commanders, Piri Pasha, Mustafa Pasha, Ahmed Pasha, Bali Bey, and Husrev Bey. Sources estimated that the Sultan’s army numbered between 100,000 and 200,000 men. It was excellently equipped for the forthcoming battles. The objective of the Ottomans was well known. They used the experience of previous generations which had shown that the city could not be taken by a land attack alone, and not even with the support of a river fleet, unless all the links with Hungary were severed. In order to achieve that, an attack was first made upon Šabac at the beginning of July 1521. The fortress was taken and defenders put to the sword. The Sultan ordered that a bridge be built over the Sava, and part of the forces were sent into Srem. The Ottomans destroyed everything on their way to Srem; they then took Zemun. That meant a considerable deterioration of the situation in Belgrade. And during that time the city was being battered. The defenders tried to attack the Ottoman artillery positioned around the town at the end of July, but in vain. Charges on the ramparts began at the beginning of August, with powerful pressure from the rivers, where the fortifications were weaker. After fierce fighting for every inch of the city, the Ottomans took the Lower Town on 8 August. It was a hard blow for the defenders. Having set their homes on fire, they all withdrew into the Upper Town.²⁰

²⁰ Gliša Elezović and Gavro Škrivanić, Kako su Turci posle više opsada zauzeli Beograd (Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1956), et alia.
Setting out on a new assault on 16 August, Ahmed Pasha tried to encourage his soldiers with falsehoods — he announced that 16 August was St Vitus day (15/28 June), well known to have been the date of the Serbian defeat in Kosovo. That best reveals whom the Ottomans considered their adversaries in Belgrade. The attack, however, did not succeed.

The destruction of the city’s fortifications had a particularly crushing effect. The Ottomans had mined certain parts of the ramparts and the towers. The fighting was fierce; the number of wounded ever greater. It became clear in the second half of August that there would be no outside help, and the city had neither gunpowder nor food. The people started to become faint-hearted, and the first desertsions occurred. The city’s Hungarian commanders opened negotiations with the Sultan. They offered the conditional surrender of the city, seeking mercy for themselves and their men. When their offer was accepted, the city’s commander was taken before the Sultan. A protocol was drawn up on the surrender of Belgrade and, on 29 August 1521, the Ottomans entered the fortress. The Sultan himself was soon to visit the battlefield.

A number of the defenders were put to death, and the remaining Serbian population was deported to Turkey. Embarking on that long and uncertain journey they took with them their holy objects, including the holy relics of St Petka and the miraculous icon of the Mother of God that had for centuries been considered the city’s most precious possession. They were settled in the vicinity of Constantinople. They named their new settlements after their lost city, and the name of Belgrade has lived with them for centuries. They also built their own church dedicated to the Mother of God, which existed up to 1955, when it was destroyed in a fire.

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On the Composition and Processing of Precious Metals
Mined in Medieval Serbia

Abstract: Accounting books of the Caboga (Kabužić) brothers 1426–1433 (Squarço/Reminder, Journal and Main Ledger) kept at the Historical Archives of Dubrovnik provide new evidence for the composition and advanced levels of processing of precious metals from Serbian medieval mines. Notably, that the residue left after the process of obtaining fine silver was copper. Even the price of the refining process is specified. Two items of a transaction entered in the Squarço in 1430 contain some previously unknown data about auriferous silver (argento di glama). Besides gold, it also contained copper and, moreover, the ratio of the two per pound is specified. Apart from the Caboga brothers’ accounting books, neither the other written sources nor geological research have provided any indication about the presence of copper in the auriferous silver mines.

Keywords: Serbian mines, medieval Serbia, silver, auriferous silver, gold, copper, Accounting books of the Caboga (Kabužić) brothers, Ragusa (Dubrovnik), Kotor (Cattaro), Venice

The production and trade of precious metals from Serbian mines has been the subject of many studies because of their role in the vigorous development of the medieval Serbian economy, society and culture. These studies have paid attention to a number of topics concerning the mining, processing and types of the precious metals.

This paper is an attempt to learn more about these topics from the business records of the Caboga (Kabužić) brothers kept at the Dubrovnik Archives, taking into consideration the data contained in their Squarço (Reminder) which, unlike the Journal and the Main Ledger, has not been published.

The extraction of precious metals from ores was a craft in its own right. After the long and complex smelting process, there would remain in the hearth the silver which was called plicho silver. However, the silver obtained by the primary smelting was not completely pure and had to undergo a further refining process. This final step in the process was called affinatio in Latin sources or finjanje, žeženje in old mining law.1 It was only the silver obtained in this way, argento fino or fine silver, that became an important commodity, much more expensive than unrefined silver.

1 V. Skarić, Staro rudarsko pravo i tehnika u Srbiji i Bosni (Belgrade: Serbian Royal Academy, 1939), 87–88.
It has been long believed that metals were exported from Serbia and that they were refined only in Venice. However, in the autumn of 1320, there is in Kotor a Venetian, Luca Baldaria, an *afinatar*, employed on a one-year contract and paid nine pounds of Venetian grossi. His employment had certainly something to do with the refinement of a metal.2

In Ragusa, the refining of one’s own silver was permitted until 1421. However, in June 1421, the Major Council of Ragusa decided that a place for silver refining should be set up at the mint. Goldsmiths were permitted to refine up to ten pounds of silver for their own needs.3 It is known that the mints accepted only fine silver (*argento fino*), the only to be used for coinage. Thus, for example, on 28 July 1428 the company of the Caboga brothers purchased for the mint 4 pounds of fine silver at the price of 22 *perpers* per pound.4

The process of refining silver was set up early on in the mines and mining towns of medieval Serbia as well. This is suggested by the presence in 1276 of silver coins from Brskovo, while the earliest reference to a mint at Brskovo comes from 1280.5 Over time, Priština, an important trading centre in the vicinity of the main mines, comes to be frequently referred to as one of the places where silver is being purchased and refined. In 1418, the Milinović brothers of Ragusa are referred to as owners of a device for silver refining (*affinatio argenti*).6 Silver was also refined at Srebrenica.7 The Serbian rulers and nobility sought to have control of the process. Thus, Djuradj Branković, son of Vuk Branković, decrees that all silver be refined at his customs.8

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4 D. Kovačević Kojić, *Trgovačke knjige braće Kabužić (Caboga) 1426–1433, Spomenik*, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts 137, Department of Historical Sciences 11 (1999), 230. There is a reference in 1430 to a silver refinery in Ragusa where the silver imported from Serbia and Bosnia was processed and refined. Cf. Voje, “Argentum de glama”, 34; V. Simić, *Istorijski razvoj našeg rudarstva* (Belgrade 1951), 41.
8 Simić, *Istorijski razvoj*, 44.
The technology of silver refining may be largely reconstructed. Apart from the main smelters, there were, sometimes in their vicinity, smaller refining facilities (so-called čistilo or čistilja). These smaller refining furnaces could also be at a distance from the mine. Some of the refining methods were used, similarly to Ragusa, at goldsmith shops or at mints. The Latin term for the person engaged in refining precious metals was afinar, afinator or čistilac (finer) in old mining law. Our knowledge of this activity is quite scant. That it was a lucrative profession is shown by the offer made in June 1429 to the Ragusan government by a precious metal refiner from as far

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9 The reconstruction by V. Skarić (Staro rudarsko pravo, 81–88) has been corroborated by newly-discovered sources. Cf. Ćirković, “Proizvodnja”, 87, n. 35; S. Ćirković in S. Ćirković, D. Kovačević Kojić and R. Ćuk, Staro srpsko rudarstvo (Belgrade: Vukova zadužbina & Novi Sad: Prometej, 2002), 59.
away as Naples. There is no doubt that there were in Serbia, apart from Ragusans, locals who mastered the technology. For example, an afinar from Srebrenica whose name has come down to us is Radin.\(^{10}\)

The process of refining crude silver entailed a weight loss. Thus, a certain amount of silver measured *ad pondus de Srebreniza* lost an ounce of silver per pound, or 8.5 percent of the original weight.\(^{11}\) According to an Ottoman document of 1488, the silver contained about 16.6 percent of metal impurities, which is to say that it lost 16.6 percent of the original weight in the refining process.\(^{12}\)

Apart from the abovementioned example from Srebrenica, the contemporary sources do not specify the loss caused in the process of refining the precious metals from the Serbian mines. Still less known is the metallic composition of the resulting waste. It has been widely accepted that precious metals were extracted from ores by means of lead. The contemporary geological examination of the slag waste recovered around the mines has not been helpful in this respect. Nor is there any clue to this in various types of written sources or even in the ample source material from the Dubrovnik Archives which otherwise contains the most significant information on all areas of the Serbian mining production.

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Of the accounting books of the Caboga brothers, it is mostly the *Squarço*, or the Reminder, that contains information which sheds a new light on the processing and composition of precious metals. The Reminder is a daily record of business transactions. The daily notes were sorted out and transferred to the Journal every evening, omitting data deemed irrelevant to further bookkeeping. It is these omitted and neglected data that are of particular interest to our topic.

An entry of 28 October 1427 states that *afinia L.56 o.1 s.4 d’argento trasi d’argento fino L.50 o.2 s.4*, i.e. that *L.50 o.2 s.4* of fine silver was obtained by refining an amount of *L.56 o.1 s.4*. On the left side of the entry is recorded: *pagia per afinar a rame pp. 3 go 4*, i.e. that the separation from copper was paid *pp. 3 go 4*.\(^{13}\) This entry was posted to the Main Ledger, where it

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\(^{11}\) Ćirković, “Proizvodnja zlata, srebra i bakra”, 87, n. 37; Dinić, *Za istoriju rudarstva* II, 86.


\(^{13}\) Historijski Arhiv u Dubrovniku (HAD), Privata, Libro di negozio Nicolo Luca Caboga, 28/3; Squarço, fol. 18’, 28 Oct. 1427.
is stated that the Company should pay per afinatura a rame duc. 1.14 An entry made in the Squarço a day later, 29 October 1429, states that the amount of argento fino in 2,5 peçe L.50 o.2 s.4 was sent to Pesaro and delivered to ser Bartolo and Francesco Ardovini.15

In the process of posting this entry from the Squarço to the Journal and then, a few times, to the Main Ledger, it is stressed that the silver in question is argento fino L.50 o.2 s.4, and that the amount has been obtained by refining L.56 o.1 s.4 of silver. Upon the sale of the silver in Pesaro, Peroçi de la Luna, through Pircho di Tanus, transferred the money from the sale to the Caboga brothers by a bill of exchange.16 So, the Company of the Caboga brothers itself arranged for the refining of the silver, which explains why this is the only piece of information about the process.

It is from these entries that we can reliably learn for the first time that silver contained copper and that fine silver was obtained by removing copper. In fact, copper was a waste product of refining, and it accounted for about 10.5 percent of the original amount. Another piece of information of particular interest is that the price of refining was 3 perpers and 4 grossi, or one ducat.17

The difference in price between fine and crude silver (ca 7.5 ducats and ca 6.5 ducats respectively) was about one ducat, exactly the price paid for refining silver (affinatura) as recorded in the Squarço.18 Consequently, the prices allow us to know reliably what type of silver, crude or fine, was in question even when it is not expressly stated. This disproves the assumption that there was a price oscillation on the market or that the silver was of lower quality. What follows from all this is that the Caboga brothers traded in fine silver in much larger quantities than previously believed, which is corroborated by the information about fine silver in the Argentum records contained in the Main Ledger.19 If the price of a specified amount of silver was lower than that of fine silver, the silver was in fact unrefined, plicho silver, as expressly stated in some cases.

The Caboga brothers also traded in the silver from mines in central Bosnia. In their business books it always figures as plicho silver. Namely, the

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14 Kovačević Kojić, Trgovačke knjige, 197, 24 Feb. 1428.
16 Kovačević Kojić, Trgovačke knjige, 46, 5 Nov. 1427; 183, 5 Nov. 1427; 188, 5 Nov. 1427; 196, 15 March 1428; 197, 15 March 1428.
17 Cf. notes 15 and 16 above.
18 Cf. notes 13 and 14 above.
19 Kovačević Kojić, Trgovačke knjige, 156, 158, 172, 198, 208, 228, 252, 280, 282, 320, 322.
entries refer to it as *plich di Bosnia*, *argento di Bosnia* and *viago di Souisochi*. The *Viago di Souisochi* and *Plicho di Bosnia* transaction records also contain information about the prices paid for *plich* silver. On average, the price was about six ducats, exactly the price the Caboga brothers usually paid for this type of silver. The fact that they exported only unrefined silver suggests that the refining process was not practised in central Bosnia, which then suggests that metallurgical techniques there were not as developed as in other mining areas.

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At first the separation of gold from silver was carried out in Venice. However, a document created in mid-October 1353 states that silver can be assayed to determine its gold content in Ragusa, Serbia or Venice. The same year, there is a mention of a Raden in Kotor, a person specialized in the craft (*Raden, magister divisionis auri argenti*). Gold was also separated chemically, and the agents which were used for bonding individual chemical elements were known. In April 1424, Marin Adamović, a Ragusan goldsmith of Kotor origin, hired a certain Bartol to separate gold from silver using the wet chemical method, i.e. to prepare aqua and all other necessary things for the process (*partire oro d’argento zoe di fare aqua et tote cose che bisogna per detto*).

Especially interesting for the question of refining auriferous silver in Ragusa are some observations of local chroniclers. Thus, an anonymous annalist records in 1279 that a good portion of the large amount of auriferous silver was secretly reshipped from Ragusa to Venice, so that the Venetian merchants are making a profit of 200 percent on investment. Much later, in the seventeenth century, another chronicler expressly states that Ragusan merchants made unusually high, 250-percent, profits compared with the price of auriferous silver in Serbia, and then sold the refined silver in Venice. Notwithstanding their exaggerations, these Ragusan annals show that such transactions were taking place, and this example certainly was not an exception.

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21 Ibid. 63.
22 R. Ćuk in *Staro srpsko rudarstvo*, 71.
As mining developed, information about gold parting in Serbia becomes more frequent. Ragusan merchants are involved, and of them Nikola Glavić, son of Tvrtko, is especially prominent. In 1428, he and his partner Nikola Živolinović contract with the goldsmith Vlatko Radetić to go to Priština and other places in Serbia, to apply his know-how. The following year Glavić imports saltpetre, which is necessary for the gold parting process. Saltpetre was imported into Serbia through Ragusa.

Apart from the price of silver refining, the business books of the Caboga brothers contain information about the costs of gold parting. Thus, for every shipment of auriferous silver, in addition to the percentage of gold, a deduction of 10 grossi per pound is taken per partidura, i.e. the costs of parting gold from silver are deducted. There where abatando go. io per L. stands alone, it was also a partidura, even though the word partidura is omitted. It is frequently expressly stated that this expense will be met from the earnings the Caboga brothers are going to make with a partner, such as, for example, Marcho di Ratcho.

The Squarço contains previously unknown information about the composition of the auriferous silver. Namely, a transaction entered on 28 January 1430 states that Radouan die aver per argento L. i 0.5 s. 4 tine in rame 0.2 s. 7 per L. tine in oro 0.3 s.ch. 1.0. The price of this auriferous silver was 25 ducats and 10 grossi per pound.

Another item in the same transaction also specifies an amount of auriferous silver: L. 3 o. 8 tine in rame 0.2,5 per L. tine in oro 0.2 s. 3 ch. 4, at a price of 21 ducats and 23 grossi per pound.

From these two cases we are able for the first time to learn that the auriferous silver also contained copper, as well as the exact content of both copper and gold per pound. The price of a pound of auriferous silver obviously depended on the copper to gold content ratio.

In the first case, where the content of copper was lower, the price was higher (25 ducats and 10 grossi per pound). And reversely, in the second case, the price of auriferous silver was lower (21 ducats and 23 grossi per pound) because the copper content was higher.

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28 G. Boerio, Dizionario del dialetto veneziano (Venice: G. Cecchini, 1856), 477.
29 Kovačević Kojić, Trgovačke knjige, 239, 256.
30 Ibid. 256; Hrabak, “Dubrovačko srebro u Italiji i Kataloniji”, 63.
In the Journal and the Main Ledger the entries concerning some shipments of auriferous silver (argento indorato) contain both the price of gold per ounce (6 ducats) and the price of silver (7.5 ducats) per pound. In some cases the previously rendered refining service is expressly stated. Thus, the Scuarço shows that on 25 September 1429 Živko Radić, a partner of the Caboga brothers, received from Vukosav L. 1 o.6 s.2 afini resto L. 1 o.3 ch.5 tine o.3 s.0 of auriferous silver. So, after refining, the original quantity of auriferous silver was smaller by about two ounces per pound. Consequently, auriferous silver contained copper too. This is in fact the ratio of copper to gold in one pound of the auriferous silver, as expressly stated in the Scuarço on 28 January 1430.

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In addition to silver and lead, the deposits at the mine of Rudnik also contained copper, and in such quantities as to afford sufficient for exportation. However, except for the books of the Caboga brothers, the sources make no mention of copper in the main mines of auriferous silver, such as Novo Brdo. Fieldwork investigation has not proved otherwise.

According to the research done by geologists, metallurgical techniques practised in Serbia were quite advanced. There is a divergence of opinion between historians and geologists, however, geologists tending to underrate the quality and scale of mining products in Serbia, especially in the case of Novo Brdo, the largest medieval Serbian mine known for the production of silver and auriferous silver. Although a vigorous mining activity at Novo Brdo has been attested by numerous slag dumps in the immediate and broader environs of the town, some geologists question even

32 Kovačević Kojić, Trgovačke knjige, 218, 230, 239, 265.
33 The Main Ledger, however, keeps record only of the amount of auriferous silver obtained after refining, i.e. L.1 o.3 s.5. There is a single entry which reiterates that this amount of L.1 o.3 s.5 lo qual afini fo o.18 s.5 was obtained by refining. Kovačević Kojić, Trgovačke knjige, 231–233.
34 Dinić, Za istoriju ruderstva II, 10–11; Ćuk in Staro srpsko ruderstvo, 35.
35 Ćuk, in Staro srpsko ruderstvo, 35; Dinić, Za istoriju ruderstva II, 88.
37 Dinić, Za istoriju ruderstva, 43–45.
38 Simić, “Rudnici zlata”, 342.
the accuracy of all written data, arguing that the mining value of Novo Brdo is highly overrated.39

Contrary to these views, V. Simić takes into account the information from the Ragusan documentary material about a high gold content of the Novo Brdo silver (as high as up to 25 per cent) and argues that the issue of discovering rich auriferous ores at some of the Novo Brdo ore deposits is becoming quite interesting for researchers; even more so because the research done so far has not paid attention to gold.40 The newly-discovered information in the accounting books of the Caboga brothers about the presence of copper in silver and auriferous silver is likely to broaden the focus of geological research to include these elements.41

Briefly, except for the accounting books of the Caboga brothers, the other written sources or the geological research done so far do not give any indication of the presence of copper in the mines of auriferous silver.

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The Double Wreath
A Contribution to the History of Kingship in Bosnia

Abstract: The fact that ban Tvrtko of Bosnia had maternal ties with Nemanjić dynasty and seized certain areas of the former Serbian Empire was used as a basis for him to be crowned king of the Serbs and Bosnia in 1377 in the monastery of Mileševa over the grave of Saint Sava. His charter issued to the Ragusans in 1378 contains the term “double wreath” which figuratively symbolized the rule of Tvrtko I over two Serb-inhabited states, Bosnia and Serbia. Tvrtko’s choice not to annex the conquered territory to his own state, Bosnia, but to be crowned king of Serbia as well required the development of a new ideology of kingship and a new form of legitimation of power. Although his royal title was recognized by his neighbours, including probably the rest of the Serbian lands, that the project was unrealistic became obvious in the aftermath of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. What remained after his death was only the royal title, while the state ruled by his successors became exclusively related to Bosnia. Yet, echoes of his coronation in medieval Bosnia can be followed in the further development of the title and of the concept of crown and state. Interestingly, an attempt to revive the double crown concept was made in the early fifteenth century by the king Sigismund of Hungary, who requested that the Bosnians crown him the way Tvrtko had been crowned.

Keywords: Bosnia, Serbia, Tvrtko I, Hungary, double wreath, ideology of kingship, coronation

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The most informative source for the coronation of Tvrtko as king is the proem of a charter to Ragusa (Dubrovnik) drawn up by the logothete Vladoje of Rascia [Raška] and dated 10 April 1378. It is probably not a coincidence that it is this “great charter”, as the Ragusans later came to call it — the charter transferring to Tvrtko the Serbian kings’ rights in relation to Ragusa — that contains a concise and clear exposition of a medieval political theory.

Μ. Δυνίτς, <i>Odluke Veća Dubrovačke Republike</i> I (Belgrade 1951), 277.
It is pious and worthy to praise the true faith and to submit the word that one desires to one's benefactor, Christ the Lord, whose divine providence is praised through all creatures and phenomena and who was merciful on mankind, which He created in the image of His own divinity and gave it the power and the knowledge over all earthly nature, to comprehend and to pass judgment and justice upon the earth. In that same manner, He granted me, His servant, through the mercy of His divinity, to inherit and continue that which was planted by God in my kin, and dignified me with the double wreath, to rule both lands, first our originally God-granted land of Bosnia, and then my Lord God dignified me to inherit the throne of my forebears, the lords of Serbia, for those forebears of mine, having reigned in the earthly realm, passed to the heavenly one. And I, seeing the land of my forebears as it was left behind them, without its shepherd, went to the Serbian land wishing and wanting to restore the throne of my fathers. And having gone there, I was crowned with the God-granted wreath to the kingship of my forefathers, so that I should be Stefan [Stephen], faithful in Jesus Christ and God-appointed King of the Serbs and Bosnia and the Littoral and the Western Regions. And then with God's help I have begun to reign and to govern the throne of the Serbian land, wishing to lift up that which fell and to restore that which crumbled…]

The term “double wreath” is used figuratively in the charter: it is double because it stands for the two states that have come under Tvrtko’s rule, Serbia and Bosnia. When referring to the coronation and the actual crown later in the text, it is simply the God-granted wreath. The “double wreath” figure is only applicable there where the crown denotes something more than just a physical object and an emblem of authority. It is therefore reasonable to pose the question as to where the term “wreath” in its abstract meaning, symbolic of the state, in the logothete Vladoje’s proem came from.

The term “wreath” can be traced to earlier Serbian documents, where it occurs in several different meanings: the martyr’s wreath; the victor’s…

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wreath; a royal and imperial insignia; and the nuptial wreath. As early as the 1930s, A. Solovjev, examining the emergence of the concept of the state in the Slavic monarchies, studied the sources and collected all references of relevance to the question posed here. He showed that the Serbian “wreath” had covered all that the Greek stephanos had, and that its meaning of an insignia had only rarely been dissociated from its other meanings by introducing another word, such as diadem. In Byzantium, the term for the sovereign’s insignia that became established over time was stemma; this term was also in use in the Serbian chancery, as evidenced by the noun stepsanije.

The “wreath” and “wreathing” are attested in the earliest Serbian sources; they had some importance for the Serbs of Rascia (Raška) as early as the late twelfth century. Transferring his powers as grand župan to his son Stefan in 1196, Nemanja “wreathed him and blessed him extraordinarily, just as Isaac had blessed Jacob”. The turning point was, however, the coronation of Stefan Nemanjić as king (1217). The fact that he was to be given the epithet “the First-Crowned” already in the time of his successors speaks of the impression the coronation left on the contemporaries and posterity. It appears that some western notions of the crown came to Serbia along with the crown itself. As Solovjev observed, this is evidenced by the term “твърни вълнъ” [holy wreath] which occurs in Domentijan. It is the exact translation of the Latin sacra corona, and has no equivalent in Byzantium.

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4 S. Novaković, Zakonski spomenici srpskih država srednjeg veka (Belgrade 1912), 632; Solovjev, “Corona regni”, 178, n. 58.
5 Domentijan, Život svetoga Simeuna i svetoga Save, ed. Dj. Daničić (Belgrade 1865), 246.
From the times of king Stefan Uroš II Milutin [r. 1282–1321], the “wreath” occurs several times in Serbian charters. Given that this decisive period saw the strongest wave of Byzantinization in the spheres of law and state, it is not surprising that the “wreath” is usually used in its meaning of an emblem of royal authority. As we have seen above, an abstract meaning had never developed in Byzantium. In the documents from the reign of Stefan Uroš III [popularly known as Stefan Dečanski, r. 1322–1331] and Stefan Uroš IV Dušan [r. 1331–1355], the wreath is as a rule used in its literal meaning.\textsuperscript{10} It is noteworthy, however, that in this very period there are also references, even if much rarer, which indicate that the meaning of the wreath as something more than just an insignia had not disappeared altogether. In the sanction of king Milutin’s charter to the monastery of St Nicholas in Hvosno, we can read: \textit{i wtq bogodarovannogo namq vynca da boudj prokltq} [and may he be cursed by our God-granted wreath].\textsuperscript{11}

There is no doubt whatsoever that the “wreath” is not used here in its literal meaning of a royal insignia. Here the “God-granted wreath” is dissociated from the person of its current bearer and belongs instead to an entire string of rulers. As observed by A. Solovjev, here the “wreath” is personified; it is able to curse like the persons listed in the sanction.\textsuperscript{12} Even if we do not go as far as Solovjev did in his conclusion that here “the notion of the crown as a subject of state authority occurs for the first time in Serbian law”, it should be said that what we have here is the notion of the crown as a transpersonal symbol of kingship.

The “wreath” used in this sense in later charters is not just a stereotypical repetition of a chancery formula. This can best be seen from Stefan Dušan’s charter of 2 May 1355 threatening with a curse by “all holy Orthodox emperors and by the God-granted holy wreath of my emperorship”\textsuperscript{13}. The contamination is quite interesting: the expression “my emperorship” highlights the distinction between the sovereign’s person and his title; the “holy Orthodox emperors” are also compatible with Byzantine notions, but the “holy wreath” by no means is. Still more interesting for our topic is a place in Dušan’s charter for the monastery of the Virgin at Arhiljevica which

\textsuperscript{10} Solovjev, “Corona regni”, 175.

\textsuperscript{11} F. Miklosich, \textit{Monumenta Serbica} (Vindobonae 1858), 71. Cf. Solovjev, “Corona regni”, 176, n. 64; Solovjev, “Pojam države”, 83. According to V. Mošin, “Sanckija u vizantijskoj i u južnoslovenskoj čirilskoj diplomatici”, \textit{Anali Historijskog instituta u Dubrovniku} 3 (1954), 36, 38, n. 60, and 40, the same element occurs in the sanctions of three charters of Stefan of Dečani and in three charters of Dušan.

\textsuperscript{12} Solovjev, “Corona regni”, 178.

Solovjev failed to notice. At the end of the proem praising Stefan Nemanja, Dušan begins to speak of himself: "Во молитве и помощи сподобили се быти сынодержником того добродеча делаца царя, приложив и благочинном помощи поставленную царю Стефану, основавшему пребывши царским князю съверском и подворском земля, и царствоватство цим землям грекской и всему Подгорю и всему западныму странаму и всему дну". It is through his prayer and help that I, the first faithful in God and God-appointed emperor Stefan, who renewed the first regal wreath of the Serbian and Littoral land and who reign over the Greek land and all the Littoral and all the Western Regions and all Dysos, was deemed fit to be an inheritor of his good deeds.\(^{14}\) The “first wreath”, which corresponds to the Serbian kingdom of the Nemanjić and tacitly implies a second, is only a step away from a “double wreath”.

All the above is enough to show that the notion of the wreath as a transpersonal symbol of kingship was known in Serbia, and was an enduring one. In Tvrtko’s milieu, it was the logothete Vladoje of Rascia who splendidly accommodated this notion to the needs of the moment by devising the unique formula\(^ {15}\) of the double wreath that God bestowed on Tvrtko for the two states he came to rule over.

The double wreath doctrine was predicated on the premise that the ban of Bosnia was the successor of the Serbian Nemanjić dynasty. Only if he lawfully succeeded to the throne of Serbia would he be entitled to the double crown. This is why the proem of the 1378 charter expressly claims that the Serbian lords, the ban’s forebears, moved from the earthly to the heavenly kingdom,\(^ {16}\) and that the Serbian land has been left without its

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\(^{15}\) The precious volume Corona regni. Studien über die Krone als Symbol des Staates im späteren Mittelalter (Veimar 1961), edited by Prof. Manfred Hellmann, contains studies on the crowns of England, France, Bohemia, Poland, Hungary and Russia, a very important comparative material covering almost all of Europe, but there is nothing resembling the “double wreath”.

\(^{16}\) Stojanović, Povelje i pisma I, 76. The concepts and terms in the 1378 proem draw on the ideological legacy of the Nemanjić, expressed in earlier Serbian charters. E.g. the charter of King Stefan Dečanski, Monumenta Serbica 88, makes a reference to the forebears who replaced “землю царствовача небесного жития” [the earthly realm with heavenly life]. Dušan is also “стрий благого корона” [a shoot from the blessed stock] in the charter to the Kellion of St Sabas at Karyes, Monumenta Serbica 89; Stefan of Dečani is “сыно и наследника светаго корона их, князь и отрась” [the son and heir of their holy stock, their branch and sprout], Monumenta Serbica 89. The phrase about the coronation in this charter is very similar to the one used in Tvrtko’s charter: и Богу дарованный князь владыка српскаго князя был на княжестве [and with the God-granted wreath of the Serbian kingdom I was crowned to kingship], Monumenta Serbica 90.
Tvrtko’s claim that he was related to the Nemanjić by blood was not unfounded. The need to emphasize Tvrtko’s tie of kinship with the house of Nemanjić as strongly as possible appears to have led to the creation of the earliest known Serbian genealogy. As shown by Dj. Sp. Radojičić, it was put together at a time when Tvrtko was still a ban somewhere in the part of Serbian lands which had come under his rule, perhaps at the monastery of Mileševa. It should be noted that the proem of the 1378 charter takes all members of the house of Nemanjić as a ruling family; they all are Tvrtko’s “forebears”, including the recently late emperor Stefan Uroš V, who could hardly be called a relative, let alone a forebear. This shows that what was insisted upon was the holy origin of the Nemanjić rather than an actual genealogical link. The Nemanjić family tradition no doubt influenced the shaping and spreading of the genealogical tradition of the Bosnian ban family. An early charter issued by Tvrtko contains a genealogy of the family going back to Prijezda [ban 1250–1287]. The story that the Kotromanić family had been ruling Bosnia “from the beginning”, that they were of German, i.e. “Gothic”, origin, is not encountered until the fifteenth century, and neither is the family name. At any rate, the legacy of the Bosnian forebears gave the right to double the wreath, which, according to the proem, is the wreath “na kraljEvstvo pryroditjlq moihq” [of the kingdom of my forebears] the Serbian lords, and the right to call it the “double wreath”.

The stage for building the double crown doctrine had been set by the course of political events in the 1370s. It is known that Tvrtko did not follow in the footsteps of his paternal uncle, Stjepan II [ban 1322–1353], and did not exploit the rise of territorial lords at the heart of the Serbian Empire to grab hold of the adjacent Serbian lands. He was also quite passive during the war that Vojislav Vojinović waged against Ragusa; he acted as an intermediary when his vassalage to the Hungarian king required that he be Ragusa’s ally and supporter. He became more active only when he was faced with the aggressive policy of župan Nikola Altomanović [nephew

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17 The expression that the Serbian land has been “left without its shepherd” is an explicit proof that the heirs of king Vukašin and emperor Simeon Uroš (Siniša) were ignored in the Serbian core areas.
19 See n. 16 above.
21 J. Tadić, Pisma i uputstva Dubrovačke Republike I (Belgrade 1935), 73.
of Vojislav Vojinović]. As far as may be inferred from the surviving documents, Tvrtko’s hostile relations with Nikola brought him into closer contact with the Serbian lands and lords. The result was his alliance with prince Lazar and their joint campaign against and defeat of Nikola Altomanović. The significance of this victory was twofold: it cemented Tvrtko’s alliance with prince Lazar, and brought him a considerable portion of the Serbian lands. Now the lord of a large territory — from the river Lim to the river Neretva, and from the upper Drina valley to the Adriatic Sea — until recently part of the Serbian state, Tvrtko found himself facing an important turning point. He could follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, ban Stjepan II, and simply annex the captured territory to the Bosnian core area (as Stjepan II had done with the region of Hum) and, possibly, expand his title accordingly. We do not and cannot know what led Tvrtko not to opt for this simpler, if less ambitious, solution. He chose another one instead: to join his earlier and freshly-gained possessions to the Serbian state and, at the same time, to emerge as the restorer of the Serbian monarchy.

After the defeat of Nikola Altomanović, the political map of the Serbian lands became much simpler: what was left of the Serbian Empire was ruled independently by Prince Lazar, Vuk Branković, Djuradž Balšić, Radič Branković and ban Tvrtko. The idea of the state as one entity did not quite die away though; room was left even in practical matters for the possibility of someone “becoming the lord emperor of the Serbs and the nobility and the Serbian land”. None of the Serbian territorial lords had much prospect of imposing his authority on the others; there was no difference among them in authority, either in its nature or in its origin, none was above the others. Unlike the first generation of lords after emperor Stefan Dušan’s death, they neither bore high-sounding titles, nor had the glory and authority of imperial generals, nor were the ruler’s relatives. The need of the fifteenth-century ruling dynasties, the Lazarević and the Branković, to present themselves as descendants, however distant, of the Nemanjić, was too great and the aura brought by the “saintly lineage” too tempting to permit us to accept the genealogical link suggested by the genealogies and encomia as a fact. On the contrary, the link is so fabricated, and in a manner so easy to see through, that none of it should be seen as any different from such genealogical fabrications as the one tracing Nemanja’s ancestry to Constantine the Great. This all is quite irrelevant anyway; what is relevant is that in the fifteenth century the Lazarević, more precisely Stefan Lazarević, and the Branković were presented and accepted as descendants of the Nemanjić. For our topic, it is important to stress that all sources about it point to the fifteenth century, and that

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22 M. Dinić, O Nikoli Altomanoviću (Belgrade: SKA spec. eds. CX, 1931).
24 Stojanović, Povelje i pisma I, 107.
25 The need of the fifteenth-century ruling dynasties, the Lazarević and the Branković, to present themselves as descendants, however distant, of the Nemanjić, was too great and the aura brought by the “saintly lineage” too tempting to permit us to accept the genealogical link suggested by the genealogies and encomia as a fact. On the contrary, the link is so fabricated, and in a manner so easy to see through, that none of it should be seen as any different from such genealogical fabrications as the one tracing Nemanja’s ancestry to Constantine the Great. This all is quite irrelevant anyway; what is relevant is that in the fifteenth century the Lazarević, more precisely Stefan Lazarević, and the Branković were presented and accepted as descendants of the Nemanjić. For our topic, it is important to stress that all sources about it point to the fifteenth century, and that
them could seriously think of assuming the role of the restorer of Serbian kingship or emperorship; there was a deep gap separating them from the “holy” Nemanjić family.

As the lord of the territory between the Neretva and Lim rivers, ban Tvrtko played a role in the further Serbian political development which was equal to that of any other territorial lord. His authority over Serbian lands was essentially the same as that of the other lords: neither he nor they inherited them; they took them by the sword. But his position was considerably different from the position of the Serbian territorial lords: he was the ruler of a state, a member of a distinguished ruling family and, moreover, distantly related to the Nemanjić. All this gave him the opportunity to appear not in the role of the conqueror of territories of the former Serbian Empire, like his uncle and predecessor, but as the restorer of the Serbian monarchy. The “double wreath” doctrine served this purpose.

Tvrtko emphasizes his kingship as kingship over Serbia in the well-known proem quoted in the introduction: and then with God’s help I have begun to reign and to govern the throne of the Serbian land.26 In the proem of the charter on the closing down of the salt market at Dračevica, he presents himself as one in the sequence of the Serbian monarchs: spodoblenný bykh kľúca i části i kučetra čarška právých členů roditeľov světých společně srbské krále a čar a poslúchajte životním nám a kých a pratložní čarščiných a všeho nedostatku vypravili vždy všedých božděděního činu krále a krále [I was deemed fit of the wreath and the dignity and the regal sceptre of my previous saintly fathers, the Serbian lords kings and emperors, and I follow their life and faith and regal regulations and set to right all that is improper in the lands of my God-granted kingdom].27 But Tvrtko does not stop at words; he takes over the rights that belonged to the Serbian monarchs.28 He feels himself bound by contracts and obliged to honour the agreement that was in force between the Serbian kings and Ragusa. His main motive for abolishing the salt market is to abide by žakonne pravle što su njima Državljani znak根据不同的 agreement the Ragusans had with the rulers of Rascia].29 While fighting for Kotor [Cattaro] and after seizing it, he

there are no information that could make it even remotely probable that prince Lazar and lord Vuk had been in the aftermath of the Battle of the Maritsa (1371) wrapped up in the legend that enhanced the prestige of their successors.

26 Stojanović, Povelje i pisma I, 76.
27 Ibid. 84.
29 Stojanović, Povelje i pisma I, 85.
underlines that it is the city of his predecessors. Finally, he sends his troops to the Battle of Kosovo (1389), deeming that it is his kingdom that is fighting the battle there. From his perspective, Tvrtko had reasons to believe and trumpet to the world that he had won a great victory.

Well-informed Ragusans, who chose to recognize Tvrtko as Serbian king in the form of address and in acknowledging his right to the St Demetrios’ Day tribute, did not fail to notice a shift in his politics after the coronation. During the precarious period caused by the war between Venice and Genoa in 1378, their message to King Louis I of Hungary is: quod rex Rassie habet expedire sua servicia de regno Rassie. They are even more specific in their reply to the Hungarian envoy: dominus rex Bossine et Rassie usque nunc iuvit nos quociens auxilium petivimus ab eo, set a modo innate, quia habet facere sua servari que intromisit de regno Rassie et est nobis longinquior, quod erat usque nunc. So, the double wreath did not remain a political theory, it was a political project set afoot.

Yet, we do not know the actual scope of Tvrtko’s influence in Serbia. Jireček was quite confident in his time: “Of the Serbian rulers, Lazar [Hrebeljanović] and Vuk [Branković] no doubt consented to this act [coronation], but the Balšić did not.” The Balšić indeed did not recognize Tvrtko as king; they had been in hostile relations or at war with him for years. They would have at best recognized his title while they were in negotiations or in times of peace. The sources offer no information about the stance held by Lazar and Vuk. The fact that they were in good relations and acted in coordination may be in favour of the view that they recognized Tvrtko as king of the Serbs. Lazar must have needed support in 1379, when he campaigned against Radić Branković and considerably expanded his territory once more. Lazar and Tvrtko jointly helped Croatian lords in their opposition to the Hungarian queens and Sigismund of Luxemburg. There is also an argument ex silencio: Lazar and Vuk made no contracts with Ragusa until 1387, whereas the Balšić did in 1377 and again in 1385. The likely reason for this cannot be Ragusa’s lack of interest, since there is reliable evidence

30 … civitas predecessorum nostrum Catharensis feliciter ad manus nostre maiestatis perpetuiter prevenit, in Š. Ljubić, Listine od odnosajih izmedju južnoga slavenstva i Mletačke republike I-X (Zagreb: JAZU, 1868–1891), vol. IV, 221.
31 V. Makushev, Istoricheskie pamiatniki Izubnikh Slaviani i sosednikh im narodov (Warsaw 1875). Cf. S. Novaković, Srbi i Turci u XIV i XV veku, 2nd. ed. (Belgrade 1960), 455 (with my additions).
33 Monumenta Ragusina IV, 177; Dinić, “O krunisanju Tvrtka I”, 145.
that Ragusan merchants operated in Serbia in the period between 1377 and 1387 as well. In the best-case scenario for Tvrtko, prince Lazar and Vuk Branković recognized him both as king of the Serbs and as their overlord. But even if this was the case, one should distinguish three parts of Tvrtko’s kingdom in practical terms: the old Bosnian lands; the Serbian lands which (the same as Kotor) came under Tvrtko’s direct control by the time of or after his coronation; and, finally, the Serbian lands controlled by Serbian territorial lords and thus only indirectly and theoretically under Tvrtko’s rule. In time, what belonged to the different parts of the “double wreath” became more and more integrated, but in Tvrtko’s hands. The Bosnian part of the state was a reality, while the restored Serbian kingdom remained a matter of claims and pretensions.

At the same time when Lazar and Vuk made contracts with Ragusa replicating the provisions contained in the emperor Dušan’s charter, the Serbian territorial lords issued the well-known recommendations for Michael, metropolitan of Jerusalem. From these Jireček inferred that Lazar, Vuk Branković and Djuradj Stracimir Balšić had replaced the Serbian emperor as equals. The metropolitan of Jerusalem, who was prince Lazar’s guest in Serbia in 1387, did not appeal to Tvrtko in the case of Ragusa’s unpaid tribute to the Jerusalem monks. This shows that Orthodox ecclesiastical circles did not bank on the king seriously. It need not be said how disadvantageous for Tvrtko’s position in Serbia and how decisive for the fate of restored Serbian kingship it was.

Conspicuously, the first signs of the Serbian regional lords’ growing independence become observable precisely at the time when Tvrtko begins to pursue a more active policy in the West. It also seems that the Serbian-Bosnian union and, consequently, the reality of Tvrtko’s Serbian kingship, grew thinner with time. A counterproof, on the other hand, is the Battle of Kosovo, which is an evidence of Tvrtko’s still strong aspirations and of a policy informed by these aspirations. It should be noted, however, that the overall situation and mutual relations in those years are not quite clear: Tvrtko is in fierce enmity with Sigismund of Luxemburg and he forces Dalmatian towns into surrender, whereas early that year Lazar reconciles with Sigismund through the mediation of his son-in-law Nicholas Garay. In June, the armies of Tvrtko, Lazar and Vuk fight together at Kosovo, which is in the territory ruled by Vuk Branković; in July, Sigismund, preparing a campaign against the “Bosnian ban”, sends his emissary to Vuk Branković; in November, he raids into Serbia, into the lands of Lazar’s heir.

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35 Zbornik Konstantina Jirečeka I (Belgrade 1959), 451.
36 G. Fejer, Codex diplomaticus regni Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis X/2, 311. The charter was published under an erroneous date, 1395, which was then corrected to 1394 in our
Be that as it may, it is in the aftermath of the Battle of Kosovo that the unfeasibility and unreality of Tvrtko’s Serbian kingship becomes patently obvious. Lazar has been killed in the battle, and his successors recognize Ottoman suzerainty; Vuk takes the side of Sigismund of Luxemburg; and Tvrtko takes a political turn towards the West. Even the theoretical recognition of Tvrtko as king must have ceased in Serbia, if it had endured throughout the period at all. It meant the end of Tvrtko’s concept of kingship as the restored Serbian monarchy of which Bosnia was but one, and not the most important, part. The kingship survives nonetheless, none of Tvrtko’s successors relinquishes it: the title and a little something of Tvrtko’s times survive, but the state becomes only and exclusively Bosnian. As a result of Ottoman suzerainty and growing pressure, in the reign of Dabiša and Helen [1391–1398] the Serbian lands and the Bosnian state territories are finally separated. After the Battle of Angora [1402], the despot of Serbia stands by Sigismund of Luxemburg, whereas Bosnia is his bitter enemy. The grant of Srebrenica to Serbia by Hungary becomes a bone of contention between Serbia and Bosnia, leading to wars and long-standing antagonisms.

With this separation, the memory of the nature of Tvrtko’s kingship begins to fade. When the logothete Vladoje’s proem of 1378 was copied in the chancery of king Ostoja, the reference to the “double wreath” and Tvrtko’s coronation as Serbian king was omitted, only the reference to the Serbian rulers as the king’s forebears was kept.37 By force of circumstance, king Sigismund of Luxemburg happened to be the most loyal to Tvrtko’s concept. In 1408, and again in 1410, he requests that the subjugated Bosnians crown him in the manner in which Tvrtko was crowned in his times. In October 1410, the Ragusans, in reply to the notification of the request, confirm that they will send envoys ala incoronation del signor nostro deli regnami di Rassa et di Bosna.38 It has been remembered at Sigismund’s court that it was a coronation with the crown of two states. Sigismund’s wish to be crowned with a “double wreath” is quite understandable. As suzerain of both states, he was above the division into the Bosnian kingdom and the Serbian despotate. When unification was attempted once more in the last days of both states, no one reached back for Tvrtko’s concept. As is well known, the whole thing was carried out in such a way that the crown prince of Bosnia was made despot of Serbia [Stefan Tomašević].

37 Stojanović, Povelje i pisma I, 421.
38 J. Gelchic, Diplomatarium relationum Reipublicae Ragusanae cum regno Hungariae (Budapest 1887), 198.
Concurrently with the political separation, the boundary that had been randomly drawn at the partitioning of the territory of Nikola Altomanović grew clearer and deeper: it became part of Serbia’s border.

II

Little is known about the circumstances of Tvrtko’s coronation. The date has been established by M. Dinić: St. Demetrios’ Day, 26 October 1377.39 As for the site of the coronation, researchers, relying on Mauro Orbini, whose story about the coronation obviously relies on an earlier source, now lost, are unanimous. According to Mauro Orbini, Tvrtko was crowned king at the monastery of Mileševa by the local metropolitan.40 The arguments cited in favour of this version have been that the monastery was under Tvrtko’s rule, that St. Sava of Serbia had been buried in it, that it was an important centre of the cult of the Nemanjić. It has been emphasized that there are references, even though of a later date, to the metropolitan of Mileševa.41

The efforts to identify the site of the coronation have not taken too much into account the proem of the 1378 charter, which expressly says the following: и ходх в херсокушке земле [and I went to the Serbian land].42 It has probably been tacitly assumed that this expression fully tallies with Orbini’s narrative. As far as we know, no one has ever posed the question how likely it is that Tvrtko would have said “I went to the Serbian land” in reference to his visit to Mileševa, to a territory under his direct rule. Nor has anyone asked if Tvrtko might have been crowned somewhere else in Serbia, perhaps at the monastery of Žiča. The issue ultimately amounts to the relationship between Orbini’s narrative and the piece of information contained in the charter for Ragusa. Should it turn out that the information in the charter contradicts Orbini, the information supplied by the learned Ragusan abbot will have to be relegated to legend, joining many others.

According to the 1378 proem, Tvrtko went to the Serbian land to strengthen the throne of his forebears, and there he was crowned king of the kingdom of his forebears. It does not necessarily follow from the context that this refers to a Serbian land beyond his direct rule. It would be vital to establish how the expression “Serbian land” was used in Tvrtko’s

40 Ora essendo Tuartco per la conquista di tanti paesi salito in gran superbia, gli venne capriccio d’incoronarsi, e intitolarsi Rè di Rassia. La qual cosa comunicando con Lodouico Rè di Vngaria ciò restò molto contento, et fù del 1276. incoronato dal Metropolitano del Monasterio di Milesceuo, et dalli suoi monaci nella Chiesa di ditto lugo: et si fece chiamar Stefano Mirce, in M. Orbini, Il regno degli Slavi (Pesaro 1601), 358.
41 S. Radojčić, Mileševa (Belgrade 1963), 41–42.
42 Stojanović, Povelje i pisma I, 421.
chancery. But the surviving documents from that period are so few that an answer to that question can hardly be deduced. The portion of the 1382 charter which speaks of the king’s activity in the lands of my God-granted kingdom makes mention of the construction of a fortress in the coastland, in the župa of Dračevica. The term “coastland” is too vague to permit any inferences as to how his newly-gained Serbian territories were termed. The charter of 1378 mentions the king’s arrival in the immediate vicinity of Ragusa: and when I came to the littoral lands and when I arrived before the glorious and fortunate city of Dubrovnik. A portion of the newly-gained territories, which were under Tvrtko’s direct rule, is called the “littoral” land, quite in the style of the Serbian chancery. It is known that the state ruled by the Nemanjić as designated in the royal title, and in the sources, consisted of the “Serbian land” and the “littoral [land]”. It is the use of the appellation “littoral land” for the annexed regions that makes it probable that the term “Serbian land” might have been used for the inland territories under Tvrtko’s rule as well; even more so as the contemporaries perceived the boundary separating the lands which came under Tvrtko’s rule from the others as neither ancient nor deep-cut.

Some subsequent events may be quoted in favour of Orbini’s version. When in 1408, after years of warring, king Sigismund of Luxemburg achieved a more significant success, he imposed on a part of the Bosnian nobility the obligation to crown him as they had crowned king Tvrtko. Sigismund’s charter for Ivaniš Nelipčić reveals what this nobleman promised: nostramque maistatem in regem et dominum suum naturalem unacum aliis id similiter assumptibus assummendis, corona dicti regni Bozne insignire, solemniter et honorifice, quemadmodum olym rex Twertbk regnavit. The following year, 1409, Sigismund was preparing himself for coronation, but it did not take place. And when Ragusan envoys came to Sigismund in Bosnia in 1410, it was known che li Bossignani sanno rinduti al signore et a facto concordio et che quisti giurni lo incoronarono del regno. This coronation, though unrealized again, was imaginable and viable only within the borders of the then Bosnian state, and not somewhere in the Despotate

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43 Ibid. 84.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid. 77.
47 Gelcich, Diplomatarium Ragusanum, 198.
of Serbia. But for us to be able to use all this as direct evidence for Tvrtko’s coronation, two more things need to be established conclusively: that the terms stipulated by king Sigismund did not change from 1408 to 1410 and, even more importantly, that he wanted to imitate Tvrtko in every respect, including the site of coronation.

Virtually nothing can be said about the coronation ceremony, even though N. Radojčić devoted a small book to the issue. He collated all available information about the coronation of the Serbian monarchs and took into account the results of the studies of coronation practices in Byzantium and Western Europe. Nonetheless, very little could be gleaned for Bosnia, except that Tvrtko had to undergo an Orthodox coronation.48

III

The 1378 charter also contains the earliest recorded royal title: ιανο βηθη δε τον αριστε in Christi nomine sanctum tranquillum et oppidum fortissimam ipsis et omnibus suis [faithful in Jesus Christ and God-appointed Stefan King of the Serbs and Bosnia and the Littoral and the Western Regions].49 In this form, the intitulatio is a clear and unambiguous expression of Tvrtko’s concept of restored Serbian kingship. By taking a place for himself in the succession of the Serbian monarchs whom he saw as his forebears, Tvrtko took the Serbian monarchic title. In doing that, he got round the imperial title and chose the royal one instead. His motives may be surmised. In some circles, notably in the Serbian Church, Dušan’s coronation as emperor was considered an illegal act of self-will contrary to human and divine laws.50 In Tvrtko’s milieu the Serbian emperor was not so frowned upon: the proem of the 1382 charter mentions Serbian kings and emperors.51 What might have played a more immediate role in Tvrtko’s decision was the fact that he had to have the assent of his overlord, the Hungarian king. It is unimaginable that the Angevin would have assented

48 N. Radojčić, Obred krunisanja kralja Tvrtka (Belgrade 1948), 80–82.
49 Stojanović, Povelje i pisma I, 77.
50 Well known are the condemnations of Dušan in the biography of patriarch Sava, in Uglješa’s charter concerning the restoration of ecclesiastical unity, and even in the biography of despot Stefan Lazarević. In secular circles, especially among Serbian and Bosnian territorial lords, Dušan was held in high esteem. This may be inferred from the fact that the Ragusans never failed to tie the provisions of their contracts to Dušan, or to glorify and extol the emperor in their negotiations with their neighbours.
51 Stojanović, Povelje i pisma I, 84.
to Tvrtko’s coronation as emperor, even more so because he had not recognized the imperial title either to Dušan or to his son and heir, Uroš.52

So, Tvrtko took the Serbian royal title, but with elements which had emerged and became established during the empire. The very form “of the Serbs” is related to Dušan’s “of the Serbs and Greeks”, whereas in the old royal title the Serbian or Rascian land had figured first.53 Bosnia was added, and it stood for all Bosnian territories individually listed in the ban title.54 M. J. Dinić demonstrated that “Pomorje” in the imperial title had not stood for the “littoral lands” from the royal title of the Nemanjić, but for the part of the territories seized from Byzantium. “Pomorje belonged to the Greek or Romaion lands.”55 Strictly speaking, “Pomorje” in Tvrtko’s title did not correspond to any real area; it was there as a mechanical reproduction of the Serbian title. However, attempts were made early on to identify it with the coastal areas which were under the Bosnian rulers. “Pomorje” was replaced with “Primorje”, and the latter was understood literally, as an area by the sea. Thus, “Primorje” features instead of “Pomorje” already in the signature in Tvrtko’s charter of 1382. Even though “Pomorje” can be found in the Bosnian royal title even later, it is more often than not replaced with “Primorje”.56

The same goes for the appellation “Western Regions” in Tvrtko’s title. Neither did this term correspond to any of the territories ruled by Tvrtko effectively or nominally. It too is a mechanically adopted element of the Serbian imperial title, where it had also referred to a territory seized from Byzantium.57

The changing title of the Bosnian kings generally reflects the changing concept of kingship. For Tvrtko, it is still a mechanical borrowing and shows little effort to make modifications: the replacement of Pomorje with Primorje and, in the last years, the inclusion of Croatia and Dalmatia. Tvrtko’s immediate successor, Stefan Dabiša, incorporates the entire ban title into the royal title, while retaining all elements of the Serbian title. So, along with “the Serbs”, along with Pomorje, Western Regions and Bosnia, there reappear: the Land of Hum, the Lower Regions, Usora, Soli and Podrinje

52 M. J. Dinić, “Dušanova carska titula u očima savremenika”, in Zbornik u čast šeste stogodišnjice Zakonika cara Dušana I (Belgrade 1951), 113–114.
54 Dinić, “O krunisanju Tvrtka I”, 142, shows that Tvrtko had never styled himself as banus Bossine et rex Rassie, but that it was a title that was only rarely and in the early days used by the Ragusans.
[Drina river valley]. The Western Regions are pulled out of the original sequence and inserted between the Lower Regions, Usora or Podrinje; obviously this term also came to refer to an actual territory, which was ranked among the last. The title of the Bosnian kings becomes fixed in the following form: N. N. “king of the Serbs, Bosnia, Primorje, Land of Hum, Lower Region, Usora, Podrinje, Western Regions etc.” There is also a shorter version, which is closer to the original Serbian form: N. N. “king of the Serbs, Bosnia and Primorje etc.”

Adopted along with the Serbian title were the formulae, essentially Byzantine: “pious in Christ the God” and “ordained by God”, but they were used alternately with “by the grace of God” from the title of ban of Bosnia.

When Tvrtko became king, he also became Stefan. “God does not ordain him only as king but also as Stefan, if one may say so.” The name Stefan was and remained an integral part of the title of the Bosnian kings and, at the same time, a lasting reminder of the origin of their kingship. The meaning of the name had been symbolic of the state already in Serbia; from Nemanja onwards, Stefan was the name, or part of the name, of every Serbian monarch. A reliable explanation for this has not been offered yet.

To Tvrtko, the name Stefan became more important than his first personal name. In the documents issued after the coronation, the name Tvrtko never stands alone, but rather Stefan Tvrtko or, not infrequently, only Stefan. All Tvrtko’s successors on the throne of Bosnia bore the name Stefan: Stefan Dabiša, Stefan Ostoja, Stefan Ostojić, Stefan Tvrtko Tvrtković, Stefan Tomaš and Stefan Stepan Tomašević. The case of the latter is the most interesting.

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59 Ibid.
60 It is interesting that the Latin version of the Bosnian royal title did not develop in parallel with the Slavic one. In it, “of the Serbs” is always replaced with Rascia; the Western Parts are omitted altogether; and the lands listed in the ban title never occur. The Latin version also occurs in a shorter and a longer form. The normal form would be: N.N. dei gratia rex Rassie, Bosne et Maritime (or partiumque maritimarum or partis maritime). The shorter form, attested for Tvrtko II and Tomaš is: N. N. rex Bosne etc. For only a brief time at the beginning of Tvrtko II’s second reign does the quite short form kralj Bosne i k tomu [King of Bosnia etc.] occur in Serbian charters as well.
62 The particular meaning of this name has been related to the Greek word “stephanos” (crown) or with St Stephen, the purported patron saint of the Nemanjić dynasty. The claim that the name Stefan was a “taboo” among the medieval Serbs cannot be taken seriously.
63 Dinić, “Veliki bosanski zlatnik”, 45.
illustrative. He was obviously baptized Stepan, but in the official documents another form of the same name was being added to it, to highlight the difference. For some reason the form of the name Štefan (not Stefan) was considered stylish and ceremonial and thus more appropriate for the royal title.64 This use of the name Stefan did not go unnoticed even beyond Bosnia. Enea Silvio remarks in reference to the Bosnian king: Bosne rex gentis Dispotus Stephanus nomine (sic enim reges suos appellare consuevere)...65

Reviving the Serbian kingship, Tvrtko also revived court offices and titles from the period of the Nemanjić kings. He omitted the titles and ranks granted by the emperors, such as despot [despotes], kesar [kaisar/caesar] and sevastokrator, and accepted those from the period of the kingdom: protovestijar [protovestiarios], logotet [logothete], stavilac [domestikos].66

The practices of the Serbian chancery were also adopted: Bosnian charters now contained a proem and, at the same time, the Serbian diplomatic miniscule (which happened to be named “bosančica”) came into use.67 These practices, which were a novelty in Bosnia, were introduced knowledgeably and with a sense of finesse. This can best be seen from Tvrtko’s charter issued to the Ragusans in 1378. Two lines, Bosnian and Serbian, are clearly distinguished in the text; the king confirms the documents issued by his Bosnian ancestors and by his Serbian forebears. The “Serbian” part contains the characteristic formula “by the grace of my kingship”, occurring in the Serbian charters from the thirteenth century onwards, while the “Bosnian” one contains the king’s word of honour to the Ragusans. In this way, a single charter continues two traditions of contractual documents.68

Tvrtko’s coronation entailed heraldic change as well. No direct borrowing was practicable in this case, because Serbia did not know of coats of arms in the strict sense, although there were emblems carrying political symbolism. It appears that the lion, which occurs on the seals of emperor Uroš and on the gold coin of king Tvrtko, was adopted from Serbia. In all

64 Щєфань Ѣтепань in all of the five surviving charters to the Ragusans. Stojanović, Povelje i pisma I, 162–167.
65 Aeneae Sylvii de statu Europae, ed. Freher, Rerum germanicarum scriptores varii (Argentorati 1717), 104.
68 For more, see S. Ćirković, Ugovori Dubrovnika sa Srbijom i Bosnom.
probability, the issuance of this large gold coin was also in some connection with Tvrtko’s coronation.69

IV

The question as to how the contemporaries saw Tvrtko’s royal title is quite easy to answer. The few surviving documents show that the Bosnian kings’ royal rank was recognized. As far as Hungary is concerned, the situation is somewhat more complicated because the kingship issue was intertwined with the issue of relations between Bosnia and Hungary. Particularly interesting for our topic is the question of the extent to which the surrounding world understood and accepted Tvrtko’s coronation as the restoration of Serbian kingship.

The Ragusans were the closest to the event. Being best versed in the recent past of the neighbouring lands, they could best grasp its significance and assess how founded the pretensions were. They were able, and had to, weigh how far such pretensions and theories needed to be acknowledged to the best of their own interest. The Ragusan attitude towards Tvrtko’s kingship is telling and unambiguous. They acknowledged him as the successor of the Serbian monarchs, agreed to continue paying St. Demetrios’ Day tribute to him, submitted to him all earlier charters issued by the Serbian monarchs for confirmation and, of course, recognized his title.

In the Ragusan documents Tvrtko’s title is rex Rassie; rex Rassie et Bosne; rex Bosne et Rassie; or rex Bosne.70 They were careful, especially in the beginning, to acknowledge his Nemanjićian pretensions, but the Bosnian reality soon began to break through. The balance that the “double crown” was supposed to symbolize could not be maintained for long. Already under Dabiša, Tvrtko’s immediate successor, Bosnia came to the foreground: in the Ragusan documents Dabiša and all subsequent kings were styled as rex Bosne. Only by exception, when addressing the king directly, was the “of the Serbs” added; this practically amounts to the instances when the official title was reproduced.71


70 Closer examination of numerous references to king Tvrtko in Ragusan records shows the absence of any pattern. All four forms occur both at the beginning and at the end of his reign. Cf. Monumenta Ragusina IV, and M. Dinić, Odluke Veća Dubrovačke Republike I-II (Belgrade 1951–54).

71 In Ragusan records Tvrtko’s successors were very rarely styled as kings of Rascia or of Bosnia and Rascia. In the Cyrillic documents where the title was reproduced, they frequently were.
Venice was farther afield, but always in touch and always well-informed of Bosnia's policies and political decision makers. The Republic was on friendly terms with Tvrtko, although his ties with the Kingdom of Naples aroused some concern towards the end of his reign. It recognized his royal title, and in the form he insisted upon. For Venice too, Tvrtko officially was rex Rassie et Bosne, but in this case the reality prevailed even sooner. There was no need to change anything in the case of his successors; they all were kings of Bosnia, while Rascia was mentioned only when the official title was reproduced.

The surviving documents are too few to allow us to learn how Tvrtko's title was received and understood elsewhere. Nothing is known of southern Italy, with which he had already established close contact. Tvrtko's successors were, of course, kings of Bosnia. All the more interesting, therefore, is a reference to Bosnia and its ruler in the records of a trial by the Inquisition in Turin, because it reveals the notions of the common people, who had heard of Bosnia because of heretical teachings. According to this document, which has long been attracting the attention of scholars of the Bosnian heretical church, a Jacobus Bech was sent to Sclavonia pro doctrina predicta integraliter addiscenda et perfecte a magistris ibidem commorantibus in loco qui dictur Boxena, qui locus subest cuidam domino, qui vocatur Albana de Boxena, et subest dictus dominus regi Rassene. This is an obvious contamination: it was known that Bosnia had been ruled by a ban, and it was also heard that now it was ruled by the king of Raška. As people knew nothing of the actual state of affairs, the following combination, which seemed quite natural to the contemporaries, was constructed: the ban of Bosnia is subordinate to the king of Rascia. This is why the document is important evidence of the kingship in Bosnia having been the restored Serbian kingship, and of Tvrtko's concept having been briefly accepted even in places where people had no idea of its true meaning.

The most important of all was the stance of the Hungarian king, lord suzerain of the land. There can be no doubt that king Louis I was fully acquainted with Tvrtko's plan, and that he consented to his coronation and restoration of Serbian kingship. There is reliable evidence that Louis and Tvrtko were in good relations shortly after the coronation. In 1378 the

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73 For examples, see Ljubić, *Listine* V–IX.


Ragusans pleaded with the Hungarian king to intervene with the “king of Rascia”, “his relative”, to prevent the transport of foods to Kotor lest the latter should become a Venetian bastion. Of course, such a petition would not have been possible had the Angevin not assented to Tvrtko’s coronation and recognized his title. The same goes for the abovementioned messages to the effect that Tvrtko now came to be estranged from Ragusa, being preoccupied with his undertaking in the Rascian [Serbian] kingdom.

The motivation of the Hungarian king can only be surmised. Louis was Tvrtko’s overlord and, as far as can be seen from the surviving sources, had maintained unclouded relations with Bosnia since 1366. On the other hand, he considered himself suzerain of Serbia, which had figured in the title of the Hungarian kings from the beginning of the thirteenth century. Louis had no real influence in Serbia until after Dušan’s death and the rise of regional lords. During Dušan’s reign all Hungarian attacks on Serbia had failed, and it was only the power struggle of regional lords under emperor Uroš V [r. 1355–1371] that opened the way to Hungarian influence. Viličani’s account of two Raška barons and the fate of Nikola Altomanović provide a glimpse of Louis’s skilful use of the internal strife in Serbia to his advantage.

Tvrtko’s coronation changed nothing in the relations with Hungary. From the Angevin’s perspective, it was even better to have as Serbian king a direct and loyal vassal than an adamant adversary such as Dušan had been in his time. Even after Louis’s death, relations between Tvrtko and the Hungarian queens remained the same for a while. The queens even went a step further in recognizing Tvrtko as Serbian king by ceding Kotor to him. At any rate, Tvrtko believed that Kotor, being a city of his predecessors, was given to him rightfully.

The situation changed when Tvrtko began to support Croatian barons and to conquer territory in Dalmatia and Croatia on his own. Unfortunately, neither these events nor their legal aspect are sufficiently known, every reconstruction being dependent on just a few documents. It is certain that Sigismund of Luxemburg contested Tvrtko’s royal title: in a document from the summer of 1389 he announces a campaign against the Bosnian ban. On the other hand, it is known that Tvrtko, having subjugated Dal-

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76 *Monumenta Ragusina* IV, 178. In the edition of Gelnch, *Diplomatarum Ragusanum*, 571, the words “proximo suo” are omitted.

77 *Monumenta Ragusina* IV, 177.

78 Dinić, “Rastislalići”, 143; and his *O Nikoli Altomanoviću*.

79 See n. 30 above.

80 See n. 36 above. While queen Maria refers to Tvrtko as king, in the document of 1387 he is “banus”. Cf. F. Šišić, *Vojvoda Hrvoje Vukić Hrvatinčić i njegovo doba (1350–1416)* (Zagreb 1902), 255, n. 158.
matian cities, restyled his title once more towards the end of his reign, this time by including Croatia and Dalmatia. The basis for this ambitious, if short-lived, change in the title was his effective control over large portions of Dalmatia and Croatia. Sigismund of Luxemburg later stated that the Bosnians had conquered regna Dalmatie et Croatie. Shortly before Tvrtko’s death, negotiations between Bosnia and Sigismund were launched, but their outcome is not known. Nor is it possible to infer what could have been the basis for this rapprochement. At that point Sigismund obviously recognized Tvrtko’s title and, a little later, Dabiša’s too. Tvrtko’s successor was addressed as king of Dalmatia and Croatia.

Sigismund of Luxemburg built his position on Bosnian kingship at the time he crushed his adversaries in Croatia and subjugated king Dabiša. He was willing to accept and recognize it, but sought to transfer it to himself as soon as possible. There were several earlier models for such a solution, above all those used by his Angevin predecessor. The institutions of the nobility as an estate, the abstract notion of the state, the separation of the ruler’s transient person from the eternal royal dignity, made it possible for one person to be crowned king in two kingdoms without either of the two losing anything of its political individuality. Sigismund made his crowning as Bosnian king an item of his political agenda. As scant and fragmentary as the surviving evidence is, it still makes it possible to keep track of some phases of his effort, and of compromise solutions he was forced to accept.

The first trace can be found in the charter by which vojvoda Hrvoje acknowledged his alliance with Sigismund in the summer of 1393. At that point, Sigismund managed merely to reserve for himself vojvoda Hrvoje’s undivided allegiance and loyal service after Dabiša’s death. The following

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82 Fejer, *Codex Diplomaticus X/2*, 443.
83 Reformationes 29, f. 76′, 26/12/1391: Prima pars est de scribendo et comitendo ser Clementi Mar. de Goče quod ipse vadat ad dominum regem Bessin pro parte communitatis nostre cum literis credencialibus et congaudeat de adventu ambassatoris regis Ungarie pro tractatu pacis cum ipso rege et recordari eidem de oblacione ipsi facta de mittendo pro parte communitatis ambassatores ad expensas communis nostri. The next day the decision was changed in the sense that the king should only be reminded of the offer.
85 This may be inferred from the fact that Split and Hvar addressed him as king of Croatia and Dalmatia. Šišić, *Vojvoda Hrvoje*, 257, n. 5, and 259, n. 47. Dabiša’s Serbian charters, and even the Latin one of June 1394, contain the ordinary royal title.
year, Sigismund crushed his main opponents, and having subjugated Dabiša himself at Dobor, forced him to cede Dalmatia and Croatia; then he took a step further and imposed upon the Bosnian barons the obligation to recognize him as their king and lord upon Dabiša’s death.\(^{87}\) This had not been forgotten by the autumn of 1395, when Dabiša died. Immediately after Dabiša’s death, when the issue of succession to the throne became a hot one, it was known in Hungarian circles that illi de Bossena apetunt regem istum [sc. of Sigismund] in suum regem et dominum.\(^{88}\) And yet, Sigismund did not achieve his goal, but had to content himself with a compromise, i.e. with Dabiša’s widow Helen on the throne, and the issue of Bosnian kingship postponed for some later time once again.

When internal change led to Ostoja’s ascension to the throne in 1398 and his coronation as king in early 1399, it became clear that whatever Sigismund had managed to achieve came down to nothing. This was the likely cause of his embittered and persistent struggle with the Bosnians and, on the other hand, Bosnia’s unyielding attitude and exclusive allying with the Neapolitan bloc. For the Bosnian king and barons, there was no trouble coming from that side: Ladislas of Naples recognized the Bosnian kingship and its formally retained vassal status. In 1406 he confirmed Bosnia’s borders, and those from the time of ban Kulin \(r. 1180–1204\), which was obviously requested by the Bosnians.\(^{89}\) Ladislas held Dalmatia and Croatia apart from the rest, and ruled them through his governor, Hrvoje.

It was not until Sigismund caused confusion and fear in the ranks of the Bosnian barons by the massacre at Dobor that he pressed his maximalist demand again.\(^{90}\) It is obvious from the charter issued to Ivaniš Nelipčić — one of those who had submitted themselves to him — that Sigismund demanded, and the Bosnians agreed, to be acknowledged as their king and lord, and crowned the way Tvrtko I had been crowned.\(^{91}\) It remains unknown how wide the circle of barons who accepted the obligations was, but there is no doubt that Sigismund imposed them even on those who submitted later, in 1409 and 1410. In the spring of 1410 Sigismund was

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\(^{88}\) L. Thallóczy, “Mantovai követjárás Budán 1395”, *Ertekezések a történelmi tudomány köréből 20/4 (1905), 110.

\(^{89}\) J. Lucius, *De regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae libri VI* (Amstelodami 1666), 428.

\(^{90}\) When king Ostoja allied with Sigismund in 1404, the Hungarian king contented himself with a compromise according to which Bosnia remained a vassal state under the terms set at the time of king Louis. Lett. di Lev. IV, fol. 61, 19/12/1403.

\(^{91}\) Šišić, “Nekoliko isprava”, 313.
ready to come to Bosnia from Serbia to be crowned as Bosnian king, but nothing happened this time either. By the beginning of 1410 he had worked out a provisional solution: he appointed herzeg Hrvoje, until recently his bitter enemy who had changed sides at the right time, as viceroy of Bosnia. Sigismund was a little closer to being crowned in the autumn of 1410. The Ragusans had already had gifts and charters for confirmation prepared, but the whole business failed once again.

Sigismund then abandoned his project for a while, and put aside his maximalist demand. This was probably due to his preoccupations in the West: he was elected Holy Roman emperor, which promised a much larger field for his ambitions. As far as Bosnian kingship is concerned, he appears to have returned to the compromise formula of 1404: he accepted Ostoja as his vassal with traditional obligations. This was formalized in 1415, when Sigismund stamped the imperial seal to reconfirm the charters for the towns, fortresses, estates and rights that Ostoja had been granted by the Hungarian king. The relationship was defined in a typically feudal manner: all was confirmed tamquam regni nostri Hungarie feodali et subdito.

As a result of the growing Ottoman pressure and Sigismund’s involvement elsewhere, Hungary intervened in Bosnian affairs less than before. It was not until Tvrtko II re-established closer ties with Hungary during his second reign that Sigismund of Luxemburg was given another chance to make decisions concerning Bosnian kingship. He persuaded Tvrtko II to draw up a charter passing Bosnian kingship to his relative, Hermann of Cilli, in case he should die without a lawful heir. Even though the whole idea had little prospect of ever being realized, it did not go without some consequences. After Tvrtko II’s death, Ulrich of Cilli put forth his claim to the throne, and obstructed the confirmation by the Hungarian court of Stefan Tomáš, who had been made king in early December 1443, shortly after Tvrtko’s death. After months of haggling, the affair ended in Tomáš’s favour. Janos Hunyadi had been so instrumental in achieving such an outcome that the new Bosnian king promised him an annual tribute. Tomáš’s case reveals how the actual relationship between the Hungarian and Bosnian kingships was veiled behind fictions and legal constructions. Ragusan

92 Codex epistolaris Vitoldi, Monumenta Poloniae historica VI (Krakow 1896), 171–172.
93 Gelcich, Diplomatarium Ragusanum, 198.
94 Thallóczy, Studien, 353.
95 Fejer, Codex diplomaticus X/6, 900–901.
96 Cf. S. Ćirković, Herceg Stefan Vukčić Kosača i njegovo doba (Belgrade: SASA spec. eds. CCCLXXVI, 1964), 72, n. 7.
97 Thallóczy, Studien, 366–368.
documents show that Tomaš had effective power from the very beginning, that he had already been deep in battles, and not without success; in his own charter for Hunyadi, however, the way things are presented makes it seem as if he had not become king until he was confirmed by the Hungarian king Wladislas: nobisque post ipsius [sc. of Tvrtko II] decessum et eiusdem disposition in dominio castrorum et tenutarum corone ipsius regni remanenti-bus, serenissimus princeps et dominus noster gratiosus, dominus Vladislaus dei gratia Hungarie et Polonie etc. rex, de speciali consilio et bona voluntate ac dispositione magnifici et potentis viri … nos in regem dicti Bosne solemn-niter instituit et confirmavit.98

During Tomaš’s long reign there was no strong central authority in Hungary and, therefore, there were no attempts to redefine the relationship between Bosnia and Hungary. It is even observable that Tomaš tried to exploit the situation to strengthen the position of Bosnian kingship. In two surviving charters, Dalmatia and Croatia (1446 and 1458) figure in the royal title, which is a sure indication of a return to the pretensions of Tvrtko I and Ostoja.99 Nor was Tomaš always loyal to Hungary in practical politics either.100 He requested the crown from the pope, which, as can be seen from the subsequent developments, was in part against Hungary’s interest. Therefore, tensions were sure to ensue after Matthias Corvinus’s accession. The issue was eventually resolved in the traditional manner: Matthias recognized the Bosnian king, whom he saw as his vassal.

Following in his father’s footsteps, Stefan Tomašević, in a melodramatic message to the pope Pius II, requested the crown and bishops for his realm. The pope granted both requests, whereby the issue of Bosnian kingship and its relationship to Hungary was reopened. Matthias’s reaction to the news of the pope’s granting absolution to the Bosnian king, of the coronation performed by the papal legate, and of the bishops sent to Bosnia, was sharp and indignant. He reminded the pope of the Bosnian king’s conduct before the Ottomans, above all of the shameful surrender of Smederevo. The Bosnian king was hardly deserving of absolution, and yet he was granted one: a sede apostolica … speciales ad se legatos mitti, et se per eos non sine gravi et evident modi regum Hungarie preiudicio coronari et ita in regno confirmari…101 The crown granted by Rome and the coronation at the hands of the papal legate violated the prerogatives of the Hungarian kings. There was quite a difference between the confirmation of Tomaš and

98 Ibid.
100 Ćirković, Herceg Stefan, 231 and 234.
101 Monumenta Vaticana historiam Hungariae sacram illustrantia, 1st ser., vol. VI (Budapest 1889), 17–19.
that of his son: Tomaš himself had held that he did not become king until he was confirmed by king Władysław Jagellon, whereas Stefan Tomašević bypassed the Hungarian king completely. By receiving the crown from a universal authority such as the papacy, Stefan Tomašević became equal to the Hungarian king and formally terminated his subordinate status. The question, however, arises as to whether that was what he actually wanted at all. It follows from the letter of king Matthias that at the time of coronation Stefan Tomašević was amidst negotiations and willing to accept the Hungarian quite difficult conditions, such as, for instance, to cede some towns in the borderland with the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the pope must have been prepared for Matthias’s protests, because the latter had already protested in 1460 at the false news that king Tomaš was seeking the crown from the pope. The pope had reassured the Hungarian king: tenemus quoque memoria hanc ipsam coronam fuisse a nostris predecessoribus sepius postulatam, neque tamen unquam obtentam; quam si ulla ratione fuissemus daturi, non sine honore et beneplacito tuo, qui ius ad illam pretendas dandum censuissetems.102 There is a reason, then, to believe that neither the pope nor Stefan Tomašević sought deliberately to change the relationship between Bosnia and Hungary. King Matthias, for his part, saw everything in the blackest light; it seemed to him that Stefan was trying to break away, and rebuked the pope for encouraging him inadvertently.103 As is well known, this dispute too was settled by negotiations, ending in an agreement which left the things as they had been. The relationship of vassalage was confirmed and, to Matthias Corvinus, Stefan Tomašević remained a fidelis noster despite his pope-granted crown.104 Upon the death of the Bosnian king, Matthias laid claim to his possessions in Ragusa.105

Contrary to the widespread perception of Stefan Tomašević as the last Bosnian king, Bosnian kingship did not become extinct in 1463. It even had two sequels, one under Ottoman, the other under Hungarian suzerainty.106 In the eyes of the contemporaries, Bosnian kingship was independent both of the Bosnian ruling family and of any particular territory. When in 1490 arrangements were being made for Matthias’s son, herzog John Corvinus, to be made king of Bosnia, only an insignificant portion of the former

102 Ibid. 14.
103 The instructions to the Hungarian envoys to the pope quoted in Klaić, Poviest Bosne do propasti kraljevstva (Zagreb 1882), 329, n. 12.
104 Fermandzin, Acta Bosnae, 250; Klaić, Poviest Bosne, 329
105 Gelcich, Diplomatarium Ragusanum 762, 763
Bosnian state territory was not under Ottoman rule. This was the last time that Bosnian kingship was reckoned with in practical politics.

V

There have been two hypotheses about the actual crown Tvrtko was crowned with in 1377. Jireček believed it likely that the “old crown of Stefan the First-Crowned was placed on his head”. Ćorović disagreed and was instead inclined to believe that some new crown served the purpose. Dinić, however, showed how weak arguments for both hypotheses were. The visual sources, which had meanwhile received more attention, are not of much help in drawing more reliable inferences either. Nothing is heard of a crown in Dabiša’s reign either. Elizabeth certainly was not crowned after her husband’s death. We know that Ostoja was crowned in early 1399, i.e. almost a year after he had actually acceded to power. An interesting piece of information comes from the time of a Bosnian-Hungarian war in the early fifteenth century. In a charter issued to Ivan Morović, ban of Mačva, king Sigismund mentions the capture of Bobovac, a town ubi corona ipsius regni Bosne conservatur.

This information is worthy of particular attention because it shows that there was in Bosnia a concrete crown, which then must have been de rigueur in the coronation ceremony. Such crowns were usually claimed to be of great antiquity and to have belonged to one of the most ancient and most famous rulers: e.g. in Hungary to St. Stephen, in Poland to Boleslaw the Brave, in France to Charlemagne. Such a crown did not move around with the king or about his residences, but was kept in one place like a sacred relic. It would have played an important role in power struggles, because only the crowning with such a crown could be legitimate. Suffice it to remember the exciting story of the Hungarian crown. The reference to Bobovac as the place where the crown of the kingdom was kept also suggests that the way the crown was handled was inspired by the Hungarian example. It is well known that the crown of St. Stephen was kept at Visegrad. All this speaks in favour of Jireček’s hypothesis. In the early fifteenth century there was one crown of the kingdom, which was treated with reverence (it was the crown that, as we have seen, Sigismund of Luxemburg wished to be crowned with)

109 Dinić, Državni sabor srednjovekovne Bosne (Belgrade 1955), 34, n. 4.
110 Šišić, “Nekoliko isprava”, 261.
111 Jireček, Istorija Srba I, 320; II, 341.
and carefully guarded. It is hard to believe that it was not an old and prestigious crown, and such a crown could only have come from Serbia.

Examining the role of the Bosnian assembly in the coronation of a ruler, Dinić discovered an important fact; namely, that the deposed Bosnian kings who regained power were crowned anew. In August 1421 the Ragusans made a decision to present gifts to king Tvrtko II in hac sua coronatione. The need to perform a second coronation indirectly shows that the crown and the coronation ceremony enjoyed exceptional prestige. What lies behind is the notion that, by being deposed from the throne and separated from the crown, the ruler loses all grace conferred upon him by the act of coronation and, also, the notion that every reign must be rendered legitimate by the act of coronation. Particular reverence for a crown is not surprising, but the rite of coronation, and especially the question of its sacral nature, poses much difficulty.

Tvrtko’s coronation was seen as the “benchmark” even as late as 1408, but this fact is of little help because we know nothing of this first rite of coronation. It is not until the coronation of Tomaš that we have some information; we know that it was performed at Mile in central Bosnia. Who performed the coronation, however, is completely obscure. There were no Roman Catholic dignitaries yet, and by being moved to central Bosnia, the rite was also moved away from the Orthodox ecclesiastical see. Judging by what is known of the “Bosnian Church”, it is unlikely that it would have taken any part in a rite so remote from its teachings and worship practices. The sacral aspect of the coronation remains in complete darkness, and it would be only natural to assume that it did not matter much. This, however, is not consistent with the practice of re-crowning, or with king Tvrtko II’s reference, in a charter for the Venetians, to his “sacred coronation” (sacra coronatione).

The whole issue becomes complicated insofar as we can see that towards the mid-fifteenth century, when king Tomaš took a turn towards Catholicism, something defective becomes observable in the manner of coronation as it had been practised until then. Namely, Tomaš requested the crown from the pope. On the one hand, it was an indication of his tying more closely to Catholicism and Catholic states. Hence his act was directed against the interests of the non-Catholics in Bosnia. The granting of the

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112 Dinić, Državni sabor, 35.
113 From the thirteenth century a certain decline of the coronation and anointment rite becomes observable in western Europe as well. It may be ascribed to the strengthening of hereditary and dynastic elements. Cf. E. H. Kantorowitz, The King’s Two Bodies. A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton, NJ 1957), 327–332.
crown by a universal authority had, however, another side to it, directed against Hungarian and Ottoman suzerainty over Bosnia. Stefan Tomašević later cited the fear of the Ottomans as his father’s motive for giving up the idea of being crowned with a crown sent by the pope. As for the Hungarian position, one should remember the reaction of king Matthias at the time of Stefan Tomašević’s coronation. One cannot fail to notice that Tomaš had put forth his request at a time when Hungary was practically without a king, its affairs being run by the “governor of the kingdom”, Janos Hunyadi, and that it was then that he reintroduced Dalmatia and Croatia in his Bosnian title.

Pope Eugene IV had sent a crown to Tomaš, but the crown was sent back to Rome. Dinić called attention to a piece of information from Split, which shows that the papal legate Tommasini, bishop of Hvar (Lesina), took from the treasury of the cathedral of St. Domnius: unam coronam auream fulcitam perlis et lapidibus preciosis… dandam et referendam serenissimo regi Bosne ut dicebatur. When Tomaš’s successor requested a crown from Rome again, he reminded of that episode: “Your predecessor Eugene offered my father a crown and wished to establish episcopal sees in Bosnia. Father rejected it back then so as not to bring Ottoman hatred on himself, because he was newly a Christian and had not yet expelled heretics and Manicheans from his kingdom.” From a statement of the pope Pius II it appears that Tomaš requested a crown more than once.

At any rate, in May 1466 Tomaš and his wife Catherine, daughter of Stefan Vukčić Kosača, were expected to be crowned at Mile, and in July the same year the legate Tommasini issued a note confirming the receipt of the crown which had not been used. It follows from this that an old crown served the purpose, but we still remain in the dark about the real reasons for this change of heart. Tomaš’s position in Bosnia prior to the coronation was strong; he had reconciled and established marital ties with Stefan Vukčić Kosača, the most powerful figure in Bosnia, until then his opponent. It is

115 Dinić, Državni sabor, 36.
116 See p. 131 herein.
117 Dinić, Državni sabor, 36, n. 11.
118 See n. 115.
119 Timere celsitudo tua videtur per litteras, quas proxime accepinus, ne propter adventum oratorum Bosnensium ad concedendos illi regno episcopos, dandamque Thome regi coronam facilis aures prebeamus… Tenemus quoque memoria hanc ipsam coronam fuisse a nostris predecessoribus sepius postulatam, neque tamen unquam obtentam; quam si ulla ratione fuissemus daturi, non sine honore et beneplacito tuo, qui ius ad illum pretendas (sic), dandum censuissetemus. Pope Pius II to king Matthias Corvinus on 7 June 1460, Monumenta Vaticana historiam Hungariae VI, 14.
true that the stance of his allies Ivaniš Pavlović and Petar Vojsalić was not quite clear, but Tomaš paid little heed to them anyway. He must have been anxious about the Bosnian Church. Perhaps his giving up the pope-granted crown was the price he had to pay for Kosača's friendship, or perhaps, as Stefan Tomašević later claimed, the fear of the Ottomans was the decisive factor. At any rate, in 1446 nothing essentially changed with regard to the crown and crowning.

When Stefan Tomašević acceded to the throne, he too asked the pope for a crown and bishops. Pius II granted his request, and papal legates, with full approval from the Bosnian barons assembled at Jajce, crowned Stefan Tomašević, by all accounts on 17 November 1461, the feast day of St. Gregory the Miracle-Worker. This time opposition came from Hungary. The sacral aspect of the coronation found its full expression, but sadly no details of the event have come down to us. The “ordines” must have been changed and Catholic rites observed. But none of it bore any fruit: the monarch’s position did not change, and neither did the conception of crown and state. It all took place too late. The taking of a crown granted by the pope symbolized merely a resolute political orientation, and it was supposed to tie Bosnia to the Christian world more firmly.

Very little is known about the actual coronation ceremony and the crown as an insignia, as can be clearly seen from the text above. Yet, some rough outlines can be drawn, and they are consistent with the other elements examined here. It all began with an Orthodox coronation in the Nemanjić tradition, in accordance with Tvrtko’s notion of kingship, and then Hungarian models began to enter the picture. Even so, Tvrtko’s coronation remained the standard model as late as the beginning of the fifteenth century. Around the middle of the century there prevailed the desire to abandon the crown and the style of coronation hitherto observed, and in 1461 a Catholic coronation with a crown bestowed by the pope was performed.

VI

Of the impression that Tvrtko’s coronation made in the country, nothing can be learned before the tardy narrative of Mauro Orbini: dopo questo [coronation] regnaua in gran pace et prosperita et ciascuno delli suoi baroni et gentilhuomini gli prestava grande vbidenza; ne osaua in cosa alcuna contradirgli. Onde ci faceua in Bosna tutto quello voleua, senza emetter al consiglio alcun signore. Il che era del tutto contra gl’instituti et vsanze di

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120 Ćirković, Herceg Stefan, 93.
121 Dinić, Državni sabor, 37.
It would be exceptionally important to be able to know how the learned Benedictine arrived at this conclusion. Did he pick it up from the sources which he no doubt drew on in this part of his book? Did he merely “intuit it from his sources” or did he draw the conclusion himself? Be that as it may, it seems quite likely that Tvrtko sought to model his relations with the nobility on the Nemanjić example, which would have necessarily meant at the expense of the “liberties” of the Bosnian nobility. But, with only one charter to the nobility surviving from Tvrtko’s reign, there are no reliable sources to draw conclusions from.

It is certain that the crown guaranteed to the subsequent kings neither unlimited power nor an exalted status comparable to that of the Serbian kings or the Byzantine emperors. In the early fifteenth century, barons deposed and installed kings, competed with them as governors of foreign monarchs, imposed their will on them; and yet, Tvrtko’s introduction of kingship and coronation cannot be said to have been entirely fruitless. On the contrary, however strange it may sound, the whole history of Bosnia until 1463, even a little longer, is overshadowed by Tvrtko’s coronation.

The coronation played a role in the construction of a new notion of the state, completely different from the one from the times of bans. The difference is neither easy nor simple to describe, it is true, but a glimpse of it can be caught from the surviving documents. In the times of bans, Bosnia, as a territory and a political entity, was inseparable from the person of the ruler. The state was the ban’s “lordship”. Under ban Kulin Bosnia is “my lordship”, and under Ninoslav “my lordship and my sons” [владание моё и моих сынов]. There was nothing in that period that would highlight a distinction between the ban’s power over Bosnia and any other power over land and people such as, for instance, the power of a feudal lord over his peasants. To the contemporaries, there was not yet a palpable distinction between public and private power. The participation of the ban’s family members in important state affairs highlights patrimonial features in Bosnian state life even more than the person of the ban. In granting and confirming hereditary possessions, in pledging and confirming the oath of fealty, there figure alongside the ruler members of his family, in a way quite comparable to the barons where decisions concerning their hereditary possessions were made only with the consent of all family members.

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122 Orbini, Il regno degli Slavi, 358.
123 Stojanović, Povelje i pisma I, 2, 8, 9 and 44.
124 The term “patrimonial” is not used here in the sense in which it was used in the earlier legal historical literature. It is not used to discuss the origin and nature of the medieval state, but to describe the difference between two stages in the evolution of the medieval state.
The Bosnian state retained patrimonial features for too long; they were there even when they had become outdated in its neighbourhood. This inevitably led to the rivalry between different concepts, even to conflicts. Vukić’s accusations against his brother, Tvrtko, for having deprived him of his inheritance can only be understood as a defence of the traditional rights of the ruling family members at a time the principle of indivisibility began to predominate. The form of address used for Vuk, “junior ban”, is probably also the result of adjusting Bosnian concepts. The form of power sharing known from the times of ban Stjepan II and his brother Vladislav now became wrapped in a new form, after the model of Hungary and Serbia, where there were “junior kings”.

After the coronation the term for the state that begins to be used is “kingship”. Already in the charter of 1382 we can read: [and I follow their life and faith and regal regulations and set to right all that is improper in the lands of my God-granted kingship]. Later on there also appears “Bosnian kingship”. In one place, the Ragusans state that they are committed “to the honour and glory of the Bosnian kingship”. Here the kingship is obviously the Bosnian state, but from other contexts in which the term occurs, it may be inferred that it was also used in a narrower sense where the king remains at its core, e.g. “of the kingship and magnates of the Bosnian assembly”. Kingship was not synonymous with the state, just as the king was no longer seen as the only essential element of the state.

The term that was more important and more frequently used was “rusag”; it first appeared in a document of queen Elizabeth dating from 1397. Undoubtedly Hungarian in origin, it is attested as early as the thirteenth century, though in an older form: uruzag, which is a translation of the Latin regnum. The Bosnian rusag or the rusag of the Bosnian kingship is the Bosnian state; but the term also denotes, already from the beginning

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125 Klaić, Poviest Bosne, 150–151.
126 In the papal letter quoted in Klaić, ibid.
127 Stojanović, Povelse i pisma I, 84.
128 Ibid. 451 and 498.
129 Ibid. 451.
130 Ibid. 503.
131 Solovjev, “Pojam države”, 87–89.
132 S. Endlicher, Rerum Hungaricum monumenta Arpadiana, 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1931), 746.
133 Stojanović, Povelse i pisma I, 269, 438, 440 and 498.
of the fifteenth century, the Bosnian state assembly.\textsuperscript{134} What lay behind this shift in meaning was no doubt the notion that the barons gathered into the assembly constituted an essential element of the state. Thus estates elements in the Bosnian state development became clearly manifest once more.

Concurrently, the person of the individual king became overshadowed by the abstract concept of kingship. The ideas which had come with the double crown fell on fertile ground and gave an impetus to taking an important step in the evolution of political thought, the one that is reflected in distinguishing, even dissociating the person of the king, transient, frail and vulnerable to human weaknesses, from his intransient office. In time, the “wreath” gave way to the crown, the “honourable Bosnian crown”,\textsuperscript{135} the term seldom used in the documents in our language. Only the Ragusan documents, especially those containing instructions for envoys, reveal that it was used quite frequently. As early as 1403, Ragusan envoys are explaining to vojvoda Sandalj: che questa cita di Ragusa e francha et non se impaca dele guerre dei reali de Hongria che hanno cum quilli de Bosna, salu pago uno piccolo tributo a Hungaria et uno asay mazor tributo ala corona di Bosna.\textsuperscript{136} It seems clear from this statement that both sides must have found it quite normal that the true “owner” of the tribute was not any one king in particular, but some more permanent and more abstract community embodied in the crown.\textsuperscript{137}

It is to the crown that are tied not only tributes but also the towns and estates which are under the king’s obedience. The document has already been mentioned in which king Tomaš speaks of his accession to the throne: nobisque post ipsius decessum et eiusdem dispositione in dominio castrorum et tenutarum corone ipsius regni remanentibus.\textsuperscript{138} So, a Bosnian king claims that the towns and estates belong to the crown. All that belongs to the crown is indivisible and is transferred to the next bearer of the crown.

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\textsuperscript{134} Dinić, \textit{Državni sabor}, 4–5.
\textsuperscript{135} Stojanović, \textit{Povelje i pisma} I, 417.
\textsuperscript{136} Lettere di Levante 4, f. 29, 29/1/1432 mentions ce lo tribute, lo qual e dovuto ogni anno all corona sua, Lett. di Lev. 11, f. 64.‘.
\textsuperscript{137} It is interesting that a few years later the Ragusans used a different figure to say the same thing: a slic za dobrographicismo pisanosti u kojem je sam Kinga, stale Kazališta bosansko-dalmatinske najviše i krajnje ga dati [and as for the tribute about which you wrote that we owe it solely to the throne of the Bosnian khanate, we intend to give it thither]. Stojanović, \textit{Povelje i pisma} I, 437. Here the throne of Bosnian kingship is used as a transpersonal symbol. The construction of this symbol probably ran in parallel with the wreath. It would be rewarding to examine all references to the throne from the \textit{Genealogy of Bar} to the fifteenth-century charters.
\textsuperscript{138} Thallóczy, \textit{Studien}, 366.
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From the time of Tvrtko’s coronation onwards there is no trace of anything even remotely resembling co-rulership, nor is there any case of any power struggle leading to a compromise based on division. Claimants to the throne in Bosnia fight for the crown, the crown is indivisible and so is all that belongs to it. This may be seen from the way the Ragusans handled the land and house that they presented as a gift to king Ostoja in 1399 after he had sold them the Slano coast. Their charter to the king specifies that the king will hold the house and land in hereditary tenure:

\[\text{u ba\[tinu u pljmjnitw u vikj vikoma njmu i njgovjm sinovwm i njgovu unu;} i praunu;} wd dana\[njga dnj napryda da volq anq gospodinq kralq \[\omega sto \[i a i njgovi sinovj i njgovo unu;E rj;jnu pola;u daryvati, prodati i wstaviti za du\[u, u;initi \[to im budj na vol} i kako \[as his noble inheritance to him and his sons and grandchildren and great-grandchildren for ever and ever from this day on, and that the lord King Ostoja and his sons and his grandchildren are free to give away, sell or bequeath the aforesaid palace for the soul, to do as they will and please like with any other inheritance]. 139 For all these pompous formulas and “forever-and-ever” promises, the Ragusans, after a war with Ostoja, transferred the house and land to the new king, Tvrtko II. They acknowledged him, too, as their nobleman and councillor, and their charter140 speaks of the hereditary right to the Ragusan title of nobility without saying a word about the mode of inheriting the house and land. The property went with the crown and was transferred to the subsequent kings: Ostoja, Tvrtko II, Tomaš, and Stefan Tomašević. The contemporaries themselves were aware that property could be inherited in various ways and that some could belong to the crown. When Tvrtko II deposited, in Ragusa, an amount of silver, which was converted into ducats, the Ragusans took the obligation, at the king’s request, that: \[the aforesaid deposit shall not be diminished at anyone’s request, neither on account of the crown, nor of proximity of kin, nor out of affection, nor out of fear, nor for war, nor for any reason in the world that may arise].141

The notion that it is the crown and not any one king that has towns, estates, incomes, rights etc., and that all of it indivisibly passes from one bearer of the crown to another by a law that is different from the one that governs the relationships between private persons, becomes particularly noticeable in comparison with the lands and rights of territorial lords. There, everything is still governed by old patrimonial traditions. Members of a

139 Stojanović, Povelje i pisma I, 428.
140 Ibid. 495–497.
141 Ibid. 517 and 518.
territorial lord’s family together dispose of property and share in his main acts, especially as regards the alienation of any portion of land. An illustrative example may be Sandalj’s conduct at the time of the sale of one half of Konavli area and the documents of the last of the Pavlović family. The territory was inherited according to private law, as clearly shown by the history of the Pavlović family: the territory passed from father to son, from brother to brother by the right of seniority. The land of a territorial lord was liable to division, as evidenced by the tragic history of herzog Stefan and his sons. The incomes, land and houses that the Bosnian lords were presented with by Ragusa were inherited as private assets, “po bližičastvu” [by the right of kinship], to use the term from a contemporary charter. Hrvoje’s house and land passed on (not quite smoothly though) to his grandchildren, and from them to their offspring, so that the income from these properties continued to be paid to distant descendants as late as the early sixteenth century. The rights of Sandalj’s descendants continued to be inherited even longer than that.

With all the above in mind, it does not come as a surprise that our sources contain places which reveal the notion that it was to the crown that the officials owed obedience and the subjects loyalty. In a charter to the Venetians, preserved in Italian translation, king Tvrtko II promises to ensure safety and protection for Venetian merchants: che nui provedremo e si fattamente comandremo a tutti nostri baroni, conti, rectori, castelani, zup-pani, ziudexi et a tutti altri officiali a la nostra sacra corona e comandamento sotoposti. Much later, the Ragusans commend the Vlatković family of Hum to king Tomaš in the following way: consideramus eos esse subjectos corone bosnensis. Obviously, in this sphere too the crown replaced the king as representative of the royal office and dignity.

This ever-stronger emphasis on the crown at the expense of individual kings did not weaken royal position. On the contrary, the kings prof-

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142 Hrvoje bequeathed his property in Ragusa to his wife Jelena (Helen), who later remarried king Ostojja. This gave grounds to Stefan Ostojić to lay the claim to the ownership of the income from the house and land. His advisor, the Ragusan renegade Mihailo Kabužić (Caboga), sought to prove that all of this was bona regalia. After the accession of Tvrtko II, Hrvoje’s granddaughters laid claims, with the king’s recommendations: Katarina, wife of Tvrtko Borovinić, and Doroteja, wife of one of the princes of Blagaj. Cf. Stojanović, *Povelje i pisma* I, 549–550 and 510–511.


144 Ljubić, *Listine* VIII, 204.

145 Lett. di Lev. 16, f. 161–161′.
ited from the authority enjoyed by the intransient and timeless crown. The crown as a symbol and embodiment of kingship helped to restore the balance of power in the Bosnian state. It stood as a counterweight to the *stanak*, the assembly of barons, a body which considered itself as being the “rusag” and “all of Bosnia”. Both the crown and the *stanak* were important for the survival of Bosnia as one political entity. A role in the preservation of Bosnia as a state despite its factual fragmentedness and many internal wars was played by the double wreath.

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146 It is observable from the Ragusan instructions to the envoys to Tvrtko II during his second reign that they identify the king with the crown, and so “corona vostra” is used there where “maiesta vostra” would normally stand, *Lett. di Lev.* 11, f. 140, 93’, 69, 68.

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Le Despote Stefan Lazarević et « Sieur » Djuradj Branković

Résumé Cet article se propose d'éclairer les relations entre le despote Stefan Lazarević et « sieur » Djuradj Branković dans les premières trois décennies du XV° siècle. Jusqu'à la fin de 1411 ces relations étaient hostiles, cependant qu'après leur réconciliation elles sont devenues et sont restées cordiales et étroites jusqu'à la mort du despote. L'auteur se sert surtout de documents véni tiens relatifs à l'établissement des frontières serbo-vénitiennes dans la Zeta entre 1422 et 1427. « Sieur » Djuradj, qui représentait la Serbie pendant ces négociations, parle d'abord au nom du despote, puis de plus en plus souvent en son nom propre.

Mots clés : Serbie, Zeta, Venise, Turquie, despote, « sieur », réconciliation, contrat, négociations, frontières

Il a déjà été remarqué que la bataille du Kosovo a indirectement favorisé les intérêts politiques de Vuk Branković en 1389. « Vuk voulait que sa personne et son territoire comblent la lacune laissée après la mort du prince Lazar. »1 Il étendait son domaine et était le plus important seigneur serbe pour Venise et Ragusa après la bataille de 1389, cependant que les Lazarević étaient relégués au second plan. Cependant, de son vivant, l'hostilité entre Vuk Branković et les successeurs du prince Lazar Hrebeljanović ne se manifestait pas. Jusqu'au 21 novembre 1392 Vuk devait lui-même se soumettre au sultan, mais, à la différence du fils de prince Lazar, prince Stefan Lazarević, il ne participe pas aux batailles de Bajazet Ier. Pendant que celui-ci mène ses campagnes au nord de l'Empire ottoman, Vuk prend la voie de la résistance. C'est pour cette raison que le sultan décide de l'anéantir. Selon Mauro Orbini, la princesse Milica se serait « adressé au Turc », qui « confis qué les terres » de Vuk et le jette en prison, où il meurt le 6 octobre 1397.2 Le sultan octroie aux « fils du prince Lazar » tout le fief des Branković, à l'exception de quelques forteresses d'importance stratégique qu'il retient. À la femme et aux enfants de Vuk il laisse juste assez de terres pour qu'ils

puissent survivre. Ces dons créent le préalable aux conflits futurs entre les Branković et les Lazarević.


Malgré la trêve temporaire entre les Lazarević et les Branković en 1404, durant la période après la bataille d’Ankara les deux familles poursuivent des politiques différentes. Bien qu’il doive encore payer tribut et apporter son aide militaire au sultan, le despote Stefan s’approche des Hongrois et devient leur vassal. Le roi Sigismond lui donne Belgrade, dont il fait son siège, une partie du Banat (la Mačva), ainsi que des terres en Hongrie avec des villes, des villages, des mines. Etant le vassal du roi, il fréquente la cour de Buda et assiste aux assemblées hongroises. Pendant ce temps les Branković, de leur siège à Vučitrn dans l’extrême sud, ne peuvent pas changer leur orientation politique. Ils demeurent vassaux du sultan Suleyman Ier, à qui ils doivent rendre hommage sporadiquement. Djuradj et Grgur le font au début de l’année 1406. Djuradj est le seul à rentrer, tandis que Grgur « reste chez son seigneur ».


5 Orbin, Kraljevstvo Slovena, 105.

6 Ljubomir Stojanović, Stare srpske povelje i pisma [Les anciennes chartes et lettres serbes] (Belgrade : Srpska kraljevska akademija, Sremski Karlovci : Srpska manastirska štamparija, 1929), 1/1, 155–156 [ci-après : Povelje i pisma].
Poursuivant une politique différente de celle du despote Stefan, les Branković soutiennent le soulèvement de Vuk Lazarević contre son frère. La paix, telle-que, entre les deux familles, éclate comme une bulle de savon. Selon le rapport de M. Orbini, après avoir obtenu le soutien militaire du sultan Suleyman Ier, Vuk revient en Serbie « accompagné de Djuradj Branković ». Avec l’appui hongrois, le despote Stefan attaque les terres des Branković et incendie Pristina. Mais, abandonné de beaucoup de ses nobles, il doit céder à son frère la partie sud de l’État, confinant aux terres des Branković. « Et c’est depuis ce moment, » écrit Constantin le Philosophe, « que son frère Vuk, avec les terres concédées à lui et les nobles qui l’appuyaient, servait Suleyman, avec ses neveux ». Mais cet état de choses ne pouvait pas durer : bientôt un changement se produisit.

En 1410, pendant les luttes pour le trône turc, le sultan Musa fait exécuter Vuk Lazarević. Cet événement, qui donne au despote Stefan la possibilité d’annexer le domaine de son frère, a des conséquences d’une portée considérable pour la consolidation des pays serbes sous la bannière du Despotat. C’est ainsi que les terres du despote Stefan confinent à nouveau au domaine de « sieur » Djuradj. Même le kesar Uglješa, qui tenait Inogošt, Vranje et Prešev, appuie le despote. En outre, l’empereur byzantin Manuel II devait confirmer à Stefan son titre de despote en 1410.

L’année 1411 était particulièrement difficile pour « sieur » Djuradj. Son suzerain, le sultan Suleyman, qu’il avait servi fidèlement depuis la bataille d’Ankara, est étranglé au début de l’année. Loin de ses terres, il se battait tantôt aux côtés de Musa tantôt en le fuyant, parce que celui-ci était une vraie « bête sauvage ». Le seul héritier mâle de la famille Branković était réduit à la simple survie. D’une part Musa le persécutait en Empire ottoman, et de l’autre en Serbie il risquait d’être attaqué par le despote. Dans une lutte contre deux adversaires la chance de succès était maigre, ou, selon la belle formulation de Constantin le Philosophe, « Car Djuradj craignait d’être persécuté des deux côtés ». C’est pourquoi en 1411, alors qu’il était

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7 Orbini, Kraljevstvo Slovena, 105.

8 « Konstantin Filozof i njegov Život Stefana Lazarevića, despot srpskog » [Constantin le Philosophe et sa Vie de Stefan Lazarević, le despote serbe], éd. Vatroslav Jagić, Glasnik Srpskog učenog društva 42 (1875) [ci-après : Konstantin Filozof], 291–292 = Stare srpske biografije XV i XVII veka [Les anciennes biographies serbes du XVe et XVIIe siècle], trad. Lazar Mirković (Belgrade : Srpska književna zadruga, 1936) [ci-après : Traduction], 90.

dans le camp de guerre, « il manda à sa mère de faire la paix avec Stefan, afin qu’ils puissent vivre comme il sied aux hommes de leur position ». Dans sa description du siège de Selymbria en automne 1411, Constantin le Philosophe souligne que Djuradj avait envoyé ce message à sa mère « plus tôt ». Ce qui est certain, c’est que cela a dû se produire après la mort du sultan Suleyman Ier en février 1411. Son offre fut acceptée, et Constantin le Philosophe décrit cet événement en ces termes : « le despote le reçut comme un fils longtemps désiré. »

La réconciliation fut conclue avant le 19 juillet 1411, donc, au moment où Djuradj n’était pas en Serbie. L’intermédiaire était dame Mara Branković, la mère de Djuradj et sœur de Stefan Lazarević, qui souffrait le plus du conflit entre les deux familles. C’était elle qui administrait les terres des Branković en l’absence de son fils.

Le renversement dans la politique de Djuradj ne consistait pas seulement dans la réconciliation mais aussi dans la soumission à Stefan. Le neveu, de plus en plus faible, baisse la tête devant l’oncle de plus en plus puissant. Non pas par amour, mais par désir de se sauver du désastre. Bien qu’il s’agisse de raisons de nature politique, il ne faut pas négliger l’influence des motifs émotifs sur les deux proches parents. De plus, il était plus facile pour Djuradj de baiser la tête quand il était loin de son oncle. Une réconciliation ne se produisait pas souvent vers la fin du XIVe et au début du XVe siècle, époque où les seigneurs serbes luttaient entre eux. Mais ici il s’agit d’un cas particulier. Bien que la réconciliation marque la capitulation de Djuradj, elle est en même temps un bon coup : non seulement elle le maintient, mais elle le désigne aussi comme successeur potentiel au trône serbe, parce que le despote Stefan Lazarević n’avait pas d’enfants. Djuradj Branković est son parent mâle le plus proche. Cependant, il devra encore mériter le trône par son comportement futur.

Soit dit en passant, pendant que l’oncle et le neveu faisaient la paix, le despote Stefan avait obtenu (probablement en 1411) du roi hongrois Srebre, une mine riche de l’est de la Bosnie, qui était une source importante de revenus. En cette période le souci majeur de Djuradj était comment rentrer au pays. Au printemps 1412 un navire vénitien le transporte à Thessalonique. Il ne peut pas poursuivre sa route parce que les Ottomans ont occupé les routes principales. Il demeure dans la ville pendant près de six mois, et il semble que c’est à cette époque qu’il rencontre Eirene Kantakouzene. Le mariage a peut-être été arrangé à cette époque. Après la réconciliation avec son oncle la position de Djuradj s’est beaucoup améliorée, de sorte qu’une
mariée de la maison royale byzantine, apparentée à la dynastie régnante des Paléologues, n’est pas hors de sa portée. D’autre part, la princesse byzantine épouserait le successeur au trône serbe.12

Après beaucoup de vicissitudes, le 23 octobre 1412 « sieur » Djuradj Branković rentre au pays. Lorsque il rend visite à son oncle, « une joie inexprimable se fit jour » et « depuis ce temps ils pouvaient se voir comme père et fils avec beaucoup de joie ».13 Donc, l’oncle a accepté le neveu comme son fils. On peut conclure de la citation de Constantin le Philosophe que le rang du « père » était supérieur à celui du « fils ». Le despote a donc affiché sa suzeraineté, et Djuradj l’a reconnu. Cependant le despote Stefan n’a pas soumis à son pouvoir le domaine des Branković, ni mis en question l’autorité de son neveu dans les terres héritées de Vuk.


L’oncle et le neveu établissent bientôt une collaboration étroite. Bien que Djuradj ait sa monnaie et ses droits de douane, au début de 1414 son ordre que la monnaie du despote Stefan peut circuler sans obstacle sur ses terres et que personne ne peut la refuser est déjà en vigueur.14 En juillet de la même année le despote visite Priština, le siège des Branković. Peut-être que l’on peut lier cette visite au fait que c’est en cette année que Djuradj devient officiellement le chef de la famille.15 Déjà l’année suivante les Ragusains écrivent au « grand et sublime sieur Djuradj Vuković [fils de Vuk Branković] ».16 Il n’est pas exclu que ce soit à cette occasion que l’oncle a été informé de manière plus détaillée sur le mariage futur de son neveu. On sait que le mariage a été célébré vers la fin de cette année. Les messagers ragusains, qui étaient venus avec des salutations et des cadeaux, avaient pour consigne d’aller voir d’abord le despote et de le féliciter à l’occasion du mariage de son neveu comme de son fils ».17

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13 Konstantin Filozof, 304 ; Traduction, 101–102.
16 Povelje i pisma, 1/1, 163.
17 Notes et extraits, II, 148.
Bien que Djuradj Branković ait établi des relations proches avec le despote Stefan, il avait un fardeau plus lourd à porter. Ce fardeau était la présence turque dans son domaine. Depuis la défaite de Vuk, ses terres, où, semble-t-il, les bases des vilayets ottomans avaient été posées depuis le XIVᵉ siècle, étaient sous le pouvoir du sanjak-bey de Skopje. Les détachements ottomans étaient stationnés à Zvečan et Jeleč, qui avaient déjà leurs propres timars. Depuis 1396 le cadi avait son siège à Gluhovica, et depuis 1399 le kefali avait le sien à Zvečan. La seigneurie des Branković avait une importance stratégique pour les Ottomans, parce que de là ils pouvaient organiser des expéditions vers la Bosnie et le nord de la Serbie.

Les Ottomans perturbaient les échanges commerciaux habituels dans la seigneurie des Branković et y prélevaient des revenus. Ils exerçaient le preuzam, c'est-à-dire les représailles collectives envers les marchands ragusains, ce qui suscitait des réactions violentes des autorités ragusaines auprès de dame Mara.18 Elle craignait les Ottomans, et surtout le plénipotentiaire de Skopje Pashayit, dont la part à Trepča en 1409 était un quart de production minière de Junij Sorkočević.19 En outre, il percevait des droits de douane sur le Lim, à Vučitrn et Dobrijevo. En 1413 lui succède son fils, Isak-bey, qui dans les années à venir sera le plus important instigateur des conquêtes turques.20 L'établissement de l'unité dans l'Empire Ottoman sous Mehmed Iᵉʳ renforce davantage encore l'influence turque dans la seigneurie des Branković. En 1415 les Ottomans ont une prise forte sur Zvečan, où ils amènent les prisonniers hongrois de Bosnie.21 En 1421 leur cadi a son siège à Prizren. Les marchands ragusains de la seigneurie des Branković commencent à s'adresser directement à la Porte. La même année le Sénat conseille à ses sujets à Priština d'envoyer quelqu'un auprès de l'empereur turc concernant leurs difficultés.22 En 1423 les Ottomans tiennent la douane et établissent leur propre cour à Pristina.23 Des timars ottomans se trouvent

18 Spremić, Despot Djuradj Branković i njegovo doba, 77–78.
20 Gliša Elezović, « Turski spomenici u Skoplju » [Les monuments turcs à Skopje], Glasnik Skopskog naučnog društva 1/1 (1925), 139–141.
22 Ivan Božić, Dubrovnik i Turska u XIV i XV veku [Raguse et la Turquie au XIVᵉ et XVᵉ siècle] (Belgrade : Naučna knjiga, 1952), 32.


À côté de ses avantages matériels, le despote a d’autres bénéfices. Il a le soutien de l’Église, qui a canonisé le prince Lazar peu après sa mort au Kosovo. Son fils est autorisé à convoquer des assemblées, un privilège dont aucun des seigneurs ne jouit par ailleurs. Lui et ses proches fondent des monastères : Resava, Ljubostinja, Kalenić, Sisоjevac, Koporin, Veluće et autres, tandis que cette activité fondateur n’existe presque pas dans la seigneurie des Branković. Avec l’appui de l’Église et une bonne base financière, le despote Stefan peut réorganiser l’administration : il introduit une organisation interne solide, avec des autorités centrales fortes. Quant au pouvoir local, il remplace les anciens župas par les vlasti avec les ducs à leurs têtes.25 La seigneurie des Branković garde l’ancien système, qui n’était pas réformé même après l’établissement de la domination turque.

Bien que le despote Stefan et « sieur » Djuradj collaborent de plus en plus, chacun dirige encore son domaine. Lors du conflit entre Ragusa et le despote en 1417, les autorités ragusaines envisagent d’interdire à leurs marchands d’aller « in Sclavonia, hoc est in contrata despot solummodo et suis tenutis omnibus ».

En 1420 Jean Castriote garantit aux Ragusains qu’ils peuvent voyager « au pays de Djuradj ou de sieur despote ». En 1421 les Ragusains mentionnent explicitement « contrate de messer Zorzi ». Néanmoins, une inscription de 1417/1418 écrite « au temps … de sieur le despote Stefan et de sieur Djuradj … dans le monastère des Saints-Archan-ges près de Prizren, par ordre de sieur Djuradj » est datée aussi du despote Stefan, malgré le fait qu’elle a été créée dans la seigneurie des Branković.

Comme les relations entre l’oncle et le neveu étaient proches, Djuradj se permettait d’intervenir en faveur des Ragusains auprès de Stefan. En 1417, quand ils se plaignent de leur position à Srebrenica, il intervient auprès de son oncle, ce qui lui vaut des remerciements particuliers du Sénat. Comme, avec le temps, Djuradj devient le plus proche associé de Stefan, en 1421 il donne à son fils le nom de Stefan. C’est le seul Stefan parmi les nombreux membres de la famille Branković.

Vu que la relation entre l’oncle et le neveu était très étroite, il était clair que leurs territoires allaient fusionner dans la personne de « sieur » Djuradj. C’est pourquoi en 1421 le despote met en évidence son droit de succéder à Balša III, bien que ses terres ne confinent à la Zeta qu’indirectement, par l’intermédiaire de la seigneurie des Branković. En héritant la Zeta, il hérite aussi la guerre avec les Vénitiens, dont le cours éclaire de plus près les relations entre l’oncle et le neveu. Déjà en 1421, le despote descend vers le littoral avec ses armées. Le 16 mai 1422 les autorités vénitiennes chargent Marco Barbadiga, le provéditeur de Cattaro, d’aller voir le despote Stefan, en le munissant d’une lettre de créance particulière pour « sieur » Djuradj, « si dictus dominus Georgius erit apud dictum dominum ducem Raxiae », où elles prient Djuradj d’intervenir en faveur de la paix, et, si Barbadigo le juge utile, elles lui donneront « unam petiam veluti non aureati ». En 1423

26 Dinić, « Oblast Brankovića », 22 = Srpske zemlje u srednjem veku, 168.
27 Povelfe i pisma, 1/1, 163.
29 Ljubomir Stojanović, Stari srpski zapisi i natpisi I [Les anciens écrits et inscriptions serbes] (Belgrade : Srpska kraljevskaja akademija, 1902), 70–71.
30 Notes et extraits, II, 166, 199, 237.
le despote laisse à Djuradj le soin de diriger les opérations militaires et de négocier avec les Vénitiens. Le neveu arrive dans la Zeta en qualité de son associé le plus proche et exécuteur de ses plans. Et c'est dans la Zeta que, à l'époque des Nemanjić, les successeurs au trône futurs s'entraînaient dans l'administration et la guerre.

Dans ses négociations difficiles, Djuradj consacre le plus de temps à la démarcation des frontières. Le 23 juin 1423 Francesco Bembo, capitaine suprême de la mer Adriatique, reçoit une lettre de Venise où il est informé que Marco Barbadigo est chargé de faire la paix « cum domino despoto seu com illo vel illis, qui essent suo nomine ».32 « Sieur » Djuradj n'est pas nommé. Le 2 juillet on écrit à Marco Barbadigo et à Francesco Bembo « super facto pacis tractande com domino despoto Rassie seu com illis, qui ab eo libertatem haberent ».33 On prévoit, donc, la possibilité que le despote ait plusieurs représentants. Entre-temps, Bembo informe les autorités de Venise qu'il s'est entretenu « cum domino Georgio nepote dominidespoti Rassie ». Le 13 juillet 1423 il est chargé « veniendi ad pacem cum domino Despoto Rassie sive cum habentibus libertatem ab eo ».34 Les Vénitiens savent, bien sûr, que Djuradj est le neveu de Stefan, mais la paix ne peut être conclue qu'avec les plénipotentiaires du despote.

Le 2 août 1423 on commande à Bembo et à Barbadigo « quod ad pacem et concordiam deueniatis cum suprascrito domino Georgio nomini domini Despoti Rassie ».Au cours des négociations, Djuradj demande d'abord Dulcigno — « Primo quidem petit dominus Georgius nomine domini Despoti Civitatem Dulcigni cum suis confinibus ». Venise avertit ses négociateurs que « in capitulis porrectis per ipsum dominum Georgium nomine domini Despoti » on ne mentionne pas Luštica, mais que « nomine predicti domini Despoti » peut la demander. Plus tard elle les informe « super facto pacis tractande cum domino Despoto Rassie siue cum deputato vel deputatis seu deputando uel deputandis per eum ». Enfin, elle leur donne la liberté « veniendi ad pacem cum domino Despoto uel deputatis ab eo ».35 Djuradj a donc entamé des négociations avec les Vénitiens au nom du despote. Pour eux, il est son envoyé (« deputatus »), même s'il n'est pas toujours nommé.

Après de longues négociations, le 12 août 1423 la paix est conclue entre les Vénitiens « Et Illustrem dominum dispotum Stefanum ducam (?) Rassie et Magnificum dominum Georgium quondam Vulchi » à Sveti Srdj.

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32 Acta Albaniæ Veneta, no. 2752 ; Listine VIII, 235.
33 Acta Albaniæ Veneta, nos. 2755, 2756 ; Listine VIII, 238.
34 Acta Albaniæ Veneta, nos. 2780, 2781 ; Listine VIII, 239.
[St. Serge] sur la Bojana. Au début du document on constate que la guerre et les différends entre Venise « Et Illustrem et Excelsum dominum Dispo-
tum Stefanum eadem gratia ducem Rassie et cetera et supra scriptum Ma-
grificum dominum Georgium » durent depuis longtemps. C’est pourquoi on entame des négociations en vue de conclure la paix « cum prefato Illus-
tri domino domino dispoto Stefano duce Rassie et c. Et ipso Magnifico
domino domino Georgio sui proprijs nominibus, et nomine, et vice her-
dum, et Successorum suorum ». La paix est conclue par le représentant des
Vénitiens « Et prefatus Magnificus dominus dominus Georgius quondam
Vulchi habens similiter plenissimam commisionem autoritatem et bayliam
ut supra a prelibato Illustri et excelso domino domino dispoto Stefano Ras-
sie duce et c. Vt patet per literas eiusdem Illustris dominij dominij Despoti
in literis sclaui Ad ipsum dominum dominum Georgium delatas Eiusdem
Illustris dominij dominij Despoti sigilli impressione munitas Considerantes
beneac diligenter quanto tempore Inter Ipsos principes et duces prealegatos
eorumque predecesseors sine visine fraude, et sine aliquali liuore sed cum
omni prorsus sincera caritate et perfecta extitit Amicicia et pax amena Quia
pace in humanis rebus nil principibus delectabilius nil melius nil tranquilla
pace suauius nil ciuibus atque subditis optabilius ». Donc, Stefan a donné à
Djuradj une autorisation écrite en serbe de conclure la paix, munie du sceau
despotique. Chose intéressante, on observe que l’amour et l’amitié règnent
entre eux, ce qui est le mieux pour leurs sujets. Quant aux décisions sur
certains voisins, on souligne que « dito Signor Zorzi nomine quo supra »
représente le despote. Djuradj demande jusqu’à six galères pour combattre
les Ottomans ou autres ennemis, « nomine quo supra ». En outre, encore au
nom du despote, Djuradj demande que la République « ratifie et confirme »
les privilèges accordés au prince Lazar et à son père Vuk. Francesco Bembo
au nom de Venise et « Magnificus dominus dominus Georgius per se et
suos heredes (sic), ac nominibus quibus supra » jurent sur l’Evangile, devant
une icône et une « figurine » de Jésus Christ, qu’ils touchent tous les deux,
de respecter les dispositions du contrat. Le contrat est établi par Nicola de
Archilupis de Cattaro en qualité de « Imperiali auctoritate Judex ordinarius
et publicus notarius » du despote Stefan et « scriba » de « sieur » Djuradj. Le
contrat est scellé du sceau de Djuradj Branković.36

N’étant pas encore informée sur la conclusion du contrat à Sveti Srdj,
le 19 août 1423 Venise charge Francesco Bembo, « quatenus si in receptione
presentis nostri mandati inter dominum. Georgio de Calcho (recte: Volcho)
nomine despoti Rassie et vos nomine nostri dominij conclusa erit pax »,

36 Acta Albaniae Veneta, no. 2805 ; Listine, VIII, 248–253. Pour les commentaires sur le
contrat voir : Istorija Crne Gore II/2 [L’histoire du Monténégro] (Titograd : Redakcija
d’envoyer sur-le-champ une galère en Dalmatie parce que les Catalans sont entrés dans la mer Adriatique. C’est pour cette raison que « sumus dispositi prestissime prouidere sic quod dominus Despotus non habebit causam molestandi loca nostra deinde ». Cette instruction montre, donc, que « sieur » Djuradj continuait à négocier au nom du despote Stefan, tandis que les Vénitiens considéraient l’accord avec les Serbes comme « une paix et une trêve » avec le despote. Bien que ce soit Djuradj qui se trouve dans la Zeta avec son armée, les Vénitiens s’appliquent à ce que « sieur Despote » ne perturbe pas leurs terres là-bas, considérant que c’est à lui que l’armée appartient.


Les négociations avec les Vénitiens se poursuivent dans l’année suivante. En été 1425 deux ambassadeurs « domini Georgii de Vulcho nepotis domini Despoti Rassie » arrivent à Venise. Ils demandent que les questions contentieuses soient réglées « super pace facta inter dominum Despotum » et les Vénitiens. Tout en soulignant qu’ils veulent vivre en paix et amitié « cum Illustri domino Despoto, et magnifico domino Georgio », les séna-

37 Acta Albaniæ Veneta, no. 2808.
38 Listine VIII, 277–278.
39 Mihailo Dinić, « Srebrenik kraj Srebrenice » [Srebrenik près de Srebrenica], Glas Srpske kraljevske akademije 161 (1934) 190, note 12 = Srpske zemlje u srednjem veku, 361, note 12.
teurs proposent l’arbitrage par une personne ou une institution neutres.40

Vu que les négociations avec les ambassadeurs de Djuradj n’ont rien donn
né, les Vénitiens décident d’envoyer encore Francesco Quirino à Djuradj.
L’instruction du 3 septembre 1425 qu’on lui a envoyé indique que certaines
dispositions de la paix, conclue « inter Illustrem dominum Despotum et
dictum magnificum dominum Georgium » d’une part et la République de
Venise d’autre part n’ont pas été observées. En rappelant qu’ils veulent la
paix « specialiter cum Illustre (sic) domino Despoto, et sua magnitudine »,
les Vénitiens soulignent qu’ils ont signifié aux ambassadeurs de Djuradj
qu’ils ne pouvaient pas donner « dominis suis » 1000 ducats des tributs de
Cattaro. Mais ils avertissent Quirino d’avoir soin que la forteresse de Durdj-
djevac soit cédée à Venise « sin autem remeneret eorum dominus ». Vu que
Djuradj « vellet » les Paštrovići, le capitaine de Scutari est autorisé de lui
faire savoir qu’on leur a promis « quod non assignaret eos dictis dominis ».
Comme Djuradj « veut » aussi l’abbaye de Sainte Marie de Ratac, Quirino
doit la céder « predicto domino » seulement si elle appartient au district de
Bar. On souligne en particulier que le despote et Djuradj doivent retourner
une partie du district de Scutari et « illam partem districtus Catari quem
tenebant ». On offre à Djuradj, le cas échéant, de se réfugier dans les pays
vénitiens « cum filiis et heredibus et bonis ac hauere suis ». On propose en-
core l’arbitrage international, et, en outre, pour parvenir plus facilement à un
accord, Quirino fait don à Djuradj de la soie brodée de fils d’argent, dont la
valeur atteignait 200 ducats.41

Dans leur instruction à Quirino de 1425, les Vénitiens considèrent le
despote et Djuradj comme une seule partie contractante. Ils indiquent ex-
plicitement que non seulement Stefan mais aussi Djuradj possède des terres
dans la Zeta appartenant à l’État serbe. Donc, en ce qui concerne les terres
dans la Zeta, on ne fait plus aucune différence entre Stefan et Djuradj.

Le 5 septembre 1425 les autorités vénitiennes informent Djuradj que
Francesco Quirino est autorisé de continuer les négociations avec lui.42 Le
26 avril 1426 ils concluent un nouvel accord, le troisième, à Vučitrn. « Ma-
gnificum et potentem dominum dominum Georgium quondam Vulchi suo

40 Acta Albaniæ Veneta, Pars II, Tomus XII, no. 2999. Selon Božić, Istorija Crne Gore
II/2, 148, en juillet 1425 les Ragusains transportent à Venise la délégation du despote
Stefan, « avec à sa tête le duc Nikola ». Cf. Ivan Djurić, Sumrak Vizantije (Vreme Jovana
VIII Paleologa : 1392–1448) [Crépuscule de l’Empire byzantin (L’époque de Jean VIII
Paléologue 1392–1448)] (Belgrade : Narodna knjiga, 1984), 272, note 15.

41 Acta Albaniæ Veneta, no. 3003 ; Janko Šafarik, « Srbski istoriski spomenici mletačkog
arhiva » [Les monuments historiques serbes des archives vénitiennes], Glasnik Društva

42 Acta Albaniæ Veneta, no. 3075.
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proprie nomine et vice, et nomine Illustris, et Excelsi principis domini domini Stephanij dispoti (dei gratia ducis Rassie, etc.) » parle un peu plus nettement en son nom que lors des négociations à Plana. Les Vénitiens soulignent que « dominus Georgius tenet » Luštica. « Magnificus dominus dominus Georgius nomine, quo supra », demande les Paštrovići aussi. En refusant, les Vénitiens répètent qu’on leur avait promis « de non assignando eos dicto domino domino Georgio nec alicui alii domino ». Malgré les divers différends, l’accord est conclu.

Pour les négociations de Vučitrn Francesco Quirino dispose de l’autorisation adéquate de la République de Venise d’une part, et de l’autre « prefatus Magnificus et potens dominus Georgius quondam Vulchi habens similiter plenissimam remissionem (recte:commissionem) autoritatatem et bailiam ut supra a prelibato Illustri et Excelsom domino, domino despoto Stefano Rassie, et cet. Vt patet per literas eiusdem domini domini dispoti ad ipsum Spectabilem et generosum dominum Franciscum Quirino delatas, eiusdem Illustris domini domini dispoti sigilli impressione munitas datas in Topoloniça die xxij mensis Martij 1426 ex parte altera, suo proprio nomine, et vice prefati Illustris domini domini dispoti Stephanj. » Donc, le despote avait autorisé Djuradj de mener les négociations à Vučitrn, dont il avait informé Quirino par une lettre du 22 mars 1426, rédigée à Topolnica, près de Novo Brdo.43 Cet endroit se trouve dans le voisinage immédiat de la seigneurie des Branković, ce qui peut suggérer que l’oncle et le neveu se sont rencontrés avant le commencement des négociations avec le représentant vénitien. « El prefato Magnifico signor Zorzo sie contento, e promete per sui proprio nome, e per suo heredi e successori e per nome del prelibato Illustro, et Excelsom Signor dispoto » qu’il renoncerait aux tributs de Cattaro. Il est souligné que « el prefato Magnifico Signor Zorzi nomine quo supra » avait négocié sur les Paštrovići, dont une partie « iera a obediencia del prefato Illustre Signor dispoto, e signor Zorzi nominee quo supra ». La manière dont la question de Grbalj, « E se algun subdito del prefato Illustre Signor dispoto, e del dicto Magnifico Signor Zorzi » est formulée suggère que ses habitants étaient sous le pouvoir des deux seigneurs. Il est convenu que les criminels et les voleurs seront poursuivis, aussi bien les sujets de Venise que « de li dicti signori » se trouvant sur les territoires de Venise et « in le terre o luogi di prefati Signori ». Les dispositions sur la liberté de circulation des marchands et sur les terres à deux propriétaires sont répétées. Enfin, Fran-

Cesco Quirino promet au nom de Venise « chel prefato Illustre signor dispoto, e el prefato Magnifico signor Zorzi cum loro fiuolj e fiuole, et heredj et etiamdio sel romagnisse una sola fiuola de I dicti signori che la prefata ducal signoria de Veniexie li receuera, et hauera, et accetera in perpetuo in fradelo e fio et in amixi carissimi per recommendadi. » Tout comme Francesco Quirino, « Magnificus dominus Georgius per se, et suos heredes (sic), ac nominibus quo supra » jure de respecter le contrat sur l’Evangile, devant une icône de Jésus Christ. On confirme les dispositions du contrat conclu à Sveti Srdj. « Promisit Insuper prefatus Magnificus dominus dominus Georgius nomine quo supra per pactum expressum stipulatione vallatum, quod prefatus Illustri...}

« Sieur » Djuradj a conclu le contrat de Vučitrn en premier lieu en son propre nom. On y observait qu’il « tient » Luštica et que les Paštrovići ne seraient pas remis à Djuradj ni à aucun autre seigneur. On lui a promis que la République de Venise considérerait comme « ses amis les plus chers » les fils et les filles du despote et de lui-même, même s’il ne restait qu’une seule fille. Cette formulation ne se rapportait qu’aux enfants de Djuradj, qui étaient mentionnés pour la première fois si explicitement dans le contrat conclu avec les Vénitiens à sa cour de Vučitrn.


Comme la collaboration entre le despote Stefan et « sieur » Djuradj devenait de plus en plus étroite, et que le neveu avait passé plus d’une décennie depuis la réconciliation à prouver sa loyauté, le despote Stefan prend la décision de le présenter officiellement comme héritier du trône. Il souffrait depuis quelque temps déjà d’une « maladie des jambes », et quand sa condition s’est aggravée, selon Constantin le Philosophe, « craignant la mort il fit venir son neveu sieur Djuradj ». Il convoque l’assemblée de l’État à Srebre-

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45 *Acta Albaniae Veneta*, no. 3061 ; *Listine IX*, 17–18.
M. Spremić, Le Despot Stefan Lazarević et « Sieur » Djuradj Branković

nica et « et y réunit avec le patriarche l’assemblée de révérends évêques et des nobles de tous les vlasti et de tous les élus ». Après avoir bêni son neveu, il leur adressa ses paroles : « Sachez désormais que celui-ci est votre seigneur à ma place. » Et puis : « Ils prièrent pour lui avec impositions des mains. » Le despote « les fit jurer à tous loyauté à lui [Djuradj] », puis le fit jurer lui-même en ces termes : « pense de toute chose comme si je le faisais moi-même. » 


On ne sait pas exactement quand l’assemblée de Srebenica a eu lieu.

Les documents vénitiens donnent l’impression que la décision de proclamer Djuradj héritier du despote avait été prise avant les négociations de Vučitrn du 22 avril 1426, et avant l’autorisation écrite le 22 mars de la même année, que le despote avait donné à Djuradj de mener ces négociations. Le despote avait convoqué l’assemblée des plus grands dignitaires au moment où il souffrait d’une maladie grave, « craignant la mort. » Il ne faut pas oublier le fait qu’il avait souffert pendant déjà trois ans de la « maladie des jambes ». Plus tard, « quand il fut guéri », il marchait et accomplissait de bonnes œuvres, constate Constantin le Philosophe.

Cela signifie qu’une certaine période de temps s’est écoulée depuis la convocation de l’assemblée jusqu’à sa mort. L’année 1425 était particulièrement difficile pour la Serbie, car le sultan était entré dans le pays avec son armée et avait atteint Kruševac. Les circonstances exigeaient des réactions énergiques. Dans l’œuvre de Constantin le Philosophe, l’assemblée de Srebenica est décrite avant les événements qui ont eu lieu en automne 1425. Il est intéressant de noter que M. Orbini constate explicitement que c’est en 1425 que le despote a transmis le pouvoir sur la Zeta à Djuradj : « Plus tard, en 1425, le despote renonça entièrement à la Zeta, qui était sous son pouvoir, en faveur de son neveu Djuradj ». Un peu plus loin il déclare que « Djuradj fut le seigneur de la Zeta, et qu’il partageait en outre le pouvoir sur la Rascie avec le despote, dont il était le successeur ».

Comme Djuradj Branković est appelé seigneur des parties serbes de la Zeta depuis 1424, et surtout depuis 1425, dans les documents vénitiens, l’assemblée de Srebenica avait été convoquée probablement en 1424, au plus tard en 1425. Néanmoins, il faut mentionner que Stefan avait séjourné à Srebenica en juillet 1426.

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46 Konstantin Filozof, 316 ; Traduction, 113.
48 Konstantin Filozof, 316 ; Traduction, 113.
49 Orbin, Kraljestvo Slovena, 74.
50 Acta Albaniæ Veneta, no. 3061 ; Listine, IX, 18. Miodrag Purković, Knez i despot Stefan Lazarević [Prince et despote Stefan Lazarević] (Belgrade : Sveti arhijerejski sinod Srps-
Il est possible que le despote Stefan ait adopté Djuradj comme fils lors de l’assemblée de Srebenica, ou plus tôt, surtout lorsqu’on sait que les relations extérieures l’exigeaient. On a déjà dit que qu’après la réconciliation de 1411 « le despote le reçut comme un fils ». Quand le neveu est venu le voir l’année suivante « ils pouvaient se voir comme père et fils ». Les Ragusains ont félicité le despote à l’occasion du mariage de Djuradj, comme « le noze di suo nievo come figlo ». Ils ont traité Djuradj comme le fils de Stefan jusqu’à la fin de la vie de celui-ci. Le 30 mai 1427, quand ils donnent leurs instructions aux messagers auprès du despote, ils soulignent avoir reçu Djuradj dans leur ville, en disant : « E mò novamente al fiol vostro, magnifico segnor Zorzi. »

Donc, en 1414 ils parlent du « neveu comme du fils », et en 1427 seulement du fils ». Ce qui, pourtant, reste le plus important, est ce que le despote lui-même écrit aux Vénitiens le 26 juillet 1426. Il y dit qu’il considère Djuradj « comme son neveu et fils » (« nepotem ac filium »). Il est neveu selon sa lignée, et fils selon la succession au trône. Plus tard, comme souverain de la Serbie, Djuradj appellera le despote Stefan « son seigneur et parent » à plusieurs reprises.


Djuradj conclut le contrat à Drivasto d’abord en son nom, puis au nom de ses héritiers mâles et femelles, et puis au nom du despote Stefan. Djuradj est le seul à être mentionné comme seigneur des terres de la Zeta, qui appartenaient au Despotat serbe. Ce n’est que dans les questions de l’aide militaire et du paiement des tributs de Scutari qu’il parle au nom du despote. De contrat à contrat conclu avec les Vénitiens, le rôle de « sieur » Djuradj devient de plus en plus important.

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« Sieur » Djuradj a passé environ trois ans et demi à négocier avec les Vénitiens et à séjourner de temps en temps dans la Zeta. Dans le contrat de Sveti Srdj et la correspondance de 1423 on voit qu’il parlait au nom du despote Stefan. À cette époque les deux parties aux négociations étaient les Vénitiens et le despote, dont le « député » était Djuradj. Dans le contrat de Plana

de 1424, Djuradj parle déjà non seulement au nom du despote mais aussi en son nom propre. C’est alors qu’on commence à en parler comme du seigneur des parties de la Zeta appartenant à la Serbie. Cela devient de plus en plus apparent en l’année 1425, pour aboutir à l’inclusion de ses enfants dans le contrat conclu avec les Vénitiens en 1426. Il conclut le dernier contrat du 11 novembre 1426 d’abord en son nom, puis au nom de ses fils et filles, et puis au nom du despote Stefan. A cette occasion on ne mentionne que Djuradj comme seigneur des parties de la Zeta appartenant à la Serbie.

Lors de ses rencontres avec les Vénitiens, Djuradj s’est montré comme un habile négociateur. Il avançait pas à pas. Il se comportait de la même façon avec le despote Stefan. Non seulement leurs relations n’étaient-elles pas compromises, mais encore se renforçaient. En été 1426 Djuradj propose généreusement aux Vénitiens d’agir comme médiateur de la paix entre la Turquie et Venise, afin que la guerre pour Thessalonique soit terminée. Pourtant, il faut remarquer que le despote s’était réservé le droit d’approuver et de ratifier les accords que Djuradj concluait avec les Vénitiens. Malgré cela, Djuradj a réussi, lors de ses mêmes négociations, à devenir officiellement l’héritier du trône serbe. Stefan avait deux points faibles : il était malade et il n’avait pas d’enfants, tandis que Djuradj était de bonne santé (il devait vivre encore une trentaine d’années) et avait des enfants. Cela a décidé du cours futur des événements.

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Bread in the Folk Culture of the Serbs
In Its Pan–Slavic Context

Abstract: The Slavs do not consider bread to be a common foodstuff, but a sacred object, a symbol of wealth and happiness. Almost all significant rituals (holidays, rites from the life cycle of a person, occasional magical activities) use bread. In some of them, such as marriages or the Serbian holiday krsna slava, it is the main ritual object, which has great symbolic value. This paper addresses the use of bread in the ritual behavior of the Serbs and related peoples, where bread has the characteristics of a symbol and therefore gains a communicative function (it is used to convey or to receive information). It is also points out that the symbolic function of bread changes depending on the grain used to make it, whether it is leavened or unleavened, and the shape of it.

Keywords: bread, rituals, customs, folk culture, Serbs, Slavs

One can assume that at the beginning of the new era the Slavs, in their ancient homeland, used unleavened millet bread as a daily nutriment, in addition to cereal porridge. According to the testimony of Byzantine historian Pseudo-Maurice, in the late sixth and early seventh century, of all the field crops, the Slavs mainly farmed millet (VIZINJ 1955: 131–132). The name kruh, kruv, krušac, which remains in Slovenian, Croatian and some western Serbian dialects, once denoted unleavened bread (most likely made of ground or chopped millet or rye), which was brittle and easily crumbled and broken (Trubačov 1996: 60). The modern name proja, which designates cornbread among the Serbs, once denoted millet bread and is derived from the word proba (proso, millet), since corn did not come to Europe until after the discovery of America. The name hleb for bread is most likely a Balto-Slavic borrowing and adaptation from the Gothic hlaifs, Old High German bleib<*blaiba. This name designates leavened bread, baked in a pan (later in an oven), unlike the unleavened breads baked in the hot ashes, i.e. kruha (ESSJ 1981/8: 27–28).

It is believed that the knowledge of preparing leavened bread was adopted by the Greeks from the Egyptians in the eight century BCE, and that at the time the yeast was prepared using flour and grape stum, and that later this practice spread to other European peoples.

The wide use of bread for ritual purposes among the Slavs has been the subject of a number of studies, starting in the nineteenth century, and up to the present. One should mention the still current interpretation of

**Bread — a holy object**

Bread was not a common foodstuff for the Slavs, but a holy object, the symbol of wealth and happiness. In Bosnia they used to say “Everything else is fine, but it’s bread that feeds you” ¹ (Dvorovi; Majstorović 1908/HH: 437), and in Macedonia “May the Lord provide bread and salt, and the house will be full” ² (Radoviško; Miladinović-Petrović 1938/XIII: 66). On the island of Hvar (Croatia), bread is called “the Lord’s blessing”, and there was a belief that a child will be protected from spells if a piece of bread is placed in its swaddling (Carić 1898/X: 159–160). The Russians (Novgorod region) say “Bread is above everything” ³ (Vlasova & Žekulina 2006: 41); the Czechs call bread “God’s gift”. The widely used expression “to have enough bread in the house” means to live without shortages. The fact that bread was a symbol of wealth is supported by the maidens’ spell for marriage among the Russians in the Urals. Maidens would place bread, salt and a ring in the home and bring in a rooster. If the rooster pecked the salt, she would marry a vagabond (a pauper); if it pecked at the bread, a wealthy man; and if it pecked at the ring, she would surely get married that year (Vostrikov 2000: 47). Bread was used for oaths: “I swear on bread.” ⁴ (Bosnia). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event that a stranger entered the house, they would

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¹ “Sve je hvala, a hljeb je hrana.”
² “Neka Gospod dava hleb i sol, pa je kućata puna.”
³ “Хлеб — всему голова.”
⁴ “Tako mi hljeba.”
immediately be given bread and salt “with the thought that then he/she could do no harm” (Lilek 1899/XI: 710). In the same region if there was no more incense in the house, a breadcrumb would be cast into the fire to provide scent, so that “evil things” (apparitions, spectres) would flee (Zovko 1901/VI: 300).

There is a belief among Russians that the forest spirit (lešij) has his bread far from the human world. If a person that he abducts eats from this bread, they cannot return home any more. According to a legend from the Russian north (the Terska region, on the White Sea), a maiden who had been kidnapped by the forest spirit because she had been cursed by her mother, finds in his home a woman with many children, who gives her the following advice “Girl, if you want to return home, don’t eat our bread. I too was taken like you” (Vlasova 2004: 360).

Bread can articulate multiple symbolisms, on several grounds: the symbolical meaning of the constituent elements — flour, salt, water and, in the case of leavened bread, also yeast; the symbolism of the manufacturing process — crushing the seeds, sifting, wetting, storing, fermenting, baking (placing in the fire, retrieval); of the shape — round, twisted (braids), hollow, cruciform, zoomorphic, etc.; of the time when it is prepared — before holidays, after the birth of a child, before or after a wedding, after a person’s death, in the dead of night, after sunset, during a full moon, during a solar or lunar eclipse, on a certain day; of the place where it is prepared — in the home, watermill, outdoors.

The preparation of bread for magical purposes requires that some other conditions be met, such as the flour being from a new watermill, or from a mill that rotates counter-clockwise, the flour being sifted through an upside-down sieve, the sieve being held behind the back while sifting, the flour coming from multiple homes, the bread being dried in the sun, etc. (for more see Radenković 1997: 145–155).

In the process of kneading the dough and baking the bread, the flour (dough) in a short time passes from unleavened to leavened, from the amorphous state do the desired form, from the unstable to stable, which can symbolically communicate the idea of the cycle of birth, death and resurrection: through ripening, harvesting and reaping the wheat “dies” but its seed is born; through milling the seed “dies” but flour is born; flour “dies” but dough it born; dough “dies” but bread is born. The Serb ritual that is performed in the case of premature birth of a child speaks of the connection between the birth of a child and the baking of bread (accordingly the womb is the oven): when such a child is born it is placed on the peel, and when the

5 “Девушка, јесли хочь быть дома, да не ешь нашего хлеба. Я, говорит, тоже такая была и тоже унесена.”
bread is removed from the oven, the child is placed briefly in the oven “so that the next would be born full term” (Miodragović 2009: 82).

The yeast, which is kept in a cold and dark place, and which is constantly used and renewed, can be associated with the ancestors, who yield offspring. The Serbs believe that when moving from an old house to a new house, the yeast in the old house should be destroyed (probably so that the patronage of the ancestors would be linked only to the new house). In Bosnia and Herzegovina (Vlasenica) it was believed that if mixed dough did not rise (if it did not ferment) it was a sign that someone in the house would die (Dragičević 1907: 332). In Bulgaria it was said that it was a bad thing for the house to run out of yeast (salt or vinegar). On the island of Hvar (Croatia) it was believed that while dough is being kneaded evil spirits circle around the house. In order to protect small children they would place a little dough in their swaddling-band before the bread is placed in the oven, and also a little warm bread after it was baked.

Wheat — millet/corn bread

The name for wheat (пшеница) is derived from *пъшени (ground, crushed); *пьвати (to grind, to crush). Wheat or white bread was initially mixed and used only for ritual purposes (family feast, Christmas, Easter, St. George’s Day, baptisms, weddings). According to data from the early twentieth century, in the mountain regions of Bosnia people ate wheat bread only several days after the harvest and on important holidays. Otherwise they ate barley, пиrow (hard, einkorn or emmer wheat), rye, millet or buckwheat. In the plains they mainly ate cornbread (Dvorovi; Majstorović 1908/XX: 437). In eastern Serbia (Boljevac) they mainly ate проja (cornbread), and rarely wheat or pure bread. When corn was scarce dough was made by mixing barley, rye or oat flour (Grbić 1925: 193–195). In Serbian epic poetry eating or serving white bread was an indication of gentry or the hero’s prestige. In Russian epic poems (всвязы) this also applies to white wheat bread, which is called калацкрупивчат (Bobunova & Hrolenko 2006: 149). In Slovenia in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century bread was mainly made out of rye, while the gentry ate wheat bread. In addition to grain flour, chickpeas, peas, potatoes and chestnuts were also added to the dough (SEL 2004: 262). One Bulgarian ceremonial song, which was sung on St. George’s Day, recounts how St. George visited the fields and referred to wheat as the holy grain (“Oh grain of wheat / be you sweet, be you holy”), and he said to the oat that it was only for looking at but that it was bitter for eating, and not for communion (“And you grain of oat / nice to look at /

6 “Oj te žito, пшеничиво, / Milo bilo, sveto bilo.”
bitter to eat / not for communion") (Marinov 1994: 595). In Russia the term *bleb* is used only for rye bread, while only ceremonial breads (*kalači*) were made out of wheat flour, for holidays (Sumcov 1996: 173). Also in Russia (Samara district), wheat bread is called *pirog* (Gvozdikova 1981: 211), which is otherwise used in Russian for various kinds of filled dough.

The cult contrast between wheat and millet (oat, corn) bread is apparent from the fact that in western Serbia on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day bread was made only from wheat flour, while on St. Basil’s Day (January 1/14) corn-flour bread was made for cattle, so-called *vasilica* or *mumuruzna česnica* (which was the replacement for what had previously been millet bread or porridge), and decorated with a “weaving tube” (Kostić 1984: 329). This ritual included two elements — corn (previously dark millet, probably unleavened bread or porridge) and the weaving tool, indicating the duality of the cult. On the one hand it is directed towards the protector of the cattle, and on the other — towards the protector of women’s activities. In some places in Russia the St. Basil’s Day porridge was prepared by the oldest woman in the house with the assistance of the oldest man (Sumcov 1996: 184). According to one tradition from Kosovo and Metohija, a man had found his brother’s killer in a foreign land, but he could not kill him until, following the advice of some man, instead of wheat (sacral) he had his fill of corn bread (profane). “One does not strike a man on wheat bread” (Bovan 1976: 87–88).

**Restrictions when kneading dough and using bread**

Special rules applied to mixing dough and using bread. In Bulgaria the bride would make the dough for her first bread on St. George’s Day. The mother-in-law would prepare the flour, sieve (sifter) and kneading tray, and invite the daughter-in-law to knead the bread. The daughter-in-law would kiss the mother-in-law’s hand and start kneading, while the maidens around her would sing the ritual St. George’s Day song. The bride was only allowed to knead the dough, while the dough would be shaped by the oldest woman in the house (Marinov 1994: 595–596). In Bosnia married women would wear their wedding ring while kneading dough so that they would not become widowed (Majstorović 1908/XX: 437). Apparently separating and scraping dough from the hands after the kneading was associated with the loss of the husband. When the bread was removed from the oven, the hole in the ashes would be evened out so “that the devils would not bake their own bread in that spot”, and so that a person would not be in a predicament (be killed, fall ill) if he stepped in such a place (Majstorović 1908/XX: 438). When

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7 “Na pšeničan leb se ne bije čovek.”
Belorussians placed the bread in the oven no one was allowed to leave the house, so as not to take away the prosperity of the home (Romanov 1912/8: 299). In Herzegovina, bread was not to be broken until it was cool “because it weeps before God when it is broken [while] hot” (Zovko 1901: 159). In Montenegro (Zeta), during lunch, it is bread that was placed first on the table, making sure that it was not upside-down (Radulović 1936: 54). Among the Serbs, the table was carefully wiped after the meal so that breadcrumbs would not fall to the ground and be trampled. If someone accidentally stepped on bread on the road, they were required to pick it up, kiss it and place it by the road so that birds or other creatures might eat it. It was a sin to curse bread (Leskovac; Djordjević D. 1958: 109; Metohija; Radunović 1988: 313). In southern Serbia it was required that the bread on the table not be turned with its side towards those who were eating, otherwise the bread would “push away” the person; it was not permitted to eat lying down. Lunch started with the host taking a piece of bread, kissing it, crossing himself and saying grace (Djordjević D. 1958: 549, 109). It was believed that it was a sin to hold bread behind one’s back (Metohija; Radunović 1988: 331), and in Herzegovina it was wrong to buy bread in town, but rather one should make it at home (Zovko 1901: 301).

**Common (everyday) bread vs. pogača, kravaj, kolač**

There is a difference between bread for everyday use and ceremonial or celebration bread. The latter bread has a clear symbolic function and it is used as a form of communication within the community as well as with the divine or demonic world. As a rule, ceremonial bread was made out of sifted wheat flour and it differed in the way that it was prepared, in the place and time that it was used, as well as in its shape. D. Marinov states that in Bulgarian tradition when kneading certain types of bread it was compulsory for the woman doing it to be dressed in new clothes, for the maiden to bring water from the spring early in the morning without saying a word the entire time (m‘ličana voda, silent water), and the water jug was to be decorated with flowers (cvetna voda, flower water), the water used to make the bread had to be poured from a full jug, i.e. without any being poured off previously (nenačeta voda, whole water). When kneading certain breads for weddings, the act was accompanied by certain songs (Marinov 1994: 372–373). Among the Slavic peoples the ritual function is mainly linked to three types of bread: *pogača*, *kravaj* and *kolač*. Although over time many of the differences in the use of these breads have faded, some of them can still be pointed out.

The *pogača* is a round flat wheat bread made without yeast, which is why in Bulgaria it is also called *prjasna pita* (unleavened flatbread). The name can be found among all the South Slavic peoples, as well as other peo-
ple in the Balkans (Greeks, Romanians, Albanians, Turks, etc.). The exception is the Czechs, who call it *pagač*. It is believed that it is an adaptation of the Italian word *focaccia*, which comes from the Latin word *focius*, “bread baked on the hearth”, from the Latin word *focus* meaning hearth (Skok 1972/II: 694). In Russian a similar bread is called *lepēhal*/*lepēška* where the root word is probably the Slavic *lěpiti*, to stick or glue. It may be assumed that the *pogača* made of wheat flour is an innovation, and that in the old Slavic homeland *kaša* (porridge) was used instead. This is supported by the ritual practice involving porridge among the East and West Slavs. In thirteenth century Russia the wedding feast was called *kaša*. Among the Slavs porridge was a ritual food for Christmas holidays, for the birth of a child, at weddings, funerals, etc. In the Tver Governorate two porridges were prepared on the day that a child was born — one thin with milk, and one thick with butter. If it was a day of fasting, the porridge was prepared using millet and buckwheat (Smucov 1996: 184, 189).

The opposition between leavened bread and *pogača* is apparent from reports from Herzegovina — as long as leavened bread was in the oven, no one was to mention *pogača* because then the bread would not rise (Vukova gradja 1934: 30).

The fact that the *pogača* is prepared quickly, baked immediately, does not change shape while baking (it does not rise), eaten the same day, and broken as opposed to cut by knife, defines its specific ritual function — it is most often linked to immediate irreversible change. By breaking it during the ritual this change is confirmed and reaffirmed in an obvious manner, i.e. it is codified in a visual manner. In Vojvodina as soon as a child is born, the midwife or a female relative brings a *pogača*, and the members of the family break it above the child’s head (Milutinović 1971: 129); in the Leskovac area before the wedding a *grabena pogača* is prepared in the bride’s home, which young men and women break above the bride’s head (Stojančević 1979: 175); when someone dies, three *pogača* are made in a neighbour’s house. One is carried and broken at the cemetery, and two are used for the funeral meal (Milutinović 1971: 128).

*Kolač* and *kravaj* are leavened, usually round breads made out of wheat flour. The first name is Pan-Slavic (*kolačć*) and it most likely comes from the round shape of this bread (*kolo–akov*, Bulgarian *kolak*). The second name (*korvaju*) is commonly known among the East and South Slavs, but it does not exist among the West Slavs (ESSJ 1984: 112–116). In Russian imperial and princely weddings the *kravaj* was so large that it was carried out by four officers. Among the Ukrainians of the Saratov Governorate the *kravaj* was also very large, covering almost the whole table (Smucov 1996: 196). Starting in the second half of the nineteenth century the name *kravaj* (korovaj in Russian) came to be linked to the word for cow (*korva–avo*).
This connection is also notable among the Baltic peoples. In western Polesje (Belorussia) one encounters the adaptation from Lithuanian *bonda* (cow) but meaning *bread*, from Lithuanian *banda*, meaning horned cattle, but also *kolač* (Nepokupny 1976: 190–191). N. Sumcov believes that the *kravaj* is a sacrificial bread, which represents a substitute for the sacrificing of a cow. This is also supported by the fact that some such breads made by the Bulgarians and Belorussians have dough additions in the form of horns (Sumcov 1996: 240). A. Potebnja has put forth the hypothesis, which is supported by the authors of the *Etymological Dictionary of Slavic Languages* (Moscow), that the *kravaj* is the groom’s symbol and that, being a male principle, it is in opposition to the cow (which is also how the bride may be called among the East Slavs): “the *kravaj* is the bull-groom” (Potebnja 2007: 132–133; ESSJ 1984: 115). V. Ivanov and V. Toporov (1974: 243–258), in addition to the abovementioned symbolism of *kravaj*, also see in it the embodiment of the world tree.

If there is a difference to be noted between these two types of ceremonial breads, it can be assumed that *kolač* in the Slavic homeland was a sacrificial celebration bread for general prosperity, which had variously shaped surfaces (dough applications in the shape of a crucifix, sun, wreath, flowers, etc.) depending on the specific purpose. *Kravaj* is a sacrificial bread that more closely concretizes fertility and fecundity — for the bride to be fertile (*svadbeni kravaj*), for the mother to have enough milk for feeding the infant (*kravaj za porodilju*), or for sheep to produce milk throughout the year (*ovčarnik kravaj, košara*, etc.).

The ceremonial role of bread

As a ritual object, bread is an integral part of many ceremonies. Almost all important ceremonies use bread: birth, weddings, funeral rites, the family and village patron saint’s day, annual holidays, ceremonies in crisis situations.

Bread in annual customs

Among the Serbs the largest number of breads was made for Christmas. In addition to the Christmas *kolač*, in the early twentieth century breads of different shapes, called *zakončić* were made: *volovi* (dough on the crust depicted horns, a yoke, a switch); *ovčarica* (a round bread with a dough band depicting sheep); *svinjarica* (folds in the crust depict pig teats); *šljivar* (plum orchard); *bačva* (barrel); *vinograd* (vineyard); *guske* (geese, two beans used for the eyes); *golupčići* (young pigeons); *polaženik* (first Christmas guest), etc. On Christmas Eve the household head would take each *zakončić*, cut off a piece of it, dip it in wine and put it aside to be given later to the livestock.
The other breads would be eaten for dinner, with the exception of ovčarica which was given to the shepherd. He would remove the balls from the bread and give them to the sheep so that they would breed/reproduce (Daničić 1900: 98–99). In Timočka Krajina on Christmas Eve the lady of the house baked twelve different breads: the bread for the young God-Christ; za vo-love (for the oxen); ovčarnica (shepherd bread); lojze (vineyard); njiva (crop field); guvno (threshing floor); svinja (pig); bačva (barrel); kola (cart, wagon); golubovi (pigeons); kosir (sickle); sunce (sun); and mesec (moon). All the breads were placed on straw covered by a sack woven from goat hair. The man of the house would place a piece of each in a glass of wine, which the members of the household would use for communion on Christmas Morning (Stanojević 1929: 48–49).

In the case of the Serbs in Kordun, ahead of Christmas the lady of the house would make the božičnjak, a leavened bread of wheat flour decorated with a pattern. If it was cracked when it was removed from the oven, it was considered a sign that the man of the house or another member of the family would die that year. It was placed on the table in a sieve (sifter) with three candles inserted into it, and it was not eaten until St. Basil’s Day. The candles were on Christmas Eve and the following three days during lunch and dinner (Bubalo-Kordunaš 1931: 118–119).

In the Homolje region, the lady of the house made the bread called povojnica on Christmas Day. When she had prepared the dough, she would smear the doors of the stables and pens with her dough-covered hands so that the livestock would be healthy (also probably so that they would reproduce, grow like the leavened bread). If the lady of the house did not have any children, she would smear dough on her forehead and her husband’s nose so that she would become pregnant (Nedeljković 1990: 20). In northern Metohija the dašik bread was made for Christmas (Bukumirić 2012: 121). The name most likely comes from dad-snik, “the one who gives, who brings wealth”.

In addition to kolać, the Serbs also made different, smaller breads on Christmas Day. For example, in some Serb regions when a man from the house (usually the household head) went to the forest to collect the badn-jak (branch of a tree that is cut down in a ritual manner on the day before Christmas, carried into the home and placed on the hearth to burn in two halves), he would carry a lepinja, which he would break on the stump of the tree that he cut down for the badnjak, then he would eat half, and leave half on the stump. In Kosovo and Metohija when the badnjak was placed on the hearth an ornate pogača would be placed on the edge, and on it, honey and salt. All members of the household would cross themselves and kiss the pogača. On Christmas Day, before sunrise, the pogača would be taken to the field (Nušić 1986: 181). In southern Serbia (around Leskovac) several
smaller breads called *koledjanke* were baked for Christmas and one of them was intended for the *zmija poljanka* (field snake) “to defend the field from hail” (Djordjević D. 1985: 59).

A widespread custom among the Serbs is to make *česnica* for Christmas, most often a kind of unleavened bread made out of wheat flour. In some villages, grain, pieces (slivers) of wood from the yoke or a coin, usually just a coin, were also put in the dough for the *česnica*. When the bread was baked all the members of the family took part in breaking it (or the man of the house did this, giving each person a piece), which was followed by the search for one of the abovementioned items. It was believed that whoever found the coin in their piece of bread would have the most luck that year. Among the Serbs in Sarajevo the *česnica* was sometimes made by the man of the house. Before Christmas he would fetch water for the *česnica* at night, wearing gloves, and he carried wheat as a tribute for the spring from which he took the water. In addition to the *česnica* he also made two hollow breads, which he left until St. Basil’s Day. After kneading the dough he would go outside with his eyes closed and touch the nearest tree with his dough-covered hands, saying “May bees spread here”. He would cover the bread with embers in the hearth to bake, also while wearing gloves (Lilek 1894/VI: 383).

In western Serbia (Užice) the *česnica* was broken before lunch by the man of the house together with the *polaženik*, not with their bare hands, but wearing gloves. They would turn it three times in the direction of the movement of the sun, then break it, kiss, exchange pieces and then sit down at the table. If a crumb were to fall while the *česnica* was being broken, it was believed that someone from the house would die that year (Milićević 1894: 174). In Bačka the *česnica* was made from several leaves of dough, each leaf being strewn with honey, chopped walnuts and raisins (RSGV 2010/10: 80).

It is obvious that the *česnica* symbolized overall happiness, with each member of the household getting a piece. The name of this bread is the noun form of the adjective *čęstъ* “piece” (this is also the root of the verb *pričestiti se*, to receive communion).

In Šumadija the *šuplji kolaci* (hollow bread) was also made for the first ritual guest on Christmas — the *položajnik*, *polaženik* — so that a bundle of hemp could be put in its opening. In northern Kosovo and Metohija the *polaznik pogača* was made for the *položajnik* (Bukumirić 2012: 448–449). In Bosnia and Herzegovina and western Serbia, an ox was brought into the house on Christmas Day as the *položajnik*, and was covered with barley, with a hollow bread hung on his horn (Lilek 1894/VI: 381–382).

On St. Basil’s Day (January 1/14), or Little Christmas, the *vasiljica* bread was made in western Serbia, which was called *vasuljica* in eastern Serbia, *vasilopita* by the Greeks, or *bosilica* in Hrvatsko Zagorje and Dalmatia. In the Užice region the *vasiljica* was made with corn flour, then crumbled
into hot lard and eaten after lunch. In the Homolje region on that day the vasilice wheat breads were fried in lard and given to the children, for the souls of the dead. The gruvanica or česnica was made in Temnić, barenica in Kosovo, bakradan (polenta) in Skopska Crna Gora, poparenica in the Preševo area. In Kosovo, Metohija and Resava it was believed that bears gave birth on St. Basil's Day and that bread should be made for them, which was called mečki povojnica in Resava and Skopska Crna Gora. In Kosovo every house made kolomboćna barenica (cornbread made with fat, usually made by adding cheese). In Skopska Crna Gora it was believed that when the bear gives birth on St. Basil's day, she goes blind and that her sight returns after forty days (Djordjević T. 1984: 72–74).

For St. Theodore's Day bread in the shape of horseshoes was baked in Banat. Such breads were called todorići or kopite in the Vršac region (Filipović 1986:49). In the area around Boljevac the bušan kolač was baked, which a rider could put his hand through while riding a horse (Nedeljković 1990: 237–238).

On the day of the Holy Forty Martyrs of Sebaste (March 9/22, celebrated by newlyweds), small unleavened flatbreads (kravajčići, kolačići), so-called mladenčići, were made. These breads were given to the shepherds. In Timočka Krajina, for this feast forty small breads called mladenci or mladenčići were made with a design incised using a twig. Unleavened breads were baked in one earthenware dish, while the rest were leavened (Stanojević 1929/IV: 44). For this holiday in some places a larger bread was made for the shepherd, which was called mladenac. Among the East Slavs there is a widespread custom that breads in the shape of birds are prepared for this holiday, commonly known as žavoronki (larks). This custom is linked to the belief that this is when the first birds return after spending the winter in warmer southern areas (Agapkina 1997: 48–62).

For Easter in Vojvodina women made the veliki uskršnji kolač (large Easter bread), in a round and braided form, with a dyed red egg placed on top. In Srem, in the villages of Mt. Fruška Gora, the tradition was to make a braided unleavened flat bread with a raw egg placed in its centre before baking. This bread is called buzdo van in Srem, jajčanik in the villages west of Sremska Mitrovica (Bosić 1966: 268), and kovržanj, kovežanjac or kovrčanjak in eastern Serbia (RSANU 1975/IX: 701). These breads were used as Easter gifts (this custom also exists in southern Serbia).

For St. George's Day, in the Homolje region a leavened bread without any markings was baked. It was kneaded in silence and a basil branch was placed on it. It was intended for livestock and was called stočni poskur or stočni kolač (Nedeljković 1990: 73).

The celebration of the family patron saint's day (krsna slava) among the Serbs is unimaginable without the slavski kolač. Even if the family was
not able to mark this holiday with a *slava* feast, they would make and break the *slavski kolač* (for more on practices involving the bread for the *ksna slava* see Jastrebov 1889: 4–17; Radenković 2013: 9–23).

The *zavetina* collective ritual, which is also known as *krstonoše* (processions of people that went to the fields carrying icons and red banners in the spring, between Easter and Pentecost), included the breaking of bread, which was brought by the designated ceremony participant — the *kolačar*. A piece of the bread was given to the person who was to be the *kolačar* the following year (Milićević 1894: 155–156).

It is notable that the two main calendar holidays, Christmas and Easter, also featured significantly different ceremonial breads. For Christmas the bread was round with various figural representations of everything that was important in the lives of people. These breads sent a message to the *sacredones* (God, ancestors) to protect the lives of the members of the household and to increase the size and wealth of the family. For Easter “twisted” forms of bread predominated, often with the addition of a whole egg. The names of these breads were often derived from the verbs *viti* (to twine) and *vrteti* (to spin), which were especially marked in folk culture. It may be assumed that such shapes were created under the influence of the belief that between Easter and Pentecost the souls of the deceased were “released”, and that they were in the fields and around their former homes. This is why the breads were dedicated to them. The life–death polarity appears in the Easter bread code as the right–wrong polarity.

*Bread in life cycle rituals*

*Birth of a child*

As soon as a child is born a female neighbour or relative immediately bakes a *pogača* and takes it to the mother. In the Temnić Serb region the custom was that a male child should take three bites from the *pogača*, without eating them, so that the newborn child would be healthy and have healthy teeth (Miodragović 2009: 76).

In Banat (Jasenovo), the third evening after the birth of the child, a *pogača* would be placed on the table, along with a glass of water and a shirt because it was believed that on that night the Fates would come and set its fate (Milutinović 1967–69: 129).

While the mother was recovering from labor, women would bring her a *povojnica*, which obligatorily consisted of a *pogača* and a gift for the child. In western Serbia for the baby shower the new mother would receive a hollow “colorful bread”, through which water was poured “so that the child would have enough milk” (Blagojević 1984: 228).
In the Leskovac region, forty days after birth, when the child was brought back from the church where a prayer was said, it would be placed in its crib and given a little bread to eat (Djordjević D. 1985: 83); in Lužnica (eastern Serbia) bread was the first solid food that the infant would receive, as soon as it started sitting up (Nikolić 1910/XVI: 171).

In the strižba ritual (celebration of the ritual first hair cutting of the child, carried out by the kum, or godfather), in the Vranje region, first bread and salt are brought out and placed in front of the kum. This explains that the bread means happiness and that the child should never be without bread or salt (Veljić 1925: 392).

When the child starts to walk, a special pogaca is made, the postupanica or postupača. In Mol (Bačka) this is a leavened pogaca wrapped in a sheet and placed on the threshold of the house. The child is walked three times over it, and then the pogaca is broken and eaten. One child eats the pogaca while running so that the child that has started walking would be fast (Milutinović 1971: 129).

When the child stops breastfeeding a special flatbread was made and given to it, which in the Užice region was a hollow bread (Blagojević 1984: 224).

In the Užice region in the event that the child did not start speaking for a long time, the grandmother or mother would take the child to the watermill where the miller would bathe the child with water from under the waterwheel and the čeketalo (the rod that rests on the millwheel and the grain hopper, agitating the hopper so that the grains would fall on the millstone, which produces noise), make a flatbread and bake it in the hot ashes on the hearth (Blagojević 1984: 231). In Bosnia in such cases the child would be given bread from the Gypsie bag (beggar’s bag). This is the origin of the expression for a talkative person “He talks like he has eaten bread from a Gypsy bag” (Lilek 1894: 667). In Herzegovina a pogaca is made and broken above the child’s head, and then given only to the children to eat (Vukova gradja 1934: 28).

From the listed examples it is obvious that the ritual use of bread was necessary for each phase of the development of the child. Since the growth changes of the child are irreversible, it is most often unleavened bread (pogaca) that is made.

**Wedding**

As a ritual object bread holds an important place in all the stages of the nuptials. Special breads were made for the engagement, the wedding day, the post–wedding visit, and they were treated differently (Sumcov 1996: 175–187; Ivanova 1997: 22–28; Gura 2012: 239–254).
In western Serbia when a girl accepts to marry a man (in some places this is expressed by her taking an apple with a gold or silver coin in it) then the future in-laws break the šareni prijateljski prošeni kolać (patterned in-law engagement bread) which the groom’s party brought. Each of the people present takes a piece of the bread, and the unmarried men and women “fight” for it so that they too might get married quickly (Blagojević 1984: 245).

In Srem, seven days before the wedding the groom’s father would go to the best man to invite him to the wedding. He would bring with him a flask decorated with flowers and a towel, a pogača and apples. At the best man’s house they would eat the pogača and drink wine. The following day the best man’s wife would bake a pogača, fill the flask with wine, place the towel in a sack and send it all to the groom’s house, which was confirmation of acceptance of the offer and of their presence at the wedding (Milutinović 1971: 130).

In Montenegro (Perast), on the Thursday before the wedding, the groom, his brother and four more young men would go to get the bride’s dowry. At the bride’s house they would be offered kokot, a bread specially prepared for that occasion (in the shape of a rooster without legs), made out of white flour, with eggs, butter, sugar, walnuts and almonds, which they broke above the dowry chest and share with the girls and members of the household who are present (Vukmanović 1958/VII: 143). Since the rooster has a breeding function, the breaking of the rooster-shaped bread by the groom and the lads from his party, above the dowry chest apparently symbolically represents the expressed model of a successful impregnation of the bride. The antiquity of this ritual symbol is indicated by the fact that it exists in other, geographically distant Slavic regions. In Russia (Kaluga Governorate) the wedding bread, decorated with branches and twists of dough, was called kurnik (from kurica, Russian for chicken). In the Pskov Governorate the kurnik was a bread that had a rooster baked in it, and it was given to the bride and groom for lunch on the second day of their wedding (Gvozdikova 1981: 208–209).

In the villages around Leskovac and Vranje on the Friday before the wedding the unmarried young men and young women from the family and neighborhood would gather in the groom’s home, for the ritual sifting of the flour and kneading of the wedding bread. At the bride’s home (in the Leskovac area on the same day, and on Saturday in the Vranje area) young people would also gather, where the grabena pogača bread was made and broken above the bride’s head (Stojančević 1979: 175).

In many Slavic areas the beginning of the wedding ceremony is linked to the sifting of flour and kneading of a special ceremonial bread made of wheat flour, which in Šerb areas is most often called sabornik (Radovanović 1998: 30–32) and sad (garden) among Russians (Gvozdenikova 1981: 204–
205). In Jagodina three branches are stuck into such a bread and a dough pigeon placed on each of them. A three-pronged branch is stuck into the center of the bread, and a “gold” apple (an apple wrapped in yellow foil) was stuck on each prong. The sabornik was placed on the table in front of the best man during the wedding feast. It was only at the end, when the šareno kolo line dance had passed, that the best man, bridesman, and the groom’s brother put their heads together and the sabornik would be broken above them (Trajanović 1983: 69–70). The breaking of the sabornik marked the end of the wedding.

Among the Ukrainians in Srem, after the dinner the korovaj wedding bread would be brought out. The korovaj was decorated with carvings and figural representations of the Moon, Sun, pigeons, small wreaths, grapes and the newlyweds. The groom danced while holding a forked branch (riska), which was decorated with tissue paper strips in different colors, with an apple on the tip. After the dance he would stick the riska in the korovaj. After this ritual dance the groom’s brother would cut the bread and hand it out to the guests, for which they gave gifts of money to the bride (Radulovački: 1955: 161–162).

Among the Serbs in Bosnia (Tavna monastery region), the devojački kolač was brought out before the wedding party started out from the bride’s home, and was then broken by the groom’s father and the bride’s father, after which a kolo was danced around the table and through the house, to the exit (Drobnjaković 1937: 84).

Bread was a compulsory element in many Slavic areas when the bride entered the groom’s home. In Bosnia the bride was given two breads, which she placed under her armpits and entered her new home like that (Drobnjaković 1937: 86). In eastern Serbia (Svrljig area) the bride would enter the groom’s home with a bread under one arm and a bottle of wine under the other (Petrović S. 1992: 99–100). Among the Slovaks (Velka Lesna), the mother-in-law would greet the bride in front of the house and give her the kusek, a round bread made specially for that occasion. She would take three bites of it and throw it above her head. The guests would catch it, share it among themselves and eat it immediately. It was believed that such a bread brought luck to those who ate a piece of it (Horvátová 1970: 74–75). In Russia, in the Kursk Governorate, the mother-in-law would uncover the bride’s face with a bread (Sumcov 1996: 198).

In the region around Leskovac the bridesman would bring a special hlepčić za mladu (small bread for the bride), tied in white and red thread. The bride would eat the bread and leave the threads so that she could start knitting socks for the child when she got pregnant. In Strupnica this bread was thrown into the bride’s lap, and she would immediately drop it on the
ground, so that she might have an easy childbirth (Djordjević D. 1958: 475).

In Šumadija (Jarmenovci) the starojkova pogača would be brought out during the lunch at the groom’s house, and each person gave money for it “so the bride could buy whiteners (makeup for the face)”. At the same time, the kumova (best man’s), deverova (groom’s brother’s) and vojvodina (witness’s) pogača were brought out, decorated with red, white and blue wool, with a piece of soap, comb and mirror on each of them (Knežević-Jovanović 1958: 95). In Bosnia, after the third drink at the groom’s house the wedding breads and all the gifts would be presented by the master of ceremonies (Drobnjaković 1937: 87).

In Russia, in Western Pričurie the bride and groom were blessed using bread wrapped in a napkin, instead of an icon. On the morning of the second day of the wedding the bride would bring the bread to the table and say “The way that you love bread in the family, so too should you love me” (Gvozdikova 1981: 208–209). Also in Russia (on the Don River) a special bread was prepared for the wedding, with the inside removed and a live pigeon placed in the hollow space, which would peer out of the hole. The bread would be placed in the room where the newlyweds were to spend their wedding night (Gura 1997: 615).

In Vojvodina eight days after the wedding the bride would be visited by her young close relatives (the parents did not visit) who brought her a pogača. This ritual visit is called pogačari. In Mošorin (Bačka) the bride was visited by her brothers and sisters, who brought her a pogača filled with walnuts and raisins. This pogača was broken above the bed (Milutinović 1971: 130). In western Serbia, when the parents visited the newlyweds, they would bring the šareni prijateljski kolač (Blagojević 1984: 271).

Postmortem rituals

When a person dies in Vojvodina three unleavened pogača would be made, however not in the deceased’s house, but at a neighbor’s. One was taken to the cemetery and broken after the burial, with all those present taking a piece, and two were eaten at the home, after returning from the cemetery, during the funeral meal (Milutinović 1967–1969: 128). The pogača was made for all the podušje (funeral meals for seven days, forty days, semi-anniversary, anniversary, Saturday of Souls). In eastern Serbia (the Svrljig area), the older woman who was in charge of the funeral (as a rule a woman whose first child had died) would make and half-bake as many dumplings as there were people staying for the funeral meal. All the participants were required to immediately eat these half-cooked dumplings (personal observation in Plužina). A specificity of Bulgarian tradition is the preparation of
a special unleavened bread, *patnina*. In northeastern Bulgaria the dough for this bread was made with the water used to bathe the deceased. The name of this bread indicates that its purpose was to send off the soul of the deceased, i.e. for his/her voyage to the other side. It was believed that when the bread was broken and eaten the person’s soul would separate from the body and fly over the house (Lozanova 1997: 41–42).

Special breads were also prepared for Saturday of Souls. In Šumadija *babica* and *krsteljak* breads were taken to the cemetery; in Levač and Temnić it was *zadušnica* or *poskurica*, etc. (Nedeljković 1990: 96). In the areas around Leskovac and Pirot for the funeral meals the *krsnik*, a small bread in the shape of a cross, was taken to the cemetery (Petrović V. 1900: 297; Živković 1987: 72). In Vojvodina the *poskurice* breads were made for Saturday of Souls, taken to the cemetery and handed out to the poor (RSGV 2007/7: 32).

**Trade rituals**

Special breads (*pogača*) were made also for the first day of ploughing, for the first harvest, etc. In Kosovo the *obraždaonica* flatbread was made for the ploughman who went out to plough or sow for the first time that year, and it was broken over the yoke in the furrow or over the seed that was brought to the field (Filipović 1967: 195).

In south-eastern Banat there was a custom of *ovnova čast* (ram’s honour) which represented the ritual introduction of the ram among the sheep, and which took place around Michaelmas. Each man of the house would bring a *pogača* that was decorated with twists in the form of five circles. He would break it with the shepherd, keeping the part that remained in his hands (Banatske Here 1958: 117).

**House building**

The testing of whether a location was good for building a house included the rolling of bread. If the rolled bread fell on “its head”, in Levač and Temnić it was considered that the location was advantageous for building a new house (Mijatović 1909: 266).

In Nadalj (Bačka) when the hole for the foundation of a new house was dug, the man and lady of the house would go down into it, break a *pogača* and share it (Milutinović 1971: 132).

When moving into a new house in Jablanice a whole wheat bread, kneaded and baked in the old house, would be brought in (Trojanović 1930: 173); in Kosovo and Metohija the lady of the house entered the new house first and carried in an earthenware dish and baked bread (Podrima), or a *pogača* and sieve (Suva Reka) (Vukanović 2001: 502); in Montenegro (Zeta),
the first things brought into a new house were a whole bread and a vat full of water (Radulović 1936: 54).

In Ukraine and Belorussia, in the event of a fire, bread would be carried around the house that had burned down (Sumcov 1996: 213). The same was done with an icon, which shows that bread was considered a sacred object.

This overview of Slavic customs and beliefs related to bread, which illustrates the extensive ethnographic material related to this matter, indicates its great importance as an artifact for folk culture.

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The Bay of Cattaro (Kotor) School of Icon-Painting 1680–1860

Abstract: Relying on post-Byzantine tradition, eleven painters from five generations of the Dimitrijević-Rafailović family, accompanied by Maksim Tujković, painted several thousand icons and several hundred iconostases between the late seventeenth and the second half of the nineteenth century. They worked in major Orthodox Christian monasteries in Montenegro, Kosovo and Metohija, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Dalmatia, but their works can mostly be found in modest village churches in the Bay of Kotor (Cattaro) and on the South Adriatic coast. The decoration of these churches was financially supported by the local population headed by elders. Along with a reconstruction of their biographies and a chronological overview of their major works, this paper seeks to trace stylistic changes in the Bay of Kotor school of icon-painting. While simply varying a thematic repertory established in earlier periods, the painters from the Bay of Kotor were gradually introducing new details and themes adopted from Western European Baroque art under indirect influences coming from the monastery of Hilandar, Corfu, Venice and Russia. This process makes this indigenous school of icon-painting, which spanned almost two centuries, comparable to the work of Serbian traditional religious painters (zograf) and illuminators active north of the Sava and Danube rivers after the Great Migration of the Serbs (1690). Despite differences between the two, which resulted from different cultural and historical circumstances in which Serbs lived under Ottoman, Venetian and Habsburg rules, similarities in iconography and style, which were inspired by an urge to counteract proselytic pressures, are considerably more important.

Keywords: icon-painting, woodcarving, frescoes, Dimitrijević-Rafailović family, Maksim Tujković, Bay of Cattaro (Kotor), Risan, Morača monastery

Between 1680 and 1860, eleven painters from the Dimitrijević-Rafailović family of Risan, with their founder Dimitrije the Daskal,1 and Maksim Tujković of Grbalj, an area in the Bay of Cattaro as the twelfth member of the group, painted a dozen fresco ensembles, several hundred iconostases and several thousand icons, and they also carved numerous frames for icons and church furnishings throughout Montenegro, Kosovo and Metohija, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Dalmatia. They were successors to the post-Byzantine tradition nurtured at the Patriarchate of Peć and the monastery of Morača in the second half of the seventeenth century and their most intense activity took place in the Bay of Cattaro and its hinterland, including the area delimited by Peć and Bijelo Polje, the Morača and Piva monasteries, Sarajevo and the monastery of Krka. The painters from the Bay of Kotor

1 The name derives from the Greek word ὁ διδάσκαλος meaning a teacher or a master.
worked in all major monastic and urban centres in the region, but most of their works were made for modest clients from Luštica, Grbalj, Crmnica and Paštrovići. During almost two centuries of uninterrupted family activity, the work of five generations of painters from the Dimitrijević-Rafailović family inevitably underwent changes, going through several stylistic phases. The first phase, between 1680 and 1760, comprises the works of Dimitrije Daskal, his four sons — Gavril, Rafailo, Georgije and Danilo Dimitrijević — and their contemporary, Maksim Tujković, a monk, icon-painter and woodcarver. The second phase covers the period between 1760 and 1820 and the activity of Rafailo’s sons Petar and Vasilije, and of Vasilije’s descendants, Djordje and Hristofor Rafailović. The third phase, between 1820 and 1860, coincides with Hristofor’s second phase, which reveals a Russian influence and includes the works of his sons Jovan and Ivo, which bring the activity of the icon-painting school of the Bay of Kotor to a close. The beginnings and the first century of the workshop’s activity were related to Risan, where Dimitrije Daskal signed his earliest works, and where he later settled and started a family. Late in the eighteenth century, when Vasilije was at the head of the icon-painting school, the Rafailovićs moved from Risan to Nalježići in Gornji Grbalj. In 1810, Vasilije’s younger son, Hristofor, moved to neighbouring Sutvara. After half a century, the importance of this artistic centre faded.

Dimitrije Daskal was the most gifted student of the zograph Radul, one of the best Serbian painters of the seventeenth century, whom he helped paint frescoes in the Praskvica monastery church of the Holy Trinity of in 1680. Dimitrije moved from the surroundings of the Morača monastery and settled in Risan. During the following years, he painted four large despotich icons for the church of Sts Peter and Paul. Between 1704 and 1718, Dimitrije painted frescoes in at least four Orthodox Christian village
Fig. 1 Dimitrije Daskal, *Holy Virgin and the dove of the Holy Spirit*, detail of the *Annunciation*, 1704, Royal Door, Church of St Paraskeve, Mrkovi

Fig. 2 Maksim Tujković, *Holy Trinity (Hospitality of Abraham)*, 1714, icon above the Royal Door, Treasury of the Praskvica monastery
Fig. 3 Dimitrije Daskal and Gavrilo Dimitrijević, *Dormition of the Virgin*, 1713, icon in a carved frame, Morača monastery church

Fig. 4 Rafailo Dimitrijević, *St Christopher the Cynocephalus*, detail of the *Deesis with saints*, first half of the 18th century, Art Gallery, Split
Fig. 5 Georgije Dimitrijević, Icon with a carved frame inscribed with the names of the deceased, 1740, Treasury of the Savina monastery

Fig. 6 Petar Rafailović, Triptych, 1776, Banja monastery near Risan
Fig. 7 Vasilije Rafailović (?), *Three-Headed Holy Trinity*, detail of the icon of the *Holy Virgin of the Sign*, ca 1800, Church of St George, Sutvara

Fig. 8 Djordje Rafailović, *Jesus Christ*, despotic icon, 1803, Church of St John the Theologian, Zagora

Fig. 9 Hristofor Rafailović, Masonry iconostasis painted with frescoes, 1841, Church of St Nicholas, Očinići

Fig. 10 Ivo Rafailović (?), Polypytch that serves as a home altar, second half of the nineteenth century, National Museum, Cetinje
churches (Šišići, Mrkovi, Pelinovo, Prijeradi) and in one Roman Catholic chapel (Dobrota). Apart from doing commissions for clients from Cattaro, he painted icons and made wood-carved or painted frames for iconostases for the monasteries of Dubočica near Pljevlja, Prskvica, Savina, Krka, Piva and Morača. Dimitrije’s style was marked by meticulous drawing, schematic faces with drooping eyelids, conspicuously dark circles under the eyes and a series of short white strokes around them. These features would later evolve into the prevailing painting manner of the icon-painting school of the Bay of Cattaro. Dimitrije Daskal simplified the patterns used by his teacher Radul in terms of form and condensed them in terms of composition. He was not very good at anatomy, proportions and foreshortening. Occasionally, when he was commissioned by prosperous monastic communities, he made lavishly carved and gilt wooden frames. But he usually made iconostases for small village churches, and then he painted the frames in imitation of woodcarving. His approach to wall-painting was the approach of an icon-painter, paying special attention to facial details of the depicted saints, their clumsy movements and stark gestures against a simplified background, repeating the same types and motifs. Apart from the liturgical calendar, Menologion, which was rarely represented in art, in extensively illustrated fresco scenes in Šišići, Mrkovi and Pelinovo, Dimitrije depicted the hagiographical cycles of St George, St Paraskeve and St Nicholas in fourteen, seventeen and eighteen scenes, respectively. Today, it is impossible to observe the purity of his unique and inimitable style in numerous icons which Dimitrije painted jointly with his sons and assistants, as well as in those that were later crudely retouched (Šišići). His work spans thirty-eight years, i.e. the period between 1680 and 1718.

The only artist who belonged to the icon-painting school of the Bay of Kotor though he was not a member of the Dimitrijević-Rafailović family was a monk of the Cetinje monastery — Maksim Tujković. He was born about 1680 in Grbalj. Tujković studied icon-painting with Dimitrije Daskal and was also a deft woodcarver. The key years in his career were: 1708 (when he worked in the church of St Luke in Cattaro); 1714 (the Prskvica monastery); 1720 (the church of the Holy Virgin in Njeguši); 1723 (Nikoljac near Bijelo Polje); 1734 (when he painted icons and carved iconostases for the Serbian church in Sarajevo and the monastery of the Holy Trinity in Pljevlja); and 1738 (the Stanjevići monastery). He also worked in the church of the Holy Apostles at the Patriarchate of Peć and the church of the Transfiguration in Budisavci near Peć. Under the immediate influence of the zograph Radul and Dimitrije Daskal, Maksim Tujković imitated the good tradition of old masters. However, the features that distinguished his works from those made by the icon-painters of the Dimitrijević-Rafailović family were the sonority of colours and a rustic painterly expression. In
his paintings, too, the same types recur. His knowledge of anatomy and perspective was poor. Radul’s influence is reflected in Tujković’s manner of shading and the stylization of facial features, particularly in highlighting the lower edges of the eyes with a radial arrangement of short white strokes. He displayed great craftsmanship in woodcarving and simple shallow relief, distinguished by the interlacing ornament. Lavishly gilded, it adorns the Royal Doors and icons above them. Along with Dimitrije Daskal and Rafail Dimitrijević, Maksim Tujković was one of the best Serbian icon-painters and woodcarvers of the first half of the eighteenth century. His artistic career can be traced over a period of thirty years, between 1708 and 1738.

Gavrilo Dimitrijević, the eldest son of Dimitrije Daskal and brother of Rafailo Dimitrijević, was born in Risan in the last decade of the seventeenth century. It seems that he lived in the area of Kolašin, where he was teaching the Psalter and basic literacy skills. On the lavishly carved wooden frame for the icon of the Dormition of the Holy Virgin in the Morača monastery, believed to have been painted by his father Dimitrije, Gavrilo left an inscription that he did the carving at his own expense. Although he did not sign any other work, it has been assumed that he could have painted two icons at the Morača monastery — the Holy Virgin with Christ and saints (1711/2) and the Vita icon of St John the Baptist (1714). His drawing was skilled and swift and it reveals a particular sense of detail, and a taste for postures and gestures adopted from real life. He had a predilection for a reduced palette and a lavish use of gilding, while his drawings in black on a gold background often appear unfinished. Gavrilo introduced in his compositions a considerable number of women and children, images in semi-profile, as well as figures unexpectedly bent in movement. These features cannot be found in the works of other members of the icon-painting school of the Bay of Cattaro. Gavrilo was perhaps the accomplished woodcarver and one of the best painters of this school. But this remains a hypothesis which cannot be confirmed with certainty. The work of Gavrilo Dimitrijević can only be traced over a period of few years, between 1711 and 1714. The last reference to him dates from 1734, but he was mentioned as a daskal (teacher) and not as a painter.

Rafailo Dimitrijević, Dimitrije Daskal’s second and most talented son, and the founder of the Raffailović family, was born about 1700 in Risan. He was engaged both in icon-painting and in woodcarving. He also decorated a linen antimpression with a painting in oil. It not been preserved, but it was recorded in a photo. Rafailo painted and signed several large icons in carved wooden frames for the monastery of Piva. Apart from the Dobričevo monastery in Herzegovina, he worked in Serbian village churches in Luštica, Grbalj and Paštrovići. Numerous icons kept in museums and galleries in Dubrovnik, Belgrade, Split and Sarajevo are attributed to him.
The typical features of his style include elongated figures, an emphatic and stylized drawing, a vibrant and warm colour scheme, as well as the modeling of complexion using several transparent pink layers, which he adopted from his father Dimitrije. His painting skills helped him to create the illusion of the third dimension and well-organized compositions, never to be attained by his successors in the icon-painting school of the Bay of Cattaro. Apart from Dimitrije Daskal and Gavrilo Dimitrijević, Rafailo was the only other member of this school who carved in-the-round, including architectural elements (a base, a colonette with a capital, and an architrave). A curious fact relating to this painter is mentioned in an inscription on a now lost icon painted for the Dobričevo monastery in 1745. The inscription tells us that the high price of sixteen gold coins paid for the icon was based on the large number of saints depicted — 221. Rafailo’s artistic activity can be traced over a period of thirty-three years, from 1723 to 1756.

Of the works of Dimitije’s third son, Georgije (Djordje) Dimitrijević, only few have been preserved. The diptych from 1740 with inscribed names of the deceased and a carved wooden frame featuring vegetal ornaments, presently kept in the treasury of the Savina monastery, and the icons showing the Presentation of the Holy Virgin in the temple with scenes from her life (1759) and the Deesis with the apostles (1748) from the iconostasis in the church of St George in Šišići (Gornji or Upper Grbalj), are believed to be his works. His painting style is marked by schematic forms, horror vacui, stocky figures, a dry colour scheme and cool tones with pronounced shadows in complexion. He also made simple wood-carvings, which at that time were more highly valued and more generously paid than the painted elements of an iconostasis. His activity can be traced over a period of nineteen years, from 1740 to 1759.

The only piece of information about Dimitrije’s fourth and youngest son is provided by an inscription, according to which he painted, in 1757, the frescoes in the church of St Nicholas at Glavati (Gornji Grbalj), which was pulled down in the late nineteenth century. This shows that he must have been a good and respected painter. The lack of information about his other works indicates that he either died young or that some of his unsigned icons are hiding among the surviving anonymous works of this painting school.

The elder son of Rafailo Dimitrijević, Petar Rafailović, was also an icon-painter and a woodcarver. He was born in Risan and was trained in painting by his father Rafailo. Petar was the head of the family workshop until 1784, when he moved to Corfu due to his trading connections, married a Greek woman, started a family, and, as it has been believed until recently, allegedly gave up icon-painting. After 1784, his younger brother Vasilije became the driving force of the Bay of Cattaro school of icon-painting. A
large number of unsigned icons are with great certainty attributed to Petar based on his distinctive style and brushwork. Two icons showing the Harrowing of Hell and dating from about 1760, one in the National Museum in Belgrade and the other in the Art Gallery in Split, are believed to be his earliest works. Parts of the iconostases in the churches at Djenovići, Vranovići, Mrkovi, Donji Morinj and the monastery of Banja near Risan make the majority of Petar’s prolific oeuvre. Several portable triptychs that he painted can be found in Macedonia, and their central panel features the Deesis. Two of them date from his late period (1781/2). Made for Greek clients, these works have inscriptions in Greek, while the years were written in Arabic numerals. Having moved to Corfu, Petar occasionally painted commissions in the style of the Greek painters of the Ionian school, strongly marked by the influence of the Venetian Baroque. The two-part icon with its upper part showing St Matthew and the lower the family house of the Djurković family of Risan (1794) dates from this period; it is presently kept in the Maritime Museum at Kotor. Petar’s works reflect all virtues and drawbacks of the icon-painting school of the Bay of Kotor. The period immediately preceding his departure for Corfu was marked by a more frequent use of gilding, which reflects both the spirit of the epoch and the fact that he worked for wealthy clients. Seeking to meet the requirements of his educated and affluent clients, Petar departed from conventional patterns, dealing surprisingly well with less common and more complicated iconographic solutions. He was also an accomplished woodcarver, deftly repeating the repertory of ornaments used by his predecessors from the Dimitrijević family in the works commissioned by large and wealthy monasteries. His activity spans a period of thirty-four years, from 1760 to 1794.

Vasilije Rafailović was the younger son of Rafailo Dimitrijević, a member of the third generation of painters from the Bay of Kotor and, most probably, a woodcarver. He had been an assistant to his brother Petar until 1784, when Petar moved to Corfu and Vasilije became the head of the family workshop. In the late eighteenth century, Vasilije and his sons moved from Risan to Nalježići in Gornji Grbalj. The icon of the Holy Virgin with Christ, painted in 1776 and presently kept in the church of St Elias in Petrovac, is Vasilije’s only signed work from the period when he was an assistant to Petar. He subsequently worked in the churches of St Luke in Kotor and St John in Gradjani. His best work — the iconostasis for the Gradiste monastery church of St Nicholas — was completed in 1795. Vasilije also worked in the churches at Sutvara, Nalježići and Gorovići (Grbalj), where he did not sign his works, and, in 1806, at Donji Seoci (Crmnica), where he made his last known work assisted by his sons. His work greatly varies in quality,
depending on whether he worked alone or was assisted by others, and on the taste, culture and financial power of his clients. Over the years, painterly negligence and a darkened and murky colour scheme began to prevail. The quality and style of the carving in the churches of St Luke in Kotor (1777) and St Nicholas in the monastery of Gradiste (1795) shows not only that it could not have been done by Vasilije but also that it could not even date from his times. It must be of a considerably earlier date, when the post-Byzantine spirit prevailed among these artists; accordingly, the carving must have been done either by Dimitrije or by one of his sons, Gavril or Rafailo. Vasilije Rafailović was active for thirty years, between 1776 and 1806. He became the head of the family workshop in 1784.

Djordje Rafailović, Vasilije’s elder son, most probably lived with his father and brother at Naljezići in Gornji Grbalj. The large unsigned icon of Sis Sava and Simeon, painted in 1795 for the church of St Nicholas of the Gradiste monastery, is believed to be his earliest work. He later made iconostases at Zabrdje (Luštica), Djenovići, Zagora and Vranovići (Donji Grbalj). Together with his brother Hristofor, Djordje made iconostases for the churches of St George (where the Ceklin clan assembled) and St Thecla in Ceklin. The Deesis with the apostles and saints (1822) from the National Museum in Belgrade is his last known surviving work. A number of icons held by museums and galleries in Belgrade, Dubrovnik, Herceg Novi and Split are also attributed to him. Djordje Rafailović’s works are recognizable by a stiff drawing style and dark, almost murky shades of ochre. Many of his icons feature red and blue horizontal bands with inscriptions in the upper part of the background. Along with basic colours, he used gilding for the Royal Doors. He adorned frames for iconostases either with painted vegetal ornaments or with carving in shallow, almost rustic relief. His activity can be traced over a period of twenty-six years, from 1796 to 1822.

In 1808, the younger brother of Djordje Rafailović, Hristofor, was awarded a house at Naljezići (Gornji Grbalj) by Prince-Bishop Petar I Petrović for his painting services. Accordingly, his career as an icon-painter must have begun before that year. He moved to nearby Sutvara in 1810, while his brother Djordje remained in Naljezići. Hristofor made iconostases at Kovači, Ceklin, Dupilo, Šišići and Naljezići, either alone or with his brother. In 1820, he adopted a Russian Baroque style of painting, which could be first observed in his works in Krimovice and Krtoli, and was later also apparent in his icons done for the churches at Sutvara, Gorovići, Kovači and Petrovac. During the 1840s, he decorated two masonry iconostases with frescoes, in the villages of Očinići and Vrela near Cetinje, respectively. These artistic ensembles were unique at that time. Although many of his iconostases have not survived, numerous icons painted by Hristofor Rafailović can be seen in museums and churches in the Bay of Cattaro. He painted in the manner
of his father Vasilije and brother Djordje, but his approach to modelling was less restricted, particularly in rendering draperies. The changes in his style under the influence of Russian art were also reflected in the cursive letters in his signature, as well as in the inscriptions, which imitate the type of letters typically found in Russian printed books. In the same iconostasis, he decorated icon frames with simple wood carvings, but he also painted them in imitation of woodcarving. Since the woodcarving technique was time-consuming and expensive, the clients apparently could not afford to have the entire iconostasis adorned with carvings. On the iconostasis for the church of St Nicholas in Krtoli (1820), which has not survived, Hristofor signed himself as “the sinful Hristo daskal Rafailović the people’s painter from Risan”. This reveals both how others saw him and how he perceived himself. The artistic career of Hristofor Rafailović was longer than that of any other painter from the Bay of Kotor: it lasted for forty-six years, from 1808 to 1854.

Hristofor’s elder son, Jovan Rafailović, a member of the fifth and last generation of painters from the Bay of Cattaro, was born on 5 October 1818 in Sutvara. He served as a deacon and then was ordained as a priest in 1839. Jovan served as the parish priest at Orahovac in the Bishopric of the Bay of Cattaro. He was trained in painting by his father Hristofor, and was his assistant, just like his brother Ivo. Jovan died on 24 July 1886, and was buried in the churchyard of St Barbara’s at Sutvara. An icon of warm colours and modest artistic merit that he painted in the mid-nineteenth century, the Holy Virgin with the Child and Sts Nicholas and Peter, is kept in the National Museum in Belgrade. The artist signed himself as “Jovan Hristofo fora Rafailović” (Jovan, son of Hristofor, Rafailović). In major museums, galleries and church treasuries, among the unsigned icons attributed to the school of the Bay of Cattaro and dated to the middle and second half of the nineteenth century there are a considerable number of works that may be identified either as painted by Jovan alone or jointly with his father Hristofor (Belgrade, Dubrovnik, Split, Nalježići, Sutvara).

The last offspring of the Dimitrijević-Rafailović family of painters was Ivo, Hristofor’s younger son. Ivo was born in Sutvara on 28 August 1829. He was appointed a deacon and ordained as a priest in 1855. Just like his brother Jovan, he primarily was a churchman, and he served as a priest in Uble in the Bishopric of the Bay of Cattaro. Ivo was trained in icon-painting by his father Hristofor. He and his brother kept on assisting their father until the end of his life in 1854. In 1869, Ivo and Jovan Rafailović led the Grbalj uprising against Austria. Their house collapsed the same year and the icons in it were destroyed. Ivo died on 12 March 1900, and was buried next to his brother in the churchyard of St Barbara’s at Sutvara. His artistic skills were rather modest and he did not sign a single icon. Accordingly, various
icons are more or less reliably attributed to him, e.g. the icon of the *Fountain of Life* from the treasury of the Serbian Orthodox church in Dubrovnik. The icons attributed to Ivo, with their naive, caricature-like, childish drawing incised into the surface, are dominated by stout figures with dark, almond-shaped bulging eyes and disproportionately large hands combined with dry colours on a gilded background. He was most probably skilled enough to carve icon frames with various simple ornaments. A large number of such unattributed pieces, usually dated to the middle or second half of the nineteenth century, can be found in museum and gallery collections (National Museum in Belgrade, Cultural History Museum in Dubrovnik, Art Gallery in Split, National Museum at Cetinje, National Museum in Zadar, Museum of Herceg Novi, private collections).

The works of painters from the Bay of Kotor show peculiar iconographic features in the scenes such as the *Annunciation* featuring the dove of the Holy Spirit, the *Black-Faced Virgin Mary*, *Virgin Skopiotissa*, *Virgin Mary the Unwithering Rose*, *Coronation of the Holy Virgin*, *Holy Virgin the Fountain of Life*, three-headed *Holy Trinity*, *Divine Fatherhood* and *St Christopher the Cynocephalus*, which make them unique and distinctive in the Orthodox Balkan world under Ottoman rule. The introduction of new themes and variations of the traditional thematic repertoire make this school of painting a distinctive phenomenon. A specific manner of painting devised by its members distinguishes this school from other contemporary phenomena in art. The organization of work of these painters of frescoes, icons and church furnishings, and masters of woodcarving, conformed to the principles of a guild. The workshop was headed by a *daskal* (teacher, master), a role that was passed down through generations, from father to son or to the most experienced icon-painter, so as to remain within the Dimitrijević-Rafailović family. Occasionally, young men who were not close relatives of the family (e.g. Maksim Tujković) were also trained at the workshop. Over time, they either became the most distinguished painters of their epoch, or remained anonymous, never signing even the works that they painted by themselves.

Despite the large number of surviving icons, it is difficult to systematize, date and attribute them reliably not only because they often lack a signature but also because several artists from various generations were involved in their production. However, a considerable number of signed works that have survived, apart from allowing attribution, reveal important information about the social structure of those who commissioned them. Numerous donor inscriptions on the icons from the Bay of Cattaro show that along with clerics, clan leaders — princes, wealthy merchants and artisans, and almost all local inhabitants, who jointly funded the decoration of a village church, were increasingly involved in the patronage of art. Try-
ing to satisfy the taste of their clients, the painters from the Bay of Kotor sometimes tended to lower the quality of their painting and woodcarving to the level of traditional patterns, but they would also enrich them with elements adopted from the art of Mount Athos, the Ionian Islands, Venice and Russia.

This indigenous regional school of painting, which spanned almost two centuries, is an extraordinarily valuable cultural and historical phenomenon in the artistic heritage of the Balkans. It bridged the gap between the waning late Byzantine tradition and the rise of Western European Baroque. The icon-painting school of the Bay of Cattaro, which preserved the features that made it unique, can be compared to the emergence, transformation and waning of the art of Serbian zographs and illuminators north of the Sava and Danube rivers, i.e. in the territory of the Metropolitanate of Sremski Karlovci (Karlowitz), after the Great Migration of the Serbs (1690). The differences between these phenomena resulted from the different circumstances in which the Serbs lived under Ottoman, Venetian and Habsburg rule. However, similarities in iconography and style, which were inspired by an urge to defend their own faith against proselytic pressures, considerably outweigh them in importance.

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David Urquhart’s Perceptions of the Eastern Question
The Affairs of Serbia

Abstract: At the beginning of his diplomatic career in Constantinople in 1835, David Urquhart was instrumental in promoting the British cause by endorsing its political grand design and mercantile interests in Turkey, Greece, the Caucasian region, Crimea, Serbia and adjacent Balkan principalities. While observing the complexities of the Eastern Question, Urquhart recognized the underlying importance that Serbia had attained in the context of competing imperial interests in the Balkans. His engaged commentaries on the crucial changes in Serbian political discourse elucidated as well his understanding of Serbian history and culture past and present. Urquhart discerned a correspondence between Serbian political affairs and the inherent situation in the region of the Caucasus and Circassia.

Keywords: Eastern Question, Ottoman Empire, Serbia, David Urquhart

The gradual decline of Ottoman dominance compelled once again the European Powers to define their own political and mercantile interests within the Balkans and in the Mediterranean. British politician and writer Benjamin Disraeli, at the outset of his public career, understood the precarious situation in the region that he considered “as the finest of Europe”. Disraeli deplored the fact that precisely this region and its populace became “a prey to civil war, in too many instances excited by foreign powers for their miserable purposes”.1 The unresolved Eastern Question, dubbed appropriately as an eternal issue, remained the European ordre de jour as an underlying political reality.2

The volatile situation in the Balkans, notably Ottoman Turkey and Greece, and in the Caucasus, brought about repeated visits by the British diplomat David Urquhart to explore these regions. He diligently recorded his observations, devoting much attention to Serbia, its leaders and its his-

tory, past and present. Urquhart felt that the heightened awareness of Serbia’s rising position was well deserved:

I look upon Serbia, next to Greece, as the most important portion of Turkey in Europe — its political independence, its future and present influence on the masses of Muslims on its western and southern side, and on the masses of Rayas (Christians) on its eastern and southern, its position between Hungary, Austria, Turkey and on the Danube, are the most important considerations combined with the spirit of the people and the riches of the soil.3

This article examines Urquhart’s perception of the Eastern Question and the ensuing entanglement of Balkan states and Serbia in particular. While observing the complexities of the Eastern Question, Urquhart recognized the underlying importance that Serbia had gained in view of the competing imperial interests in the Balkans. Most of all, he discerned a peculiar correspondence between Serbian political affairs and the inherent situation in the region of Caucasus and Circassia.

At first, Urquhart was drawn to the Greek struggle for independence from Ottoman dominance. Determined to help the insurgents, he sailed with Lord Cochrane to Greece in 1827. He joined the Greek’s fighters and was severely wounded in the battle of Salona. He remained in Greece for almost three years while convalescing before returning to England. He recalled his return to England in his book The Spirit of the East, Travels through Roumeli during an Eventful Period:

In the early part of 1830 I was in Argo returning to England from Constantinople, after spending nearly 3 years in Greece and Turkey […] bidding adieu to a land in the destiny of which I have been deeply interested.4

All along, Urquhart felt a keen sense of respect for the embattled populace amidst the many glorious vestiges of the historic past. As a former student of Classical Studies, at St. John’s College at Oxford, he was familiar with the history of these ancient settlements. His scholarly interest prepared him well for his future political and fact-finding mission in Greece and surrounding principalities serving well the British cause and its govern-

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4 The date of his return to England was inaccurately noted as 1828 in some biographies. Urquhart described his return from Constantinople in the quoted paragraph from his travelogue The Spirit of the East, Travels through Roumeli during an Eventful Period (London: Henry Colburn, 1838), vol. 1, 1.
ment. By his own admission, as a young scholar in Oxford, he often traced on the map these distant places with much yearning. He appreciated the opportunity and felt privileged to have visited these locations:

Here am I, at length, in Scodra [Scutari] … When I look at the map, and run over Argyro, Castro, Delvino, Tepedelene, Berat, Scodra, I can scarcely congratulate myself enough on having visited these spots I have so often traced on the same map with so much longing, but so little hope to visit.5

Urquhart continued to offer support to the Greek cause often addressing the British political elite in his writings. His astute understanding of issues in the embattled region ensured him an appointment to Sir Stratford Canning’s mission. In 1831 he sailed again to Constantinople, this time to resume his post on the mission addressing the disputed border between Greece and Ottomans. In the process of evaluating both sides of the issue, Urquhart distinguished himself by helping to secure a workable settlement.

Gradually, while negotiating with Ottoman officials, Urquhart became interested in Ottoman civilization and culture. He also became aware of Turkey’s strategic position as a potential barrier against rising Russian colonial aspirations in the Black Sea, the Crimea and the Caucasus.

The British political elite objected to any extended Russian interference in the contested area. They feared that such a move could threaten the waterways of the eastern Mediterranean by controlling the sea route from the Black Sea. Britain aimed to keep the nominal rule of the so-called Sick Man on the Bosporus as long as possible. Urquhart’s own campaign, intended also to protect British mercantile interests, ultimately resulted in his appointment to a trade mission in 1833. Prior to his departure for Greece, he managed to finish the writing of, and prepare for publication, Turkey and its Resources.6

Urquhart’s keen understanding of the key issues in the region led to his appointment to the position of Secretary of the British Embassy in Constantinople in 1835. Before leaving for the new post, he founded the The Portfolio or a Collection of State Papers Etc., a periodical published in London. The first issue attracted attention by a selection of Russian state papers pertaining to the situation in Europe in 1820–1830. The Portfolio included other writings with an exceptional range of discussed issues. The

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5 *The Spirit of the East* (digital version), entry of 24 December 1830.
On his repeated travels to Greece and Turkey Urquhart visited Serbia on four different occasions. His visit to Serbia was prompted by his general interest in the manifest presence of Serbia, as a Slavic nation, pitted against the bordering Empires. He declared himself his set objectives:

The exposition of the condition of Slavonic population subject to Prussia, Austria, and Turkey amounting to above twenty million souls, has been one of the principle objects which we proposed to ourselves.

In April 1833 Urquhart visited Serbia for the second time and had several opportunities to meet and talk with Prince Miloš Obrenović. He took note of Prince Miloš’s comments on the current situation in Serbia and the lack of needed support from the enlightened, constitutional nations of Europe. Urquhart came to agree with the Prince’s statement since he believed that the Principality of Serbia had a unique and important position in Southeastern Europe and deserved due consideration.

On his fourth visit to Belgrade, in May 1837, Urquhart conferred again with leading Serbian politicians and dignitaries. He travelled to Belgrade to attend the accreditation of the first British Consul Lloyd George Hodges to the Obrenović court. He also met with Princess Anka Obrenović, the daughter of Jevrem Obrenović and niece of Prince Miloš. Princess Anka was interested in public affairs and decided to watch the ceremonial arrival of Consul Hodges from a window in her sister’s house. Later, Urquhart was introduced to the young Princess by Antun Mihanović, the Austrian Consul in Belgrade. Mihanović, a Croat by birth, was a frequent visitor in her parents’ house and had an occasionally opportunity to talk with her. She left a brief account of Urquhart’s visit of 17 May 1837, describing him as a highly intelligent and fascinating man. She recounted the animated
conversation during Urquhart’s visit in her Diary, and regretted that she had to interrupt the conversation to join the family at dinner. To her mind, a meeting with such an enlightened man was much more important than a dinner at her sister Simka’s house.

She mentioned that Urquhart had adopted the “Turkish ways” that were noticed and talked about in the social circles she frequented. It is not clear whether her remark referred to Urquhart’s attire or his general demeanor. At the time, Urquhart was the Secretary at the British Embassy in Constantinople. Interestingly enough Urquhart’s preference for the Ottoman style attire was criticized in the British daily Morning Chronicle of 16 January 1943: “Mr. Urquhart clothed like a fashionable Frontispiece in the Ottoman garb of Daoud Pasha. It is lamentable to see how Vanity and Self Absorption, a Man of Some Ability so benumbed.”

Yet Urquhart continued to wear his Ottoman clothing ignoring adverse comments of his chosen style. According to his own admission, he preferred the style of Muslim attires while serving as a British representative in Constantinople. He claimed that this change of clothing enabled him an easier communication with the local people and authorities alike.

In 1843, at the outset of the New Series of The Portfolio, Urquhart proudly ascertained that his journal had attained recognition not only in England but also abroad, eventually resulting in the publication of The Portfolio in France.

Urquhart included four articles dedicated to Serbian public affairs in the first issue of the New Series. He decided that the opinions of Serbian leaders should be heard to explicate the situation in their country and their prerogatives. Accordingly, he was instrumental in publishing Projet de Memoire of the Serbian Government. He commented on the importance of this memorandum stating that it was primarily addressed to the British King and his Court: “Such are the views which Serbia addresses to the Government of your Majesty.—Such is the principal object of the present memoir” (pp. 71–77).

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10 Anka Konstantinović née Obrenović (1821–1868) was the eldest daughter of Jevrem Obrenović, Prince Miloš’s brother. He treated her like a son, allowing her greater liberties than usually allowed to daughters. Her “Diary” is kept in the Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, no. 14147. Cf. Mišković, “Izmedju seljačkog porekla i statusa princeze”.
This unique memorandum provided a concise record of the political crisis in Serbia starting in August 1842 and continuing until March 1843. The change of ruling dynasties introduced a decisive modification in many areas of political and public affairs. The election of Prince Alexander, the heir of Karadjordjević dynasty, prompted increased attention to the principality of Serbia. According to Urquhart, the Projet de Memoir ascertained the political orientation towards Turkey being the supreme ruler of the region. Russia was mentioned as the nominal Protective Power, suggesting that Russia did not provide promised benevolent protection to the Slavic population under Ottoman rule.

Furthermore, Urquhart stated that Serbian people were cognizant of the intrinsic situation in Serbia observed in a historical perspective. In conclusion, Urquhart commented again on the importance of Turkey as the ultimate ruler in the Balkans:

Serbian people have learnt [...] that the sovereignty of Turkey, far from endangering its liberties [...] can on the contrary alone shelter it against these influences, which have already caused it more than one shock, and threaten to bring upon it the greatest evil.13

Urquhart was aware that Prince Miloš Obrenović’s despotic rule disregarded the necessity of governmental reforms as well as constitutional rights of the people at large. He pointed out that the failing policies of Prince Michael (Mihailo), heir and successor to the Obrenović throne, were declared to be antinational. Prince Micael and his government followed mistaken advice, in particular in foreign affairs, leading to dangerous ineptitude. It appeared that they were seduced by hopes of aggrandizement that resulted in a revolt against the Sultan. Urquhart declared that this decision proved to be erroneous. Therefore, Urquhart expressed again his affirmation of the Sublime Porte as the supreme ruler of the region.

All along, Urquhart criticized the professed Russian imperial policies perceived as harmful to the Serbian people. He claimed that the ensuing state of affairs required Serbia to summon all her energy to extricate herself from the Russian influence under the guise of the Protective Power. Urquhart apparently chose to disregard the Russophile inclination of long standing as well as the rising Pan-Slavic penchant among the Serbian people at large.14

While describing the political crisis in Serbia in 1842, Urquhart duly noted that a veritable mass movement came into existence supporting the

13 The Portfolio / Le Portfolio, New Series vol. 1, 71–76.
implementation of a liberal Constitution and a number of modern state institutions. The struggle was led by the Constitutionalists (Ustavobranitelji) acclaimed as the Defenders of the Constitution. One of their renowned members, Ilija Garašanin, advocated a modern system of government by means of reforms carried out in an administrative manner. Garašanin, an astute politician, also proposed measures for strengthening the state by introducing an open-minded and progressive orientation in Serbian foreign affairs.15

Apparently, Prince Alexander Karadjordjević shared all these concerns and convictions of the Serbian people. He possessed moderate inclinations embracing national and peaceful tendencies. His objectives were “to attach himself unreservedly to the Ottoman sovereignty and reciprocal conventions concluded between the Porte and Serbia.” In essence, the Serbian people remained under Ottoman rule while preserving independence in internal affairs.16

The good offices of the incumbent British ambassador in Constantinople were recognized with gratitude. Moreover, the British government was urged to appoint a political agent to provide advice and support to the Serbian people and the new government of Prince Alexander. Historian Milorad Ekmečić argued that the Projet de Memoir, in spite of its brevity, had far-reaching consequences and ought to be considered as the first version of the famed Načertanije (Draft). Ultimately the Načertanije presented the national and political program of the newly established Serbian government formally compiled by the statesman Ilija Garašanin. Moreover, Ekmečić suggests that the essential ideas presented in Načertanije were in reality dictated by the interests of the Great Powers considering the contested region of the Balkans.17

Urquhart followed closely the evolving political situation, conferring at time with politicians in Serbia and providing his own assessment of the inherent political orientation. Relying closely on the ideas encapsulated in the Projet de Memoir, he provided a lengthy analysis of the diplomatic proceedings following the election of Prince Alexander in September 1842. Urquhart sought to justify the legality of Prince Alexander’s election to counteract concerted efforts to the contrary. His chronicle of these historic events had a lengthy self-explanatory title, Narrative of

16 The Portfolio / Le Portfolio, New Series vol. 1, 71–76.
Events in Serbia from the Election of Prince Alexander in September 1842, to his Re-election in July 1843. He commented favorably on the newly-charted political course in Serbia. He fully agreed that it was important to keep Serbia within the protective realm of the Ottoman Empire. Urquhart’s Narrative was published in the same issue of The Portfolio that brought the Projet de Memoir.  

Urquhart described in great detail the change of the ruling dynasty in Serbia. The deposed Obrenović dynasty chose to leave the country. Subsequently, Prince Alexander, heir of the Karadjordjević dynasty, was summoned to rule the Principality of Serbia. In addition, the unresolved Eastern Question was rightfully perceived as a causative and dangerous political reality. 

Urquhart criticized the duplicity of the alleged contested legality of ascension to the vacant throne by Prince Alexander, the heir of the Karadjordjević dynasty. True to his Russophobe attitude, he provided arguments pointing to the misguided efforts of Russian officials to declare the election illegal. The Russian tenuous accusation reverberated not only in Serbia but throughout Europe since it endangered the political discourse by questioning ultimately the judicial justice and integrity of law:

Since in this period efforts have been made to apply the term “illegal” to this election, and this attempt has given great importance to the event, not for Serbia only but for Europe,—not as affecting only political objects and interests of its various Government, but as bearing on the public law of nations and the sense of rectitude and justice in all men. 

Furthermore, Urquhart asserted that Russia had declared her indignation and her wrath against Serbia and against the Sublime Porte in all courts of Europe. Russia also tried to influence Prince Metternich with “the double fear of a Russian army appearing before Belgrade.” Urquhart quoted a statesman from Vienna who, fearing the proximity of the Russian army, stated that: “Austria cannot expose herself to allow another Caucasus to be created at her frontier!” 

In actuality, the Prince had been rightfully and legally elected to the ruling position already in September of 1842 by the Serbian Assembly. Urquhart was aware of the legality of the election upholding the rule of lawful governance. He recorded with satisfaction the re-election of the

19 Ibid. 77. 
20 Ibid. 77–78. 
21 Ibid. 89.
Prince by the unanimous consent of the Serbian Assembly. The election was reported in the *Augsburg Gazette* of 12 July 1843, and described as a peaceful conclusion of recent upheavals. Urquhart quoted this report and noticed that it mentioned the presence of Russian officials at the election in Belgrade: “It is indeed a repetition of the election of September last, with the difference of taking place in the presence of two Russian commissioners, Baron Lieven and M. Wastchenko.”

Again Urquhart highlighted the good offices of the Ottoman governance gradually allowing independence of Serbia’s internal affairs. According to four hatt-i sheriffs (of 1829, 1830, 1833 and 1838), the Sultan recognized Serbia as a self-governing principality under the elected hereditary dynasty. Moreover, since there existed some misgiving about the legality of Prince Alexander’s newly-attained position, a second election was contemplated and it took place in July 1843.

Urquhart commented on the ongoing implementation of the projected political course expressed in *The Projet de Memoir*, as stipulated by the Serbian leaders. He singled out the following statement:

> It is our first duty to prevent the bonds that attach us de jure to the Sultan from being the means of subjugating us de facto to Russia. It is not from the strength of Turkey that we have to fear, it is from her weakness that we have to apprehend.

Urquhart appreciated the desire of Serbian leaders to safeguard their hard-won sovereignty. He trusted the good judgment of the Serbian people at large since they were “fully able to distinguish their friends from foes.” Urquhart was equally aware of Russian long-standing interests in the Balkans and Serbia in particular. Thus, he was both surprised and delighted to observe the forthright resentment against any Russian or any other foreign interference in Serbian internal and foreign affairs. Equally, he noticed that Serbian politicians did not necessarily accept as feasible all Russian plans and perspectives, a move that Urquhart perceived as prudent and wise.

Urquhart had long felt that only few published books and reliable sources presented the events that influenced the making of Serbia as a nation throughout historic times. Thus, he summed up his own reflections in

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a succinct exposé titled “The Affairs of Serbia”. Although he thought that his explanation would not amount to an extensive discussion of major historical events, he assured the readers that it would provide reliable facts:

So few sources of information respecting Serbia are generally accessible, and the interest involved in the question of her independence from foreign interferences are so complicated and momentous, that we shall offer no apology for presenting our readers with a succinct account of her present position and her recent history; promising that our sketch, if rude, shall be characteristic, and that if imperfect, it shall not be materially erroneous.

Urquhart starts his historical overview with his unique perception of the distinctive character of Serbian people. The inhabitants of Serbia appear to have inherited a spirit of loyalty to their ancestral lands relying on themselves while not actively seeking foreign assistance. Urquhart observed that the Serbs seemingly possessed a singular spirit of patriotism more related to the classical paradigm than to the modern age.

He found the question of Serbia’s independence from foreign interference to be very intricate. Urquhart proceeded with a brief geographic as well as demographic account of Serbia and its people. He noted that the main chain of high mountains and thick woods provided a formidable impediment for an invading army. As a shrewd observer of economic and trade potentials and well versed in maritime affairs, Urquhart saw another advantage of this natural resource. He reasoned that the extensive oak forests throughout Serbia could produce excellent timber for shipbuilding that any country with naval tradition, including Britain, would appreciate. Thus, Serbia was largely indebted to her forests for potential wealth as well as security. Urquhart commented on the strategic position of the Morava valley which intersects the mountainous surface of Serbia. He estimated that with a population consisting more than one million.

Urquhart gave a brief outline of historical events starting with the arrival of the Slavs on the European scene and the gradual formation of the

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26 “The Affairs of Serbia” was published in The British and Foreign Review XVI (London 1844). In a short preface of sorts to this article, Urquhart cited Leopold Ranke’s book Die Serbische Revolution and Amie Boué’s La Turquie d’Europe. He also quoted several treaties, debates and hatt-i sherifs presented in the House of Commons. He probably wanted to provide the bibliographical sources pertaining to Serbia that he valued.


28 It is noteworthy that Milorad Ekmečić (Dijalog prošlosti i sadašnjosti) commented on the importance of “The Affairs of Serbia” and included a portion of it pertaining to some crucial arguments, bringing the selected excerpts both in the original English version and in a Serbian translation (pp. 128–135).

first Slavic states on the Balkan Peninsula. Singled out among the Serbian rulers was Stefan Dušan, who had assumed the title of Emperor of all Serbs and Greeks. After Emperor Dušan’s sudden death in 1355, frequent Ottoman invasions led to the decisive Battle of Kosovo in 1389. Although the leaders of both armies died, the Ottoman forces eventually achieved victory and soon entered into a close feudal alliance with the Serbian rulers. The demise of Serbian statehood brought a marked change in the lives of the Slavic populace deprived of native leadership and representation gradually reduced Serbia to an Ottoman province. By and large, the Porte respected individual property and religious and secular customs. The Muslim rulers established their residences almost exclusively in towns, while the countryside remained the domicile of the people at large. Urquhart commented as well on the scarcity of schools and educated teachers that resulted in a low literacy rate and lack of education in general. Under these circumstances, the Serbian people continued to respect the traditional ways of their forefathers. Epic bards, guslari, became historians, perpetuating the oral renditions of historical events. The lyrical and epic songs and stories preserved metaphorically traditional moral and ethical values.

Urquhart closed his outline of Serbian history with a well-chosen metaphor comparing the imminent growth of all Slavic nations, and Serbia in particular, to a proverbial oak tree. His sympathetic tribute to Serbian people acknowledged their exemplary achievements:

We now bid Adieu to the Serbians […] Let them remember that the tree of liberty is of slow growth; but like their native oak, once rooted in a favorable soil, it derives fresh vigour from the storm that agitates its branches […] They stand at the head of all nations of Slavonian origin, for they possess freedom, without which intellectual development is impossible […] their example cannot fail to exercise the most powerful influence: their steadfastness may rescue from debasement one of the noblest races of mankind.30

From the start of his political career Urquhart aimed to consolidate British political and commercial interests. During his term as the secretary of the British Embassy in Constantinople, he believed it important to inform the public at large and summon support against the Russian colonial designs in the Balkans as well as in the Caucasus. He was concerned that the British regional interests would be held in check by the proximity of the competing Russian presence.

The outspoken tenor of his commentaries on Russian affairs was in time perceived as inflammatory by the British Secretary of foreign affairs, Lord Palmerston. Urquhart’s unfavorable view of Russian foreign policy

30 Quoted after Ekmečić, Dijalog prošlosti i sadašnjosti, 134–135.
threatened the diplomatic negotiations, potentially leading to an unwanted international crisis. Moreover, Urquhart published his views in an openly anti-Russian pamphlet, *England and Russia: being a fifth Edition of England, France, Russia and Turkey*. His highly critical position resulted in his being recalled from the British Embassy in Constantinople in 1837.

Urquhart was not alone in embracing a Russophobe attitude. Informed politicians as well as British writers such as, among others, Disraeli, Byron and Shelley, argued against any Great Power involvement in the Greek cause. Shelley’s well-known poem *Hellas* expressed mistrust of all covert colonial aspirations of Austria, Russia or England. Shelley rightfully perceived that such interventions should be abolished since: “This is the age of the war of the oppressed against the oppressor.” Byron was equally outspoken in this respect and even considered Orthodox Christian Russians no different from Muslims. Byron believed that only Greeks should fight to free Greece. He thought that Greece would be better off under the Muslims than under the Russians:

But this is well: Greeks only should free Greece  
Not the barbarian, with his mask of peace  
Better still serve the haughty Mussulman,  
Than swell the Cossaque’s prowling caravan;  
Better still toil for masters than await,  
The slave of slaves before a Russian gate.

Urquhart’s views as well as those of a number of well-known British intellectuals presented largely a response to the colonial advancements of the Russian Empire in the Balkans and the Caucasus of long standing. Russia’s appropriation of the Crimea in 1783 was perceived as a strategic territorial expansion of major significance. Such a move aimed also to appropriate the historic Taurus of Greek antiquity. Catherine the Great and her generals, beside strategic considerations, entertained the idea of transforming the native landscape, rich with rare herbs and plants, into a proverbial Garden of Eden. Yet there were many unsettling questions in

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this artificial paradise. The indigenous Caucasian population, including Chechens, Kabardians and Circassians, was hard to subdue and maintain even a tenuous collaboration. Most of all there was a growing hostility and ongoing sporadic confrontations between Russian military and civilian authorities with the independent chieftains resisting Russian encroachment. Mutual relations projected uncertainties and shifting loyalties with Turkey, Iran and Russia. Urquhart left a vivid recollection of his first encounter with Circassians:

I did land on that shore unarmed and alone . . . and within four-and-twenty hours did I find myself seated on the summit of a knoll, the Kuban running at my feet, and before me rolled out the interminable vistas of the plains of Muscovy, traced with Kalmyk lines, and dotted with Cossack plucks braves, while around me were assembled . . . Then it was that the involuntary oracle burst from my lips, “You are no longer tribes, but a people; you are Circassians, and this is Circassia”.

He decided to advance the unity of all Circassian people by providing a recognizable symbol of their identity. He designed a national flag as the emblem of their unity. The same flag continues to be honored and used in Circassia even today. Urquhart described the concept of his design in an inspired manner:

From the naked necessities of the moment, therefore, was the colour to be derived ... Green, the colour that robes their mountains, and that indicates the faith of Mecca, was that which I chose. On it, I placed a bundle of arrows, their peculiar arms and a crown of stars, that in the nightly bivouac they might associate their freedom...35

Urquhart was also aware of the geographic importance of Circassia “as a barrier to mighty conquests — a veritable rampart against Russia”. He believed that Serbia held a similar strategic position. In the Introduction to his lengthy treatise, A Fragment of the History of Serbia, Urquhart acknowledged the strategic position of Serbia as well as its people.

Urquhart perceived certain similarities between the indigenous Circassian population and the Serbian people as open to consideration. Both the Serbs and the Circassians preferred independence and objected to any interference in their respective internal affairs. Their innate geopolitical position presented a veritable rampart against foreign invasion, including Russian colonial design. Urquhart perceived that the respective lifestyle of both Serbs and Circassians was conducted in harmony with

35 Speech titled “The Flag of Circassia” was delivered by David Urquhart on 23 May 1838 to the Commercial Community in Glasgow. It was published in London by the Circassian Committee in 1863 as a single-sided leaflet and is in the possession of the British Museum since 1882.
their natural environment. He also considered the respectful traditional ways of both Serbs and Circassians to be pure and unspoiled by harmful western influences.

Urquhart described Circassia “as the land of primeval mythology, the land of beauty and the Golden Fleece attracting again the eyes of the West”. Moreover, he did not detect any hostility toward Circassians while he visited Turkey. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that there existed a voluntary connection among several Circassian chieftains who expressed the oath of allegiance to the Sultan.

Urquhart also noted an affinity in interpersonal relations between Serbs and Circassians. He formed this assumption in Serbia during the unsettling situation after the election of Prince Alexander in September 1843. At the time, the highest Ottoman administrator in Belgrade was Hafiz Pasha, a Circassian by birth. In his conversation with Serbian officials, Urquhart noted an approval of Hafiz Pasha’s comportment. Further conversation verified his supposition and he was told that although Hafiz Pasha was an Ottoman official he was a native Circassian and therefore was favorably inclined towards the Serbian cause. Hafiz Pasha obviously discerned a resemblance with the Circassian position in Caucasia pitted against powerful empires. He understood well the underlying situation of Serbia within the domain of powerful neighboring states.

Later, remembering his experiences both in Serbia and Circassia, Urquhart considered writing a book titled “Serbia, the Circassia of the West”, which would have included an “Outline of the Character and Position of the Slavonian Population in Europe”. He planned to present his observations on perceived affinities and ostensible similarities between these two regions and their inhabitants.

While Serbia unlike Circassia or Greece really dwells in Europe, Europe comprehends it still less than those name, so much used and so little understood. Serbia was a great and powerful kingdom when Muscovy was composed of distracted provinces and Poland was yet unuttered name. She now stands pre-eminent among the Sarmatian race unincorporated with the

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36 The Portfolio, New Series vol. II (London: James Maynard, 1843), Section 13, 351.
37 Ljušić, Kneževina Srbija, 377.
38 The planned book, Serbia, the Circassia of the West, was announced in The Portfolio 24 (1844), 294. It seems that this book was never completed or was published in a small numbers of copies. Cf. also, Ekmečić, Dijalog prošlosti i sadajnosti, 102; and Slobodan G. Markovich, British Perceptions of Serbia and the Balkans 1903–1906 (Paris: Dialogue, 2000), 14. Markovich concurs as well with the view that the Fragment of the History of Serbia apparently is the preserved part of Urquhart’s book Serbia the Circassia of the West.
Russian Empire. She is the centre of Slav resistance to Muscovite despotism and presents to Europe its chief security against Russian ambitions.39

In time, his persistent campaign against fallacies of Russian colonial aspirations became a cause célèbre. A number of Urquhart’s contemporaries declared him a strange figure with only one cause in his life. Karl Marx summed up these opinions:

… his campaign against Russia, which he conducts with monomaniacal acumen and a great deal of expert knowledge, none of this does any harm. The knight with one cause in life is bound once more to be “the noble knight of the woeful countenance”.40

In reality, Urquhart supported many causes during his lifetime. As a young man he fought valiantly with the Greek fighters for independence from Ottoman rule. At the outset of his diplomatic career in Constantinople he was instrumental in providing the British government with significant intelligence. His prolific writings testified to his strong desire to promote the British cause endorsing its political grand design and mercantile interests in Turkey, the Caucasian region, Serbia and adjacent Balkan principalities. Urquhart advanced in particular his understanding of Serbian history and culture in his many extensive writings. His engaged commentaries on the crucial changes in the political discourse of the Great Powers pointed as well to the inherent intricacies of the Eastern Question.

Urquhart valued opportunities to explore the concealed beauty of ancient vestiges of civilization. By the same token, he was engaged in a meaningful exchange of ideas with contemporaries, in many walks of life, appreciative of the offered hospitality.41 He skillfully provided a passing look of the environment, habitation, customary ways while cognizant of the lot of people inhabiting the contested regions that retained considerable geopolitical importance. For the most part Urquhart appreciated the rising political importance of Serbia and wrote a number of articles pertaining to Serbia’s history past and present. He advanced as well the idea of Circassian nationhood and political independence. He was fully aware of the shared historical experiences of the people in contested regions bordering the Ottoman Empire, as well as the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires.

40 *David Urquhart by Karl Marx*.
41 Urquhart even provided architectural sketches of a typical dwelling admiring the façade and the airy and uncluttered interior space. Cf. *The Spirit of the East*. His travelogue was well received and translated into German: *Der Geist des Orients* (Stuttgart and Tubingen: Gottäsche Buchhandlung, 1839).
Urquhart appreciated the cultural diversity of the world he knew and the people he met on his eventful travels crossing Serbia and the bordering Balkan principalities, Turkey, Greece and the regions of Caucasus. He wrote studies of lasting significance related to the spirit of the East, as well as to the spirit of the West of his time.

Bibliography and sources


Mots clés : Jovan Ristić, historiographie serbe, histoire diplomatique, mémoires

Jovan Ristić fut envoyé en Allemagne en 1849 comme boursier d’État serbe pour les sciences historiques. Il étudiait aux universités de Berlin et de Heidelberg. À Berlin, il suivait les cours du célèbre historien Leopold von Ranke qui imprima sa marque sur lui. Ayant obtenu le grade de docteur à Heidelberg en 1852, il partit pour Paris où il apprenait le français et, à la demande de la Société savante serbe, examinait des anciens manuscrits serbes à la bibliothèque parisienne. À son retour en Serbie en 1854, il voulut obtenir la chaire d’histoire, mais il ne put pas y accéder. À cause de cela, il décida d’entrer dans l’administration d’État, ce qui le conduisit progressivement vers la diplomatie et vers la politique. Lui, qui dans sa jeunesse voulut être professeur d’histoire, vécut plus tard en tant que régent et ministre de faire de l’histoire.

Durant toute sa vie, Ristić écrivait peu ou prou : ses inclinations vers l’écriture furent fortes. Depuis son plus jeune âge, il rédigeait des études littéraires et des brochures concernant les questions de la politique intérieure. Il apparaissait comme s’il avait négligé les études historiques. Après son retour de la France, il publia un article sur les anciens manuscrits serbes à la bibliothèque parisienne et un autre sur la « Mention des anciens voyageurs
à travers la Serbie », mais après, jusqu’en 1872, il ne publia rien de ce qui pouvait relever de l’historiographie. C’est en ce moment précisément que voit le jour son étude sur le « Bombardement de Belgrade » qu’il gardait au fond d’un tiroir pendant dix ans. Cette étude fut publiée sans la signature de Ristić. En 1872 il était membre du Conseil de la Régence et tenait que sa position officielle ne lui permettait guère de prendre la responsabilité d’un tel article décrivant l’un des conflits les plus difficiles entre notre gouvernement et la Sublime Porte. Il donnait des instructions à notre représentant à Constantinople qui, dans le cas d’une protestation de la Porte, devait répondre que « cette œuvre était restée en manuscrit du regreté Miloje Lešjanin, éditée maintenant par sa famille, la presse étant libre ». La brochure sur le bombardement de Belgrade eut du succès auprès de notre public. Selon les mots de Ristić, elle fut enlevée en un clin d’œil ; le relieur n’avait pas de temps pour brocher le livre, et il ne faisait que coller une feuille après une autre. Ristić ajoute : « Depuis que la littérature serbe existe, il n’y avait pas de livre qui pourrait se vanter de ce succès. » Enjoué probablement par une telle réussite, Ristić avoue aux diplomates russes, en confidence bien entendu, que c’est lui et non Miloje Lešjanin qui est le vrai auteur de cette brochure enlevée en un clin d’œil.


1 V. Lettres de Jovan Ristić à Filip Hristić : Jovan Ristić, Istoriski spisi (Belgrade : Srpska književna zadruga, 1940), 101–102.
un quart de siècle de notre histoire, — le quart de siècle plein d’événements si importants tels la Révolution hongroise, la Guerre de la Crimée, coup d’État dynastique de 1858, le règlement final de la question des garnisons ottomanes dans les villes de Serbie 1867). Incité par les polémiques soulevées par ses considérations historiques, Ristić écrivit deux brochures qui complètent en quelque sorte les *Relations extérieures*. Dans cet ouvrage, le tableau de la politique étrangère du Prince Michel s’arrête au moment de la libération des villes. Ce qui suivit après la libération des villes jusqu’à la mort de Michel, ne fut décrit que dans la brochure *La dernière année de la politique étrangère du Prince Michel* (1895). La deuxième brochure *Une Régence* (1894), expliquant et justifiant la politique entière du Conseil de la Régence de Blaznavac et de Ristić, complétait le troisième volume des *Relations extérieures*, ne traitant que de l’action diplomatique de la Régence.


Finalement, il ne faut pas omettre de la liste de ses écrits historiques son discours consacré à Leopold von Ranke, prononcé le 22 février 1892 lors de la séance solennelle de l’Académie royale serbe serbe à Belgrade. En outre, ce discours mérite l’attention parce qu’il nous montre les points de vue de Ristić sur la manière dont il faut écrire l’histoire.

Si l’on porte un regard d’ensemble sur les articles historiques de Ristić, nous verrons en premier lieu que, sauf pour les écrits en relation avec l’époque du Prince A. Karadjordjević, tous les autres traitent des événements dans lesquels Ristić prit part officiellement soit comme envoyé diplomatique soit comme ministre des Affaires étrangères ou même comme le régent. Ristić, en ce qui concerne les événements du temps de Karadjordjević, s’il n’eut pas participé, il les suivit en tant que contemporain. Aucun de ses articles n’était écrit seulement d’après les documents ; tous ses articles affichent plus ou moins le caractère des mémoires. Ainsi, même sans autre valeur, ils auraient la valeur d’une source historique.

Décrit les événements auxquels il fut personnellement impliqué, Ristić parlait beaucoup de lui-même, — car sa contribution y était très considérable, mais aussi pour faire taire ses ennemis qui lui déniaient ses mérites. Il n’est pas rare que son exposé historique se transforme en défense personnelle ou même en son propre éloge, — ce fut la raison pour laquelle beaucoup de contemporains doutaient de son objectivité d’historien.

Les écrits de Ristić sur le prince Michel Obrenović ont toujours une grande valeur, mais seulement comme un fragment. Ristić n’engloba pas sa politique étrangère de tous les côtés. Il n’éclaura que la partie accomplie, sous le règne de Michel, à Constantinople au sujet de la question des villes.
Le reste, il le laissa dans l’ombre, — et lorsque en 1895 Piroćanac publia sa brochure sur le prince Michel, le public eut l’impression que la politique de Michel s’avérait dans toute son ampleur et toute la grandeur de son idée fondamentale. Dans la polémique avec Piroćanac, Ristić compléta en partie ses écrits antérieurs sur le prince Michel, donnant son opinion sur les actions et les intentions du Prince même hors de la question des villes. Ristić et Piroćanac exagèrent chacun à sa manière. Ristić ne tenait compte que de l’action diplomatique officielle du prince Michel et de ses résultats positifs. L’insurrection générale des peuples balkaniques préparée en cachette par le Prince, et les projets de l’Alliance balkanique liés à cette insurrection, Ristić ne l’estimait ni pour la pensée la plus sage ni pour le plus grand mérite du prince Michel. Piroćanac non seulement jeta la lumière sur toute la conspiration secrète de Michel, mais il prenait pour absolument fondé que la mort même de Michel empêcha une insurrection générale balkanique, l’insurrection dont tous les préparatifs étaient terminés et dont le succès était tout à fait certain. Se fondant sur cette hypothèse, Piroćanac donne la valeur à la fois à ce que le prince Michel réussit à faire et ce qu’il projetait de faire. Ristić exagérait en ne regardant que les résultats positifs de la politique du prince, — et Piroćanac, quant à lui, en ne faisant guère la différence entre les résultats positifs et les projets inachevés. Cependant, Ristić et Piroćanac ont tort sur un point commun. Ils séparent trop tous les deux le prince Michel Obrenović de son époque, — et présentent les aspirations de toute une génération comme sa propre idée personnelle. Piroćanac ne reconnaît aucune importance à l’opinion publique sous le règne de Michel. Ristić comprend, il est vrai, qu’il y eut une opinion publique nationaliste, très ravivée d’ailleurs, — mais il ne s’en occupe non plus. Or, la question est de savoir si sans cette opinion publique la politique nationaliste de Michel aurait été efficace.

Dans l’histoire diplomatique des guerres serbo-turques, Ristić se place dans une conception beaucoup plus vaste que dans les traités sur la politique étrangère de Michel. Sous le règne du prince Michel il eut, à vrai dire, un rôle important mais subordonné, — le rôle du représentant diplomatique à Constantinople. Pendant les guerres serbo-turques il fut ministre des Affaires étrangères, — et, à certains moments, son mon était décisif. C’est pour cela qu’il est plus profond et exhaustif dans l’histoire des guerres serbo-turques que dans ses articles sur le prince Michel. Ce qu’on pourrait reprocher à son histoire diplomatique aujourd’hui, c’est un certain manque de la perspective historique. Il fut trop proche des événements et fut y trop impliqué personnellement. La question de son propre rôle et de sa responsabilité personnelle devint ainsi la question majeure de l’histoire entière des guerres serbo-turques. Certes, il aurait été mieux que Ristić avait pris pour ses dires la forme des mémoires, à la manière de Bismarck qui donna à
l'ouvrage de ses grands événements historiques le titre modeste « Pensées et souvenirs ». L'histoire des guerres serbo-turques de Ristić reste une contribution de premier ordre pour l'histoire, mais ce n'est pas l'histoire au sens propre, — et s'il n'eut pas la main heureuse dans cette œuvre, c'est dans la tentative de se faire son propre historien.

Les écrits de Ristić sur le prince Karadjordjević s'approchent tout au plus aux œuvres historiques au sens strict. Ristić y parlait des choses par rapports auxquelles il se tenait ni trop loin ni trop proche, dont il se souvenait mais auxquelles il ne prenait pas part. Il est nécessaire de les compléter dans les détails, ou parfois de les corriger, mais tout porte à croire que les grands traits des hommes et des événements y esquissés ne seraient pas beaucoup modifiés. Jovan Ristić sut s'y prendre notamment en ce qui concerne l'analyse d'une situation politique donnée, et dans la recherche des causes de changement immanentes à elle-même. Il y a de la dialectique hé-gélienne en cela, lorsqu'il montre à un point le changement d'une situation de l'intérieur : cela ne doit pas nous étonner car à l'époque des études de Ristić en Allemagne l'esprit de Hegel régnait aux universités allemandes.

De tous les grands historiens Ristić appréciait Ranke le plus et c'est Ranke qui lui servait de modèle. Il est un autre historien qui l'avait influencé, ce qui est un fait avéré bien qu'il ne le mentionne pas explicitement nulle part : il s'agit de l'historien français Thiers. Dans son discours à l'Académie, il caractérise ainsi le procédé de Ranke : « Il y a deux écoles des historiens. L'une apporte à ses études un certain idéal humain le posant en tant que critère de ses jugements des tous les événements et les phénomènes qu'elle décrit. L'autre porte un regard sur l'histoire en tant qu'organisme, en l'exposant objectivement dans son ensemble. Elle ne partage pas des préjugés ; elle ne refuse ni corrige rien ; elle prend des choses telles quelles et les juge par le critère qui leur est immanent. » Sans doute, Ristić a trop simplifié en réduisant toutes les écoles historiques en deux : l'une idéaliste, qui évalue les faits historiques selon leur valeur morale et l'autre réaliste, qui ne s'engage pas dans l'appréciation morale, mais se contente de trouver leurs causes et d'établir leur nécessité. Laisser de côté l'imperfection de cette classification des écoles historiques, il est important de savoir que Ristić inclut Ranke dans l'école réaliste, à laquelle il incline également. Comprendre des phénomènes historiques comme inévitables parce qu'ils se sont réalisés, et chercher leur justification dans leur nécessité, c'était à l'époque de Ristić quelque chose de beaucoup plus neuf et hardi qu'il ne le semble aujourd'hui : cette conception devait notamment paraître neuf et hardi lorsque Ristić voulait le mettre en pratique dans l'étude de notre passé le plus récent, car cette conception éliminait des idéalisations nationalistes et des préjugés dynastiques.

Ristić fut très méticuleux dans le constat des faits, mais il s'appuyait parfois trop sur les sources écrites. Il aimait dire que tout ce qu'il affirmait

Ristić appartenait encore à cette époque où l’on croyait que l’histoire était une branche de la littérature. Il cultivait son style. Si nous exceptons parmi nos historiens ceux qui comme Vuk St. Karadžić et prêtre Mateja Nenadović furent les stylistes par nature, les meilleurs stylistes demeurent Jovan Ristić et Čedomilj Mijatović. Mijatović avait plus d’imagination, ou, à vrai dire, de la fantaisie dans le style, et Ristić plus d’intellect : ni l’un ni l’autre n’avaient guère des sentiments. Ristić s’efforçait plus à l’égard de la composition de ses articles : c’est à cause de cela qu’il vantait tant la composition de Leopold von Ranke. Il soulignait que Ranke ne développait pas les détails au détriment de l’ensemble et que chez Ranke tout s’accordait dans l’harmonie. Quant au style, Ristić apprit beaucoup aussi des historiens français tels Saint René Taillandier et Thiers. On le voit dans la construction de ses phrases qui n’est pas allemande mais française. Il cultivait tant la clarté française et l’élégance de l’expression ; de tous les discours prononcés à notre Académie, aucun ne ressemble tant aux discours académiques français comme le sien.

Aux lecteurs d’aujourd’hui peut apparaître que dans les écrits de Ristić il y a, d’un côté, trop d’actes officiels, et de l’autre, trop de style, — et que au bout du compte ses écrits ne représentent pas encore une vraie histoire. Ce jugement ne serait pas juste. Ristić jouit vraiment au sein de notre historiographie d’une renommée très importante. Au moment où Ristić commença à décrire notre histoire récente, elle ne compta que quelques décennies, — et tous ses prédécesseurs étaient plus des écrivains de mémoires ou collectionneurs des sources que des vrais historiens. Comme on l’a déjà mentionné, les écrits de Ristić lui-même ressemblent encore pour une grande partie aux mémoires : Piroćanac ainsi dit que le titre qui leur conviendrait serait « Les souvenirs officiels de M. Jov. Ristić ». Cependant, et c’est le mérite de Ristić, il fit un grand effort de s’élever des mémoires à l’histoire au sens propre et de regarder les événements, quelques proches qu’ils soient, par cette impartialité chère à Ranke. Ses études, hormis celles consacrées au temps du prince Karadjordjević, demeurent à mi-chemin entre mémoires et histoire, — et quant à son impartialité, il avait parfois plus de sérénité du ton que de l’objectivité du jugement, — Ristić demeure le premier qui essaya d’écrire notre histoire récente à la manière des véritables historiens, ayant
devant ses yeux un si haut modèle que fut Ranke. Réussir même en moitié dans une entreprise si courageuse pour son époque est sans aucun doute un grand mérite.

Il faut reconnaître encore une chose à Ristić. Il est le premier chez nous d’avoir détacher l’histoire diplomatique en tant que discipline indépendante de la science historique. Après lui travaillèrent particulièrement sur l’histoire diplomatique Vladan Djordjević, Mihailo Gavrilović, Grgur Jakšić : c’est Ristić, le père de notre histoire diplomatique, qui leur ouvrit la voie. Ristić eut cette prépondérance de connaître très bien son sujet. Parmi les historiens il y a ceux qui connaissent bien les documents, mais qui manquent l’histoire relatée par ces documents. Il y a par exemple des professeurs érudits qui ont examiné toutes les sources sur un chef de guerre ou un homme d’État, mais qui ne disposent pas d’aucune expérience personnelle ni dans la vie militaire ni politique. Ce ne fut pas le cas de Jovan Ristić. Lorsqu’il aborda l’histoire diplomatique, il eut une grande expérience dans les affaires diplomatiques. Il fut ainsi très prudent dans la critique des actions des autres. Il n’y a pas chez lui des critiques mordantes et des attaques personnelles sans scrupule comme dans l’histoire diplomatique de Vladan Djordjević. Il savait de son expérience comment l’activité politique était difficile et que les erreurs étaient inévitables et que le succès dépendait non seulement de l’habileté personnelle mais aussi des conditions favorables. Pour parler de manière générale, il savait que dans la vie politique la situation l’emportait souvent sur les hommes ; c’est pour cela qu’il y portait l’attention particulière et se distinguait parmi nos historiens avant tout par sa compréhension et jugement exacts des situations. Il ne se perdait pas dans les détails, il allait au fond des choses et avait le sentiment sûr de ce qui était possible et réalisable. Son talent se révèle le plus clairement dans ses articles sur l’époque du prince Karadjordjević. Il y avait à juger les situations auxquelles il n’était pas personnellement intéressé et qu’il pouvait regarder en tant qu’historien pur : les jugements qu’il prononça se sont conservés jusqu’aujourd’hui. C’est pour cette raison que dans cette édition de la Coopérative littéraire serbe ces articles occupent une place majeure.

Hormis les articles historiques sont ajoutés à cette édition deux discours politiques de Ristić — ceux qui relatent les moments les plus importants de l’activité publique de Ristić : la proclamation de la Constitution serbe de 1869 et la représentation des intérêts de la Serbie au Congrès de Berlin. Bien que sa voix ait été faible pour les réunions publiques, il se distinguait en tant qu’orateur politique. Il se gardait de l’improvisation ; il préparait ses discours soigneusement comme il faisait pour les articles, et grâce à cette préparation il l’emportait sur l’ennemi. La composition de ses discours est très méthodique ; il introduit graduellement ses auditeurs dans la matière, — et en expliquant tout en détail, il les séduit en même temps pour
sa position. Même dans les plus grands conflits des partis, il préservait dans son exposé le ton calme et froid, comme si son parti et lui-même n’étaient pas en question. L’élan orateur et les belles phrases étaient rares chez lui ; il ne s’adressait pas aux cœurs de ses auditeurs et il leur parlait d’en haut, mais parfois c’était précisément cette manière autoritaire qui contribuait à son succès.

Vu à travers ses études historiques et ses discours parlementaires, Jovan Ristić se révèle le même comme dans son activité politique : un grand travailleur de l’opinion mûre, plongé dans le labeur, soigneux de ne pas perdre son équilibre spirituel.

\textit{UDC 94(497.11):929 Ristić J.}

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Stojan Novaković et la politique étrangère de la Serbie


Mots clés: Stojan Novaković, Péninsule, Serbie, Empire ottoman, Autriche-Hongrie, Russie, politique étrangère

Ayant accepté en 1886 le poste du ministre à Constantinople, la position la plus délicate du service diplomatique serbe, Stojan Novaković, homme politique serbe expérimenté et savant de renom, consentait, en effet, de s’occuper désormais de la politique étrangère de la Serbie, ne sachant pas qu’il s’agissait d’un engagement à long terme. Ce n’était pas une surprise lorsqu’il était question de Stojan Novaković, car, compte tenu des devoirs qui se posaient devant lui, il était l’un de ceux qui avaient les connaissances nécessaires pour y répondre. Or, le gouvernement du Parti progressiste donna au printemps 1885 le projet général pour « la préservation et l’amélioration des intérêts politiques, ecclésiastiques et populaires serbes en Empire ottoman »1, auquel il fallait subor-

1 Arhiv Srbije [Archives de la Serbie; ci-après AS], Le fonds de Milutin Garašanin, n°836, 1885, Instruction pour la préservation de l’influence de la Serbie en Vieille Ser-
donner les directions les plus importantes de la politique étrangère et dont la réalisation s'imposait impérativement. Ce fut le programme, élaboré en détail, des tâches les plus importantes de la politique extérieure, le premier après 1878, cette année malheureuse quand la Serbie, à peine reconnue en tant qu’État indépendant, était encerclée par ses ennemis. Le programme fut conçu pour sursauter la Serbie et la libérer de la pression et, avant tout, pour la diriger vers son ancien noyau, c’est-à-dire la Vieille Serbie et la Macédoine. Ces régions étaient habitées par des groupes nombreux de la population serbe se trouvant dans une situation difficile, sous la pression du régime ottoman et des agitations dangereuses des Bulgares et de leur Exarchat, torturés au cours des années précédentes par des partisans de la « Ligue de Prizren » (Ligue albanaise). Le programme comprenait le travail bien organisé et détaillé avec cette population afin qu’elle se relevât, se raffermît et se dirigeât vers sa métropole. C’est pour cette raison qu’il envisageait toute une série d’activités envers la Turquie d’Europe, y compris l’obtention du soutien des plus hautes autorités ottomanes, d’où il fallait couler un véritable déluge de la propagande culturelle et scolaire. La plus responsable et la plus délicate partie de cette vaste action fut confiée à Stojan Novaković qui en tant que nouveau ministre serbe à Constantinople devait non seulement l’assumer mais également être son père spirituel.

Il était difficile à trouver en Serbie une personnalité qui serait plus convenable que Stojan Novaković pour frayer les chemins de la réalisation du programme entièrement orienté vers la Vieille Serbie et la Macédoine en vue de l’actualisation de la question serbe, c’est-à-dire de poser les fondements de la politique nationale serbe en Empire ottoman, la voie la plus importante de la politique étrangère serbe. Il était au cours des années écoulées à la fois l’un des meilleurs connaisseurs de la situation balkanique et l’un des collaborateurs les plus hardis dans le domaine de la propagande nationale et scolaire en Empire ottoman. Dès les années 1870, Novaković se rallia à la propagande nationale dans les régions voisines serbes, en premier lieu en tant que ministre de l’Instruction publique envoyant des livres pour le peuple serbe de ces régions, ce qui s’intensifia au début des années 1880.² Ministre dans le gouvernement de Milutin Garašanin 1884–1885, Novaković prit part de première main dans l’élaboration du dit programme orienté vers la Vieille Serbie et la Macédoine et, bien qu’il eût sorti du gouvernement en 1885, il assista à Garašanin comme le membre du Conseil d’État dans les

² V. Vojvodić, Iz književne istorije i prosvete [De l’histoire littéraire et de l’éducation] (Kikinda, 1989), 95, 115, 117, 141, 147.
préparatifs immédiats pour sa réalisation. En 1885, il était très engagé dans la « question bulgare » et, de plus, prenait des dispositions importantes pour la politique extérieure de la Serbie. À la veille du déclenchement de la guerre serbo-bulgare, en tant que membre de la direction du Parti progressiste, Novaković rencontrait fin octobre 1885 le chargé d’affaires grec à Belgrade et ouvrit la question de l’alliance entre la Grèce et la Serbie qui comprendrait le partage de la Macédoine. En décembre 1885, après la défaite à Slivnica, il conseilla le roi Milan de se rapprocher de ces pays avec lesquels la Serbie n’entretienait pas de bonnes relations, c’est-à-dire de la Russie. Cependant, il n’est pas aisé d’affirmer avec certitude combien cela influença le choix de Novaković pour le poste du ministre en Empire ottoman, bien qu’il soit possible d’y trouver les raisons valables. Or, Stojan Novaković était l’un des ceux qui ont pris part dans la création du dit programme pour la Vieille Serbie et la Macédoine du printemps 1885, mais dont la réalisation devait s’attarder à cause de la guerre avec la Bulgarie. Le centre de la future action devait être Constantinople et il allait de soi d’y envoyer la personnalité qui était un excellent connaisseur de la situation en Empire ottoman et qui ne manquerait pas de la sobriété dans la réflexion. Compte tenu que la solution favorable était conditionnée par le relâchement des Ottomans, ainsi que par la résistance aux Bulgares et à leur propagande, ce poste nécessitait quelqu’un qui n’était pas indifférent à la turcophilie dans la méthode, et dont le prestige personnel et la réputation de savant seraient importants pour le respect de ses actions. Le choix de Stojan Novaković était donc tout à fait logique.

En effet, c’est à Constantinople en 1886 que commença l’engagement de Stojan Novaković dans la diplomatie, sa participation directe dans les affaires étrangères de la Serbie et le travail persévérant sur les tâches les plus importantes de la politique nationale. Étant parti avec le but de défendre les intérêts nationaux serbes en Vieille Serbie et en Macédoine, Novaković était armé des connaissances provenant des sources diverses qui devaient lui servir dans son travail. Il s’agissait en premier lieu de la lettre

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1 AS, Gradja za istoriju makedonskog naroda IV-1 (1879–1885) [Sources pour l’histoire du peuple macédonien IV-1 (1879–1885)] (Belgrade, 1983), n° 175, 180, 195 ; Stojan Novaković, « Bugarsko-srpski rat i onovremene krize 1885–1886 » [La guerre serbo-bulgare et les crises de l’époque 1885–1886], Godišnjica Nikole Čupića XXVII (Belgrade 1908), 4–5.


du chef de l’État-major de l’armée serbe le général Lešjanin datant de 1882, dans laquelle, à la base des données sur les réussites des Bulgares en Macédoine, avaient été nommées les tâches de la Serbie en vue de s’opposer aux Bulgares⁶ ; la deuxième source était l’œuvre du géographe de renom serbe Vladimir Karić Le pays serbe [Srpska zemlja], également de 1882, où étaient marquées les frontières de la Macédoine serbe, c’est-à-dire de cette partie de la Macédoine que cet auteur considérait pour serbe.⁷ Pourtant, aussitôt après Novaković prit conscience des méconnaissances et des obstacles divers qui se posaient sur son chemin. Il était surpris lorsqu’il se rendait compte combien de dommage avait été fait à la nationalité et à l’idée serbes dans la Turquie d’Europe par l’activité de l’Exarchat bulgare, fondé en 1870. La propagande bulgare avait pratiquement séparé la Macédoine de la Serbie. La Macédoine était pleine des agents, écoles, prêtres, comités etc. bulgares.⁸ Novaković était persuadé qu’il serait nécessaire de faire beaucoup d’effort pour y rétablir l’esprit serbe.

À l’opposé de l’action bulgare, l’ennemi le plus grand et le plus dangereux de la Serbie, l’activité de Novaković se développait calmement et presque en sourdine. Dans toutes ses conversations avec les hommes d’État ottomans les plus importants, Novaković plaçait la Vieille Serbie et la Macédoine au centre. Son intention était de créer, grâce aux facilités obtenues de la part des Ottomans, le fondement avantageux pour le développement d’un mouvement national, culturel et scolaire serbe auprès de la population serbe.⁹ Fendant son action sur la politique turcophile, afin de briser la méfiance de la Porte et du sultan, Novaković partait en effet dans le combat pour la Vieille Serbie et la Macédoine avec tous les instruments qui étaient à sa disposition avec permission des organes les plus hauts ottomans. Avec l’ouverture des consulats serbes à Skoplje et à Thessaloniki en 1887, puis à Bitolj et Priština en 1889, furent fondés les véritables centres qui, estimait-il, avaient à mener et diriger un programme général de l’action culturelle, scolaire et politique. Vu que, à son avis et avec les conditions matérielles défavorables, les livres étaient l’instrument le plus puissant dans cette action de la préservation de la nationalité serbe en Vieille Serbie et en Macédoine, il s’employait en faveur de la distribution du plus grand nombre de livres ou de l’impression de livres sur place afin de les livrer le plus rapidement possible.

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⁷ V. Karić, Srpska zemlja [Le pays serbe] (Belgrade, 1882).
⁸ AS, Gradja za istoriju makedonskog naroda IV-2 (1886–1887) [Sources pour l’histoire du peuple macédonien IV-2 (1886–1887)] (Belgrade, 1986), no 49.
⁹ Ibid..
aux lecteurs. De plus, il le prenait pour le devoir suprême de la politique serbe. C’est pour cette raison qu’il appela au gouvernement serbe que les consulats serbes y vissent l’une de ses obligations les plus importantes et il se donna pour but d’ouvrir le plus possible des librairies et des salles de lecture. Il tenait beaucoup à lancer des revues serbes dont les informations pouvaient servir de manière forte stimulante dans le combat pour la réussite de toute l’action. Il devait s’efforcer afin d’encourager l’ouverture des écoles serbes sur le territoire de la Vieille Serbie et de la Macédoine et d’y envoyer les instituteurs et les manuels scolaires. Il proposait une lente introduction d’une seule langue littéraire grâce à la publication des manuels qui comprendraient les mots des dialectes locaux mais qui seraient progressivement et systématiquement remplacés par les expressions littéraires. Tout cela, en effet, devait être l’arme le plus important dans la préservation de la nationalité serbe dans ces régions.

Rares étaient les hommes politiques et les diplomates serbes qui étaient capables de remplir si patiemment ces devoirs vraiment difficiles comme Stojan Novaković. Il fallait surmonter de nombreux obstacles et difficultés et surtout se porter avec les faiblesses dont souffraient les autorités officielles ottomanes telles la négligence, l’interruption et l’irrésolution, leur incrédulité proverbiale concernant les initiatives serbes. Novaković n’en manquait ni de la ténacité ni de la persistance. Cependant, les Ottomans n’allaient pas facilement à la rencontre, et même lorsqu’ils se montraient conciliants, ce n’étaient qu’avec beaucoup d’atermoiement et partiellement. Ils n’étaient pourtant pas prêts d’aider la Serbie dans le conflit avec la Bulgarie en Macédoine. La Bulgarie vassale leur était plus proche et plus importante de la Serbie indépendante. Ils le disaient clairement à Stojan Novaković lorsqu’il leur proposait une position commune contre les Bulgares et leurs « actions bien préparées » à l’égard de la Macédoine. Vous voulez diviser la Macédoine — disaient-ils à Novaković — mais elle dispose de son maître qui la défendra. Cela signifiait que l’aide était nécessaire pour la réalisation du projet ambitieux du raffermissement de la nationalité serbe en Empire ottoman et maîtrise des ambitions concurrentes, en premier lieu bulgares, la lutte contre la méfiance des Ottomans. Compte tenu que Constantinople était le centre où se reconnaissaient

10 AS, MID [Ministère des affaires étrangères], PPO [Département de politique et éducation], 1887–1889, fasc. II, S. Novaković à Č. Mijatović, Constantinople, le 26 avril 1888.

11 AS, Gradja za istoriju makedonskog naroda IV-3 (1888–1889) [Sources pour l’histoire du peuple macédonien IV-3 (1888–1889)] (Belgrade, 1987), n° 50.

12 AS, Gradja za istoriju makedonskog naroda V-2 (1891) [Sources pour l’histoire du peuple macédonien V-2 (1891)] (Belgrade, 1991), n° 106.
tous les facteurs important au sud-est, Novaković dépensa beaucoup d'énergie de les pénétrer et les utiliser éventuellement pour la partie serbe.

Stojan Novaković réussit à Constantinople en premier lieu à se convaincre en la force de la politique russe en Empire ottoman et de juger son importance pour la réalisation du programme serbe. Ce fut de grande importance pour lui personnellement et pour son futur travail. Il comptait parmi ces hommes politiques serbes qui demandaient au cours des années précédentes le détachement de la Serbie et l'amélioration de ses relations avec la Russie. Cette attitude eut pour la conséquence son départ du gouvernement de Milutin Garašanin en 1884 et, en relation avec cette décision, son désaccord avec la politique du roi Milan.13 Pourtant, cette position était en question à Constantinople. À son arrivée, il rencontra la politique russe dans les grands troubles. Les Russes s'embrouillaient dans la question bulgare et, selon leur opinion, au lieu de mener une grande politique, ils montraient de l'obstination envers la Régence et l'Assemblée nationale bulgare qui demandaient les changements ; même les Ottomans, qui gardaient la souveraineté sur la Bulgarie, étaient beaucoup plus élastiques.14 C'est pourquoi la Légation russe à Constantinople n'était pas prête au début d'aider les demandes serbes signalées par Novaković. Ce n'était qu'après la crise bulgare de 1887, avec l'avènement de la dynastie des Cobourgs et le refroidissement des rapports entre la Bulgarie et la Russie, que les représentants russes avaient l'oreille des intérêts serbes. Même à cette époque-là, leur aide n'était pas inconditionnelle, ce que Novaković considérait pour le désir de la Russie de reconquérir son influence en Bulgarie.15 Ce qui était important pour Novaković c'était qu'il avait entretenu de bonnes relations avec les représentants russes à Constantinople et qu'il avait réussi à pénétrer dans la force de la politique russe orientale ce qui confirma encore sa conviction que la Serbie devait s'appuyer davantage sur la Russie. Cela lui apparaissait nécessaire car tout portait à croire que les grandes puissances ne voulaient pas bouleverser l'équilibre des influences en Orient, qu'elles faisaient tout pour y maintenir la paix et le statut quo, y compris les territoires balkaniques.

14 AS, MID, PO [Département politique], 1887, fasc. I, dossier V/1, n° 395, S. Novaković à D. Franasović, Constantinople le 28 mars 1887.
15 AS, MID, PO, 1888, fasc. IV, dossier N/2, n° 54, S. Novaković à D. Franasović, Constantinople le 19 janvier 1888 ; ibid. dossier B/3, n° 115, S. Novaković à D. Franasović, Constantinople le 9 février 1888 ; AS, Gradja za istoriju makedonskog naroda V-2 [Sources pour l'histoire du peuple macédonien V-2], n° 40, 62.
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de l’Empire ottoman, d’où on se rendait facilement compte que la Serbie ne pouvait pas avoir l’appui pour ses objectifs dans les capitales européennes.

L’une des directions importantes de l’action de Novaković à Constantinople fut le Patriarcat œcuménique. Dès son arrivée et dès le début de l’organisation d’un vaste travail culturel et scolaire en Turquie d’Europe, il sentit quelle fut l’importance pour l’ouverture des écoles serbes, en tant qu’instrument le plus puissant de la propagande serbe, d’une institution légale, reconnue par les autorités ottomanes telle l’Église orthodoxe grecque qui avait dans ses mains le Patriarcat œcuménique. L’idée de rétablir le Patriarcat de Peć, un projet similaire à l’Exarchat bulgare, était depuis longtemps perdue et il ne semblait pas possible d’y aboutir. Les Grecs s’y opposeraient d’ailleurs car ils tenaient beaucoup à l’unité et à l’ensemble du Patriarcat œcuménique. L’Exarchat détruisait l’Église grecque en Turquie d’Europe et favorisait les intérêts bulgares au détriment des grecs, autant qu’il menaçait les intérêts serbes en rendant possible la pénétration des Bulgares en Macédoine. Qui plus est, bien que l’Exarchat ne disposât pas, à la base du firman de la fondation de l’Exarchat du février 1870, des diocèses d’Ohrid et de Skopje, les Bulgares les ajoutèrent à la liste des églises diocésaines en 1872, ce qui témoignait de leur expansion, au détriment des Grecs et des Serbes.16 C’est précisément pour cette raison que Novaković voulait trouver l’allié dans l’Église œcuménique. Il entre en contact avec le Patriarcat à la base de cet argument du besoin de la défense commune contre les Bulgares et l’Exarchat en demandant l’appui dans l’obtention des titres épiscopaux serbes à Skopje et à Prizren afin de faire barrage, disait-il, à la propagande bulgare.

À partir de 1889, l’année depuis laquelle il s’occupait intensivement du Patriarcat, afin d’entretenir avec lui de bonnes relations, Novaković essayait de découvrir ses pensées et de trouver les moyens du rapprochement. Il pensait qu’il fallait y utiliser de l’argent et il envoyait des messages au gouvernement serbe en ce sens.17 À cause de l’importance de ces relations, il voulait se rapprocher de la politique officielle grecque, connaissant son influence sur le Patriarcat. Dans les dernières années de sa mission à Constantinople, il entra dans les négociations avec le ministre grec.

16 AS, Gradja za istoriju makedonskog naroda, V-2 [Sources pour l’histoire du peuple macédonien V-2], n° 79.
17 AS, MID, PO, 1887, fasc. V, dossier P/3, S. Novaković à D. Franasović, Constantinople le 6 mars 1887 ; Ibid. PPO, 1890, ligne 257, PP n° 49, S. Novaković à S. Grujić, Constantinople le 15 janvier 1890 ; AS, Gradja za istoriju makedonskog naroda IV-2 [Sources pour l’histoire du peuple macédonien IV-2], n° 79 ; AS, Gradja za istoriju makedonskog naroda V-1 (1890) [Sources pour l’histoire du peuple macédonien V-1 (1890)] (Belgrade 1988), n° 67 ; AS, Gradja za istoriju makedonskog naroda V-2 [Sources pour l’histoire du peuple macédonien V-2], n° 40. Le gouvernement serbe accepta l’initiative de Novaković et consenta l’argent pour le Patriarcat.
L'accord avec les Grecs avait pour Novaković une signification plus profonde. Voyant les Bulgares comme les opposants majeurs en Macédoine, Novaković croyait que les Grecs pourraient être un allié très utile. Il pensait d'ailleurs depuis un certain nombre d'années à la conclusion d'un traité serbo-grec, et le séjour à Constantinople le persuada encore davantage. À cause de ses prétentions, la Bulgarie était également l'ennemi dangereux des Grecs, ce qui était une bonne raison pour ceux-ci de s'entendre avec les Serbes. Le plus important était le fait que la Serbie et la Grèce avaient peu de raisons pour le conflit, la délimitation des zones d'influences étant plus facile. Ayant accepté les interprétations du géographe serbe distingué Vladimir Karić sur les frontières de la dit Macédoine serbe, Novaković pensait que la délimitation serait possible plutôt avec les Grecs qu'avec les Bulgares ; de plus, la Serbie pourrait trouver le soutien de la Grèce dans le combat contre les prétentions bulgares. Les intérêts serbes en Turquie d'Europe imposaient non seulement la politique turcophile mais aussi philhellène ; Stojan Novaković croyait que l'accord avec les Grecs repousserait la propagande bulgare et l'influence de l'Exarchat. Cet accord serait fondé sur la reconnaissance des titres épiscopaux à Prizren et à Skoplje et sur le marquage des zones d'action serbe et grecque en Macédoine.

Dans les négociations avec le ministre grec à Constantinople Mavrocordato en 1890–1891, Novaković proposa la ligne de démarcation entre les deux pays. C'était la même ligne qu'il avait proposé au chargé d'affaires grec à Belgrade en 1885, les négociations étant supprimées à cause de la guerre serbo-bulgare. Selon sa proposition, la zone serbe comprendrait les vilayets de Kosovo et Monastir et la partie du nord du vilayet de Thessaloniki jusqu'à la Demir Kapiya avec les vallées de Struma et de Mesta jusqu'à Melnik et Nevrokop, laissant ces deux villes sous l'influence de la propagande grecque, Strumica restant serbe. Les négociations n'aboutirent pas à cause de l'attitude très ferme du représentant grec. Mais, les Grecs n'étaient pas opposés à l'installation des métropolites serbes à Prizren et Skoplje, comme c'était le cas dans les autres éparchies avec la majorité serbe. Stojan Novaković ne perdait toutefois pas l'espoir en résultat positif. Il était convaincu que, malgré toutes les difficultés et les obstacles imposés par le panhellénisme grec, l'accord serbo-grec serait la garantie d'un plus grand succès dans la préservation de l'idée serbe en Turquie d'Europe. En outre, l'accord ouvrirait la porte du rapprochement avec le Patriarcat œcuménique. Suivant son conseil, la Serbie devrait continuer les négociations à Athènes directement avec le gouvernement grec.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{18}\) AS, MID, PO, 1890, fasc. III, dossier 3, n° 1107, S. Novaković à S. Grujić, Constantinople le 19 août 1890 ; AS, Le fonds de Vladan Djordjević, n° 225, S. Novaković à M. Kr. Djordjević, Constantinople le 3 octobre 1891 ; AS, Gradja za istoriju makedonskog naroda V-1 [Sources pour l'histoire du peuple macédonien V-1], n° 59.
Ayant terminé sa mission à Constantinople en 1891, Stojan Novaković pouvait être content du résultat total qu’il avait obtenu. Il posa les fondements de la politique nationale serbe en Empire ottoman et rassembla le peuple serbe autour des institutions qu’il avait fondées. Il va de soi qu’il n’était pas facile d’achever tout cela. Combattre les Ottomans et leur méfiance, ainsi que la concurrence des pays balkaniques et la politique des puissances orientée à la préservation du statut quo en Empire ottoman c’était une prouesse. Devant tous ces obstacles, Novaković ne perdait jamais l’espoir. En ce sens, il écrivait au gouvernement serbe, entre autre, que les Russes n’aidaient pas, que la relation avec la Porte était difficile, mais qu’il ne restait autre chose que de « frapper et refouler davantage avant d’obtenir le succès ».

II


Les conceptions de Novaković sur la politique étrangère de la Serbie furent en grande partie influencées par l’expérience personnelle acquise au poste du ministre serbe à Constantinople entre 1886 et 1891. Constantinople fut la capitale où se croisaient les intérêts des plus grandes puissances européennes ainsi que ceux des États balkaniques. En outre, c’était le centre du Patriarcat et de l’Exarchat. La lutte acharnée pour la Macédoine et autres parties de la Turquie d’Europe était à l’ordre du jour à l’époque de la mission de Novaković à Constantinople ; chaque pays balkanique montrait des preuves de ses frontières ethnographiques ainsi que des arguments pour

19 AS, Gradja za istoriju makedonskog naroda V-2 [Sources pour l’histoire du peuple macedonien V-2], n° 62.
ses prétentions. En ce qui concerne Novaković, en premier lieu il y eut sa conviction qu’il fallait orienter l’attention vers la question macédonienne et l’amélioration de la condition de la population serbe de ces régions. Qui plus est, c’étaient les tâches principales de la Serbie. Il pensait qu’il fallait se rapprocher encore des Ottomans et des Grecs et de travailler avec ténacité dans le domaine scolaire, l’ouverture des écoles et l’obtention de nouveaux titres épiscopaux en tant que phase préalable pour les actions politiques. En tant que savant et homme politique, il se rapprochait de plus en plus de l’idée de l’entente des États balkaniques fondée sur le principe de la démarcation des territoires en question et d’équilibre du pouvoir, ainsi que la création d’une sorte de la fédération entre eux. Quant aux puissances, Novaković se persuada que les puissances occidentales ne montraient pas de l’intérêt d’aider la cause serbe et que seulement la Russie était favorable aux demandes serbes. Les hommes d’État russes étaient intéressés par la préservation de la paix dans les Balkans. D’autre part, il était évident que l’Autriche-Hongrie n’était pas du tout prête de s’engager en faveur de la Serbie. Bien que Novaković eut l’idée du rapprochement avec la Russie même avant son arrivée à Constantinople, l’expérience y obtenue fut décisive pour son orientation. Au lieu de la politique austrophilie, il pensait que la Serbie devrait se tourner vers la Russie.

Le programme qui fut le fondement de la politique du gouvernement de Novaković fut le même qu’il avait posé au roi en tant que condition de son engagement à la tête du gouvernement. Il s’agit du Mémoire sur le projet des affaires d’État où furent exposées les tâches de sa future politique. La place exceptionnelle dans ce programme Novaković consacra à la politique étrangère de la Serbie. C’est précisément dans cette partie du programme que les nouveaux traits apparaissent comme le produit de l’expérience obtenue à Constantinople et, de manière plus générale, des connaissances des mouvements dans les relations internationales après le Congrès de Berlin. Le plus grand changement se manifesta à l’égard de l’Autriche-Hongrie. Novaković opta pour le rétablissement de bonnes relations avec toutes les grandes puissances, soulignant que la Serbie ne devait s’appuyer particulièrement sur une puissance ce qui signifiait la rupture dans les liens étroits avec l’Autriche-Hongrie fondés sur la base de la Convention secrète de 1881. Novaković expliqua son point de vue à l’égard de la Convention secrète en disant que la Serbie ne pourrait désormais avoir aucun traité secret. Ce fait comprenait la recherche du soutien parmi ces puissances qui pourraient y montrer de l’intérêt. En premier lieu, Novaković avait en vue la Russie et c’est pour cela que les relations avec l’Autriche-Hongrie ne pouvaient pas être maintenues.

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20 S. Novaković, « Memoar o planu kojim da se povedu poslovi zemaljski » [Mémoire sur le projet des affaires d’État], Nedeljni pregled no 6 (43), le 8 février 1909, 85–87.
au même niveau dans l’avenir. Dans la partie qui traitait de la politique étrangère, Novaković attribua à la Serbie une place importante dans les Balkans. Il accentua que la Serbie dut revenir à la politique du prince Michel. C’était la première fois depuis la mort du prince Michel que la Serbie se déclarât publiquement en ce sens. Cela signifiait revenir à la politique de l’entente politique et économique avec d’autres États balkaniques. Il était entendu que la Serbie devait se retourner vers une vaste activité non seulement vers le sud mais aussi vers la Bosnie, bien que très prudemment, cette activité étant abandonnée après la crise orientale en 1878. La direction générale fut celui du sud, vers la Vieille Serbie et la Macédoine, en y utilisant les moyens légaux, c’est-à-dire des établissements religieux et scolaires. La Serbie continuerait ainsi la politique turcophile et philhellène en tant qu’instrument de base dans la défense des intérêts serbes sur le territoire de la Turquie d’Europe.

Bien que le gouvernement de Novaković ne voulût pas établir l’orientation russophile dans la politique étrangère au détriment de l’Autriche-Hongrie, dès le début de son mandat émergea le processus d’une profonde séparation économique et politique entre Vienne et Belgrade. Les difficultés héritées des gouvernements antérieurs au sujet de la distribution du bétail sur le marché austro-hongrois, provoquées par les limites imposées de Vienne et ayant pour résultat l’immense dommage pour l’économie serbe, le gouvernement de Novaković envisageait résoudre par la pression pour l’abolition de ces mesures restrictives, mais aussi grâce à la séparation de l’Autriche-Hongrie et l’exportation vers d’autres marchés européens. Ce chemin exposa la Serbie aux grandes tentations ainsi que le gouvernement de Novaković aux grandes difficultés. La Serbie fut dans l’embrasement étroit de l’Autriche-Hongrie et la sortie de l’autre côté fut incertaine. De plus, la question économique devint également la question politique, car le gouvernement serbe, parallèlement à l’émancipation dans le commerce international, faisait le même dans son orientation dans la politique étrangère. Or, l’Autriche-Hongrie n’y cédait pas. Pourtant, il était apparu que, malgré la persistance de Novaković pour percer le blocage austro-hongrois, ses efforts n’avaient pas de bonnes chances. Les hommes d’affaire autrichiens et hongrois étaient convaincus de ne pas lever l’interdiction de l’importation serbe. D’autres marchés furent lointains et largement inconnus ainsi que le transport fut cher et risqué. En préservant les plus grandes limites pour l’importation serbe, l’Autriche-Hongrie pensait ainsi influencer la politique du gouvernement de Novaković qui, bien que gouvernement du Parti progressiste proche du roi Milan et du roi Alexandre, avait clairement mani-

21 AS, MID, PO, 1895, fasc. II, dossier 4, n° 1262, Rapport de Vienne à Novaković, le 21 septembre 1895 ; ibid. n° 1288, S. Novaković aux ministres serbes, Belgrade le 8 octobre 1895 ; ibid. dossier 5, n° 1799, Rapport de Vienne à Novaković, le 21 décembre 1895.
festé son souhait de trouver l’appui en Russie. La détérioration des rapports de deux pays fut facilitée par le différend des fêtes de 1000 ans à Budapest en 1896. Novaković refusa que la Serbie y fût représentée officiellement à cause de la volonté de l’organisateur d’inclure le drapeau serbe dans le cortège d’honneur, parmi les drapeaux qui représentaient les pays de la couronne hongroise. L’opinion publique serbe se rapprocha de cette attitude du gouvernement, en manifestant vivement à Belgrade et en brûlant le drapeau hongrois. La guerre économique et la fête de 1000 ans conduisirent à la dégradation sérieuse des relations politiques entre les deux pays. Les accusations de Vienne et Budapest furent directement adressées contre le gouvernement de Novaković. Il était clair que la culpabilité fut provoquée par l’attitude de plus en plus pro-russe dans l’orientation officielle de la Serbie et dans la politique qui soutenait les aspirations de l’émancipation nationale et le rôle plus indépendant dans les Balkans.

Le changement dans la politique étrangère de la Serbie, estimait Novaković, devait être le nouveau facteur important dans la réalisation de ses besoins notamment en ce qui concerne le soutien dans les directions les plus importantes de son engagement. C’était, il va de soi, la Turquie d’Europe. C’est précisément ce besoin ainsi que l’absence de la Russie des questions intérieures de la Serbie qui furent la base favorable des relations plus étroites serbo-russes dans l’avenir. En tout cas, cette orientation rencontra un écho favorable en Russie. Au paravant, les Russes voyaient la Serbie comme un facteur secondaire entièrement dans la zone des intérêts autrichiens. Cependant, les premiers signes de Novaković aux représentants russes sur le changement de la politique étrangère leur laissèrent une impression favorable. Tout en gardant certaine réserve, car les progressistes avaient la réputation d’être austrophiles, on était unanime en Russie que Novaković avait eu raison de faire résistance à l’Autriche-Hongrie. Les Russes voulaient savoir s’il s’agissait d’une orientation de longue durée du gouvernement progressiste et comment se dérouleraient les mouvements intérieurs en Serbie et quelle serait la politique serbe dans les Balkans. De plus, la Russie observait la Serbie à travers le prisme de son engagement à l’Extrême-Orient, son estimation de l’ouverture possible de la Question d’Orient à cause de la situation dans les parties asiatique et européenne de l’Empire ottoman, ce qui imposa également une certaine pudeur. C’était dans les années à venir

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23 Ibid. n° 776, Novaković aux ministres serbes, le 21 avril 1896.  
24 Ibid. fasc. I, dossier 8, n° 1143, Rapport de Saint-Pétersbourg pour Novaković, le 15 août 1895.
qu’il fallait vérifier ou non la ligne ascendante dans le développement des relations serbo-russes.

Le tournant du gouvernement de Novaković vers la Russie renforça le besoin du rapprochement avec d’autres pays balkaniques, en premier lieu la Bulgarie. Compte tenu de l’orientation russophile de plus en plus ressentie en Bulgarie à l’époque, lorsqu’au Monténégro elle avait été manifestée depuis longtemps, il apparaissait évident que le chemin des États balkaniques conduirait vers l’entente mutuelle. La Russie elle-même aspirait à établir une sorte de l’alliance balkanique sous son influence, l’alliance qui ne serait pas tellement offensive mais qui lui donnerait une sorte de contrôle sur les événements sur le sol balkanique. Novaković, quant à lui, était très proche de cette idée. Qui plus est, ses propres réflexions étaient orientées vers l’entente avec la Bulgarie. Cela correspondait à sa vision du retour à la politique du prince Michel, autrement dit à l’entente balkanique. Au fond de cette entente, selon lui, devait se trouver l’accord sur la Macédoine. Il ne cachait guère qu’il était prêt à préciser les zones d’influence de deux pays en Macédoine. Pourtant, les Bulgares n’en montraient pas d’intérêt. L’attitude favorable de la Russie sur leur entente mutuelle pouvait contribuer à sa réalisation rapide.

C’est grâce au mérite direct de Novaković qu’en 1895 et encore plus en 1896, le nouveau climat apparu dans les relations de la Serbie avec la Bulgarie et le Monténégro. Les négociations sur le traité commercial entamèrent à la fin 1895. Dans la première moitié de l’année suivante plusieurs visites de divers représentants de deux sociétés eurent lieu. En mai 1896, le prince Ferdinand de Bulgarie rendit visite à Belgrade. Dans les journaux serbes et bulgares furent publiés plusieurs articles qui appelaient au rapprochement des pays et peuples balkaniques. Le résultat de cette action se manifestait dans le fait que les Serbes et les Bulgares montrèrent que l’idée de l’harmonisation de leurs majeures directions de la politique étrangère leur était proche — mais, c’était tout. Quant au Monténégro, le travail sur l’établissement des rapports plus étroits se déroulait dans des conditions plus favorables. En premier lieu, Stojan Novaković coupa toute action menée contre la dynastie monténégrine par certains journaux belgradois et cercles d’émigration monténégrine à Belgrade. Grâce à son initiative, l’ancien traité commercial fut renforcé et complété ce qui assura les relations économiques stables entre deux pays. Il échangeait la correspondance confidentielle avec le ministre des affaires étrangères Gavro Vuković sur les sujets politiques sérieux tels, par exemple, la question macédonienne. En outre, il stimula la coopération dans la politique religieuse et culturelle envers la Turquie d’Europe, le pas important pour la Serbie dans sa résistance aux prétentions bulgares.25 Il contribua à la création du climat général favorable aux relations...

exigées par le peuple de deux pays. La visite du monarque monténégrin à Belgrade au temps de fêtes de Vidovdan faisait partie de ces mouvements. À cette occasion, de vifs sentiments nationaux se manifestèrent notamment par rapport aux territoires non libérés sous le pouvoir ottoman. Les pourparlers officiels menés entre Stojan Novaković et Gavro Vuković aboutirent à un accord oral assurant avant tout l’aide du Monténégro au sujet de la Macédoine.26 Stojan Novaković croyait que la coopération plus forte avec le Monténégro dans l’avenir obtiendrait des points importants pour sa politique nationale.

La réalisation des tâches nationales majeures de son gouvernement Stojan Novaković voyait en Vieille Serbie et Macédoine. Pour y aboutir, il lui semblait indispensable d’arrêter l’offensive de la politique bulgare, beaucoup plus raisonnée et diversifiée à l’époque, qui menaçait d’imposer la solution définitive pour la question macédonienne grâce aux divers aspects de sa propagande, formation des comités et organisation des actions des comitadjis. Novaković pensait qu’il fallait éviter l’intrusion directe dans les affaires de la Macédoine à cause des attitudes des grandes puissances. Il voulait néanmoins que la vraie réponse de son gouvernement aux Bulgares fût dans la précision des devoirs et obtention des succès concrets de sa propre politique.27 Repoussant dans la deuxième moitié de 1895 les actions de la Bulgarie en Macédoine et s’efforçant notamment, en alarmant les grandes puissances, de lui rendre impossible l’attribution de nouveaux berats, Novaković commença en même temps une vive activité à Constantinople au sujet des demandes pour l’intronisation de nouveaux métropolites serbes.28 Il s’agissait en premier lieu de Prizren, vacant après la mort du métropolite de Ras et Prizren le Grec Melentije en été 1895. Novaković s’attachait énergiquement que fût nommé le Serbe Dionisije Petrović. Il incita la population serbe du Kosovo afin qu’elle présentât des pétitions en ce sens. Il essayait d’obtenir l’accord de la Porte et du sultan pour fléchir le Patriarcat ; dans cette perspective, il engagea l’ambassadeur russe à Constantinople. Lorsqu’en janvier 1896 Dionisije Petrović fut élu métropolite à Prizren, c’était une grande victoire de la cause serbe.29 Le peuple serbe au Kosovo et dans le sandjak de

27 AS, MID, Légation à Constantinople, fasc. 52, n° 476, S. Novaković à Vl. Djordjević, Belgrade le 12 juillet 1895.
28 Ibid. n° 426, S. Novaković à Vl. Djordjević, Belgrade le 29 juillet 1895 ; ibid. PPO, 1895, PP n° 2108, S. Novaković à Milan Garašanin (chargé d’affaires à Athènes), Belgrade le 14 octobre 1895.
29 N. Ražnatović, « Rad vlada Crne Gore i Srbije na postavljanju srpskih mitropolita u Prizrenu i Skoplju 1890–1902 » [Le travail des gouvernements du Monténégro et
Novi Pazar obtint un point d’appui important et les possibilités de continuer les affaires nationales. En même temps, cela signifiait le grand succès de la politique tenace et patiente de Stojan Novaković. La Serbie se tournera encore plus vigoureusement vers la Macédoine avec plus de chances de combattre les aspirations de la Bulgarie. Cependant, Stojan Novaković resta attaché à la voie pacifique, respectant les désirs des grandes puissances qu’on ne perturbât pas la paix. Il était en même temps à la recherche du soutien de la diplomatie russe dont l’influence à Constantinople fut considérable. D’ailleurs, il ne devait pas risquer un autre chemin. Il était conscient que rien d’autre ne pourrait être utilisé sauf les instruments diplomatiques et que ça serait une grande illusion de croire qu’un changement dans les Balkans pourrait ouvrir la Question d’Orient ou perturber la paix.

Novaković ne voulait pas être si catégorique dans l’évaluation de la situation dans les Balkans pour ne pas attendre les événements qui pourrait un jour surprendre la Serbie. Au milieu des années 1890, une certaine crise provoquée par les conflits nationaux ébranlait l’Empire ottoman en Asie-Mineure. Bien qu’il n’y eût pas de perspective d’élargissement, rien ne pouvait pas garantir que dans l’avenir la Serbie ne se trouverait pas dans le tourbillon des événements avec des conséquences incertaines. Vu que la Serbie n’était pas militairement prête pour défendre les intérêts serbes, Novaković essaya d’armer la Serbie par des armes modernes de la Russie. C’était son dernier effort dans la politique étrangère, qui n’a pas abouti, car le gouvernement russe n’était pas prête de livres les armes dans un court délai.30 Le gouvernement de Novaković abdiqua en décembre 1896. Malgré les raisons de sa chute, où il faut certainement nommer son orientation dans la politique étrangère — le roi Alexandre ayant subi la pression de l’Autriche-Hongrie, parmi ses grands mérites sont la consolidation de la position internationale de la Serbie et le succès dans la défense des intérêts serbes en Vieille Serbie et Macédoine, au moment difficile lorsque l’Empire ottoman à cause de sa crise intérieure, était au centre des intérêts des grandes puissances.

III

Après la chute de son gouvernement, Stojan Novaković ne passa qu’une année hors la politique étrangère de la Serbie, mais exerça toutefois son
influence sur elle. Les résultats de son travail, notamment ceux qui relevaient des tâches nationales principales de la Serbie dans les Balkans furent si importants et l’introduction d’une nouvelle voie n’était pas en question. Cela apparaissait clairement dans la politique menée en 1896/1897 par le nouveau gouvernement de Djordje Simić. Le fondement de la politique nationale et les directions de la politique étrangère suivaient de près ceux du gouvernement de Novaković. Qui plus est, lorsqu’en octobre 1897 le nouveau gouvernement de Vladan Djordjević fut élu et la Serbie revint à l’orientation austrophile, les devoirs nationaux demeurèrent les mêmes. En présentant au roi Alexandre le programme de son cabinet, parmi les tâches les plus importantes mentionnées par Vladan Djordjević étaient celles qui relevaient de la protection des intérêts serbes en Empire ottoman ; l’activité diplomatique y devait être encore plus grande accompagnée d’une pression ardente, mais en gardant l’esprit de la politique turcophile. Comme la personnalité qui devait prendre la responsabilité de ces tâches était le ministre serbe à Constantinople le choix de Vladan Djordjević pour ce poste portait naturellement sur Stojan Novaković. « En Serbie il n’y a pas d’homme d’État qui connaîtra mieux les questions concernant la Vieille Serbie et la Macédoine »31, affirmait Djordjević au roi Alexandre. Djordjević estimait que Novaković reviendrait à son ancien poste avec l’autorité du chef de gouvernement tourné de l’Autriche-Hongrie à la Russie ce qui pourrait lui assurer le soutien plus fort qu’auparavant de l’ambassadeur russe, le fait important dans la communication avec la Porte et le Patriarcat.

Stojan Novaković n’accepta pas facilement cette nouvelle entrée dans la diplomatie. Il ne put pas oublier la chute de son cabinet par le roi Alexandre malgré l’assurance du roi qu’il soutiendrait son programme à long terme. Il ne partageait pas une grande partie du programme du gouvernement de Djordjević et ne donnait pas son accord au retour à l’orientation politique austrophile. Ayant obtenu les mains libres pour se battre pour l’avenir de la Vieille Serbie et la Macédoine, il céda après longue hésitation motivé par l’idée qu’il fallait continuer l’œuvre commencée. Il ne pouvait pas savoir qu’il passerait plusieurs années dans la diplomatie et qu’il mènerait la lutte pour les intérêts serbes en tant que ministre dans plusieurs capitales européennes.

La seconde mission de Stojan Novaković à Constantinople se déroulait dans les conditions beaucoup plus défavorables qu’auparavant. À la veille de son arrivée, les Bulgares obtinrent plusieurs titres épiscopaux dont deux furent dans cette zone de la Turquie d’Europe qui fut considérée serbe.32 La

31 V. Djordjević, Kraj jedne dinastije I [La fin d’une dynastie I] (Belgrade, 1905), 120.
32 AS, MID, PPO, 1897, fasc. II, ligne 57, PP, n° 4382, S. Novaković à Vl. Djordjević, Constantinople le 23 décembre 1897 ; ibid. PO, 1897, fasc. VI, dossier 2, n° 3697, S.
nouvelle orientation austrophile de la politique officielle de la Serbie diminuait ses chances auprès des représentants russes, bien qu'il fût pour eux une personnalité de renom. Il semblait également peu probable que les relations serbo-bulgares s'améliorassent ; leur conflit en Macédoine devenait de plus en plus dangereux. De plus, la circulation des Albanais sur le territoire de la Vieille Serbie annonçait en fait la possibilité de l'organisation d'un mouvement qui afficherait le caractère nettement antiserbe.

S'attachant avec grande énergie et élan aux devoirs de la propagande culturelle et scolaire en Empire ottoman, Stojan Novaković pensait arrêter les Bulgares de passer à la rive droite du Vardar grâce aux berats (ce qu'ils ont partiellement acquis) y voyant l'un des plus grands dangers pour les intérêts serbes. Il en rédigea de nombreux rapports à son gouvernement. Il n'était pas content de la solution partielle de la question épiscopale serbe du temps du gouvernement de Djordje Simić lorsque le candidat serbe Firmilijan n’obtint que le poste d’administrateur de l’éparchie de Skoplje. Son succès personnel fut donc la promotion de Firmilijan pour le métropolite de Skoplje, accordée par Saint-Synode du Patriarcat œcuménique en 1899. Avec persévérance mais en vain, Novaković s’efforçait d’obtenir le berat afin que Firmilijan fût intronisé en tant que métropolite. Ses espoirs en Patriarcat et son aide auprès de la Porte furent en partie démentis. Il en allait de même pour le soutien russe, beaucoup plus faible qu’auparavant, ce qui résulta à cause de la réorientation de la Serbie officielle vers l’Autriche-Hongrie.

Un problème ancien apparut lors de la seconde mission de Novaković à Constantinople. Il s’agit du comportement des Albanais et leur influence sur la position des Serbes en Vieille Serbie. Déjà pendant son séjour à Constantinople dans la deuxième moitié des années 1880, il intervenait auprès des organes ottomans afin de repousser l’arbitraire des Albanais, d’autant plus qu’il lui semblait que les Ottomans en avaient été incompréhensiblement conciliants. C’est à cette époque qu’il conquit que la destruction de l’élément serbe en Vieille Serbie prenait place afin de le subs-

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Novaković à Vl. Djordjević, Constantinople le 27 décembre 1897 ; ibid. PPO, 1898, fasc. VII, ligne 177, n° 159, S. Novaković à Vl. Djordjević, Constantinople le 16 janvier 1898.

33 Ibid. PO, 1887, fasc. I, dossier 2, n° 360, S. Novaković à D. Franasović, Constantinople le 20 mars 1887 ; ibid. n° 965, S. Novaković à J. Ristić, Constantinople le 24 octobre 1887 ; ibid. PO, 1889, fasc. I, dossier 1, n° 553, S. Novaković au ministre des affaires étrangères, Constantinople le 4 juin 1889 ; ibid. PO, 1889, fasc. IV, dossier IV, n° 1695, S. Novaković à S. Grujić, Constantinople le 12 décembre 1889 ; ibid. PO, 1890, fasc. I, dossier 1, n° 751, S. Novaković à S. Grujić, Constantinople le 2 juin 1890 ; ibid. PO, 1892, fasc. VI, dossier 5, n° 557, S. Novaković à M. Kr. Djordjević, Constantinople le 7 mai 1891 ; ibid. PO, 1892, fasc. VI, dossier 5, n° 1211, S. Novaković à M. Kr. Djordjević, Constantinople le 27 octobre 1891;
tituer par la population albanaise. Il pensait qu’il s’agissait de la politique entamée après les guerres de 1876–1878 et au temps de la Ligue albanaise (de Prizren). Pour la seconde fois à Constantinople, il retrouva ce problème encore plus lourd. La mobilisation des Albanais de la part de la Porte dans la guerre courte et victorieuse contre la Grèce en avril-mai 1897 eut pour conséquence que les Albanais restèrent armés même après le conflit. Sur le territoire du Kosovo et de la Métochie mais aussi dans d’autres parties de la Vieille Serbie régnerent l’anarchie ressentie le plus douloureusement par la population serbe. Grâce aux consuls serbes en Empire ottoman, Stojan Novaković rassembla une vaste documentation sur la violence des Albanais contre les Serbes afin de la joindre à ses notes rédigées pour les organes officiels ottomans et les représentant des puissances à Constantinople. Cette documentation fut à l’origine du Livre bleu préparé pour la Conférence de la Haye en 1899 où il n’arrivera pas. Novaković apprit très sérieusement la réunion de l’assemblée des chefs albanaïs à Peć en janvier 1899 et les aspirations pour l’autonomie qu’y émergeaient. Selon lui, l’hostilité des Albanais envers les Serbes fut soutenue par les Ottomans. Qui plus est, il était convaincu que le projet d’encerclement de fer musulman autour de la Serbie était en train de naître au palais du sultan. C’est pourquoi il avertissait le gouvernement serbe contre les assurances prétendument antiottomanes des chefs albanaïs. La réalisation de l’autonomie albanaise au sud de la frontière de la Serbie signifiait en fait la consolidation des frontières actuelles. « Une nouvelle autonomie albanaise donnerait le coup de grâce à toutes nos aspirations vers le sud et vers anciens pays serbes, déjà endommagés par nos migrations à la fin du XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècles » observait Novaković.

Ni pour la seconde fois, Stojan Novaković ne réussit pas à voir les résultats de son activité diplomatique à Constantinople. En février 1900, il quitta la ville pour prendre un nouveau poste diplomatique, celui du ministre à Paris. Pourtant, ce n’était qu’une étape de courte durée. Pendant quelques mois du séjour dans cette ville, il pouvait se convaincre que, hors la politique domestique et certaines questions commerciales, aucune politique n’y était

34 Ibid. PO, 1898, fasc. I, dossier 5, n° 2371, S. Novaković à Vl. Djordjević, Constantinople le 6 novembre 1898.
pas menée. 18 C’était sans doute la conclusion un peu résignée d’un homme qui, durant des années, dans l’atmosphère effervescente de la Méditerranée, était encombré par des obligations, parcourant la Porte, le palais du Sultan et les légations étrangères et rédigeant la correspondance diplomatique. Si ce n’était qu’une courte trêve, c’était également une expérience utile pour sa nouvelle mission. En novembre 1910, Novaković était à son nouveau poste, celui du ministre serbe à Saint-Pétersbourg.

Élu ministre serbe en Russie selon la volonté du roi Alexandre, en tant que personnage de grand renom dans les milieux les plus hauts russes, pour assurer le soutien de la Russie à la Serbie et son dynastie en rendant possible la visite du couple royale à Saint-Pétersbourg, Stojan Novaković y partit fermement convaincu de travailler au renforcement des relations entre la Russie et la Serbie. C’était, à son avis, la tâche principale de sa mission. Il pensait que la division entre russophiles et austrophiles en Serbie devait disparaître laissant la place aux gens responsables dévoués aux intérêts de leur pays. 39 L’intérêt de la Serbie correspondait à l’appui sur la Russie, estimait-il. Les fondements de ces bonnes relations à partir de 1900 se trouvaient dans la chute du cabinet de Vladan Djordjević, le parrainage du couple impérial russe au couple royale serbe ainsi que la mort de l’ex-roi Milan. Novaković soulignait une importance particulière pour les tâches nationales de la Serbie y compris le soutien russe dans la question de l’intronisation du métropolite serbe. Il partit pour Saint-Pétersbourg avec de telles conceptions pour les vérifier, confirmer ou corriger sur place.

À Saint-Pétersbourg, Stojan Novaković se trouvait dans une nouvelle situation qui exigeait moins l’activité diplomatique que la réflexion et la proposition des solutions. Le sujet central de son intérêt restait pourtant le même. Son ambition était, comme à Constantinople, d’orienter la politique de la Serbie dans sa question la plus importante — celle du destin de la Turquie d’Europe. On parlait beaucoup à Saint-Pétersbourg à cette époque-là, des réformes et de l’autonomie de la Macédoine. C’était une actualité de premier ordre attirant comme le sujet préféré des journaux une grande attention de l’opinion publique. Connaissant l’importance de cette question, Stojan Novaković essayait de juger le climat qui l’entourait. C’était la première et la plus importante tâche de Novaković à Saint-

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18 Ibid. PO, 1900, fasc. III, dossier 1, n° 1046, S. Novaković à Vl. Djordjević, Paris le 11 avril 1900.

Pétersbourg et il la présentait à son gouvernement afin qu’il pût réagir rapidement.

Dans plusieurs de ses rapports, Novaković informa le gouvernement serbe sur les idées des réformes. Il avertissait que la Serbie ne pouvait pas s’y opposer pour ne pas ruiner le prestige d’un État chrétien. D’autre part, elle ne devait pas jouer le rôle du « page ottoman » ni laisser les Bulgares de se présenter comme les protecteurs naturels de la Macédoine. Il suggérait que l’une des obligations de premier ordre de la politique serbe était de couper les liens entre la population de la Macédoine et la Bulgarie. Novaković n’écarterait en avance ni l’idée de l’autonomie de la Macédoine ; selon lui, cette idée ne représentait pas le danger pour la Serbie sauf si la Bulgarie ne l’instrumentalisait pas suivant la même méthode comme dans le cas de la Roumélie orientale en 1885. Hormis des instruments diplomatiques, Novaković pensait qu’il fallait tenir compte de l’opinion publique étrangère en y présentant et défendant continument ses points de vue et ses intérêts afin de consolider et renforcer son rôle. C’était le devoir de la presse serbe, des articles rédigés dans les rédactions serbes, sur la base des sources serbes, qui devaient frayer les chemins pour les idées serbes. À Saint-Pétersbourg, Novaković vit que les autres, y compris les Bulgares, le firent mieux et plus habilement.

Stojan Novaković comprit à Saint-Pétersbourg que la Russie et l’Autriche-Hongrie, d’après le traité datant de 1897, veillèrent sur le statut quo en Turquie d’Europe. La question principale pour la Serbie était : quelle politique mener envers l’Empire ottoman, la politique conservatrice aux côtés de la Russie ou la politique nationale, indépendamment ou avec la Bulgarie, c’est-à-dire la politique révolutionnaire avec le but de détruire le pouvoir ottoman dans les Balkans. Novaković s’exprima pour l’alignement à la Russie, car le traité de 1897 lui ressemblait à la Sainte Alliance du début du XIXe siècle empêchant tout changement dans les Balkans. Il était d’ailleurs convaincu que la Russie conserverait ses liens traditionnels dans les Balkans et resterait le grand espoir du monde orthodoxe y compris la Serbie. « Notre hésitation entre l’Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie dans la dernière décennie » - écrivait-il au gouvernement en 1902 — sert aux Russes et Autrichiens comme la raison de leur entente, et, quant à nous, elle pour-

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40 AS, MID, PPO, 1902, PP n° 4826, S. Novaković à V. Antonić, Saint-Pétersbourg le 22 novembre 1902.


42 AS, MID, PO, 1901, fasc. III, dossier 4, n° 1039, S. Novaković à M. Vujić, Saint-Pétersbourg le 24 mars 1901 ; Ibid., PPO, 1901, ligne 608, PP n° 1155, S. Novaković à M. Vujić, Saint-Pétersbourg, le 9 avril 1901.
rait nous instruire comment éviter cette politique autant que possible dans l’avenir. »

En effet, Stojan Novaković y fut résolu : l’appui de la Serbie est la Russie orthodoxe.

En avisant le gouvernement serbe dans ses rapports en 1902 et dans la première moitié de 1903 des activités risquées des Bulgares en Macédoine, il attirait attention notamment sur le danger d’une éventuelle aventure dans laquelle la Serbie pouvait faire irruption. Ce n’était que par la politique loyale à l’égard de l’Empire ottoman qu’il était possible de défendre les Serbes en Empire ottoman, avec l’intervention de la Russie, dans tous les cas des abus de la part des autorités ottomanes. Cette opinion était formulée lorsque Novaković obtenait des nouvelles sur la préparation des actions révolutionnaires en Macédoine par les Bulgares, prévues pour le printemps 1903, tandis qu’il était connu que l’Empire ottoman, dès 1902, y avait positionné son armée non sans accord de la Russie et de l’Autriche-Hongrie ; selon Novaković, ce fait servait d’avertissement à chaque mouvement éventuel qui devait ainsi affronter une force brutale. En effet, Novaković était persuadé que si la Serbie participerait dans un tel mouvement en Macédoine, cela contribuerait à exterminer les Serbes de l’Empire ottoman. Or, l’Autriche-Hongrie aurait pu obtenir le droit d’arrêter la Serbie ou d’occuper une partie de la Turquie d’Europe, le fait qui ne manquerait pas d’enthousiasme à Vienne et Budapest, observait Novaković. Il écrivait à son ami Ljubomir Kovačević qu’il était dans l’intérêt vital de la Serbie de préserver le comportement correct. En effet, il prévit la catastrophe de la population en Macédoine au temps de l’insurrection (d’Ilinđen) en août 1903.

Stojan Novaković observait de près l’action réformatrice des puissances en Turquie d’Europe, c’est-à-dire dans sa partie macédonienne, imposée après le traité de Mircšteg en octobre 1903. Il essayait de présenter aux Russes le danger de l’introduction possible de l’autonomie dans les régions introduites aux réformes. Il ne cachait non plus la crainte que le sandjak de Novi Pazar ne fût pas inclus dans le projet des réformes. L’accord des puissances sur l’action réformatrice n’était que l’ambition de ne pas laisser ce territoire de leurs mains empêchant les États balkaniques de le contrôler.

43 Diplomatska prepiska Kraljevine Srbije, no 3.
45 AS, MID, PO, 1904, fasc. VI, dossier 6, no 2035, S. Novaković à A. Nikolić, Saint-Pétersbourg le 12 novembre 1903 ; ibid. PPO, 1904, ligne 93, PP no 664, S. Novaković à N. Pašić, Saint-Pétersbourg le 12 février 1904 ; Diplomatska prepiska Kraljevine Srbije, no 24.
selon leurs propres aspirations. Cependant, Novaković avait peur de deux problèmes potentiels, le comportement de la Bulgarie et la position internationale de la Russie.

Stojan Novaković n’avait pas de doutes que la Bulgarie forgeât le plan pour la Macédoine comme en 1885 pour la Roumélie orientale — des livres, articles, cartes ethnographiques, agitation et actions révolutionnaires sur le terrain n’étaient que couverture. L’insurrection en Macédoine en août 1903 et le traité de Mircšteg révélèrent les intentions des grandes puissances, défavorables aux projets expansionnistes des États balkaniques, de préserver l’ensemble de l’Empire ottoman grâce aux réformes. Si la Bulgarie choisira la voie de l’expansion, pensait Novaković, la Macédoine pourrait être occupée par une puissance étrangère. Le scénario serait celui de 1878 lorsque, selon lui, la politique irréfléchie de la Serbie, Monténégro et Russie introduisirent les Autrichiens en Bosnie, la Serbie dut affronter la Bulgarie de San Stefano ainsi que les Russes et les Serbes durent subir les conséquences du Congrès de Berlin. L’occupation étrangère de la Macédoine serait le début du partage de l’Empire ottoman, mais parmi les puissances. Tout changement signifierait modification du Congrès de Berlin. Dans ce cas, la Serbie avait beaucoup à craindre quant au destin de la Bosnie-Herzégovine et du sandjak de Novi Pazar. Selon Novaković, la Serbie devait être aux côtés de la Russie et de veiller sur ses intérêts en Empire ottoman grâce à l’aide de la Russie. Qui plus est, l’alliance balkanique n’aurait pas aucune chance. L’Europe, y compris la Russie, ne permettrait pas aucun changement par la force.

La position internationale de la Russie fut pour Stojan Novaković le problème qui l’inquiétait beaucoup à cause du destin incertain du pays après les défaites dans la guerre contre le Japon et les activités révolutionnaires intérieures. « Il est pénible pour nous les Slaves de regarder notre espoir slave en destruction. Si seulement je n’étais pas venu le regarder par mes propres yeux », lamentait-il dans une lettre à son ami Valtazar Bogišić. La Serbie avait besoin d’une forte Russie, il en était fort convaincu. C’est avec ces pensées sombres qu’il finit sa mission politique à Saint-Pétersbourg en novembre 1905, car le président du gouvernement serbe Nikola Pašić le

47 AS, MID, PO, 1904, fasc. VI, dossier 8, no 536, S. Novaković à N. Pašić, Saint-Pétersbourg le 18 mars 1904.
48 Ibid. PO, 1905, fasc. I, dossier 5, no 422, S. Novaković à N. Pašić, Saint-Pétersbourg le 3 mars 1905.
49 B. Nedeljković, Prepiska Stojana Novakovića i Valtazara Bogišića [La correspondance entre Stojan Novaković et Valtazar Bogišić], Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Zbornik za istoriju, jezik i književnost srpskog naroda XXVIII (1968), no 174.
Après avoir pris sa retraite en 1905 et étant revenu à Belgrade, pour se consacrer au travail scientifique, comme il disait, Stojan Novaković revint aussitôt à la vie politique en refondant très rapidement son Parti progressiste. Écrivain des articles sérieux dans la presse progressiste, député à l’Assemblée nationale élu à la liste des Progressistes et leur chef politique, il montrait de l’intérêt particulier pour les thèmes nationaux et les questions de la politique étrangère. En premier lieu il se déclara en tant que partisan ardent de l’indépendance économique et politique complète vis-à-vis de l’Autriche-Hongrie. Dans plusieurs articles publiés dans l’organe du Parti progressiste Videlo en 1906, il alertait ses lecteurs des menaces dangereuses de l’Autriche-Hongrie adressées à la Serbie et accompagnées des pressions économiques. L’Autriche avait conditionné la signature du traité commercial de la commande antérieure des canons, munitions et matériel de guerre de la part de la Serbie. La Serbie avait à choisir : s’incliner ou se coltiner la guerre douanière. Stojan Novaković leva sa voix contre le relâchement et appela aux mesures qui aboutiraient à la libération économique. En outre, il conseilla au gouvernement de Nikola Pašić de chercher partout de nouveaux clients pour préserver la liberté du commerce serbe y compris la conclusion des traités économiques avec d’autres pays.

Stojan Novaković continua sérieusement de suivre l’action réformatrice des grandes puissances entamée en 1903/04. Dans certains de ses articles de presse, il soulignait les dangers potentiels de cette action. Il accentua notamment que l’Autriche-Hongrie était cette puissance qui pourrait utiliser ses réformes pour réaliser ses ambitions. Il se méfiait du fait que les sandjaks de l’ouest de la Vieille Serbie (sandjaks de Novi Pazar, Peć, Priština et Prizren) ont été séparés du plan des réformes. Or, c’étaient les régions où les Serbes avaient été exposés à la violence brutale des Albanais. Novaković doutait que l’Autriche-Hongrie fût prête de préserver toute seule l’ordre dans le Vilayet de Kosovo, d’autant plus que les officiers autrichiens se disposaient dans le sandjak de Skoplje. Dans cette action, au lieu de la pacification de la Turquie d’Europe, il voyait « la maraude de la Péninsule Balkani-

\[50\] Dardanus [Stojan Novaković], « Ekonomska nezavisnost » [L’indépendance économique], Videlo no 38, le 16 mai 1906 ; « Ekonomska emancipacija » [L’émancipation économique], Videlo no 41, le 19 mai 1906 ; « Sloboda trgovanja » [Liberté du commerce], Videlo no 51, le 2 juin 1906 ; « Naša trgovina » [Notre commerce], Videlo n°57, le 9 juin 1906.
que ». Qui plus est, dans l’exclusion de la partie de l’ouest de la Vieille Serbie de l’action réformatrice il remarquait la présence de l’Italie. Selon lui, il fallait y ajouter l’activité plus forte de la Bulgarie en Macédoine, celle-ci étant prête, pour satisfaire ses ambitions, de prendre des actions qui pourraient provoquer la réaction radicale de l’Europe. Contrairement à cette opinion, Novaković défendait l’idée que ce n’étaient que les pays balkaniques, ayant antérieurement délimité ses zones d’influence, qui devraient être demandés sur le sort de la Turquie d’Europe.

La question des Serbes en Empire ottoman était l’une de celles auxquelles Stojan Novaković réservait le plus de son attention après le retour de Saint-Pétersbourg. Il la mit au centre de tous ses interventions à l’Assemblée nationale où il était élu presque régulièrement dans la liste du Parti progressiste. Pour lui, cette question était inséparable du destin de tout le peuple serbe. Dans une interpellation qu’il soumit en 1906, soulignant la condition difficile des chrétiens en Empire ottoman, il avertit que les États balkaniques « peuvent se trouver dans les dangers fatales ». C’était une sorte d’appel pour aide au peuple de ces régions. Il croyait que c’était la seule solution possible pour faire quelque chose pour la population serbe opprimée en Empire ottoman, car l’action commencée en 1903/04 semblait disparue. Certains espoirs de changement réapparurent toutefois en 1908 lorsque la Russie et l’Angleterre prirent une nouvelle initiative au sujet des réformes en Empire ottoman. C’est précisément au moment de la remise de la note anglaise à Constantinople qu’il semblait possible de recommencer le processus des réformes lorsque le mouvement constitutionnel des Jeunes-Turcs entama en été 1908 une vraie révolution en Empire ottoman.

Les déclarations des Jeunes-Turcs sur la réforme constitutionnelle, la liberté et l’égalité avaient un grand retentissement dans le monde. Stojan Novaković était parmi ceux qui gardaient l’espoir en changement profond en Empire ottoman. D’ailleurs, si les Ottomans ne réalisaient pas ce qu’ils avaient annoncé, il pensait que les puissances seraient résolues d’entreprendre une nouvelle action réformatrice pour y aboutir y compris l’intervention.

51 Dardanus, « Makedonija » [Macédoine], I–III, Videlo n° 2, le 2 avril 1906 ; n° 3, le 5 avril 1906 ; n° 8, le 11 avril 1906 ; « Novopazarski sandžak » [Le sandjak de Novi Pazar], Videlo n° 11, 14 avril 1906 ; « Grabež oko Balkanskog poluostrva » [La maraude de la Péninsule balkanique], Videlo n° 48, le 30 mai 1906.


Jugeant ce moment de l’importance capitale pour les Serbes en Empire ottoman, il proposa certaines actions. Il s’agissait de reconnaître aux Serbes les droits autonomes en Empire ottoman : la reconnaissance de l’Église serbe et de la nationalité serbe. Pourtant, c’étaient les demandes radicales qui nécessitaient l’engagement fort de la politique serbe mais aussi d’autres circonstances favorables.

L’annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine qui en automne 1908 provoqua la crise internationale et menaça de grands conflits dans les Balkans, tournant l’attention des projets de réformes des Jeunes-Turcs y compris parmi les hommes politiques serbes. Toute la Serbie se mit debout protestant contre l’annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, le territoire peuplé majoritairement par la population serbe, refusant de reconnaître ce fait et oubliant pour l’instant les Serbes en Empire ottoman, c’est-à-dire les laissant aux projets de réformes. Il s’agissait d’une rare occasion où la Serbie nécessitait le soutien des organes officiels ottomans, compte tenu que la Bosnie-Herzégovine représentait deux provinces ottomanes occupées en 1878 par l’Autriche-Hongrie. Le résultat de la crise d’annexion, à ce qu’on croyait en Serbie, était la plus grande tentative pour sa politique étrangère et les intérêts du peuple serbe au total.

Après la proclamation de l’annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, en octobre 1908, Stojan Novaković était le premier à lever sa voix fortement, encourageant le peuple serbe de ne pas se laisser aller. Dans les discours patriotiques de grande inspiration à l’Assemblée nationale, il évoquait le passé héroïque et montrait des exemples des grands hommes qui contribuaient à l’unification nationale non par les armes mais par le livre, la plume et la peinture, comme c’était le cas chez certains peuples européens. C’est pourquoi il appela que ce combat se continuât afin d’obtenir ce but par le livre et par la concorde nationale, disant que cette force était si puissante et invincible. De la tribune de l’Assemblée, il faisait preuve qu’il ne fallait pas avoir peur des défis. Souignant le grand danger qui venait de l’Autriche-Hongrie et de ses futurs pas contre la Serbie même et le peuple serbe entier, Stojan Novaković appelait à trouver des alliés dans les Balkans afin qu’on formât l’alliance balkanique au sud de la Save et du Danube y compris l’Empire ottoman. Il évoquait également le besoin d’utiliser « l’arsenal diplomatique » pour chercher les garanties des « acquisitions accomplies jusqu’à présent par le peuple serbe grâce à ses efforts ». Finalement, il proposait la création d’un

54 Ibid. 871–873 ; Videlo n° 61, le 7 août 1908.
55 S. Novaković, Najnovija balkanska kriza i srpsko pitanje [La crise balkanique la plus récente et la question serbe] (Belgrade, 1910), 95–98.
programme national qui serait le programme pour l’avenir et présenté en tant que tel en Europe.56

Juste après l’annexion, à la demande du ministre des affaires étrangères Milovan Milovanović, Stojan Novaković accepta de préparer, ensemble avec d’autres savants de renom tels Jovan Cvijić, Ljubomir Kovačević et Ljubomir Jovanović, un plan de compensations, c’est-à-dire la demande bien fondée des compensations territoriales pour la Serbie dans le cas d’une conférence internationale au sujet de la Bosnie-Herzégovine. En effet, il l’accomplit tout seul, en faisant une courte étude en forme de mémoire, dans lequel il faisait preuve, par exemple, que la Podrinje et Trebinje, éventuellement réclamés par la Serbie avaient toujours été serbes dans le passé. Qui plus est, il y ajouta, à la demande du Monténégro, la revendication du territoire allant des Konavli jusqu’à Boka Kotor.57

Fin octobre–début décembre 1908, Stojan Novaković fut dans la mission spéciale à Constantinople afin d’obtenir de la part du sultan et de la Porte le soutien pour les revendications de la Serbie en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Fin connaisseur des mœurs diplomatiques à Constantinople et de la psychologie des négociateurs ottomans, il n’était pas découragé par le fait que les Ottomans, au lieu de donner leur accord aux demandes de la Serbie, réclamèrent une convention militaire à la fois offensive et défensive orientée plus contre la Bulgarie celle-ci ayant saisi l’occasion de proclamer son indépendance au temps de l’annexion qu’à la préservation des intérêts ottomans en Bosnie-Herzégovine.58 Dans les longues négociations fatiguantes, Novaković put se persuader que l’Empire ottoman était de plus en plus en froid avec la Bosnie, avant d’y renoncer définitivement. Les Ottomans étaient de moins en moins disposés à la convention militaire ce qui pouvait s’expliquer, selon Novaković, par le fait que les Ottomans eux-mêmes n’étaient pas prêts pour le conflit avec l’Autriche-Hongrie. Néanmoins, les négociations furent terminées, selon le propos de Novaković, par une dé-

57 AS, MID, PO, 1908, fasc. III, dossier 8, n° 3687, S. Novaković à P. Velimirović, Constantinople le 8 novembre 1908 (prilog)
58 Ibid. dossier 6, n° 3554, S. Novaković à P. Velimirović, Constantinople le 14 octobre 1908 ; ibid. n° 3555, S. Novaković à P. Velimirović, Constantinople le 14 octobre 1908 ; ibid. n° 3636, S. Novaković à P. Velimirović, Constantinople le 29 octobre 1908 ; ibid. fasc. IV, dossier 1, n° 3740, S. Novaković à M. Milovanović, Constantinople le 23 novembre 1908.
claration sur l’entente cordiale ; or, la mission ne fut pas vidée du succès. Pourtant, l’idée des compensations fut rejetée, l’Autriche-Hongrie s’étant accordée avec l’Empire ottoman sur l’abandon de la Bosnie-Herzégovine. D’autre part, c’est pour cela que la conférence internationale n’eut pas lieu.

L’homme de compromis et l’homme politique pondéré et réfléchi, qui évoquait toujours la nécessité de la concorde intérieure devant les circonstances internationales défavorables pour la Serbie, Stojan Novaković, en pleine crise économique du février 1909, fut élu le président du gouvernement de concentration. Au beau milieu des menaces militaires de l’Autriche-Hongrie contre la Serbie qui, face à une intervention militaire inévitable, n’acceptait pas de reconnaître l’annexion, Novaković forma le cabinet du salut national ayant pour but d’étendre les conflits entre les partis et ses leaders, de rétablir l’unité entre eux, de diviser la responsabilité et de trouver la sortie de la crise. C’est dans le programme de son gouvernement présenté à l’Assemblée nationale, formulé entièrement dans l’esprit de ses convictions, il proclamait que le peuple serbe posait sa question nationale devant l’Europe y voyant la seule voie possible pour sortir de la crise. Par la note du 10 mars 1909, le nouveau gouvernement exprima à toutes les grandes puissances la volonté pacifique de son pays, soulignant sa « promptitude de respecter les jugements des grandes puissances au sujet bosno-herzégovinien ». La Serbie termina ainsi la crise, sous la pression des grandes puissances et sans que le cœur y soit, mais tout en sauvant le monde de la guerre. Aux côtés de Novaković, tous les partis politiques de la Serbie prirent la responsabilité de cet acte.

Après la crise d’annexion, Stojan Novaković revint dans ses efforts consacrés aux tâches de la politique étrangère de la Serbie à la Vieille Serbie et la Macédoine et, ipso facto, à la question des rapports officiels avec l’Empire ottoman. Le développement même de la situation intérieure en Empire ottoman y contribuait, mais aussi le fait que, après l’annexion de Bosnie-Herzégovine, la Vieille Serbie et la Macédoine pourraient devenir la cause


d’une nouvelle crise balkanique. Bien qu’après la victoire des Jeunes-Turcs il semblât que partout en Empire ottoman y compris dans sa partie européen l’ordre, la responsabilité et l’égalité devant la loi eussent régné, il était rapidement apparu que la politique annoncée ne serait pas appliquée dans sa zone européenne. Tandis que les Serbes en Empire ottoman essayaient de s’accommoder au nouveau système et de s’inclure à la vie politique afin de faciliter leur position, les Albanais qui perdaient leurs privilèges devenaient des farouches opposants des Jeunes-Turcs et exprimaient leur mécontentement par le soulèvement des révoltes mais aussi par la violence perpétrée contre les Serbes. Les Jeunes-Turcs n’insistèrent que pour une courte période sur les principes déclarés. Ainsi, la situation en Turquie d’Europe ne s’améliora pas significativement. Aux mouvements armés albanaïs les Jeunes-Turcs opposaient le plus souvent la quête de la paix avec les Albanais au lieu des conflits. Les Serbes en payèrent le prix, étant exposés à de nouvelles vagues de violence. C’est précisément le fait que Stojan Novaković avait en vue lorsqu’il demandait dans plusieurs de ses interpellations et déclarations à l’Assemblée nationale que fussent prises les mesures contre la violence en Empire ottoman.\footnote{Rad Narodne skupštine sazvane u redovan saziv za 1909. godinu, Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine II [Le travail de l’Assemblée nationale. Les notes stenographiques] (Belgrade 1910), 1403–1404 ; ibid. Stenografske beleške V (Belgrade, 1911), 3617 ; Rad Narodne skupštine, III redovan saziv 1908–1911, Stenografske beleške I (Belgrade, 1910), 21–28 ; Rad Narodne skupštine, III redovan saziv 1908–1911, Stenografske beleške II (Belgrade, 1910), redovni sastanak 26. II 1911, 30–31 ; Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine, IV redovan saziv 1908–1911, VIII redovni sastanak 16. nov. 1911 (Belgrade, 1911) I, 1–5, Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine, IV redovan saziv za 1908–1911, okt. 1911 – jan. 1912, XX redovni sastanak 2. dec. 1911 (Belgrade, 1911) I, 1–3 ; Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine, vanredan saziv 1912–1915, IV redovni sastanak 18. maja 1912 (Belgrade, 1912), 1–3.} Il s’agissait d’autre part de sa critique de la politique étrangère serbe qui tendait à préserver de bonnes relations avec l’Empire ottoman après la crise d’annexion. Selon Novaković, c’était au détriment des intérêts du peuple serbe. C’est pour cette raison qu’il insistait qu’on parlât beaucoup plus fermement avec l’Empire ottoman.

Tout cela fut en relation avec l’engagement de plus en plus énergique de Novaković pour l’entente entre les États balkaniques. Quant aux Grecs et Bulgares, il aspirait même auparavant à une politique solidaire, mais il ne voulait pas que cela fût de courte durée et sans convention. Il comptait sur Monténégro en tant qu’ami et allié et appelait à surmonter les discordances réciproques qui dataient encore des années qui précédaient la crise d’annexion. De la tribune de l’Assemblée nationale, Novaković faisait appel aux peuples balkaniques de trouver l’accord entre eux et demander ensuite de l’Europe les mains libres. Une fois l’entente réalisée, les « négociations »
avec l’Empire ottoman auront lieu. Il croyait qu’on pourrait ainsi finir avec « ses illusions ».63

À la veille des guerres balkaniques, rares étaient ceux qui posaient la question de la position du peuple serbe en Empire ottoman avec une telle fermeté et vivacité comme Novaković à l’Assemblée nationale. Selon le Journal de Jovan Žujović, le président de l’Assemblée nationale Andra Nikolić disait que Stojan Novaković, lorsqu’il parlait des Serbes en Empire ottoman, avait l’air d’un fervent lycéen.64 Dans ses interpellations et discours, Novaković insista qu’il fût nécessaire d’aider à la population serbe en Vieille Serbie et en Macédoine terrorisée par les Albanais et par l’anarchie qu’y régnait. « Il est toujours le devoir de la Serbie de défendre ses compatriotes comme ses concitoyens »65, étaient ses mots. Les moyens d’aide étaient différents. En premier lieu, il évoquait les moyens diplomatiques, inépuisables, qui pourraient réaliser même « ce qu’il semblait impossible ».66 Dans ses déclarations on pouvait de plus en plus entendre même les demandes d’ autres mesures de pression plus fortes. Il se donnait plus fermement pour l’action commune des États balkaniques pour la défense des chrétiens en Empire ottoman. « Un pas commun sur n’importe quel sujet en Empire ottoman vaudrait mieux qu’un pas individuel de chaque pays balkanique »67, prononça-t-il à la réunion de l’Assemblée nationale le 15 décembre 1911. En effet, celaient les mots de l’homme qui devint l’un des initiateurs de la guerre balkanique.68

Lorsque dans la guerre des États balkaniques contre l’Empire ottoman, éclatée en 1912, triomphèrent les armes des alliés, l’armée ottomane étant mise en déroute, Stojan Novaković y voyait non seulement victoire du peuple serbe mais aussi la réalisation des idées formulées par ses grands

64 J. Žujović, Dnevnik I [Journal] (Belgrade, 1986), 244.
68 Suite à la proclamation de la mobilisation Stojan Novaković ne put pas cacher son enthousiasme : « La mobilisation est là et avec elle quelque chose de sublime et beau, à ce qu’en ne peut pas se réjouir et s’admirer suffisamment : l’alliance et l’entente des États balkaniques. » Narodna skupština u vanrednom sazivu (I i II prethodni i I, II i III redovni sastanak održani 20, 22, 24 i 30. septembra 1912. godine) [L’Assemblée nationale, session extraordinaire] (Belgrade, 1913), 11.
visionnaires le prince Michel Obrenović et le ministre Ilija Garašanin, aux-quelles il aspirait également. Sur la proposition du président du gouverne-
ment Nikola Pašić, il était en tant que diplomate expérimenté et excellent
connaissance des Balkans en tête de la délégation serbe à la conférence de
paix à Londres, la conférence qui avait pour but de conclure la paix et de dé-
cider sur les résultats de la guerre. Pendant la conférence, Novaković s’avéra
le négociateur ferme et patient, résolu pour que la Serbie ne perdit pas à la
table ce qu’elle acquit par les armes. Par son comportement pondéré, tolé-
rance et sens d’harmoniser des opinions différentes, il contribuait fortement
pour que l’attitude commune des États balkaniques à l’égard de l’Empire
ottoman se préservât à la conférence.69 Compte tenu que la conférence des
ambassadeurs des grandes puissances qui s’occupait de l’Albanie nouvel-
lement créée prenait également place à Londres, Novaković ne cessait de
rencontrer ses participants, de prier, conseiller, proposer, expliquer, dessiner
les cartes et tout cela afin que les frontières du nouveau pays ne fussent pas
déterminées au détriment de la Serbie.70 C’est son grand mérite d’avoir fait
preuve que Prizren, Peć, Djakovica et Debar devaient rester en Serbie et
que les frontières de l’Albanie n’étaient pas délimitées tant au détriment
de la Serbie que cela aurait pu être le cas. Compte tenu que la Serbie était
restée sans accès à l’Adriatique à cause de la création de l’Albanie, Stojan
Novaković pensait qu’il fallait faire la révision de la frontière serbo-bulgare
e Macédoine. Qui plus est, il conseilla Pašić de Londres d’abolir le traité
entre la Serbie et la Bulgarie, conclu en 1912, comme futile car étant dé-
passé par les événements, le conseil qui rencontra l’écho favorable auprès
du président du gouvernement. Ensuite, il suggéra que la Serbie gardât en
Macédoine les territoires qu’elle avait libérés dans la guerre.71 En effet, c’est
ce qui s’est passé bien que la Bulgarie ait violé elle-même le traité d’alliance
par les attaques armées sur les positions militaires serbes en Macédoine.
À la veille de la Première Guerre mondiale Stojan Novaković avertis-
sait souvent du danger que représentait pour la Serbie l’Autriche-Hongrie.
Il était presque persuadé que le conflit serait inévitable. Une fois la flamme
de guerre allumée il savait qu’il s’agissait d’un conflit historique. Juste après

69 Dokumenti o spoljnjoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914 [Documents sur la politique
(Belgrade, 1986), n° 463, 522. L’attitude commune manquait dans le cas des frontières
de l’Albanie. Selon Novaković, chacun était laissé de s’occuper de soi. Dokumenti o spo-
ljnjoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914, VI-1 (1/14 I – 31. III/13. IV 1913) (Belgrade,
1981), n° 47.

70 Dokumenti o spoljnjoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, V-3, n° 488, 496, 500, 527, 536, 596 ;
ibid. VI-1, n° 30, 35, 36, 38, 47.

71 Ibid. V-3, n° 442, 584, 621 ; ibid. VI-1, n° 48.
la déclaration de la guerre par l’Autriche-Hongrie à la Serbie, dans une réunion de Pašić avec les chefs des partis politiques tenue à Niš, Novaković resta conséquent en déclarant qu’il était indispensable d’oublier les conflits entre partis et que tous devraient « unir les forces pour sauver le pays »72. Sa sagesse et l’expérience d’homme d’État furent confirmées à la réunion secrète de l’Assemblée nationale à Niš en novembre 1914, lorsqu’il prévenait qu’il faudrait penser à la fin de la guerre et qu’il serait nécessaire, compte tenu des prétentions d’autres États sur certains territoires balkaniques, de préparer à l’heure les documents indispensables aux représentants serbes à la future conférence de paix.73 C’était, à vrai dire, son dernier engagement aux affaires de la politique étrangère.

V

Homme politique, diplomate, homme d’État et activiste national, dans son travail en politique étrangère de la Serbie Stojan Novaković s’intéressait le plus à la question serbe, la question la plus importante à résoudre. Il l’approchait par son éducation exceptionnelle d’un savant, mais aussi par sa grande expérience politique et par l’exaltation d’un patriote. En tant que savant, il fut également occupé par l’étude de la question serbe, mais il s’attachait à esquisser des parallèles entre l’histoire des Serbes et leur rôle dans les tendances balkaniques et européennes de son temps. Il s’occupait de l’histoire du peuple serbe à travers les siècles, mais il rédigeait également des études consacrées aux problèmes balkaniques de son époque où il définissait clairement ses points de vue sur la position de la Serbie à la fin du XIX° et au début du XX° siècle. Il contemplait l’avenir en pensant que le peuple serbe devrait apprendre de ses erreurs et suivre la voie des grands peuples et leurs civilisations. C’est grâce à sa recherche scientifique qu’il connaissait mieux l’essence de l’actualité contemporaine. En effet, Stojan Novaković fut le meilleur représentant des droits historiques du peuple serbe à la fois dans la science et dans la vie politique. C’était son fil conducteur dans son travail dans le domaine de la politique étrangère de la Serbie pendant plusieurs décennies donnant à cette politique la direction qui, selon le jugement de ses contemporains, effaça la différence entre elle et les aspirations du peuple.

Stojan Novaković — dans ses considérations sur la politique étrangère de la Serbie, dans les études qu’il publiait ou en travaillant longuement et patiemment à Constantinople, en se luttant pour chaque école, livre, église, chaque métropolite en Vieille Serbie et en Macédoine, où en insistant en

72 P. M. Draškić, Memoari [Mémoires] (Belgrade, 1990), 95.

L’analyse des mouvements intérieurs dans les Balkans de Novaković et sa vision de l’avenir correspondaient aux représentations de ces processus sur un plan européen plus vaste. Le problème central, selon lui, représente la dispersion d’un peuple en plusieurs parties qui se développent dans des conditions différentes. Il faut y ajouter la division des pays balkaniques avec des intérêts croisés. Le coupable majeur, Novaković le trouva dans le dé-

75 Ibid. XXVI, 601.
M. Vojvodić, Stojan Novaković et la politique étrangère de la Serbie

veloppement même du processus de la libération nationale dans le passé récent. Lorsqu’au XIXe siècle les pays balkaniques se libérèrent, ce n’était que partiellement, se séparant des ensembles de leur peuple. Leur développement suivait donc une voie indépendante par rapport aux compatriotes qui étaient restés, par exemple, en Empire ottoman. Qui plus est, les circonstances les divisaient de plus en plus et les uns n’étaient plus capables de suivre les autres. L’exemple le plus drastique était celui du peuple serbe. D’autres changements ont également vu le jour. Les séparatismes et les antagonismes entre les pays balkaniques l’ont emporté, souligne Novaković, ce qui amenait de l’eau au moulin des grandes puissances et de leurs intérêts expansionnistes. C’est pourquoi il avertit que la discordes des États balkaniques toujours imposait aux Balkans une puissance étrangère. Pour l’alternative à un nouvel envahisseur dans les Balkans, Novaković propose l’entente des États balkaniques. Selon lui, les États balkaniques doivent entrer sur la scène européenne avec des solutions préparées, ce qui veut dire libérer l’espace de la Turquie en Europe par leurs propres moyens et solidairement. Il proposa la division du territoire libéré qui ne suivrait pas l’ethnographie, car si les frontières des États balkaniques étaient définies selon ce principe, elles ressembleraient à la dentelle qui remplirait presque toute la carte géographique. Il proposait que la libération des territoires balkaniques et la limitation des frontières entre les États balkaniques se réalisassent sur la base de l’équilibre du pouvoir et de la compréhension des intérêts particuliers et communs, ce qui conduirait vers la confédération balkanique. C’était la clé des questions serbe, yougoslave et balkanique. Novaković ainsi signala le concept de l’alliance des États balkaniques dont le partisan il resterait jusqu’à la fin de sa vie. Compte tenu que cette alliance fut réalisée en 1912, Stojan Novaković peut être considéré comme son père spirituel. Il en va de même pour la guerre balkanique qui mettra fin à la Question d’Orient.

Novaković voyait son idéal de la réalisation complète de la question serbe, qui était au fond de son engagement dans la politique étrangère de la Serbie, dans la création, avant tout, de l’État serbe. Selon lui, c’était le but auquel tous les hommes d’État serbes devaient aspirer. Dans l’entretien qu’il accorda au journaliste du Figaro en 1897, il présenta la structure de cette

76 Ibid. XXV, 73 ; S. Novaković, « Srpske i bugarske raspre povodom jednog bugarskog spisa o Hilandaru » [Les querelles serbes et bulgares au sujet d’un manuscrit bulgare sur Chilandar], in Balkanska pitanja i manje istorijsko-političke beleške o Balkanskom poluostrovu 1886–1905 [Les questions balkaniques et brèves notes historiques et politiques sur la Péninsule balkanique 1886–1905] (Belgrade, 1906), 498.

77 Šar-Planinac, « Grške misli o etnografiji Balkanskog poluostrova », XXVI, 622.

Novaković avait soigneusement étudié et formulé la question serbe pendant la crise d’annexion en 1908/09, au moment du grand choc ressenti par le peuple serbe à cause de l’annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine par l’Autriche-Hongrie. Il le faisait dans ses articles et entretiens dans les journaux, mais aussi dans ses discours aux séances de l’Assemblée nationale. L’annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, estimait-il, était un fait dangereux pour les Serbes dans leur totalité ; il lui semblait urgent que la question serbe fût présentée à l’échelle européenne dans son intégralité afin de faire connaître les aspirations de ce peuple et d’éveiller l’intérêt pour son destin. C’était le programme pour l’avenir qui exigeait d’y incorporer tout sans gêne. « C’est à nous en ce moment difficile et désagréable de notre vie nationale » — dit Novaković à l’Assemblée nationale le 2 janvier 1909 — « de poser la question serbe, laissant de côté toute opportunité et toute réserve. Le peuple doit avoir un programme…pour entrer dans l’avenir ».

Présenter la question serbe sur la scène européenne signifiait pour Novaković essentiellement de demander pour les Serbes hors la Serbie la satisfaction des leurs besoins politiques, économiques et culturels y compris la reconnaissance de l’autonomie. Stojan Novaković le fit sans hésitation dans ses articles et déclarations dans la presse en montrant ses points de vue à l’égard de la réalisation de la question serbe. L’idée essentielle qu’il développait, et qui provenait de ses idées du début des années 1890, c’était que l’unité du peuple serbe pourrait être accomplie malgré les obstacles politiques et en dépit des frontières étatiques délimitées entre les différents groupements du peuple serbe. En suivant les exemples de l’unification italienne et allemande, lorsque l’unification spirituelle était fondée avant l’unification politique, grâce à l’unité de la culture, science, arts et littérature, le peuple serbe devrait — pensait Novaković — accomplir l’unification de ses composantes de plusieurs pays de par l’esprit, langue, conscience nationale, travail culturel et scolarisation. On utiliserait des instruments pacifiques, ceux auxquels le pouvoir étatique ne pourrait faire des obstacles. « C’est la bataille

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78 La revue progressiste Pogled [Le regard], n° 77, 10 septembre 1897, publia le texte intégral de l’entretien de Novaković dans le Figaro.

plus difficile que celle des armes, mais où il n'y a pas de défaites, la victoire
n'y manque pas, et une fois gagnée — elle est éternelle », disait Novaković,
en ajoutant qu'il fallait y se préparer depuis ses tendres années, chez soi, à
l'école, dans la rue.80 Si c'était le cas — croyait-il — les conséquences seraient
salutaires. Il n'excluait pas ni la voie militaire, mais il pensait que cette voie
paisible, par le livre, était de longue durée, plus forte et plus certaine. Il pou-
vait modifier cette attitude après les victoires éclatantes de l'armée serbe en
1914, qualifiant que des revirements plus importants se déroulent dans le
cas d'une guerre plus rapidement qu'en paix.81

En croyant qu'un jour les droits historiques du peuple serbe de la
libération et de l'unification seront satisfaits, sans égard si cela serait accom-
pli pacifiquement ou par des armes, Stojan Novaković ne cachait pas son
désir que l'avenir de ce peuple s'accordât avec les tendances générales du
développement européen. Fermement convaincu que le passé devrait être
la leçon pour l'avenir, il restait jusqu'à la fin de sa vie un grand partisan de
l'idée que le peuple serbe faudrait suivre des exemples des peuples européens
développés, même après la réalisation de la question serbe. « Nous devons
regarder le passé seulement pour trouver des erreurs et des exemples qu'il
faut éviter. Nous devons suivre la nouvelle lumière ouverte par de nouveaux
siècles et des exemples des grands peuples et civilisations. C'est uniquement
dans cette direction que nous trouvons notre futur salut »82, écrivait Stojan
Novaković en 1913.

Ni les idées de l'unification yougoslave ne lui étaient pas étrangères.
Il faut souligner, cependant, qu'elles se retrouvent dans les années ultérieures
de son activité politique. Il en dit long dans ses articles de 1908 et de 1909,
aussi que dans ses déclarations publiques, mais il ne les expose pas systéma-
tiquement. Dans les années qui suivaient, au temps où le conflit militaire
entre les puissances qui pourrait résulter par des grands détours dans les
Balkans était de plus en plus accentué, ces idées trouvent un écho favorable
chez lui plus comme une vision que comme le vrai programme. Suite au
déclenchement de la guerre en 1914, un changement important dans sa
pensée se manifeste. « La défense de la Serbie et l'unification des Serbes ne
représentent plus rien dans ce conflit mondial. Mon rêve, ma vision de la
Yougoslavie sont à l'ordre du jour »83, déclarait Stojan Novaković en janvier
1915 à Niš, dans l'entretien à son fidèle Djurdje Jelenić. Il écrivait de cette

80 Novaković, Najnovija balkanska kriza i srpsko pitanje, 99–100.
81 Dj. Jelenić, « Tri istorijska amaneta » [Trois dernières volontés historiques], Politika n°
7496, le 14 mars 1929, p. 1.
82 S. Novaković, Nekolika teža pitanja iz srpske istorije [Quelques questions difficiles de
l'histoire serbe], II (Belgrade, 1913), 40.
83 Jelenić, « Tri istorijska amaneta », 1.
orientation pour un nouvel État yougoslave dans les pages de son étude *Les problèmes yougoslaves dans le passé et dans l’actualité*, terminée quelques jours avant sa mort en février 1915, publiée la même année par les soins de son fils Mileta Novaković dans la *Revue de Paris* sous le titre *Problèmes yougo-slaves*.

Il voyait le nouvel État composé des pays serbes, croates et slovènes, mais il laissait ouverte la forme de l’union. Pourtant, ces mots à l’égard de l’avenir commun, prononcés les derniers jours de sa vie et notés par Djurdje Jelenić sonnent comme un avertissement : « La seule chose que j’aurais à craindre en avance c’est : les Serbes et les Croates — pour autant que je les connaisse — seraient-ils en mesure de préserver et de maintenir notre nouvel État ».


Dardanus [Stojan Novaković]. « Ekonomska nezavisnost ». Videlo no 38, le 16 mai 1906.
— « Ekonomska emancipacija ». Videlo no 41, le 19 mai 1906.
— « Sloboda trgovanja ». Videlo no 51, le 2 juin 1906.
— « Naša trgovina ». Videlo no 57, le 9 juin 1906.
— « Makedonija », I–III. Videlo no 2, le 2 avril 1906; no 3, le 5 avril 1906; no 8, le 11 avril 1906.
— « Novopazarski sandžak ». Videlo no 11, 14 avril 1906.
— « Grabež oko Balkanskog poluostrva ». Videlo no 48, le 30 mai 1906.


Jelenić, Djurdje. « Tri istorijska amaneta ». Politika, no 7496, le 14 mars 1929.


— Katolička crkva u Srbiji. Belgrade, 1907.
— « Memoar o planu kojim da se povedu poslovi zemaljski ». Nedeljni pregled no 6 (43), le 8 février 1909.
Najnovija balkanska kriza i srpsko pitanje. Belgrade, 1910.


Croatian Pretensions to Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1848

Abstract: Since the early 1860s many Croat politicians, both prominent (from Ante Starčević and Ante Pavelić to Franjo Tuđman) and little known, have been openly expressing the ambition to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia at a favourable moment and under certain conditions, invoking Croatian state and historical right in support of their pretensions. These pretensions, born out of the belief that the unfortunately shaped territory of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia lacks the necessary strategic depth, have led to a fully-fledged strategy for creating an ethnically and religiously pure Greater Croatia and to constant conflict with the Serb side which also lays claims, predominantly ethnic, to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Keywords: Croatia, Greater Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, territorial pretensions, Croatian state and historical right, Serbs, Serbia, geopolitics

The alarmist thesis about the Serbs’ purported hegemonic intentions and aspirations for a Greater Serbia, coming from Croatia for more than a century and a half, has been a leitmotif threaded through every anti-Serb public statement or action both at home and abroad. It seeks to depict both the Serbs as a group and Serbia as territorially insatiable aggressors, while concealing own aggression and own, ethnically and historically unfounded, pretensions to someone else’s territories. Although not new in Croatian politics, this tactic has not been given due attention and explanation in historiography. It is, in fact, a legacy of Austria-Hungary, whose vilification of the Serb aspiration for freedom and unification was directly proportionate to its territorial appetites in the Balkans and its growing support for the German policy of eastward expansion. Austria-Hungary invariably labelled whatever was Serbian as Greater Serbian in order to nip in the bud any attempt of the Serbs to pursue their interests, which were at variance with its own. This tradition of Austro-Hungarian politics, in which Croats participated and frequently led the way, has been perpetuated and Serbian politics denounced and invariably branded as being Greater Serbian in all historical

1 For this see Izvori velikosrpske agresije, ed. B. Čović (texts by Miroslav Brandt, Bože Čović, Slaven Letica, Radovan Pavić, Zdravko Tomac, Mirko Valentić and Stanko Žuljić) (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1991). To the same category of publications belong Mirko Grmek, Mare Djidara & Neven Šimac, Le nettoyage ethnique. Documents historiques sur une idéologie serbe (Librairie Arthémé Fayard, 1993) and Stjepan Murgić, Tomislav Bogdanić & Stipan Budimir, Kontrapunkt slobode (Zagreb: Pisanni Nikkal, 1997).
periods since the 1848 revolution. Attacking Serbism and Greater Serbism, which they saw as the main rival to Croatism and Greater Croatism, Croat politicians were not just fantasizing about a Greater Croatia, they worked towards that end persistently and consistently, convinced that all means are permitted, including the genocidal annihilation of Serbs.

The aspiration for Croatia’s territorial enlargement is of an older date. Numerically not too strong and territorially small, the Croat people harboured imperial ambitions. This can be clearly seen from the names such as “Alpine or Mountain Croats” (Slovenes); “Orthodox Croats” (Serbs); “indisputable Croats” or “the jewel of the Croat people” (Muslims); or “Turkish Croatia”, “Red Croatia”, “White Croatia” and “Carantanian Croatia”, referring to parts of Bosnia, to Montenegro, Dalmatia and Slovenia respectively. Over time, these appellations have been carefully nurtured and planted into the minds of Croats in order to instigate their belief in the greatness of Croatia and the great numerical strength of the Croat population.

Imbro Ignjatijević Tkalac warns as early as 1866 that states cannot be founded “on old title deeds and ‘virtual’ territorial claims”; but a policy premised on state and historical right could not be other than Greater Croatian. In 1861, the Croatian Diet invokes Croatian state and historical right to raise the claim of the Triune Kingdom to a portion of the Slavic lands and to its provinces in the Ottoman Empire — i.e. to Bosnia and Herzegovina — which should be reunited with the Triune Kingdom in the process of settling the “Eastern question”.² In 1878–81, the Diet hails the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and expresses hopes that conditions may be created for joining Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Triune Kingdom within the dualist Habsburg Monarchy.³ Don Mihovil Pavlinović hails the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, hopeful that these lands may soon be annexed to Croatia, and is disappointed when his hopes proved illusory.⁴ The scale of territorial ambitions premised on Croatian state and historical right can be seen from the article “What is the true Croatian policy and who is its proponent” published in the newspaper of the Party of Right [Stranka prava / SP] Hrvatska (no.

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² Spisi saborski i sabora kraljevinah Dalmacije, Hrvatske i Slavonije od god. 1861, ed. and pub. by Bar. Dragojlo Kušlan and Dr. Mirko Šuhaj (Zagreb 1862), vol. II, 32–34: I 16.
“The lands encompassed by the state right of the Croats, by history and by nationality, stretch: from Germany to Macedonia, from the Danube to the [Adriatic] sea, and the names of the present-day individual provinces are: Southern Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorizia, Istria, Croatia, Slavonia, Krajina [Military Frontier], Dalmatia, Upper Albania, Montenegro, Herzegovina, Bosnia, Rascia, Serbia — and all these go by one true name: the State of Croatia. These lands extend over more than 4,000 square miles, and the population numbers up to 8 million souls.”

The stance held by Hrvatska was not lonely. It was not the product of an irresponsible journalist or politician. Nor did it reflect a passing trend. Rather, it was the natural result of a deep-rooted and widely accepted belief. As early as 1869 Eugen Kvaternik, a key figure of the Party of Right along with Ante Starčević, writes to Mihovil Pavlinović that, should their party policy be followed, should Croat state and historical right be acknowledged, then “soon the flag of pure, unspoiled Croatia will fly, not from the Drava to the sea but from the Salzburg-Tyrol Alps to Kosovo and Albania!”5 Kvaternik’s Greater Croatian ambitions — which covered Styria, Carniola, Gorizia and Istria, almost all of Bosnia “as far as Mt Romanija and Višegrad, and half of [H]Erzegovina, as far as the rivers Neretva and Buna”— were clearly stated in his book La Croatie et la confédération italienne (Paris 1859), and were the reason why his contemporary, Alexander Hilferding, a renowned Russian historian, ethnographer and linguist, levelled harsh criticisms at the book, arguing that no historical right could entitle the Croats to take the lands that were not theirs, that it would be sheer robbery inevitably pushing the kindred Slavic peoples into a conflict.

Carefully analyzing Kvaternik’s text, Hilferding comes to the conclusion that the Croats have set themselves the goal of taking control of the neighbouring areas with the assistance of Western Europe. That is why they are humble before Western Europe, and “arrogant and intolerant towards their fellow Slavs”. Hilferding advises the Croats “not to humiliate themselves before Western Europe and not to harbour arrogance and intolerance towards their fellow Slavs, but a sense of unity and love”.6 Hilferding’s well-intentioned message, imbued in pan-Slavic feelings, received no response from those it was addressed to.

Driven by expansionist territorial ambitions and “armed” with state and historical right, the “Croat academic youth”, behind whom stood the father of the homeland, Ante Starčević, saw not only Bosnia and Herzegov-

6 Hilferding’s review was originally published in the Russkaia beseda in 1860, and the Belgrade-based Srbske novine brought a translation in a separate issue.
ina as Croat lands, but also “the whole of Albania, and the whole of Rašija [Raška/Rascia], and the whole of upper Moesia or present-day Serbia”. A proponent of this policy, which Franjo Rački termed “specific Croatism”, writes that “the Croatian king is called upon to set a cross on the church of St Sophia in Constantinople”.8

In late 1875 Croatian university students of Starčevićan orientation, stating that Bosnia and Herzegovina are the hinterland of Dalmatia and belong among the lands of the crown of Zvonimir, publish a map titled: “Croatian state, published on the occasion of the 800th anniversary of the coronation of Zvonimir, king of all Croats”. Apart from what then was the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia, the map also encompasses Istria, Carinthia, Carniola, most of Styria, Bosnia and Herzegovina as far as the Drina, as well as the area that would be incorporated into Montenegro in 1878.9 In his geography of Bosnia published in 1878, the historian Vjekoslav Klaić, a sympathizer of the Party of Right, describes the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Croat, including the “Mohammedan Croats”. Referring to the “Christian Croats” (i.e. Roman Catholics) and the “Eastern-Greek Croats” (i.e. Serbs), he says that they lost their free will as a result of centuries of enslavement.10

In the book *Croat Nationality or the Soul of the Croat People* [*Hrvatska narodnost ili duša hrvatskog naroda*] published in 1879, the well-known Croatian author Djuro Deželić, a follower of the Party of Right, states that the following provinces are inhabited by Croats and “therefore [are] Croatian: all of present-day Dalmatia with Boka Kotorska [Gulf of Kotor], the vilayet of Bosnia, i.e. Bosnia with Turkish Croatia and the Pashalik of Novi Pazar (Rascija), present-day Herzegovina, which up to the source of the Neretva was called Turkish Dalmatia as early as 1789, when Engel11 was writing his history, and finally, Montenegro with Northern Albania”.12

The pretensions to Bosnia and Herzegovina were so strong that bishop Strossmayer wrote an embittered letter to Rački in 1878: “Our people

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11 Historian Johann Christian Engel (1770–1814).
12 See pp. 179 and 180 of Deželić’s book.
V. Dj. Krestić, Croatian Pretensions to Bosnia and Herzegovina

stare at Bosnia and Herzegovina like a stork at its egg, forgetting that our entire inner logic is against it. How can you expect to be liberated by the one who’d like to drown us in a drop of water…”13

Less than twenty years earlier, Strossmayer, still not disillusioned with Austria and its policy towards Croatia and Croats, seeks, in his confidential memoranda to the Austrian minister-president Count Johann Rechsberg, to motivate political factors in Vienna to engage more actively in resolving the Eastern Question, suggesting that Bosnia and Herzegovina would, with the help of Croats and the Military Frontier, “fall into their hands like a ripe plum”.14 The bishop’s offer of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria was motivated by his wish for them to be wrested from the Ottoman Empire and annexed to Croatia when it would become possible. In 1879, he writes to Marijan Marković, bishop of Banjaluka: “What is Bosnia’s is Croatia’s, and what is Croatia’s is Bosnia’s.”15 If one remembers that Strossmayer based his entire politics on Croat state and historical right, his position on the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes easy to understand.

The Greater Croatian aspirations are obvious in the programmes of the Party of Right too. The first article of the party programme adopted at the party convention held in Zagreb on 26 June 1891, and signed by Ante Starčević with his 250 followers, states: “The Party of Right will, on the grounds of state right and the nationality principle, use all legal means to have the Croat people, who lives in Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, in Rijeka with the kotar [district] and in Medjumurje, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Istria, united into a single state body within the Habsburg Monarchy, and it will support with all its might the striving of the fellow Slovenes for the Slovenian lands to join this state body.”16 The first article of the 1894 party programme states: “Croat state and natural right must be exercised: by establishing the wholeness of the kingdom of Croatia through the unification of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Rieka, Medjumurje, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Istria, Carniola, Carinthia and Styria within the Habsburg Monarchy.”17

13 Ibid.

14 V. Krestić, “Koncepcije Josipa Jurja Štrosmajera o istočnom pitanju”, Istraživanja 5 (Novi Sad 1976), 400.

15 Ivan Mužić, Hrvatska politika i jugoslavenska ideja (Split 1969), 29.


17 Dr Sime Mazzura & Dr Marijan Derenčin, Programi oporbenih stranaka u Hrvatskoj (reproduced from the Obzor) (Zagreb 1894), 12 (italics mine). August Harambašić, a noted Croat poet and prominent member of the Party of Right, in a speech he gave in 1890, expected the cheer “Long live Croatia!” would resound from Triglav to the Timok, and from the Soča to the Balkans.
The formulation “establishing the wholeness of the kingdom of Croatia” and uniting it with the cited regions implies that these regions used to be united at some point in the past. However, the desire to create a Greater Croatia led the Party of Rights to falsify the past, and not only in this programme but also in a number of other cases. Croatian territorial claims covered three categories of lands. One encompassed those that constituted the “real extent”, or what then was Croatia and Slavonia with the city of Rijeka and its environs; a second encompassed the lands claimed on the grounds of the so-called virtual right: Medjumurje, Dalmatia, the Kvarner Islands, a part of Istria, and parts of north-eastern Bosnia; while a third encompassed the lands that Greater Croatian circles wished to see as part of Croatia on the grounds of “Croat state and historical right”. The 1894 programme of the Party of Right included Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, even though they had never formed part of Croatia. Anyway, in the second half of the nineteenth century the project for the phased creation of a Greater Croatia was fully developed, so that in the subsequent decades, strategies and tactics for achieving the objective needed only to be elaborated and supplemented.

In late 1902 the well-known Croatian politician, jurist and author Marijan Derenčin, advocating the expansion of Croatia, is ready to declare the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while generously acknowledging Serbia’s right to expand towards the south.\textsuperscript{18}

In early 1908, Iso Kršnjavi, a prominent member of the Pure Party of Right [Čista stranka prava / ČSP], makes a suggestion to Zanantoni, chief of staff to the Zagreb-stationed corps, that “for the dynasty and monarchy to forever have an unconditionally reliable and safe stronghold in all directions, towards the inside and towards the outside, Bosnia and Herzegovina should be united into a single state body with Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, and placed under the administration of an absolutely reliable person who would carry out Bosnia’s transition to a constitutional system in a way similar to how Count Pejačević, as ban and commissioner, annexed the Military Frontier of Croatia back in his time”.\textsuperscript{19} As for Kršnjavi, he believes that the Greater Croatia idea is nothing other than “a bit shrunken Yugoslav

\textsuperscript{18} Iso Kršnjavi (\textit{Zapisci}, 234–235) reacted in the following way: “So, the merryman [Derenčin] is giving us Bosnia, plus the right to expand westwards. We haven’t even fully digested the Military Frontier yet, and the Serbs who came with it, so what would we do with the Serbs in Bosnia? ‘Septemvirize’ them too? Bosnia hasn’t been formally ceded to our monarchy yet, there the sultan is sovereign. How has Dr. Derenčin come to appropriate someone else’s property? — He’d say: Sultan, so what! Bosnia’s ours!”

\textsuperscript{19} Kršnjavi, \textit{Zapisci}, 510.
idea” which is easier to fulfil than the ambitious Yugoslav idea. In 1909, to smooth the way for Croatia to take hold of Bosnia, he suggests that Josip Stadler, archbishop of Vrhbosna seated at Sarajevo, should assume the office of bishop of Djakovo so that the “unity of the clergy in Bosnia” may be achieved. He argues that Croats need Bosnians because the latter are hardy, honest and reliable. From his perspective: “Anti-Serbism is here what anti-Semitism is elsewhere. Self-defence!”

During the crisis caused by the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Josip Frank, the leader of the Pure Party of Right, advocates the reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy in the trialist mode, with Croatia enlarged with Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Greater Croatia, constituting its third entity. He hails the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, believing that it forestalls the possibility of their being annexed by Serbia and paves the way for reshaping the Monarchy and for achieving his party objective, that of unification of Croatia and Dalmatia with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Frank begins to muster volunteers for the so-called Croatian People’s Legion [Hrvatska narodna legija], which would repel Serbia’s regular and paramilitary units allegedly planning to make incursions into Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some of the Muslim members of Frank’s party show readiness to shed their blood for the cause of “unification of all Croatian lands”. At a conference held in Zagreb in November 1908, it could be heard that “thousands of Croatian Muslims [are ready] to rush to the Drina under the Croatian flag to defend the Croatian holies and the legacy of their ancestors”. At the same time, the Committee of the religious and cultural Croat People’s Union [Hrvatska narodna zajednica / HDZ] draws up a programme known as “Points”, explicitly stating that “Bosnia and Herzegovina are Croatian lands in ethnic and state right terms”, and that “the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats naturally aspire to unite Bosnia and Herze-

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20 Ibid. vol. I, 212.
21 Ibid. vol. II, 504, 568 and 587.
22 Marko Trogrlić, “Hrvatska i ‘Hrvatsko pitanje’ u korespondenciji Franka i Moritza von Auffenberg-Komárova (1908.–1910.)”, in Pravaška misao i politika (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2007), 168, 171–174. As early as 1890 Frank, in a speech he gave at the party club, advocated the unification of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, the “Croatian parts” Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Frank saw them united into a state within a federally organized, i.e. trialist monarchy.
23 Zlatko Hasanbegović, “Islam i muslimani u pravaškoj ideologiji: o pokušaju gradnje ‘pravaške’ džamije u Zagrebu 1908”, in Pravaška misao i politika, 93.
24 On Frank’s mustering of volunteers to be used as a tool for Croatia to grab hold of Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Kršnjavi, Zapisi, vol. II, 546–547 and 558.
25 Ibid.
govina with Croatia, within the Habsburg Monarchy”.

26 The Croat Catholic Association [Hrvatska katolička udruga], founded in 1910, also adopts as one of its goals the article from the programme of the Party of Right relating to the unification of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatia. The main promoter of Frank’s version of Rightism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially during the First World War, Josip Stadler, archbishop of Vrhbosna, advocates the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia.

There have been all sorts of justifications — historical, natural, ethnic, geographic, economic, geopolitical etc. — for each object of Croatian territorial hunger (such as, say, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vojvodina, parts of Slovenia, Montenegro), and a smoothly working mechanism developed in their support. Every pretension or claim by others on what they staked a claim themselves was fiercely criticized and condemned; a method which has been in use since the mid-nineteenth century is the demonization of the Serbs: the Serbs are described as a people of villains and brigands, byzantine cunning, primitive and devious; they are Šumadijan [central Serbian] bandits and chetniks. Croats, on the other hand, are a cultured, humane and peace-loving people; the territories they claim belong to them on various grounds, whereas Serbs wish to seize them without any grounds, for the simple reason that they are marauders, a disruptive factor, a source of crises, unrests and wars.

With amazing persistence, using proven methods, unchallenged or even aided by Belgrade’s short-sighted policies, they raised their Greater Croatian pretentions to the rank of a justified and legitimate right. Once this was accomplished, they did not even try to conceal the readiness to achieve their national and state demands at all costs, even by brutal force. The Serbs failed to work out an appropriate response to such

26 Zlatko Matijević, “Politika i sudbina: dr. Ivo Pilar i njegova borba za samostojnost hrvatskog naroda”, in Pravaška misao i politika, 216.
28 Ibid. 188 ff.
29 Cf. e.g. L. V. Südland, Južnoslavensko pitanje (Zagreb 1943), 383; Dr Ante Pavelić, Putem Hrvatskog Državnog prava (Buenos Aires — Madrid 1977), 486; Petar Vučić, Politička sudbina Hrvatske. Geopolitičke i geostrateške karakteristike Hrvatske (Zagreb 1995), 156.
30 As early as 1911, the Starčevićan youth emphasized, in article 7 of its Young Croat Programme (Riječ mlade Hrvatske, Hrvatskom djaštvu i svemu narodu posvećuje Starčevićanska mladost [Zagreb 1911], 4; italics mine): “Young Croats, as the staunchest champion of radical Greater Croatian propaganda, which will encompass all Croat lands mentioned in the political programme, as well as all Croat settlements, will mostly
a challenge. Enthusiastic about the Yugoslav idea, genuine and gullible proponents of brotherhood and unity, they were always a step behind.

The newspaper of the Croat community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Hrvatski dnevnik* (Croat Journal), which held a purely racial stance on territorial issues, brought a series of articles about the affiliation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The articles were assembled in a booklet titled *Croatian Bosnia (Us and “them over there”)* [*Hrvatska Bosna (Mi i “oni tamo”)*] published in Sarajevo in 1907. The opening pages of this toxically Frankist-clericalist [*franko-furtimaisi*] reading state:

A whole series of features of Bosnia’s geographic, ethnographic and historical situation clearly mark its political position in relation to the monarchy, and the political symbolism of Croatdom in Bosnia even more clearly. It represents a link between the monarchy and Bosnia which may have given in the most difficult historical disasters but has never broken. It represents the ethnic link between the territory where the Croat tribe founded its true if still small state with present-day Croatia; it represents the link which entitles our king, in state-right terms, to feel a ruler and not a mandatary in Bosnia, briefly: only Croatdom, be it of the Christian or Islamic faith, is the element entitled to span the gap that there is between Europe and the Balkans.

This feeling is seething and living inside each of us, clearly setting us our task in the course of historical and cultural development: first and foremost to bring Bosnia closer to Croatia, to pave the way to the monarchy and into the heart of Europe, the way which, wherever to you may go from Bosnia, leads only via Croatia. In that way Croatdom will resurrect again, because the link of blood is the link stronger than steel!

That we shall have to fight along the way is known to all: here we are, fighting for a long time the eternal battle against the elements which gravitate towards the other side of the fatal gap described above, which are being driven out of the union with the monarchy by some irresistible centrifugal force, which only yesterday met the authorities under the mask of loyalty, and today are weaving webs and throwing them across the Drina, which call us, Croats, their brothers so that they can, in the brotherly embrace, take away our historical rights and our nationality, and sell them — at Terazije [centre of Belgrade]!

But we are still on this side of the divide, and they over there will stay on the other! [pp. 5–6; italics mine]

This is the kind of feeling that Greater Croatian circles were imbued with. What relations were supposed to be like in the big country longed for and fantasized about for centuries can be seen from the newspaper *Hrvatsstvo* [Croatdom]. The first issue, released in Zagreb on 2 May 1904, brings,
among other things, the following: “We shall fight for the independence of the Roman Catholic Church, for its rights and institutions, against every attack, wherever it may come from. Our task will be [to ensure] that our entire public social life is revived and reborn in Jesus Christ […] We shall strive to ensure, through constitutional means, the organic extension of Croat state right […] In the Croat lands, we recognize only one political people: Croat, only one flag: Croat, only one official language: Croat.”

Fiercely attacking the Croats willing to team up with Serbs, Hrvatsstvo wrote:

Here, Christ, there, the Antichrist. Here, pure and glorious Croatdom under the Croat flag, there, a chaos of mindless principles and a muddle of various flags. Here, pride, inherited from the ancient Croats, who would not cede an inch of their land without bloodshed, and there, people who are giving Croat lands dewed with Croat blood away like old rags, all in the name of some ostensible concord, to those who would rather have their right hand cut off than hear of any concord with their brother. Some brotherhood indeed!

The gap between Serbs and Croats will grow deeper because of us! That is what you are telling us too.

And who has ever spanned that gap? You? When and where? You’ve had plenty of time! So, where is that concord? The kind of concord some Serbs want to strike with you is the kind every ox can strike with its butcher. All it has to do is lay its head under his axe. We simply don’t need that kind of concord, because we’d cease being what we are and what we want to be — Croats […] as for their [Serb] political usurpations, we cannot get along with them until they acknowledge to the Croat lands that which belongs to them according to the compromise [of 1868]: one Croat flag, one Croat language, in a word, one political people, Croat.”

Even towards the very end of the First World War, when it was obvious that the Central Powers were defeated and the Habsburg Monarchy on the brink of disintegration, hopes that a Greater Croatia was possible were not given up, as evidenced by a note that Iso Kršnjavi wrote down on 25 October 1918: “I’ve spoken with the government secretary Andres31 today, and he says there’s been word in government circles that an imperial manifesto recognizing a free greater Croatian state is going to be announced tomorrow. This state will encompass Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia with Rijeka, and Medjimurje, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina. Perhaps Istria too. And the emperor will allegedly visit Zagreb a few days later.”32

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31 Ivan Andres (1883–1959), a politician, lawyer and legal writer.
Several prominent Croat politicians, besides those already mentioned, openly expressed the intention to have Bosnia and Herzegovina annexed to Croatia. For example, Stjepan Radić, having fled the country, had a written proposal stating the “demands of Croats vis-à-vis Serbs” delivered to a Briton. The proposal envisaged “full independence of Croatia (Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia) in a confederation with Serbia on the basis of the Entente through an accord which would leave up to Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bačka, Banat, Montenegro and Macedonia to decide freely by plebiscite if they wish to remain tied to militarist and centralist Serbia or enter a federation with peaceful and neutral Croatia”. At about the same time (on 23 September 1923) Radić, still in London, asks of the Presidency of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (Hrvatska republikaanska seljačka stranka / HRSS) to have the Map: Croatia and Croats drawn up. Besides Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Medjumurje, Prekomurje “with Krka and Kastav”, the map was supposed to contain all former Austro-Hungarian lands: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bačka, Banat and Baranja, and even Montenegro and Macedonia. In his instructions for drawing up this map, which was obviously intended mostly for foreigners because it was to have annotations in French or English, Radić stresses: “In the area from Subotica to the Adriatic Sea, all districts where Croats account for more than 50% of the population are to be marked in (in Bosnia, Muslim and Catholic Croats are, naturally, counted together) blue shades, and the Orthodox in red.”

By turning to the British and having the Map drawn, Radić obviously wanted to internationalize the Croat question. His written proposal depicts Serbia in dark colours as a militarist and centralist country which lacks democratic liberties and rights, a country with which a country as freedom- and peace-loving as Croatia cannot live in a state union. Presenting Serbia as inept and incapable of keeping all the listed provinces together, he recommends Croatia as the focal point around which these provinces — Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bačka, Banat, Montenegro and Macedonia — could gather on a federal basis. This appears to have been an overt attempt to break up the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and instead to lay down the foundations of the long-yearned-for Greater Croatia of which the Greater-Croatian ideologist Eugen Kvaternik had dreamt and written, the one “not from the Drava to the sea but from the Salzburg-Tyrol Alps to Kosovo and Albania”. That the latter conclusion is not far-fetched may be seen from a report of the British minister in Belgrade and his remark that there is in the mind of the “pan-Croat” a vision of a “powerful province”

33 Djordje Dj. Stanković, Pašić i Hrvati, 1918–1923 (Belgrade 1995), 310.
34 The original letter was in the possession of the late Dr Aleksandar Vlaškalić, through whose courtesy it was made available to me.
centred on Zagreb, which would consist of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, a
good part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Baranja, and a part of Bačka.\textsuperscript{35} While
making drafts of a new party programme (1925), Radić also intended to
change the boundaries of Bosnia in such a way that the Bosnian Sava Valley
\textit{(Posavina)} was annexed to Croatia. According to this project, the Gulf of
Kotor \textit{(Boka Kotorska)} would be detached from Croatia, but Croatia would
be given parts of Herzegovina in return.\textsuperscript{36}

After the end of the war in 1918, Ante Pavelić also frequently re-
verts to the question of Croatia’s territorial extent. The programme of the
Party of Right of 1 March 1919, behind which stood Pavelić, stresses that
the party will use “all legal means to ensure that all Croat lands (Croatia,
Slavonia, Dalmatia, Rijeka with the \textit{kotar}, Medjumurje, Prekomurje, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and Istria with the islands) are united, on the basis of
Croatian state right and the right to national self-determination, into one
independent Croatian state.”\textsuperscript{37} In the Pro-memoria he submitted in 1927
to Roberto Forges Davanzati, a member of the Grand Council of Fascism,
Bosnia and Herzegovina are incorporated into Croatia. The Pro-memoria
on Consultations Held in Budapest on 31 October 1927 states that the
“Croatian state encompasses Croatia with Medjumurje, Slavonia with
Syrmia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Dalmatia”. The draft pro-memoria
of September 1928, which was supposed to be signed by representatives “of
the Royal Italian government and the Croat people”, and which called for
constituting a Croat state, states that the latter will be composed of “Croat-
tia and Slavonia, Medjumurje, Dalmatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina”. In
article 2, the Italian government is called upon to acknowledge Croatia and
Slavonia with Medjumurje, Dalmatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina as be-
ing “historically Croat lands, and to support and help in every way the aspi-
ration of the Croat people for the creation of an independent state”. Pavelić
sees Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of Croatia in some of his published
writings as well, such as \textit{Die kroatischen Länder und ihre Bevölkerung} (1931),
or \textit{Die kroatische Frage} (1936). In the former case, this Croatia of his had an
area of 107,753 km\textsuperscript{2}, and in the latter about 107,000 km\textsuperscript{2}.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{35} Živko Avramovski, \textit{Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji: godišnji izveštaji Britanskog pos-
lanstva u Beogradu 1921–1938}, vol. I: \textit{1921–1930} (Belgrade — Zagreb 1986), 44; Sofija
Božić, \textit{Srbi u Hrvatskoj 1918–1929} (Belgrade 2008), 45.

\textsuperscript{36} “Zabilješka Marije Radić”, Zagreb, 23 March 1925, Bogdan Krizman, \textit{Korespondencija

\textsuperscript{37} Mario Jareb, \textit{Ustaško-domobranski pokret od nastanka do travnja 1941. godine} (Zagreb
2006), 165.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. 169.
In discussing the territorial extent of the Croatian state, Pavelić and his Ustasha followers invariably emphasize the Croat state and historical right to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croatia they envisage always stretches east to the Drina. Characteristic in that respect is Pavelić’s article “Bosnia is ours” published in 1932. Among other things, it says the following: “as far as Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, let Belgrade know […] that these are ancient Croat lands […] and that the Croat people will never let our lands be severed from the motherland, Croatia, that we shall all die rather than let the greater-Serbian moloch swallow them. Let Belgrade not forget that ancient Duvno Field [Duvanjsko polje] is in Bosnia, let it not forget that there is in Bosnia and Herzegovina a Croat Catholic-Muslim majority […] and let Belgrade know that the whole of Croatdom will fight to the last drop of blood for these lands of theirs, that they will surely cut off those covetous Belgrade hands that are reaching out for this Croatian jewel… Bosnia is Croatian and we will never give it up.”

Vladko Maček, the successor of Stjepan Radić, continued to pursue his predecessor’s Greater-Croatian policy. Even before Radić’s death (1928), in a speech he gave in 1923, he states that the “Croatian idea has spread […] from the Mura to Montenegro, from the Adriatic Sea to Zemun”, and that

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39 Ibid. 169 (italics mine).
40 Ibid. 179.
42 Jareb, Ustaško-domobranski pokret, 168–183.
now Bosnia too “has joined Croatian Dalmatia, which has for centuries wished to get in with her sister, Croatia”. His goal is a state composed of all former Austro-Hungarian South-Slavic provinces under Croatian leadership and, possibly, tied to Serbia in the form of an “association of interests”. Like Radić, he also advocates some form of plebiscite, motivated by the wish to divide the Kingdom of Yugoslavia into two parts, with the Drina as the boundary between them. According to a statement he made in 1936, each province: “Vojvodina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, even Dalmatia, may choose as they wish, i.e. as their representatives, elected in an election for a constituent assembly, should decide. In other words: if Vojvodina wants [to come together] with Serbia — fine, if it wants [to be] out of it, fine, if it wants with Croatia, together or separately, it’s fine again…”

A testimony to Maček’s growing territorial appetites has been left by Jovan Jovanović Pižon, leader of the Agrarian Party, who wrote down what Prince Paul Karadjordjević had told him. At a meeting between the Prince and Maček held before the Cvetković–Maček Agreement (1939), the Prince asked, “What do you think Croatia is?”, and Maček replied, “The banovinas of Primorje [Coast] and Sava.” At another meeting, Maček claimed Dubrovnik, and then Vrbas Banovina (with a ninety-percent Serb population). At a third meeting, Maček laid claim to Syrmia as far as Ilok, Brčko with its environs, Bijeljina, Travnik, Fojnica, and Herzegovina.

Even after the Cvetković–Maček Agreement of August 1939 created Banovina Croatia, ceding to it parts of western Bosnia (previously within Vrbas Banovina), Maček was not satisfied with the territorial extent of the new Banovina. He thought of the agreement as being “incomplete” and containing a number of debatable issues, notably territorial. Since, as he put it, the agreement “has not definitively settled the Croatian territorial question”, a provision was included that the definitive extent of Banovina Croatia will be determined at the reorganization of the state union. “And this is only natural,” Maček stressed, “because the territory of Banovina Croatia will look completely different depending on whether the reorganized state union includes, say, an autonomous Vojvodina or not, an autonomous Bosnia or not, etc.”

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43 Božidar Murgić, Dr Vladko Maček — vodja Hrvata (Zagreb n.d.), 34. Given this viewpoint of Maček, S. Božić, Srbi u Hrvatskoj, 49, rightly concludes that his idea of the borders of Greater Croatia was not in any way different from the borders proposed at the First Croatian Catholic Congress held in Zagreb in 1900.


45 Ranko Končar, Opozicione partije i autonomija Vojvodine 1929–1941 (Novi Sad 1995), 339.
The aspiration to expand Croatia to the greatest extent possible continued at the time of the Independent State of Croatia [Nezavisna Država Hrvatska/NDH] as well. Dissatisfied with its size, the Ustasha establishment sought to enlarge it through the mediation of Slavko Kvaternik, Pavelić’s deputy. In a telegram of 14 May 1941, the German minister in Zagreb Siegfried Kasche conveyed to his Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kvaternik’s request to expand “Croat” territories to the Albanian border, including the towns of Priboj, Prijepolje and Pljevlja. Kasche supported the request, arguing that “Croat troops have already been stationed there”. However, Italy objected. Count Ciano described the request as “Croat imperialism”, and in the diary entry of 30 June 1941, wrote: “Now Pavelić would like to have the Sanjak of Novi Pazar. An absurd, groundless demand. I’ve prepared a letter of rejection signed by the Duce.”

According to a book on the activity of the German Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst/BND), one of the key figures in the Yugoslav communist establishment, Ivan Stevo Krajačić, drew up, and at the time Josip Broz’s unlimited power was in full swing, a plan for creating “sovereign Croatia with Bosnia and Herzegovina” with borders matching those of the Independent State of Croatia in 1941. This may be seen as yet another proof of consistency in Greater-Croatian aspirations, especially those relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Political systems, state frames, forms of government and political leaders have been changing, but not the policy intent on drawing Croatia’s border along the Drina.

The geopolitical position of Croatia is involved in many issues that burdened, and continue to burden, Croato-Serbian relations. According to the generally held opinion of leading Croat politicians and geopoliticians, past and present, Croatia resembles a banana, a crescent or, as the well-known Croat historian Vjakoslav Klaić described it, a “sausage [its ends] well straddled apart”. In early 1909, hopeful to change it, Klaić develops a political programme according to which “Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Istria and the islands should unite”, forming an entity in which Croats would constitute a majority, and they should join Austria. A banana-shaped Croatia, in the view of practically all politically thinking Croats, has no chance of survival and progress. Antun Radić explains that “Dalmatia united with Croatia would look like crusts of a bread loaf, and the inside you’d scoop out would be Bosnia and Herzegovina hollowed out of the

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46 Smilja Avramov, Genocid u Jugoslaviji u svetlosti medjunarodnog prava (Belgrade 1992), 265.
47 Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, Der Schattenkrieger (Dusseldorf 1955), 213; Smilja Avramov, Postherojski rat zapada protiv Jugoslovije (Novi Sad 1997), 193–194.
Croatian bread [...] and if we want to be fully fed, we need the inside, we need Herzeg-Bosnia”.\textsuperscript{49} For Antun’s brother, Stjepan Radić, Bosnia is “like the bowels of the rest of Croatia. Well, take out a man’s bowels and tell him to live”. In the view of Frano Supilo: “Croatia without Bosnia will always be a toy in the hands of whoever rules the presently-occupied provinces [Bosnia and Herzegovina]”.\textsuperscript{50} Croat politicians believed that for economic and financial independence to become permanent takes achieving new territories. \textit{Hrvatski dnevnik} wrote in 1940: “Croatia in its present-day extent cannot last in permanence, for it needs some more parts for its own economic development.”\textsuperscript{51}

According to the most prominent and most highly esteemed Croat geopolitician of the interwar period, Ivo Pilar (who also wrote under pseudonyms L. v. Südland, Dr. Jurčić and Florian Lichtträger), “from the geopolitical perspective, the triune [kingdom] has no chance of surviving in national-political and economic-political terms without Bosnia and Herzegovina.”\textsuperscript{52} Pilar’s view expressed in the book \textit{The South-Slav Question}, which saw four editions within a few decades, two in German and two in Croatian, was that “Croatia and Slavonia separated from Bosnia and Dalmatia, their natural constituent parts, are a torso unable to survive”.\textsuperscript{53} In a booklet which considers the course the Croat people should take even before the end of the Great War, published in 1915 and reprinted in 1917, Pilar let it be known in no vague terms what the strategic goal of the Croats is and has to be: “The Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia with its long and narrow territory of very small depth, which stretches in two directions (Dalmatia, at places, only a few kilometres [deep]), are not at all able on their own to be the scene of any state and political creation and, in this form, have no future whatsoever as a national-political body. This realization was, in our view, the cause of that frantic quest for a broader framework for our national development before the year 1878; it was the cause behind the emergence of Illyrianism and Yugoslavism. The Triune Kingdom will have the basic requisites for existence only with Bosnia and Herzegovina joined to it. The Croat people in the Triune Kingdom itself has little prospect of

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Dom} no. 7, 4 April 1901.
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Hrvatski dnevnik} no. 1346, 30 January 1940.
\textsuperscript{52} Dr. Ivo Pilar, \textit{Politički zemljopis hrvatskih zemalja: geopolitička studija} (Sarajevo 1918), 21.
survival, and Bosnia and Herzegovina emerge as an essential requisite for the national survival and political development of the Croat people. Limited to the Triune Kingdom alone, the Croat people can only survive; it will be able to live only if it has Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Pilar’s view, Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia are the shell, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the core of Croatia.

A statement Pilar made in a conversation with Iso Kršnjavi, occasioned on 1 June 1918 by Pilar’s intention to found, with the archbishop Stadler, a new Croatian party in parallel with the Pure Party of Right, may provide some insight into him as a person and politician, and into his views of Serbs: “Serbs ought not rule, they should be treated as a subordinate nationality.”

In line with the shell-and-core view illustrated above, the fourth volume of the Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia published in 1960 by the Zagreb-based Lexicographical Institute of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, under the direction of Miroslav Krleža, contained the entry on Croatia which was accompanied by a map of this republic with the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all the way to the Drina, joined to it. The map accompanying the text on Serbia in the seventh volume of the Encyclopædia released in 1968 followed a different approach. Serbia was halted at the Drina, barely allowed to cross to the left bank of the river. In this, as in many other cases, Croatian geopolitical mania for Bosnia and Herzegovina came to the surface.

What the Lexicographical Institute did in the 1960s was neither new nor unusual when it comes to Croatian territorial pretensions towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. The tradition is more than a century old. As early as 1862, Josip Partaš prepared a geographic map according to a draft made by Franjo Kužić, titled “Historic map of the whole of the Kingdom of Croatia with boundaries of the now existing provinces and major ancient and more recent places.” The map shows Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, south-western parts of Serbia and south-eastern parts of Slovenia as lands of the Kingdom of Croatia.

At this point, it should be remembered that the First Croatian Catholic Congress held in Zagreb in 1900 produced a map showing the eastern

54 Dr. Juričić, Svjetski rat i Hrvati. Pokus orijentacije hrvatskoga naroda još prije svršetka rata (Zagreb 1915; and 1917), 65.
55 Pilar, Politiki zemljopis, 26.
56 Kršnjavi, Zapisci, 796.
57 Historički zemljovid cijelokupne Kraljevine Hrvatske sa označenjem granicab sada obstoječih pokrajina i navedenjem znamenitijih starih i novijih mjestab, printed in Zagreb by the well-known printing house of Dragutin Albrecht.
border of Greater Croatia stretching from Kotor on the Adriatic coast to Zemun at the confluence of the Danube and Sava rivers: Croat historians “rolled up their sleeves” and got down to proving that the entire area “has been a Croat ethnic space in history”.58

As much in keeping with the Greater Croatian aspiration to have Croatia’s eastern border on the Drina is an ethnographic map prepared by Nikola Zvonimir Bjelovučić in 1933, and published in his little book The Ethnographic Boundaries of Croats and Slovenes released in Dubrovnik in 1934. With its by no means small territorial enlargement, this map, titled “Ethnographic boundaries of Croats in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and adjacent countries”, irresistibly resembles the Independent State of Croatia under Ante Pavelić. This Croatia incorporates all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Gulf of Kotor and the Adriatic coast further south to Bar, western parts of Bačka, the Baja area in Hungary, parts of Hungary southeast of Pecs, a long tract of land along the left bank of the Drava from Sveti Martin in the east to Donja Lendava in the west, and all of Syrmia. Deliberately a broad-brush and imprecise depiction, Bjelovučić’s map was an expression of Greater Croatian territorial pretensions rather than a faithful reflection of the actual ethnic proportions. It encompassed all lands which were seen as belonging to Croatia by state and historical right. Ethnography was a pretext for making a public statement of Greater Croatian political goals in a blurred way.

With this summary overview of the subject which could otherwise be extensively discussed, even readers unfamiliar with the Greater Croatian ambitions harboured by earlier generations will not find it difficult to identify the sources and inspiration of the modern-day Croat politicians who believe that Croatia should be defended on the Drina (such as, for example, the late Dalibor Brozović, member of the Croatian Academy of Sciences, or Franjo Tudjman). They invoke Croatian state and historical right to claim, say, the Gulf of Kotor or Bačka, while at the same time wishing to preserve the internal boundaries between the federal units of the former Yugoslavia, popularly known as “AVNOJ boundaries”.

The answer to the central issue in relations between Croats and Serbs, as well as the causes of their occasional conflicts and, eventually, a war reside in the programme of the ideological predecessors of Pavelić’s Ustasha — the former Party of Right and the Frankists-clericalists — which championed a single flag, Croat, and a single political people, Croat, in one large Croat state.

Croatian politics was steeped in the ideas of Ivo Pilar, constituting the basis for its geostrategic goals and the national idea. Pilar’s geopolitical

58 Milorad Ekmečić, Srbija izmedju srednje Evrope i Evrope (Belgrade 1992), 98.
views and Greater Croatian aspirations found a consistent follower in the historical work of Dominik Mandić, whose attention was also focused on Bosnia seen as a Croatian land: “With its mountainous ranges, river routes and its entire geopolitical strength, B[osnia] and H[erzegovina] continue, fill up and territorially connect the northern, Pannonian, Croat lands with the southern, Adriatic, lands. Without B and H, Croat lands would be left torn apart, lacking natural communications and territorial wholeness. The river Drina with its deep bed and the surrounding high mountains closes up the Croat lands and separates them from the Serb lands and the central Balkans. It is the line along which the Romans divided the eastern and western Roman Empire; it is there that the eastern and western churches, western and eastern cultures are divided.\(^{59}\)

That Franjo Tudjman harboured Greater Croatian pretensions much before he became the president of Croatia can be seen from his 1977 “Draft of the Programme of the Croat National and Socialist Movement [Hrvatski narodni i socijalistički pokret / HNSP]”, published much later in his book Usudbene povijestice (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 1995): “It is true that the leadership of the HNSP starts from the reality of present-day boundaries of the republics, but it has to keep in mind that they were established to the detriment of Croatia in every respect […] Syrmia and the Gulf of Kotor were exempted from the historic borders of the Croatian (Triune) Kingdom and taken away from Croatia, while the purely Croat areas in B[osnia]-H[erzegovina] (which had been incorporated even into Banovina Croatia in 1939) were not joined to it, nor was the Croat part of Bačka (with Subotica). Besides, while Vojvodina was joined to Serbia even though the national programme of the C[ommunist] P[arty of] Y[ugoslavia] in the former [interwar] Yugoslavia demanded that it become a federal unit, B-H was not incorporated into the Croat federal unit, although it is connected with Croatia in every respect (geographically, economically, by transportation, historically and culturally) more than Vojvodina is with Serbia.”\(^{60}\)

When the Croat Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica/HDZ) led by Tudjman began its struggle for political power in Croatia, the promotional campaign it offered contained all geostrategic, economic and national-political ideas about Bosnia and Herzegovina which Ivo Pilar and Dominik Mandić had left as a legacy. Insisting on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s inseparableness from Croatia, the HDZ programme advocated


an “economic, transportational, spiritual and civilizational association of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which constitute a natural, indivisible geopolitical whole and whose historical destiny suggests their reliance on one another”. Based on such premises, the Croat emigration in Canada, led by Gojko Šušak and in close contact with the HDZ leadership, by mid-1989 had already had a map of Greater Croatia encompassing all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Sandžak and the Montenegrin Adriatic coast. At a Croat emigrant meeting held that year in Vancouver, “[these] maps of ‘greater Croatia’ hung all over the place”.

When it comes to the HDZ’s Greater Croatian pretensions, particularly significant is the “Proclamation to the citizens and Diet of Croatia and to all Croat people” created in Zagreb on 29 November 1989. Article 2 of the “Proclamation” (which was signed, among others, by Šime Balen, Franjo Tudjman, Dalibor Brozović, Vladimir Šeks, Josip Manolić and Branimir Glavaš) states: “In opposition to the publicly communicated plans for creating a Greater Serbia, within or without the SFR Yugoslavia, and at the expense of the Croat and other non-Serb peoples, we put forth the demand for the territorial wholeness of the Croat people within its historical and natural borders.” The “Proclamation” was meant to mobilize Croatia against “Greater Serbian aggression”. There was no unanimity as to the precise delineation of Croatia’s “historical and natural borders”, but all agreed that they should encompass Bosnia and Herzegovina, and considerable portions of Vojvodina. After much debate and several versions of the borders, Manolić’s proposal was adopted not to go into delineating the borders, but instead to simply state that “there are historical and natural borders of Croatia”: “Why go into discussing whether to take this corner away from someone or to leave some other! We have stayed on the idea of unspecified borders anyway. Neither the borders of Banovina Croatia, nor the borders of the NDH, nor the AVNOJ borders! But simply — borders.”

As may be seen from Tudjman’s talks with representatives of the Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina and with his closest associates from Croatia during the Yugoslav crisis and wars (1991–1999), he sought ways to tie some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina as closely as possible to Croatia in state and legal terms. At the meeting with a HDZ-BH delegation held in Zagreb on 27 December 1991, Tudjman said, inter alia: “So, it seems

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62 Darko Hudelist, Tudjman: biografija (Zagreb 2004), 638.
63 Ibid. 656–659 ff.
V. Dj. Krestić, Croatian Pretensions to Bosnia and Herzegovina

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to me, just like we exploited this historical moment to create an independent, internationally recognized Croatia, so I believe it is the moment to unite the Croat national being within the maximum possible borders. If that would be exactly 30 municipalities or 28 is less important even from this perspective…” Like Pilar, in fact following in Pilar’s footsteps, Tudjman argued that “the state of Croatia as it is [likened to an unnatural pretzel] has no requisites for life, but a Croatian state even within the Banovina borders [1939] has…”64 Intent on grabbing hold of some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina,65 Tudjman was ready to settle on the slightly expanded 1939 borders of Banovina Croatia,66 or to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina with Serbia.67

Following in the ideological footsteps of the Rightists, Frankists-clericalists and Ustaschas, Tudjman, the good student of Ivo Pilar and Dominik Mandić, was adamantly opposed to the Muslims’ self-identification as Bosniaks, insisting instead upon their being defined as Croats of Muslim faith, with a prospect of gradual Croatization,68 just as the Serbs in Croatia were constantly pressed into becoming Croats of Orthodox faith. He justified the pretensions towards Bosnia and Herzegovina by the claim that constituting it as a republic after the Second World War had been a “historical absurdity”, the restoration of “a colonial creation formed between the fifteenth and the eighteenth century”.69

Tudjman’s commitment to Pilar’s ideas can also be seen from a statement he made on 17 September 1992 at a meeting with representatives of the Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina: “Gentlemen, the Bosnia-Herzegovina question is one of the vital questions for the Croat people as a whole, for the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign, internationally recognized state, and all Croats in B-H should be aware of it. It is not just a problem of the Croats in B-H, it is a problem of the Croatian state, of the Croat people as a whole. Why? Because it is so connected both historically and geopolitically with Croatia because of the unnatural borders of the present-day state of Croatia, because of B-H, be it this way or that…”70

64 Goldštajn, “Hrvatska i rat u Bosni”, 111.
66 Ibid. 118.
67 Ibid. 245.
68 For more on this, see vol. II of Stenogrami o podjeli Bosne, ed. Ivan Lovrenović, 131, 145, 196, 217, 352 ff, 398 ff, 491 ff.
69 Goldštajn, “Hrvatska i rat u Bosni”, 111.
Tudjman was ready to go to war to achieve his goal as regards Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a conversation with representatives of the Croat Defence Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane/HVO) for the Sava Valley region (Posavina) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the municipalities of Ravno, Čapljina and Stolac, on 21 September 1993, he said, among other things: “A horrible thing such as war, that which is a tragedy for a person, for a family, for some areas, the greatest tragedy that there can be, in a sense even produces, by way of demarcation between peoples, some more favourable circumstances for the survival of some peoples in the future…”71 Just as he justified genocide in his book Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti,72 so now he justified war and bloodshed in the name of a better future for Croatia and Croats.

Even as the war was drawing to an end, at a meeting of Croatia’s highest officials in late 1993, Tudjman argued these were the times when “borders of the future Croatian state are being defined. They will probably be larger than any Croat ruler or king in history had ever had under his control. […] The Croat Republic of Herceg Bosna will join Croatia. Croatia will be stronger and more powerful.”73 This is an interesting statement for more than one reason, but there does not seem to be any doubt that the obsession of the Croatian president and his team — because of which he went to war to break Yugoslavia and create an independent Croatia — was a Greater Croatia. While carefully concealing the ultimate goal, the Croatian political leadership headed by Tudjman was using the well-known red-herring tactic ruthlessly accusing Serbia of having started the war in order to create a Greater Serbia.

The author of a book on Croatia’s political destiny argues without any hesitation that, after the capitulation of Italy in September 1943, and the annulment of the Treaty of Rome,74 the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska / NDH) was territorially rounded out, that Croatia achieved its geopolitical and geostrategic ideal in terms of size, shape and position. The only problem was that this ideal Croatia had “too much non-Croat population”.75 About the Ustasha state rounded out in September 1943, the same author, Petar Vučić, has to say the following: “Even though it largely remained an unattained ideal, it has nonetheless re-

71 Ibid. 337 (italics mine).
73 Goldštajn, “Hrvatska i rat u Bosni”, 111.
74 The Treaty of Rome concluded on 27 January 1924 between the Kingdom of SCS and Italy recognized Italian sovereignty over the city of Rijeka (Fiume).
75 Petar Vučić, Politička sudbina Hrvatske: geopolitičke i geostrateške karakteristike Hrvatske (Zagreb: Mladost, 1995), 221.
mained a lasting witness to a high state-building movement which, through such a state-building project (albeit incompletely accomplished), became a true successor of the Croat historical state-building ideal and thought.”

The line of thinking which is quite in keeping with the well-known statement of Franjo Tudjman that “the NDH was not merely a ‘quisling’ creation and a ‘fascist crime’ but also an expression of the Croat people’s historical aspirations for its own independent state as well as of the realization by international factors […] of these aspirations of Croatia and of its geographical borders.” The ill-informed may have been surprised and upset by this statement, but it was fully in line with a century of aspirations and trends of Croatian politics.

In Tudjman’s case, these aspirations and trends are visible from his public statements as well. So, for example, in the opening speech he gave at the First General HDZ Convention held in Zagreb on 24 and 25 February 1990, he said the following: “This demand of ours has been an expression and continuation of the viewpoint of only such Croatian politicians of the last and this century as the ‘father of the homeland’ Dr. Ante Starčević, then Mihovil Pavlinović, Dr. Ante Trumbić and Stjepan Radić. All of them spoke of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the viewpoint of their geopolitical unity with Croatia and the West, having no doubts as to where their people would decide it belonged at a referendum.”

Judging by this, Tudjman was a true follower of the geopolitician Pilar, the historian Mandić and poglavnik Pavelić, as can also be seen from what he said at his meeting with the highest military officials held on 23 August 1995 in the Presidential Palace in Zagreb. Tudjman clearly and without a second thought let his collocutors know that the demographic issue in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Istria should be resolved militarily because, he emphasized, it was the only way to firm up Croatdom in those parts, adding that the Croat Republic of Herceg Bosna and the HVO had been created specifically for that purpose.

That a Greater Croatia with all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as far as the Drina, has been an ideal of Croat politicians can also be seen from the words of a priest uttered from the pulpit of the church of the Wounded Jesus in Zagreb. He wished for a “more beautiful, better, larger and happier” Croatia whose seat would be at Banjaluka, as the poglavnik had wished it to be. The Dominican Vjekoslav Lasić also expressed his hope that the wish

76 Ibid.
77 “Prvi opći sabor Hrvatske demokratske zajednice”, Glasnik HDZ-a 8 (March 1990), 18.
would come true, even more so because the “current shape of Croatia is a little bit strange”.

Vjekoslav Matijević, a lawyer and President of the Croatian Liberation Movement (Hrvatski oslobodilački pokret) — founded by Pavelić in 1929 after the Croatian Party of Right was banned — said in an interview in 1993 that the Croats had to be “firm and adamant about the question of our borders, and join forces to stop the Serbs from crossing the Drina…”

Vučić, the Dominican Lasić and Matijević are not lonely fanatics. They say what and how Croat political circles thought and still think about the future of Croatia. A certain Radomir Milišić joined them when he wrote: “Since the destiny of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the destiny of the Croats in this state, is inseparable from Croatia, i.e. Croatia and Croats have to do their best to let it separate from Croatia too much (because Croats are a sovereign people there, and they can defend that right only with the help of the Republic of Croatia), Croatia will have to keep and eye and ear on that space which is so vital to it. The spaces that the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina have organized and physically defended are a basis of Croat sovereignty in that state, as well as proof that Bosnia cannot be built without Croats.”

Finally, the very fact that an institute named after Dr Ivo Pilar was founded in Zagreb not so long ago appears to show that his thought is still well and alive in Croatia, and that it has a following.

As a result of the persistent demand for incorporating Bosnia and Herzegovina into Croatia, so that the latter can live and not just “vegetate”, the Croats, as Stjepan Radić believed, “have been taught to think that there can be no free and united Croatia without Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

The few examples of Greater-Croatian territorial pretensions towards Bosnia and Herzegovina on the grounds of Croat state and historical right presented here serve only as an illustration. However, all followers of the policy of Eugen Kvaternik and Ante Starčević, who predicated their programmes on “on old deeds and ‘virtual’ territorial claims”, had a rapacious appetite for territory. There is no need today to waste time proving that the Ustaša regime of Ante Pavelić based its entire politics on Croat state and historical right. That politics showed its dark face to the world during the war years from 1941 to 1945. Even though the world was surprised and appalled by its vicious brutality, it was a logical outcome of an ill-founded and

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82 Radomir Milišić, Stvaranje Hrvatske: analiza nacionalne strategije (Zagreb 1995), 12.
83 Stjepan Radić, Politički spisi (Zagreb: Znanje, 1971), 289.
irrational policy which could have no other result than hatred towards the Serbs, eventually leading to one of the most horrible genocides in history.

Franjo Tudjman also based his politics on Croat state and historical right and planned to incorporate Bosnia and Herzegovina into Croatia, because he was also “taught to think”, as Radić put it, “that there can be no free and united Croatia without Bosnia and Herzegovina”. With this politics Tudjman embarked on a war to break Yugoslavia and create a large and independent Croat state. The result of this aspiration is an ethnically cleansed Croatia. By creating a state without Serbs, Croatia has come closer to its geostrategic goal as regards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without Serbs in Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, without this internal “factor of disturbance”, it will pounce, with more energy and fewer obstacles and hurdles, upon Bosnia and Herzegovina, upon Serbs and Muslims. As long as Croatia and its politicians pursue the policy based on Croat state and historical right, they will aspire to grab hold of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and there will be no peace and stability in the region.

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Milovan Dj. Milovanović (1863–1912)

Nikola P. Pašić (1845–1926)
Pašić and Milovanović in the Negotiations for the Conclusion of the Balkan Alliance of 1912

Summary: This essay examines the divergence in views and actions between the two leading Serbian statesmen, Nikola Pašić and Milovan Milovanović, during the course of negotiations with Bulgaria which led to the conclusion of the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, a prerequisite for the successful military operations against the Turks in the Balkan War of 1912. Milovanović, the foreign minister, considered an agreement with Bulgaria as an indispensable diplomatic asset for Serbia which would allow her to preserve her independence in the face of the hostile Austria-Hungary and secure an outlet to the Adriatic Sea. Although he fully appreciated the difficulties of Serbia's position pointed out by Milovanović, Pašić was rather unbending in respect of the territorial concessions to Bulgarians in Macedonia to which Serbia had to agree in return for the conclusion of an alliance. This essay demonstrates that the difference between Pašić and Milovanović was a matter of tactics rather than principle. The former realised that the price had to be paid for the Bulgarian alliance but preferred to have the Serbian government accept an unfavourable borderline under duress, because of the arbitration of Russian Emperor, rather than on its own volition. Not willing to take the responsibility for the concessions made in Macedonia, Pašić chose to present formal rather than real opposition to his party colleague. It was Milovanović's diplomatic elasticity and courage that enabled the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement to come into being.

Keywords: Pašić, Milovanović, Serbia, Bulgaria, Balkans, alliance, treaty, Balkan Wars

The light is not sufficiently shed on the last year of Milovan Milovanović’s life. In particular, his relations with Pašić during the course of negotiations for the conclusion of the Balkan Alliance remain unexamined. The contradictions in their mutual relations have already been noted: 1 Pašić distanced himself from Milovanović during the negotiations, he disagreed with his conduct, but did not prevent him from the conclusion of an agreement, maintaining a reserved attitude throughout, until the outbreak of the Balkan War. Therefore, in order to better understand not just the history of the Balkan Alliance, but also later events, especially the Second Balkan War of 1913, it is of interest for our political and diplomatic history to analyse what Pašić and Milovanović disagreed on and how their disagreement affected the negotiations with Bulgaria.

To analyse the workings of Pašić and Milovanović in 1912, it is necessary to find out what was their general outlook on the question of agreement and alliance with Bulgaria. They did not differ on that point at all — both of them saw an agreement with Bulgaria as a basis of political programme. There was no difference in principle. Differences emerged in the matters of practical politics: What kind of an alliance Serbia needed? To what extent should Serbia meet Bulgaria’s requirements? To put it simple, was an alliance necessary at any cost?

Milovanović’s political programme contained two parts, negative and positive. The former concerned the suppression of Austro-Hungarian penetration in the Balkan Peninsula relying on the support of Russia and Western Powers, that is to say on that political grouping in Europe which accepted the principle “Balkan for the Balkan peoples”. The positive part of his programme concerned a rapprochement and agreement between the Balkan states, particularly between Serbia and Bulgaria. Both parts of the programme were mutually compatible. The negative part was not sufficient in itself because Austria-Hungary, even if halted in its penetration, was still strong enough to paralyse Serbia’s development. On the other hand, without the positive part of the programme — a Balkan agreement — Bulgaria might have realised her own pretensions without and even against Serbia.

Pašić accepted Milovanović’s programme, just like the majority of politicians in Serbia. The first disagreement between them emerged in connection with the presumption that the positive part — an alliance with

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1 Politicians in Serbia were nearly unanimous in their assessment of the necessity of an agreement with Bulgaria. The Radicals, Aca Stanojević, Ljuba Jovanović, Lazar Paču, Stojan Protić took a favourable view of the agreement notwithstanding their reservations towards Milovanović personally. The Independent Radicals, Ljuba Stojanović, Jovan Žujović, Ljuba Davidović, Milorad Drašković, Jaša Prodanović often supported Milovanović more than Radicals themselves. The Progressives, the Marinković brothers, did away with the old Austrophile policy of their party and sought for an agreement with Russia which implied the necessity of a Balkan alliance. Stojan Novaković, the Prime Minister at the time of the Annexation Crisis in 1908, had personally laboured for a rapprochement with Bulgaria, although he had much doubted the likelihood of an agreement. The Liberals alone stood aloof. Public opinion, university professors and Serbian intelligentsia (Jovan Cvijić, Draža Marković, Stojan Stojanović, Aleksandar Belić) approved of an agreement with Bulgaria as well. The extreme nationalists — Apis and his friends from the Black Hand organisation — collaborated with Milovanović at the time of the negotiations. See Jovan M. Jovanović, “Milovan Dj. Milovanović and the Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance of 1912”, Politika, 13 March 1932; Andrei Toshev, Balkanskiite voini, I ( Sofia, 1929), 236; Jovan M. Jovanović, “Novaković u diplomatiji”, in Spomenica Stojana Novakovića (Belgrade: Srpska kniževna zadruga XXIII, 1921), 164, 212.
Bulgaria — proved impossible to achieve. Milovanović approached the Serbian question viewing it from Balkan and Central European aspect. It was not just the question of emancipation of the Serbian people in the Balkans, but also, due to geographic position and political circumstances in the wake of the Berlin Congress, an internal and external issue of Austria-Hungary which indirectly involved it into Central European problems. Milovanović came to conclusion that Serbia had to, in the name of Balkan emancipation, spearhead the resistance to Austria-Hungary or, if that was impossible, submit herself to the Central European political system and become its avant-garde in the Balkan Peninsula.³

For the purpose of his political orientation, Milovanović paid most attention to the attitude of two capitals: Vienna and Sofia. He feared Austro-Hungarian attempts to divide the Balkans with Bulgaria. Milovanović felt that in such division Vienna would cheat both Serbia and Russia, and finally Bulgaria. It depended on Sofia's attitude towards tempting offers from Vienna whether Balkan matters would be primarily solved by Balkan states or Great Powers, and Austria-Hungary in particular. The former solution was possible provided Serbo-Bulgarian agreement was concluded; the latter would be the consequence of a failure to come to terms and would be fatal for Serbia's independence.⁴ Therefore, Milovanović conducted his policy under the motto: either in Skoplje with Bulgaria or in Salonica with Austria-Hungary! Milovanović claimed that Serbia needed Bulgaria against Austria-Hungary and Austria-Hungary against Bulgaria.⁵ In other words, Serbia's independence, threatened by the Dual Monarchy, could be saved only by an agreement with Bulgaria for the purpose of common defence. If such development was impossible, and Serbia was forced to sacrifice her independence, that loss would be compensated by territorial gains in the south, in Macedonia.

These Milovanović's conceptions further emphasised their positive part after the Annexation Crisis — although they did not undergo essential changes. In the wake of the annexation, Milovanović was increasingly pessimistic about the possibility of coming to terms with Austria-Hungary. From 1909 onwards, as the Bulgarian Minister at Belgrade, Tosev, stated, a Serbo-Bulgarian agreement became a fixed idea for him. Choosing between two alternatives — with Austria-Hungary or Bulgaria — Milovanović decisively opted for the latter. All his diplomatic activities in 1909–1912 — a rapprochement with Austria-Hungary and trade negotiations — were mostly

³ Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia; hereafter AS], Milovan Milovanović Papers, XXVI/13.
⁴ AS, Milovanović Papers, XXX/155.
⁵ Ibid. XXX/157.
tactical manoeuvring in order to bring Bulgaria closer to Serbia and prepare
the ground for negotiations. He focused on negotiations with Bulgaria; he
approached them as a drowning man clutching at a straw. Milovanović was
intent on concluding an agreement with Bulgaria at any cost.6

In comparison with this main goal, Milovanović found everything
else of less importance. The partition of Macedonia which was the central
issue of an agreement with Bulgaria was thus of secondary importance. In
Milovanović’s view, an agreement with Bulgaria was rather the means of de-
fence from Austria-Hungary than leverage for penetration into Macedonia.
By virtue of his vocation and intellect Milovanović was a diplomat who as-
essed the position of Serbia in the context of European and Balkan powers.
He was not himself concerned with the matters pertaining to Macedonia
in the way that other Radicals such as Sveta Simić, Ljuba Jovanović and
Pašić were. Milovanović was convinced that the Macedonian nationality
did not exist and that formation of it would be harmful; neither Serbs nor
Bulgarians should stand as separate nations — therefore, an autonomous
Macedonia would be an artificial and temporary solution. He regarded such
a solution, in the aftermath of the events in Eastern Rumelia, as a first step
towards unification with Bulgaria. In his view, “the state reason”, i.e. life and
rational necessities of Balkan states were crucial in the liquidation of Ot-
toman heritage.7 He was deeply convinced that it was impossible to deter-
mine any real demarcation line in Macedonia, just like it was “impossible to
determine a point of division between two similar colours which gradually
spill and merge one in another”. He also found arbitrary the extant Serbo-
Bulgarian state border “as any other border drawn to the left or to the right
would be arbitrary”.8 Milovanović was thus always willing to make conces-
sions in his negotiations with Bulgaria. At the beginning of the negotiations

6 On 19 January 1912, Milovanović recorded: “We, Serbia, desirous of surviving as an
independent state and forging our future as an independent state in a community with
other Balkan states must firstly do all in our power to reach an agreement with Bulgaria
which can only be done with consent and protection of Russia. If that turns out to be
entirely impossible, our only path will remain — in the embrace of Austria-Hungary.
And that solution might be definite and consequently faithful for the entire Balkan
Peninsula”. See AS, Milovanović Papers, X/1.

7 Milovanović had stressed this thought at the time he had been a Minister in Rome.
In his telegram of 28 January/10 February 1904 [the first date is given according to the
Julian calendar which was in use in Serbia until 1919], he wrote that an agreement with
Bulgaria must be reached “not for the sake of solving the Macedonian question, but
with a view to staying exclusively on the practical grounds of defence of the common
and general Balkan interests against a foreigner”. Quoted in Vladimir Ćorović, Odnosi
izmedju Srbije i Austrougarske u XX veku (Belgrade 1936), 55.

8 AS, Milovanović Papers, XXVI/22–23; XXX/159.
in 1909 he considered the frontiers encompassing Skoplje, Veles, Prilep и Ohrid to be *conditio sine qua non* and eventually, at the end of the negotiations, he renounced the latter three towns.

Milovanović’s chief objective was an outlet to the Adriatic Sea and for that reason he endeavoured to close the road towards the south for Austria-Hungary; the borderline he requested in Macedonia was something of a strategic security for the communication leading to the sea.

Such a stance on the part of Milovanović was rooted in his profound suspicion that the Habsburg Monarchy was soon going to collapse. Always an exponent of rationalism and utilitarianism in politics, Milovanović discounted the assumptions based on wishful thinking and hopes. Much impressed by the Habsburg Monarchy’s determination during the Annexation Crisis, Milovanović did not believe that Serbia could considerably contribute to and play an important role in the break-up of the Dual Monarchy on her own. Conservative to the core, he could not easily adapt to such far-reaching and revolutionary assumptions. Even if the break-up came to pass, Milovanović wondered, what would Serbia gain? Russia would get hold of the Galician Ruthenes and had a decisive influence in the Czech lands and Poland; Germany would descend on Trieste; the Balkan states and small nations would be smothered between Germany and Russia.9

The disagreement between Milovanović and Pašić lay in their differing views on the Serbian goals in Macedonia and the future of Austria-Hungary. Accepting the programme carried out by Milovanović as minister for foreign affairs (1908–1911) and prime minister (1911–1912), Pašić followed it up to a certain point. Milovanović’s premises about the necessity of conforming Serbian programme to Austria-Hungary in case of a failure to come to an understanding with Bulgaria were the result of an intellectual speculation which sought for solution in all situations but did not take into account the mood of Serbian political circles and common people. An anti-German wave which had swept Serbia, particularly from the time of the Annexation Crisis onwards, was so strong that it would no doubt disallow any such policy. Pašić felt this current much deeper and better than Milovanović who was more given to theoretical musing. In Milovanović’s chess game only men — Great Powers — were visible whereas Pašić took account of pawns too. In respect of Austria-Hungary’s future Pašić did not share Milovanović’s opinion that its break-up was a matter of distant horizons.10 Just in the rare moments of angriness Pašić would threaten, for example to Italy, that the Serbs would prefer an Austro-Hungarian yoke,

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9 Ibid. XV/1, a note written in Berlin, 7/20 October 1909.
together with their Slav brethren, than consent to domination on the part of any other power. Indeed, he was averse to such combination much more than Milovanović and used it rather as the means of a political blackmail. For that reason, Pašić did not make such a close connection between the positive and negative part of the Serbian foreign policy programme as Milovanović did, and he did not attach to alliance with Bulgaria the absolute importance of a salvation for Serbian diplomacy. As for Pašić, contrary to Milovanović, an alliance with Bulgaria was not just a defensive tool against the Dual Monarchy, but also, if not more so, a tool for penetration in the south, in Macedonia. In his estimation of benefits that Serbia could derive from such an agreement Pašić had two criteria, defensive and offensive, and he set his course depending on their mutual relationship. The gains that Milovanović wanted to achieve in the west, in the direction of the Adriatic Sea, were not sufficient compensation, in Pašić’s view, for the territorial concessions to Bulgarians in Macedonia. In 1912, Pašić took the same line as in the Annexation Crisis of 1908: he refused a compromise which, in his opinion, infringed on the Serbian national programme. For the same reasons, he would prove to be “intransigent” in 1915 when he resisted the pressure from the Allies in a truly desperate moment.

Both Milovanović and Pašić saw an alliance with Bulgaria as a defensive means against Austria-Hungary. In order to win over Bulgarian support, Milovanović was prepared to make concessions. Far more distrustful, Pašić doubted much more that assistance from Sofia would be forthcoming. In his eyes, the dilemma was whether one should pay too high a price in return for an uncertain assistance. A European with broad horizons, Milovanović could not understand bargaining. This *procedé* was alien to him and he took it as an unpleasant necessity. Contrary to him, Pašić, a typical politician of a Turco-Byzantine style, knew how to bargain. As much as Milovanović did not have the strength and nerves to engage in such a trading striving to accomplish his objective in the negotiations with Bulgaria, Pašić was perfectly willing to haggle over a last village as he would do over a capital city.

II

The Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations for the conclusion of an alliance could be divided into two phases: the first one took place in 1909–1911 — it started in the midst of the Annexation Crisis and reached the Tripolitania War. The second phase began in the fall of 1911 and it was ended with the successful conclusion of the treaty. The first phase was characterised by uncer-

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11 A dramatic account is given in *Spomenica Ljubomira Davidovića* (Belgrade 1940), 107–108.
tainty, Milovanović’s constant attempts to break the deadlock, the sounding and preparing the ground in Europe and Sofia’s indecisiveness. The second phase was marked by serious efforts and negotiations which gradually led towards the successful outcome.

The first phase was rather general in nature and both Milovanović and Pašić acted in unison. That was beyond any dispute. As foreign minister, Milovanović had the initiative which was fully supported by Pašić. In this harmony, it should be noted that Milovanović was intent on pushing Pašić in the background — and that for personal reasons. On the occasion of the Bulgarian King Ferdinand’s visit to Belgrade in November 1909, Milovanović entirely preoccupied the guest at a tea party at which King Petar and Pašić were also present. “He talked to me much longer than [he talked to] them,” Milovanović noted, “the conversation was conducted almost entirely between the two of us”. The jealousy between Pašić and Milovanović was also visible in the relations with Russia. The latter constantly overshadowed the former during the conversations in St. Petersburg in 1910 when both Serbian statesmen tried to further involve Russia in Serbo-Bulgarian relations. Much better orator than Pašić, striking and well-mannered in salons, a man of “high society”, Milovanović overshone his prime minister on such occasions. Giving account of his conversation with Izvolsky who was intellectually akin to him, Milovanović recorded with the greatest satisfaction: “It was mostly I who kept conversation going in French. From time to time Izvolsky explained to Pašić in Russian the subject of conversation and Pašić then expressed his agreement or, if Izvolsky would ask for his opinion, after having asked the same question to me, he would answer vaguely and with incomplete phrases”.

Pašić must have found his position rather unpleasant, but he endured it maintaining his reserved attitude. His caution probably stemmed from the Russian stance which neither he nor Milovanović could entirely decipher. Russian official diplomacy pressed forward the idea of a Serbo-Bulgarian rapprochement at that time, but it was reluctant to meet the request of the Serbian government and put pressure to bear on Sofia in the matter of partition of Macedonia. In March 1910, Izvolsky openly stated to both Pašić and Milovanović that he did not approve of the San Stefano treaty, but that treaty remained purely Russian creation and he was unable to get rid of it that easily. Izvolsky suggested the middle course — that the San Stefano treaty in principle remained “the basis of Russia’s Balkan policy” but that it should undergo certain modifications “in order to meet Serbian interests and rights which were forgotten and infringed on at the time of its

12 AS, Milovanović Papers, XVIII/5, 9.
13 Ibid. XVI/23.
making”. \(^{14}\) The Russian minister for foreign affairs pointed out the motto for relations with Bulgaria: *glisser et non appuyer* — because the truth that had to be told the Bulgarians was bitter. While Milovanović was satisfied with this outcome believing that the ice was broken, Pašić paid more attention to the geographic map that he and Milovanović had given to Izvolsky with marked Serbian territorial demands in the south.

The same difference emerged in the conversations with the Bulgarian minister Toshev in Belgrade in the spring of 1911. Milovanović stressed the necessity of a rapprochement in principle, on a broad basis, whereas Pašić said the same but he added the borderline Bregalnica–Ohrid.\(^{15}\)

The second phase of negotiations, which started in the fall of 1911 and centred on the delimitation in Macedonia, brought about the first and real disagreement between Pašić and Milovanović. The arrival of Rizov in Belgrade in September 1911 opened serious conversations. It should be noted that Rizov addressed Pašić first although the latter had no portfolio in the government at that time and then Milovanović; the Bulgarian government seems to have known that Pašić’s consent was prerequisite. Rizov brought the first concession from Sofia — the proposal of a borderline along the frontier of the Skoplje *sanjak*, stretching southwards from the Šar mountain. Milovanović rejoiced on account of the change in Bulgarian opinion which had until then stood on the ground of indivisibility of Macedonia. He saw the abandonment of that principle as a victory of the idea of agreement. He was prepared to make concessions in order to strengthen that idea. Pašić also welcomed this step, but he met the Bulgarian frontier proposal with his own — from the Bregalnica river to Struma which gave Serbia, along with Skoplje, Veles, Prilep, Kičevo and Poreč. Milovanović

\(^{14}\) Izvolsky asked Milovanović for his assistance in the drafting of a “formula” which he could put forward to the Bulgarian government. On 11 March 1910, Milovanović handed him the following proposal for the modification of the San Stefano treaty: “De donner une juste et large satisfaction aux droits nationaux et historiques de la Serbie sur les territoires au sud de Katchanik et de la Schara Planina en lui permettant de s’assurer le littoral serbo-albanais de l’Adriatique avec un hinterland suffisant et de remplir ainsi une condition essentielle de son independance effective. — La renunciation au cours supérieur du Wardar de la part de la Bulgarie serait largement compensée par des avantages qui en resulteraient pour l’indépendance balkanique en général ainsi que pour sa propre sécurité.” Izvolsky was, however, not satisfied; he wanted something much more indefinite. Milovanović revised his draft and handed Izvolsky a new and much more moderate formula next day: “En se reservant d’examiner et de donner la juste et large satisfaction aux demandes de la Serbie, fondées tant sur les arguments d’ordre ethnographique et historique que sur les besoins imperieux d’ordre économique, qui sont la condition essentielle de son independance et, par consequent de l’indépendance balkanique en général.” See AS, Milovanović Papers, XVI/9, 13.

and Pašić differed in terms of tactics: the former, in his own words, wanted to avoid “further detailed discussion of that dismal question now,” insisting that both sides eschew “stubborn preservation of prejudices no matter how deep-rooted”. While Milovanović was trying to smooth over those questions which could dampen the Bulgarian zeal, Pašić regarded such compliance as a consequence of the circumstances forcing King Ferdinand’s hand and he thus intended to make the best out of these favourable circumstances. On the other hand, the conciliatory and compromise-prone Milovanović made use of Pašić’s mood; he was more comfortable with the mediating role between Pašić and Rizov than dealing on his own with the Bulgarian delegate. Rizov gave his own assessment of the Serbian negotiators with whom he had met in Milovanović’s house on the night of 21–22 September 1911 and discussed the delimitation in Macedonia: “The most intransigent and persistent was Pašić, the most approachable was Milovanović, whereas Ljuba Stojanović kept the middle course agreeing to make concessions in order to conclude an alliance”.16 It was Ljuba Stojanović who finally suggested, since Pašić and Rizov had failed to come to terms, that a straight line be drawn from Kratovo to Struga so as to give Veles and Prilep to Bulgaria while Kičevo and Poreč would belong to Serbia. Rizov rejected it; it was finally agreed to assign the entire region between the Šar and Rodopi Mountain to the arbitration of the Russian Emperor.17

Just like with Rizov, Milovanović tried to avoid conversations about the delimitation in Macedonia at his meeting with Geshov, the Bulgarian prime minister, on the train journey from Belgrade to Lapovo on 28 September.18 Geshov’s and Milovanović’s account tally in respect of Macedonia:

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16 Priloženie km tom prvi ot doklada na parlamentarnata izpitatelnata komisia, Sofia, 1918, I, Interrogation of Rizov, 371 [hereafter Doklad].

17 Milovanović provided a detailed account of this meeting in his notes — AS, Milovanović Papers, XXVI/81–83; there is also some information in Die Internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalten des Imperialismus — Documente aus den Archiven der zarichen und provisorischen Regierung 1888–1917, Reiche III, i, No 545, 563; Krasnyi Arhiv, Diplomaticheska podgotovka balkanski vojni 1912, VIII, No 4, 7; Doklad I, no 1, 370/1. There are certain discrepancies in these reports. Rizov later claimed that the autonomy of Macedonia had been agreed on in principle and that the faith of Kičevo alone remained in dispute while Veles, Prilep and Krusevo had been given to the Bulgarians. See Guechoff, L’alliance balkanique, 48–49. Milovanović did not mention it; he professed just the opposite in the frontier matters.

18 AS, Milovanović Papers, XXVI/87–94. The historiographical coverage of this meeting has so far been based on Geshov (L’Alliance balkanique, 22–27), the only participant who published the content of conversations. The accounts of Poincare (Les Balkans en feu, Paris, 1926, 51–51) and Stanoje Stanojević (Srpsko-turski rat 1912, Belgrade, 1928, 47–48) were based on his writing. There are also the second hand reports by Hartwig and
they both claimed there was no discussion of a partition. Geshov also wrote that Milovanović had mentioned the possibility of Austria-Hungary’s demise which would simplify the delimitation issue: Serbia would have Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Romania would receive Transylvania. Milovanović did not mention that; indeed, it seems highly unlikely that he would refer to so uncertain, and according to him even unbelievable, contingency — the break-up of the Dual Monarchy. That would amount to providing arguments against his own demands: to ask for a smaller piece of more-less certain in exchange for something larger but entirely uncertain. Milovanović was not so naive a negotiator. Geshov’s account was designed to serve its purpose — to keep King Ferdinand and the Bulgarian government in the favourable mood for an agreement.

Pašić authorised Milovanović’s negotiations with Geshov. He was probably pleased with the fact that there was no talk of concrete delineation. Nevertheless, while Pašić, on one hand, gave assurances to Hartwig as to his full agreement, he was increasingly drawing back and distancing himself from Milovanović’s work, on the other. In early October 1911, Pašić almost demonstratively rejected a chairmanship of his Radicals’ club as well as presidency of the parliament. His behaviour suggested that something was brewing behind his peaceful exterior since the head of a ruling party was usually, in keeping with parliamentary practice, either prime minister or president of the National Assembly. There was a rumour among the Radicals, not without foundation, that Pašić “did not want to align himself with this political situation and preferred to have a free hand for some other [political] action”. There was also some talk about a new cabinet in which Pašić would take the place of Milovanović. However, such an act would bring about a split in the Radical Party. Pašić felt that and that was one of the reasons why he restrained himself from initiating a crisis.

Nehljudov (Krasnyi arkhiv III, no 16, 32; Die Internationalen Beziehungen, III, No 696, 589, 625). These reports are often inaccurate, for example that of Hartwig in which he mistook the vilayet of Salonica for the vilayet of Adrianople (Edirne) acknowledged by the Serbs as an indisputably Bulgarian territory. Hartwig also did not, perhaps inadvertently, mention the division of Albania for which Milovanović had stood. Milovanović’s report makes clear the great extent to which Geshov was concerned about the attitude of Romania much discussed during the meeting.

19 Die Internationalen Beziehungen, III, i, No 625; Krasnyi arkhiv VIII, no 16.
20 Politika, 15 October 1911.
In the course of negotiations about the territorial delimitation with Bulgaria in Macedonia Pašić and Milovanović stood and argued for two different conceptions. The former’s view was that the delimitation issue should be postponed until the victory. It was sufficient to determine what is beyond dispute — up to the Šar and Rodopi Mountains — and the principle of division of Macedonia; the division itself would be carried out following a successful war and under supervision of the Russian Emperor. The latter’s view was that it should be the other way round: the borderline in Macedonia, definite if possible, should be determined immediately. The arbitration of Russian Emperor would then be purely formal.

The first thesis was put forward by Rizov during his preliminary conversations in Belgrade in September. At first Milovanović hesitated. There was a good and a bad side to the proposition. If the details of delimitation were brushed aside, the making of an agreement would surely be easier for both sides. However, this uncertainty could induce both sides in case of a war to embark on conquering the contested regions with a view to making good their claims rather than throwing all their forces against the enemy. Before the Balkan Wars, there was little faith in the strength of the army in Serbia. Conflicts within officer corps, doubts regarding the quality of armament reflected in the bitter parliamentary debates formed the conviction that the Bulgarian army was better prepared than the Serbian army in both moral and material respect. To enter an uncertain situation with a stronger partner would mean to play a game against the better prepared player. That was the reason behind Milovanović’s initial hesitation. As it soon became apparent that there could be no compromise between Pašić’s and Bulgarian stance, he accepted a partial solution which allowed him to procrastinate as long as possible the dismal question of delimitation. When Rizov again broached this question at a meeting with Pašić, Milovanović had already accepted it and resisted only for the sake of appearance. He placed his hopes in Russia. Having obtained Izvolsky’s consent to revision of the San Stefano treaty and believing that Russia had had a debt to Serbia from the time of the Annexation Crisis, Milovanović was hopeful that he managed to win over Russian diplomacy for the cause of Serbian pretensions in Macedonia. Therefore, he insisted on the absolute Russian arbitration at a meeting with Geshov and in his first draft of an alliance treaty sent to Sofia. It was not before the Bulgarian side declined to accept this procedure that Milovanović engaged himself in the detailed discussion concerning the prospective frontiers.

21 AS, Milovanović Papers, XXVI/84.
True to his mistrustful nature, Pašić did not entirely share Milovanović’s confidence in Russia. For that reason, he immediately put forward maximal demands and put pressure on Milovanović to do the same. Pašić agreed to Russian arbitration at a meeting with Rizov so as not to incur the displeasure of Russia and because he was cornered due to the consent of other negotiators; he did not see it as a substitute for his own frontier proposal. While Milovanović made his mind, under Bulgarian pressure, to enter detailed negotiations, Pašić was getting closer to the idea of an absolute Russian arbitration for the simple reason that he realised he could not impose his own proposal for division — and he was not willing to renounce it. Both Milovanović and Pašić underwent evolution during the negotiations but it was in the opposite directions: the former was initially in favour of the absolute arbitration and in the end accepted the definite frontiers — in this case the arbitration was a sheer formality; the latter argued for the definite frontiers and then switched to the absolute Russian arbitration. This evolution was a natural consequence of their general attitude towards alliance with Bulgaria. Milovanović wanted the alliance at all costs and Pašić demanded maximal territorial gains in the south making the conclusion of an alliance conditional on that settlement. Unable to have his frontiers accepted, Pašić passed the decision for their abandonment on someone else — in this case the Russian arbiter.

IV

The first draft of an alliance treaty sent from Belgrade to Sofia was the fruit of Milovanović’s and Pašić’s common labour. The Bulgarian government was dissatisfied with it because it did not include the autonomy of Macedonia as a principle and it envisaged Russian arbitration over the entire area from the Šar to the Rodopi Mountains. The second draft produced by Milovanović and Pašić together partitioned the disputed territory of Macedonia in three zones: 1. the uncontested Serbian zone the borders of which were mostly those suggested by Ljuba Stojanović’s compromise proposal — a straight line from Kratovo to Ohrid; 2. the uncontested Bulgarian zone across the Bregalnica river and southwards from Prilep up to Ohrid; 3. the contested zone in between which was to be the subject of Russian Emperor’s arbitration. This proposal seems to have been something of a compromise between Pašić’s and Milovanović’s views: Pašić’s border was moved northwards, from Prilep to Kičevo, but the Serbian minimal request

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22 Krasnyi arkhiv VIII, no 34, 43; Die Internationalen Beziehungen III, i, no 801; Doklad I, no 9. A detailed history of the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations is beyond the scope of this work. These are touched upon only so far as they demonstrate the attitude of Milovanović and Pašić.
was now final and not subject to any later decision. This definiteness, in particular, upset the Sofia government.

Aware of the powerful influence of Pašić, the Bulgarian government used the occasion of Milovanović’s trip in Paris in November to send Rizov after him in order to pressurise him further far away from the leader of the Radical Party. There is no doubt that Milovanović wavered in Paris. He did not put much of resistance. Rizov skilfully pleaded to him with a mixture of personal and general matters appealing to his common sense as much as his sentiments. “I swear on my fatherland and honour that this is our last attempt to reach an agreement,” Rizov told Milovanović. “As your old friend I ask you and beg you to attach your name to this great accomplishment. Have courage, persevere and overcome all obstacles that even your political friends might throw in your way.”

Following the Parisian conversations Milovanović’s activities were marked by more energy and determination.

On his return from Paris, Milovanović sent to the Bulgarian government another proposal which envisaged an autonomous Macedonia and a new borderline in case the autonomy proved unviable with further concession on the left bank of the Vardar river. The Bulgarian government responded with their own concessions moving the border from the Skoplje sanjak to the Serbian proposal of the frontier on the right bank of the Vardar — an agreement was thus reached in this area. In return, the Bulgarians requested Kratovo and Kriva Palanka on the left bank of the Vardar. Gešov begged Milovanović to accept this as the final Bulgarian proposal. Milovanović found himself in a difficult position hemmed in between the Bulgarians and Pašić. “With the full and deepest conviction,” he recorded, he was “willing to entirely accept the Bulgarian proposal”. At the same time, he was struggling as a typical bargainer: is the moment ripe for him to make concessions or is there more to be gained? Hartwig backed the Serbian side; Stepa Stepanović and the General Staff demanded Ovče Polje to which they attached great strategic importance. Therefore, Milovanović decided to make partial concessions rather than give in completely: Kriva Palanka and Kratovo would be given to Bulgarians but, in return, the frontier would run from the vicinity of Kratovo along the lines of the old Serbian border proposal and extend over Ovče Polje to the Ohrid lake. This compromise gave away Kratovo and Kriva Palanka, and kept part of Ovče Polje.

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23 Guechoff, L’Alliance balkanique, 51.

24 The watershed Pčinja–Kriva Reka–Bregalnica with the borderline reaching the Vardar below the confluence of Pčinja rather than the confluence of Bregalnica.

25 The Bulgarian proposal was: the watershed of the Pčinja and Kriva Reka and then along the Pčinja from the confluence of Kriva Reka up to the Vardar.
Not capable of maintaining the fight on two fronts, at home and abroad, Milovanović decided to force the issue with Pašić. In mid-December 1911, he convened a council consisting of Radicals, Independent Radicals and army officers to lay down his personal opinion, find out what was the dominant attitude towards the problem at hand and share the responsibility for further concessions to Bulgarians.

At this meeting, Milovanović underscored that the events did not allow any procrastination. “My conviction has always been that a Serbo-Bulgarian community is the first and the most important condition for both our and their future. Today more than ever I see no other way in which our independence as a state and further accomplishment of our national ideals could be secured”. Bulgaria sought for agreement at the time, Russia made effort to facilitate it, the circumstances were favourable. It was a distrust in King Ferdinand alone that militated against the alliance. But that was a permanent reason and anyone who wanted an agreement with Bulgaria would have to take it into account. “We want and must want an alliance because there is no substitute for it. If Ferdinand is dishonest, he will cheat not just Serbia, but also Russia. We must hurry because we do not know what the spring will bring about and, in case of a crisis in the Balkans, we cannot remain in the open — not secured either from Bulgarian or Austro-Hungarian side. An Albanian revolution will bring Austro-Hungary in the Novi Pazar sanjak. Serbia cannot resist such contingency without an agreement with Bulgaria. Finally, Serbia might be compelled to force the issue herself as soon as European constellation allows it because the Serbian population is being systematically exterminated in Old Serbia, and Kosovo is the central position of the Serbdom. Our relations with [Ottoman] Turkey become increasingly pointless and even dangerous for us. They have served us well as a means of drawing closer Bulgaria, but the Turks blackmail us now — they threaten to take a favourable view of the Bulgarians again as soon as we raise our voice for the protection of our compatriots. After all, the Bulgarians could seek protection in an agreement with Austria-Hungary if they do not find us forthcoming, which would be bad for them but fatal for us”. Concluding his report, Milovanović suggested that Kratovo and Kriva Palanka be abandoned and stated that he could not accept the responsibility for the breakdown of the negotiations in the existing circumstances. In other words, he was prepared to resign.

After having been asked first for his views, Ljuba Stojanović refused to express his opinion: it was for the government, and not the opposition, he said, to conduct policy. Milovanović was supposed, being a foreign minister, to make a decision by himself. Stojanović was actually in agreement with Milovanović and he said him as much in private after the meeting had been concluded. He encouraged Milovanović to persevere and overpower Pašić supporting his intention to resign if the latter continued to put a
spoke in his wheel. Other participants in the meeting did not shed any more light. Pointing out his exclusively military point of view, Stepa Stepanović stressed the strategic importance of Ovče Polje. Stojanović replied to him that in case of a war with Bulgaria the outcome will be decided in the direction Niš–Sofia and not Ćustendil–Skoplje. Andra Nikolić and Stojan Protić were inclined towards Milovanović’s view, but they were reluctant to openly state their opinion out of consideration for Pašić.

Pašić finally spoke as well. He made a clear and open stand against further concessions. He even disputed Milovanović’s last offer which renounced a part of Ovče Polje and fell back to his initial proposal for the frontier on the Bregalnica river made to Rizov at the beginning of the negotiations. Pašić reverted to the starting point: lets have both proposals — the Serbian and the Bulgarian — going to the arbitration of Russian Emperor. He categorically professed that he “does not consent to the amputation of Serbian nation” given that the indisputably Serbian lands were about to be given to Bulgarians. Pašić argued that Kratovo and Kriva Palanka were Serbian areas and claimed that he could bet on his life he would be able to gain these two towns for Serbia.

Pašić did not dispute Milovanović’s assessment of the general situation — Serbia was in a difficult position and the faithful days were ahead. But he refuted Milovanović’s thesis that an agreement with Bulgaria was the only way out of predicament. If that agreement proved impossible to reach, Pašić proposed another combination: to win over the Albanians and form joint Serbo-Albanian units which would, according to him, put an end to Albanian atrocities in Old Serbia, create a dam against Austria-Hungary and protect Serbian interests in Macedonia against Bulgaria. Pašić remained intransigent and met Milovanović’s argument to the effect that Serbia could not withstand a two-front fighting with the remark that it was better to wait than to cede Kriva Palanka.

Having seen that Pašić could not be dissuaded, Milovanović stuck to his guns as well and paid a visit to Hartwig immediately after the meeting. He received full support from the Russian minister, enthusiastic about the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement, and also a promise of Russia’s intervention in Sofia. Without hesitation and firm in his decision to proceed at his own risk, Milovanović sent instructions to Spalajković on 15 December to make concessions regarding Kratovo and Kriva Palanka. From that moment onwards Milovanović worked on his own without consulting Pašić.

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26 A note on this meeting is in AS, Milovanović Papers, XXVI/96–102; the instructions for Spalajković can be found in Krasnyi arhiv IX, No 65.

27 There is also the account of Milan Gavrilović, Pašić’s secretary, on the events on the eve of the conclusion of the Balkan Alliance which was drawn upon in E. C. Helmre-
Pašić did not fail to inform Hartwig about his stance making it clear that he was opposed to any further concessions and that Milovanović was working on his own. His attitude was also known in Sofia. Nehljudov, the Russian minister to Bulgaria, accused him overtly in St. Petersburg of not wanting an agreement and pointed out the danger of Pašić’s undermining Milovanović’s efforts. Such an attitude on the part of Pašić no doubt influenced the Bulgarian government not to press too hard. It also induced Russian diplomacy to back the Serbian desiderata more firmly so that Pašić’s view would not prevail and the negotiations as a whole come into question.

Pašić intervened in the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations one more time in January 1912 when Struga, which the Bulgarian government had previously ceded to Serbia, suddenly became a matter of contention. The agitated Pašić went straight to Hartwig and expounded that the Bulgarian request was absolutely unacceptable. In the matter of Struga, Pašić was, just like Milovanović, frightened of the behaviour of the Russian military attaché in Sofia, Colonel Romanovsky, who interfered with the dispute and suggested his own frontier proposal. “The Romanovsky line” was dangerous.

ich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913 (Cambridge 1938), 58–59. Just like Milovanović, Gavrilović also did not specify the exact date of the meeting he referred to. Perhaps it was the same meeting, although there are considerable differences in the two records. Milovanović’s notes make it clear that the meeting was held before 15 December 1911; his notes are entirely credible and written immediately after the event. Citing Gavrilović, Helmreich has mentioned a memorandum distributed to the participants at the conference — Pašić allegedly wrote down his objections on that document. Unfortunately, that document has not survived and Gavrilović laid it out from memory. According to Gavrilović, Milovanović convened a conference between the leaders of Serbian parties in order to consult them about the conclusion of an alliance. He justified major concessions made to Bulgarians by their assistance against Austria. All the participants except Pašić agreed — he was silent and simply remarked that Milovanović was foreign minister who had to make a decision. Having been asked later about his attitude on this occasion, Pašić pointed out too great concessions made to Bulgarians and his suspicion concerning their help against Austria. He was convinced that Ferdinand would never act against the Dual Monarchy. Moreover, he suspected that the Bulgarian King would inform Vienna about what was going on. Finally, Pašić himself spoke of the Bulgarian alliance at the Radicals’ conference in Belgrade in 1920; he referred to the meeting of the Crown Council under King Petar’s chairmanship during which he had said in the presence of Radicals’ and Independent Radicals’ leaders that “the royal government went further in making concessions to Bulgaria than our interests required…” See Spomenica Nikole Pašića povodom desetogodišnjice smrti (Belgrade 1937), 203–204.

Krasniy arkhi IX, no. 66.

Ibid. IX, no. 69, 70.

Ibid. IX, no. 71.
as it prejudiced the Russian arbitration. Milovanović and Pašić opposed it together. They parted ways soon again when Milovanović, in order to have his treaty, ceded this town on the Ohrid lake to Bulgarians.

V

The contemporaries differed in their assessment of Pašić’s conduct in 1911–1912: Milovanović, Rizov and Geshov held one opinion and Splajković was of different mind. According to the former opinion, Pašić wanted to do away with the accusations of him being a Bulgarian and Bugarophile which had haunted him since the time of the Timok Rebellion, the Radicals-inspired peasant uprising against King Milan Obrenović and conscription in Eastern Serbia in 1883. Basically, he was in agreement with the work of the Serbian government but, not being a member of the cabinet, could allow himself to criticise. According to the latter opinion, Pašić purposely obstructed any attempt at rapprochement with Bulgaria which was not carried out under his personal control and authority.

Both opinions were well-founded to some extent. His alleged pro-Bulgarian stance and his ambiguous conduct before the marshal court in connection with the 1883 Timok Rebellion had been a major hindrance in Pašić’s political life. He was known as a politician prone to undermining his own party’s government as long as he was not a member of it — the case in point was Vujić’s cabinet in 1902. Nevertheless, these reasons were not the main ones. The issue was not so simple. There were two features in Pašić’s conduct during the negotiations both of which implied the refusal of concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia. Pašić first demanded the Bregalnica frontier and then proposed the arbitration of Russian Emperor between the requests of Serbia and Bulgaria; it was not before Milovanović refused it under Bulgarian pressure that Pašić wanted a breakdown of the negotiations or their procrastination. The essential in Pašić’s manoeuvring was that he accepted an agreement with Bulgaria in principle but did not allow the Serbian government to voluntarily attach its signature on a borderline that he found unfavourable. Having been told by Milovanović that the Russian Emperor would at best decide along the lines of the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier agreement, Pašić replied: “Well, let it be so!” His unspoken intention was to have the Serbian government, if must be, accept a borderline for the sake of an agreement with Bulgaria under duress, because of the imperial ruling which could not be disputed, rather than on its own volition.

Hartwig justified Pašić’s behaviour in St. Petersburg on account of his greater responsibility as the head of the party that that of Milovanović.31

31 Ibid. IX, no. 74.
Given the very strong nationalist feeling in Serbia, even more pronounced due to the comitadji activities and the fighting against the Bulgarian irregulars in Macedonia, Milovanović’s conciliatoriness was bound, once it was made known, to cause stir of protest among parties and politicians in Serbia. From 1903 onwards, the entire Serbian nationalist press vehemently campaigned for the annexation of Slaavic Macedonia to Serbia referring to the Emperor Dušan’s lands and the medieval Serbian state. It was rather predictable that the borderline envisaged in the 1912 alliance treaty would face damnation from the nationalist circles in Serbia. In addition, Pašić himself shared such views and gave them direction. His opposition and reserve during the negotiations with Bulgaria stemmed from his personal conviction and the fear of reactions from the nationalist current.

When the content of the agreement became known, the dissatisfaction predicted by Pašić erupted. Crown Prince Aleksandar openly stated his disagreement and bewilderment at the negotiated border. Unaware of the conclusion of the alliance until the outbreak of war, Novaković was markedly dissatisfied when he found out about “the contested zone”. Ribarac and the Marinković brothers were also against the contracted borders. Jovan Cvijić refuted in the newspapers the rumours to the effect that he had suggested the Serbo-Bulgarian borderline in Macedonia; he even claimed to have protested against this frontier in a letter to “a distinguished person” prior to the signing of the alliance treaty. The frontier suggestions sent to Bulgarians (the watershed Pčinja-Bregalnica and the line which left out

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32 Milos Bogitschewitsch, Kriegsursachen (Zurich 1919), 35. Cemović claimed that Crown Prince had promised him, while the negotiations were still underway, that he would wrack such a treaty through his activities in St. Petersburg. Cemović also provided additional information on Pašić’s conduct but these have to be taken with a pinch of salt on account of his bitterness and strong qualifications. Cf. Cemović, “Srpsko-bugarski ugovor 1912”, Politika, 1 August 1925; “Zavera” protiv g. N. Pašića”, Pravda, 25 July 1925; “Izvrstanje istorije i istine”, Politika, 2 September 1925; Djurdje Jelenić, “Nikola Pašić i srpsko-bugarski spor 1913”, Politika, 31 August 1925).


34 Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine [Stenographic Record of Proceedings, The National Assembly of the Kingdom of Serbia], 32nd regular session, 16 May 1913, 525.

35 Štampa, 20 January 1913.

36 Cvijić took part in the first phase alone. He drew the delimitation map — Bregalnica, Demir Kapija — which Milovanović handed to Izvolsky in St. Petersburg in 1910. See AS, Milovanović Papers, XVI/35.
Kratovo and Kriva Palanka) were in fact made, under Milovanović's instructions, by two soldiers: General Staff Lieutenant-Colonel Živko Pavlović and General Staff Major Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis. This co-operation was made possible by Milovanović's connections with the “Unification or Death” (Black Hand) organisation. The organisation was familiar with the course of negotiations through Apis and Bogdan Radenković. It should be noted that the two of them fully supported Milovanović's work although they were extreme nationalists. The “Unification or Death” organisation considered the victory over the Ottoman Empire the foremost objective of the alliance. Everything else was subordinated to that goal. In respect of the territorial delimitation with Bulgaria, the only condition was an outlet to the Adriatic Sea and the secured right bank of the Vardar River. The prevalent opinion in the organisation was that “the size of the territory to be allotted to Bulgaria should not be turned into a major issue since the unification between the Serbs and Bulgarians must inevitably come to pass”. There was more fear of the Albanians than the Bulgarians. The backing of the organisation and the support of Independent Radicals perfectly played into Milovanović's hands to overcome Pašić's opposition.

VI

Finally, all this begs the question: why did not Pašić oust Milovanović during the negotiations since he disagreed with his work? Pašić partially answered this question himself after the First World War when he contended that “the treaty had to be accepted as Bulgaria would otherwise relieve herself from the responsibility before Russia which facilitated the conclusion of the agreement”. Russia was too much involved in the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations to take their breakdown lightly. In addition, Pašić realised the seriousness of situation in which Serbia found herself, particularly after the outbreak of the 1911 Italo-Turkish War. All the reasons that Milovanović advanced in favour of the agreement were too apparent for Pašić to oppose. His combinations with the Albanians could be the last and desperate resort in case the efforts for the conclusion of an agreement with Bulgaria failed, but they could not substitute for the Bulgarian alliance. Finally, the removal of Milovanović, which could have been effected, was bound to open a severe political crisis in Serbia. Milovanović had the backing of Independent Radicals and army officers as well as some Radicals. His elimination would

37 Ibid., XXVI/95.
39 Speech at the conference of the Radical Party in 1920, Spomenica Nikole Pašića, 204.
not just bring about a rift in the Radical Party, but also turn all other parties against Pašić. In principle, a Bulgarian alliance against Ottomans was extremely popular in Serbia; after all, the Radicals themselves had been propagating it for quite some time. The same people who threw a stone on Milovanović, once they found out about the contracted frontiers, would turn against Pašić if he tried to disrupt the alliance at the time of its formation. Had Pašić brought Milovanović down, he would have found himself in a difficult position: either to break with the Bulgarians which would have drawn the wrath of Russia and Serbian public on his head or to continue the negotiations following in Milovanović’s steps as the agreement could not be concluded otherwise? Fearing to plump for any alternative, Pašić resorted to half-measures: without taking responsibility for abolishing the agreement he stepped back and presented formal rather than real opposition — not strong enough to topple Milovanović or loud enough to put his disagreement on record.

Such behaviour on the part of Pašić was particularly conspicuous following Milovanović’s death in June 1912. The entire public in Serbia expected the leader of the Radical Party to form a cabinet. Instead, Marko Trifković did it and Jovan M. Jovanović became a foreign minister in his cabinet. Pašić who had struggled to come into office all his life now renounced the premiership on his own volition and left for Marienbad as soon as the parliamentary crisis was resolved. Pašić’s taking over the government was expected not just in Serbia, but also in Bulgaria; Geshov and King Ferdinand sent messages though Spalajković to King Petar in that sense. However, it was not before mid-September 1912, on the eve of the war, that Pašić made the final decision and took the matters in his own hands.

VII

The divergence between Pašić and Milovanović in 1912 was rather practical than a matter of principle. Their disagreement was the consequence of their differing estimate of the relation between the extent of concessions and the benefits of alliance. Both Pašić and Milovanović had certain arguments to explain their conduct. Pašić believed that the alliance treaty was unfavourable for Serbia: its terms put in question even the territory from the Sar Mountain to Struga and Pčinja whereas Bulgaria was going to receive the somewhat revised San Stefano borders and emerge in the entire

40 This strange outcome of the crisis was duly noted not just in Serbia, but also abroad. See Redlich, Schicksalsjahre Österreichs 1908–1919 (Vienna 1953), vol. I, 169.
41 Miroslav Spalajković, “Kralj Petar i bugarski kralj Ferdinand”, Politika, 6 January 1941.
area as Serbia’s southern neighbour. The direction of Serbia’s expansion was channelled towards the Adriatic Sea over the mountainous and hostile Albania. On the other hand, Milovanović’s assessment that Serbia could not endure the conflict with Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria at the same time was a foregone conclusion. Peace was possible with the latter, and not the former, country and it was necessary to pay a certain price in order to have it. “If it had been possible to ask for all that was wanted,” Marko Trifunović professed in defence of Milovanović in the parliament, “the alliance would not have been concluded”. The Serbo-Bulgarian alliance treaty of 1912 no doubt played a valuable role in the historical development of the Balkan nations and served as a starting point for the great events that followed.

With his diplomatic elasticity, broad horizons and willingness to meet the Bulgarians more than half way for the sake of agreement Milovanović was instrumental to the conclusion of the alliance in the circumstances of 1911–1912. He carried out the negotiations with Bulgaria mostly on his own showing determination, energy and the clear vision of a goal. “With a clear conscience and full conviction I can state that I have done all that could be done for a favourable solution,” he wrote down just before the signing of the treaty. The fact that the Balkan Alliance of 1912 rested on the shaky ground and was rooted in the then political constellation rather than profound transformation of mind in the two countries was neither his nor Pašić’s fault. In any case, the compromise-prone Milovanović was certainly not an exponent of Serbian nationalism which fully blossomed prior to the Balkan Wars. The marked bearer of this trend in the Serbian society was and remained Pašić.

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Serbia, the Serbo-Albanian Conflict and the First Balkan War

Abstract: After the restoration of Serbia in 1830, the areas of medieval Serbia left out of her borders were dubbed Old Serbia – Kosovo, Metohija, Rascia (the former sanjak of Novi Pazar and the neighbouring areas). Old Serbia (from 1877 onwards the vilayet of Kosovo) was dominated by local Albanian pashas, whereas the Christian Orthodox Serbs and their villages were attacked and pillaged by Muslim Albanian brigands. The religious antagonism between Muslims and Christians expanded into national conflict after the 1878 Albanian League had claimed the entire “Old Serbia for Greater Albania”. The position of Christian Orthodox Serbs, who accounted for a half of the population at the end of the nineteenth century, was dramatically aggravated due to Muslim Albanians’ tribal anarchy, Austria-Hungary’s pro-Albanian agitation and, after 1908, frequent Albanian rebellions. All efforts of Serbia to reach a peaceful agreement with Muslim Albanian leaders in Old Serbia before the First Balkan War had ended in failure. The First Balkan War was the most popular war in Serbia’s history as it was seen as avenging the 1389 Battle of Kosovo which had sealed the Ottoman penetration into the Serbian lands. In October 1912, Serbia liberated most of Old Serbia, while Montenegro took possession of half of the Rascia area and the whole of Metohija. While the decimated and discriminated Serb population greeted the Serbian and Montenegrin troops as liberators, most Albanians, who had sided with the Ottomans, saw the establishment of Serbian rule as occupation.

Keywords: Serbia, Old Serbia, Ottoman Empire, Kosovo, Metohija, Serbs, Muslim Albanians, First Balkan War

Growing tribal privileges vs. decaying Ottoman system

Prior to the Serbian Revolution (1804–1813) which led to the establishment of an autonomous Serbia (1830), the present-day area of Kosovo and Metohija had been subdivided into several sanjaks governed by local Ottoman officials, mostly outlawed Albanian pashas. General conditions of the Empire’s Christian subjects deteriorated along with the deterioration of the once powerful Ottoman central authority. Already assigned by the Ottoman theocratic system to a lower social class (reaya) than Muslims, they were now exposed to re-feudalization as a result of the rapid Ottoman administrative and economic decline. The timar (sipahi) system was turning into çiftlik system, especially detrimental to the Christian Orthodox tenant farmers. Local Muslim Albanian governors in the districts and provinces in

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nowadays Kosovo and Metohija became hereditary feudal lords as early as the eighteenth century. Muslim Albanians were tolerated by the Sublime Porte as feudal lords or scofflaw regents because they were seen as promoting the Ottoman order based on *Shari'ah* law and tribal privileges. Their pro-Ottoman culture made them useful even though they corrupted the Ottoman administration. In the early nineteenth century, Albanian beys ruled as semi-independent provincial governors, virtually uncontrolled by the central government in Constantinople.¹

Several notable Albanian families succeeded in imposing themselves as hereditary pashas (Djinolli or Džinić in the Priština area, Begolli or Mahmutbegović in the Peć area, Rotulli or Rotulović in Prizren etc.). Ruled by renegade Albanian pashas who, similarly to the conservative Muslim beys in Bosnia, wanted to preserve the *status quo* which would guarantee their privileges in Turkey-in-Europe, the Serbs of Kosovo-Metohija suffered from both local outlaws and frequent Albanian revolts against the attempts of Europeanization and modernization on the part of Ottoman central authorities. In these unruly conditions, plundering and violence became the prevailing social and political conditions in the area.²

The successive waves of violence perpetrated by Muslim Albanians against Christian Serbs in Metohija during the 1840, as well as in the two following decades, were amply recorded in various official complaints, usually signed by notables and priests from Serbian villages. The official complaints, listing numerous grievances, were submitted to the Ottoman Sultan, Serbian Prince and Russian Emperor respectively. The abbot of Visoki


Dečani monastery, Serafim Ristić, described the difficult position of the Christian Serbs in Metohija, particularly in the district of Peć, in a memorandum sent to Constantinople.3

The Serbian Orthodox Church re-established in 1557 by the famous vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha under the name of Patriarchate of Peć, was eventually abolished in 1776, and all the Serb bishoprics came under jurisdiction of the Greek-controlled Patriarchate of Constantinople.4 Nevertheless, several Serb bishops remained in office. In the early decades of the nineteenth century, the dynamic Serb metropolitans Janićije and Hadži Zaharije of the Raška-Prizren Bishopric urged the establishment of Serb schools.5 According to the available data, several dozen primary schools in both Metohija and Kosovo were attended by at least 1,300 Serbian students in the 1860s. A number of talented students from Kosovo and Metohija were trained as teachers in Serbia from the early 1860s onwards owing to generous scholarships granted by the wealthy Prizren Serb merchant Sima Andrejević Igumanov (1804–1882), the founder of the Serbian Theological School (Bogoslovija) in Prizren in 1871.6

The first half of the nineteenth century was marked by spiralling violence mostly directed against the Christian Orthodox Serb population, which resulted in their occasional conversion to Islam and increasing emi-

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3 “[…] the violent persecutions by Albanians and the mistreatments exceeding every measure which, if not stopped, will force us [the Serb Christians] out from our land drenched with the blood of our ancestors and from our hearths to flee. […] For not even our Holy Churches remain untouched by criminals. Not a single Christian house has been spared from looting, and every village, town, church or monastery cries under persecution. […] That is why there is no use to ask who did this because whatever we have said so far has brought no use.” Cf. this quotation and other similar complaints against Albanian terror compiled by Serafim Ristić in a volume under the title Plač Stare Srbije [The Lament of Old Serbia] (Zemun: Knjioplećatna I. K. Soprona, 1864), dedicated to British pastor Rev. William Denton. Cf. also William Denton, Christians in Turkey. Their Conditions under Mussulman Rule (London: Dadly, Isbiter & Co, 1876).

4 On Sokollu Mehmed pasha, see Radovan Samardjitch, Mehmed Pasha Sokolović (Lausanne: L’Age d’Hemom, 1994).

5 Cf. the most important studies: Petar Kostić, Crkveni život pravoslavnih Srba u Prizrenu i njegovoj okolini u XIX veku (Belgrade: Grafički institut “Narodna misao” A. D., 1928) and, bz the same author, Prosvetno-kulturni život pravoslavnih Srba u Prizrenu i njegovoj okolini u XIX veku i početkom XX veka (sa uspomenama pisa) (Skopje: Grafičko-industrijsko preduzeće Krajničanac a. d., 1933).

Migration to the neighbouring Principality of Serbia. Appalling Serb testimonies of religious and social discrimination against them, perpetrated mostly by Muslim Albanian outlaws (kaçaks), were confirmed by both Western and Russian travellers.

The ambitious plans of the Serbian Prince Mihailo Obrenović and his Prime Minister Ilija Garašanin’s for an all-Christian uprising in Turkey-in-Europe in the late 1860s paved the way for future cooperation with the powerful Muslim and Roman Catholic clans from northern Albania. Nevertheless, the Belgrade government’s friendly relations with the clans of northern Albania had no tangible effect on the Kosovo renegade pashas and their lawless clans in terms of improving the difficult position of the persecuted Christian Serb population.

The decrease of Serb population caused by tribal anarchy and forced migration was partially compensated by high birth rate in the rural areas where both Serbs and Albanians lived in extended families (zadruga) comprising several generations with up to 80 members (20 to 40 on average). Demographic structure was different amongst urban population. According to the renowned Russian scholar A. F. Hilferding who conducted extensive, highly reliable research during his voyage to the region in 1858, the ethnic and religious composition of the main towns was as follows: Peć — 4,000 Muslim and 800 Christian Orthodox families; Priština — 1,200 Muslim and 300 Christian Orthodox families; Prizren — 3,000 Muslim, 300 Christian Orthodox and 100 Roman Catholic families.

In the 1860s, the British travellers M. McKenzie and A. P. Irby recorded that Serb villages were not the sole target of Albanian outlawed raiders. During their visit to Vučitrn, a Serb priest explained them, in the presence of an Ottoman official (mudir), the position of urban Christians:

> There, said he, the mudir sits — one man with half a dozen zaptis [police-men] — what can he effect? There are here but 200 Christian houses, and from 400 to 500 Mussulman [Muslim], so the Arnaouts [Albanians] have

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7 For more, see Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852–1912, ed. Dušan T. Bataković (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1988).


10 Aleksandar F. Giljferding, Putovanje po Hercegovini, Bosni i Staroj Srbiji (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1972), 154–165 (Serbian translation from the Russian original of 1859).
it all their own way. They rob the Christians whenever and of whatever they please; sometimes walking into a shop, calling for what they want, and carrying it off on promise of payment, sometimes seizing it without further ado. Worse than this, their thoroughly savage, ignorant, and lawless way of living keeps the whole community in a state of barbarism, and as the Christians receive no support against them, no enlightenment nor hope from Constantinople, they naturally look for everything to Serbia; — to the Serbia of the past for inspiring memories, to the Principality [of Serbia] for encouragement, counsel, and instructions.11

According to Austro-Hungarian military intelligence sources from 1871, the demographic structure of Old Serbia (Kosovo, Metohija, the former sanjak of Novi Bazar [Novopazarski sandžak] and present-day northwestern Macedonia) prior to the Eastern Crisis (1875–1878) was as follows: 318,000 Serbs, 161,000 Albanians, 2,000 Osmanlis (ethnic Turks), 10,000 Vlachs, 9,000 Circassians and Gypsies. Of them, 250,000 were Christian Orthodox, 239,000 Muslims and 11,000 Roman Catholics.12

Serbia’s and Montenegro’s two wars against the Ottomans (1876, 1877–1878) resulted in the defeat of the pro-Ottoman Muslim Albanian troops and the migration, both voluntary and forced, of at least 30,000 Muslim Albanians (mubadžirs) from the liberated territories of the present-day southeast Serbia, the former sanjak of Niš. Conversely, dozens of thousands of Serbs fled from various parts of Old Serbia, mostly Kosovo (Lab and other areas of eastern and northern Kosovo), into the newly-liberated territory. Their exact number, however, has never been determined. Prior to the Second Serbo-Ottoman War (1877–78), the Albanians were the majority population in some areas of the sanjak of Niš (Toplica), while a number of Albanian villages was emptied from the district of Vranje after the 1877–78 war.13 Reluctant to accept their loss of feudal privileges in a Christian-ruled European-type state, most Muslim Albanians emigrated to Metohija and Kosovo, taking out their frustration on the local Serbs.14

12 Peter Kukulj, Major im Generalstabe, Das Fürstentum Serbien und Türkisch-Serbien (Stara Srbia, Alt-Serbien). Eine Militärisch-geographische Skizze (Im Manuskript gedruckt. (Vienna: Aus der kaiserlich-königlich Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1871), 147–149.
13 For example, prior to 1878 the Prokuplje area in the region of Toplica had 2,031 Serbian, 3,054 Albanian, and 74 Turkish households. After 1878, only a few Albanian villages remained, while 64 were completely deserted. For more see Djordje Mikić, “Social and Economic Conditions in Kosovo and Metohija from 1878 until 1912” in Serbia and the Albanians, ed. V. Stojančević, 241–242.
**Vilayet of Kosovo: Religious Affiliation, Tribal Society and Rise of Nationalism**

The Vilayet of Kosovo (1877–1912), an administrative unit of 24,000 sq km extending from Novi Pazar and Taslidje (Pljevlja) to Priština, Skoplje and Tetovo, was synonymous with Old Serbia during the last decades of Ottoman rule; it was a large political unit subdivided into sanjaks, kazas and nabis. In addition to Christian Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Albanians, its population included a considerable number of Muslim Slavs, Bulgarians, ethnic Turks, Hellenized Vlachs and Greeks. According to diverse data regarding the Vilayet of Kosovo, with Priština (until 1888) and Skoplje (1888–1912) as its successive seats, the Albanians, mostly Muslims, accounted for less than a half of the population until the late 1870s.

The number of Serbs declined during the following decades. Prior to the First Balkan War (1912) Albanians were already a majority in most of Metohija (Prizren, Djakovic and Peć), while Serbs remained a relative majority in the rural areas of Kosovo (Mitrovica, Priština, Gnjilane, Zvečan, Ibarski Kolašin, Novo Brdo), and in the region of Rascia (the former sanjak of Novi Bazar). In total, there were 390,000 ethnic Albanians and 207,000 Christian Orthodox Serbs in the whole of Old Serbia.

Prior to the Eastern Crisis (1875–1878), the Muslim Albanians had wavered between their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and defending their own local interests which pitted them against the measures implemented by the central authorities in Constantinople. Defending their old privileges, the Muslim Albanians became, just as Muslim Slavs in Bosnia, a serious obstacle to the modernization of the Ottoman Empire during its declining period. Their national movement took an organized form at the very end of the Eastern Crisis. The Albanian League (1878–1881) was formed on the eve of the Congress of Berlin in Prizren. The Albanian League called for a solution of the Albanian national question within the borders of the Ottoman Empire; conservative Muslim groups prevailed in its leadership.
and commanded the 16,000 men-strong paramilitary forces operating in several Ottoman vilayets.\(^{19}\)

The main cause of their discontent was the territorial enlargement of Serbia and Montenegro, two new independent states recognized by the Congress of Berlin in July 1878, while the main victims of their religious and national frustration were the Christian Serbs remaining under Ottoman rule, who were held responsible for the aspirations of the neighbouring Balkan states. Dissatisfied with the Porte’s concessions to great European Powers, the Albanian League tried to sever all ties with Constantinople. In order to prevent further international complications, the new Sultan, Abdülhamid II (1876–1909), ordered military action and brutally destroyed the Albanian movement.\(^{20}\)

The real nature of the Albanian League and its attitude towards other ethnic communities was described in detail in a confidential report sent to the Serbian government in Belgrade by Ilija Stavrić, Dean of the Serbian Theological School (Srpska Bogoslovija) in Prizren. A first-hand account of the Albanian League meetings revealed that Albanians were determined to “expel the Serbs and Montenegrins back to their former borders […] and if they return, to put these infidels [Kosovo-Metohija Serbs] to the sword”.\(^{21}\)

Well-informed and Albanian-speaking, Stavrić added that a member of the Albanian League forced the Serbian community in Prizren “on the 13th of this month [June 1878] to cable a statement of our loyalty as subjects and our satisfaction with the present situation to the Porte; moreover, [we were forced] to declare that we do not wish to be governed by Bulgarians or Serbia or Montenegro. We had to do as they wished. Alas, if Europe does not know what it is like to be a Christian in the Ottoman Empire?”\(^{22}\)

Nevertheless, a revived loyalty to the Sublime Porte emerged among the Muslim Albanians only a few years later as an ecstatic response to the Sultan’s proclaimed pan-Islamic policy. Far from being Islamic fanatics, the Albanians greeted the new policy of Sultan, who assumed the title of reli-


\(^{21}\) Arhiv Srbije, Ministarstvo inostranih dela, Političko odeljenje [Archives of Serbia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Department], 1878, fasc. IV, no 478, a confidential letter of Ilija Stavrić of 26 June (8 July) 1878 from Prizren.

\(^{22}\) Ibid.
gious leader (caliph), as meaning the renewal of their tribal privileges and autonomy, as well as political and social predominance over their neighbours, the Christian Slavs. Thus the Muslim Albanians in the western Balkans were encouraged by Sultan and Caliph Abdülhamid II to relentlessly suppress Christian unrest as a potential threat to the internal security of the Empire’s European provinces.23

Furthermore, modern Albanian nationalism, stemming from its tribal roots, gave priority to tribal rather than any other loyalties. Although defined in ethnic terms, the Albanian national movement was still dominated by a Muslim majority and burdened by conservative Islamic traditions further reinforced by pan-Islamic policy and fears of European-style reforms. According to confidential Austro-Hungarian reports, Muslim Albanian volunteers from Old Serbia demonstrated absolute solidarity with the Ottomans during the Greek-Ottoman War of 1897, while their patriotism, directed against Christians, was easily transformed into religious fanaticism.24

The slow progress of Albanian national integration provided the Dual Monarchy with the opportunity for broad political action: in this early process of nation-building, the Albanian elites and the entire nation were divided into three religious communities. Their members had different social statuses, opposed political traditions, spoke different dialects and used different alphabets. In order to minimize these differences, Vienna launched some important cultural initiatives: books about Albanian history were printed and distributed, the national coat-of-arms was invented, and various grammars were written to promote a uniform Albanian language.25

The Latin script, supplemented with new letters for non-resounding sounds, was intended to become a common script for Albanians of all three confessions; until the early twentieth century, a variety of scripts were in use for texts in Albanian, including Greek, Cyrillic, and Arabic characters. Special histories were written — such as Populare Geschichte der Albanesen by Ludwig von Thallotzy — and distributed among the wider public in order to awaken national consciousness and create a unified national identity for


the Albanians of all three confessions. The most important element in Austria-Hungary’s political and cultural initiative was the theory of the Illyrian origin of Albanians. This was a deliberate choice intended to “establish continuity with a suitable historical past”, a typical case of “invented tradition”; still, something was different from the similar pattern applied elsewhere in Europe: the “inventors” and the propagators of an “invented tradition” were not members of the national elite but their foreign protectors.26

Similarly to other belated nations (verspätete Nation) confronted with rival nationalisms, the Albanians sought foreign support and advocated radical solutions. The growing social stagnation and political disorder produced anarchy that reigned almost uninterrupted during the last century of Ottoman rule: the Christians, mostly Serbs, were the principal victims of political discrimination and the Muslims, mostly Albanians in Kosovo-Metohija, were their persecutors.27

Fabricated rumours about the Kosovo Serbs’ rising to arms on the very day Serbia was proclaimed a kingdom in March 1882 resulted in the establishment of a court-martial in Priština. Over five years of its uninterrupted activity, roughly 7,000 Kosovo Serbs were sentenced for “sedition”, while another 300 were sentenced to hard labour on the basis of suspicion rather than evidence. The prominent Serb urban elders were imprisoned, along with teachers and merchants, priests and some prosperous farmers. The sentenced were sent to prisons in Salonika or exiled to Anatolia. It was not before 1888 that some of the surviving Serbs were pardoned due to the joint mediation of Russian and British diplomacy.28

Kosovo Serbs Drama: Discrimination and Persecution, 1882–1912

It was in 1882 that Sima Andrejević Igumanov from Prizren published the terrifying testimony: *The Current Regrettable Situation in Old Serbia (Sadašnje nesretno stanje u Staroj Srbiji)* containing credible and verifiable data on the harassment, discrimination and atrocities committed by Otto-

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man Turks and Muslim Albanians in the early phase of the court-martial’s activity. Fearful that Serbia would pay enough attention to the sufferings of her co-nationals in Turkey-in-Europe, Igumanov attempted to raise awareness of the new wave of ethnically and religiously motivated violence.29

A mixture of religious, socially-based antagonisms and growing national rivalry added to the intensity of the Serb-Albanian conflict: “It is true that the Albanians in Kosovo, who were preponderantly Muslim, identified themselves religiously with the Turks, and on that basis were identified with the [Ottoman] Empire. They naturally regarded [Orthodox] Christians, being enemies of Turkey, as their own enemy. However, as far as the Slavs were concerned, the hatred of the Kosovars [Kosovo Albanians] was not founded on religion — although religion intensified it — but on ethnic differences: they fought the foreigner (the Shkja) because he coveted their land.”30 Nevertheless, the religious dimension, although not predominant among Muslim Albanians, remained the basis of social reality: many Muslim Albanians in Kosovo-Metohija believed Islam to be the religion of free people, whereas Christianity, especially Orthodox Christianity, was seen as the religion of slaves. European consuls observed an echo of such beliefs among the Albanians as late as the early twentieth century.31

Serbia to revive the issue of Serbian Metropolitans in Prizren and Skoplje, as the first step to re-establish the Patriarchate of Peć and to obtain wider international support for the official recognition of Serbs as a separate nation and their legal protection in Old Serbia. Serbian General Consulate was opened in Uskub (Skoplje) covering the whole of the Vilayet of Kosovo in 1887 and, after a long delay, another Serbian consulate was

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29 “Our homeland [Old Serbia] has been turned into hell by dark crazed bloodsuckers and masses of Asian tyrants. Banditry, violence, destruction, spying, denunciation, daily arrests, accusations, trials, sentences, exiles, seizure of property and life in many ways, wailing and mourning for the dead and burial of the executed, all these have become ordinary events everywhere in Old Serbia and [Slavic] Macedonia.” Quoted from Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852–1912, 101.

30 “Shkja – plural Shkje – is the word the Albanians use for the Slavs. The derivation is from Latin sclavus in the meaning of Slav.” (Quoted from Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, 202).

established in Priština in 1889. The immediate response was Albanian-led anarchy that developed into a large-scale attempt to drive out the Christian Serbs from Metohija. In April and May 1889 alone, around 700 persons fled from Kosovo and Metohija to Serbia. The Russian consul to Prizren, T. Lisevich, concluded that the Muslim Albanians’ goal was to cleanse all the areas between Serbia and Montenegro and thus deprive Old Serbia of its Serbian character. Anti-Serbian feelings culminated with the murder of the first Serbian Consul in Priština, Luka Marinković, in June 1890. Based on the information received from the Serbs of Priština, the Serbian government claimed that Albanian conspiracy was behind the assassination, while the Sublime Porte presented the murder as an act of general Muslim antagonism to Christian foreigners. Marinković’s successors succeeded in getting the first Serbian bookshop started and sponsored the renovation of the primary and secondary Serbian school in Priština.

After the death of Meletios (Meletije), the last Greek Metropolitan in Prizren, the concerted diplomatic efforts of Belgrade and Cetinje, bolstered by the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, resulted in the appointment of a Serb prelate, Dionisije Petrović (1896–1900), as Raška-Prizren Metropolitan. In accord with the Belgrade government, the new metropolitan, as well as his successor Nićifor Perić (1901–1911), carried out a broad reorganization of both ecclesiastical and educational institutions of Christian Serbs, opened new schools, established new church-school communities, and coordinated all important national affairs throughout Old Serbia.


34 Novak Ražnatović, “Rad vlaste Crne Gore i Srbije na postavljanju srpskih mitropolita u Prizrenu i Skoplju 1890–1902. godine”, Istoriji zapisi XXII/2 (1965), 218–275; Istorija
Serbia, on her part, planned to open a consulate in Prizren (1898–1900) so as to facilitate daily communication with the Raška-Prizren Metropolitan and to provide moral support to the discriminated local Serb population. However, as the local Muslim Albanians threatened to burn down all Serb houses and shops in the town and sent angry protests to the Sublime Porte, Serbia eventually gave up that idea altogether.35

Systematic persecution against the Christian Serbs in Kosovo, Metohija and Slavic-inhabited Macedonia, fiercely conducted from 1882 onwards, was an integral part of Sultan Abdülhamid II’s pan-Islamic policy. Seeking to put an end to this situation, the Serbian Minister at the Sublime Porte, Stojan Novaković, spared no effort in 1898–1899. In his diplomatic note submitted to the Ottoman Foreign Minister, Novaković stressed that “crimes and robberies are daily occurrences, and the perpetrators remain unpunished, and not even charged by the [Ottoman] authorities. The number of refugees fleeing across the border for their lives is enormous, and increases daily. According to the data the Royal government [of Serbia] possess, more than four hundred crimes have been perpetrated in the sanjaks of Priština, Novi Pazar, Peć and Prizren within a few months, last summer and winter. They include murder, arson, banditry, desecration of churches, rape, abduction, robbery, plundering of whole herds. This figure accounts for only part, one-fifth at most, of what really happened, since most crimes have remained unreported because the victims or their families do not dare to complain.”36

Formal investigations by Ottoman authorities had no significant results, nor did they improve the security of Serbs in Old Serbia. Deprived of Russian support in Constantinople, the Belgrade government accomplished nothing. The plan to submit a bilingual “Blue Book” of diplomatic correspondence regarding Albanian violence to the 1899 International Peace Conference at Hague was prevented by Austria-Hungary – Vienna sent a protest to Austrophile King Alexander I Obrenović of Serbia. In the absence of official support, Serb refugees from Old Serbia and Slavic

36 Bilingual Serbian-French publication with correspondence between the minister of Serbia at Constantinople and Ottoman foreign minister Tefvik Pasha: Documents diplomatiques. Correspondance concernant les actes de violence et de brigandage des Albanais dans la Vieille Serbie (Vilayet de Kosovo) 1898–1899 (Belgrade: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 1899).
Macedonia sent a memorandum to the Conference, but their complaints were not put on the official agenda. The impunity of Muslim Albanians for their crimes in the 1880s and particularly 1890s, under the auspices of Sultan Abdülhamid II himself, led to uncontrolled anarchy which was causing serious trouble for both the governor (vali) of Kosovo and the central government in Constantinople.

Western travel accounts from the end of the nineteenth century vividly portrayed the precarious situation of Christian Orthodox Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija and the neighbouring areas:

Of the rest of the Christian Servian [Serbian] population of Old Servia [Old Serbia], for every nine who remain one has fled in despair to free Servia [Serbia] within recent years. The remainder, unarmed and unprotected, survives only by entering into a species of feudal relationship with some Albanian brave. The Albanian is euphemistically described as their ‘protector’. He lives on tolerably friendly terms with his Servian vassal. He is usually ready to shield him from other Albanians, and in return he demands endless blackmail in an infinite variety of forms. [...] They can be compelled to do forced labour for an indefinite number of days. But even so the system is inefficient, and the protector fails at need. There are few Servian villages which are not robbed periodically of all their sheep and cattle — I can give names of typical cases if that would serve any purpose. For two or three years the village remains in a slough of abject poverty, and then by hard work purchases once more the beginnings of the herd, only in due course to lose it again. I tried to find out what the system of land tenure was. My questions, as a rule, met with a smile. The system of land tenure in this country, where the Koran and the rife are the only law, is what Albanian chiefs of the district chooses to make it. The Servian peasants, children of the soil, are tenants at will, exposed to every caprice of their domestic conquerors. Year by year the Albanian hillmen encroach upon the plain, and year by year the Servian peasants disappear before them.

A similar first-hand account recounting the crimes against Christian Serbs committed by Muslim Albanians was penned by a notable American traveller:

It would be difficult for the [Ottoman] Turks to carry out there the custom of disarming [Orthodox] Christians. But the Ottoman Government had secured the loyalty of Christians [Roman Catholic Albanians] — as

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38 Pisma srpskih konzula iz Prištine 1890–1900, 185–187.
well as Mohammedan Ghegs [Muslim Albanians] by allowing them to pillage and kill their non-Albanian neighbours to their hearts’ content. They are ever pressing forward, burning, looting, and murdering the Servians [Serbs] of the Vilayet of Kossovo [Kosovo]. The frontier line of Albania has been extended in this way far up into Old Servia [Old Serbia]. Even the frontier of Serbia proper is not regarded by these lawless mountain men. They often make raids into Bulgaria when quartered as soldiers on the border. The [Muslim] Albanians have overrun all Macedonia. They have found their way in large numbers as far as Constantinople. But beyond their own borders and the section of Kossovo from which the Servians have fled, they are held within certain bounds. In many Albanian districts the Albanians are exempt from military service, but large numbers of them join the Turkish army as volunteers. They enlist for the guns and cartridge.\(^{40}\)

A detailed list of Christian Serb households in the Bishopric of Raška-Prizren, compiled in 1899 by Metropolitan Dionisije Petrović, amounts to 8,323 Serbian houses in the villages and 3,035 in the towns of Kosovo and Metohija, which gives 113,580 persons (with ten persons per family on average). By comparison with the official data of the Serbian government registering some 60,000 Serbs forced to emigrate from Kosovo, Metohija and the neighbouring regions to the Kingdom of Serbia between 1890 and 1900, the statistics showed that the number of Serbs in villages had declined by at least one third from the time of the Eastern Crisis (1875–1878). Most of the remaining Serbian houses were in larger towns, where they were relatively protected from violence: in Prizren (982), Priština (531), Peć (461), Gnjilane (407) and Orahovac (176), and much fewer in small towns such as Džakovica (70) and Ferizović (20).\(^{41}\)

British diplomats, usually distrustful of Serbian political goals on account of their fear of Russian influence, were quite concerned with the scope of the Albanian outlaws’s terror in Kosovo. In May 1901, a British diplomat reported that forty Serbian families were compelled to emigrate to the Kingdom of Serbia due to the Albanian terror, whilst another report from September of the same year stressed that the whole of Old Serbia suffered from Albanian-inspired violence: “The Old Servia [Old Serbia] is still an area of disturbance owing to the lawlessness, vendettas and racial jealousies of the Albanians”. The same confidential report stated that the oppression against the Serbian population continued and


that 600 Albanians, supported by fifty Ottoman soldiers, “had reduced a [Serb-inhabited] village of sixty households to one quarter of that number”. Similar confidential British report of December 1901 underscored that Albanian terror in the period from the early spring to the end of that year resulted in the expulsion of 250 Kosovo Serb families to the Kingdom of Serbia.42

Metohija (the sanjak of Peć) remained the main theatre of the continuous ethnic cleansing of Serb Orthodox Christians. The Serbian consuls from Priština and Skoplje were banned by the vali of Kosovo to travel and visit their co-nationals or the renowned Serb monasteries of Patriarchate of Peć and Visoki Dečani until 1905 because of the fear for their security. Mgr Nićifor Perić, the new Metropolitan of Raška–Prizren entrusted in 1903 the administration of the Dečani Monastery to the brotherhood of the Russian skete of St. John Chrysostom from Mount Athos, dependency of the Serbian monastery of Chilandar (Hilandar). The Russian monks were brought in in the hope that they would protect the Serbs in Metohija, deprived of both Russian and Serbian diplomatic protection, restore monastic life in the impoverished monastery and stem the growing influence of Austro-Hungarian and Roman Catholic propaganda. Russian diplomacy, with their consulate in Prizren and Embassy in Constantinople, was also expected to provide assistance for the protection of Serbs. Dissensions between Belgrade and St. Petersburg, and divisions among the Serbs of Metohija regarding the actions of Russian monks in charge of Visoki Dečani monastery militated against Serb national and cultural action in Metohija.43

According to Austro-Hungarian statistics from 1903, the population of Kosovo and Metohija consisted of 187,200 Serbs (111,350 Christian Orthodox, 69,250 Muslim and 6,600 Roman Catholic) and 230,300 Albanians (Muslim 215,050, Roman Catholic 14,350 and Christian Orthodox 900).44 These statistics, however, could not be completely reliable, given the difficulties in collecting data and the Dual Monarchy’s strong political interest in supporting Albanians at that time — at the outset of Great Powers’ reform action in Old Serbia and Macedonia, the three “Macedonian Vilay-

42 Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Southeast Europe, Turkey, no. 1 (1903) (London: Printed for H.M. Stationery Office by Harrison and Sons, St Martin’s Lane, 1903), 45, 88–89, 102.
43 For more details see D. T. Batašović, Dečansko pitanje, 2nd ed. (Belgrade: Čigoja Štampa, 2007), with the earlier literature.
ets” (1903–1908). Indeed, the Serb-inhabited areas in the northern regions of Vilayet of Kosovo were alone excluded from the reform project as a result of Vienna’s adamant demand.45

Serbia, the Young-Turk Regime and the rebelled Albanians (1903–1912)

The Young-Turk Revolution, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the proclamation of Bulgaria’s independence, which all took place in 1908, essentially altered the balance of power in the Balkans. The abortive reform action on the part of Great Powers had come to an end. The Young-Turks restored the 1876 Constitution, proclaimed equality for all subjects of the Ottoman Empire regardless of their religion and nationality, and announced radical political and social reforms.46 These promises were greeted by Ottoman Serbs as an opportunity for their national affirmation and free political organization. In Skoplje (Uskub), the seat of Vilayet of Kosovo, the Serbian Democratic League was formed as early as 10 August 1908 with the temporary Central Committee presided over by Bogdan Radenković. The formation of district committees ensued at the meetings held in Priština, Vučitrn, Mitrovica, Gjilane and Ferizović, comprising the most distinguished Serb representatives, teachers, priests, craftsmen and merchants. The Serbian newspaper Vardar was founded in Skoplje to propagate the principles of the Serbian Democratic League, writing extensively on the difficult position of Serbs throughout Old Serbia. The Vardar devoted special attention to the oppression against Kosovo Serbs renewed after the expiration of a formal pledge (bessa) not to do so given by Albanians in Ferizović. The Serbian Democratic League and the Vardar insisted that the stipulations of the Ottoman Constitution be fully enforced on Albanians as well; the Albanians recognized the new regime but displayed no readiness to obey the law.47

Having concluded an agreement with the Young-Turks, the Serbs from Turkey-in-Europe put forward their own candidates in several important districts for the elections for a new Ottoman Parliament. In Kosovo

45 For more, see Milan G. Miloievitch, La Turquie d’Europe et le problème de la Macédoine et de la Vieille Serbie (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1905); Fikret Adanir, Die Makedonische Frage. Ihre Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1908 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1979).


and Metohija they had candidates for the Peć, Prizren and Priština sanjaks, but managed to win a mandate in Priština alone - Sava Stojanović was elected. Two more Serbs became the members of parliament in Constantinople, Aleksandar Parlić from Skoplje and Dr. Janićije Dimitrijević from Monastir, while Temko Popović of Ohrid was elected senator. A large assembly of the Ottoman Serbs was held in Skoplje on the Visitation of the Virgin in 1909 with 78 delegates present, 44 from Old Serbia and 34 from Slav-inhabited Macedonia; the Organization of the Serbian People in the Ottoman Empire was established which would grow into a representative body of all the Serbs from the Ottoman Empire. 49

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 1908 and the project for building a railway through the Novi Pazar sanjak revealed Austria-Hungary’s ambition to establish its rule in the Ottoman-held provinces in the Balkans. The meetings held by Serbs against the annexation were also attended by Albanians. Frightened by Austro-Hungarian aspirations, many Albanian notables made attempt to approach the Serbs. Bairam Curri of Djakovica proposed to Bogdan Radenković a joint protest to the annexation, while the prominent Begolli (Mahmudbegović) family of Peć negotiated with Serbian diplomats about possible cooperation. At the same time, Austro-Hungarian followers among Albanian notables strongly opposed this rapprochement with the Serbs. While relative peace reigned in Gnjilane and Priština, the Serbs were still oppressed in the Peć nahi. The Albanians threatened that the proclamation of Constitution was only temporary and that the infidels (gjaurs) would never have the same rights as Muslims.51

Notwithstanding individual crimes, the situation in Kosovo and Metohija was tolerable prior to the unsuccessful coup d’etat in Constantinople in April 1909. Abdülhamid II failed to topple the Young-Turks, and he was thus compelled to abandon his throne. His half-brother Mahmud V Reshad was proclaimed Sultan.52 Within the Young-Turk leadership, a pan-Ottoman inclination prevailed, which considered all subjects of the Empire Ottomans. The Serbian Democratic League was renamed the Educational-
Charitable Organization of Ottoman Serbs, but its activities were soon curbed. Under various decrees and laws, the activities of many Serbian societies were forbidden, land estates were confiscated from churches and monasteries, while the work of schools and religious committees was hindered. The law on the inheritance of estates greatly upset the Serbs, since many owners fled to Serbia in the previous period. Many estates were divided among the new *muhadjirs* (Muslim Slavs who settled in Kosovo after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The new legislation also upset *chiflik* farmers: their *agas* could drive them off their land and settle Muslims instead, or exert double taxes. 53

At the beginning of the Young-Turk reign, the Albanians also founded their national clubs and educational societies which became the centers of national gathering and political agitation. Autonomist tendencies were revived. The pan-Ottoman ideology of the Young-Turk leadership, the centralization of administration, the introduction of military service and the new tax policy ruffled the Albanians. Instead of enjoying Abdülhamid II’s protection, they faced the resolute Young-Turks who had no regard for their special rights and privileges. The first conflicts in Kosovo and Metohija arose in 1909 when the Ottoman authorities attempted to complete the lists for conscription purposes and the collection of taxes. At the anniversary of the Revolution in 1909, the Albanians held a congress in Dibra (Debar). They rejected the demand for conscription, clamoured for the creation of an autonomous region encompassing all Albanian-inhabited areas, and displayed marked hostility towards the neighboring Serbian states.54

Despite their religious diversity, political disagreements, different economic interests, the leadership of the Albanian movement attained a high degree of national solidarity in opposition to the centralism of the Young-Turks. The Young-Turks’ attempts to introduce military service and new taxes enraged Albanians of all three confessions. Regular Ottoman troops could not suppress the rebellious Albanian clans, and the Young-Turks were soon compelled to making concessions after the punitive expedition of Djavid Pasha in fall 1909 and the rigorous measures in northern Albania had not brought the desired results. 55

Another Albanian insurrection broke out in spring 1910 following the repeated attempts of the authorities to collect taxes. The resistance in Kosovo and Metohija was particularly strong in the Djakovica (Gjakovë)


Under the command of Torgut Shefket Pasha, nearly 50,000 strong Ottoman troops ruthlessly crushed the insurrection and seized arms, but this forced pacification proved just a temporary solution. Albanian committees increased agitation for an autonomous Albania and fomented discontent among Albanians in the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The rebellions in Yemen and Lebanon, the disorder in Crete and the Italian incursion in Tripoli put the Young-Turks in a difficult position.56

The Malissors rose to arms in northern Albania. The Montenegrin King, Nikola I Petrović Njegoš, supplied the courageous Malissors rebels with arms and provided shelter for refugees. He hoped that Albanian insurrection would further weaken the Ottoman rule in the region. The Albanian leaders from Old Serbia, Isa Bolletini and Suleyman Batusa, were among 3,000 Albanians who found refuge in Montenegro. A memorandum (“Red Book”) was sent from Montenegrin capital Cetinje to Great Powers and the Young-Turks demanding the recognition of the Albanian nation and the creation of an autonomous Albania. 57

In fall 1911, Bolletini requested arms from Serbia, while the Montenegrin government urged Belgrade to assist the Albanian insurrection before some other foreign power took advantage of the situation. The Serbian Premier, Milovan Dj. Milovanović — the architect of the Balkan League of 1912 — regarded the Albanian insurrection and its ties with Montenegro with certain distrust. Fearing that Austria-Hungary could send its army to restore order in the Vilayet of Kosovo, Milovanović believed that the rebellion was not in the interest of Serbia and the Ottoman Serbs.58

The Serbs of Vilayet of Kosovo soon found themselves cornered between the Young-Turks and the Albanians. The Young-Turk authorities were often rather harsh: after the introduction of extraordinary measures and court-martial (urfa) in May 1910, many people were beaten, and several Serbs died from the wounds inflicted, during the action to seize arms from the population in Kosovo. Local Albanian outlaws availed themselves of the turmoil to sack Serbian homes.59 When Sultan Mahmud V Reshad arrived in Kosovo in summer 1911 to offer amnesty to the rebelled Muslim Albanians, another wave of violence hit the Christian Serbs. From July to 56 Alan Palmer, *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1994), 212–213.
November 1911, 128 robberies, 35 arsons, 41 banditries, 53 abductions, 30 blackmails, 19 threats, 35 murders, 37 attempted murders, 58 armed robberies, 27 affrays and abuses, 13 attempts to convert people to Islam by forced circumcision and 18 serious woundings were perpetrated against Christian Serbs throughout Old Serbia. 

The disturbing extent of violence urged Serbian consuls in Skoplje and Priština to demand from the Belgrade government to secretly arm the persecuted Serb population in Kosovo.

Nevertheless, the Young-Turk regime found itself in a severe crisis and new elections were announced. Belgrade expected the Young-Turks to win the elections, and instructions were sent to Kosovo Serbs to support the Ottoman government. After the conference of Ottoman Serbs held in Uskub (Skoplje), in March 1912, a new electoral agreement was concluded with the Young-Turks. The Albanians, fierce opponents of the Young-Turk regime, renewed their attacks upon the Serbs prodded by their chiefs.

The preparations for a general Albanian insurrection had begun in January 1912 under supervision of Hasan Prishtina of Kosovo and Ismail Kemal of south Albania. Hasan Prishtina’s task was to gather the people and collect the arms, while Ismail Kemal was to contact Albanian committees and make propaganda in European capitals. It was agreed that the insurrection in the Vilayet of Kosovo would begin in the spring and spread to other regions inhabited by Albanians. In July 1912, the insurrection broke out in Kosovo; refusing to shoot their Muslim brethren, the Ottoman officers, soldiers and gendarmes joined the rebels. The vali of Kosovo personally returned to the Albanians the arms seized two years before. War with Italy, uprisings and unrest all over the Empire combined with the danger of international involvement compelled the Sultan to remove the Young-Turks, dissolve the Parliament and yield to the demands of Albanians.

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60 Zadužbine Kosova, 716; additional archival documentation, 717–728.

61 Ibid. French Consul in Uskub, Pierre-Léon Carlier, also reported in September 1912 on continuos persecution by the Albanians against the Ottoman Serbs, supplied with a list of crimes in August and September 1912: “J’ai entretenu à différentes reprises Votre Excellence des vexations continues dont souffrent les Chrétiens en général, et les Serbes Ottomans en particulier, dans le vilayet de Kossovo, du fait des Albanais, et de l’inaction absolue des autorités ottomanes pour la poursuite des crimes des attentats contre les propriétés […] qui montrent la situation lamentable qui est faite aux Serbes dans ce Vilayet” (AMAE, Paris, Turquie, Guerres balkaniques, vol. VII, Uskub, 16 septembre 1912). Cf. also Bataković, Kosovo Chronicles, 154–156.


63 Bataković, Kosovo Chronicles, 162–165.
Nevertheless, some 15,000 rebels, dissatisfied with the appeasing promises of the Sultan, moved south and took control over Uskub. A committee was sent from Constantinople to enter into negotiations with the rebels. Hasan Prishtina handed it a list with 14 specific demands: special laws for Albania based on the common law; the right to carry arms, amnesty for all rebels; appointment of officials who speak Albanian and are familiar with their customs in four vilayets (Kosovo, Scutari, Monastir and Janina); recognition of the Albanian language as official; curriculum and religious schools in the native tongue; army service for Albanians in their own territory alone; building of roads and railways, further administrative subdivisions; trial for the Young-Turk government. As the local authorities accepted most of the demands after a week, the rebels dispersed.  

The rebel leadership comprised the people of different political affiliation and social status. Some of them were military commanders, others prominent tribal chiefs (Riza Bey Krieziu, Bairam Curri) and former outlaws (Isa Bolletini, Idriz Seferi); some of them supported the old Ottoman system, others were ardent Austrophiles. On the other hand, there were also former diplomats and dissatisfied politicians (Hasan Prishtina, Jahja Aga, Hadji Rifat Aga and Nexhib Draga), and all of them held quite opposing views as to the future of Albanians. Their official petitions did not contain a demand for the territorial autonomy for the Albanians, nor was the Porte willing to comply with such a demand. Fearing an intervention of other Balkan states, Hasan Prishtina and Nexhib Draga, the major negotiators, were satisfied with a settlement of the Albanian question within the framework of Ottoman legitimacy.

The attitude of the rebels toward the political status of Serbs in Old Serbia was, despite some exceptions, basically intolerant. The Serbian newspaper in Skoplje Vardar pointed out that the Serbs in Old Serbia were not against the fulfilment of Albanian national demands on the part of Ottomans: “We just consider it unfair that we Serbs are excluded, whose desires and interests, like in this case, as always, remain unheeded”.

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66 Hrabak, “Arbanaški ustanci 1912”, 325. One of the Serbian agents in Kosovo, Grigori-je Božović, who observed the Albanian movement in summer 1912, noted the following: “As far as the Serbs are concerned, the negative aspect of this movement is that the Arnauts [Albanians] are on the verge of becoming a nation, and they wish to settle their issue in Kosovo, and they are neither the conquerors nor the conquered. We [the Serbs] fall between them and the Young Turks, and both will rage at us. A positive move is that the Albanians are starting to rid themselves of Turkish fanaticism; Muslim solidarity and hypnosis are slackening; they are very aware that they are at enmity with the Turks.
The Serbian government endeavored to exploit the Albanian insurrection to further weaken the Ottoman system and oust Austro-Hungarian influence in its leadership. The Serbian consul in Priština conferred with the influential leaders — Bairam Curri, Isa Bolletini and Riza Bey, while Bolletini’s two sons were guests of the Belgrade government. Many Albanian leaders were paid large sums of money or were given arms. In return, the Serbians demanded that all the rights granted to the Albanians should be extended to Serbian population as well. Due to insistence of several of the leaders, particularly the pro-Austrian Hasan Prishtina, this demand was rejected.\(^67\)

The Albanian national movement felt, despite periodical assistance from both Montenegro and Serbia and the on-going negotiations, profound intolerance for Serbs in the Vilayet of Kosovo. No Albanian seriously entertained the idea of recognizing the rights of Serbs to have national institutions and independent political activity as evidenced by the escalation of Albanian violence in 1912. Periodical attempts of some tribal chiefs to approach distinguished Serbian representatives in the Ottoman Empire were merely tactical moves without real political importance. Intolerance towards the Serbian people, which still constituted the majority in certain districts of the Vilayet Kosovo, was exhibited in all plans and programs of Albanian leaders. From the emergence of the Albanian League to the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century, the Serbs in Kosovo, Metohija and the neighboring regions were deprived of the most fundamental human and civil rights. Confrontation between the Albanians and Young-Turks, the fear of the Balkan states’ and Austria-Hungary’s interference only temporarily halted the continuous persecution of Kosovo Serbs.

*\textit{Liberation from the Ottomans 1912: Jubilant Serbs and Hostile Albanians}\*

With the First Balkan War (1912) the tide turned. A series of Albanian rebellions (1910–12) had precipitated the formation of the Balkan Alliance (Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro), which, motivated by the deteriorating status of the entire Christian population in European Vilayets, declared war on the Ottomans. Prior to the outbreak of war, the Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pašić, offered the Albanian leaders an “accord on the union of Serbs and Albanians in the Vilayet of Kosovo”, whereby ethnic Albanians would be given religious freedom, the use of the Albanian language in Albanian municipal schools and administration, preservation

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of the Albanian common law and, finally, an Albanian legislative body in charge of religious, judicial and educational affairs within the Kingdom of Serbia. 68 At the same time, Serbia endeavored to obtain support of the Kosovo Albanians in the forthcoming military operations. In a secret mission to northern Kosovo, two most reliable intelligence officers Dragutin T. Dimitrijević Apis and Božin Simić intended to come to an agreement with two influential Albanian chieftains Isa Bolletini and Idriz Seferi: they were requested not to take part in the impending war against the Ottomans. 69

The Commander of the Third Serbian Army assigned to operate in Kosovo, General Božidar Janković, also had contact with Kosovo Albanians. In his war proclamation, King Petar I Karadjordjević invited Serbian troops to respect the lives, property and legal rights of various national and religious groups in Turkey-in Europe, including Albanians, Muslim Slavs and ethnic Turks, thus ensuring political liberties, civil and human rights to all future citizens of Kingdom of Serbia. The war declaration emphasized amiable attitude towards the Albanians provided they maintained their neutrality during the military operations. However, Austro-Hungarian agitators encouraged both Muslim and Roman Catholic Albanians to confront the Serbian army, promising that the Dual Monarchy’s troops were already on their way from Bosnia to assist them. 70

On 10 October, the Albanians opted for armed defence of their “Ottoman fatherland” at their vast gathering in Uskub (and subsequently in Priština and Dibra). Kosovo Albanians received 63,000 rifles from the Ottomans to organize a full-scale resistance against the Serbian troops but no more than 16,000 of them came to the frontline at Merdare to face the well-prepared, highly disciplined and modernized Serbian army.

Out of its roughly three million inhabitants Serbia managed to mobilise almost 255,000 soldiers in ten infantry divisions, one cavalry division and artillery batteries amounting to 288 cannons. The 76,000 men strong Third Serbian Army led by General Božidar Janković stormed Kosovo. Highly motivated Serbian troops advanced in exaltation. The general feeling among the Serbian soldiers, embued with the Kosovo tradition, was that


they were the “Avengers of Kosovo”, the heartland of medieval Serbia (“Old Serbia”) which had fallen under the Ottoman rule after the fateful Battle of Kosovo in 1389. As the most popular war in contemporary Serbian history, the First Balkan War was marked by a remarkably high combat morale.

Similar patriotic feelings also overwhelmed Montenegrin troops which advanced steadily into Metohija, towards Istok, Peć and Djakovica.

The Serbian artillery scattered Albanian irregular (bashibozuk) units. The first Serb soldier to enter liberated Priština was the famous poet and former Serbian consul in Priština, Milan M. Rakić, who left Foreign Ministry and joined the army as a volunteer. Having captured Priština, the Serbian troops attended the solemn liturgy at the Monastery of Gračanica celebrating the long-awaited liberation of Kosovo. Following the liberation of Priština (22 October), the First Serbian Army won a decisive victory over the considerably stronger Ottoman troops at Kumanovo (23–24 October 1912), and triumphally entered Skoplje. After another Serbian victory (18–19 November) near Monastir (Bitolj, Bitola in the vilayet of Monastir) the war was brought to an end.

Austro-Hungarian diplomatic representatives and intelligence agents from the Old Serbia were shocked by the spectacular victories of Serbs. The Ibar detachment of the Serbian army (Ibarska vojska) entered Kosovo from the north, through Mitrovica and Zvečan, continuing its breakthrough towards Peć and Djakovica which had already been seized by Montenegrins. The Austro-Hungarian Consuls, especially Oskar Prochaska in Prizren and Vice-Consul Ladislav Tachi in [Kosovska] Mitrovica, along with their network of agents, attempted in vain to encourage the Albanians to fight against the Serbian forces by spreading rumors of Austro-Hungary’s entry into war and the imminent conquest of Belgrade. The Serbian government


72 Jean Pellisier, _Dix mois de guerre dans les Balkans. Octobre 1912–août 1913_ (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1914), 33: “...il n’y a pas des sacrifices dont les Serbes ne soient capables pour le triomphe de leur cause nationale. Presque toute la population civile, de 18 à 50 ans, est en ce moment sous les armes, Et tous, depuis le dernier des paysans, qui sait à peine lire et écrire, jusqu’au plus grand des savants, se battent avec un grand enthousiasme et un héroïque courage. L’exemple des hommes est aussi suivi par les femmes.”

73 See a first-hand account of the Serbian war correspondent from Vojvodina, Jaša Tomić, _Rat na Kosovu i Staroj Srbiji 1912. godine_ (Novi Sad: Štamparija Svetozara Miletića, 1913).

was aware of the Dual Monarchy’s encouragement of Kosovo Albanians to oppose the Serbian army, but there was little evidence available.\textsuperscript{75}

Viennese press, hostile to Serbia for decades, spread alarming news that the Serbian army had reportedly wounded and killed Consul Prochaska in Prizren. This failed attempt to discredit the Serbian army became known as “the Prochaska affair”. Nevertheless, the planned advance of Serbian army into Albania was halted for the next ten days - an outlet to the Albanian littoral was among Serbia’s war aims. A later investigation of the Command of the Third Army established that, before the arrival of the Serbian army, Consul Prohaska had „spread misinformation“ and prepared the Albanians to resist a small detachment of Serbian troops that took Prizren on 30 October 1912. Prochaska had also “staged a shooting from the consulate on the day the Serbian army arrived in Prizren” and then “refused to attend the ceremony which was prepared by the Prizren municipality“ for the Serbian troops and avoided „to present himself“ to the commander of the Serbian Third Army, General Janković.\textsuperscript{76}

In an additional investigation regarding the conduct of the Austro-Hungarian Vice-Consul Tachi in Mitrovica, who caused similar incidents but on a smaller scale, the following was discovered: “Mr. Ladisav Tachi [...] is already known as a Serbophobe [...] It is known that Mr. Tachi, through his agents and mercenaries, prepared the grounds for Austro-Hungarian occupation of Sanjak [of Novi Bazar] and Mitrovica. He coordinated the spreading of his propaganda through the agency of Albanians — the Catholics. He also had quite a following amongst Muslims, the immigrants from Bosnia. On the eve of the arrival of Serbian army in Mitrovica, he claimed that the Austro-Hungarian army had already reached Pljevlja [Taslidje]. There is a written proof that can be found at Muslim leaders in Mitrovica, as well as [the regions of] Shala, Drenica and [Ibarski] Kolašin, proving Mr. Tachi’s involvement with the Albanians and Turks from the area.”\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{75} While he was searching a house of one of the Albanian beys in Dibra (Debar) a Serbian seargeant-scholar found the notes made by Austrian Baron Nopcsa. These notes were made during his travels around Albania, Old Serbia and Macedonia in a mission to secure support of Muslim and Catholic Albanians for the struggle for an autonomous Albania under the patronage of Austria-Hungary; officially, he was conducting “scientific geological research”. Jovan N. Tomić, \textit{Austro-Bugarska i albansko pitanje} (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1913), 38.


The Austro-Hungarian agitation amongst the Albanians in Old Serbia proved to have been an insufficient motivational force.\textsuperscript{78} The Eastern detachment (Istočni odred) of Montenegrin army marched into Peć, where it was welcomed by the local Serb population as well as the monks of the Patriarchate of Peć; the troops then continued their advance to the Visoki Dečani monastery. The Montenegrin troops met eventually with their Serbian allies in Djakovica, which became the borderline between Serbian and Montenegrin possessions in Old Serbia.\textsuperscript{79}

In order to achieve rapid pacification, the Serbian military authorities issued proclamations in Priština and other towns calling Albanians to put down and surrender their arms, guaranteeing their civil rights and property. Even in the traditional hotbed of outlaws, Drenica, and in the Peć area, Muslim Albanians eventually accepted partial, if not full, disarmament. However, as a result of anti-Serbian agitation of their tribal leaders many Albanians fled and found shelter in the mountains. Occasional skirmishes with the still rebellious Albanians provoked strong reactions on the part of Serbian troops. Certain incidents following armed attacks on Serbian military and civilian authorities were portrayed by the Viennese

\textsuperscript{78} Leon Trotzky, the future leader of the Bolshevik revolution, was a Vienna-based Russian journalist, who observed the First Balkan War from his hotel in Belgrade. He was informed of the situation on the front by Serbian socialists, who were adamantly against the war, as well as from other Viennese war correspondents in Belgrade. Thus, his reports on the alleged “Serbian crimes” in Kosovo against Albanian civilians, similar to those from Austrian press, were not confirmed by other war correspondents who witnessed the military operations in Old Serbia. Leon Trotzky, \textit{The Balkan Wars 1912–1913} (New York & London: Pathfinder 1993), 117–137. The first-hand account which provides the entirely opposite views is Barby, \textit{La Guerre des Balkans}, passim; Général Herr, \textit{Sur le théâtre de la Guerre des Balkans} (Paris & Nancy: Berger-Levrault, 1913), 23–67; Adopf L. Vischer, \textit{An der serbischen front; erlebnisse eines arztes auf dem serbisch-türkischen kriegsschauplata, 1912}, (Basel: K.C.F. Spittlers, 1913); Gaston Gravier, \textit{La nouvelle Serbie} (Coulommiers: Imp. P. Brodard, 1913). There were, however, international reports on the crimes against civilians committed by all warring sides, not always verifiable and, as Robert Seaton-Watson observed, mostly from the Bulgarian perspective: \textit{Report of the International Comission to Inquire into the Causes and the Conduct of Balkan Wars. Divison of Inter-course and Education of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace} (Aylsbury: Hazel Watson and Viney, 1914), reprinted as \textit{The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a new introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict by George F. Kennan} (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994).

press as heroic resistance of the Albanians, while the actions of Serbian forces were presented as gruesome acts of oppression against the innocent civilian population. In parallel, Serbian officers kept reassuring the Albanian population that Serbia is at war against the Ottomans alone, and not against them. Serbia quickly established civil administration in the newly-liberated areas. Kosovo was divided into the Lab, Priština and Prizren districts. Montenegro divided Metohija into the Peć and Djakovica districts. Having been defeated the main Albanian leaders, Bairam Curri, Riza Bey Kryeziu and Isa Boleliniti, fled to Malissia in northern Albania. Whilst the most of Kosovo Albanians remained hostile to the new Serbian regime, Christian Serbs, as well as Muslim Slavs of Gora (Goranci) and Peć, greeted the Serbian and Montenegrin armies with exhilaration.

The Serbs in Prizren shouted “Thank God, thanks Serbia!” stressing that they had been waiting for that moment for five hundred years (since the 1389 Battle of Kosovo). They emphasized the fact that they had been persecuted solely by the Albanians and that they maintained good relations with the ethnic Turks. The Serbs of Priština solemnly greeted the Serbian troops with church bells tolling, strong emotions, tears and flowers; the houses were open for soldiers, while the Muslim municipality authorities presented themselves to General Janković and recognised the new regime. In Peć, the local Serbs were also thankful to ethnic Turks, who had often been robbed by Albanian outlaws as well. The Turks of Peć refused the demand of Riza Bey Kryeziu to destroy the Patriarchate of Peć and they were instrumental in preventing a number of robberies and attacks by the Albanians, prior to the arrival of Montenegrin troops in the town. The jubilant Serbs in Peć reported bitterly to a war correspondent that there was not a single Serbian house among the remaining 500 in that town that did not lose one or two family members during the reign of terror of Albanian outlaws: “You came in the nick of time to liberate us. If you had come in several years, you would not have found us here!”

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81 D. T. Bataković, Kosovo i Metohija u srpsko-arbanaškim odnosima (Belgrade: Čigoja Štampa, 2006), 189–199.
82 Tomić, Rat na Kosovu i Staroj Srbiji, 155–157.
83 Ibid. 119–120.
84 The urban Turkish communities in Prizren, Peć and Priština blamed the Albanians for all the conflicts in the past and expressed their readiness to live in peace with Serbs and to recognise the new regime (ibid. 191–193).
Epilogue

The London Treaty of 30 May 1913 fixed the borders between Serbia, Montenegro and the newly-established Albania with the exception of some disputed sections left to the arbitration of an International Commission. Austro-Hungary tried to obtain a “Greater Albania” in order to counter-balance Serbia and Montenegro which doubled their territories after the First Balkan War. Although Serbia and Montenegro were forced to withdraw their forces from the Albanian littoral under the threat of Austro-Hungarian military intervention, their delegations emphasised the fact that Kosovo and Metohija, the “Holy Lands of the Serbian people”, could under no circumstances remain outside their borders. Both Old Serbia (most of the Vilayet of Kosovo) and Slav-inhabited Macedonia (most of the Vilayet of Monastir) were officially incorporated into Serbia on 7 September 1913 by King Petar I Karadjordjević’s decree. The most of Metohija (the sanjak of Peć with Istok, Peć, Dečani and Djakovica) was integrated into the Kingdom of Montenegro.

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Entrance of the Serbian troops in Gračanica, 1878

Vilayet of Kosovo, 1877–1912
The Correspondance on the Albanian Violence in Old Serbia, 1898–1899 (The Blue Book of Diplomatic Correspondance)
2 Requiem for a beheaded Serb by Albanian outlaws in Peć, 1906
3 Serbian and Montenegrin officers in Djakovica, 1912
4 Visoki Dečani Monastery, 1903
5 Solemn entrance of the Serbian troops of General M. Živković in Mitrovica, 1912
King Nikola and the Territorial Expansion of Montenegro, 1914–1920

Abstract: This article discusses the abortive efforts of King Nikola of Montenegro to achieve territorial expansion for his country during the First World War. Although he was a believer in the unification of Serbdom, he wanted to achieve it under his leadership rather than that of the Serbian Karadjordjević dynasty, and therefore had no intention of letting Montenegro be simply merged with Serbia and his family pushed into the background. Therefore, King Nikola campaigned not just for the preservation of Montenegro as an independent state, but also for its considerable territorial expansion, mostly at the expense of Austria-Hungary, and also at that of Serbia and Albania. He did not desist from his endeavours even at the time of his exile following the capitulation and occupation of Montenegro in 1916; on the contrary, it was then that his demands were most comprehensive. However, he could not resist the reality on the ground during and in the wake of the war, and all his efforts remained useless.

Keywords: King Nikola, Montenegro, territorial expansion, First World War

In the course of his long political activity on the Serbian and Balkan scene King Nikola Petrović-Njegoš conducted a lot of negotiations, put forward and declined many suggestions or proposed solutions and accepted some compromises. This was perfectly natural for a man who autocratically exercised his sovereign duties, had no government capable of imposing its will and viewpoint or associates who could be entrusted with delicate missions.

Since he was intent on playing the leading role in Serbdom and carrying out its unification, King Nikola found the economic, political and military strengthening of Montenegro of utmost importance. During the first phase of his reign, still as Prince, he believed that in this way he could secure the influence in political decision-making for himself and Montenegro. To begin with, he believed that the occasional expansion of Montenegro into the neighbouring territories could enhance his, and his family’s, reputation and at the same time extinguish or
diminish that of other pretenders (the Obrenović and Karadjordjević families). For that reason, he incessantly interfered with the surrounding lands (Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo and Metohija, the Adriatic coast) and, in some cases, embroiled himself in ill-conceived undertakings which, due to the opposition of Great Powers, ended in withdrawal, suspicions and diplomatic and political defeats. It is safe to assume that prior to 1914 that motif was one of the most important in the shaping of his policy.

The outbreak of the world war as well as its subsequent course convinced King Nikola and a few of his closest associates that such policy was not realistic but they did not give up territorial expansion. After all, all other countries, the participants in the war, Great Powers and smaller states alike, including those in the Balkans, expounded the need for the change of borders on account of ethnic or strategic considerations. King Nikola resorted to all kinds of reasons (economical, strategic, political, the loyalty to the Allied cause) to justify his demands. Moreover, as a supreme commander of the Montenegrin army he frequently influenced the making of military plans which reflected to a large extent his own territorial desiderata — the operations in Bay of Cattaro (the Gulf of Kotor), Dalmatia, Herzegovina, Bosnia, Northern Albania and Scutari.

The territorial expansion of Montenegro, in King Nikola's view, could get that country out of the encirclement in which it found itself upon entering the war and get it rid of the close political and military co-operation with Serbia. King Nikola was quick to realise that the most dangerous threat to the future of Montenegro and his own family was coming from Serbia and her dynasty; he was aware of the prevalent mood of the Montenegrin population, the weakness of his state and army and the Allied suspicions of him. All this induced him to hurriedly respond and defend his country by clamouring for its territorial pretensions. He made effort to do so through the mediation of some Great Powers — Italy and Russia.

King Nikola's first step was to sound Russia out. In early December 1914, the Russian minister at Cetinje, Aleksandar Girs, reported that King's close associates spoke of the necessity for preservation of Montenegro's independence and territorial augmentation to be realised at the end of the war. There was some talk of the annexation of Bay of Cattaro and the stretch of the coast up to Dubrovnik. Gris found such ambitions to be "fantastical", i.e. unacceptable and badly received among the people.¹ As it

¹ Girs to Sazonov, Cetinje, 10 December 1914; Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya v epohu imperializma, ser. III, I-X (Moscow 1931–1937), vol. VI-2 [hereafter MO], 205–206; Dragovan Šepić, Italija, Saveznici i jugoslovensko pitanje 1914–1918 (Zagreb 1970), 40, 106. In November 1914, Petar Plamenac, the foreign minister of Montenegro, discussed the incorporation of Scutari.
turned out later, that was the minimal programme of Montenegro’s sovereign. His whetted appetites took their final shape when Italy decided to enter the war on the side of the Allies in the spring of 1915. Prior to that, and as soon as he found out about the Italian decision, King Nikola sent to Russia his envoy, General Mitar Martinović, in order to win over the Russian court and government for his pretensions. The Martinović mission formally had another objective — to secure regular supplies of arms and food for Montenegro. In fact, the political agenda was more important, although Martinović’s efforts remained abortive. The Russian government and military circles refused the Montenegrin requests, and Crown Prince Danilo complained to the Russian military attaché at Cetinje about the support extended to Serbia. According to the information provided by the Russian minister to Serbia Trubetskoy and his military attaché Potapov, Martinović’s mission was extremely important. The former claimed that it aimed to persuade the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich to take into consideration the territorial pretensions of Montenegro and, in particular, to separate them from those of Serbia on the occasion of the conclusion of peace. Potapov believed that Martinović intended to inform the Grand Duke about the plan hatched by the Italian Queen Jelena, the daughter of King Nikola, which envisaged the strengthening of Montenegro and the weakening of Serbia. That would be realised upon the evacuation of Italian troops through the occupation of southern Dalmatia by Montenegrin forces and the territorial expansion of Montenegro at Serbia’s expense. Sergei Sazonov, the foreign minister, let the Emperor know about this plan and warned that the acceptance of the Montenegrin King’s demands would lead to a split between Serbia and Montenegro and therefore his requests should be declined. The Emperor approved of Sazonov’s attitude.

Besides, the Serbian officers attached to the General Staff of the Montenegrin army notified the Serbian Supreme Command that King Nikola had prepared a proclamation to the people of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia calling them to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with Montenegrins and Italians. This made Colonel Petar Pešić think that King Nikola had

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2 Sazonov to Nikolai II, St. Petersburg, 25 April/8 May 1915 [two dates are given according to Julian and Gregorian calendar respectively — the former was in official use in Montenegro until 1919], MO, III, VII–2, 384–385; Šepić, *Italija*, 106–107. Serbian diplomacy was aware of Montenegro’s territorial pretensions. In early May 1915, King Nikola wanted the following territories: Albania up to the Mati river, Herzegovina in its old boundaries, Bay of Cattaro up to the Neretva river. King Nikola hoped to push out Serbia by introducing Italy in his political game.
made to some secret arrangement with the Italians at the expense of Serbia. Therefore, he asked Field-Marshall Radomir Putnik, Chief of the Serbian Supreme Command, to let him know in which direction the Montenegrin troops should be deployed in the impending operations: to Sarajevo, Mostar, or Dubrovnik. Pešić insisted that King Nikola should be made clear that he had to co-operate in accordance with the agreed plan of the two Supreme Commands and forced to “reveal his clandestine negotiations”. A week later, General Božidar Janković, Chief of the Montenegrin Supreme Command, discussed this matter with King Nikola. The latter read him part of the declaration in which he encouraged Bosnians, Herzegovinians and Dalmatians not to be desponded and call them to assist the Serbian, Montenegrin and Italian armies. The proclamation spoke of the mighty Russia, the protector of Serbdom and Slavdom, Italy, the bearer of the principle of equality of nations, the armies of which would fight along with the Serbian and Montenegrin armies. The King presented himself as a bearer of freedom and peace and the unifier of Serbdom. General Janković claimed that King Nikola impatiently expected Italy’s entry into the war convinced that the operations of Italian troops in Dalmatia and Boka would make easier the actions of Montenegrin forces in Kotor and Krivošije, the conquest of Trebinje and Bileća, and the thrust into Herzegovina and Dalmatia. The Chief of the Montenegrin Supreme Command warned that King Nikola was in a hurry to make an appearance with his troops in the conquered regions due to his vanity and political reasons; he even queried if he could send his troops in Bosnia, in the direction of Sarajevo, a suggestion which General Janković discouraged. Finally, General Janković suggested that the announcement of the proclamation be prevented — he had already been working to that end.4

No doubt King Nikola missed no opportunity to achieve his intentions concerning the annexation of new regions to his own country. In doing so, he did not take into account the resistance he met with (Serbia, Russia), the uncertainty which Italy’s entry into the war entailed or the hostility of the population in Dalmatia and Dubrovnik towards his liberation intentions. Given the all-round opposition he encountered, King Nikola’s policy was bound to fail, giving rise in the process to the feeling of enmity and distrust towards him which he later would not be able to dispel. The issue of Montenegro’s territorial expansion undoubtedly drew King Nikola’s attention during the war and afterwards, and he was supported in that endeavour by his governments and ministers. Far from extraordinary, such preoccupation was quite natural. Moreover, King Nikola linked

4 Janković to Supreme Command, Cetinje, 12 May 1915, conf. no. 955, Vojni arhiv [Military Archives], Belgrade, reg. III, b. 91, fasc. 4.
the territorial expansion of his country with the future of his dynasty and
the survival of an independent Montenegro. His premise was that Europe’s
consent to Montenegro’s territorial expansion would in fact mean an ex-
pression of confidence in the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty. At the same time,
it would considerably contribute to easier acceptance of the return of the
discredited dynasty on the part of Montenegrin people.5

Just as he was mistaken in counting on Russia, King Nikola was
under illusion as to Italy’s willingness to support his intentions. From the
early days of the war Italian diplomacy was determined in its opposition to
Montenegrin designs in respect of northern Albania, and Scutari in par-
ticular. When King Nikola’s troops entered Scutari in June 1915 Italy sus-
pended any co-operation with Montenegro, requested the blockade of the
Montenegrin coast and the cancellation of any sort of assistance to that
country (financial, material).6 The Italian government did not approve of
King’s other intentions either. As early as March 1915 the Italian foreign
minister, Sidney Sonnino, informed the Ambassador in London, Marquis
Guglielmo Imperiali, that Serbia should have Dubrovnik and Medua as
well as Kotor and Bar “if she one day, which seems highly likely, unifies with
Montenegro”. A few days later, Sonnino supplemented this telegram add-
ing that Serbia would receive Bosnia, whereas the hinterland — he prob-
ably referred to Herzegovina — would be granted to both Montenegro and
Serbia which, he was convinced, would soon unify.7 Following the entry of
Montenegrin troops into Scutari, Sonnino took a much more determined
stance. He drew the attention of the Italian Ambassadors in the Allied capi-
tals that the coast from Pelješac to the Drim was reserved — he did not say
for which country — and the Montenegrin demands pertaining to it would
not be considered before peace terms were discussed.8 Sonnino maintained
this attitude until the end of the war.

5 Andrija Radović also supported such attitude at the time when he was the prime min-
ister of the government-in-exile. In a memorandum sent to King Nikola on 19 August
1916 he professed that the territorial expansion of Montenegro was a precondition for
its restoration, even in case a Yugoslav state came into being. “In the most favourable
circumstances, Montenegro will encompass Herzegovina up to the Neretva river, and
with Dubrovnik, Bay of Cattaro and Skadar [Shkodra] there will be a state with about a
million inhabitants”. V. G. Popovitch, Censuré ou M. André Radovitch (Paris 1917), 77.
6 S. Ratković, “Sukob Italije i Crne Gore oko Skadra 1915. godine”, Istorijški zapisi
XXXI/1-2 (1974), 95, 122.
7 Sonnino to Imperiali, Rome, 14 March 1915, Gab. Speciale, no. 101; Sonnino to
Imperiali, Carloti and Tittoni, Rome, 21 March 1915, Gab. Speciale, no. 125, Sidney
Sonnino Papers on microfilm, reel 31.
8 Sonnino to Ambassadors, Rome, 13 August 1915, I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani
In order to demonstrate his intention not to give up territorial expansion, King Nikola approved the execution of a long-prepared incursion into northern Albania and the capture of Scutari. At the end of June 1915 Montenegrin troops under the command of General Vešović entered Scutari despite numerous admonitions of the Allied governments. This action brought about further troubles and difficulties for the already discredited and isolated King Nikola. At the initiative of Italian diplomacy, the Allied governments handed a note to Cetinje on 10 July expressing their disagreement with the occupation of Scutari, refusing to recognise it and welcoming the decision of the Montenegrin government to comply with the final solution of Great Powers after the war. In the following months, there were rumours to the effect that the Montenegrin action had been taken in collusion with Austria-Hungary. King Nikola was willing to agree to Great Powers arbitration because he believed it to be a way of keeping the issue of Montenegro’s territorial expansion on the agenda in future.

In early 1916, having found themselves in exile in Italy following the capitulation of Montenegro, King Nikola and Lazar Mijušković, the prime minister, continued their work with a view to securing territorial concessions after the war. That was indeed a rather unusual situation: having disbanded his army, consented to capitulation and left the country, the King requested the Allies to support Montenegrin territorial demands. The scene was almost grotesque and demonstrated the extent to which King Nikola did not grasp the situation he found himself in and how much he alienated the Allied governments with his actions. Naturally, he first turned to the Russian government for support. This was another mistake as Russian diplomacy did not approve of the Montenegrin court’s policy and it increasingly left it to other Great Powers to deal with it. In mid-March 1916, King Nikola expressed his concerns for the future of Montenegro to the Russian minister at his court. He laid down the following conditions for its survival as an independent state: a) assurance of its independence; and b) the necessity of its territorial expansion. The Russian minister replied that the matter could not be discussed at the moment and that King Nikola should work towards rapprochement and co-operation with Serbia.

On the same day (19 March), Mijušković prepared a memorandum, at the express request of King Nikola, which he handed to the Russian minister Islavin. This document detailed all the territorial demands of the Montenegrin sovereign and pointed out that the guarantee of territorial and political integrity of Montenegro on the part of Great Powers was a precondition for the preservation of its independence.

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10 Vujović, Ujedinjenje, 157.
As for territorial extension, King’s maximal demands were as follows: the border would run ten kilometres south of the mouth of the Drim into the Adriatic Sea, along the watershed of the left bank of the Drim up to the confluence of the Black and the White Drim where the border between Serbia and Montenegro would be rectified in favour of the latter country in the Prijepolje region; from there it would run along the Lim and the Drina northwards to Rogatica and then to the west so as to attach Rogatica, Sarajevo and the surrounding area to Montenegro; the border would then run below Livno and descend to the sea, leaving the entire course and mouth of the Neretva to Montenegro. The entire bank of the the Neretva up to the Medua Bay would belong to Montenegro. 

King Nikola’s demands were unrealistic and unacceptable to any Great Power, or Serbia. Italy, in particular, refused to discuss the coastal region and Montenegrin territorial demands in general. Serbia and Russia followed suit. It was no wonder then that the Allies did not respond to the Montenegrin memorandum, which made King Nikola and Mijušković anxious. Their fear forced them into further mistakes.

Since the Russians were not forthcoming, King Nikola turned to the Italians. At the end of August 1916, he paid a visit to the Italian ambassador in Paris, Tomasso Tittoni. In the course of their second conversation he told the ambassador about his intention to visit the Italian royal couple in the Racconigi castle. He assured Tittoni he had not conducted negotiations with the Serbian government even though there was much talk to that effect, and also professed that he would leave to Great Powers to decide on territorial acquisitions of Montenegro and Serbia and, once such decisions were translated into a written document, he would work towards its fulfilment. “He handed me a memorandum in which he proclaimed his aspirations,” Tittoni wrote to Rome, adding that he would send it by courier. The memorandum has not been found and its content is not known although it is safe to assume that it was similar, if not identical, to the text given to Islavin. Finally, Nikola gave assurances to Tittoni that Italy had her own reasons to work towards the restoration of Montenegro and asked him to relay their conversation to Sonnino. King Nikola also mentioned that “his General has raised a rebellion against Austria-Hungary, liberated certain counties and captured some arms”. The King intended to return to Montenegro and his people and to fight along with them — he believed that Italy should help the rebels. He considered Italy the only possible ally on

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11 Ibid. 158.

12 Tittoni to Sonnino, Paris, 30 August 1916, Gab. 180, Sonnino Papers, reel 11.
account of her policy towards Yugoslav unification. However, he could not count much on Italian support either then or later.13

For quite some time King Nikola did not broach the territorial issue or send memoranda to Allied ministers and ambassadors. It was not before September 1917 that he prepared a new and lengthy memorandum for the Allied governments in which he laid out Montenegro’s territorial pretensions. The reason behind this renewed activity was obvious: in July 1917 the Corfu conference between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav exiled politicians from Austria-Hungary took place and accepted the programme of Yugoslav unification; prior to that, in the spring of 1917, the Montenegrin Committee for National Unification had been formed which soon developed a lively activity against King Nikola and his policy. That was a sign for alarm and a stimulus to address other Great Powers as well. On 27 September 1917, King Nikola handed to George Graham, British Chargé d’Affairs at the Montenegrin court, a lengthy memorandum presenting his requests and expectations. He told Graham that he had drawn up the memorandum himself, of which he was very proud, and asked him to forward it to London. In an extensive document written in French the King presented the history of his country and Serbian people from the times of the Ottoman Sultan Murad I, the struggle against the invader and the sacrifices endured by Montenegro; he wrote of a high sense of duty possessed of Montenegrins, their devotion to progress and civilisation, and he remarked that Cetinje had had a printing press before Rome, and after London got one, in which books were printed both in Cyrillic and Latin letters. “A democrat in heart, the Montenegrin loves the fatherly authority of the old and famous [Petrović-Njegoš] dynasty which steers his destiny even today,” the King wrote. Then he looked back at Napoleon I’s wars, the conquest of his armies in Bay of Cattaro which had led to the separation “between the hard-working peasant and the seaman who cannot resign himself to being separated from a Montenegrin”. He reminded that Montenegro had not received in the Balkan Wars what was due to it — Scutari, although it had lost 6,000 men in the fighting for that town. He ascribed the responsibility for that to Austria-Hungary. Then he referred to the assistance provided by Montenegro to the Allied countries during the war; he also reminded of the fact that the Allies had not provided the expected help to the Montenegrin army and people, which resulted in immense casualties, devastation and suffering.

13 In March 1917, when the need for an Italian protectorate in Albania was considered, Sonnino agreed “to make some concessions in the Shkodra region” to Montenegro. Sonnino to Morone, Rome, 18 March 1917, DDI, ser. V, vol. VII, 385–386.
All this was but a prelude in what King Nikola wanted to request. He raised the question if such casualties were not deserving of the Allied favour and support, in particular territorial compensations and reparations. In order to heal its wounds, economically recover and secure its future, King Nikola stressed, Montenegro had to rectify its borders. At the expense of Albania he demanded Scutari and Medua, important on account of trade and supply lines; in the north, he asked for part of Bosnia, up to Mt Romanija, for which Montenegrins shed their blood in the war; Herzegovina with Mostar, a region linked since ancient times with Montenegro through the common struggle against the Turks; the Neretva was envisaged as the northwest border of Montenegro which would encompass Dubrovnik, a splendid cultural centre; the entire coast from the mouth of the Neretva to that of the Drim, Bay of Cattaro included, should also belong to Montenegro; in the east, in the direction of Serbia, Montenegro had no territorial pretensions since “a people of the same blood and language connected to us with brotherly love” lived there. Finally, King Nikola pointed out that the Montenegrins counted on the Allied wisdom and generosity to the smallest ally and expressed his conviction that such an attitude would secure peace in the Balkans.14

King Nikola’s programme was very precise and more ambitious that the previous ones. In comparison with the earlier documents and his statements, there was a change in the thrust and nature of arguments. Above all, humanitarian and civilisational reasons were underlined rather than political — the sacrifices for the Allied cause, economic restoration, progress, better future. There was a considerable difference in relation to the previous memoranda in respect of the size of the territory and regions requested by King Nikola. The memorandum of March 1916 was abandoned. For example, that memorandum called for rectification of the Serbian border, whereas the latest one did not raise that question. As far as the coast was concerned, the pretensions remained as before with a minor adjustment — the border proposed in 1916 had been moved ten kilometres south of the mouth of the Drim; also, the requests concerning Herzegovina took their final shape. On the whole, King’s memorandum presented his maximal territorial demands.

That was how King’s programme was understood in the British Foreign Office. Harold Nicolson of the Political Department thought the memorandum had completely formulated Montenegrin territorial pretensions, but believed these should be neither discussed nor decided upon. He

suggested that King Nikola simply be told that his requests would be considered. George Clerk, a Political Department official, noted that the King’s demands, if accepted, would mean the doubling of Montenegro’s size. “They are, of course, completely unacceptable, mostly because of the existing various treaties and commitments.” He pointed out that the memorandum was “typical of its royal author” and that he should be simply thanked. Anything else, even an assurance that his requests would be taken into consideration, had better be avoided. His suggestion was accepted and on 8 October Graham was instructed to thank King Nikola for his document, which he did.

A few weeks later the same memorandum was handed to the Italian ambassador in Paris, Marquis Salvago-Ragi. Salvago-Ragi reported to Sonnino that King Nikola had given him a memorandum prepared for the peace conference which had been nicely received in London, and asked permission to forward the memorandum to Rome. That was the end of this matter: King Nikola never received any assurance or promise regarding a favourable consideration of his demands.

In early 1918, certain important events took place forcing King Nikola to voice his views. The October Revolution, the Italian defeat at the Battle of Kobarid and the subsequent US declaration of war upon Austria-Hungary had considerable impact on the Balkan developments, Montenegro included. To encourage Italian resistance, on one hand, and convince Austria-Hungary’s ruling circles that their country could be saved through deflection from Germany, on the other, British prime minister, David Lloyd George, and American president, Woodrow Wilson, gave speeches together. Both of them expounded their conviction that Austria-Hungary should be preserved, whereas Serbia and Montenegro should be restored and indemnified. That meant that neither country could expect territorial enlargement. As Montenegro was supposed to be granted nearly all territories at the expense of Austria-Hungary, the suggestions of the Allied leaders denoted their disagreement with the King’s demands. Moreover, although it did not say it publically, the British War Cabinet made a decision that the best solution of the Montenegrin question would the annexation of Montenegro to Serbia.

During these days King Nikola was at his residence in Pau, in the south of France. His prime minister, Evgenije Popović, visited him there.

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15 Salvago-Ragi to Sonnino, Paris, 17 October 1917, DDI, ser. V, vol. IX, 167–168. Sonnino replied that the minister Romano Avezzana should thank King Nikola for his memorandum which he had read with “interest”. Sonnino to Avezzana, Rome, 18 October 1917, Gab. 1699/14, Sonnino Papers, reel 41.

and they discussed the Allied leaders’ programmes. According to the Italian minister Avezzana, the King was “very satisfied with the recent speeches of the English prime minister and president Wilson which included the restoration of Montenegro among the chief war aims”. King Nikola was worried because of France, the statesmen of which failed to mention Montenegro and its future in their public statements. He considered that failure deliberate, in fact evidence that France was still working to suffocate Montenegro and attach it to Serbia.\footnote{Avezzana to Sonnino, Paris, 12 January 1918, Gab. 23/16, Montenegro 1915–1918, box 158, The Archives of Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Rome.} A month later, in February 1918, King Nikola met in Paris with the Italian prime minister, Vittorio Orlando, and foreign minister Sonnino. They assured him that the Italian government would make every effort to restore Montenegro after the war. The King also tried to secure France’s support and, to that end, visited the prime minister, Georges Clemenceau. He complained to Clemenceau about the manner in which he, his family and government had been treated; he objected to his being depicted as a traitor and treated as an enemy, to the cancellation of his subvention, to the prevention of a Montenegrin regiment from being formed, and to suggesting the annexation of Montenegro to Serbia. According to the King, Clemenceau was very friendly towards him personally and to Montenegro, and he was willing to renew the subvention and support the formation of a Montenegrin regiment. He also stated to have been unfamiliar with the plans for the annexation of Montenegro to Serbia, but he promised to make enquiries about that matter.\footnote{Avezzana to Sonnino, Paris, 7 February 1918, Gab. 23/16, ibid.}

After all these conversations the situation was much clearer and the attitude of Allies towards Montenegro was determined. Great Britain, the USA and Italy were inclined to the preservation of Montenegro as an independent state while France’s stance was indefinite. No Great Power, however, expressed its views on the territorial demands and expectations of the Montenegrin sovereign. He could have been satisfied with such assurances even though some of them were insincere (Britain and France) while others were motivated by own interests (Italy). King Nikola realised what was the value of such assurances as well as the meaning of the complete silence in respect of his territorial requests. That seemed ominous to him. He confided his thoughts and mood to Avezzana in mid-April 1918. The Italian minister found him “worried and reserved”, which he put down to the uncertain situation and the hesitation of Allies to voice their views on Montenegro’s future. On that occasion, the King told Avezzana that he decided to pay a visit to Queen Jelena and discuss his future actions with her. The minister
refrained from giving any advice to the King, but he was convinced that there were serious reasons for the impending visit.\textsuperscript{19}

Serbian diplomacy was also aware of this visit. The minister in London, Jovan Jovanović, wrote to Regent Alexander that King Nikola was in Rome. He assured the Regent that Italy would side with Montenegro against the unification and assist King Nikola to form a Montenegrin regiment which would be sent to Albania to be as close as possible to Montenegro. Jovanović did not see a fortunate future for the old King for whom he claimed to have come into conflict with his own people. The minister believed that Montenegro’s fate had been decided a long time ago. “Since 1904 the old skilful King has lost the rudder of his ship which he ‘skilfully’ steered from 1860 onwards,” he wrote. “Since then his ship has drifted without a rudder, without a mast. It has not been entirely wracked as yet, but the end is near…”\textsuperscript{20} Jovanović’s metaphoric prophecy eventually proved accurate.

At the beginning of May 1918, the King received and visited the Allied ambassadors. On 5 May, he had a conversation with the American ambassador, Thomas Page, and expressed the appreciation of Montenegrin people for president Wilson and his ideas; he hoped that the USA would protect the rights of small nations, Montenegro included. Finally, he delivered a lengthy memorandum on the territorial demands of Montenegro and requested that it be forwarded to president Wilson.\textsuperscript{21} Two days later, on 8 May, the British ambassador, Rennell Rodd, visited King Nikola at his residence. Their conversation was much more open than that with Page. The King complained about his unfortunate fate, uncertain future, Serbia’s attitude; he tried to convince Rodd that the Montenegrins did not want unification with Serbia, that France was under Serbia’s influence and that he therefore trusted in Great Britain alone. He handed him a memorandum for which he claimed to have been prepared for the peace conference, he requested that it remain confidential and be forwarded to the Foreign Of-

\textsuperscript{19} Avezzana to Sonnino, Pau, 17 and 23 April 1918, Gab. 20, 22, Sonnino Papers, reel 19. Nikola journeyed with his daughter Vjera.

\textsuperscript{20} Jovanović to Regent Alexander, London, 27 April 1918, private, Court’s office, various years, Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia], Belgrade.

A few days later, on 12 May, the King handed a memorandum to the Italian minister at the Montenegrin court, Marquis Paolo Montagliari. Describing the content of the memorandum, ambassador Rodd pointed out that King Nikola was “a master of that kind of documents”. His demands were identical to those he had made in September. Indeed, the only new feature concerned a few paragraphs which depicted the wars waged by Montenegrins in Herzegovina (1876) and the sufferings endured by Montenegro at the time of Ottoman incursions (1852 and 1862). This suggests that King Nikola did not give up his demands, but he refrained from making new ones. He remained convinced that the territorial extensions he envisaged were a *sine qua non* of Montenegro’s future.

The reaction of American and Italian diplomacy is not known. The Foreign Office received the King’s memorandum with resignation rather than outright rejection. Nicolson noted that the King had mentioned the struggle for Scutari in order to use it in his own defence. As for Dubrovnik, Nicolson opined that this town had to belong to Serbia, even if Montenegro was restored. His resignation was apparent in a remark that “the question of Montenegro would be one of the most difficult for the peace conference, because little can be done without a plebiscite which would be difficult, if not impossible, to carry out”. Allen Leeper, an expert for territorial settlement, was hopeful that the recently held conference of the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary and the Italo-Yugoslav agreement (Torre-Trumbić) would diminish the influence of King Nikola in Rome. His words confirmed the widely-spread belief that Italy was a sole protector of Montenegro and its ruler — and thus the main factor in the solution of this question.

In the following months there was no indication of King Nikola’s new initiatives with regard to Montenegro’s territorial demands. His attention was increasingly drawn to the question of the unification of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. He considered it essential for the future of his dynasty. Realising that he was not able to prevent the unification as the Allied governments supported it, the King endeavoured to discredit the foundations (centralism) on which it was supposed to be executed. He condemned Dr. Ante Trumbić, the president of the Yugoslav committee, for his co-operation with the Serbian government and claimed that he had no support in

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22 Rodd to Balfour, Rome, 9 May 1918, conf. 63 with the attached undated memorandum in French, FO 371, file 85253/85253, TNA. The text of the memorandum can also be found in Montenegro 1915–1918, box 158, Archives of Italian Foreign Ministry, Rome.
the country and spoke for no one. He advocated the creation of a federal
state in which all constituent provinces would have autonomous status.23

When the peace conference invited the delegation of Montenegro
in early March 1919 to put forward and explain its requests, the prime
minister, Jovan Plamenac, revised the objectives formulated in the King’s
memoranda. Nevertheless, their essence remained the same even if their
justification was considerably different from that advanced by King Nikola.
Plamenac requested Herzegovina, Bay of Cattaro and Scutari with the sur-
rounding area. His memorandum did not mention Medua, Dubrovnik, the
Neretva valley, the Adriatic coast from the mouth of the Neretva to that of
the Drim or the Serbian border.24 Apparently, this was a departure from the
King’s maximal demands, and it provided the Montenegrin delegation with
room for manoeuvre to expand or reduce its requests depending on the situa-
tion. It remains a mystery why King Nikola agreed to such curbing of his
agenda. He must have accepted it at the request of Plamenac.

King Nikola gradually formulated the territorial demands of Mon-
tenegro. Initially, these were constrained and indefinite, often unclear and
contradictory. Some regions and towns were always included in his com-
binations: Bay of Cattaro and Kotor, Skadar, Dubrovnik. Mostar, Sarajevo
and Medua were added later. At first, the request for rectification of the
Serbian border was advanced and later that claim was abandoned.

It should be noted that King Nikola put forward his maximal de-
mands at the least favourable moment for him and Montenegro, i.e. while
he was in exile. No doubt he misjudged his abilities and influence as well
as the Allies’ frame of mind. He realised it was worth addressing some gov-
ernments (Italian and British) and not others (French). He quickly came
to the conclusion that Russian support could not be expected, whereas he
placed great hopes in the USA and its president. Given the small number of
his capable officials, it is difficult to ascertain if he conferred with someone
and, if he did, with whom. He obviously wrote his memoranda himself, as
evidenced by their flamboyant style and phrases, historical references and
emphasis on war.

He presented himself as an enlightened, progressive ruler who was
hampered in his efforts to forge a better future for Montenegro by its pov-
erty, backwardness, small size and the small number of his subjects. These

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23 Montagliari to Sonnino, Paris, 31 August and 3 September 1918, no. 5–6, Montene-
gro 1915–1918, box 158, ibid.

24 Montenegro before Peace Conference, Memorandum of 5 March 1919 which the
government of the Kingdom of Montenegro submitted to the Paris Conference (Paris
1919), 27–37; Dragoljub Živojinović, “Pitanje Crne Gore i mirovna konferencija 1919.
were the arguments he used in order to support his demands which seemed, and with good reason, excessive and unrealistic to most people. Moreover, his requests were impossible to achieve also on account of the fact that Great Powers took a dim view of his return to Montenegro.

Being an experienced statesman, King Nikola believed that the fate of Montenegro and his dynasty was in his own hands. He was the only person who could speak on behalf of both with the requisite authority. However, the Allied diplomats and statesmen found him a cunning, shifty, insincere autocrat and distrusted him. He lost their confidence through his actions and policy for which he was suspected of collaboration with Austria-Hungary and the betrayal of the Allies. This was his stigma and he could not shake it off until the end of the war.

Despite the King's great hopes, his efforts to win over the Allies for his programme of territorial expansion failed dismally. That was inevitable and the King could hardly be responsible on this score. He spared no effort, but the circumstances and resistance to his policy were such as to make it impossible to any person to achieve more than he did. He persistently struggled for what he believed in and realised in the end that the struggle was useless.

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La France et le problème des Nationalités pendant la guerre de 1914–1918 : le cas de la Serbie

Résumé : Paris a suivi pendant la Première guerre mondiale à l'égard de la Serbie une politique beaucoup plus complexe qu'on ne le croit en général. Bien sûr, on soutenait par principe la Serbie, victime de l'agression austro-allemande. En même temps, à plusieurs reprises pendant le conflit des considérations d'opportunité stratégiques ou diplomatiques déterminèrent la position française bien plus que le soutien à la Serbie. À la fin de la guerre, tout en acceptant le principe de la Yougoslavie, Paris essaya de tenir compte également des équilibres régionaux des Balkans, en particulier en évitant de heurter frontalement l'Italie. Dans ces conditions, on comprend mieux les hésitations de la politique officielle française à l'égard de la Serbie, malgré la sympathie générale que suscitèrent les Serbes par leur résistance héroïque.

Mots clés : France, Serbie, Grande Guerre, nationalités, Yougoslavie, Italie

Paris a suivi pendant la Première guerre mondiale à l'égard de la Serbie une politique beaucoup plus complexe qu'on ne le croit en général. Bien sûr, on soutenait par principe la Serbie, victime de l'agression austro-allemande, qui était, avec la Belgique, la meilleure justification de la guerre du point de vue français, en ce qui concernait le droit international. Bien sûr, la sympathie de l'opinion française était réelle, comme le montra le succès des « journées de la Serbie » organisées en France pendant la guerre, ou l’accueil de jeunes Serbes dans des Lycées français. En même temps, comme on va le voir, à plusieurs reprises pendant le conflit des considérations d’opportunité stratégiques ou diplomatiques déterminèrent la position française bien plus que le soutien de principe à la Serbie. À la fin de la guerre, tout en acceptant le principe de la Yougoslavie, Paris essaya de tenir compte également des équilibres régionaux des Balkans, en particulier en évitant de heurter frontalement l’Italie. Bien entendu, les aléas d’une guerre mondiale très difficile expliquent largement ces variations.1 En même temps il me semble utile de tenir compte des différents courants qui existaient en France à propos des nationalités : pour les uns, la « libération des nationalités opprimées » était une question de principe ; pour d’autres, le maintien de l’équilibre européen, de l’accord des grandes Puissances passait avant ; pour d’autres enfin, qui ne croyaient pas trop aux « jeunes nationalités » d’Europe orient-

tale, une application mécanique du principe des nationalités (en fait fort vague quand on le presse un peu) ne devait pas conduire à une « balkanisation » accrue des Balkans (le sens péjoratif du mot « balkanisation » en français est ici très significatif : il fallait regrouper, constituer de « grandes nationalités », politiquement, stratégiquement et économiquement viables, quitte à ce qu’elles soient guidées par un peuple dominant. Cette gamme de conceptions, quelque peu contradictoires, aide à comprendre les variations de la position française en 1914–1919.

Les conceptions françaises en matière de nationalités

En effet la France était très prudente : même si elle a largement contribué à remodeler la carte de l’Europe en 1918–1919, elle n’a pas été ce défenseur constant et décidé des Nationalités opprimées que l’on décrit souvent, malgré certaines déclarations, comme celles de Briand en 1916. Avant 1918 la position française réelle était loin de correspondre vraiment au principe des nationalités. Elle n’évolua (et encore en partie seulement) qu’à partir de la Révolution de Février en Russie, puis à nouveau après Brest-Litovsk ; elle évoluait encore à l’extrême fin de l’année 1918 après la défaite allemande et sous la pression du wilsonisme. En particulier les présidents du Conseil et les ministres des Affaires étrangères successifs, même Clemenceau, se montrèrent fort réservés. Et même quand, en 1918, le fait des Nationalités fut intégré réellement dans la politique française, les considérations géopolitiques continuèrent à jouer un rôle crucial pour les dirigeants : le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes était très sérieusement modulé par la nécessité de bâtir une « Barrière de l’Est » (où le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes jouerait son rôle) aussi forte que possible contre l’Allemagne, et on ne perdait pas encore l’espoir de reconstituer une Russie certes démocratique, mais unitaire ou tout au plus fédérative, avec laquelle on pourrait renouer l’Alliance franco-russe.

Une raison fondamentale de la prudence des dirigeants français était le soupçon très répandu que les indépendantistes d’Europe centre-orientale étaient en fait des alliés de l’Allemagne. Ce soupçon touchait en particulier les Ukrainiens et les Baltes, malgré les efforts de ceux qui tentaient, largement en vain, d’expliquer aux responsables parisiens la situation très particulière de ces régions et la complexité de la situation.2 Mais même, on va le voir, on pensa à certains moments que les Serbes pourraient être tentés par

une paix séparée avec Vienne. Disons-le tout net : les jeunes nations d’Eu-
rope de l’Est n’inspiraient pas à Paris une confiance totale, certains préjugés
culturels étaient à l’œuvre. Mais, au-delà de ces considérations d’opportu-
nité, ou de psychologie, la division des élites dirigeantes françaises était
profonde. La défense des Nationalités (sauf pour la Pologne, pour des rai-
sons historiques et sentimentales ou religieuses, et encore avec beaucoup de
prudence) ne faisait pas l’unanimité. D’un côté on avait une certaine gauche
radicale, non socialiste, avec des ramifications internationales dès l’avant-
guerre. C’étaient les défenseurs enthousiastes des Nationalités, cause li-
béatrice, progressiste et même révolutionnaire à l’époque. C’était tout un
monde qui était persuadé, outre sa conception de la justice, que la France
avait tout intérêt à prendre la tête des Nationalités opprimées. (Ajoutons
cependant que bien souvent ce que l’on avait en tête, c’était les « grandes
nationalités », notion apparue très clairement sous le Second Empire : il
ne s’agissait pas de « balkaniser », mais de regrouper les peuples en grands
ensembles plus ou moins homogènes, et conduits par une nationalité histo-
riquement considérée comme un guide plus avancé : le cas des Serbes et de
la Yougoslavie, ou des Tchèques et de la Tchécoslovaquie, vus de Paris, s’ex-
pliquent largement ainsi. Le modèle d’unification centralisée de la France
était implicitement plus ou moins consciemment pris comme modèle).

Mais en face on compte beaucoup de conservateurs, qui avaient gardé
un très mauvais souvenir des conséquences de la politique des Nationalités
de Napoléon III. Ils étaient désireux pendant la guerre de ne pas compro-
mettre le rétablissement du Concert et de l’équilibre européens à l’avenir,
considérés comme une garantie pour la France. Pour eux le problème des
Nationalités restait subordonné aux intérêts internationaux de la France. Ils
n’étaient pas fermés à toute possibilité d’évolution, surtout si elle pouvait
affaiblir les Puissances centrales, mais l’idée essentielle restait la suivante :
le mouvement des Nationalités devait être contrôlé et canalisé par les gran-
des puissances alliées, en fonction de leurs intérêts, même si on n’excluait
pas une prise en compte prudente et progressive des réalités nationales.
Le principe fondamental n’était pas le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-
mêmes mais la reconnaissance des Nations par les Alliés. La Nation était
considérée par les conservateurs comme une construction progressive, à la
fois historique, politique et culturelle, inscrite dans un cadre européen, non
pas comme l’expression absolue d’une identité nationale en tant que telle

3 On remarquera la présence dans ce groupe de slavisants réputés, et la contribution de
Sébastien de Gasquet dans le livre déjà cité de Georges-Henri Soutou, Ghislain de Cas-
telbajac et Sébastien de Gasquet en particulier évoque de façon passionnante les débats
au sein de la slavistique française autour du phénomène ukrainien.
comportant des droits appelant une réalisation immédiate. On voit déjà comment la combinaison de cette vision avec celle des « grandes nationalités » a pu contribuer à informer en 1914–1919 la position française par rapport aux nouveaux États-Nations, comment en particulier elle a peut contribuer les variations de la France envers la Serbie.

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La crainte d’une paix de compromis entre la Serbie et les Puissances Centrales, 1914–1918

Ce manque de confiance, disons-le, ajouté à la difficulté à comprendre la complexité des questions balkaniques, a été particulièrement marqué à propos de la surestimation, à Paris, du risque d’une paix séparée entre Belgrade et les Puissances Centrales. Bien sûr, les responsables français ont porté pendant la Première Guerre mondiale une très grande attention au moral des Serbes, à leur ténacité. Une défection de leur part, dans les circonstances tragiques que connaissait la Serbie, une paix séparée avec les Empires centraux auraient privé les Alliés, au-delà même des conséquences stratégiques, d’une carte morale essentielle devant l’opinion internationale et en particulier l’opinion américaine : la défense des petits pays victimes de l’agression germanique. Le cas de la Serbie était à cet égard très comparable à celui de la Belgique, qui fut elle aussi l’objet de la même attention et pour les mêmes raisons.

Or à Paris on éprouvait bien des inquiétudes : on redoutait les conséquences de la situation tragique d’un pays occupé, des manoeuvres austro-allemandes, des graves divisions internes au sein des responsables serbes. Tout cela rendait une paix séparée pas invraisemblable. D’où toute une série de conséquences très importantes pour la politique française envers la Serbie pendant la Guerre : celle-ci ne s’explique pas seulement par des impératifs stratégiques (conserver des troupes serbes pour le Front d’Orient), ni par le « principe des nationalités ». Paris en fait était très réticent d’une façon générale, on l’a vu, à l’égard de ce principe et tint compte dans le

cas serbe par priorité dans une première période des revendications de la Bulgarie, après 1915 de celles de la Roumanie et de l’Italie. En revanche un axe essentiel de la politique française était la nécessité de prévenir tout risque de voir la Serbie sortir de la guerre. Nous allons voir en effet combien de décisions de Paris à propos de la Serbie s’expliquent en fait d’abord ainsi, et donc, d’une certaine façon, par un doute sur la solidité de la nation serbe et de ses dirigeants, bien plus que par la volonté de soutenir les aspirations nationales serbes.

Décembre 1914 : un sondage austro-allemand en direction de Belgrade


Le représentant français à Nisch [Niš], Boppe, s’entretint de ces avances avec Pachitch [Pašić], qui le chargea en outre d’indiquer à Paris que le comte Czernin avait demandé à le rencontrer. Mais il n’y avait aucune ambiguïté dans la position serbe : le nouveau gouvernement d’union nationale constitué le 6 décembre poursuivrait la politique du Cabinet précédent, de guerre à outrance contre l’Autriche-Hongrie, même si la Serbie devait subir le sort de la Belgique.

Il est vrai que juste après le sondage autrichien la situation militaire s’était retournée : encore critique le 2 décembre (Vienne avait évidemment voulu en profiter), elle devint beaucoup plus favorable aux Serbes après les combats qui eurent lieu du 3 au 7 décembre.

Juin-août 1915 : des inquiétudes et des soupçons

En juin 1915, l’inquiétude perça à Paris : l’armée serbe avait bien rétabli la situation militaire et libéré le territoire, mais elle ne reprenait pas l’offensive

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5 Mémoire de DEA sous ma direction en 1997 de Françoise Baret, « La France et la création de la Yougoslavie, 1914–1919 ».  
7 Télés. de Boppe des 6 et 7 décembre 1914, ibid.  
8 Télé. Boppe du 9 décembre, ibid.
contre l’Autriche, contrairement aux engagements de l’état-major serbe,⁹ et au contraire déclenchait une opération contre l’Albanie. Cela détournait Belgrade du but essentiel de la guerre.¹⁰ En outre cela provoquait la colère des Italiens, que Paris voulait ménager depuis leur entrée en guerre le 23 mai...¹¹ En effet, outre l’intérêt italien pour l’Albanie, le retard de l’offensive serbe libérait des troupes autrichiennes contre Italie.

L’inaction serbe provoqua des réactions divergentes parmi les responsables français : certains pensaient que c’était le résultat de la mauvaise humeur serbe devant les promesses faites par le traité de Londres en avril à l’Italie, et aussi devant les négociations en cours avec les Bulgares (au sujet de la Macédoine) et les Roumains (au sujet du Banat), qui toutes compromettaient la réalisation des aspirations serbes.

C’était en particulier l’opinion de Barrère à Rome,¹² et surtout de Paul Cambon à Londres, qui, dans un télégramme très énergique du 24 juin critiquait l’offre faite par les Alliés à la Bulgarie de la partie de la Macédoine conquise par les Serbes en 1913 et y voyait la raison de l’inaction serbe.¹³ Et Joffre quant à lui était convaincu que la raison essentielle de cette inaction était l’inquiétude serbe devant les négociations des Alliés avec les Bulgares et les Roumains, suivant l’accord avec l’Italie. Il recommandait que les Alliés prennent « vis-à-vis de la Serbie des engagements formels, lui assurant un minimum de satisfactions ».¹⁴

D’autres responsables pensaient plutôt que la réserve serbe, étant donné la situation stratégique générale (en particulier l’échec des Russes, au lieu de l’offensive russe promise) était dans l’intérêt militaire bien compris des Alliés. C’est ainsi que Boppe, représentant de la France auprès du gouvernement serbe, sans contester l’effet négatif des tractations avec l’Italie, la Roumanie, la Bulgarie, estimait néanmoins que le facteur essentiel dans l’inaction serbe était l’échec militaire des Russes devant l’offensive austro-allemande en cours depuis mai, et le souci des Serbes de conserver prudemment leur dernière armée intacte, en particulier contre une éventuelle attaque allemande. Boppe pensait que cette attitude était dans l’intérêt des

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¹¹ Télé. de Barrère du 12 juin.

¹² Télé. de Barrère du 11 juin, ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Lettre de Millerand à Delcassé du 29 juin, déjà citée, ibid.
Alliés, afin de conserver un instrument permettant d’empêcher les Allemands, le moment venu, de donner la main aux Bulgares et aux Turcs.\(^{15}\)

Mais Boppe n’excluait pas non plus chez les Serbes des motivations politiques, et pas seulement militaires, et en particulier la volonté de garder intacte l’armée serbe comme un moyen de pression au moment du règlement de la paix.\(^{16}\) Cambon, à Londres, allait encore plus loin, et rappelait que la Serbie n’était liée par aucune convention aux Alliés et pourrait donc négocier une paix séparée avec l’Autriche-Hongrie et l’Allemagne si elle le souhaitait.\(^{17}\)

Or dans les semaines suivantes, en juillet et août, des informations parvinrent au Quai d’Orsay, selon lesquelles il aurait existé un accord tacite avec les Autrichiens pour maintenir cette sorte de trêve.\(^{18}\) Sans que l’on soit en mesure d’élucider pleinement ces soupçons, notons que pour certains auteurs il y eut effectivement des négociations entre l’Allemagne et des intermédiaires de Pachitch au cours du printemps et de l’été 1915.\(^{19}\) En revanche les documents diplomatiques allemands indiquent que Berlin aurait souhaité de telles négociations, mais qu’elles n’eurent pas lieu.\(^{20}\)

*Ces inquiétudes semblent avoir conduit Paris à faire des promesses verbales aux Serbes, incluant la Croatie*

Dans cette période de doute, et au moment de leurs négociations avec l’Italie, la Roumanie et la Bulgarie, les Alliés furent obligés de donner aux Serbes des garanties écrites, mais limitées (à cause des Bulgares et des Italiens) et qui parurent à Belgrade très insuffisantes. Du coup, par trois fois, Paris alla plus loin et ajouta des promesses verbales, qui engageaient considérablement l’avenir, et qui s’expliquaient, malgré les complications diplomatiques qu’elles annonçaient, par l’inquiétude de voir les Serbes céder face aux manoeuvres austro-allemandes.

Le premier document écrit fut une note commune des Alliés du 30 mai 1915, par laquelle ils demandaient à la Serbie de s’en remettre à eux pour fixer les conditions auxquelles la Bulgarie entrerait en guerre, sans

\(^{15}\) Télé. Boppe du 24 juin, ibid.

\(^{16}\) Télé. Boppe du 23 juin, ibid.

\(^{17}\) Télé. du 24 juin déjà cité.

\(^{18}\) Télé. de Panafieu à Sofia du 17 juillet, évoquant un accord avec Pachitch et la Main Noire, par l’intermédiaire d’une personnalité neutre ; télé de Delaroche-Vernet à Cettiigné du 19 août ; rapport d’un Français en Serbie, classé le 31 août ; ibid.

\(^{19}\) Vladimir Dedijer, *La route de Sarajevo*, Gallimard, p. 419.

lui faire la moindre promesse précise en échange. Mais Boppe avait été autorisé, dans ses conversations avec les Serbes, à accompagner la remise de cette note de commentaires verbaux, dans lesquels il pouvait évoquer « l’acquisition par la Serbie, à la conclusion de la paix, de territoires étendus et d’un accès à l’Adriatique ».  

On sait d’autre part que, devant la gravité de la situation et les hésitations serbes, Delcassé envisagea fin juin 1915 la possibilité de promettre aux Serbes, outre l’accès à l’Adriatique, la Bosnie-Herzégovine et l’union avec la Croatie, si les Croates acceptaient celle-ci. Une promesse formelle ne devait être faite que si tous les Alliés étaient d’accord ; or seuls les Russes manifestèrent leur approbation, les Italiens ayant sans doute été fort réticents! Néanmoins il est probable que Boppe, informé à titre confidentiel par Delcassé, a dû dépasser ses instructions et faire allusion à ces propositions dans ses conversations avec les Serbes, parce que Patchitch, en février 1918, y fit référence.

Le deuxième document écrit allié fut une note du 15 août 1915, par laquelle les Alliés exigeaient de la Serbie qu’elle accepte que la frontière bulgaro-serbe, en Macédoine, revienne à la ligne décidée en 1912 ; en échange on lui promettait la Bosnie-Herzégovine, la Slavonie, et un accès à l’Adriatique. Le sort de la Croatie et du Banat serait réservé jusqu’aux négociations de paix.

Pachitch fut fort mécontent : il aurait voulu qu’on lui promît en outre la Croatie. Mais ce ne fut pas possible, à cause des Italiens. Cependant, le 18 août, Delcassé autorisa Boppe à déclarer verbalement à Pachitch que ni la France, ni la Russie, ni la Grande-Bretagne ne feraient obstacle à une union des Croates à la Serbie, si ceux-ci la souhaitaient.

On voit comment la crainte d’une défection ou semi-défection serbe, au cours de l’été 1915, conduisit Paris à faire, pour la première fois, des promesses sur la question yougoslave, sur laquelle pourtant Paris se montra toujours fort prudent. Ceci confirme le poids de ces inquiétudes et arrière-pensées dans la définition de la politique française envers la Serbie.

21 Télé. de Pichon, MAE, à Corfou du 6 février 1918, vol. 388.
22 Télé. de Delcassé à Nisch du 29 juin, télé. de Paléologue (Saint-Pétersbourg) à Delcassé du 30 juin, vol. 372.
23 Télé. de Pichon, MAE, à Corfou du 6 février 1918, vol. 388.
Novembre 1915-janvier 1916 : le désastre militaire serbe fait craindre à Paris une défection, et cette crainte suscite toute une série de décisions


Pachitch lui-même, début décembre 1915, adressa un appel aux Alliés pour qu’ils aident au sauvetage de l’armée serbe et lui permettent ainsi « de lutter contre toute tentation de capitulation de la nation serbe ». D’autre

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30 Mémoire de DEA de Françoise Baret, p. 17.
31 La SCR (contre-espionnage) diffuse par exemple des notes rédigées par le député serbe Tricha Katzlerovich, chef du parti socialiste serbe, saisie lors de son passage à Bellegarde, et fort critiques (vol. 375).
33 Télé. circulaire de Briand le 27 décembre, vol. 374.
part il demandait aux Alliés une déclaration selon laquelle ceux-ci aideraient la Serbie à reconquérir son indépendance et son territoire.

Le 22 décembre, Briand décida de répondre positivement à l’appel de Pachitch. Il est clair que dans son esprit le premier objectif de cette aide serait d’empêcher une paix séparée : selon ses propres termes, « moyennant ces dispositions nous n’aurons guère à redouter de négociations de paix séparées de la Serbie, dont les gouvernants n’ont rien à gagner à capituler (du moment que nous ne les abandonnons pas) ».34

On pensa d’abord transférer et reformer l’armée serbe en Albanie. Mais tenant compte de la situation militaire, et également du refus des Italiens d’aider les Serbes à reconstituer leur armée en Albanie,35 Briand prit finalement une série de décisions capitales : tout d’abord l’armée serbe serait transférée à Corfou, conformément à l’avis de Joffre, dès lors que sa réorganisation en Albanie n’était plus possible.36

En outre Vesnitch [Vesnić], ministre serbe à Paris, étant revenu à la charge le 23 décembre, le 27 Briand donnait pour instruction à Boppe de déclarer à Pachitch que la France s’associerait « à tous les efforts de la valeureuse nation serbe pour reconquérir l’intégrité de son territoire, son entière indépendance et la satisfaction de ses aspirations nationales ».37

C’était la première fois que Paris s’engageait aussi loin. On notera que ce n’était pas d’abord par un souci de nature militaire tendant à conserver une armée serbe pour le front d’Orient (personne ne pouvait savoir à ce moment-là dans quel état elle se trouverait à l’issue de son évacuation, et dans l’immédiat elle était démoralisée et sans armements : le télégramme de Briand du 22 décembre paraît d’ailleurs bien indiquer que l’on ne songeait pas à ce moment-là à la transférer vers Salonique). Mais le premier objectif de la démarche demandée à Boppe était bien politique : il s’agissait d’éviter le risque d’une paix séparée de la Serbie.

Cet objectif fondamentalement politique est également prouvé par le fait que Paris aurait voulu au départ installer le gouvernement serbe non pas à Corfou, mais à Aix-en-Provence, donc éloigné de l’armée serbe, qui visiblement pour Paris ne constituait pas une priorité à ce moment précis : le but était explicitement de maintenir le gouvernement serbe sous influence française et de le mettre à l’abri des influences défaitistes.38

38 Télé. de Briand à Corfou du 17 janvier, et refus de Pachitch le 20 janvier 1916, vol. 376.
Le mois de mars 1916 fut particulièrement critique. Il faut évidemment se souvenir du contexte dramatique de ce mois-là. La conférence interalliée de Paris du 27 mars devait prendre des décisions cruciales pour les Balkans : les Anglais voulaient évacuer Salonique et utiliser les forces qui y étaient réunies pour la défense du canal de Suez, les Français au contraire voulaient renforcer la tête de pont de Salonique et prendre l’offensive à partir de là pour soulager Verdun, les Serbes souhaitaient le transfert de leurs troupes de Corfou à Salonique et une offensive vigoureuse afin de réaliser plus sûrement leurs objectifs dans les Balkans. Comme on le sait, on parvint le 27 mars à un compromis : le front de Salonique serait maintenu, on y transportait l’armée serbe, mais il ne serait pas question d’offensive dans l’immédiat. 39 Il est clair que dans ces conditions toute information concernant la fiabilité des Serbes était vitale et urgente pour Paris.

C’est dans ce contexte que parvint à Paris (au ministère de la Marine, qui le transmit au Quai d’Orsay) un rapport sensationnel, et qui connut une réelle diffusion, du service d’espionnage que le commandant de Roquefeuil, envoyé à Athènes à la fin de l’année 1915 à la suite d’une réorganisation de l’ensemble des services français d’espionnage en décembre 1915, venait de commencer à établir en Grèce. 40 Mais en fait l’action de Roquefeuil et tout son service débordait largement la Grèce et en particulier il était chargé aussi de suivre les affaires serbes. Son principal agent dans ce domaine était le journaliste Jean Pélissier, qui depuis le début de la Guerre était dans le service de contre-espionnage de la Sûreté et qui était affecté depuis sa création au service de Roquefeuil. Pélissier était un journaliste de gauche, proche des milieux radicaux-socialistes, avec des relations politiques étendues dans ce milieu, partisan actif des nationalités, co-fondateur avant la guerre de l’Office central des Nationalités, organisme qui réunissait les milieux radicaux européens favorables aux nationalités, et dont faisait partie Pachitch ; il connaissait bien les questions balkaniques depuis les guerres balkaniques qu’il avait suivi comme correspondant de presse en 1912 et 1913. 41 Pélissier avait des informateurs vivant dans la communauté serbe d’Athènes et particulièrement bien placés depuis que le gouvernement serbe était réfugié à Corfou. L’un de ceux-ci, membre de la Main Noire et que

39 Petar Opacic, Le Front de Salonique (Belgrade 1979), pp. 49–51.
Pélissier connaissait depuis 1912, l’avertit le 12 mars 1916 d’un complot destiné à renverser le gouvernement Pachitch. Le chef du complot était Yaktchitch, directeur du grand journal belgradois Štampa, austrophile convaincu. Yaktchitch aurait l’accord du Prince héritier Alexandre, et aurait réussi à rallier une minorité de la Main Noire, avec son chef, le colonel Dimitriévitch (alias colonel Apis), auteur de la révolution de 1903 qui avait mis les Karageorgevitch au pouvoir, ancien chef des services secrets serbes, furieux d’avoir été mis à l’écart après l’arrivée des troupes serbes à Corfou. Certes Dimitriévitch n’était pas austrophile, ne s’entendait, selon cet informateur, avec Yaktchitch que pour renverser Pachitch, mais il existait un risque que la combinaison succédant à celui-ci ne fût résignée à une entente avec les Puissances centrales, dans l’état de détresse où se trouvaient les Serbes. Le complot devait se nouer à l’occasion du prochain voyage à Paris de Pachitch et du prince Alexandre, les conjurés comptant demander au gouvernement français de faire pression sur Pachitch pour qu’il se retire. Ils comptaient sur l’appui à Paris de Victor Bérard.42

En outre son informateur, de toute évidence membre de la Main Noire mais hostile à Yaktchitch, serait venu à Athènes pour soulever les officiers grecs contre le roi Constantin et pour préparer l’assassinat de celui-ci et du roi de Bulgarie. Ce qui paraît particulièrement troublant, c’est que cette dernière information devait constituer l’un des principaux chefs d’accusation du procès de Salonique contre la Main Noire en juin 1917!43 Or cette affaire est confirmée par plusieurs sources : Dimitriévitch/Apis aurait bien eu l’idée d’organiser l’assassinat du Kaiser, du roi de Grèce et du roi de Bulgarie.44

D’une façon générale, l’informateur de Pélissier paraît fiable.45 Les indications très précises données à cette occasion à Pélissier par son informateur de la Main Noire sur l’histoire et l’organisation de cette société, ainsi que sur les dessous de l’attentat de Sarajevo paraissent très exacts.46 On se demande néanmoins pourquoi il éprouvait le besoin de faire de telles révélations à Pélissier...

Un point néanmoins, j’y reviendrai, est peu vraisemblable, justement celui qui constituait l’élément le plus inquiétant aux yeux des Français : la

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44 Vladimir Dedijer, La route de Sarajevo, p. 418.
45 Voir le récit détaillé de Vladimir Dedijer, La route de Sarajevo, pp. 384 ss.
46 Cf. le Journal de Pélissier à la date du 13 mars 1916. Ce Journal se trouve à la Bibliothèque ukrainienne Simon Petlura à Paris, que je tiens à remercier ici.
possibilité qu'Apis, hypernationaliste anti-autrichien de toujours, finisse par s'entendre avec Yaktchitch pour conclure une paix séparée avec l'Autriche.

Un autre point pose un problème : que Yaktchitch ait eu l'accord du Prince Alexandre contre Pachitch. Certes, le Prince pensait semble-t-il au printemps 1916 à écarter Pachitch du gouvernement.\(^{47}\) Mais il était également très opposé à Apis. Il est donc très peu probable qu'il ait soutenu une conspiration Yaktchitch - Apis, qui plus est austrophile. D'autre part il n'était guère vraisemblable non plus qu'Apis fût à la fois prêt à s'entendre avec des partisans d'une paix de compromis avec les puissances centrales, et décidé à faire assassiner le Kaiser, le roi de Bulgarie et le roi de Grèce.

Devant la gravité de ces informations, et outre l'envoi du rapport Pélissier du 14 mars qui fut, répétons-le, transmis au Quai d'Orsay et ne resta donc pas enfermé dans les cartons des services secrets, Roqueféuil décida d'envoyer Pélissier à Paris rendre compte et chercher des instructions. Le 17 mars, il écrivait au Ministre de la Marine qu'il lui envoyait Pélissier (dont il rappelait au passage les antécédents et les importantes relations) rapporter, aux services de la Marine et si possible également au président du Conseil, les intrigues austrophiles dans les milieux serbes.\(^{48}\) (Rappelons que les souvenirs de la période où la Serbie était en fait un satellite de Vienne n'étaient pas anciens, et que lors de la crise bosniaque de 1908 Paris s'était montrée relativement compromise à l'égard de Vienne, et avait prodigué des conseils de modération à Belgrade, à la grande fureur de Saint-Pétersbourg ; même si les temps avaient changé, il est clair que rien de tout cela ne devait apparaître comme invraisemblable à Paris).\(^{49}\)

Arrivé à Paris le 28 mars, Pélissier vit le chef de la 1ère section de l'état-major de la Marine, qui chapeautait le renseignement, l'amiral Schwerer, et le ministre, l'amiral Lacaze, à différentes reprises. Les deux hommes se montrèrent très réceptifs, admettant que si le parti austrophile serbe revenait au pouvoir et si les Allemands lui faisaient alors des offres favorables il serait bien difficile d'empêcher la Serbie de conclure une paix séparée.\(^{50}\) Philippe Berthelot, le directeur de Cabinet de Briand (président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères) que Pélissier vit le 31 mars, se montra beaucoup plus calme : on était au courant des intrigues contre Pachitch, mais elles n'avaient « aucune chance d'aboutir »\(^{51}\)

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\(^{48}\) Service Historique de la Marine, SS Q X f 8.

\(^{49}\) Georges-Henri Soutou, « La France et le Concert européen dans la crise bosniaque », communication à paraître.

\(^{50}\) \textit{Journal} de Pélissier, 28 mars 1916.

\(^{51}\) \textit{Journal} de Pélissier.
Néanmoins, même si rien finalement ne devait se passer pendant le séjour à Paris de Pachitch, fin mars 1916, et si Roquefeuil estimait que Yaktchich en fait avait échoué dès le mois de mai,52 les responsables français prenaient ces menaces au sérieux : Roquefeuil estimait que l’échec de Yaktchich n’avait pas mis un terme aux intrigues allemandes ;53 Boppe, le représentant de la France auprès du gouvernement serbe à Corfou, prit au sérieux le rapport Pélissier qui lui fut communiqué54 et tint régulièrement informé le gouvernement serbe, avec l’assentiment du Ministère de la Marine et du Quai d’Orsay, des informations recueillies par Roquefeuil. En même temps il tenait Paris soigneusement informé des intrigues anti-pachitchistes et germanophiles dans les milieux politiques serbes, en particulier au sein du parti libéral, dont les députés avaient dans l’ensemble refusé de quitter la Serbie, et dont certains représentants siégeaient dans les commissions municipales mises en place par les Autrichiens, et au sein du parti socialiste serbe.55

Sur le fond de l’affaire de la Main Noire, telle qu’elle fut décrite à Pélissier, bien entendu, il faut être très prudent : on a affaire à un mélange de choses vraies (l’opposition de la Main Noire à Pachitch) et d’éléments très douteux (l’existence d’une réelle conspiration entre Yaktchich et Apis et la finalité défaitiste de cette conspiration, et également l’appui du Prince Alexandre). L’ensemble est très suspect, même s’il ne faut pas sous-estimer la fièvre obsidionale qui régnait dans les milieux serbes et l’extrême complexité de la Main Noire. On flaire de toute évidence une machination policière (surtout en tenant compte du pseudo-attentat commis contre le Prince Alexandre quelques mois plus tard et du très suspect procès de Salonique contre la Main Noire début 1917, qui reprit les mêmes accusations contre Apis que celles de l’informateur de Pélissier en mars 1916). D’autant plus que l’on sait que la police secrète du ministre de l’Intérieur Ljubomir Jovanović intriguait contre Apis, et que Jovanović lui-même répandait dès 1916 les thèmes du rapport Pélissier et du procès de Salonique (Apis aurait voulu assassiner le Kaiser, etc.).56

On subodore donc une manipulation. Elle pouvait avoir deux objectifs, d’ailleurs pas exclusifs : conforter Pachitch, y compris contre le prince Alexandre (mis en cause par l’informateur de Pélissier comme prêt à une paix séparée) en le présentant comme le seul Serbe fidèle aux Alliés, afin

53 Rapports Roquefeuil des 17 et 26 juin 1916, SHM, SS Ea 148.
56 Jovanović, « Apis ».
de lui assurer l’appui français, juste avant son voyage et celui du Prince Alexandre en France. Mais il pouvait s’agir aussi pour la police serbe de nourrir de l’extérieur, pour le rendre plus crédible, un dossier contre Apis, dans le genre de ce qui devait arriver plus tard à Thoukatchevski (on sait que Staline s’est intéressé personnellement par la suite à toute l’histoire du procès de Salonique).

On doit même très sérieusement se demander si le gouvernement français n’a pas été manipulé à cette occasion, et manipulé par des services secrets serbes (dans l’affaire Apis Jovanović et Pachitch ont travaillé ensemble) qui auraient joué sur les craintes parisiennes à l’égard des manoeuvres autrichiennes : il semble bien que la Main Noire et en particulier Apis/Dimitriévitch n’aient pas cherché à renverser le gouvernement, et encore moins à traiter avec les Autrichiens, et encore moins avec l’appui d’Alexandre, mais au contraire que depuis 1914 Pachitch et le Prince Alexandre, qui avait progressivement écarté les membres de la Main Noire des postes militaires importants, cherchaient eux à s’en débarrasser pour de bon.58

D’autre part Pachitch avant la guerre avait fait partie du Comité de patronage de l’Office central des nationalités dont Pélissier était le secrétaire général ; Pélissier était en Grèce sous son nom, sous couverture journalistique, et était donc parfaitement facile à contacter ; ses relations dans les milieux politiques parisiens, outre son rôle dans les services secrets français, probablement assez transparent, tout cela en faisait le vecteur idéal pour une machination. On ne voit d’ailleurs pas bien pourquoi l’informateur de Pélissier lui aurait révélé de pareils secrets, en dehors d’un montage de ce genre ? Le succès de renseignement de Pélissier était en fait trop beau...


La collaboration policière franco-serbe à partir de 1916

Sans qu’on puisse en être sûr, une manipulation dans cette affaire n’est donc pas impossible. Elle pouvait avoir pour but, dans une période où, rappelons-le, tout le Front d’Orient était en balance, de pousser les Français à resserrer

57 Ibid.


59 Soutou, de Castelbajac et de Gasquet, Recherches sur la France, p. 15.
leurs liens avec Pachitch, qui apparaissait comme la seule garantie contre les menées austrophiles, peut-être même à le conforter contre le Prince Alexandre, et peut-être aussi, on va le voir, à établir entre les deux gouvernements une collaboration policière contre les opposants à Pachitch.

Manipulation ou pas, cette affaire eut en effet de très importantes conséquences dans ce domaine. En effet la crainte ressentie à Paris de voir Pachitch renversé par des partisans d’une paix séparée, crainte puissamment renforcée par le rapport de Pélissier, conduisit le gouvernement français à collaborer avec le gouvernement serbe pour mettre hors d’état de nuire les « suspects ». Or ceux-ci se trouvaient souvent en France, ou en Suisse, ou passaient régulièrement d’un pays à l’autre, depuis l’occupation de la Serbie. Le seul moyen pour le gouvernement serbe, réfugié à Corfou, de les contrôler était donc d’obtenir l’aide des Français.

Ainsi donc, on va le voir, les Français utilisèrent tous leurs moyens pour mettre hors d’état de nuire les Serbes suspects de défaitisme. Dans leur esprit ils contrôlaient ainsi fermement les Serbes et leurs éventuelles tentations défaitistes, ce qui était un souci constant depuis le début, on l’a vu. Mais ce faisant ils confortaient en même temps le pouvoir de Pachitch et le débarrassaient de ses opposants. Finalement, qui contrôlait qui ? C’était pour le moins une relation ambiguë. D’autre part il faudrait bien sûr étudier les archives autrichiennes, pour détecter la part de vérité dans les craintes françaises, et la part de manipulation des Serbes autour du thème des manoeuvres autrichiennes, l’un n’excluant bien entendu pas l’autre...

Bien entendu, cette histoire ne se résume pas à des manipulations policières : il y avait un intérêt objectif commun aux Français et aux dirigeants serbes à maintenir un front rigoureux contre l’Autriche ; néanmoins cette intimité entre Paris et Pachitch a probablement contribué à influencer la politique française envers Belgrade au moment de la création de la Yougoslavie à la fin de la guerre.

La collaboration policière franco-serbe se mit en place en juillet 1916, effectivement, soulignons-le, à la suite des rapports inquiétants sur l’état d’esprit des Serbes envoyés par Pélissier, Roquefeuil et Boppe, que j’ai évoqués. Le 12 juillet, Paris informait Corfou que : « le gouvernement de la République était déterminé à réprimer sévèrement... toute intrigue de ce genre qui se produirait sur son territoire et à prêter son concours au Gouvernement serbe pour lui permettre de couper court à des agissements semblables à ceux que dénoncent MM de Roquefeuil et Pélissier ».60

Cette collaboration s’établit entre le Quai d’Orsay, épaulé par les légations françaises à Corfou et à Berne, la légation de Serbie à Paris, et le ministère de l’Intérieur français : les passages de Serbes entre la France

60Tél. du 12 juillet, MAE, Serbie, vol. 380.
et la Suisse seraient contrôlés par les autorités françaises en accord avec la légation de Serbie ; les Serbes résidant en Suisse mais fidèles au gouvernement serbe seraient incités à revenir en France et ne seraient plus autorisés à quitter celle-ci ; les Serbes suspects résidant en Suisse eux ne seraient pas autorisés à revenir en France. Ou éventuellement au contraire on laisserait rentrer en France les Serbes considérés comme les plus dangereux, comme le socialiste Katzlérovitch, pour qu’ensuite ils ne puissent plus en sortir.61

En outre les autorités françaises et serbes collaboreraient étroitement pour la censure de la correspondance serbe.62 Il semble enfin qu’une collaboration fut mise en place entre le Quai d’Orsay et la légation de Serbie afin d’orienter la censure de la Presse dans un sens conforme aux voeux serbes.63

Paris était d’autant plus incité à aider le gouvernement serbe dans ce domaine que les nouvelles du front intérieur serbe n’étaient pas bonnes : le 17 juillet 1916 Boppe rapportait que Pachitch avait été fort mal accueilli par les députés serbes réfugiés à Nice ; cela laissait présager la crise entre Pachitch et la Skoupitchina que nous verrons par la suite.64 Dans le même ordre d’idées, Clément-Simon, qui avait été en poste à Belgrade avant la guerre et connaissait bien la Serbie, et qui suivait les affaires serbes au ministère des Affaires étrangères, notait le 30 octobre 1916 : « je crois que le milieu serbe est en pleine décomposition. On ne saurait trop le surveiller ».65

Le dénouement de l’affaire de la Main Noire

Paris suivit avec la plus grande attention le dénouement de l’affaire de la Main Noire, de l’arrestation des « conjurés » en décembre 1916 au procès de Salonique en juin 1917.66 Les Serbes obtinrent même une collaboration policière des Français dans cette affaire : à leur demande la police française procéda à une perquisition au domicile parisien de Guentchitch, homme politique qui avait fait partie du complot de 1903 et qui était resté proche

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61 Toutes les pièces passim dans le vol. 380.
64 Dépêche Boppe du 17 juillet, vol. 380.
65 MAE, vol. 382.
de la Main Noire, et chez l’épouse du général Popovitch, l’un des conjurés arrêtés, qui résidait à Lyon.67

On notera cependant que les responsables français ne crurent pas une seconde à la réalité de la conspiration d’Apis, et encore moins de son orientation austrophile. Le capitaine Carlier, attaché militaire près de la Légation de France en Serbie, estimait que le colonel Dimitriévitch, qu’il avait souvent rencontré, était francophile.68 Clément-Simon était parfaitement sceptique à l’égard des accusations portées contre les « conjurés ».69 Un télégramme de Cambon adressé à la légation à Corfou, le 26 juin (le jour même de l’exécution) recommandait au gouvernement serbe d’éviter « toute rigueur excessive » ou « haine de parti », de façon à ne pas ternir l’image internationale de la Serbie.70

Quant à Boppe, constatant que l’affaire avait conduit à la chute du gouvernement et à la constitution d’un cabinet exclusivement « vieux-radical », il télégraphiait à Paris le 24 juin :

« Les ministres dont M. Patchitch s’entoure lui seront d’un bien faible secours dans l’œuvre qui lui reste à accomplir pour ramener sur le territoire national le roi Pierre et le prince héritier. Il semble que ce dernier ne s’en rende pas compte. Il regrettera certainement plus tard d’avoir cédé au désir de se débarrasser du chef de la Main Noire et de s’être laissé ainsi entraîner à faciliter la rupture de la coalition dont l’appui lui a été si précieux au cours des deux années tragiques qu’il vient de vivre ».71

Printemps 1918 : crise ministérielle serbe et manœuvres autrichiennes

En mars 1918 les responsables français furent très préoccupés par une longue crise ministérielle serbe, qui ne fut résolue qu’en apparence fin mars avec la constitution d’un Cabinet Pachitch « vieux-radical » monocolore, ce qui inquiétait beaucoup le nouveau représentant de la France à Corfou, Fontenay.72 De fait dès le 27 avril 1918 la crise rebondissait, et Fontenay commençait à craindre le départ de Pachitch, avec toutes ses conséquences possibles sur la politique extérieure serbe.73 En outre depuis quelques se-

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70 Vol. 386.
71 Vol. 386.
maines des bruits insistentes de démarches de paix des Autrichiens auprès des Serbes circulaient à nouveau. Le Prince Alexandre aussi bien que Pachitch ne démentaient ces bruits que bien mollement.74


Dans ces conditions, Fontenay, le 6 mai 1918, estimant que le moral d’un peuple en guerre depuis sept ans parvenait peut-être à ses ultimes limites, conseillait instamment à Paris de manifester solennellement l’appui de la France aux aspirations nationales serbes, afin de galvaniser le peuple.77 Or le gouvernement français n’avait jamais renouvelé d’engagements formels dans ce sens, depuis les encouragements de Briand en décembre 1915 (cf. plus haut), mais qui n’étaient pas une manifestation publique. Depuis, la position française s’était montrée plutôt beaucoup plus prudente : lors de la définition au niveau gouvernemental des buts de guerre français, en décembre 1916-janvier 1917, on avait finalement renoncé, contrairement au projet initial, à réclamer la destruction de l’Autriche-Hongrie.78


75 Cf. par exemple le tél. de Fontenay du 10 février, vol. 388.
77 Vol. 389.
Les Anglais pour leur part n’étaient pas en fait à ce moment-là partisans de supprimer l’Autriche-Hongrie. Les Français qui avaient insisté sur cette formule, sous l’influence de Berthelot, mais surtout pour appuyer le Comité national tchéque, tout en ne cachant pas à celui-ci que l’on ne prolongerait pas la guerre pour réaliser cet objectif, qui n’était donc pas un absolu. En fait, pour Briand il s’agissait surtout d’une manoeuvre à court terme, destinée à inquiéter Vienne, à affaiblir les adversaires : il n’était pas question pour lui sérieusement de détruire l’Autriche-Hongrie.

D’ailleurs à partir de l’été et de l’automne 1917 Paris pensa plutôt à une paix séparée avec l’Autriche-Hongrie, qui ne serait donc pas détruite, mais simplement transformée en confédération, ce qui n’allait pas dans le sens des revendications serbes. Ajoutons que dans la déclaration du 10 janvier 1917 on avait finalement renoncé à mentionner spécifiquement les Yougoslaves, à cause de l’opposition italienne ; le mot Slaves était donc en fait fort vague, et concernait d’ailleurs plutôt les Polonais. Pour résumer : la déclaration du 10 janvier 1917 ne promettait de façon ferme que la « restauration de la Serbie » : sur le reste des aspirations serbes, comme sur les aspirations yougoslaves, elle restait parfaitement vague.

Pichon, ministre des Affaires étrangères de Clemenceau depuis novembre 1917, et Clemenceau lui-même étaient particulièrement prudents dans ce domaine, pour des raisons générales, car l’intérêt géostratégique de la France commandait la prudence en matière de nationalités (pour ne pas affaiblir la Russie, pour ne pas offrir à l’Allemagne un champ d’expansion dans une Europe danubienne affaiblie). Mais aussi, dans le cas yougoslave et sans qu’il soit possible d’insister ici, ils tenaient avant tout à ménager

84 Laroche, Au Quai d’Orsay, p. 38 ; Suarez, Briand, T. IV, pp. 114–115.
85 Soutou, de Castelbajac et de Gasquet, Recherches sur la France.
l’Italie.\textsuperscript{86} D’autre part les responsables français recevaient des conseils divergents sur la question yougoslave : Fontenay, à Corfou, plaidait pour une union entre Serbes et Yougoslaves conduite par les Serbes ; mais Charles Loiseau, qui suivait à l’ambassade de France à Rome les affaires croates, plaidait plutôt pour un État yougoslave séparé de la Serbie.\textsuperscript{87} Rien en outre n’était simplifié par l’attitude très complexe, on le sait, de Pachitch dans cette affaire.\textsuperscript{88}


\textsuperscript{87} DEA Baret, et MAE, Guerre 1914–1918, vols. 159 à 161.

\textsuperscript{88} Alex N. Dragnich, \textit{Serbia, Nikola Pasic and Yugoslavia} (Rutgers UP, 1974).

\textsuperscript{89} Soutou, de Castelbajac et de Gasquet, \textit{Recherches sur la France}. 
D’autre part des considérations diplomatiques complexes venaient souvent troubler le schéma géopolitique de la « Barrière de l’Est ». C’est ainsi qu’à propos des aspirations serbes à fonder une Yougoslavie unissant Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, Paris se montrait en fait prudent, afin de ne pas mécontenter l’Italie qui avait ses propres visées dans la région.\(^90\) Plutôt que d’un politique clairement défini il vaudrait mieux parler d’arbitrages constants entre le principe des nationalités (compris d’ailleurs selon le modèle républicain français et selon la vision des « grandes nationalités » et non pas de façon strictement ethnique), les considérations géostratégiques et les rapports avec les différents alliés.

3 juin 1918 : Paris prend enfin position publiquement en faveur des aspirations yougoslaves

La situation allait évoluer au printemps 1918 et Paris allait prendre enfin clairement position, le 3 juin, en faveur des aspirations yougoslaves, en cosignant la fameuse déclaration solennelle du Conseil Suprême de Guerre qui se tint ce jour-là à Versailles, par laquelle les Alliés soutenaient la création d’un État polonais uni et indépendant, avec accès à la mer, et assuraient d’autre part de leur sympathie les aspirations nationales des Tchécoslovaques et des Yougoslaves.\(^91\)

Paris, après avoir, on l’a vu, longtemps hésité à se prononcer publiquement sur ces questions, répondait ainsi au vœu exprimé par Fontenay avec beaucoup de force, on l’a vu, le 6 mai. Le gouvernement français se décidait ainsi à franchir un pas devant lequel il avait longtemps hésité sous l’influence d’une série de facteurs : tout d’abord la question des nationalités de l’Autriche-Hongrie avait été très publiquement et fortement relancée par le Congrès des races opprimées d’Autriche qui se tint à Rome début avril, auquel participait une délégation française de poids, dont Albert Thomas et le député Franklin-Bouillon, président de la Commission des Affaires étrangères, spécialiste à la Chambre du problème des Nationalités.\(^92\) Le succès du Congrès et la pression de la majorité de la Chambre, beaucoup plus favorable aux Nationalités que le gouvernement,\(^93\) allaient conduire Pichon et le Conseil des ministres, dès le 19 avril 1918, à se rallier aux


\(^{91}\) Soutou, de Castelbajac et de Gasquet, *Recherches sur la France*, p. 95.


résolutions du Congrès et à envisager de donner « une preuve tangible et efficace » de son soutien aux nationalités de l’Autriche-Hongrie.\footnote{Télé. de Pichon à Barrère, à Rome, du 19 avril, vol. 161.}

Un autre facteur capital fut le mûrissement de l’affaire tchéco-slovaque dans l’esprit des responsables français au printemps 1918 : on était maintenant fermement décidé, on l’a vu, à appuyer les Tchèques, et donc à soutenir le principe des nationalités plus fermement qu’auparavant.\footnote{Mémoire de Maîtrise sous ma direction en 1996 d’Alexandra Forterre, « La France et le problème tchèque, 1914–1919 ».} En outre Paris tenait à faire entrer à cette occasion par les Alliés de façon définitive la création d’un Etat polonais avec accès à la mer, ce qui était désormais un objectif fondamental de la France, pour retrouver un contre-poids contre l’Allemagne après la défection russe.\footnote{Soutou, de Castelbajac et de Gasquet, \textit{Recherches sur la France}, pp. 90 ss.}

Bien entendu le contexte yougoslave a également joué son rôle dans cette affaire, plus qu’on ne l’a dit (car l’affaire tchécoslovaque a monopolisé l’attention) : tout d’abord Paris était très attentif aux tensions qui s’aggravraient à nouveau entre Trumbic et le Comité yougoslave d’une part, et Pachitch de l’autre.\footnote{Télé. de Barrère du 4 mai, vol. 389.} Peut-être a-t-on pensé qu’un soutien français solennel à la cause yougoslave était le meilleur moyen de contribuer à réconcilier Trumbic et Pachitch, et donc à conforter ce dernier au pouvoir, dans la situation politique difficile où il se trouvait?


\footnote{Télé. de Barrère, à Rome, du 19 avril, vol. 161.}

\footnote{Mémoire de Maîtrise sous ma direction en 1996 d’Alexandra Forterre, « La France et le problème tchèque, 1914–1919 ».}

\footnote{Soutou, de Castelbajac et de Gasquet, \textit{Recherches sur la France}, pp. 90 ss.}

\footnote{Télé. de Barrère du 4 mai 1918, vol. 389.}


\footnote{Cf. DEA Baret et dépêche Fontenay du 16 mai 1918, vol. 389.}
Toutes ces raisons contribuaient à pousser nombre de responsables à conseiller désormais au gouvernement de prendre solennellement position en faveur du programme yougoslave : il semble par exemple que les Alliés aient d’abord envisagé, pour la déclaration du 3 juin, de ne pas mentionner les Yougoslaves, sous la pression des Italiens. Fontenay à Corfou et Barrère à Rome exercèrent la plus vive pression sur Paris pour que l’on mentionne aussi les Yougoslaves : si on omettait ceux-ci, commentait Barrère, se serait « les pousser dans les bras allemands », ce qui faisait écho aux craintes mentionnées par Fontenay quelques jours avant.  

Mais l’affaire fut tranchée de façon décisive par Washington : en effet un facteur capital fut évidemment le durcissement et le ralliement de Wilson au principe de la dissolution de l’Autriche-Hongrie et de la stricte application du principe des nationalités, alors que dans les Quatorze Points de janvier 1918 il n’était pas encore question de dissoudre la Double Monarchie : le 31 mai Washington apportait son soutien officiel et public aux Nationalités de l’Autriche-Hongrie, et explicitement aux Tchécoslovaques et aux Yougoslaves, c’est-à-dire que les Etats-Unis refusaient de tenir compte des réticences italiennes sur ce point. Du coup le 3 juin les Alliés, au Conseil Suprême de Guerre de Versailles, adoptaient une déclaration semblable, dans laquelle les Yougoslaves donc étaient expressément mentionnés.

Mais dans cette dernière étape, on l’a vu, la crainte, toujours présente chez les responsables français de voir la Serbie conclure des arrangements séparés avec les adversaires avait aussi joué son rôle, comme tout au long de cette histoire. Et à l’automne 1918 le gouvernement hésitait encore à soutenir à fond ses revendications « yougoslaves » pour ne pas se brouiller avec l’Italie. On le voit donc, la crainte de voir la Serbie, dans une triste situation et non liée aux Alliés par des textes formels, rechercher une entente avec l’Autriche ou l’Allemagne a été un facteur essentiel, voire déterminant, dans la politique française à l’égard de ce pays, beaucoup plus que le principe des nationalités en soi ou même les nécessités militaires et stratégiques. Le transport de l’armée serbe à Corfou, la collaboration policière avec le gouvernement serbe, l’intimité avec Pachitch, le soutien progressif et en fait

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tardif aux aspirations serbes et yougoslaves, tout cela s’explique très largement par la crainte à Paris d’un arrangement austro-serbe ou austro-germano-serbe. Tout cela devait bien sûr avoir aussi de grandes conséquences sur les conditions de naissance de la Yougoslavie unie, et jouer à ce moment-là en faveur de la solution voulue par Pachitch.

Il semble d’ailleurs que ces craintes étaient fort excessives, sous réserve de découvertes éventuelles dans les archives allemandes (déjà bien explorées) ou autrichiennes, mais que Pachitch sut en jouer assez habilement. En particulier il parvint, en exploitant ces craintes, voire peut-être même en manipulant Paris, à mettre un terme à la priorité systématique que la France accordait au départ, dans sa conception des affaires balkaniques à l’Italie, à la Roumanie, voire même avant son entrée en guerre à la Bulgarie. En outre il sut semble-t-il assez habilement utiliser Paris dans toutes ces affaires aussi sur le plan de la politique intérieure serbe, afin de se maintenir au pouvoir face à ses opposants, en se présentant au gouvernement français comme le seul rempart face au défaitisme (réel ou supposé) de certains Serbes.

Conclusion : la Serbie et les limites et les ambiguïtés de la reconstruction de l’Europe en États-Nations en 1918–1920

Le vote du Parlement autrichien dès novembre 1918 en faveur du rattachement à l’Allemagne montre que le problème était réel). Et, comprenant que la révolution russe et la fin de l’Autriche-Hongrie avaient fait disparaître tout contrepoids au Reich à l’Est de l’Europe, Foch et les missions militaires françaises en Europe centrale et orientale jouèrent un rôle déterminant dans la détermination des frontières des nouveaux États, qui furent conçues beaucoup plus pour leur permettre de constituer la « barrière de l’Est » contre l’Allemagne que selon des considérations ethnographiques ou liées au droit des peuples.104

La relativité indécise du concept de nationalité en Europe orientale pour les contemporains, permet de comprendre pourquoi les traités de 1919–1920 tiennent compte à la fois de l’esprit nouveau et du wilsonisme (c’est-à-dire du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes) mais aussi des considérations de puissance traditionnelles.105 L’esprit nouveau se manifeste par l’émergence de toute une série de nouveaux pays ou par des renaissances nationales ; c’est la fin des Empires autrichien, russe et ottoman, et la carte de l’Europe s’en trouve bouleversée. L’esprit wilsonien se manifeste également par des plébiscites dans certains cas difficiles, le plus important étant celui de Haute-Silésie.

Mais l’esprit nouveau est limité par des considérations géopolitiques : l’Anschluss de l’Autriche à l’Allemagne est interdit ; les frontières de la Pologne, de la Tchécoslovaquie, de la Yougoslavie et de la Roumanie, les quatre pays alliés de la France après la guerre, sont tracées très largement (par rapport à l’Allemagne ou à la Hongrie) par les missions militaires française dans ces pays durant les premiers mois de 1919 sur la base de considérations stratégiques, afin de tenter de remplacer, face à l’Allemagne, l’allié de revers russe, afin aussi de contenir la Hongrie et d’empêcher une alliance germano-hongroise.106 Les États ainsi constitués ne sont pas strictement homogènes (ou même fort peu comme la Tchécoslovaquie) mais ils sont considérés comme viables et capables de faire barrage à l’Allemagne et à la Hongrie.

On n’avait donc pas cherché à faire coïncider, au moins dans toute la mesure du possible, les frontières et les groupes nationaux, et on admettait donc qu’il y aurait toujours d’importantes minorités nationales. Du coup


106 Stevenson, French War Aims against Germany. Le Moal, La France et l’Italie.
l’œuvre des traités de 1919–1920 sera frappée par une ambiguïté fonduemen-
tale : en effet ni la Pologne, ni la Tchécoslovaquie, ni la Roumanie, ni la
Yougoslavie nouvelles ne respectaient, dans leurs structures mêmes, de fa-
cçon stricte le principe des nationalités : elles répétaient à plus petite échelle
les multinationalismes des Empires. Il y aurait donc encore de nombreuses
minorités nationales dans la nouvelle Europe. Les vainqueurs (les débats
fort informés des différentes commissions chargées de délimiter les nou-
velles frontières le prouvent) n’en étaient pas inconscients.107 Sans compter
qu’en fait les choses se décidaient depuis l’armistice largement sur place, les
nationalités « libérées » se servant largement au détirement de leurs voisins
vaincus ou plus faibles, cette conscience était cependant émoussée, me sem-
ble-t-il, par deux facteurs.

Tout d’abord, en tout cas pour les Français, la sensibilité aux ques-
tions nationales n’était pas celle de l’Europe actuelle ; c’est ici qu’a joué à
plein la notion de « grandes nationalités », déjà mentionnée : vu de Paris,
dans la continuité de cette notion bien assise depuis le XIXe siècle, que les
Serbes dirigent en fait la Yougoslavie ou les Tchèques la Tchécoslovaquie
ne choquait nullement. D’autre part la conception de l’État-Nation, d’ins-
piration rousseauiste, imposée par les vainqueurs de 1919 était censée per-
mettre de dépasser le problème des minorités : les membres des minorités
nationales des nouveaux États se verraiant garantir, d’ailleurs sous l’égide
de la SDN, la plénitude des droits civiques et civils et seraient en principe
à l’abri de toute discrimination et participeraient à l’élaboration de la « vo-
lonté générale » dans le cadre étatique national. C’est ainsi que la souverai-
ets des nouveaux États était limitée, en ce qui concernait le statut de leurs
minorités ethniques, par un contrôle international. Des traités de minorités
(garantisant les droits civiques et politiques à tous les habitants) annexés
aux traités de 1919–1920 furent imposés par les Alliés aux nouveaux États,
traités garantis et suivis par la Société des Nations. Ces traités se révélèrent
moins inefficaces qu’on ne l’a dit souvent, mais enfin ils réglerent que très
imparfaitement le problème.

En outre cette reconnaissance des droits des minorités et leur partici-
pation à la vie de l’État ne se feraient qu’au niveau individuel : aucun groupe
national ou ethnique intermédiaire ne pourrait s’interposer entre l’individu
et l’État, l’État-Nation rousseauiste issu de la « volonté générale ». Cette
vision était celle des Français, de l’Europe occidentale, des Américains,
des nouveaux dirigeants de l’Europe centrale issus des milieux radicaux :
ce n’était pas celle de beaucoup d’habitants de l’Europe centrale, de culture
germanique, pour lesquels les groupes nationaux continuaient à exister au
sein des États, et devaient se voir reconnus des droits non seulement indi-

viduels mais collectifs, dans un schéma non pas d’État-Nation mais d’État fédéral, reconnaissant la personnalité de ses éléments constitutifs, comme l’avait pratiqué justement l’ancienne Autriche-Hongrie, quelles qu’aient pu être ses maladresses. Disons-le, la conception française était celle de la citoyenneté, alors que la tradition romantique d’inspiration germanique était celle de l’ethnicité. Cette divergence fondamentale de conception taraudera, de la Tchécoslovaquie à la Yougoslavie en passant par les minorités hongroises ici et là, l’ordre établi en 1919 et ne permettra pas de stabiliser de façon durable les États issus des traités de 1919–1920, malgré une première période relativement favorable, jusqu’au début des années 30, et qui vit fonctionner de façon à peu près convenable le système de garantie des droits des minorités.\textsuperscript{108} On ne s’entendait en effet pas sur la signification même d’État-Nation : Nationalstaat ou Volksstaat?

Le jugement porté sur les traités de 1919–1920, pour ce qui concerne en particulier la recomposition étatique de l’Europe, est aujourd’hui en général sévère. Pour beaucoup il l’était déjà à l’époque : Robert Lansing, le secrétaire d’État américain, soulignait qu’il était impossible de définir des frontières nationales claires dans beaucoup de régions d’Europe.\textsuperscript{109} Beaucoup pensaient, comme Jacques Bainville, que l’éclatement des Empires profiteraient tôt ou tard à l’État qui était devenu à la suite de la guerre un véritable État national, et qui était au moins virtuellement le plus puissant de tous : l’Allemagne.\textsuperscript{110} Dans ces conditions, devant ces divergences et doutes à propos des nationalités, qui existaient bien avant 1914 et qui ne disparurent pas ensuite, on comprend mieux les hésitations de la politique officielle française à l’égard de la Serbie pendant la Première Guerre mondiale, malgré la sympathie générale que suscitèrent les Serbes par leur résistance héroïque.

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\textit{327(44:497.11)}

\textsuperscript{108} Sur cette divergence fondamentale cf. le livre lumineux de Bastiaan Schot, \textit{Nation oder Staat? Deutschland und der Minderheitenschutz} (Marburg : Herder Institut, 1988).


\textsuperscript{110} Jacques Bainville, \textit{Les conséquences politiques de la paix} (Fayard, 1920).
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The Absolute Power of the Sovereign, Bureaucracy, Democracy and Constitutional Government in the Works of Slobodan Jovanović

Abstract: The papers discusses the views of Slobodan Jovanović (1869–1958) on several phenomena of Serbia's political and institutional development in the hundred years between the First Serbian Uprising in 1804 and the fall of the Obrenović dynasty in 1903, and on different political systems, looking at the sources on which his thought drew upon, the ideas he was guided by and the theoretical framework of his legal and socio-political thinking. His major work, a legal theory of the state, as most of his other writings, was his own contribution to what he held to be a national mission, the building of a modern state based on the rule of law.

Keywords: Slobodan Jovanović, nineteenth-century Serbia, legal theory of the state, democracy, totalitarianism, bureaucracy, constitutional government, absolutism

The developed system of categories and prevailing ideas of West-European scholarship

Our subject requires taking into consideration not only Slobodan Jovanović’s theoretical works on the state — studies on important topics (such as sovereignty, the social contract, the justification of the state, the source of authority, the accountability of administration); on important political institutions (parliamentarianism, bicameralism, the Grand National Assembly, the National Assembly); and, in the second edition of O državi [On the State], on political parties, the right to rule, ministerial responsibility, federalism — but also his interpretation of Serbia’s constitutional and political development in the course of one century. It does not seem unnecessary therefore to reiterate one point of general agreement: Slobodan Jovanović was a prolific writer who made a contribution in many different areas, from literary criticism to legal, social and political theory, notably in the area of Serbia’s political and constitutional history.¹

¹ Jurists will no doubt rightly consider him as Serbia’s great legal theoretician of the state, and historians, rightly again, as a significant historian, notably of Serbia’s develop-
Jovanović followed the development of modern political institutions and debates about them, primarily in leading European countries, and wrote about some phenomena, historical figures and processes from the perspective of political science and political sociology. This socio-political approach is evident not only in his Examples from Political Sociology, but also in his texts on the leaders of the French Revolution, on the role and ruling style of British King George III whose politics caused the British American colonies to rebel against the crown, and on many political events and figures of nineteenth-century Europe and Serbia. Jovanović had tremendous knowledge of the political systems in Europe and was also interested in some questions relating to the political development in the countries — or states, as he termed them — of the British Commonwealth and in the United States of America. Such vast knowledge made it possible for him to conduct what today would be defined as comparative analysis of political systems, which he did for some European countries and their regimes formed after the First World War. Owing to a profound understanding in the nineteenth century. This is the assessment of renowned Serbian historians such as Vladimir Ćorović (Slobodan Jovanović – istoričar) and Radovan Samardžić, as well as those who wrote about him abroad. According to Samardžić, in the afterword ("Delo i pisac") to vol. 12/II of Jovanović’s Sabrana dela [Collected Works, hereafter SD] (Belgrade: BIGZ, Jugoslavijapublik & SKZ, 1991): “Books, studies and short essays on nineteenth-century Serbia no doubt occupy the most prominent place in his work” (p. 677), but also: “Slobodan Jovanović held that he was not doing the job of a historian, but rather that his research was primarily political and legal” (p. 688), and: “As a theoretician of the state and law, Slobodan Jovanović studied constitutional and legislative issues even in his historical works or, more precisely, his historical essays, treatises and monographs were largely based on his study of constitutional and legislative questions” (p. 673). Samardžić devoted yet another essay to Jovanović: “Slobodan Jovanović. Istoričar kao pisac” [Historian as a writer], Pisci srpske istorije, 3 vols. (Belgrade: Prosveta, vol. II, 1971; vol. III, 1986). Serbian historians or historians of Serbian origin abroad wrote about Jovanović and evaluated his work at a time when such writing was difficult to publish in his homeland. See e.g. Dimitrije Djordjević, “Historians in Politics: Slobodan Jovanović”, Journal of Contemporary History 3:1 (1973); Michael Boro Petrovich, “Slobodan Jovanović (1869–1958): the career and fate of Serbian historian”, Serbian Studies 3:1–2 (1984/85). Jovanović’s contribution as a theoretician of the state has been less studied than his contribution as a historian. First reviews of his legal-political studies and ideas after the Second World War appeared in the collection of papers presented at a scholarly conference devoted to his work: Delo Slobodana Jovanovića u svom vremenu i danas [The Work of Slobodan Jovanović in his Times and Today], ed. Stevan Vračar (Belgrade: Pravni fakultet, 1991); Aleksandar Pavković, Slobodan Jovanović: An Unsentimental Approach to Politics (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1993) was an attempt at systematic analysis of his political ideas.

2 *Primeri iz političke sociologije* [1940], SD, vol. 10.
3 “Poratna država” [1922] [The post-war state], SD, vol. 8.
standing of the evolution of modern political institutions, he was able to address Serbian political issues using a well-developed system of categories which included not only legal but also sociological and political theoretical and methodological postulates.

During his university studies in Switzerland, Jovanović became acquainted not only with German and French legal doctrines but also with the political institutions of Britain, which led him early on to cherish the ideal of the legal state/constitutional government. He is not just a jurist who deals, when appropriate and in detail, with issues of administration and bureaucracy, nor just a historian who observes, describes and analyzes important events, developments, relations among leaders and between leaders and people, numerous rebellions and other efforts made in a bid to bring about change in these relations; he also approaches these processes from the sociological and political perspective, using a set of notions in which an important role is played by the categories such as absolutism, Oriental despotism, autocracy, bureaucracy, oligarchy of officialdom (frequently used), constitutional government, bicameralism, separation of powers, legal security, civil liberties, parliamentarianism (both in a positive and in a negative sense), political parties, partisanship, etc.

What Jovanović said about Leopold Ranke — that, “being one of the greatest historians of the last century, he was able to recognize in the internal strife of Karageorge’s times not only what was local but also what was general” — applies, in our view, to Jovanović himself. He, too, seeks for the general, without ever losing sight of the particular and concrete. In doing that, he is guided not only by his scholarly scrupulousness and studiousness but also by his own “approach to the subject” which involves striking descriptions of carefully selected situations and events implying or leading to inevitable conclusions. In their vividness, they fill the “conceptual framework” with images. Regrettably, the language barrier and the lack of interest of “developed” nations in really understanding the nature of political relations in a Balkan country have, as in many other cases, prevented his work from becoming more widely known.

Jovanović does not simply describe and explain the history and problems of Serbia’s political and constitutional development. He tends to choose the examples that he believes may be useful for the state and the people, hopeful that he will contribute to the well-being of the nation by imparting his knowledge of the nature of those legal and political institutions of politically and economically developed countries which would be useful for Serbia to adopt and, conversely, of some hard-way-learnt lessons.

4 Slobodan Jovanović [1937], “Karadjordje i njegove vojvode” [Karageorge and his generals], SD, vol. 11, 17.
about what to avoid. In doing so, he does not impose a preconceived pattern onto Serbian history; but rather he explores it and presents the findings. It appears from his scrupulously and scholarly presented ideas and the problems he dealt with that he made a politically constructive attempt to play an implicit reformist role in the public life of the country; hence our attempt to interpret some of his ideas from that perspective. But, of course, not every work of his was meant to serve a practical purpose or to teach. Yet, his legal theory of the state, critique of absolutism, oligarchy and bureaucracy, advocacy of the freedom of citizens within the legal framework of the state and, on the other hand, his willingness to understand and justify certain “reasons of the state” do belong among such ideas.

His later portrayal of totalitarian states contains some serious warnings, but so do his earlier analyses and assessments of the processes unfolding during the French Revolution and of those phenomena in a relatively recent past of Serbia that he subjects to criticism. We even tend to believe that all his studies on the history of political doctrines were written with the clear intention to foster some educational objectives by pointing to typical cases and to the dark side of historical phenomena.

According to Milorad Ekmečić, Jovanović’s historical research is guided by the belief that certain “ideé-forces” operate as driving forces of history. This observation by a historian about major ideas being involved in the quest for a certain philosophy of history or “a sense in history” seems pertinent because Jovanović’s work seems to suggest that he did have in mind certain trends or “ideé-forces” that influenced the nineteenth- and twentieth-century social and political development of those countries from which he believed his own country should borrow knowledge and experience in order to progress.

Jovanović himself mentions guiding ideas, such as: the idea of “our [national] liberation and unification”; of the “state” (with the remark that the Populists were imbued with “western liberalism”, but grafted onto it the “idea of a strong state, in the Bismarckian sense that prevailed at the time”); and of constitutional government or, as we would put it today, “democracy”. He prefers if changes can be made peacefully and gradually. For example, he sees the Serbian Constitution of 1869 “as an attempt, after the dynastic crisis, to carry out the transition from a personal to a constitutional regime with as little social turbulence as possible, peacefully, gradually and with measure”. Jovanović puts forth the same view when he speaks about the

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6 One can easily understand why by reading Burke; see Slobodan Jovanović, “Iz istorije političkih doktrina” [From the history of political doctrines], SD, vol. 9, 149–212.
failure of the Obrenović regime (i.e. from the second reign of Prince Miloš to Alexander’s downfall) to find a “middle ground between ‘the state idea’ and civil liberty”, but he sees where the general spirit of the time, or one of its guiding ideas, was leading: “All things aspired to the same goal: national unity and Europeanization of institutions.”

It is inspiring, therefore, to try to identify the “ideés-forces” which Jovanović was looking for and which influenced his interpretation of Serbian history. Yet, in spite of the above quotation and given his methodological pluralism and non-deterministic approach, he does not seem to have looked for a sense in history or a philosophy of history. What may be assumed with some certainty from his works and his whole life is that Jovanović was inclined to the Whig idea of broad liberties within the framework of reasonable and stable laws, and that it probably was at the core of his ideal of constitutional government. As he said himself, one of the ideés-forces which had been influencing the development of Serbia during the one-century period which was in the focus of his political and historical research, was the idea of constitutional government, of the rule of law.

The absolute “power of the ruler” and the “state of law”

From the very beginning of the momentous historical process of liberation that Leopold von Ranke wrote about in his *Serbian Revolution*, apart from the struggle against the Ottomans and the work on the internal organization of the restored state, an almost inevitable process ridden with uncertainties and tragic events was also taking place, and Slobodan Jovanović could not fail to describe it. It was the power struggle among the Serbian popular leaders and the aspiration of the most important of them, Kara-George and Miloš, to impose their power on the other insurgent leaders and county heads. This struggle for power accompanied both the First and the Second Serbian Uprising. What draws Jovanović’s attention is that the leaders sought to make their power over the people absolute; so much so that at times domestic governance was comparable to Ottoman. This internal power struggle and tendency to impose absolutism onto the people could take nasty forms if the leaders were irascible persons letting their whims take the upper hand. What Jovanović wants is not to paint an idyllic picture of the process of liberation or embellished portraits of popular leaders; he wants political facts of relevance to the history and constitutional and political development of Serbia. The lessons that can be drawn from

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7 Slobodan Jovanović, *Vlada Aleksandra Obrenović I* [1929] [The reign of Alexander Obrenović], SD, vol. 7, 366–370, where he also uses the abovementioned expression “Oriental despotism” (p. 369).
Jovanović’s accounts and analyses — probably written with the intention to make the past known in order to help people avoid repeating it and become better equipped for the future — are absolutely priceless.

According to Jovanović, “the constitutional issue here, same as everywhere, did not arise until after the establishment of a sovereign power which needed to be constitutionally restricted.” The process had begun with Karageorge and did not end until 1830, when the Sublime Porte recognized Miloš Obrenović as hereditary Prince of Serbia. Although Karageorge had harboured the same ambition and almost succeeded, the 1813 disaster brought an end to it, and so Miloš became the creator of sovereign power. “The ‘Governing Council’ [Praviteljstvujući sovjet], initially conceived as an assembly of county delegates which was supposed to put limits to Karageorge’s power,” Jovanović continues, “became his office. The Council members, appointed by Karageorge instead of being delegated by the counties, were nothing more than ministers of the ‘Supreme Leader’.” Jovanović argues that “supreme political power was formally vested in the Council, with Karageorge as merely its president, but Karageorge, had it not been for the 1813 disaster, would have certainly dissociated himself from the Council and taken the title of prince”.

In his review of Stojan Novaković’s book The Constitutional Question and the Laws of Karageorge’s Times (published in 1907), Jovanović emphasizes that Novaković deals with the earliest and the least explained period of recent Serbian history. He argues that the earlier historians, being “too close to Karageorge’s era to be able to look at it impartially”, interpreted the struggle between Karageorge and his opponents as a personal thing, as a mere struggle for power. Novaković, on the other hand, seeks to find a more general significance of the struggle between Karageorge and his opponents. It seems that Jovanović in one of his later writings follows quite closely certain patterns observable in Novaković. Jovanović relies on Novaković for telling examples to illustrate the reign of self-will and fruitless attempts to overcome such a situation. For instance, Jovanović describes the experience of Boža Grujović (born as Teodor Filipović). Having studied law in Austria and Hungary, and teaching law at universities in Russia, he was invited to come to Serbia to lay the groundwork of the country’s legal system. The situation that he found on his arrival in 1805 was that “all power was in the hands of vojvoda [insurgent leaders], and each of them

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9 Ibid. 14.
10 Slobodan Jovanović [1908], “Ustavno pitanje i zakoni Karadjordjevog vremena” [The constitutional question and the laws of Karageorge’s times], SD, vol. 11, 603.
commanded in his area in the same manner as he commanded in his camp”. Grujović offered more general ideas “with a moral”: “There where one or more govern at will, not abiding by the law but doing as they please, there the land has died, there is no freedom, no security, no good, there is nothing else but browbeating, only under a different name”. Grujović wanted to replace this state of affairs by “the rule of law”. “Law is the will of the people. The law is the overlord and the judge in a land. All lords and rulers and the Governing Council must abide by the law […] a land without law is doomed.”

Jovanović assumes that Grujović wanted the separation of civil and military authority and the supremacy of the Council, as a civil authority, over the vojvodas as holders of military authority, because: “Only there where there is supremacy of civil authority over military is it possible to put an end to personal arbitrariness and introduce the rule of the law”.

Karageorge was compelled to battle with the county heads who refused to recognize his authority and wanted a Council capable of limiting his power. Miloš, however, reached an oral understanding with the Sultan’s vizier Marashli Ali Pasha that he would take care that people remained peaceful, while in return the vizier allowed the transfer of administrative powers to popular leaders, with the Ottoman government remaining the highest authority. By promising to pacify Serbia, Miloš gained support from Marashli Ali Pasha, who had his own reasons to play Miloš off against other popular leaders. Hence Miloš was able to neutralize his most dangerous rivals and rise to the position of “Supreme Prince”. By the time of the Sultan’s berat of 1830, “Miloš had already become the unlimited ruler of Serbia: building his own authority instead of the previous authority of the pasha, he made it as despotic as that of the pasha had been.”

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11 Ibid. 604.
12 Ibid. 608.
13 Jovanović, “Naše ustavno pitanje XIX veka”, 14–15; as Jovanović wrote (ibid.), Prince Miloš “was not bound by law because there were no written laws in those times. In principle, the judicial power was separated from the executive; everywhere, there were, besides the heads of nahiyes, separate judicial collegiums, but the Prince paid no heed to this separation of judicial and executive powers. He kept instructing the courts how they should proceed; reviewed their rulings; moreover, he administered justice himself. The central government was not divided into ministries, but all affairs were managed from one chancery, the chancery of the Prince, which means that the Prince governed directly, and not through ministers. The only limitation on his power was the National Assembly, which met twice a year to set taxes for the nahiyes (these taxes covered the costs of both Turkish and native authorities). However, even this limitation was of little practical effect. The National Assembly was not composed of freely elected representatives, but of the heads of nahiyes and village communities, who depended on the Prince because they were appointed by him.”
The process of political institutionalization and of establishing constitutional or/and statutory limitations to the regime of personal rule was a slow and difficult one. Jovanović shows it graphically when describing the fate of a Russian idea concerning the Council, as well as the obsequious manner of the notables towards Miloš, not at like that of the leaders of the First and Second Uprisings had been.  

Jovanović is also noted for his psychological portrayal of political actors, leaders and rulers. He tends to make seemingly parenthetical but quite consequential and accurate observations: “For Miloš it was morally impossible to negotiate with notables. It is difficult for any absolutist to transform into a constitutional ruler; it was even more difficult for Miloš, because the notables were men he had created and elevated. He ranked them slightly higher than his pages and patrolmen. To him, letting them limit his power would have been as good as humiliating himself and losing all dignity”.  

The situation changed under Prince Alexander Karageorgević. “Alex- ander owed his accession to the throne” to the Constitutionalists, and therefore “was willing to let his power be limited by their Constitution”. But he

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14 By 1817 Miloš had mostly got rid of the brave and self-reliant among the leaders of the uprising. “The notables accepted the Russian concept of the Council straightaway but then they were men who had risen to prominence while serving Miloš, beginning as his buljubaše [military officers], scribes, tatari, business partners, etc.” Jovanović suggests that they can be seen as the parvenus of Miloš’s reign, as his camarilla. Once they rose in society under Miloš’s patronage, they began to feel his absolutism too hard to bear. The Prince had given them offices and honours, allowed them to grab hold of land and create large estates, but their power, honour and wealth did not have an adequate legal basis.” In the absence of law, the Prince was the unlimited master of all public offices; he would give them and take them away at will; he would move them from higher to lower posts, etc.” “His favourites could be degraded or dismissed at any time.” “The notables felt all the more insecure because Miloš was an inconsistent, whimsical, irascible man, and it was as easy to find favour with him as it was to fall out of it. The notables were driven by the need for legal security. They wanted their privileged position, obtained by the grace of the Prince, to be grounded in law and thereby independent of the will of the Prince.” “As for the peasant,” Jovanović writes, “he did not enjoy full economic freedom; he still felt himself dependent, tied to the land of, and thus enslaved by, his lord. The peasant demanded the abolition of corvée and the introduction of free trade. The farmer was oppressed by corvée. He did not labour only for the ’common good’ and the Prince himself, but also for more or less all public officials of some rank: captains and village heads, members of the court and village mayors, priests and monks. Indeed, it could have seemed to the peasant that he was not a free man, but a servant to his master.” Cf. Jovanović, “Naše ustavno pitanje XIX veka”, 15–16.

15 Ibid. p. 17.

16 Ibid. 19.
was not “the strong ruler that new times required”. This is why almost all of the time between 1842 and 1858, under Prince Alexander and the Constitutionalists, was spent to modernize governance, separate administration from judiciary, and train the necessary civil servants.

When the new Law on the Council (1858) made the Council a stronger factor than the Prince both in legislative and administrative matters, its members began to think about ousting the Prince (Jovanović assumes their motives). The realization of this idea required that another important political institution be introduced into the political life of the nation: the National Assembly, established by the Law on the National Assembly of 1858. Along with the Assembly, there appeared in Serbia the first political party — the Liberals. Jovanović follows very closely not only the creation of the institutions that constituted the basis or framework for achieving constitutional government, or democracy, but also whatever factors that could lead away from achieving it.

Prince Miloš was not any more hypocritical or “Machiavellian” than many other absolute rulers before him or absolute presidents and secretaries general after him. Yet, under his rule things were changing, and hypocrisy and manipulation became techniques of ruling. Slobodan Jovanović demonstrates this using his own selection and description of details, but in such a way that he cannot be criticized for partiality. According to him, under Prince Miloš a mere mention of the word “constitution” could mean putting your life at risk. However, when Miloš was invited to return to Serbia to re-assume power in 1858, he publicly stated that he would rule as a “constitutional ruler”. Once on the throne again, however, Miloš told Kabuli Efendi, Ottoman commissionaire, that he would not abide by the Constitution of 1838. When Kabuli Efendi asked what he would do in the meantime, until the Constitution was changed, Miloš replied: “I will not abide by it”. In Jovanović’s view, this exchange reveals Miloš’s actual attitude towards the “constitution” as such, i.e. that had no intention to rule by the Constitution of 1838 or, for that matter, by any other Constitution. Miloš’s self-willed
style of rule was obvious in all matters, of which Jovanović gives numerous
eamples, adding that during the Prince’s first reign the National Assembly
“voiced his will as if it had been the will of the people” and that the Prince
wanted to achieve the same thing during his second reign. 20

Prince Michael (Mihailo) wanted to strengthen sovereign power in
accordance with the role he intended for the ruler, i.e. for himself. Accord-
ing to Jovanović, Michael believed that the only way for people to progress
to a higher cultural level was for them to be led by “a good despot, a crowned
enlightened educator who would organize all intellectual resources of the
nation as his own well-disciplined officialdom.” Michael strove to establish
a “police state” and “to make a try at enlightened despotism after his father’s
patriarchal despotism”. 21

Michael’s intentions met with resistance. Jovanović writes about op-
position coming from the Liberals, “whose intelligentsia refused to place
itself in the service of Michael’s enlightened despotism. They were mostly
younger people, educated abroad and confident that Serbia’s most pressing
need was to establish political institutions of the liberal West, a parliamen-
tary system and freedom of the press”. Michael called upon the Liberals to
abandon the unproductive political struggle and to work for the common
good under the authority of their Prince as his officials, but they did not
respond to his call because he had failed to fulfil their expectations. The
Liberals “had expected of the restored Obrenović dynasty to bring down
the bureaucratic system and enable popular participation in state affairs.
But Michael reduced popular participation in state affairs to a minimum.
Convinced that the masses were politically immature, he continued to rule
through officials. The only difference between the Karadjordjević rulers and
him was in that under the Karadjordjević dynasty it was the officials who
‘ruled’ through the Prince, while under Michael it was the Prince ruled who
through the officials. Michael did not destroy the bureaucracy; he just dis-
ciplined and strapped it up — made it harmless to the Prince. But that did
not make it harmless to the people too.” 22

Autocratic aspirations, then, were not specific to Prince Miloš; they
were shared by his successors too. “All three Obrenović rulers — Michael
and Milan and Alexander — were proponents of the same idea — that of
the ruler’s concentrated power and enlightened despotism. In their view,
the masses were not cultured enough to enjoy political liberties; moreover,
they suffered from a common Slavic malady, discord, which, under liberal

20 Ibid. 286 ff.
22 Ibid. 27–28.
regimes, might lead into real anarchy.”

For all of the Obrenović rulers whose regimes he studied Jovanović gives a concise analysis of the forces on which each relied in the effort to concentrate power in his own hands: “Michael wanted to rule with officials, but not with political parties; Milan exalted ‘the state idea’ as a counter to the narrow-minded, local views of a peasant parliament; Alexander worked out a ‘neutral government’ formula; but all of them shared the same policy under different names: order and labour imposed from above!”

True to his intention to identify and assess a phenomenon but also to make a point (in accordance with the “idées-forces”), Jovanović claims that except the Conservatives in Michael’s times, all Serbian political parties of the second half of nineteenth century, which is to say the Liberals and the Radicals and “even the Populists”, “strived to provide legal security for the citizens”. To the political parties, it seemed that what “the Obrenović rulers ultimately wanted was ‘autocracy’ and that they, on the pretext of strengthening state authority, were destroying not only political freedoms but also the legal security of the citizens”. Hence, Jovanović poses the following questions: “Can a Western-style culture be raised under such Oriental despotism? Is a strong state possible there where all sources of individual energy are sealed? […] To limit the ruler by the law was the ultimate goal of the Liberals when they fought for the institution of the National Assembly; and of the Radicals when they fought for a parliamentary system; and of the Progressives when they, contrary to the ruler, wished to set up a Senate of wealth and learning. In brief, the whole thing came down to this: What was the lesser of two evils — a strong but despotic authority or an authority that would be made harmless to the citizens but also powerless. What was needed was a middle ground between the two extremes, a solution that would reconcile ‘the state idea’ and civil liberties.”

The issue seems to be as topical as it was in the 1920s when the passage quoted above was written. In our view, Jovanović offered a theoretical middle ground in his legal theory of the state.

On bureaucracy and bureaucratic oligarchy

Jovanović observes and remarkably describes the nature of personal rule such as was established in Serbia after both uprisings. Jovanović had predecessors in that respect, at first Vuk Karadžić, and then other historians and

34 Ibid. 369.
35 Ibid.
writers. Many of them were aware of the unenviable status of those who were supposed to carry out the decisions of new authorities. They were also aware of the need to legally regulate the status of the social group for which Vuk had already sought “justice”, most of all for the sake of the success of the national movement and Serbia’s progress. Jovanović is keenly interested in the process of transformation that the Serbian state was undergoing in the nineteenth century; and in the role in that process of the stratum of professionals who administered state affairs and without whom no new state can be constituted, nor can any state function. His studies cannot be seen as focused on one particular historical phenomenon relating to the Serbian insurgents or, later, to people and society in the process of state building. He perceives and sheds lights on some general features of this transformation, in accordance with his quest for the general in the particular and using the particular to grasp the general, a principle that he sees as a strength of Ranke’s approach. His description of these phenomena, as arresting as that of Prince Miloš’s arbitrary rule, is combined with his ideas and assessments of the nature of bureaucracy in a politically fermenting and undeveloped society, of the social function of a well-educated and well-organized officialdom, of dysfunctions in economic and political life and of the manner in which a bureaucratic oligarchy ruled through its subordinates who were neither educated nor responsible.

In fact, when writing about officialdom and bureaucracy Jovanović usually reserves the latter term for the practices that he perceives as objectionable. His views on officialdom are similar to the doctrines whose normative ideal is “the legal state” or “the state of law”. These views of Jovanović, and of the German and French legal theoreticians he drew on, are similar to

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26 In his inaugural address as a member of the Royal Serbian Academy, he presented an excerpt from his study on the Constitutionalists. He obviously found it very important to read the section concerned with the bureaucracy (see the excerpt published in Godišnjak SKA XXV (1911), 171–173). One cannot help thinking that he used the occasion to draw attention to a phenomenon which he deemed as being harmful to the people and the state, and as preventing Serbia from falling into step with European trends. Although other states were not immune to it either, they tended to cope with the problem through laws and political institutions. Jovanović’s lucid descriptions in several of his works are illustration enough of the position of the bureaucracy in relation to the Prince’s self-willed rule, but also of the arrogance of the bureaucratic oligarchy towards people whenever they were given the opportunity. In the parts of On the State that deal with the organization of administration (Part 3, chap. III), Jovanović gives a detailed account of the position of officialdom in the institutions of the Constitutionalists’ regime (Part 1, chap. II of the study on the Constitutionalists), and in his work The Second Reign of Miloš and Mihailo (where the chapters of relevance to our subject are chap. II, “The overthrow of public officials”, and chap. IV, “Miloš’s autocracy”), and he writes about similar issues and situations in several other places.
Hegel's view that officialdom is necessary for putting the idea of the “state” into practice. On the other hand, Jovanović clearly notices and remarkably describes how officialdom can obediently serve a ruler’s absolutism, and the tendency of the bureaucracy to rise above both the ruler and the people and gain control over the state. A century that has elapsed since the time described by Jovanović gives ground to assume that bureaucracy remains a threat to every modern state, though, of course, not in so primitive forms as were those studied by Jovanović.

Jovanović vividly portrays the transformation of officials from being the Prince's personal servants to becoming members of the state apparatus: “During Miloš’s [first] reign, the official in the modern sense did not exist. Today the official is seen as a state organ; back then he was seen as a private servant of the Prince.” The particulars given by Jovanović clearly show the position of officials during Miloš's reign. The Prince regarded them as his personal servants. “For example, an official could be assigned as a servant to the Prince’s household; officials would wait the Prince’s table; put the shoes on his feet, etc. None of them had a precisely defined formal duty; they could be assigned to this or that job, changing lines of work and responsibilities at the Prince’s will. There was no established hierarchy of titles; nor was there an established rule for promotion from a lower to a higher grade. Under Miloš it could easily happen to an official who had a good salary and performed the most important state duties to be suddenly demoted to an ordinary and insignificant job and a low salary; in fact, to be demoted from a higher-ranking position to a lower.”

Jovanović briefly but remarkably describes the nature and significance of the change to the status of bureaucrats in relation to the Prince brought by the so-called Turkish Constitution of 1838: “from being servants to the Prince it made them servants to the state; it granted them the rights of officials and the justice which Vuk had asked for them. After Miloš’s downfall, under Michael [Obrenović] and under Alexander Karadjordjević, their legal position was set in detail by a number of decrees, including the rule (though it was not strictly observed in practice) that only properly trained persons, those with a diploma, were eligible for officialdom. It was not enough any more to be the Prince's personal protégé. The state official did not have anything to do with the Prince's household; nothing outside his office was his concern. Officials proceeded to higher ranks through promotions: each higher rank was a new mark of distinction; once granted it could only be lost by a court ruling; the Prince could no longer demote them to a lower grade position at will. The salaries of officials were not arbitrarily

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27 Jovanović, Ustavobranitelji, 49.
28 Ibid.
determined by the Prince, but by the budget resolution, i.e. an act adopted jointly by the Prince and the Council […] The state service was separated from other occupations. The state official was forbidden to engage in trade; forbidden to provide legal representation; he had to be a state official and nothing but a state official […] One of the main ideas of the regime of the Constitutionalists was that the reputation of state authority required that the subjects be in awe of the state officials who were its living representatives. That is why state officials were given outward marks of distinction: titles and uniforms.”

Jovanović gives a somewhat sarcastic description of the bureaucrats feeling uncomfortable and sweating in their uniforms; but they loved the security of their employment that their new legal status provided. Namely, a state service job came to be seen as a permanent job. During the regime of the Constitutionalists, to be appointed by decree “was considered to be as secure as ownership of a crop field or a meadow”. Since they could be deprived of their status of officials only by a court ruling, state service titles were made “as inviolable as private property”. The rank and title become ‘acquired rights’.”

With reference to Vuk Karadžić’s claim that under Miloš nobody was eager to become an official, Jovanović describes the distinction: “Now that the position of officials was considerably improved, everyone was making a rush for the job. The age of the Constitutionalists was marked by a rush on state service jobs […] Educated people only thought of how to enter the state service after completing their schools; in fact, the only reason why parents sent their children to school was that they might become state officials […] At first, due to the lack of educated people, uneducated had to be employed, those previously engaged in trade or a craft, — and their example came to be an outrage. The whole lot that charged into the state service for material benefit saw it as nothing other than a sinecure, some kind of ‘God-given pension’, bread without sweat.”

29 Ibid. 50–51. Jovanović makes a sarcastic remark that this gives “a military appearance” even to the most ordinary bureaucrat who “spends his day with a goose quill in hand”. Titles were bestowed only to senior officials and depended on the rank. “The uniform prescribed for special occasions was: greatcoat and gloves, sabre and boots, like the military. Uniformed and titled, officials had to pay attention to their appearance, to look clean and tidy, which nowadays is required of military officers. When, in the 1850s, some officials tried to grow beards, the Prince forbade it: an official must be clean shaven. His beard is the subject of a decree as well as his clothing.”

30 Ibid. 52.

31 Ibid. 55. Jovanović cites the comment of a minister (Aleksa Simić) after an inspection visit to the provinces: that the officials work as if they were forced to “hard labour”, but at the same time “are grabbing for promotion and salary like caterpillars”. He adds that
Analyzing the change in the position, permanency, security and influence of the bureaucracy under the regime of the Constitutionalists, Jovanović argues that they turned into a “bureaucratic oligarchy”. The Liberals fought against the bureaucratic system as they understood it, i.e. as the political supremacy of state officials which had originated from the Constitution of 1838. Jovanović also gives a brief analysis of other political factors: “The Prince was passive; the National Assembly was not being convened; all power lay with the Council, — and consequently, when the Council became bureaucratized, the bureaucracy became omnipotent in the state. At that moment, it really seemed that officialdom had taken all power away from the Prince and the people, changing from being servants to the state to being masters of the state. The proceedings of the Council were secret; there was no free press to make the workings of this body public or to subject them to criticism; the officials administered the state much like an aristocracy, without any contact with the people, as if politics had been an occult skill ungraspable by ordinary citizens.”

Jovanović speaks of discontent with the Constitutionalists because of the state in which the judicial system in Serbia was, and claims that not even after all changes, and after the transfer of legislative powers from the Council to the Assembly under the Constitution of 1869, “was there judicial independence”, and “exploitation by officials was possible only because the Assembly had no power over the ministers whatsoever”. Jovanović argues that the way in which the Constitutionalists organized the bureaucracy relied on an outdated notion of its role: that bureaucracy should govern, and the people should obey; that the bureaucracy was the intelligentsia, and the people, a rough-edged peasant crowd. As state officials were held to be the smart ones, it necessarily followed that they should not follow the people; the people should follow them. “in a primitive country, where money was scarce and hard to earn, a state job with its salary seemed like a gold mine, giving bread without sweat”.

“Naše ustavno pitanje”, 28.

Ibid. 30 and 34.

Jovanović, Ustavobranitelji, 52–53, brings many interesting details to corroborate and complement his accounts and assessments. E.g., he writes that Jeremija Stanojević, a minister in the government of Alexander Karadjordjević, defined the relationship between authority and people with utmost clarity: “The authority is the tutor, and the people are its pupils.” Ilija Garašanin shares this view in a letter to Knicanin: “Tell everyone that all that they should think about is how to run their own household, and they should by no means worry about the duties of the Governing Council […] If the Governing Council mustn’t meddle in their private affairs, then I guess they mustn’t meddle in the affairs of the Council.” Paradoxically, in Jovanović’s view, this same Garašanin requires, in an official document, that people “respect” state officials, and that officials “respect”
finds it interesting that people tended to accept the Constitutionalists’ notion of the relationship between power and people: 35 “In short, under the regime of the Constitutionalists, officialdom was more than just officialdom; it was a ruling class in the state […] Supreme power was organized consistent with this view, namely that officialdom is the one with whom the guardianship of the people lies.” 36

In 1859, Miloš was on his way to Serbia to begin his second reign, issuing demagogic statements that he would be “a constitutional ruler”. One of the issues he intended to deal with was the issue of officialdom. As early as 28 January 1859, his Proclamation of Accession envisaged that every Ministry should prepare both decrees of appointments for new officials and of dismissals for some incumbents. The Liberals’ demand for a “purge” of officials came in handy for Miloš and thus many officials were fired. Their removal was contrary to the provisions of the 1838 Turkish Constitution; but those provisions were not abided by: “Under Karageorge, there had been much talking about the recalcitrance of officials, as a result of their not being subjected to any severe disciplinary sanctions. Upon Miloš’s return, a complete mockery was put up. Miloš would appoint and dismiss officials at will…” 37

During his second reign, Miloš “admitted to the state service men whose only qualification was the fact that they had suffered for the Obrenović dynasty”, thereby increasing the number of incompetent officials. Even during his son Michael’s reign there were “many half-educated or even uneducated officials left from the time of Karageorge”, and there were county mayors who were illiterate. Jovanović’s accounts give a clear picture of how far away from what the new state needed the actual situation was. 38

In Jovanović’s opinion, Prince Michael was determined to put an end to the farce put up by Miloš, but he never intended to restore the Constitutionalists’ system of permanently employed and undisciplined officials. Michael’s views generally concurred with the views of one of his most loyal supporters, Miloje Lešjanin, expounded in the treatise The state service and the “law”; otherwise, “it is a sure way to anarchy”. “It is not enough for him,” Jovanović writes, “that people should obey authorities: he also requires ‘respect’ from them. Indeed, if people do not respect state officials and do not trust their good sense, then people will not let officials manage affairs of state without them.”

35 Ibid. 53. Jovanović relies on the account of Ljubomir Nenadović, who heard peasants say that the common people were unsophisticated and in need of command, and that nothing could be done if there were no laws.

36 Ibid.

37 Jovanović, Druga vlada Miloša and Mihaila, 367.

38 Ibid. 369–370.
state servants (1859). “The aim of this treatise, very carefully written in keeping with the German legal literature of the period, was to prove that, contrary to what the Constitutionalists held, the official is not the owner of his title. The official is, in fact, a servant of the state; his title is assigned to him in common interest and he is answerable to the head of the state for the way in which he uses the title.”39

It was not until Michael’s constitutional change that the “Council’s oligarchic rule” was terminated. The change was introduced indirectly, that is by way of laws (because the Porte insisted that it should be the one to grant the constitution, though without going into the question of its content any more). However, he too sought for his regime to be “enlightened absolutism” which had been causing the opposition of the Liberals, and not even he “destroyed” bureaucracy; he just “overpowered and restrained it — made it harmless to the Prince”, but “that did not make it harmless to the people too”, whose participation in power Michael “reduced to a minimum”.40

Michael wanted to limit the power of officialdom, to regulate its status by law, but also to strengthen the ruler’s power and control over officialdom, putting it in a position which imposed unconditional obedience not only in matters of state administration but also in political and moral matters. The Law on State Officials enacted in 1864 (and remaining in force until 1923, though, of course, amended and supplemented) did not envisage the possibility of their administrative dismissal. But the following year changes were made which abolished the permanency of their employment, facilitating their dismissal if it was “in the interest of the service”. This change opened the way for major abuse of power against the officials whose political beliefs the government might find suspicious, and abolished the legal basis of their independence. “In his rigid and arrogant autocratic rule,” Jovanović writes, “Michael was not content to impose ordinary discipline on state officials; he wanted complete moral solidarity between the government and state officials. They were not allowed to have a different political opinion from the government; they had to serve the government not only as its professional organs but also as its loyal supporters […] Michael stepped across the line of mere bureaucratic discipline […] because, bureaucratic discipline does not destroy the citizen in the bureaucrat; it leaves him the freedom of political belief. Only soldiers are required to obey the orders issued in the name of the ruler with their entire moral being, without thinking for themselves and yet with great enthusiasm.”41

39 Ibid. 367.
41 Jovanović, Druga vlada Mišoja i Mihaita, 370. Jovanović held that Michael’s legislation was based on a true premise which, however, was subsequently taken too far: “The
Michael’s intention to step up control over officialdom was greatly facilitated by one paragraph of the abovementioned Law (§ 76). It placed it not only under judicial but also under administrative control, which, as it often happens, could be broadly, partially and arbitrarily interpreted and hence used as the government’s political guillotine against public officials. “In practice, Paragraph 76 introduced by Michael proved to be highly detrimental; some even claimed that it had ruined our officialdom. The moral integrity of an officialdom left to the mercy of the government tends to be eroded, and the personal regime of both Milan and Alexander relied on such bureaucratic servility. Officials became something of civil mercenaries, willing to serve any regime for the sake of ‘having a job’. Unscrupulous as they were, they became a corruptive element in our public life. Lešjanin used to say that officials should be state servants — and that was quite true. Due to Paragraph 76, they did not become state but government servants, which is quite another thing.”

When it comes to the issues discussed here, Jovanović is very critical in his assessment of the post-1859 period under the Obrenović rulers: “We created a sort of a bureaucratic-proprietary state, the upkeep of which exhausted the economic strength of the nation, and which limited internal freedoms in favour of some disproportionately big external tasks.” This assessment seems to bring Slobodan Jovanović closer to the notion that the bureaucracy can behave as it were (or to actually be) the owner of the state, i.e. that it can “privatize the state” and use it almost as a private thing in order to gain personal benefits. In some respects this idea is similar to the ideas such as Mosca’s notion of the political class, Djilas’s notion of the new class, Rizzi’s notion of “the managerial class”, or even to Waclaw Machajski’s nineteenth-century notion of why the victory of the socialists might be possible, but socialism as a classless society was not.

In his study on Svetozar Marković Jovanović pays much attention to Marković’s critique of bureaucracy, and not only in the third chapter (“His criticism of the bureaucratic system”) which is entirely devoted to this problem but also in other chapters (for example, “His criticism of the Liberal Party”). According to Jovanović, “apart from the bureaucratic system… [Marković] mainly criticizes the Liberal Party but it, too, on account of the bureaucratic system.” In the opening part of the second chapter (“Serbia in his times”), Jovanović states that “in his political article ‘Our miscon-true premise was that an orderly state service required, apart from the accountability of officials before the court, their accountability to senior administrative authority.”

41 Ibid. 370–371.
42 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, 368.
43 Slobodan Jovanović [1903], “Svetozar Marković”, SD, vol. 2, 92.
ceptions’, which he wrote as a government scholarship holder studying in Zürich, and which cost him his scholarship, Svetozar Marković wrote the following: ‘What I see as the most pressing need in Serbia is to destroy the bureaucratic system.’ In much of his work, Jovanović seeks to demonstrate that the status and role of the bureaucracy needed to be changed and its power limited, but that it should not be destroyed. Furthermore, that it is unfounded to ascribe to the bureaucracy all those sins that Marković ascribed to it, and to accuse it of being omnipotent; were it really so, there would be grounds to claim that the bureaucracy has been the most influential factor of civilization and initiator of every revolutionary change. “If Svetozar Marković was not content with making the bureaucratic system less complicated but demanded its abolition instead, the reason above all was in that he saw the situation in Serbia blacker than his contemporaries did.”

On the State, probably the most important single work of Slobodan Jovanović, deals with theoretical and practical aspects of the role, nature, legal status and responsibilities of the bureaucracy (Chapter “Organization of the administrative power”, § 62 “Officialdom”); with the tendency of the bureaucracy to alienate itself from, and rise above, the people (chapter “Organization of the legislative power”, § 45 “Relationship between legislature and electorate”); and also with the danger of bureaucratization of the legislative body. “If, in addition to the administration and the judiciary, the legislature were also bureaucratized, then the entire state organization would be bureaucratized. Even though the bureaucratic element is necessary in the state organization, it must not be allowed to take over the entire state organization. Made master of the state and left without control by the people, the bureaucracy becomes high and mighty: the dignity of state authority comes to be considered as their own, they behave as a ruling class and think that the people are there for them and not the other way round.”

There was a huge gap between the normative ideal of the legal state and a bureaucracy subject to law on the one hand and, on the other, the reality of Serbia’s seventy-five years of constitutional and political development which Slobodan Jovanović studied. Much of this gap is still Serbia’s reality. Jovanović does not want to mythologize the restoration of the Serbian state, nor is he overly understanding of its weaknesses; quite the opposite, he identifies and analyzes them like a physician would analyze a disease, aware that only the truth about things can lead to their change, and that

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45 Ibid. 58.
46 Ibid. 68.
therefore the responsibility of scholarship is to reveal, not to conceal. By the way, Jovanović sticks to this very principle in analyzing the mores and mentality of the nation.48

Slobodan Jovanović gives brilliant studies of the process of transformation of the insurgent masses led by one or, more precisely, a few leaders, into a state which was yet to become a constitutional, i.e. legal state (and we hold this to be an important feature of his political ideal of the state, towards which the process he studies did unfold, but not at all along a line, nor determined by some influential idées-forces). Today, some would describe this process using a widely popular but not entirely precise term — transition. In his studies, Jovanović follows the course, problems and difficulties of the process of transformation from the Prince’s despotic rule and treatment of public servants as his personal servants to officialdom as a professional and permanent group. Within this process, he also follows the role, behaviour and evolution of other actors and mechanisms on the political scene (such as the royal court, the National Assembly, political parties, the army and the people) and describes and analyzes the role of particular factors in constitutional and political struggles.

On the notion of democracy and the ideal of legal government

Slobodan Jovanović does not address the issue of democracy in a systematic manner; apart from an essay he wrote as a student, he discusses it along with other topics. It should be borne in mind that the notion of democracy in his times was different from what it is today. It was not as synonymous with the good, beautiful and true as it tends to be today49 or with more or less the best possible form of government. Jovanović’s concept of democracy does not have the connotation, meaning and role that it tends to have today. It seems, therefore, that Jovanović’s political ideal comes down to two words: constitutional government or legal government, a category he often uses or has in mind while writing. Jovanović’s ideal state is the state that Serbia needed given its level of development, problems, national mentality and many other factors. He writes about the magnitude of the national task that lay ahead of nineteenth-century Serbia: “We had to build, in what even yesterday had been an Ottoman pashalik, a modern European state, a state with its officialdom and army, its courts and schools, its banks and railways. Afterwards,

48 See his posthumously published (1964) contribution to the study of Serbian national character and cultural model in SD, vol. 12, 543–582.
49 This is how Klaus von Beyme, Die politischen Theorien der Gegenwart (Munich: Piper, 1972), critically writes about the popular understanding of democracy today; quoted after the Croatian edition: Suvremene političke teorije (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1977), 199.
a thus organized Serbian state should incorporate other Serb lands which were still under foreign occupation.”

Reflecting on our national mentality and “cultural models”, which significantly influence political behaviour, Jovanović also describes the behaviour of some nineteenth-century political figures and party leaders. These descriptions indeed seem to capture some characteristic and widespread features of people in high positions, without attempting an explanation why it was so: “Politicians good at manoeuvring like Garašanin and Ristić are rare. Most politicians lack moderateness both in resisting and in giving in: they are either principled and self-righteous to the point of rigidity and obstinacy or opportunistic to the point of unprincipledness verging on spinelessness. Sometimes both extremes can be seen in one person: one at the beginning, the other at the end of his career.” That is why Jovanović was able to believe that the establishment of a modern legal state or a state of law was more important and urgent than the introduction of a democratic system. With its rational organization expressed in good laws, such a state would restrict and direct our passions, arbitrariness and behaviours guided by personal whims. As a matter of fact, David Hume had a similar view about democracy and the rule of law. He argued that while democracy was not necessary for the development of modern society and its economy, the rule of law was.

The heading of this section contains the word “democracy”. It is used as an abbreviation for many things which are habitually required today but towards which Jovanović would have had some reservations. Because the term “democracy” does not encompass, etymologically or semantically, all which it does in its modern everyday usage and which is often a set of desirable practices or elements which may not be easily compatible or even are incompatible. In Jovanović’s youth, the ideas of rights and freedom, the right to vote and freedom of the press, constitutional guarantees of individual rights, freedom and property, and the idea of the state of law as a form of constraint of absolutism and arbitrariness were more current and widespread than the idea of democracy even though the latter was already becoming an idéé-force.

In his student report on the last academic year in the form of an essay submitted to the ministry that granted him his scholarship, Jovanović says that he has studied public law and that he has the honour of touching upon “one of the most important questions of that science, the question of democracy”. There we can find an outline, and assessment, of something

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51 Ibid. 371.
52 It was a good decision to include this essay, written in 1889 and previously unpublished, in his Collected Works (SD, vol. 12, p. 795–809). It reveals Jovanović’s youth-
that would later be pejoratively called “mass society”, a society to which a specific form of democracy, potentially totalitarian, corresponds (see below on the ideas of J. Talmon). Influenced by Bluntschli, young Jovanović writes: “In a democratic system sovereignty belongs to the people… [and] all citizens are equal before the law”; “and these two postulates, without which the idea of real democracy is unimaginable” also entail equal political rights. In the political system of this type, “all citizens participate with equal rights in affairs of state, and state administration is not in the hands of only one social stratum or caste.” A feature of democracy is that “the will of the numerous majority is taken as being the will of the people and in the name of it the defeated minority must conform.”

What Jovanović sees as strengths of democracy are that it teaches the nation to govern itself, instils a sense of personal pride in people and significantly diminishes the importance of the bureaucracy. Democracy has also its negatives and Jovanović is well aware of them, arguing that nowadays it is impossible to establish an immediate, direct, democracy, such as existed in ancient times. He also emphasizes great weaknesses of parliamentary democracy and the unacceptability of both a Caesarean system and the constitutional Convention system (established during the French Revolution). Finally, of the entire ideal of democratic government as viewed by Jovanović remains only one form of the Swiss model with some elements of the American one.

ful preoccupations and his audacity to express some ideas which would not have been looked favourably by the regime, and it also gives us a clue to possible influences on his later views on some weaknesses of democracy.

Jovanović might have also been influenced by some ideas which were current in social psychology in France and Switzerland at the time, and which were used in interpreting some phenomena characteristic of the French Revolution: the Jacobin terror undoubtedly influenced Jovanović’s formulation of some of his ideas and views. Gustave le Bon’s *Psychologie des foules* (The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind) was published in 1895. It was seen not only as controversial, but also as superficial and, by some, as supporting antidemocratic tendencies. Jovanović probably learned a lot from his professors and from books, and new developments gave substance to some of his doubts. The experiences with totalitarian democracies, about which he later learned a lot, being their contemporary, and about which he wrote towards the end of his life, confirmed his fears of the negative sides of democracy expressed in his early work.

In his essay “Nikola Pašić” (SD, vol. 11) Jovanović ranks Bluntschli among the European liberal writers who were much read by Pašić’s Radicals after they turned their back on Russian socialists such as Chernyshevsky and others (p. 145). Bluntschli’s book on political parties, one of the first on the topic in the world, was published in Serbia in 1880, as well as many other articles.

If a democracy is immediate, Jovanović writes, then “sovereignty is exercised by the people itself […] the separation of powers is meaningless because all powers are concentrated in its hands; the people is the lawmaker and the judge and the government. It is the tyranny of all over all; all citizens are masters and slaves at the same time. If we want to take it a step further, we could say that it is a sovereign who serves himself. This form, although it may seem the most perfect one at first sight, is quite contrary to the needs of modern society and does not suit its needs. Science has demonstrated that immediate democracy can be useful to an extent only in the most primitive times. Being impracticable in today’s circumstances is not the only flaw of immediate democracy; there are other, more serious shortcomings. Encountering no restrictions, people tend to believe that everything is permitted. Their rights extend as far as their force extends. The few politicians who manage to take the lead of the masses become the masters of the life, property and honour of the other citizens, disposing of them according to their own whim. The laws are trampled underfoot, there is no such thing as law and justice, and the whim of a few cunning agitators holds in its hands the fate of the wretched people who, by the way, live in the blissful belief that they are free.”

The lines quoted above reveal an influence of the reactions to the interpreters and implementers of Rousseau’s theory during the French Revolution. Jovanović also offers a socio-psychological analysis of mass movements, to which he devoted many pages in his other works. Here already, he writes: “It was said a long time ago that people tend to lose their minds […] the crowd is incapable of cool-headed reasoning and mature judgement, it goes by the first impression, it is a slave to its passions and weaknesses […] Immediate democracy subjects society to an even greater danger. By its very principle, it is intolerant and despotic and ruthlessly crushes every, even the most reasonable and most justifiable, resistance […] In such a democracy there is no room for independent spirits, for people who would not sacrifice their intellectual individuality whatever the cost.” These lines were obviously based on the then widespread views on democracy, and not only conservative but also liberal, such as the views of John Stuart Mill who wrote about the tyranny of the majority and was concerned about the intellectual liberties of the individual facing the pressure of insufficiently enlightened and intolerant public opinion, of what today would be called mass society.

More than sixty years later — in the meantime, he published a book on the leaders of the French Revolution based on thoroughly examined sources (during the Paris Peace Conference), wrote on Burke and on Car-

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56 Ibid. 797–799.
57 Ibid.
lyle, and, what is more important, he witnessed the forms of totalitarianism before, during and after the Second World War — Jovanović returns to the issue of the relationship between freedom and democracy in his *On Totalitarianism*. In chapter III (“The totalitarian state”) he writes: “The problem of personal freedom in a sovereign state did not arise only under the absolutist monarchy, it arises in the age of democracy as well. The omnipotence of democratic assemblies is no less incompatible with personal freedom than the omnipotence of a ruler.” Jovanović’s finding that even the philosophy of rationalism can become a basis for fanaticism should also be given due importance: “The French Revolution demonstrates that collective fanaticism can be ignited by the philosophy of rationalism.”

Representative democracy, as he understood it in his student days, has different flaws: “There is no much guarantee that the people are represented well and truthfully. Popular representatives frequently tend to misuse their public office for personal gain [...] All decisions are taken by majority vote, but this majority is sometimes so thin, so accidental and so pressured into, that it cannot be regarded as being a true expression of the will of the people.” Describing the institutions of representative parliamentary democracy, the only example of which he finds to be France at the time, Jovanović says that parliamentary institutions were quite popular in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, but confused with representative government, especially in France and even by such prominent figures as Montesquieu and Benjamin Constant. During the Revolution, the Assembly attempted to establish such institutions, but failed. Unfortunately, Jovanović adds, not even a third attempt (i.e., after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/1) was “this political ideal of Montesquieu’s, this much praised and glorified English parliamentarianism able to fulfil the high hopes pinned on it [democracy] [...] Parliamentary democracy can be understood and defended only as the result of a long and arduous struggle between the crown and the people.” Jovanović sees parliamentarianism as being the compromise outcome of the abovementioned struggle, and levels the criticism that “it has been suited for a false democracy, for the monarchy. It has never been of any use in a real democracy, in the republic [...] In such a system the people play the minor role of a distant spectator [...] Finally, there is a theoretical argument against parliamentarianism, that it is contrary to the

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58 Slobodan Jovanović [1952], *O totalitarizmu* [On totalitarianism], SD, vol. 12, 153.
59 Ibid. 172.
60 Jovanović, “O demokratiji”, 800.
61 Ibid. 801.
great principle of separation of powers." As we know, Jovanović will later criticize the flaws of the principle of separation of powers from the standpoint of the legal sovereignty of the state. In his report as a student, where he also deals with non-parliamentary representative democracy, exemplified by the United States of America and Switzerland, he takes a less critical view of this form, defining it as “a mixture of representative and immediate democracy.”

Observing that democratic revolutions played a role in overthrowing absolutist regimes, Jovanović claims that not even democracy could get rid of vestiges of absolutism. “Contemporary democracy is not the product of peaceful and gradual improvement. It was born out of a revolution, covered in blood, tainted, overwrought, full of hatred and vengeful […] and in France, where democracy was the most successful, revolutions came one after another, and even monarchies, which would rise overnight only to fall the next day, bore the imprint of street rioting (not to mention republics).” Jovanović concludes his student report with the statement that wishing “to marry democracy and monarchy would mean wishing to reconcile democracy with its negation.”

It should be borne in mind that Jovanović wrote this essay towards the end of the nineteenth century, when democracy was not the word of the day as it is today. Although it has a lot of inconsistencies and its conclusion concerning the relationship of democracy and monarchy may have been politically motivated (and, as has already been said, not even Great Britain could be considered a democratic state at the time), it nonetheless shows the author's familiarity with a number of issues which preoccupied the legal and political theory of the period. His view of the impossibility of reconciling democracy with monarchy should not be regarded as specific to Serbia at the time; it also prevailed in the United States and Switzerland, the countries that would not even take such a model into consideration, and France, which had become a republic less than twenty years before this essay was written and which Jovanović takes as an example of democracy.

In the text “On the social contract” which mostly deals with Rousseau, Jovanović contends that Rousseau was mesmerized by the idea of abolition of tyranny and by the notion that a society cannot become a true community unless it is free. Such a community and his notion that the weaker should not be subordinated to the stronger were based on the principle of universal equality which should be achieved. Jovanović notices contradic-

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62 Ibid. 802.
63 Ibid. 805.
64 Ibid. 806–807.
65 Ibid. 809.
tions in Rousseau’s understanding of freedom and equality, as well as its flaws, i.e. the unacceptable consequences of Rousseau’s understanding of equality: “For Rousseau freedom is uniformity [...] Rousseau’s thoughts are the following. For a man to be free, he must renounce his will and obey the will of the community [...] Or, so that no one would be a slave, all will be tyrants [...] and he transferred absolutism from one man to the whole society.”

When he says that “all that Rousseau knew about freedom, he learnt from the history of the republics of classical antiquity”, Jovanović also follows prominent French historians and students of classical antiquity. “In the ancient view, to be free did not mean to be as independent of the administration of society as possible, but to participate in it more. It meant the right to vote on public affairs in the council, free access to the Forum or the Agora [...] every citizen a voter and elector.”

Benjamin Constant was the first who pointed to the outdated and erroneous understanding of the nature of ancient democracy. Jovanović was acquainted with Constant’s liberal thought and wrote about him. Constant’s ideas were later developed by Fustel de Coulanges, who was also well known in Serbia owing to a translation of his Ancient City published in 1895. Fustel de Coulanges was breaking the misconceptions held by many eighteenth-century French revolutionaries, demonstrating that the so-called free man had been a “slave of the state” even in ancient Greece at the peak of its democracy.

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67 Ibid. 196–197.

68 Fustel de Coulanges, La cité antique (Strasbourg 1864); Eng. transl. by W. Small, The Ancient City (Boston & New York 1877), Book III, chap. XVII, characteristically titled: “Omnipotence of the State. The Ancients knew nothing of Individual Liberty”. This interesting issue, discussed in the nineteenth and twentieth century, was raised by Benjamin Constant, De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes (Paris, 1819). Franz Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State (Free Press, 1957), wrote about the Spartan social order and the regime of Diocletian as two totalitarian experiments of antiquity, allowing for the possibility that forms of Oriental despotism were of the similar kind. In his view, the Spartan regime was based on terror, not law. He relies on Thucydides, Plutarch and other ancient sources to show how that system of terror was maintained and how bloody were the consequences of sending out young Spartans, “from time to time”, to terrorise and slaughter the helots. The lack of the individual’s moral autonomy in ancient Greece and in Athens at the peak of its democracy was also discussed by Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, transl. by G. Hight (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), esp. vol. I. See also V. Stanović, “Razvitak ideja o slobodama i pravima čoveka i gradjanina” [Evolution of the ideas of the liber-
But apart from the ancient understanding of the nature of freedom, which has its modern version, there is a different, liberal, understanding such as championed by John Stuart Mill. Two notions of freedom were written about by Isaiah Berlin after the Second World War, and before the war also by Harold Laski, who advocated state interference in social life so as to secure certain rights for those who have neither the wealth nor the power to do that by themselves.\(^\text{69}\) So, in 1895, basically discussing the idea of two concepts of freedom, Slobodan Jovanović illustrates them ingeniously by showing the difference between the French and English understanding of the role of the constitution or, we would say, understanding of the character of constitutional government. “The first duty of every French constitution is to settle the issue of who will be sovereign. In it, freedom is called universal suffrage. Moreover, the ideal of every citizen is to have whatever position in its administration, if not as a wheel in its machine then at least as a cog. There is more than one reason to say — and it has been said — that his ideal is not freedom, but power, the power, of course, transformed into common good, made accessible to all. As Benjamin Constant observed, it is not freedom, it is despotism, but vulgarized.”\(^\text{70}\)

Unlike the French view of the role of the constitution and the nature of political system, “English unwritten constitutionality does not decide on where authority resides. It sets barriers\(^\text{71}\) to power no matter where it resides. It is entirely born out of concessions that individuals or an individual, at first private associations, forced out of representatives of state authority; it is a series of guarantees with which personal freedom is limited and of limits set to the right that the social community has over its members. According to it, freedom is not called universal suffrage, but *habeas corpus.*” The English citizen “is not wrestling for power, but away from power.”\(^\text{72}\) At the time Jovanović was writing these lines, France had already introduced universal suffrage, while Britain was still far from it (the right to vote was expanded to all adult men after the First World War, and to all women only in 1929).


\(^\text{71}\) A pun in Serbian: *ustav* meaning “constitution” and *ustava* meaning “dam”, “barrier” (to unlimited power).

In that sense, England was not a democracy in the modern-day sense, but it did have a political system where all citizens enjoyed broad liberties within the boundaries of law, legal security, independent judiciary etc.; whereas France had none of it, only universal suffrage.

Significant for Jovanović’s views on democracy, with obvious critical overtones and some reservations, were also the then current ideas which he emphasized in a short review of Jelinek’s book on the rights of the minority. Jovanović finds that Jelinek’s main intention was to discuss whether the majority has the right to impose its will on the minority and how the minority can secure its independence. Jelinek’s book “makes us reconsider the right of the majority, which we, in this age of democracy, tend too much to take as an incontestable and absolute right”. Without expressing his own view (except implicitly, through choosing this particular book for review and through laying emphasis on certain ideas), Jovanović writes that Jelinek considers the rule of the majority as a necessary evil and that it would be much more to his taste if nothing is decided by simple majority vote, but by agreement between different social groups. He also adds that this famous German legal theoretician, accepting the even more famous theory of John Stuart Mill, “demonstrates that, if unconstrained, the rule of the majority might become a serious obstacle to progress, since it is always a minority, and a tiny one, that is the first to get enthusiastic about new ideas”. Jovanović does not fail to notice a further difficulty arising in the case when political parties represent different religions or nationalities. If the majority rule principle were strictly applied in such a case, the result in practice would be the tyranny of the numerically strongest religion or nationality over all other religions and nationalities.73

In a short essay written in 1923 with reference to a book by an American historian, Jovanović also expresses objections to democracy as a form of government: “As soon as a great world crisis began [First World War], the American democracy felt helpless. It surrendered itself to the government with blind trust, which means that it expected its salvation from despotism, and a despotism for which it was yet to be seen — after the war and according to the achieved results — whether and to which extent it would be beneficial [...] The same lack of political wisdom which democracy had shown during the war was evident even after the war when the problems of social reconstruction arose [...]. The rule of the largest number was established in Europe and the USA before the problem of educating the masses had

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73 Slobodan Jovanović [1902], “Pravo manjina” [The right of minorities], SD, vol. 11, 599. Reference to John Stuart Mill concerns his concept of the tyranny of the majority, put forward before him by James Madison in the eighteenth century and by Alexis de Tocqueville in the nineteenth century.
been solved. A new force, stronger and mightier than any before but blind and unruly, was thrown into political life.”74 Although, in his opinion, to destroy political parties would be as good as to disorganize the democracy, Jovanović criticizes the political parties, as he perceives them, for not being an educational actor in public life; they govern the masses, but they do not make them better. Their main concern is to win elections. They are primarily, if not exclusively, set for the election struggle. Hence they are not even trying to enlighten people. They find it more practical to take advantage of their ignorance and simplicity for the sake of a momentary political success. “They as a rule pursue a demagogic policy; they delude or inflame the voters instead of informing them. They have done relatively little to foster political consciousness.”75

In his most important single work, even though written at the beginning of the twentieth century, Slobodan Jovanović divides the evolution of European democracy into three phases. In the first phase, it is seen as the liberation of the individual from the pressure of authority and the focus of attention is on constitutional guarantees of personal freedom — “on the rights of man and the citizen”. In the second phase, democracy is understood as the rule of the majority and attention is focused on the electoral system and the demand for universal suffrage which is supposed to secure an influence of the masses on affairs of state. In the third phase, democracy is understood as organized social solidarity. The economically and politically stronger must not be allowed to exploit or tyrannize the economically and politically weaker. The state is a common institution of all its members, be they rich or poor, part of a majority or of a minority. The state is entitled to require them all to make sacrifices, but it owes them protection in return. Democracy shifts from the rule of the majority to the protection of the minority, and once it becomes understood in that way, it also becomes obvious that proportional representation must be accepted as the electoral system which provides the most guarantees to minorities.76

As we have stressed several times, Jovanović does not looks up to democracy as an ideal, although he observes that it has become an idee-force. His ideal is the legal state, the rule-of-law state. However, a thus understood legal state has some limitations, which result from Jovanović’s notion of the state itself. Since today democratic systems are defined by the existence of the separation of powers, of the rights and liberties of the citizen as something that is relatively independent of the authority of the state and serves

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75 Ibid.
76 Jovanović, O državi, 327–328.
as a meta-legal basis of its constitution and legislature (in Jovanović's view, these rights are granted by the state which is also entitled to deny or abolish them if circumstances require), constitutional limits to power in principle (which is not quite in accordance with Jovanović's understanding of the nature of sovereignty), it follows that Jovanović's views on democracy are different from the currently prevailing, though not necessarily correct, views on democracy. The most significant differences stem from Jovanović's views on the state, especially from his concept of the state as a person with an infinite will to create law, and from his interpretation of sovereignty. These views, presented in the best and most complete way in his book On the State, were brought together into a comprehensive, closed and non-contradictory system in the spirit of the ideas and best methodology of the German school of legal thought from the beginning of the twentieth century. Once he expounded them, Jovanović's was in the bonds of his system and it could have been a hindrance to him to venture a different, more up-to-date interpretation of categories such as the separation of powers, sovereignty, the rule of law, human rights and liberties, even the very idea of democracy. On the other hand, within the boundaries of his system, i.e. the system of the German school of legal thought of the period, Jovanović was very flexible and inspired to judge facts and to subsume them under his categories, taking a very critical position when the facts, but also the government's policies and decisions, were not in accordance with the normative character of his system; for example, when he defends some elements of the separation of powers using the argument that an absolute monarchy would otherwise be the only system that is not in logical contradiction to the concept of sovereignty in the strict sense.

To better understand Jovanović's views on the state, it should be remembered that he emphasizes, from a legal point of view, that the defining attribute of the authority of the state is that it is the highest and independent, that states can unite into an “association of states”, but that a “state of states” is not possible, and that international rules are based on their being recognized by sovereign states.

Slobodan Jovanović was acquainted with Montesquieu's teaching about the separation of powers. He frequently refers to various ideas of Montesquieu's, especially in the work on the social contract, in an overview of the Abbé Sieyès's political ideas (on the occasion of the centenary of the Abbé's death), in the short essay on American federalism (1939), where he also refers to the American exponents of the theory of separation of powers and to Tocqueville's interpretation of the nature of the American system and constitution.

With respect to all the above, Jovanović's poses, in the book On the State, the crucial question: “Should the authority of the state, being the
highest, be unlimited as well?” and replies: “We believe that it should. One authority can only be limited by another, higher authority; if there is no higher authority above state authority then there is no way to limit it. Can state authority be limited by the legal system? Here, one should first determine in what sense the expression ‘state authority’ is being taken. If state authority is taken in the sense of state coercion, then it may be limited by the legal system, i.e. the state organs that dispose of the means of state coercion may be limited by the legal system in such a way that they are not allowed to use these means whenever they find it fit, but only when the legal system allows them to.”77 But, “if state authority is taken in the sense of the will of the state which is the creator of the legal system, then it cannot be restricted by the legal system. The legal system cannot at once be an expression of the will of the state and the only means to limit this very will […]” Apart from ‘unlimitedness’, the concept of sovereignty also involves ‘indivisibility’. It is unimaginable that sovereignty could belong half to one authority, half to another. […] But from sovereignty being indivisible it still does not follow that sovereign state authority must be concentrated in one organ. Sovereign state authority is expressed in state laws: if the indivisibility of sovereignty required that sovereign state authority be concentrated in one organ, then absolute monarchy would be the only that conforms with the logic of state sovereignty. Monarchical absolutism used to be defended with this theoretical argument […] In the modern constitutional monarchy, however, the legislative power is divided between the monarch and the parliament, and the parliament is almost always bicameral.”78 And the crown statement, which does not resolve the contradiction: “The indivisibility of sovereign power requires only that, at a given moment, only one will be taken as sovereign will, i.e. as the law.”79

Jovanović had considerable reservations about the principle of separation of powers, among other reasons, because many theoreticians considered it as being unsuitable for monarchies and, perhaps even more, because of the difficulties and adverse effects of its practical implementation. In “Sieyès” (1936), he writes: “Montesquieu saw guarantees against abuse of power in the separation of powers, in the limitation and supervision of one power by

77 Ibid. 130.
78 Ibid. 131. There follows the explication of the manner in which contradictions between the two views should be reconciled, and a very clearly articulated one: ‘As a matter of fact, the plurality of state organs does not mean that sovereign power is divided among them […] in a constitutional monarchy various agents are so interconnected that all of them form one authority. They cannot make legitimate decisions without one another.”
79 Ibid. 132.
another [...] Sieyès, although he was not Montesquieu’s disciple, accepted his principle of separation of powers, developing it and making it complicated to the point that the state machinery eventually became too fine for practical use. The American Civil War brought another experience with the division of sovereignty. But American federalism was nonetheless consolidated on the original principle of separation of powers, of “checks and balances”, and federalism, on the principle of divided sovereignty, a system in which the constitution holds a very important place. What Jovanović sees as an important advantage of the US system is that no person or body is sovereign, only the constitution is. He also states that the fundamental rights of the individual play a role in limiting power, because “the parliamentary majority in the Union or in the states, however despotically inclined it may be, would not dare impinge on the basic rights of individuals.”

These views and observations of Jovanović constituted an implicit modification of some legal principles of the state as he had presented three decades earlier, an evolution that brought him closer to more modern understanding of democracy and federalism but, of course, the functioning of these modern ideas and institutions requires a different social, political and cultural setting from the one he could count with.

The emergence of new forms of totalitarian, ideologically inspired, absolutism, led Jovanović to conclude, in “The post-war state”, that “almost everywhere in post-war Europe [First World War], institutions which do not conform with the principles of the old rule-of-the-law state are gaining ground to a lesser or greater extent. In the rule-of-the-law state, the citizen was free in the sense that his freedom was limited only by the law and that the legislative power was above other powers. After the war the supremacy of the legislative power has been called into question.” “The post-war state”, a comparative study of a few political systems subsequently appended to the book On the State, brings remarkable descriptions and balanced assessments of the principles, institutions and political practice of these new systems.

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80 Slobodan Jovanović, O državi, 499.
81 Slobodan Jovanović, On the State, in subject and method, and many have noticed inconsistencies between the supplement and the first, already thrice revised work, given that the supplement, while
In the study On Totalitarianism — written in 1952, after the accumulated experience with totalitarian regimes and their consequences in practice compared to those presented in “The post-war state” — Jovanović in a way sums up his reflections on democracy as well, stating that experienced people could defend it as “the least bad of all political systems, but young people, who expect an ideology to give them a thrill, could not be thrilled by democracy.”

“In the nineteenth century some believed that democracy with its ideology might become a new religion. But once its party came to power, democracy began to lose the power of attraction it had while it had still been an unaccomplished ideal. The more its ideas were being realized, the more they were being adapted to the requirements of life, which is to say, to our human weaknesses. Eventually, democracy has turned into an ordinary, prosaic and ‘too human thing’.”

In the “Supplement” to the essay on totalitarianism, Jovanović makes a very interesting observation. While the essay was in press, a book of Jacob Talmon was published. Contending that “totalitarian democracy has not arisen outside the political traditions of the West; it has arisen from the eighteenth-century political ideas which asserted themselves as a historical force in the French Revolution,” Jovanović points out, Talmon has in mind the ideas of J.-J. Rousseau, Maximilian Robespierre and François Noël Babeuf. “According to these ideas,” Jovanović continues, “our mind is able to become aware of the best possible social system which would secure freedom and equality to people and thus usher into a new era in the history of mankind, the era of peace and prosperity.” It is easy to recognize in these lines Burke’s criticism of the French Revolution which Jovanović analyses in his essay on this philosopher. In continuation, Jovanović presents his views about the evolution and nature of democracy, totalitarian democracy in particular. “Since the French Revolution, democracy has been evolving in two different directions depending on whether the focus has been on the idea of freedom or on the idea of equality: on the one hand, in the

being in itself a good study on five different European regimes, disturbs the structure of a general legal theory of the state. The study brings Jovanović’s accurate observations about some features of the new state forms based on comprehensive totalitarian, i.e. fascist and national-socialist, ideologies, as well as the Bolshevik state under the rule of the communist party and with a communist economy and ideology.

85 Ibid. 158.
direction of liberal democracy, such as prevailing mostly in the West; on the other hand, in the direction of totalitarian democracy, such as is observable in communist Russia and its satellites [...] What they all have in common is the messianic belief that heaven on earth is achievable. They are convinced that the cause of all ills is in that a handful of rulers enslaved their peoples and forced them to sacrifice their own wellbeing to their particular interests. As soon as this slavery of man to man would end, people would, working for the common good in a free community, find their own personal benefit.88

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Jovanović’s moderation, and a call for finding the right measure in everything, in every action, decision or institution, is obvious in countless places in his works. He was as strongly against excessive concentration of power in the hands of the Prince, the King, the Council or even the Assembly as he was against anarchy or an overly weak government in situations that required a more resolute policy and a regime based on an established legal order guaranteeing safety and certainty.89

His views presented above seem to reveal also an influence of the thoughts that inevitably come to mind while studying Machiavelli. Jovanović was not against the centralization of power in one person if the situation required so, but was resolutely against absolute and despotic personal rule. He mentioned the “Council oligarchy” countless times in order to demonstrate that, in his view, such a regime offered as little prospect of good governance as a personal regime. As history shows, various triumvirates and decemvirates which resulted from inevitable power struggles and divisions of influence often proved to be as unbearable to the common people as some previous absolute power, be it a Caesar or an assembly.

Slobodan Jovanović was quite moderate and careful when expressing the views which may be understood as judgments and advices. One of the ideal forms (in a methodologically sense) of the state, the form that he

88 Ibid. 158.
89 As an example of how Jovanović judges the nature of concentration of power depending on the situation, one may quote from his “Conclusion” to the book on the Constitutionalists (Ustavobranitelji, 261–262): “Just as there had been a need for dividing overly concentrated power, now there was a need for concentrating overly divided power. As the need grew stronger, the fall of Alexander Karadjordjević grew more inevitable [...] Alexander Karadjordjević had to fall because he was not the strong ruler that new times required and who was to concentrate power in his person. The Constitutionalists had to fall because the Council oligarchy that they represented could not come to terms with a strong ruler. As [Jovan] Ristić says, one and the same disaster caused the ruin both of Prince Alexander and of the Council oligarchy that was against him.”
obviously championed and rightly considered as a must for Serbian society, is a variety of the rule-of-law state or, as he often termed it, legal state. It is the concept of state as was developed in the German theory of the state, but combined with some elements of institutions and practices encountered in England and France. As he clearly put state interests before individual interests, he also held that each set of rights should have a set of obligations as a counterbalance. He obviously was aware that the building of a modern state in Serbia depended on overcoming all forms of dynastic, oligarchic or bureaucratic absolutism. He became familiar with many varieties of that type of regime through studying both the history of nineteenth-century Serbia and a somewhat earlier history of Europe, where new forms of ideologically inspired totalitarian absolutism emerged after the First World War.

Jovanović’s theory of the state had the mission to pave the way for the development of the Serbian state at a time it was still coming out of great hardships and conflicts, with new conflicts already looming on the horizon. Under such circumstances, to base the state on rational legal principles, such as those in the civilized European countries, was the most that the prevailing ideas in European thought, the legal ratio, and the situation in Serbia, which inspired a deep sense of patriotic duty, could contribute to the building of the state structure. But the principles that Jovanović envisaged for the Serbia of his time to be built upon still being in many respects ahead of what we have in practice today, his ideas about the state based on the law can still be inspiring and effective.

At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, Jovanović perceived democracy as one of the most influential ideas, but wherever he encountered it in his historical enquiries it seemed to him that its fruits tended to become bitter for people because of various doctrinal exaggerations or, at best, there where it did produce good results, such as the United States of America or Switzerland, he was aware that it was thriving because it grew on a different soil from the one his own country had. He contented himself to point to the oft-cited thought that democracy is the least bad of all political systems. His ideal was that of “lawful rule”, something like Max Weber’s concept of legitimate rule based on the law. It is a variety of the “legal state”, which has become outdated in the practice of developed democracies, but which, taken as a whole, with its content and message, can still be an inspiration for constructive political projects which might transcend the initial aspiration of this very concept.
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Vladimir Ćorović: The Last Polyhistor

Abstract: This essay portrays Vladimir Ćorović (1885–1941), the distinguished Serbian historian of Herzegovinian origin, who made a distinct mark in the field with his prolific and wide-ranging writing. Given his vast array of interests, both in terms of topics and historical eras, Ćorović has been dubbed the last polyhistor, following in the footsteps of Stojan Novaković and other historians of similar calibre.

Keywords: Vladimir Ćorović, historiography, polyhistor

Vladimir Ćorović is a historian who should not be judged by world standards. He learned and took over much from the Viennese Slavists. But not because he found himself, by force of circumstance, under their influence during his education and could not shake off that influence afterwards. With endless energy, passionate in his work, one of those creative people who pile up their inner strength by spending it, maturing at a time which self-importantly offered different models and influences, Ćorović had many opportunities to emulate, to search for himself while observing others, to plant the offshoots of great world role models into Serbian culture. He was even able to do that in some accordance with the actual state of his field: the oversaturation with philological-critical consideration of historical questions, the predominance of primary analytical works, the lack of more daring conceptions in shedding light on the dead landscapes of the past — all that, at the time of Ćorović’s rise, produced the seemingly reliable impression that the way had been paved for different ventures. However, he kept such temptations at arm’s length although he worked for few; he only remained attached, fairly loosely, to the traditional methods of the Viennese philological school, and that, no doubt, because they seemed to him to be,
for much of the work he was doing, the least intrusive, sufficiently varied, most suitable, briefly such as to determine to a great extent the result of the work at hand.

II

The number of undertakings Ćorović accomplished is all but countless; the areas of study in which he tried himself ranged from prehistoric to the most recent times, from medieval and traditional to modern literature, from philology to popular political writing; he published editions of old writers, archival material and anonymous literary heritage; he wrote historical studies based on thorough analysis, exhaustive monographs, broad syntheses, and patriotic books and articles intended for the broadest readership; he was a museum curator, national revolutionary, Austrian prisoner, university professor, Academy member, journal editor; he was engaged in every major scholarly and literary undertaking; he wrote all the time, several hours a day, and sometimes read out proofs of his latest work to his students instead of teaching. When he was unfortunately killed in 1941 he was still in his prime, closer to the middle than the end of his fruitful career; moreover, he left behind so many manuscripts, some already prepared for print, that, for some other scholar, these alone would make a decent lifetime contribution to historiography.

Ćorović belonged to the generation of Serb scientists, writers, artists, politicians and merchants of Herzegovinian origin who assumed, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a very prominent and quite distinctive place in their nation. They were noted for their level-headedness, honesty, moderate realism, sound and perceptive reasoning and various creative abilities; it seems, however, that their sense of defining themselves and their work in accordance not only with their people's needs but also with their own abilities has not been stressed enough. If intellectuals with useless smartness can often be seen amongst the Serbs, if they expire too soon, waste too much and grow old too fast, if their scientific or literary oeuvre can be subsumed under the category of misconceived utilitarianism which serves ephemeral petty causes, the Herzegovina-bred authors can seldom be described as such: they are peculiarly marked by the virtues typical of Herzegovinian merchants for ages — they keep the best stock, they are more concerned about their good reputation than about their wealth, they do well because they know themselves and their market, they consider their profession commendable from the national point of view, they are good heads of the household, and not misers, they always see men of learning as a social stratum above themselves. This rationality without rationalist pettiness, this pragmatism without pragmatic slavery to everyday needs
of others, this broadness in defining and playing one’s own role, dignity in self-effacement, composure in endeavour, this way of finding beauty in self-sacrifice, in work, in perfecting oneself — all this was a basis for authentic and harmonious creation and for expressing one’s own individuality. So every individual in this ever-renewing group of great Herzegovinians, from Sava Vladislavić to Jovan Dučić, made it in his own, and very distinct, way, as if shaped in a vacuum, while remaining quite similar to one another. Among them, Ćorović was a bearer of energy, of indestructible creativity, a man of balanced mind and disciplined thought, steady in his tremendous ambitions; and he judged himself quite accurately: that he can and should work in as many fields of historiography, philology and literary history as possible because all of the job is sorely needed by Serbian scholarship and he is able to do it in his own manner. That is why he remained completely poised, completely focused, void of all vanity, true to himself and the work he intended to accomplish even in choosing the method of accomplishing it. The absence of any risk-taking in his approach to primary sources and historical conceptions should not be attributed to a lack of knowledge, narrow-mindedness or ill-preparedness to try something different: his main concern was the extent and primary criticality of the work done because he believed that the only indispensable thing to do — and that he was the most suitable to do it — was to restore, broaden and strengthen once again the foundations of Serbian historiography which had not yet had enough effort of true masters of the trade built in them.

III

Ćorović became a polyhistor owing, among other things, to the bases laid by Serbian historiography before him. The polyhistor had been a phenomenon of long standing, recurring at steady intervals; and it gave the best results on the occasion of its recurrence associated with Stojan Novaković. The writers of Serbian history and antiquarians who arose in the age of Baroque and erudition were each daring enough to take another look at that history in its entirety and to fit it, each in his own way, in the framework of the common past of all South Slav or Balkan nations. It had been so from the time of Mauro Orbini and Jaketa Lukarević to Pavle Riter Vitezović and Count Djordje Branković and it saw a renewal during the eighteenth century in those Serbian historiographical writings which largely stemmed from the genres of hagiography, genealogy and annals of the older Serbian historical literature. In the age of the Enlightenment and rationalism, Jovan Rajić emerged as a polyhistor with his broad historical perspective, his treatment of the entirety of Serbian history and his fitting it in the framework of a history composed of the histories of the other South Slav peoples; but he
was even more of a polyhistor for his varied use of sources, for the number of questions he raised and his efforts to provide answers, and for his search for methods which would vary rather than stick to a single pattern. Vuk Karadžić can be considered a polyhistor for the mere fact that he sought to write a history of the Serbs on a philological basis not just in his critical approach to sources but also in his conceptions of historical development; which then compelled him to review Serbian history in its entirety and cover as fully as possible the internal workings of the life of the people. If those synthetists of Serbian history who, like Dimitrije Davidović, Jovan Hadžić, Danilo Medaković or Alimpije Vasiljević, did not have proper historical education or genuine scholarly interest cannot be regarded as polyhistors, still less can the participants of the decisive clash between pseudo-romanticists and realists in Serbian historiography, Panta Srečković and Ilarion Ruvarac, who can practically be seen as the obverse and reverse of the same phenomenon insofar as both tended to be too preoccupied with details of medieval history. A renewal of polyhistoric ambitions was heralded by Čedomilj Mijatović in a talented, imaginative and occasionally brilliant manner, but he lacked the patience and critical approach to sources to sort out and wrap up his work. Prior to Ćorović, such a renewal was carried out best, in a reliable and trustworthy manner, by Stojan Novaković. With his vast work, he became a polyhistor not just because he was engaged in historical philology studies, because he studied and published a great deal of sources, dealt with many aspects of literary history, worked on Serbian history from Slav settlement in the Balkans to his own times. Novaković was a polyhistor above all because in every of his various fields of interest he relied on a method which was appropriate for the subject under study.

Not many saw Stojan Novaković as an inspiring example. Some claimed to be followers of Ruvarac, remaining within the narrow confines of analytical solving of medieval chronological or genealogical puzzles; others departed from Ruvarac, deeming that archival material offered the only possibility for historiographical work. To many, Novaković’s work seemed to be the closing stage of an epoch in which it was still possible to be a polihystor and which was bound to give way to an era of improved and more complex work in narrower fields. Contrary to the majority, Ćorović mustered the strength and courage to follow Novaković’s suite and make the same effort.

There is a link between these two fearless explorers and immeasurably prolific writers of Serbian history, a link that stems from the similar attitude they had towards that history: over time, they looked into the history of their nation in such detail and learnt about it so profoundly that their earnest interest must have pulled them in various directions, into different fields, into topics which, every time, required different source materials and
different methods. And that nicely corresponded with their understanding of the profession of the historian — it is not just a professional obligation, a mere fulfilment of duty, it is a total creative endeavour with which one identifies completely and makes it one’s lifelong pursuit.

IV

As a polyhistor, Vladimir Ćorović looked up to Novaković because of his attitude towards contemporary Serbian historiography and his understanding of the role he should play in it. But, once again much like Novaković, what also lay at the core of this attitude of his was the nature of his education, his scholarly preparedness, his actual ability for research, the breadth of his knowledge which constantly prodded him to move in different directions and, finally, his unusual interest in the entirety of the Serbian past. In keeping with the well-established tradition of his predecessors, he studied in Vienna, with Vatroslav Jagić, Konstantin Jireček and Milan Rešetar, in the seminar where, in the early twentieth century, Slavic philology was perhaps best studied and taught, and with historians whose historiographical method was still, at least partly, attached to the historical-philological school. Besides, Ćorović found himself in a Vienna where one could avail oneself of a hundred years of philological study of South Slav antiquities, from Jernej Kopitar to Jagić; most of the important monuments had already been discovered, examined and published, and the method of approaching these monuments had been developed, tested and established from one undertaking to another, and so had the realistic and scholarly expectations from such undertakings. At the same time, what Ćorović was able to witness in Vienna was an increasingly open revolt of historians against the tutelage of philologists (who had informed their method for too long) and their quest for their own way in approaching new archival material, in writing new works increasingly based on such material and in temporarily narrowing the historical method even to the point of avoiding any conception, in order to isolate and deaden its philological core.

Without a shred of impatience, intolerance or bias in assessing this situation, Ćorović chose the profession and calling of a historian, but he did not neglect his philological education and he made a very good use of his knowledge in that field. As if he had another personality inside himself, he conducted, along with historiographical work, philological and literary-historical enquiries, occasionally dwelling on medieval Serbian hagiographies, on the traditional and written heritage of the Ottoman period and on a number of more recent phenomena, from eighteenth-century Serbian urban lyrical poetry and Lukijan Mušicki to his own contemporaries. A crucial role in his decision to become primarily historian was inevitably
played by his reliable and rational recognition of his own inclinations, his
creative temperament which required a boundless field of work and his per-
ception of what the pressing need of the culture and national situation of
the Serbs was. Thus Ćorović the historian was not too susceptible to philo-
logical influences. If the object of study required it, he would embark on
a philological critique of sources; other times he would conduct archival
research, comprehensive and hasty so as to cover and master the material
from different periods, from the thirteenth to twentieth century.

The road that Ćorović travelled was not much different or divergent
from the one travelled by many of his contemporaries, particularly those
from Herzegovina. And yet, he was exceptional in many respects. Although
formed as a scholar, he did not go through life jealously protecting his time
working time and his work from external influences: he was not afraid to
interact with wider intellectual circles, to join movements, to live though his
people’s drama, to take on new responsibilities, to open his mind to unex-
pected discoveries — and to translate all that, very quickly, into his work, his
scholarly profession, his new writings belonging to new areas of interest.

While serving, before the First World War, at the National Museum
(Zemaljski muzej) in Sarajevo he once again came closer to his native land
and remained forever engrossed with all that testified about its past and up
to the most recent forms of his people’s life and struggle. His book Historija
Bosne [History of Bosnia] published shortly before his death was written
exhaustively and with the obvious intention to include all that was known
and remembered, in whatever form, about that land in medieval times. Al-
though this work followed after a series of his studies about medieval Bos-
nian history (e.g. on Ban Kulin in 1921; on King Tvrtko Kotromanić in
1925), it was nonetheless supposed to be just an antechamber of Ćorović’s
building which was going to be built from the dreary ruins of his native
land’s past. His noted studies on Luka Vukalović (1923), on Mostar and
its Serbian Orthodox Christian community (1933) or on relations between
Dubrovnik and its neighbours in the early eighteenth century (1941) seem
to have been but preparatory work for the erection of that building. A par-
icipant in the revolutionary movement of the Yugoslav youth in the years
preceding 1914, Ćorović joined, straight from Austrian prison, the editorial
board of the Književni Jug [Literary South], a journal published in Zagreb
which, by 1917, had considered the demise of Austria-Hungary and the
formation of Yugoslavia a foregone conclusion. True to himself, however,
he could not be so naive as to see in the Habsburg Monarchy’s becoming a
fact of the past the demise of the fragmented and multiplied proponents of
its idea. Nothing of Austria-Hungary, Ćorović argued, should be forgotten.
His Crna Knjiga [Black Book], purposely put together as a collection of
documents of various provenances, memoirs and questionnaires in particu-
lar, brought forth the trials and tribulations of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war when the Monarchy, hungry for vengeance, said its last word in the form of malevolent abuse carried out through local authorities. Years of sustained work resulted in his comprehensive, and perhaps most important, study *Odnosi izmedju Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku* [Relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 1936]. This towering work, which piled up stacks of documentary material in order to clarify, as profoundly as possible, the events followed almost day by day, challenged all conceptions — be they of German origin or coming from the Habsburg legacy, suspiciously benevolent Britons (Seaton-Watson), the Vatican or the remaining Austrian-type Social Democrats — which still praised the Habsburg tutelage over South-East Europe or signalled the aspiration to re-establish similar tutelage through the involvement of new factors. The purpose of this book of Ćorović was not only the stereotypical one: to defend the thesis about the inevitability of the clash between an obsolete aggressive empire and the national aspirations of Balkan peoples and thus to defend Serbia from the allegations that she had caused the war. Its purpose was also to expose a historical legacy which, found in its final formative stage, remained productive of unhealthy offshoots. Having become, through his own evolution, a proponent of the idea of Yugoslav unity which, according to him, was not the result of an agreement but rather of a long-term historical process, Ćorović shaped his voluminous *Istorija Jugoslavije* [History of Yugoslavia, 1933] in accordance with that idea, and the strength of the method in this book primarily depended on the strength of his Yugoslav conceptions. In writing it, Ćorović relied on all that had carried some weight in previous Yugoslav historiography; he did his own research for some sections; his is also the structure of narrative since he had no predecessor to look up to. Except for the last part, the book is well thought out and organized, written in a style that remains within the boundaries of scholarship while being as adjusted as possible to the capacities of a less informed reader. In fact, it was the only complete history of Yugoslavia that far exceeded the requirements of a textbook.

Today’s historians tend to criticise Ćorović, apart from for what falls outside his scholarly endeavour, for not having been careful and accurate enough in his criticism of sources and facts due to his work overload and constant haste. If we carefully consider these objections, Ćorović seems to have made several breaches of method perhaps for the simple reason that he did more than others: on average, the mistakes made by those who pour scorn on Ćorović are not fewer than his. More serious are the objections concern-
ing his expression. Ćorović was an eloquent, highly literate, almost literary gifted historian. But he was not able to write much and fast and, at the same time, to cultivate his style, chisel his phrase, avoid bumps and inaccuracies. At times, instead of striving for a power of expression or an elegant word order, he slides into familiarity which can bother the reader and, for a moment, reveal an incomplete and undeveloped thought. His exposition in Istorija Jugoslavije is free from the kind of redundancies which are supposed to be dropped from a history finally shaped and follows an almost natural sequence of events. Ćorović also authored several, mostly literary-historical, essays which together make a perfect whole. Yet, in most of his works he drew his scholarly expression closer to artistic, mainly through his flamboyant sentence and deliberately suggestive narrative. Unwilling to sacrifice the source material to a distilled depiction of the historical moment he was dwelling on or to its sophisticated description, he could not even get to elevate his expression, through narration or discussion, to the noblest of qualities. Parenthetical analytical diversions and, to put it bluntly, a certain overload of information lead Ćorović’s reader astray from the clear image that could have emerged after all: the reader stops at some details and tries, together with the writer, to make them clear. The greatest writers of history make up for the shortcomings in their critical approach to detail by offering a critical review of the whole, i.e. the final process of reconstruction and, in doing so, they wrap up their endeavour with a work which corresponds to life architecturally and is close to art outwardly. Ćorović could have accomplished that in a number of his works had he not chosen a different method to achieve a different goal, thereby leaving his work open and visible, vulnerable to objections for which he has been more rarely forgiven than anyone else.

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Modernization Mixed with Nationalism

Abstract: This essay reflects on a particular manner in which modernisation have taken place in the Balkans in modern history, from the 1878 Berlin Congress onwards. The Balkan countries faced twofold difficulties in their development: they had to overcome their backwardness stemming from the centuries of the Ottoman yoke and catch up with modern Western Europe, and resolve their numerous mutual territorial and political disputes. The latter task was especially difficult due to the constant interference in Balkan affairs on the part of Great Powers. This interference further aggravated nationalistic tensions between the Balkan states. The peculiar mixture of modernisation efforts and nationalism remains to this day when the entire region strives to join the European Union.

Keywords: modernisation, nationalism, Balkans, Serbia, Yugoslavia, Europe

It is rather difficult to find a region in Europe which has seen so many conflicts, redrawing of borders, ethnic and political changes as the Balkans has. Plans for different re-arrangements of the Balkans have been even more numerous. That is hardly surprising: these occurrences were provoked by the proverbial Balkan fragmentation.

The conflict-prone nature of the Balkans was particularly conspicuous during the nineteenth and early twentieth century when independent national states were formed and then tried to extend their borders in accordance with what was very broadly-conceived as ethnic territory. Contrary to West Europe, the process of national delimitation has never been fully completed.

Great Power interference with the relations in the Balkans played considerable role in facilitating national tensions. In fact, ethnic fragmentation and plethora of territorial disputes stemmed from such interference. The rival national programmes of Balkan states clashed one with another and, in parallel, had to overcome the centuries of backwardness. In the wake of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the majority of Balkan states regained their independence after a long period of time while Bulgaria was granted an autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire.

1 See more in Balkany v evropeiskikh politicheskikh proektakh XIX–XXI vv, eds. Ritta P. Grishina, Konstantin V. Nikiforov & Galina V. Lobacheva (Moscow: Institut slavjanovedenija RAN, 2014).
Figuratively speaking, these countries came back to Europe after having been taken into Asia following the Ottoman conquests. Nonetheless, it was not enough to make a formal come-back; it was necessary to return to Europe in a real sense of that word which meant to Europeanise all the aspects of a largely patriarchal way of life; it was necessary to turn the people into true Europeans in a socio-cultural sense of that word. Therefore, modernisation (or Europeanization) became an essential idea for the Balkan states in the period from the Berlin Congress to the Great War. For the developing countries, there was no more actual or pressing task.

The period from the 1878 Berlin Congress to the First World War in 1914 was that of the so-called “first globalisation”. It seemed that new opportunities opened for the Balkan states. Yet, neither European nor Balkan states seized that chance. The Balkan countries became “poor cousins” of the Western world and, moreover, were threatened to become dependent again, but this time dependent on European states rather than the Ottoman Empire. In case of Serbia, the danger came from Austria-Hungary. Incidentally, it was then that the Balkans was dubbed a “powder keg in Europe”. Instead of the expected era of prosperity, the world slipped into international conflict.

It can never be stressed enough that the history of Balkan nations in the real sense of that word started only after the Berlin Treaty. And it was compressed in thirty-six years — until the outbreak of the First World War. And the Balkan countries had a great deal of things to accomplish in the field of modernisation over those thirty-six years. This period is sharply divided in two phases: a relatively calm first phase which ended around the coup d’état in Serbia in 1903 or slightly afterwards and the second phase which led to the tumultuous war years.

The decisions reached at the Berlin Congress remained in full force until the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, but some of its terms had been questioned much earlier. In 1885, Bulgaria was unified and then the Serbo-Bulgarian war broke out. In 1896–1897, there was the uprising on the Island of Crete which escalated into the Greco-Ottoman war. In 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus initiated yet another Great Power-induced redrawing of the Balkans.

It has long been noted that the growing influence of Serbian officer corps, the increasing prestige of a military career and the partial militarisation of Serbian politics constituted an important feature of modernisation in Serbia. This aspect has always been actual and one of the most significant

\footnote{For more details see Olga V. Sokolovskaia, Veliki ostrov Sredizemnomor’ia, Gretsiia i mirnovorcheskaia Evropa. 1897–1909 gg.: K 100-letiiu prisoeedinienia Krita k Gretsi (Moskva: Institut slavjanovedenia RAN, 2013).}
for Serbian historiography. It was associated with the problem of the incomplete social structure of Serbian society. In a certain phase of the country’s development senior officer corps tried to fill the void caused by the lack of a hereditary elite which had been annihilated in Serbia, and some other Balkan countries, after the Ottoman conquest. The sole exception in the Balkans in this respect was the “boyar Romania” due to its distance from Constantinople. Some Serbian historians present army officers as a substitute to the “middle class” of Serbian society.\(^3\)

The result was that the army rather than state apparatus, clerks, political parties and partially intelligentsia became one of the pillars of, and at the same time a limited threat to, the Serbian democratic regime. This exaggerated role of Serbian officer corps persisted from 1903 until the Salonica trial in 1917 and the execution of Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis, the unofficial leader of the clandestine officer organisation “Black Hand”.

Nevertheless, Serbian officers continued to play a political role in their country’s history. This was the case with the royalist anti-fascist movement of General Dragoljub Draža Mihailović in the Second World War, the attempts of the post-Titoist Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) leadership to prevent the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation in the early 1990s, and finally, the emergence of the special intelligence services on the political scene towards the end of Slobodan Milošević’s rule in the Federal republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

The increasing influence of the military in Serbia following the May 1903 coup was not a random and isolated occurrence in the Balkans. In 1908, the pan-Greek Military League was formed while at the same time the Young Turk revolution took place in the Ottoman Empire executed by junior officers. Therefore, militarisation was a regional process.\(^4\)

The Serbian modernisation remains a matter of lively debate in both Serbian and Russian historiography. It centres on the extent of Europeanization, the extent to which Serbia was prepared to adopt European values. Occasionally, this discussion becomes rather strange when its participants persistently point out the obvious – they “knock at the open door”. It is crystal clear that Serbia was far from “a modern European state” at the beginning of the twentieth century with regard to infrastructure and industrialisation. However, that cannot be a reason for criticising Serbian politicians


because they embraced French-inspired doctrines (liberalism and radicalism), constitutional monarchy, parliamentary system and other European political institutions.  

The speed and extent of political reforms remain a matter of polemics. The avoidance of reform implementation had grave consequences. The policy of Milan Obrenović serves as an ample illustration of this rule. However, the Balkan rulers often de facto carried out more consistent policy of modernisation than some of their predecessors. They often merged a policy of modernisation with nationalist slogans under which, in fact, the struggle against previous modernisation efforts started. It was important to give modernisation a form that was apprehensible and acceptable to the people at large.

The period from the Berlin Congress to the First World War has lately been drawing a lot of attention. The books of Russian scholars A. L. Shemyakin, A. J. Timofejev, IA. V. Vishniakov, P. A. Iskenderov no doubt expanded our knowledge and understanding of the complex processes that took place in the Balkans in the early twentieth century.

Finally, the choice of a road to civilisation often in practice meant the choice between pro-western (in case of Serbia pro-Austrian) and pro-Russian course. A. L. Pogodin has noted a remarkable contrast in the life of Serbs between “European taste of a few [...] and the deep-rooted affection for Russia among the mass [of people]”. A similar situation exists even today.

There was also a matter of Balkan territorial issues. Those have been resolved in various manners but mostly in a traditional way — by war. It is sufficient to observe that the twentieth century saw the two Balkan Wars.

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two World Wars and a series of civil wars during the 1990s often referred to as the Wars of the Yugoslav succession.

The Balkan Wars, the first one in particular, had a special place in the re-arrangement of South-East Europe. It was something of an East-European Reconquista which pushed the Ottoman Empire and Muslim and Ottoman population back to Asia. The small Balkan states made a common stand on their own volition for the first time in history rather than acting in support of Great Powers agenda. The Balkan allies were even termed “the seventh Great Power”. Their alliance, however, did not last for long. The division of spoils ended in new conflicts. Just like the struggle against the Moors did not spare the Christian kingdoms from fighting each other, the expulsion of the Ottomans was accompanied by conflicts between the new Balkan states over the former Ottoman possessions.9

The Balkan Wars “constituted chronologically the second, but equally important, phase of establishing the Balkan national states” — the Berlin Congress of 1878 being the first phase.10 The Eastern Question which had been on the European agenda from the end of the seventeenth century — the complex knot of international conflicts over the territories of the declining Ottoman Empire - was also brought to a close. Imperial Russia remained deprived of the ardently desired “keys of its own house”, the control over the Black Sea bays and Constantinople.

The demise of the multinational Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War led to formation of new national states instead of them, a consequence of then modern slogan of national self-determination. However, the Versailles peace settlement based on that principle did not extinguish a multitude of national disputes. The newly-established borders did eliminate a lot of the old disagreements, but they also gave birth to new ones. Moreover, all the Balkan states had their own dissatisfied minorities.

Nearly all the Balkan countries faced national disasters in the early twentieth century. The Ottomans lost their European lands and then their Empire collapsed. Bulgaria was bitterly disappointed twice — after the Second Balkan and the First World War. Serbia lost her outlet to the sea in 1913 and survived her own Calvary during the First World War. Macedonia remained divided. In the wake of the First World War, Greece suffered "Asia

Minor disaster”, the defeat of the Greek army in the Greco-Turkish War (1919–1921). The sole exception was the Carpatho-Balkanic Romania.

Following the Second World War, there was a rising interest in different forms of a union between the Balkan countries. In particular, one of the most famous projects for the re-arrangement of South-East Europe was the plan to form the so-called Balkan (Danube) federation. Its realisation never got off the ground. In the Balkans, and across the entire Eastern Europe, the states became even more monolithic in terms of their ethnic composition.

As a result of the expulsion at the end of the Second World War, the ten million strong German community in Eastern Europe ceased to exist. The instrumentalisation of German national minorities abroad for the purpose of disrupting the countries in which they lived on the part of Nazi Germany undermined the general position of national minorities in the long run. The world directed its attention to protection of individual human rights. The protection of universal human rights was considered sufficient for the protection of all, national minorities and small ethnic groups included.

In the 1990s, when the Yugoslav crisis erupted, it became obvious that this was not the case: the collective rights of ethnic groups separated from the main body of their nation were also in need of protection. Incidentally, the break-up of communist Yugoslavia turned into another Serbian national disaster.

From the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century the solution of Balkan territorial and national disputes was often envisaged in the formation of larger multinational states which would digest not just different nations, but also their territorial conflicts. Yugoslavia was the best example of that whereas numerous schemes for Balkan (Danube) federation were never realised. The end of the twentieth century witnessed the diametrical opposition to such tendency. In order to resolve national conflicts in multinational states, these states were disintegrated.

The problems of Balkan modernisation did not disappear following the two World Wars. After the Great War, modernisation was still modelled on the western patterns and it continued to lag behind with the result that the gap separating the Balkan from developed countries did not decrease. After the Second World War all the states (with the exception of Greece) underwent the cantering, and now alternative, modernisation which trod on the path of socialism. Yugoslavia endeavoured to find another model of

\[11 \text{ Cf more in: The Balkans in the Cold War. Balkan Federations, Cominform, Yugoslav-Soviet Conflict, ed. Vojislav G. Pavlović (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, Serbian academy of Sciences and Arts, 2012).}\]
an alternative modernisation through the so-called self-management. And once again, the initial success turned into failure at the end of the road. Besides, that failure was followed by the rise of nationalism in all Balkan countries and, in fact, nationalism became an alternative to communism. Today the Balkan countries again undergo an imitating and cantering modernisation.

It is important to remind oneself of the cyclicality of Serbian (Yugoslav) history. It was particularly visible in the attempts to solve the most complex national question in the Balkans. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia, it could be safely said, tried to apply all the variations of internal policy, from unitary state to federalism in 1939 when the Croatian lands (two previous banovinas) formed the Banovina of Croatia. Seeking its own solution of the national question, “the second”, Tito’s communist Yugoslavia traversed much the same path as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia — from formally unitary, but essentially unitary, state composition on the pattern of that in the Soviet Union to de facto confederal one as defined in the 1974 Constitution. And the outcome was much the same.

The main characteristic of Yugoslavia’s self-management reforms was the fact that it coupled economy and ethnic relations. One affected the other and sometimes accelerated and other times slowed down the overall pace of reforms. Relative democratisation of social life cleared the ground for economic development. However, it produced entirely different results in the field of ethnic relations since it was primarily understood as a decentralisation of the state and loosening of federal ties. Rather than harmonising ethnic relations decentralisation brought about growing nationalism in all the Yugoslav federal units (republics) and all spheres of public life, and increasing tensions between the Yugoslav nations. When those tensions reached their zenith, Yugoslavia broke up.12

Today nearly all Balkan countries belong to or endeavour to join the European Union (to “come back to Europe” again). This is again facilitated by the globalising world. Nevertheless, the European project has not put an end to numerous Balkan disputes. To say the least, the Serbian, Macedonian and Albanian national questions remain unsolved. Some old differences like the Greco-Turkish one have not been removed either. The unifying Euro-Atlantic idea in the Balkans is challenged by some other ideas as, for example, the pan-Slav, which is currently not in the forefront, or, contrary to it and growing in strength, the pan-Turkish one (as part of the more global pan-Islamic idea).

The Balkans remains to be a volatile and rather under-developed region of Europe. The Balkans population suffer the most on that account. The accomplishment of their dream of a peaceful and comfortable life seems not to lay in a new, if voluntary, submission to “European Empire” this time, but rather in the realisation of a still actual slogan “Balkan for the Balkan peoples”. At the moment, this appears somewhat utopian, but who knows what tomorrow will hold in store? The Balkan history continues no matter what.

Bibliography and sources


The hundredth anniversary of the start of the First World War (The Great War as it was once called, and as it is against referred to more frequently today) is an opportunity for the modern world to once again focus its attention on the beginning of the war that was one of the largest tectonic shifts in modern history. These shifts marked the beginning of the twentieth century, and paved the way for — and perhaps even caused — many of the evils of that century and left consequences which can still be
felt. Moreover, the claim that this war, from the aspect of the consequences, has still not ended in some parts of the world is not entirely unconvincing. What were the causes of the First World War? How and why did it break out? Could it have been prevented? Is there a guilty party or multiple guilty parties, regardless of whether it is an individual or a nation? Even a hundred years after the beginning of the 1914 catastrophe, as it is referred to in the title of one of the books covered by this review, we are still uncertain about the answers to these questions, and also being re-examined are some of the conventional wisdoms about the beginning of the military conflict.

Quite expectedly, this many open issues on the centennial of the First World War has led to the appearance of a large number of publications on the topic of its beginning and the causes that led to it. All these works, written in English in order, among other reasons, to reach a maximum audience, are big commercial publishing undertakings. Consequently, these are not books that are intended for the expert audience of dedicated historians, which would be published in the few journals covering this field, and which would be the topic of conferences far removed from the eyes of the media and the public. These are books which are sold in large numbers, which have to reach general readers and have a social impact far beyond the circles of dedicated professionals. This is why the authors, even if they wanted to do it differently, had no choice and needed to adapt their manner of presentation and writing style to educated non-specialists, such as the author of this review. All the books listed in this review are easy to read, they hold the reader’s attention, and can almost, at least in some cases, be compared to well-penned fiction. Searching for ways to attract a wide circle of readers, i.e. to hold on to them, the authors occasionally sought analogies between events a hundred years ago and the present events. The examples used were relatively recently headline news and can hold the attention of contemporary (Western) readers, who are not so interested in, for example, the situation in Bosnia or Serbia a hundred years ago, and perhaps are unable to keep their attention for a longer period of time on anything that is not related to September 11, Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan or at least Hezbollah. Nonetheless, such an approach can hardly be accepted from a methodological point of view — therefore there are inevitably errors when value judgements are made on someone’s role in the past based on common present-day value models, especially in the Western world, where the largest number of the readers of these books lives. The result is, for example, the parallel drawn between Young Bosnia and present-day Islamic fundamentalists, or the parallel between contemporary Serbia and present-day Iran, regardless of its being poorly substantiated by facts, in a situation where the media image of present-day Iran (with or without reason) is completely negative, causing, i.e. calling for such a view of Serbia from a different time.
Also, secondary historical sources are mainly used with well-known facts only being interpreted in new ways — seeking new points of view. There is no magic wand, except in the case of MacMillan, at least to some extent; there are no new documents that shed completely new light on the period a century ago. This is quite understandable — most of the mining work has been done in the past hundred years. One should be empathetic to those who are disappointed that documents have not been unearthed unambiguously blaming or exonerating any of the sides of the historical guilt, but unfortunately for them this is simply how things are and one should accept it. This is especially true since during completely unrestrained access to the Serbian archives on two occasions (1915–1918 and 1941–1944) nothing was found that would unquestionably link the Serbian authorities to the assassination in Sarajevo.

Consequently it is quite expected that present-day historiographic literature is to a great extent reduced to re-examining facts and observing them in a new light. It is interesting, however, what this new light does. Clark, for example, makes it clear that this new light consists of the things that have transpired in the meantime, especially present-day events that still occupy the attention of the general public. For instance, Clark claims that following the events in Srebrenica and the siege of Sarajevo, we have far less understanding for Serbian national liberation in the early twentieth century, and it becomes more difficult to consider Serbia as the object or victim of the politics of the Great Powers. It seems that the issue of the justification of the placement of events of a hundred years ago in such a context remains open. This is supported by the fact that the same author does not offer any explanation of contemporary events, but only lists them, and, for example, he does not provide a comparative analysis of the sources of the structural problems of the European Union and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This would undoubtedly be interesting and relevant, but he stops at the declaration that today we have more sympathies for the latter. Regardless of the fact that in respect to sympathies it seems that Clark unjustifiably transformed the first person singular into the first person plural, one should point out that historiography as a science still aims to comprehend reality as it was once, and not to comprehend its values and express sympathies from the standpoint of present-day dominant values, whatever they may be.

Even more interesting is the process in which present-day events are used as a benchmark for the evaluation and even justification of past events — a process that Clark uses by comparatively analysing the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum issued to Serbia in 1914 and the so-called peace offer
(proposed agreement) in Rambouillet in 1999, and claims that terms of the issued ultimatum were more lenient. Regardless of whether this is true, it has nothing in common with the nature of the 1914 ultimatum. Worst of all, such a process does not allow us to understand the behaviour of the interested parties in either case, nor do we learn anything more than the incentives that the decision makers were exposed to, especially bearing in mind that much had changed in international relations during the eight decades that separate the two events. If nothing else, we are richer for the collective experience of nearly a hundred years. And what an experience it is — the experience of world wars, the Holocaust, Nazism, Communism, in short, the darkest totalitarianism, the atomic bomb, and the world on the brink of nuclear war. Can it be that all this does not affect how each of us thinks, regardless of who it is that is making a particular decision.

Regardless of the rather loud cries surrounding it, the revision of historiography is quite a natural process. It is not necessary for new documents to be discovered — old ones can be interpreted in new alternative ways, and the question is not whether historiography is being revised, but whether such a revision will allow us to better understand the past and consequently to better understand the time that we live in and the world around us. However, in the case of the First World War the revision is specific, as Mom-bauer clearly demonstrates, since the issue of German guilt for the war had become a political issue in that country even during the war (apparently the main German participants had no illusions about their own roles or about the outcome of the war), and especially after the Treaty of Versailles and the consequently determined German war guilt, as the basis for war reparations. Since Germany was in the focus of global attention one more time during the twentieth century (this time there was no dilemma about its war guilt), the issue was raised as to whether Nazism was the natural continuance of German (primarily Prussian) militarism, or a strange aberration that occurred under extremely specific circumstances in the Weimar Republic. In fact, if Germany was not to blame for the First World War, then the thesis about the continuity of German militarism and authoritarianism loses its credibility — then Hitler would not have been part of German political tradition, but rather happened to be head of state by pure chance.

It is likely that the last great revision of historiography, i.e. the last great revolution in the interpretation of the causes of the First World War

\[1\] In addition to the book that is being reviewed, this comparison, for completely unknown reasons, can be found in Clark’s biography of Emperor Wilhelm II. The character of the causality link between the Kaiser and the conference in Rambouillet truly remains a mystery. See Christopher Clark, *Kaiser Wilhelm II, A Life in Power* (Penguin Books, 2009), 304.
occurred in Germany with the Fischer controversy, since the new documents that Fischer discovered,\(^2\) including the so-called September Program,\(^3\) led to scientific as well as non-scientific conflicts, primarily in the Federal (at the time western) Republic of Germany. It was not only science that was in question, as demonstrated by Mombauer, but rather the debate included categories of treason, national consciousness and all other categories that are under no circumstances part of academic debate. The reviewed books, with the exception of Hastings to a certain degree, and Fromkin in a specific manner, do not accept Fischer’s original thesis, that a clear German strategy existed, i.e. a consistent political plan to place Europe under German domination\(^4\) through war, and in keeping with the tradition of Prussian militarism and state formation. However, this in itself does not mean that there is no German war guilt, i.e. that Germany did not want to start the war, regardless of the stated goal.

However, let us start chronologically, from the newest books, to those that were published somewhat earlier. Margaret MacMillan’s book is not only the newest but is certainly the most encompassing, it is the only truly comprehensive book among those reviewed. The structure of the book corresponds to what the author sets as her goal, which is to answer the question why peace ended, not why war started. Namely, in the year that the First World War broke out Europe celebrated a hundred years of unprecedented peace (with smaller incidents such as the Crimean War and the Franco-Prussian War). It was a period of unmatched technological, economic and social progress. The book starts with this new Europe in 1900, and the Ex-

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\(^3\) According to the program, one of the German war objectives was “We must create a central European economic association through common customs treaties, to include France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and perhaps Italy, Sweden and Norway. This association will not have any common constitutional supreme authority and all its members will be normally equal, but in practice will be under German leadership and must stabilise Germany’s economic dominance over Mitteleuropa”, quoted Nail Ferguson, *The Pity of War 1914–1918* (London: The Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1998), 171. The title of Ferguson’s chapter *The Kaiser’s European Union*, although not so much the content, focuses on proving that entering the 1914 war was a strategic mistake on the part of Great Britain, indicating the possibility of similarities between the present-day EU and German war objectives in 1914.

\(^4\) The existence of a German war plan, better know as the Schlieffen Plan, is beyond any reasonable doubt, though in this respect there have been certain exceptions lately, although not very convincing. See Terence Zuber, *The Real German War Plan 1904–14* (Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2011).
position Universelle in Paris that year, and the author claims that the concept of playing with a zero-sum was abandoned in international relations at that time, with the dominant concept being that the sum can be increased through cooperation. However, MacMillan takes us back to the roots of that Europe, the strongest being the unification of Germany three decades earlier, as well as the absence of Bismarck and Germany’s departure from his concept of partial and balanced alliances with its neighbours, primarily Russia.

MacMillan repeats in several places that war was not unavoidable and she builds the explanation why it did in fact occur by arranging pieces into a mosaic: the forming of alliances led to the establishment of a bipolar world, the world of opposed alliances that went to war. The book reviews the history of Anglo-French, Anglo-Russian, Franco-Russian and Austro-German relations. Each of the big players had their own strategic interests and the author thoroughly analyses the strategic thinking of each of them, which led precisely to such, and not some other alliances. At the same time the biggest players are playing their strategic games throughout the already globalised world, and the Anglo-Russian “big game” was played in the foothills of the Himalayas and in China, and the Anglo-French — in the Sudan, Indochina and Central Africa.

MacMillan covers all the significant international crises that preceded the outbreak of the First World War and clearly shows that war did not occur out of the blue, but rather that tensions were clearly visible. Both the first and second Moroccan crises, the Italian occupation of Libya, the annexation of Bosnia, the Balkan Wars, the Eastern Question, which was the name at the time for everything that came with the weakening and breakup of the Ottoman Empire — these are all crises that were, in present-day financial jargon, the stress-tests of peace in Europe at the time. Europe survived all the stress-tests until the assassination in Sarajevo. And had it not failed that stress-test, it probably would have failed the next one — it is quite clear from MacMillan’s account.

Great attention is rightfully given to the Anglo-German naval arms race, as the likely crucial single factor that led to war, and accordingly an analysis is presented of the strategic impact of this race on what created the basis for Britain indeed opting for an alliance with France and Russia, and ultimately entering the war against Germany. MacMillan clearly shows how this coerced and needless German move led to the alienation of Great Britain, as Germany’s natural ally (Germany’s domination of the continent was not a threat to British maritime domination, and vice versa). And MacMillan uses this example to analyse the way the German military and political elite made (wrong) decisions. Many things are apparent in this arms race: the unclear strategic thinking, the superficial knowledge of
the other side, and the poor prediction of its reactions, huge ambition and rather erroneous reasoning.

The author has an interesting approach, which was also applied in her previous books, where history is reviewed by considering the individuals who made key decisions. Therefore we get suggestive portraits of the political and military elite of the period, such as genuine pacifist and diligent politician, French socialist Jean Jaurès, but also the not exactly perfectly balanced personality of Wilhelm II, the depression prone Helmuth von Moltke the Younger (Chief of the German General Staff), or colourful, to put it mildly, Conrad von Hötzendorf (Chief of the Austrian General Staff). On all sides there was evidently a rather small breadth in thinking, a lack of inventiveness, lethargy, lack of inquisitiveness and historic irresponsibility. It is not a question of the decision makers being convinced that war would not break out, but rather their conviction that the war would be short and that the war objectives would inevitably be achieved quickly. In places where analogies with the present-day or at least subsequent events (the way that strategic decisions were taken, for example) are possible as well as necessary, unfortunately there are none (with one exception). However, the analogy with the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, from the standpoint of the relations of the military and political leadership and their crucial individuals in the decision-making process — a very interesting topic — is mentioned rather superficially. Even though the decision was to primarily follow individuals, MacMillan does not hesitate to allocate guilt for the war to peoples, i.e. countries. In her opinion, to blame for the war were Austria’s “mad determination” to destroy Serbia, Germany’s support to Austria’s war desires “to the hilt”, and Russia’s anxiousness to mobilise the army as soon as possible.

The book was obviously written under great pressure from the publisher that it be published at the prime time, in the year prior to the hundredth anniversary of the breakout of the war. This is why, even though the book was not written quickly, the editor’s work has been carried out hastily and sloppily. That is the only explanation for mistakes such as the “European Community for Iron and Steel” (instead of European Community for Coal and Steel, p. 270), or the formulation according to which the legal council of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “unfortunately” (probably for those who sent him, not for historiography) did not succeed in finding any facts regarding the involvement of the Serbian government in the assassination in Sarajevo (p. 538), and that instead of Franz Joseph (who appears in the picture above the text) the Austro-Hungarian monarch was labelled as Franz Ferdinand (p. 379). However, these oversights do not

diminish the great value of the book. The sentences are completely clear, the dynamics of the text exceptional, drawing readers to the next page, which they turn with anticipation. The First World War was not inevitable, MacMillan reiterates in this excellent book, it was brought about by people who did not realise what its nature would be, let alone what the consequences would be, and those who did have some idea did not have the courage to oppose the war (p. 605) — in both cases, people who were not up to challenges of the time they lived in.

The questions could be raised whether Emmerson's book should have been included in this review at all. The reason for including it was that it is an interesting supplement to central contemporary historiography. The book offers a comprehensive description of the year 1913, the last year before the war. The author moves from country to country, i.e. from city to city, describing life in different places at the time. The book provides a series of images of peace that could have lasted another hundred years — it is almost a travel guide from a distant past. However, the attentive reader of this not especially interesting or comprehensive book can notice that there is a slow but certain change in the balance of power. Even though the European countries, i.e. their metropolises, are still the centre of the world, new countries on the fringes of this centre were slowly gaining strength, i.e. other peoples were growing stronger on the wave of the so-called first globalisation. These were primarily the U.S.A., as well as other countries on the American continents, certainly Japan, the almost unnoticed Australia (Down Under), and China's potentials were slowly becoming apparent. Some of them, such as the U.S.A., will take Europe's place in global affairs after the exhausting war on the continent and the appearance of destructive political projects, such as Fascism and Communism. The rise of some, especially China and India, will come considerably later, and the prospects of some, such as Argentina, will become significantly darker.

In many ways Hastings' book differs from the others reviewed in this article. It is by far the closest to journalism, but the best journalism possible. There are no footnotes or references, and it includes many more personal stories “from the scene”, not only about the decision makers but also about common people, who, whether they wanted to or not — felt the consequences of these decisions. It is almost like a novel about the year 1914, only both the characters and the events are real. The book is written in an elegant English language, the likes of which are slightly fading today, especially outside of the British Isles. As is the case with every novel, there are protagonists, individuals as well as peoples, good and bad, only all are tragedians — it is no wonder that the title of his book is Catastrophe.

Hastings has no dilemmas and moral relativism is not acceptable to him: the First World War was a war between good and evil. Evil is embodied
in Germany, in every respect. Not only is Germany guilty for the beginning of the war, but its elite started it in order to achieve German political domination over the peoples of Europe. For Hastings, as opposed to the other authors, another dilemma simply does not exist — Fischer was absolutely right. War occurred because there was a German political plan for that war. All those that fought against Germany in that war represent good.

The Serbs are given by Hastings a special place among those on the side of good, disproportionate to their military and especially economic power, and with deep respect. To the British readers Hastings explains, since he is slightly less interested in others, that the Serbs were to Austria-Hungary what the Irish were to Britain in the twentieth century. The only difference is that Britain proved to be resilient, the author adds. Hastings is the only one of the authors to show how the year 1914 and what followed it were tragic for Serbia. Specifying that one in six residents of Serbia was killed during the war, Hastings concludes that Austria did in fact succeed in punishing Serbia for the death of Franz Ferdinand. However, the price for that punishment was the self-destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In fact, the clash between Austria and Serbia, as depicted by Hastings, is a Shakespearean embrace of two enemies, neither of which can get out of it. In present-day language, the interests were so opposed to each other that no compromise could be reached. It was only later, with the wrong political decisions of the Serbian elite, that Serbs became aware of the long-term consequences of these horrific human losses that Hastings mentions.

Drina, Liège, Tannenberg, Marne, Ypres all appear as in the chapters of Hastings’ novel, ending with the “the Serbs’ last triumph” (the Battle of Kolubara) and what marked the end of 1914 “in the field” — life (for those that were so lucky) in the muddy trenches. It is a quite expected content for a book by a military historian such as Hastings. However, the reader might be somewhat disappointed by the treatment of the Battle of Tannenberg — there is too little material on this extremely important event. This catastrophic Russian defeat, from which the Imperial Army never recovered, brought about by the epochal incompetence and arrogance of the officers of the Imperial Army, and not by any special exceptionality of the German army, regardless of other consequences, fortified the myth of the invincibility of this army and the Prussian aristocracy, with von Hindenburg as the role model. The first myth was destroyed exactly thirty years later, relatively near Tannenberg, on the Eastern Front. The only difference is that it was no longer the Imperial Army on the other side, but rather the Red Army. And there was no armistice, like the one in 1918. The second myth was destroyed by the unobstructed political rise and survival of Nazism.

With this book Hastings proves that he is a member of the “old guard”, the one that apparently is slowly disappearing. This is a man who
still believes that we can and must draw a line between good and evil, and that the attempt to understand something or someone does not mean that we should also inevitably justify them. This is a man who considers courage, commitment to ideals, loyalty and sacrifice for others to be virtues. This is a man who believes that patriotism is not passé and that freedom represents one of the pillars of the dignity of human existence. This is a man who apparently does not know the meaning of the expression “political correctness”. Hats off to him!

In his first book, of the two that are included in this review, McMeekin tries to show which is the main party guilty for the First World War, but not the only guilty party — none other than Russia. This is done from the position of the Turkish Empire and the great injustice that was done to it by breaking up the formerly powerful empire. McMeekin believes that it is precisely Russia that should be declared the main scavenger. The finger is pointed at the duplicitous Sazonov, as though duplicity in politics was a Russian invention that this empire had monopoly over. However, if Russia wanted the war so badly, what then is the explanation for the assessments by the German General Staff that it was not until after 1916 that Russia was ready for war (this is how long it took to lay railway tracks in the so-called Polish bulge). Also, what is the explanation for the catastrophic defeat of the aggressor country in the first battle of Tannenbergr — usually the aggressor scores victories against the unprepared adversary in the early days of war, at least the Germans have experience in this.

This extremely unusual thesis about the sole Russian guilt for the breakout of the First World War was presented by McMeekin in this chaotically and unsystematically written book, in an attempt to defend it with confusing arguments, with the ever-present desire to distinguish in Manichaean style the evil Russia, the aggressor, and good Turkey, the victim of aggression. It seems that the Western Front did not exist for McMeekin. It is as though also non-existent was the German war plan, according to which the focus of operations was on the Western Front. It is as though the Battle of the Marne did not take place. Russia’s sole guilt would be a Copernican Revolution in the perception of the causes of the First World War, and McMeekin, a young and anonymous author prior to this book, trades precisely on that fact. Proving or disproving Germany’s guilt is something that is usual, it has been going on for a long time, but exclusive Russian guilt — that would certainly contribute to the publicity of the book and its author. However, one should remember that the Copernican Revolution occurred because Copernicus was right.

The author published a second book in the same year, practically a daily chronicle of the last days of peace, in which he examines things in a completely different way. There are no more evil, duplicitous, cunning and
self-confident Russians, but rather all the decision makers are now ordinary human beings, with all their limitations. One should not waste any more words on McMeekin’s contribution to contemporary historiography.

Christopher Clark became the main star of the new historiographic cycle with his book *The Sleepwalkers*, which has become widely known. It is likely that one of the reasons for this is that in this book the entwinement of the fields of history and international relations is quite clear, perhaps clearer than in any other of the reviewed books.

However, let’s start from the beginning. Already at the very beginning of the book Clark states that the book “is concerned less with why the war happened than with how it came about.” His explanation is unconvincing — he believes that the answer to the question “why invites us to go in search of remote and categorical causes: imperialism, nationalism, armaments, alliances, high finance,” etc. It remains unclear what then should be the focus of historiography if it does not address these issues. The methodological problem is clear, independent of this: such a dissection is understandable in certain areas (the separation of procedural law and substantive law, for example), but to analytically answer the question *how*, without analysing the *why*, certainly represents nothing more than an ordinary chronology, like the one presented by McMeekin, and that is certainly not worthy of mention in a review of historiographic works. Even though Clark tones down his stance a bit later, he defends it by citing the stance of Bulgarian historian Budinov “once we pose the question ‘why’, guilt becomes the focal point”. Things are somewhat clearer now: such a methodological procedure allows for the elegant circumventing of Fischer’s thesis on the German guilt for the war, as well as the guilt of its allies, such as Bulgaria. This is why the conclusion that no one was guilty for the First World War: “The outbreak of war was a tragedy, not a crime” (p. 561).

At the very beginning of the book Clark also presents a second interesting hypothesis — the First World War was not the consequences of any long-term deterioration of international elations, “but of short-term shocks to the international system”. However, the problem is that well-organised international relations are resistant to short-term shock — they are resistant to stress-tests. If short-term shocks toppled the international system, it was not resistant to such shocks, which speaks enough about its vulnerability. And things become even more absurd when at the end of the book we learn from the author what these short-term shocks were: the creation of the Albanian state, the Russian diplomatic reorientation from Sofia to Belgrade (p. 557), and of course — the shots fired in Sarajevo. In line with the stated logic the absurd conclusion follows: the reason for the slaughter at Verdun was the creation of the Albanian state. However, such a methodological approach allows the author to circumvent a serious analysis of everything that
MacMillan had analysed: the long-term changes in relations between the great powers, which led to the establishment of a system of international relations, which were so deteriorated that Europe was constantly on the brink of war. None of this exists in Clark’s book. Therefore German war guilt cannot exist whatsoever. And all that under the slogan “How, not why!”

The greatest weakness of Clark’s book is the lack of arguments for his apodictic claims, i.e. their inconvincibility, if he even presents them at all. For example, Clark says that “In any case, it was not the building of German ships after 1898 that propelled Britain into closer relations with France and Russia.” Without any evidence! Not even the fact that naval domination was crucial for Britain’s national security, nor the clearly demonstrated British tolerance toward the growth of the navies of distant countries (the U.S.A. and Japan), nor the thought that Britain could feel threatened by the huge modern navy not far from its shores, nor the absence of any reason for Germany’s aggressive program of maritime armament — none of this fazes Clark. Germany is not guilty and that’s it. There’s nothing to prove there!

Even more interesting is the treatment of the famous meeting of the Imperial War Council in 1912, which authorities consider the event that confirmed Germany’s aggressive war intentions, embodied in the position of so-called preventive war, before future opponents, primarily Russia, gain military strength. The key historic source on the content of the meeting is the journal entry of Admiral von Müller, the Chief of the German Imperial Naval Cabinet, practically chief of staff of the German navy. Clark claims that this meeting had no significance, and in support of this he cites the conclusion from von Müller’s journal entry that the result of the meeting “amounted to almost nothing”. The problem is that Clark does not even try to consider what Admiral von Müller’s expectations were, and based on what criteria he made the conclusion that he entered in his journal. It is reasonable to assume that the Chief of the Imperial Naval Cabinet was interested in operational issues related to the navy preparing for war: how many new ships would be outfitted, how recruitment would increase the human potential, how the new personnel would be trained. Admirals are in fact not interested in political conclusions, but formal operational decisions related to the navy that they command. If we look at Admiral von Müller’s notes in this light, it becomes clear that his lapidary conclusion was (likely) not related to the political result of the meeting, and only such a result is relevant from the point of view of historiographic analysis. This was not neglected by MacMillan, who notes in von Müller’s record that von Moltke’s concurred that war was unavoidable and his words “War the sooner the

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better”, and the Kaiser’s position that Germany would have to go to war against Great Britain and France together (p. 479).

The weakness of Clark’s arguments, where there are any, is a general feature of his opus. For example, in his history of Prussia one can find the claim that the Soviet authorities had greater understanding for the Prussian aristocracy than the Western allies did, differentiating between them and the Nazis, which the Western allies did not do, wanting to destroy Prussia as the cradle of German militarism. The argument supporting this claim can be found in the fact that Soviet media, unlike Western media, expressed sympathies for the conspirators who tried to eliminate Hitler, and that the Soviet authorities tried to organise German units that would fight against the German army, commended by Prussian offices, within the National Committee for a Free Germany. The only thing that Clark ignores is that this is a totalitarian government, where propaganda comes first (as is the case in their totalitarian Nazi opponent — previously ally, before the war — with the propaganda project based on General Vlasov and his Army) and which took this project to be a propaganda victory. The Western allies did not engage in propaganda, but rather in the destruction of Prussian militarism, which is why they had no need for such gestures. And the extent to which the Soviet authorities truly differentiated between Nazism and Prussian militarism, and to what extent they perceived virtues in the Prussian aristocracy, is best apparent in the ferocity with which that entire area was destroyed towards the end of the war and the tenacity with which all Prussians were forced out. Of course, none of that is important to Clark — he still believes that the Russians/Soviets saw virtue where no one else did, perhaps excluding himself. Someone had some understanding for his beloved Prussia, even if that someone was Stalin!

Clark has an interesting analysis of the transformation of the European multipolar system of alliances, which was based on the German concept of loose alliance with neighbours, into a bipolar world that led to the breakout of war. Of course, Clark is correct when he says that this bipolar system was necessary but not a sufficient condition, i.e. that it did not cause the war. He surprisingly successfully explains his view by pointing out the fact that Cold War bipolar world did not lead to a global war. Clark is correct when he explains that after Hiroshima and Nagasaki the decision makers and general public had no illusions about how a nuclear war would be conducted and what would be its consequences. In this sense Clark is correct that the decision makers in 1914 were sleepwalking. Even though


they knew they were going to war, most of the decision makers had no idea what kind of war awaited them.

The way that secondary historical sources are used in Clark’s book is quite problematic. For example, Clark states, citing Bulgarian historian Teodorov, that after the First Balkan War Crown Prince Alexander toured various “Macedonian towns in the conquered areas” and spoke to “local Bulgars” in the following way. “What are you?” “Bulgarian.” “You are not Bulgarian. Fuck your father.”8 The credibility of the source is yet to be verified. Not everything that was ever published is appropriate for quotation — this is the advice to those who are preparing for a career in science, but Clark apparently does not abide by it. And the detailed recount of portions of the memoirs of a 26-year-old (therefore novice) French diplomat, Louis de Robien (pp. 433–435), on his experiences upon arriving in St. Petersburg, including his assessment of the local cuisine, is not only completely irrelevant, but is apparently supposed to serve to show that at the time Russia was a backward country and a country of Orthodox fundamentalism, in order to discredit the Russian side in 1914, especially in the eyes of the present-day more superficial readers, in whom the word fundamentalism elicits an association with Iran and some other present-day evils.

However, the question may be raised why *The Sleepwalkers*, a book with so many methodological deficiencies, has achieved such success that many people worldwide believe it to be a synonym for contemporary global historiography on the topic of the First World War. This is no coincidence; it is a very well-written book. The style is suitable, keeping the reader on edge, the right measure of connection with secondary historical sources has been made, and parallels with the present are such that it grasps the attention of the readers who are not so interested in the period a century ago — Clark is obviously an experienced author. *The Sleepwalkers* is a bad, but very well-written book — one might even say skilfully written.

Fromkin’s book, even though published nearly a decade ago, has still made it into the selection for this review for its contributions to the field of international relations more than historiography, and for the very clearly expressed theses about the causes of the First World War. Fromkin points out one of the very important characteristics of the Triple Alliance, the alliance that Germany was in — the links between the allies were asymmetrical. The indubitable pillar of this alliance was Germany and its commitment to its allies was unquestionable. The other two allies, Austria and especially Italy, had less strength, military as well as economic, and were less reliable partners, i.e. with less commitment to the alliance and the obligations stemming from it.

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The German leaders simply did not know how their allies would act when hard times came around, since they had not received a single credible signal from them regarding the acceptance of the agreed obligations. Judging that the alliance with Italy was a dead letter (time would prove that this was a good assessment) the German authorities knew that it was crucial that at least Austria-Hungary be their ally, otherwise they would be alone, between France and Russia. This is why it was crucial that they secure this alliance.

Fromkin believes that the best way for that was for Austria (Fromkin writes about Austria, not referring to Austria-Hungary, likely implicitly pointing out the asymmetry in the adoption of foreign policy and military decisions) to attack Serbia, because then it would have to seek Germany’s protection from Russia, Serbia’s ally, i.e. protector. This is precisely how Fromkin interprets Germany giving Austria a free hand in early July 1914, and even Germany’s dissatisfaction with the slow preparations for the war against Serbia, i.e. encouragement to speed up the start of the war. Simply, the moment that Austria is at war with Serbia, because of the Russian threat there would be no thought of abandoning the alliance with Germany, which is of crucial importance for the integrity of the German Eastern Front.

From this it follows that there was a strategic conformity between Austrian and German interests. Both countries wanted war: Austria against Serbia, and it was not interested in anything else, and Germany against Russia, with a preventive war on the Western Front, so that after the defeat of France, the entire German military force could focus on Russia. Therefore the Austrian alliance on the Eastern Front was of strategic importance to Germany in the defensive phase, i.e. until France was defeated and kicked out of the game. It takes two to keep the peace, Fromkin writes, but only one to start a war — the one that wants to start it; the other side does not have much choice. He considers the First World War to be Austrian and German, however Austria wanted a local war, in accordance with its capacities.

In Fromkin’s book, as well as in several others reviewed, there is testimony of one of the possible implications of the Sarajevo assassination. The victim of this assassination was a person that many believed was opposed to a war against Serbia. It appears that Franz Ferdinand was aware that Austria-Hungary could not survive a war, that it was too weak a state structure. We will probably never learn the truth about this, but as Fromkin states, at the moment when the Austrian army moved against Serbia, Austrian Chief of the General Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf admitted “Had the Archduke still been alive, he would have had me shot” (p. 302). However, he was no more.

Annika Mombauer’s book is included in this review because it presents a review of the history of revision of the historiography on Germany’s war guilt, clearly showing how the issue of this guilt exceeds the historiographic, i.e. academic frame. This is a serious political issue. Namely, there
probably is not a country in the world with such a heavy historical heritage as Germany. Since no one can dispute Germany’s guilt for the beginning of the Second World War — this matter is quite clear — the question is raised as to the continuity of Germany’s aggressive policy and militarism, rooted in the German state up to 1945, which inevitably stems from Fischer’s thesis. Mombauer showed how the German the academic and non-academic public reacted to the appearance of Fischer’s thesis, and how it was possible that Fischer’s controversy led to him being denied financial support for traveling to a series of lectures in the U.S.A. solely based on his historiographic findings, i.e. the views that he argued. This is best apparent from the excerpt from Gerhard Ritter, Fischer’s main opponent, and his thesis: “...if [the war] was caused solely or primarily by the excessive political ambition of our nation..., and has recently been affirmed by some German historians, then our national historical consciousness darkens even further than has already been the case through the experiences of the Hitler times!”9 Indeed, the question emerges as to what historiography should be addressing. As Mombauer writes that Ritter, feeling secure in himself, explained that “it is the task of the historian to help elevate the political image of the nation about the nation by presenting the history that this nation creates” (p. 120). Fischer obviously had a different vision of his task — the search for the truth. And this is where Fischer’s superiority over his most aggressive critics emerges. In a slightly altered form, one that does not dispute Germany’s war guilt, regardless of whether there was a concrete political plan before the war, this thesis survived to the time when Mombauer published her book (2002).

And at the end of this review, one should point out that the word “understand” has two different meaning. One is the meaning of comprehension of the sense, i.e. apprehension of cause and effect relationships, implying value-neutral answers to questions of why and how. I believe that it is the task of every science, including historiography, to address such “understanding”, i.e. the comprehension of reality as it is, i.e. in the case of historiography — as it was. The other meaning is in the sense of justification, i.e. having understanding for someone or something. This is a matter of value judgements, which inevitably leads to the creation of a heritage of national awareness, which is so dear to Ritter, regardless of whose it is, ours or theirs. This is something that is not, or at least should not be, part of science. Unfortunately, a great portion of the works went into justifying someone or something, and not the cognition what, why and how happened exactly a hundred years ago.

The monograph Kosovo Cultural Myth by Sanja Bošković, Professor of Slavic Studies and Chairman of the Department for Slavic and Oriental Languages at the University of Poitiers in France, treats a very actual topic both in scholar and public discourse. Intent on approaching this subject from the cultural angle, the author points out that her book “is an attempt at different reading of a cultural legacy and within it the unique fact such as the Kosovo myth”. Bošković’s study is divided into eight chapters.

The first introductory chapter discusses the motive of betrayal as one of the key elements of the oral epic tradition concerning the Battle of Kosovo which has also become the fundamental bearer of the collective interpretation of a historical event. The author poses a number of questions which put the false historical fact about the betrayal of Vuk Branković in opposition to the oral popular tradition and the collective remembrance of the Battle of Kosovo as a place of meeting between history and poetry. Here is a poetisation of history in which historical fact departs from its initial shape and conforms to epic voice (p. 11). Therefore, the Kosovo cultural myth is comprehended in this book as remembrance of and singing about the Battle of Kosovo embodied in the epic oral voice which has developed in something of a spiritual creation in the fullness of time.

The second chapter deals with the notions of legend, myth and mythicisation within the Kosovo saga and demonstrates the crucial role of an oral tradition in the emergence and formation of the Kosovo myth. Bošković explains the notion of myth relying on interpretations of the classic authors of the anthropological theory of myth: Frazer, Malinowski, Jung, Lévi-Strauss, Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, Eliade. The author quotes Eliade who has claimed that myth is a true story, i.e. a story which speaks the truth about the position of a human in the universe notwithstanding all its imaginativeness, a story of creation and coming into being.

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Mythicisation of epic content — the Kosovo myth in this case — is a constructive process which has become the main cultural myth amongst Serbs. Considered a cultural myth it develops from cultural perceptions to unique collective experience of historical and cultural reality (p. 17). Besides primary, ethnological myths which are contained in archaic cultures, cultural myths are derived from the culture of a particular community. Such myths reflect collective experience and memory, and they are built and modified in the course of time. In an attempt to present the complexity of the Kosovo myth through her different reading of it, the author distinguishes between the following segments of its structure: historical segment, the core around which mythical structure is formed; contemplative segment which offers the explanation of a historical fact; metaphysical-Christian segment provides an explanation for the defeat in the battle and puts historical event into a wider metaphysical context; archetype segment is visible in oral tradition; and finally, the segment of collective cultural perceptions which reflect the collective consciousness of the people and their reception of historical event (p. 30).

The third chapter points out the difference between ethnological and cultural myths, and argues that the Kosovo myth cannot be categorised in the former group. It provides a review of different mythological theories formulated by Taylor, Spenser, Frazer, Malinowski, Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, Freud, Jung, Cassirer, Eliade. Based on Cassirer’s division into natural/cosmogonical and cultural myths, the author considers the latter as myths of ancestors-heroes, the mythical forms of a profane content which rest on the collective perceptions of a society. Cultural myths are of pragmatically ethical nature, they develop in the course of time and pass on from one generation to another.

The forth chapter analyses the origins of the Kosovo myth which has grown from a concrete historical event. Bošković wonders when and how the Kosovo myth came into being, and she points out the complex origins of it the discussion of which requires an analysis of different facets of collective memory. The key notion in the analysis is that of time — “the Kosovo myth has been formed and is still being formed in the course of time” (p. 89). Within the Kosovo myth there is a number of layers of different memory types: mythical-ethnological memory, ritual-syncretic memory, the elements of epic memory, historical memory, “flash” memory as well as repetitive and semantic memory. The said types present different forms of collective memory and attest to the complex nature of the Kosovo cultural myth. The aspects of perception of the Kosovo event are presented in tables for the purpose of emphasising the semantic structures which contribute to passing on the Kosovo cultural heritage.

The fifth chapter discusses the multi-layer nature of the Kosovo myth, including the epic cycle dedicated to the Battle of Kosovo. The author analysis the key figures of the myth (Emperor Lazar, Jug Bogdan and his nine sons, the Jugovic, Miloš Obilić, Vuk Branković, Milan Toplica, Kosančić Ivan) and points out that “the cultural myth of Kosovo has formed around concrete historical event, the battle that took place on 15/28 [according to Julian/Gregorian calendar] June 1389, and as such it constitutes the back-bone of the Serbian people’s historical memory” (p. 218). Bošković finds out that the epic cycle of Kosovo reflects a collective memory which, on one side, bears witness to historical facts and, on the other, relays symbolical value. Although this cultural myth has been formed around concrete historical event, it was epic verse and oral tradition that had the essential role in its passing on from one genera-
The last eighth chapter broaches the question of preservation of cultural identity in the era of globalisation in the 21st century. New appreciations of the notions of space and time lead to new appreciation of the Kosovo cultural myth. The author concludes that “apprehended as a virtual and real ground of Serbian spirituality and collective cultural identity [it] is being moved from a location into the space of modern historical moment” (p. 464).

In this book, the Kosovo myth as a cultural phenomenon recorded in the Serbian language and oral tradition is a case study of cultural identity, both individual and collective. This study particularly benefits from its interdisciplinary approach (literary, anthropological and cultural). Due to its exposition of numerous theories regarding the research of a complex phenomenon such as myth this book is a valuable point of departure for humanities students and scholars as well as those interested in the issues stemming from myths and their interpretations in different cultures.


Reviewed by Dušan T. Bataković*

P. K. Kitromilides, Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens, is the foremost international specialist on the history of the Enlightenment in the Greek-speaking world. He defines the Enlightenment as “an affirmation of all the political consequences of the emancipation of the human mind from tutelage of authority: it proclaimed the rights of the individual; it fought resolutely against despotism, fanaticism intolerance and social injustice; it clamoured for the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity in which it found a new religion of humanity”. Within this context, liberalism “which sanctioned the autonomy and the rights of the individual, became the foremost political expression of the new philosophy”. Absorbed by the theocratic and multinational Ottoman Empire from the sixteenth century the societies in Mediterranean Europe entered the Enlighten-
ment era with a backward social and economic structure, unprepared for its secularized European culture. Perceived as “a threat to the entrenched social order and its values”, the Enlightenment was gradually transformed, in particular after 1789, into a “fundamentally political movement focused on the highest of stakes: the basic values and institutions of society; the shape of the body politic; the definition of an acceptable collective destiny; and the legitimate direction of the affairs of the society.”

Covering two centuries of a bitter intellectual struggle between secular and religious thought, the analysis offered in this book reveals the major influence of late seventeenth- and eighteen-century European thinkers, such as John Locke or Voltaire, on the development of the Enlightenment within the narrow but prominent elite of secular-oriented Greek intellectuals. Prof. Kitromilides shows the extent to which the Newtonian scientific revolution sparked the dispute between liberal-minded intellectuals and conservative church-oriented groups, between modernity and traditionalist religious approach to life and education. Early, seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century protagonists of the Enlightenment, educators and philosophers such as Methodius Anthrakitis, Vikentios Damodos or Antonis Katiphoros from northern Greece and the Ionian islands, heralded a change in the overall intellectual climate by introducing new ideas, such as natural law and Aristotelianism, into the Neohellenic world. The main figures of the Greek Enlightenment, such as A. Korais and E. Voulgaris, and their followers remained ever open to enlightened ideas coming from western Europe. Their main hope was that the gradual introduction of these ideas into the education process, and possibly politics, would give an impetus to the modernization and Europeanization of the Ottoman-dominated Greek world.

Evgenios Voulgaris (1716–1806), also a native of the Venice-held Ionian Islands and early translator of Locke and Voltaire into Greek, came to be synonymous with the Greek Enlightenment, epitomizing Greek re-education through “the affirmation of reason as the only standard of truth”. Over the twenty years of teaching in the Greek world, from the Balkans to Asia Minor, Voulgaris and his disciples “made the Enlightenment and its social and political implications appear as a credible option, relevant to the changing needs of Greek society under Ottoman rule in the eighteenth century”.

The rediscovery of ancient Greek traditions through the translation of western historical narratives (sixteen volumes of *Histoire ancienne* by Charles Rollin, a devoted disciple of Bossuet) was instrumental for the self-perception of modern Greeks as direct and natural descendants of ancient Greece and its spectacular classical civilization. “These elements of the Neohellenic self-conception were put forward at varying levels of articulation in a wide range of sources over a long period of time and culminated in nineteenth-century historicism. The modern Greek Enlightenment spelled out the initial version of a historical doctrine that eventually provided the basis of national self-conception.” The rediscovered ancient Greek past became a basis for new interpretations of the genuine Greek heritage such as the art of government, democracy, “civility and civil virtue, the equitable administration of justice, ingenuity of mind in the exact sciences, dexterity in the arts, and virtuosity in all things. Thus, out of the pages of a textbook on ancient history,” Kitromilides stresses, “emerged the moral and intellectual priorities of the Enlightenment, timid and circumscribed, to be sure, but nonetheless irresistible.”

In what followed in the process, apart from passing from a sacred to modern, culturally-based geography (*Novel Geog-*)
raphy by D. Philippides and G. Constanza in 1791), an innovation that contributed largely to the self-awareness of the Greeks, two important Greek intellectuals (I. Moisiodax and D. Katartzis) offered, in the 1770s and 1780s, a new theory of enlightened absolutism as an instrument of social change, combining the Hellenistic and Byzantine legacies with the modern need for cultural transformation and political renewal.

Adamantios Korais, the eyewitness of the 1789 French Revolution, was the most prominent among the enlightened Greek intellectuals. His political activity gave substantial weight to the whole movement, spreading an entire set of revolutionary and national ideas among freshly-awakened layers of Greek society. Korais was inspired by Condorcet and his ideological successors, and profoundly impressed by the intellectual impact of Condorcet’s treatise on the progress of the human spirit. In a similar way Korais, a liberal republican, sought to bolster the Greek Enlightenment through his Mémoire sur l’état actuel de la civilisation dans la Grèce (1803). The French Revolution which “seemed to give concrete political form to the philosophical and cultural aspirations of the Enlightenment” was discredited to a large extent by the bloody events of 1793, which had a negative impact on the Greek learned society, giving rise to the publication of anti-revolutionary pamphlets. The richest layer of Greek society, the Phanariotes, aligning their interests with those of the Sublime Porte at Constantinople, saw the Enlightenment ideas and their proponents as the main threat to their dominant role in Greek education and traditional culture. Some dogmatists of the Patriarchate of Constantinople articulated their opposition in the counterrevolutionary text titled Paternal Instruction, exhorting their Orthodox flock to acknowledge the legitimacy of Ottoman rule and “submit loyally and gratefully to their God-ordained masters and forget all idle talk about a deceptive liberty on this earth.” According to this concept, “the modern system of liberty was imported at the time from the West into Orthodox lands” and “stood in sharp contradiction to the Scriptures, and it involved nothing more than the pursuit of selfish interest and vile appetites”. It presented the Ottoman Empire as a rampart against Western proselytism, “as a bridle on Latin heresy”.

Korais responded with an anonymous pamphlet describing Ottoman rule as despotic and discriminatory, its system as corrupted, immoral and socially unjust, and the spiritual leadership of Greeks as enslaved in its centuries-long captivity. His Fraternal Instruction, as underscored by Kitromilides, “was the first proclamation of the political liberalism of the Enlightenment as a matrix for the Greek future.” Unlike ecclesiastical circles, Korais’s pamphlets praised Napoleon’s advances in the Ionian Islands and Egypt, seeing them as the announcement of the inevitable demise of corrupt Ottoman rule. Korais was also responsible for the launching of the ambitious and very successful project of editing and republishing the Greek classics. The sixteen volumes of his Hellenic Library published between 1806 and 1827 reintroduced into modern Greek literature the great ancient authors such as Isocrates, Xenophon and Strabo, often considered as being compatible with the ideas of the Enlightenment, as well as the famous Greek authors from the period of the Roman Empire such as Plutarch.

Along with Korais, daring political action combined with intellectual activism was a trademark of Rhigas Velestinlis. In 1797, only a year before he was strangled in the fortress of Belgrade for fomenting revolutionary activity against the Ottomans and seeking to establish contact with Napoleon, Rhigas Velestinlis had published the influential pamphlet
New Political Constitution addressing the Greeks of the mainland, Asia Minor, the Mediterranean islands and the northeast Balkan regions of Wallachia and Moldavia. This important document, defining as Greeks all Balkan non-Greek ethnic groups bound to Greek language and culture, was inspired by Montesquieu and contained a charter of the rights of man and the popular battle hymn Thourios, linking the modern struggle for freedom to ancient Greek traditions.

The main challenge to the ideas of the Greek Enlightenment, however, was the Greek revolution itself. After the War of Independence started in 1821 and the National Assembly of insurgent Greece drafted a charter in January 1822, Korais scrutinized the new constitution in his Notes on the Provisional Constitution of Greece. It was in 1827 that the Third National Assembly of revolutionary Greece adopted Korais’ suggestions and expressed its gratitude. “It was the Enlightenment’s finest hour,” Kitromilides accurately concludes: “A nation fighting for its freedom reached self-consciousness by making the aspirations of the Enlightenment the matrix of its fate.”

The eventual collapse of many of the major Enlightenment ideas in nineteenth-century Greece was marked by the ascendancy of a nationalist ideology combined with conservative religious thought that was hiding behind Romanticism and the nation-state concept. In spite of the revolutionary tradition which brought about the restoration of modern Greece in 1829, the lack of a liberal content in the national ideology pushed the enlightened trends in Greek society deep into the background: “The measure of liberalism’s failure can be best appreciated in view of the fact that constitutional government and significant political change in Greece were achieved not as a consequence of liberal politics but by military interventions in 1843, 1862, and 1909 — a feature of the Greek political system that inaugurated an ominous tradition in the twentieth century.” Thus, the rise of a nationalist and authoritarian model of society was responsible for the failure of liberalism, remaining the source of friction and instability until this day.

The Enlightenment, the author concludes, “remained a vision of possibilities and alternatives and a framework of social and cultural criticism rather than a workable blueprint of actual developments”. Prof. Kitromilides’s masterly written book offers a well-argued and captivating in-depth reconstruction of the whole cultural and political process of transmitting the European “new science” to the southern Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean, explaining the intellectual background of modern Greece.


 Reviewed by Veljko Stanić*

Despite previous research into the history of Serbs in Hungary, a synthesis pertaining to this subject has been conspicuous by its absence, at least until the emergence of Academician Vasilije Krestić’s book. Previously, historians could refer to a few comprehensive studies such as the two-volume monograph Vojvodina published in 1939/40 which covered the period up to 1790 and Dušan Popović’s work Srbi u Vojvodini, 1–3 the coverage of which extended to 1861; there were also

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certain collective projects such as *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije* and *Istorija srpskog naroda* which dealt with the history of Serbs in Hungary.

Resulting from several decades of scholarship and archival research carried out in Vienna, Budapest, Zagreb, Novi Sad, Sremski Karlovci and Belgrade, this book is no surprise. Emeritus Professor of the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, Director of the Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) and Secretary of the Department for Historical Sciences of SANU for many years, Krestić has dedicated his entire scholarly work to modern history of the Serbian people, particularly history of Serbs in Croatia and Slavonia and Serbo-Croat relations (*History of the Serbs in Croatia and Slavonia, 1848–1914*, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1997; *Gradja o Srbima u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji 1848–1914, 1–2*, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1995; *Iz istorije Srba i srpsko-hrvatskih odnosa*, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1994). Also, Krestić has paid particular attention to Hungarian matters at the early stages of his academic career with his doctoral dissertation *Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba 1868. godine* and then with his thorough monograph *Istorija srpske stampe u Ugarskoj, 1791–1914*. Encompassing his own research of several decades and the entire historiographical legacy concerning the Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy, his work offers well-thought through answers to a series of questions relating to the political, social, economic and cultural history of Serbs in Hungary from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century.

Covering the period from the Assembly of Timișoara of 1790 to the inclusion of the province in Serbia in 1918, the author has studied the long nineteenth century from the emergence of modern national feelings amongst the peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy at the end of the eighteenth century until the profound change in the map of Europe at the end of the First World War. A chronological framework of this synthesis is divided into six large thematic parts and as many as 63 chapters: 1. From the Assembly of Timișoara to the 1848 Revolution; 2. The Revolution of 1848–1849; 3. Bach’s Absolutism (1849–1860); 4. State Reorganisation of the Monarchy and the Serbs (1861–1867); 5. From the Austro-Hungarian Compromise to the Congress of Berlin (1867–1878) and 6. From the Congress of Berlin to the End of the First World War. The former part of the nineteenth century with special reference to the impact of the First Serbian Uprising of 1804 on the Serbs in Hungary and their later political and cultural development is something of an introduction. Relatively largest part of the book deals with the Revolution of 1848–1849 which is covered in detail. The last few decades of the nineteenth century saw the liveliest political organisation of Serbs in Hungary, the activities of the Serbian People’s Liberal Party of Svetozar Miletic, the formulation of political programmes of the radicals, liberals, independents and others. The discussion of the First World War treats not just political situation, but also everyday life of the Serb population.

Spanning over such a long period of time, the author begins with the analysis of different state-legal frameworks in which the Serbian people lived under the Habsburg Monarchy from the end of the eighteenth century – these were reflections of the changes in the state organisation throughout the nineteenth century. Drawing on his immense knowledge of the history of the Habsburg Monarchy, Krestić endeavours to present the political development of Serbs in the light of the general political ideas of that time and the dynamics of the Monarchy’s political life. At the same time, he does not lose sight of the fundamental political processes in international relations, particularly the development of the Eastern Question.
and its influence on the fate of Serbs in the Monarchy.

Taking into account all the aspects of social stratification and economic development of the Serb populace in Hungary, as well as the processes and institutions of their cultural life, the author, however, mostly focuses on political development, ideas, movements and parties. Wellversed in archival records, Krestić has provided a nuanced picture of political events in Hungary. Preoccupied with the currents of the Serbian people’s national integration in Hungary, the creation and preservation of its religious and national identity, Krestić considers this phenomenon in its interaction with other political factors embodied mostly in Vienna and Pest, but also in Belgrade and Zagreb. Analysing numerous changes and constants in these relations in the period of time longer than a century, the author underscores the fundamental connection of Serbs in Hungary with Serbia and her political and social development. Moreover, he has seen the decades-long resistance to Magyarisation as a core thread of the struggle for political individuality of Serbian nation in Hungary which merged into the overall movement for national unification realised in 1918.

Particularly novel are the author’s discussions about the Croatian component in the political life of Hungarian Serbs, new revelations about the politics of notables, the matters concerning the Military Border as well as the activities of the Serbian People’s Liberal Party. The issues of Serb national-religious autonomy and nationality in Hungary are also examined and, along with the above-mentioned questions, contribute to the presentation of a well-rounded account of the complex period of history of the Serbs in this part of the Habsburg Monarchy. This book thus fulfils a considerable lacuna in Serbian historiography and provides a reliable point of departure for further research.


Reviewed by Jelena N. Radosavljević*

The formation of the Albanian nation was a long process, which began considerably later than what was the case with other nations in the Balkan Peninsula. Some historiographical works attach great importance to certain events, for example the meeting of the the Albanian League in Prizren. However, this process took place under foreign influence. One of the European great powers which actively affected this process in the 19th and 20th century was Austria — Hungary. It is precisely that influence that is the theme of Teodora Toleva’s Ph.D. dissertation The Influence of Austria — Hungary on the Formation of the Albanian Nation, 1896 — 1908. This book is an extended version of her doctoral dissertation awarded at the University of Barcelona.

The book is divided into several parts. At the beginning there are some introductory texts of Georgi Markov, Vrurban

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Todorov (Sofia, Bulgaria), Augustin Colomines Companis (Barcelona, Spain) and Leopold Auer (Vienna, Austria) about the book and the author who belongs to both Spanish and Bulgarian historiography. The book consists of introduction, ten chapters and conclusion.

The author points out in her introduction that she has unearthed valuable and fairly unknown source material during her research in Viennese archives which made possible an in-depth approach to this subject. This is especially important because of the fact that some of these sources were used fragmentarily and interpreted with a view to confirming certain judgments (Stavro Skendi, Peter Bartl, George Castellan, Hans Dieter Schanderl etc.). The chronological frame of the book covers the period from 1896, when three secret conferences were held in Vienna, to the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, which brought about a partial change in the Austro-Hungarian policy towards the Ottoman Empire. This was the period when the policy of the adjacent Slavic countries towards the Dual Monarchy became less predictable, Russian influence in the Balkans was growing, and the influences of Italy, France, Great Britain and other states were not negligible as well. It was then that the Albanian question and its instrumentalisation for the purpose of achieving Austria-Hungary’s political goals became prominent.

The first three chapters are dedicated to the structure of diplomatic and intelligence services of the Habsburg Monarchy (from 1867 onwards Austria-Hungary), its policy to the Albanian question and the impact of that policy on a much wider area. The author explains how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one of the three joint ministries in Austria-Hungary came into being and highlights its importance because it was practically directly subordinated to the monarch. The ministry comprised of a network of diplomatic legations, consulates, viceconsulates, which often recruited a large number of agents in their respective areas in order to collect important information. Toleva highlights the importance of the 1896 secret conferences intended to organize Austria-Hungary’s political activities amongst the Albanians. The significance of these meetings and the Albanian question in general was indicated by the involvement of two most prominent officials, the minister of foreign affairs Goluchowski, and the minister of finance Benjamin Kallay who was well-versed in Balkan affairs. The resolutions made on these occasions showed how seriously Austria-Hungary approached an analysis of the Albanian question. Nothing was left to chance, which the “Memorandum on Albania” made clear; this document consisted of contributions made by a number of people, and it was finally compiled by Baron Zweidineck. The author points out that the memorandum has not been much used in historiography, or has been used selectively in order to prove certain claims. The memorandum was not favourable to the Ottoman Empire. Zweidineck considered its decomposition inevitable, and the formation of an Albanian Principality under Austro-Hungarian protectorate the only means of preventing Serbia and Montenegro from partitioning the Ottoman territory. The memorandum envisaged an active propaganda in the area between Montenegro, Bosnia and Serbia in the north, the Adriatic Sea in the west, Preveza, Ioannina, Argirocastro and Kastoria in the south, and Priština and Ohrid in the east (the villayets of Scutari, Kosovo, Monastir and Ioannina). Zweidineck noted that Albanian population was divided into tribes, which used many different dialects, and a few literate people used different alphabets. The Albanians were frequently embroiled in mutual feuds, and they were divided into Muslims, Orthodox and Roman Catho-
lics. Their tribal way of life and local interests suppressed the sense of common ethnic origin. Toleva underscores that Benjamin Kallay played a great role in the shaping of the memorandum; he believed that Serbia’s aggrandizement was possible only in the south, and only in the area up to Novi Pazar, which was, in his view, a sufficient compensation for its renouncing Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was predicted that the Roman Catholic Church would also be involved in this project, particularly the monastic orders of Jesuits and Franciscans whose monasteries were situated in the area inhabited by Albanians. In addition, propaganda activities were envisaged through the medium of press, magazines and books in which the Austro-Hungarian consular network would have a special role. Zweidineck also enclosed the ethnic and religious population tables for this area. The fact that Toleva has published most of the text of the memorandum provides this book with an additional value, since it cuts the ground from under arbitrary interpretations.

In the forth chapter, the author argues that the resolutions of the secret conferences, and especially the memorandum, denoted Austria-Hungary’s renouncing of the principle of legitimacy, which had already been undermined by the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878. Austro-Hungarian diplomacy had no confidence in the allegedly friendly governments (the Ottoman Empire, Italy), although it tried not to cause major doubts about its intentions at the Sublime Porte. Therefore, it was intent on gaining the Muslim Albanians by guaranteeing their rights, while Italy’s influence exercised through Roman Catholic priests educated in the Pontifical College in Scutari was supposed to be suppressed by the education in Albanian language and alphabet, which was yet to be codified.

The fifth chapter deals with the uprising of the Miriditi tribe in 1897 and the peaceful liquidation of that rebellion. The reports on these events sent by Austro-Hungarian consul in Skadar, T. Ippen, contained information about the important centers for the future propaganda amongst the Muslims. In his opinion, new consulates should be opened in Berat and Tirana. The author explains, on the basis of numerous sources, how the consuls created a network of confidential agents through the agency of which they exerted influence in the field and obtained information about the Albanian population which was then forwarded to Vienna. In that way, the consuls in Skoplje, Bitolj (Monastir), Prizren and Durrëz watched over the proceedings of the Albanian League assembly held in Peć in 1899. This was also a clear indication of how little confidence the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy had in the Ottoman Empire’s ability to keep control over its possessions — the said assembly was organised by the Porte.

The following chapter details the activities of Austro-Hungarian consuls. They used to travel across the country during the summer months, and make acquaintances and connections usually through the extensive distribution of money. However, their reports were not always optimistic. They described the great differences between certain tribes, their religious division, the lack of national awareness and almost non-existent desire for education in Albanian language.

The next three chapters demonstrate the primary reliance of Austro-Hungarian propaganda on the Roman Catholic Albanians. The authors of the memorandum and other documents stemming from the secret conferences of 1896 referred in this connection to the previous peace treaties concluded by the Sublime Porte, which had assigned to the Habsburg Monarchy the right of protection over the Roman Catholics in the Ottoman Empire. Detailed consular reports contained the lists
of all Roman Catholic buildings in the territories inhabited by Albanians. Unlike other diplomats from the predominantly Roman Catholic countries, their Austro-Hungarian colleagues were especially interested in Roman Catholics of Albanian ethnicity alone. The use of religious factor for propaganda purposes, the establishment of a network of agents, as well as the effect of bribery were reflected in the interesting example of Monsignor Primo Docchi from the parish of St. Alexander, who spread Austro-Hungarian propaganda among the Miriditi, particularly through literary works. The consular reports bore witness as to the existence of some twenty various alphabets and a few dialects used amongst the Albanians, but Vienna was persistent, despite all the difficulties, in its endeavours to create a common Albanian language and alphabet. The main goal was to gradually suppress the Italian — but also Greek and Serbian — schools.

The tenth chapter also discusses the importance of press and the idea of launching a newspaper in the Albanian language. The newspaper “Albania” published in Brussels and edited by the Albanian emigrant, Faik Bey Konica, was a result of such endeavours. However, the articles about Albanian history and folk literature published in this newspaper were written in Vienna. The low level of literacy of Albanian population made this publication fail in reaching its objectives.

The conclusion reiterates the most important findings of this study and points out the facts that shaped the unique development of the Albanian nation. The decisive factors were the great powers’ policies in the Balkans and the basic characteristics of the Albanian population, especially its religious, tribal and linguistic division. The Austro-Hungarian diplomacy was particularly influential through its consular network and propaganda activities. The author suggests that Albanian population in the late 19th and early 20th century had not formed a nation as yet. At the end of the book there are appendices such as consular reports, ethnographic maps and tables, which show religious and ethnic composition of the regions which the Albanians populated, along with other national and ethnic groups.

Teodora Toleva’s book is a new and useful contribution to historiography on the Albanian question, and therefore the Balkan history. Founded on numerous first-hand, mostly unpublished and Vienna-based, sources, which are frequently reproduced in the text, it sheds light on the seriousness with which Austria-Hungary approached the Albanian issue as part of its plans for establishing control over the Balkan Peninsula.

**Gerhard Hirschfeld & Gerd Krumeich, **_Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg_. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2013, pp. 331.

*Reviewed by Dušan Fundić*

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War overview, envisaged as a history of the war from the German point of view. They were motivated by the fact that the contemporary Germans have quite superficial knowledge of the First World War and by the pressing need to answer many queries of their foreign colleagues about the German view of certain crucial issues during the war. The authors aim to explore the effects and consequences of the war through the prism of soldiers in the trenches, home front, and various similar approaches. In order to achieve these goals, the authors have included over one hundred images, important diplomatic and military documents, but also letters and diaries of “common people” in wartime surroundings.

The book is divided into twelve chapters, arranged in chronological order with subjects such as war propaganda, home front, and industrialization of war. Every chapter is followed by a useful bibliography used for the compilation of its content. The first quarter of the book offers an interpretation of the origins and causes of the war. Hirschfeld and Krumeich consider that the turn of the century saw not only the beginning of a chain of events that included the Russo-Japanese war, the Balkan war of 1912, and the so-called near-war crises, but also, as a corollary of those events and the arms race, the rise of the peculiar popular sentiment: “pre-war mentality”. There was the popular belief widespread amongst politicians, diplomatic and military as well as scientists, journalists, writers and artists, that the outbreak of a great war just a matter of time. Under the influence of the widely accepted Social Darwinism, and the notions of advanced and backward races, war was believed to be “the right of might”. According to the authors, such ideas found fertile soil in Wilhelminian Germany.

At the turn of the twentieth century Germany was in the period of steady economic and demographic growth. Its population had grown from approximately 50 million in 1880 to 70 million in 1910. The German leadership pursued the risky policy of colonial expansion. To be true, lagging behind the Netherlands and Great Britain which had acquired their colonial possessions in the early modern period of European history, Germany could only attain colonies through politics of extortion or war. The German Empire embarked on the aggressive “Weltpolitik” which was propped by construction by construction of a powerful fleet especially under the leadership of admiral von Tirpitz from 1897 onwards. The Schlieffen plan was also made at that time with a view to finding solution for the conduct of a two front war.

Reviewing the near-war crises from the Moroccan affair of 1905 to the Balkan wars, the authors explain how the “psychosis” of a surrounded power came into being in Germany. It was the belief that as a Central European power Germany was surrounded by the increasingly hostile neighbours frightened of its progress and strength that gave birth to the fear of “Einkreisung”, the encirclement. Such fears were of immense importance in the July Crisis.

Hirschfeld’s and Krumeich’s account of the July Crisis hinges on three crucial points. First, the “simply irresponsible” German policy of testing the Triple Entente between Great Britain, France and Russia and especially the Russian resolve to wage war proved to have been a grave mistake. Second, the aggressive Austro-Hungarian policy towards Serbia in spite of the lack of evidence for the Serbian government’s complicity in the Sarajevo assassination, which continued even after
Serbia had given a response considered as “a masterpiece in style of traditional diplomacy” to Vienna’s ultimatum, leading to further aggravation of the situation. Finally, the Russian and Austro-Hungarian general mobilisation made the German leadership put their plans into motion. The German responsibility, according to Hirschfeld and Krumeich, is exemplified in the conduct of two key actors: Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg’s irresponsible intention to test the will of Russia and its allies to engage in a war and the “better now than later” attitude of the Chief of Staff von Moltke the Younger. There was also the shared illusion, despite some predictions and warnings, that the war would be a brief affair — similar to those of the 1870s — that plunged the governments concerned into it. In such circumstances, the Clausewitz formula that “a war is merely the continuation of policy by other means” was accepted. Euphoric reaction to the outbreak of war in the so-called “August experience” is vividly described in a chapter of a same name. Using interesting patriotic songs and poems as illustration the authors explain the depths of uncritical attitudes of population through examples of scientists, writers, artists who accepted a kind of collective enthusiasm.

Having been exhausted after just few weeks of war, the German militant euphoria rapidly dissipated. The failure of the Schlieffen plan led to continuation of the war and the crimes in Belgium accounted for the lost propaganda war. The largest part of the chapter is devoted to the Western and Eastern front where the German army mainly fought. There is also a short description of the German participation in the Balkan front, mainly in autumn 1915 against Serbia. The authors conclude this part of the book with the Swiss criminologist Rudolf Archibald Reiss’ report on Austro-Hungarian war crimes in Serbia; they also point out the k. u. k. Army headquarters view of these atrocities as “senseless reprisals”.

The chapters “Propaganda” and “Home front” deal with Germany’s efforts to mobilise its full capacities in the ongoing war. The main thesis here is that the Germans never managed to counter the British and French in terms of propaganda. This happened because they were unable, or uninterested, to show a true front suffering but rather tried to create a “hero image” for its population. On the other hand, Britain and France were much more successful in utilising their total capacities for war in comparison with Germany. The atrocities committed in Belgium gave substance to the image of “the Hun” and provided German enemies with a powerful propaganda tool.

The great battles of 1916–17 at Verdun, Somme and the Brusilov Offensive reflected the increasing industrialization of war with the attendant rapid growth in the number of casualties. Also, the narrative is enriched with the excerpts from diaries of the combatants and the letters sent to their families in which the atmosphere in the front was brought to life. “It is terrible how much blood flowed and the recent successes are too small in relation to the great sacrifices that have been made,” wrote a German sergeant in early March 1916. The rising casualty count is explained in the next chapter “The industrialization of war”. This industrialisation is illustrated with statistics: in the beginning of the war, Germany produced around 40,000 rifles and in 1916 that number rose to c. 250,000. The production of artillery ammunitions also rose from 11 million rounds per month in 1914 to c. 220 million in March 1916. The usage of tanks, U-boats and poisonous gas warfare is taken into account as well.

The last quarter of the book deals with the issues of politics in a total war, German defeat, the peace conference and the legacies of the Great War. The authors provide a short overview of the “Septemberprogram” that envisaged a German...
dominated Europe and the creation of a colonial empire in Central Africa. However, unlike the “Fischer school”, they do not consider this programme as the key document for the history of German imperialism. Instead, the authors endorse — “as most experts now agree” — an approach based on Wolfgang J. Mommsen’s theory of “Formelkompromiss” according to which certain politicians, the military, several rich individuals and industrialists sought for the realisation of the program. It also included the idea of ethnic cleansing of the Poles as a means of securing Germany’s eastern border which was later incorporated into Nazi plans for the expansion to the East. The closing months of the war saw the failure of German offensive in the West. However, the German Supreme Command’s hiding of the truth from the public led to the birth of the “stab in the back” legend, an illusion that the undefeated German army was betrayed in November 1918. With the defeat in the West, the German-imposed terms of the Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest treaties were discarded and with them the conquest of Poland, the Baltic Region Romania and Ukraine.

The main legacy of the First World War for German society, Hirschfeld and Krumeich stress, is a non-existence of the shared memory or consensus over the reasons for the defeat and its consequences. Such situation facilitated the rise of Nationalists and Anti-Republicans in the Weimar Republic and militated against the development of democratic culture in Germany between the two world wars. The closing chapter is followed by a short and useful chronology of the most important events in the first two decades of the 20th century.

In conclusion, Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg is a short, interesting and informative book which contributes to understanding of the main research topics of the First World War from the German perspective. With a lot of excerpts from original documents, the authors produced a well-written book that can serve as a suitable starting point for future researchers.

M. MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace — The Road to 1914,

Reviewed by Miloš Vojinovic*

In 1914 the famous writer Herbert George Wells wrote several articles in which he blamed the Central Powers for the outbreak of the Great War. The articles subsequently appeared in the book titled The War That Will End War. H. G. Wells’s idea became a slogan which, during the war and the Paris Peace Conference, symbolized the belief that after so much bloodshed in 1914–1918 there will be no more wars. After David Fromkin’s book A Peace to End All Peace, The War That Ended Peace is a new piece of historical writing that draws attention to this utopian belief, which culminated during the Paris Peace Conference.

MacMillan, professor at the University of Oxford, claims that historians should not ask only “why the Great War broke out”. She instead raises the question “why did the long peace not continue”? This is how MacMillan seeks to find a place for her book in the vast literature on the origins of the First World War. The War That Ended Peace does not

bring many new ideas. The focus on the collapse of peace instead on the outbreak of the war, was used by William Mulligan in his book *The Origins of the First World War* published in 2010. Numerous books about the First World War published over the past twenty years, such as John Röhl’s books about Kaiser Wilhelm II and his politics, David Stevenson’s *Armaments and Coming of War*, or Günter Kronenbitter’s *Krieg im Frieden*, all have offered new ideas for debate about the origins of the war. The same can hardly be said for MacMillan’s book.

The book is filled with many enjoyable anecdotes, and it is an easy read. The first chapter *Europe in 1900* is arguably the most original in the entire book. MacMillan has used the Universal Exposition held in Paris in 1900 to demonstrate many characteristics of pre-war Europe, from nationalism and imperialism to economic progress and development to international relations. She argues against the idealized picture of Belle Époque and claims that the exhibition reflected tensions inside Europe. Influence of Social Darwinism is illustrated by the example of the official catalogue of the Paris Exhibition, where it was said that “war is natural to humanity” (pp. 7, 25).

MacMillan’s ideas are not constant throughout the book. For example, on p. 171 she quotes conversation between David Lloyd George and the liberal statesman Lord Rosebery. They spoke about the *Entente cordiale* of 1904 and Rosebery claimed: “It means war with Germany in the end.” Later on in the book, MacMillan claims that alliances before 1914 were defensive in character and that they acted as deterrent to aggression (pp. 520–530). This is not the only place where MacMillan’s ideas are not entirely clear, and the book seems to have been written within a short span of time.

A large part of the book (pp. 28–245) is devoted to the creation of two opposing blocs, Great Britain, France and Russia on one side, and Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other. This part of *The War That Ended Peace* is not simply a diplomatic history; it is more of a history of international relations, if we bear in mind the difference between the two as it was defined by Pierre Renouvin. The author does not only sum up the content of numerous diplomatic despatches but also seeks to depict the character of a “surprisingly small number of men” whose decisions took Europe to war. Even though MacMillan does not quote Renouvin, she searches for his *forces profondes* that shaped the politics of the Great Powers. In the chapter on Great Britain and the end of so-called “splendid isolation”, she shows how Britain’s declining prestige and the rise of other world powers forced Great Britain to abandon its own diplomatic traditions.

The chapters devoted to Germany are expectedly focused on the personality of the Kaiser. Wilhelm is portrayed as unstable, as a ruler who was proudly saying that he had never read the German constitution, and who was especially proud of his army. We can see the German Kaiser as a person who did not appreciate civil authorities and who had always had more faith in his army than in the diplomatic service. The Kaiser once said: “You diplomats are full of shit and the whole Wilhelmstrasse stinks” (pp. 77–78). Considerable attention is devoted to the naval arms race between Germany and Great Britain. MacMillan minutely follows the development of German naval laws, of Alfred von Tirpitz’s politics and his relationship with the Kaiser. She claims that “the naval race between Germany and Britain helped to lead Europe towards the Great War” and that “the naval race is the key factor in understanding the growing hostility between Britain and Germany” (pp. 80–142).

Chapters *Unlikely friends* and *The Bear and the Whale* covers the first years of the twentieth century which were marked by revolutionary changes in European for-
eign policy, with the Entente Cordiale in 1904 and the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907. MacMillan places these agreements in the broader context of international relations between all of the Great Powers. Chapter The Loyalty of the Nibelungs is about complex relations of Austria-Hungary and Germany. The author maintains that Austrian foreign policy was especially complex because of the close link between domestic and foreign policies in the multinational empire. The Austrian chief of staff Conrad von Hőtzendorf is given due attention. It is an example of how MacMillan can easily introduce biographical elements into a story of international relations. Hőtzendorf believed that “it must always be kept in mind that the destinies of nations and dynasties are settled on the battlefield rather than at the conference table” (pp. 233–234). The Austrian chief of staff from 1906 to 1917 (with interlude in 1912) is portrayed as a person powerfully influenced by Social Darwinism. He believed that existence is about struggle. MacMillan shows Hőtzendorf’s attitude towards the South Slavs, whom he judged as “bloodlust and cruel”. He is portrayed as a warmonger and MacMillan quotes one of the letters in which Archduke Franz Ferdinand wrote to the Austrian foreign minister about him: “For naturally, Conrad will again be for all kinds of wars and a great Hurrah-Policy, to conquer the Serbs and God knows what” (p. 237). MacMillan also addresses a topic which is not always discussed in the books about the origins of the Great War: the peace movement and antimilitarism. She here follows the line of François Furet who maintains that when the First World War started members of the Second international in Berlin, Paris, London and St. Petersburg did not believe that socialist universalism was more important than patriotism.¹

In the chapters Thinking About War and Making the Plans MacMillan shows how militarism shaped the history of the early twentieth century. She claims: “What the military plans did do to bring about the Great War put additional pressure on the decision-makers by shortening the time in which decisions had to be taken. Whereas in the eighteenth century and even in the first part of the nineteenth, governments usually had months to think about whether or not they wanted or needed to go to war, they now had days. Thanks to the industrial revolution, once mobilization started armies could be at their frontiers and be ready to fight within a week, in the case of Germany, or in the case of Russia with its greater distances, just over two weeks” (p. 323). It was assumed that the war would be short and that only increased the pressure on decision makers.

The First Moroccan crisis in 1905 is emphasized by the author as the start of a crisis period which would eventually end in a European war. MacMillan shows how Kaiser Wilhelm had not wanted to visit Morocco, but was persuaded by his chancellor Bülow. Although Bülow advised Wilhelm against saying anything at all to the French representative, German Kaiser could not restrain himself from making comments. MacMillan interprets the Bosnian crisis in the context of the Austro-Russian rivalry for influence in the Balkans. The reader is led to understand the Balkans as a sphere where Russian influence confronted Austrian. MacMillan argues that Russia and Austria had earlier agreements as regards the Balkans, such as the treaty of 1897. While some historians maintain that Russia or Serbia started to change the game in the Balkans, MacMillan claims that it was Austria: “In 1906, however, under pressure from his nephew and heir, Franz Ferdinand, Franz Joseph

made two important appointments which inaugurated new, more active policies for Austria-Hungary. Conrad took over as chief of the general staff and Aehrenthal became Foreign Minister. Many, especially in the younger generation of officers and officials, hoped that now the Dual Monarchy would stop its slow suicide and show that it was still vital and powerful” (pp. 409–410). Interestingly, MacMillan sees Austrian ambitions as regards the Ottoman Empire as colonial. That is similar to the position of Clemens Ruthner and Stijn Vervaet, who studied Austrian rule in Bosnia in a colonial context. It seems that MacMillan is right when she claims that the Balkans was dangerous because “highly volatile situation on the ground mingled with great power interests and ambitions” (p. 477).

Even though MacMillan writes about the feudal system of land tenure in Bosnia “that had alienated the tenants who were mostly Serb”, and about the trial held in Vienna where the Austrian prosecutor used forged documents, when it comes to Serb or South Slav nationalism, it is mostly presented as a consequence of agitation that came from Serbia (pp. 418, 426). As Robin Okey has noted, Serbian nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not simply the result of propaganda. It had much to do with the fact that the Austrian regime in Bosnia reserved the majority of jobs in civil administration for Austrians and Hungarians, and only a handful for the loyal Catholics. Democracy and civil rights were important factors that drew the attention of the South Slavs of Austria to Kingdom of Serbia.  

In the chapters on Germany, MacMillan makes a statement that requires further analysis. She claims that Wilhelm “did not want a general European war and in the crisis of 1914 as well as previous ones his inclination was to preserve peace” (p. 63). This statement is completely out of line with the historiography of Wilhelm's role in the July crisis. John Röhl used ample source material during his life-long study of Wilhelm II and his role in the July crisis and his conclusions strongly contradict MacMillan’s claims. MacMillan has not connected the War Council held on 8 December 1912 in Berlin with the crisis in Austro-Serbian relations. If we compare the role Wilhelm had in December 1912 and his role in July 1914, it is easy to understand the importance of Kaiser’s decisions.

When Serbian troops entered Albania and reached the Adriatic coast in the autumn of 1912, it was seen in Vienna as a good cause for war. But Austria needed support from Germany for war and the Austrian chief of staff Basius Schemua left for Berlin, disguised as a civilian. He was asking for German support for war against Serbia and he was assured of Germany’s support, regardless of circumstances and even if a general war were to result. German Kaiser revised his deci-

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2 J. Pleterski, “The Southern Slav Question”, in The Last Years of Austria-Hungary:  
sion after he had found out that Great Britain would not be neutral in the case of a European war. In July 1914, the scenario was absolutely the same. After the Sarajevo assassination, a high-ranking Austrian official went to Berlin again; this time it was Count Hoyos. Wilhelm's decision was crucial since Austria could not wage war without Germany's support. Before Count Hoyos cabled the news that Germany would support Austria, Conrad spoke with the Emperor and asked him, “If the answer is that Germany is on our side, will we then wage war against Serbia,” and the Emperor answered, “In that case, yes.”

Count Hoyos claimed in his memoirs that Germany had been aware of the likely risk of a European war, but still encouraged Austria-Hungary to proceed with action against Serbia.

MacMillan compares Young Bosnia with Al Qaeda (p. 546). Since she used Vladimir Dedijer’s book *The Road to Sarajevo*, it is really difficult to understand her criteria for this comparison, and for her claim that it is “hard not to compare them to the extreme groups among Islam fundamentalists such as Al Qaeda”. What requires additional attention is the claim that “Pašić got wind of what was up” (p. 549) and that the Austrian government “unfortunately [sic!] was unable to find evidence that the Serbian government was behind it” (p. 566). The reader gets the impression that the evidence existed but there was no time to collect it.

Official Austrian investigation concluded that there was no evidence that the Serbian government had known about the assassination plans. Senior Austrian diplomat Friedrich von Wiesner was sent to Sarajevo to collect evidence about possible connections between the conspirators and the Serbian government. In his report to the Austrian foreign minister Lepold Berchtold, Wiesner claimed: “There is nothing that can prove or raise suspicion that Serbian government encouraged the crime or preparation of it. On the contrary, there are reasons to believe that this is completely out of question.” This episode is also confirmed by Leo Pfeffer, Austrian investigator who was in charge of the official inquiry.

It is not that the evidence existed but Austrians did not find it, as MacMillan suggests. When Wiesner sent his report, Austrians had already known about Vojislav Tankosić and Milan Ciganović, and had almost all details, and Wiesner wrote about them in his report to Vienna. But he knew that they were not Serbian government, and that is why he wrote that there was no connection between the conspirators and Serbian officials. The Austrian government tried to obtain evidence about such a connection wherever it could, and the Hungarian prime minister Tisza even wrote to the Croatian ban Ivan Skerlecz, “I am informing you that we are collecting those concrete data which shed light on the machinations directed against us by Serbia.”

Count Hoyos himself wrote in 1922: “I never believed that murder

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8 Diplomatische Aktenstücke Zur Vorgeschichte Des Krieg 1914 (Vienna 1919), 52.

9 Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik: von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914, VIII 10252/53.


Reviews

of the Archduke was prepared or even wished in Belgrade of St. Petersburg."\(^{12}\)

\[^{12}\] A. Hoyos, Der deutsch-englische Gegensatz und sein Einfluß auf die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns (Berlin 1922), 77.

Margaret MacMillan is well known historian of international relations, and in this book she offers her summary of the events that led Europe to the First World War. Although her book is rich in content, apart from new stereotypes on Serbia, it does not offer new ideas and explanations about the origins of the First World War.


Reviewed by Aleksandra Djurić Milovanović*

The monograph entitled: *Political and Diplomatic Relations of Romania and Serbia Between 1903 and 1914* (Romanian original: *Relațiile politico-diplomatice ale României cu Serbia în perioada 1903–1914*) by Timisoara historian Miodrag Ciuruschin /Ciuruşchin/ is a reviewed and amended version of this author’s PhD thesis, on which he was engaged from 2003 to 2009. The monograph was prepared based on published and unpublished archival material on the relations of Romania and Serbia in the period between 1903 and 1914. The research was performed in the following archives in Romania: Romanian National Archives in Bucharest and Timisoara (*Arhivele Naționale ale României din București și Timișoara*), Diplomatic Archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest (*Arhivele Diplomate ale Ministerului Afacerilor Externe*), Archives of National Library, and Archives of Romanian Academy of Sciences and Arts (*Arhiva Bibliotecii Naționale și Arhiva Academiei Române din București*), and in Serbia: Archives of Serbia, and Archives of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. In addition to the Foreword by Romanian historian Dr Ioan Munteanu from the Timisoara Western University, and the Introduction, the monograph consists of four chapters, Conclusion and Bibliography. Miodrag Ciuruschin was awarded for this monograph by the Romanian Academy of Sciences and Arts, as well as by the Romanian Society for Historical Science (*Societatea de Științe Istorice din România*) in 2010.

In the introductory Chapter, the author indicates the research framework and the main topics included in this study. The aspects of Serbian-Romanian political, diplomatic, military, economic and cultural relations in the period between 29 May/11 June 1903 and 15/28 July 1914 have not been studied by either Serbian or Romanian historians in the context of wider international relations so far; only individual segments of this dynamic historic period have been studied. The author’s intention was to present the status and relations of Serbia and Romania in this book, in the period when the international political life was characterised by tensions in the relations between the great powers and the presence of a large number of hot spots, which constituted a potential threat to world peace. The research was also extended to relations between the states of Southeast Europe,

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as well as relations between Romania and Serbia with Austria-Hungary, Russia and other great powers, to the extent in which they influenced the Romanian-Serbian relations. Taking into account that the Romanian-Serbian relations at the start of the twentieth century had not been studied thoroughly and systematically in the historiography so far, the author paid special attention to the unpublished archive sources in the Serbian language and in the Romanian language. Simultaneously, the use of press and other written sources, in addition to abundant literature sources, gives this research a value of a referent scientific study, important for understanding the international relations in Southeast Europe on the eve of the Great War (1914–1918).

Chapter One, *Good Neighbourly Relations (Relații de bună vecinătate)* deals with the relations between Romania and Serbia from the May Coup on 28/29 May (11/12 June) 1903 to the outbreak of the First Balkan War on 6 (18) October 1912. The events from this period have not attracted a great deal of attention of historians, who have studied the Serbian-Romanian relations so far, relying on the opinion that the two countries had good neighbourly relations in the period from 1903 to 1912 and that no important events occurred in this field over the period. With this monograph, Ciuruschin has made an effort to demonstrate that the Serbian-Romanian relations were very intensive in that period, and that they had their important place in the mosaic of political events, which made Southeast Europe—or more precisely the Balkans, an unstable region. Conditions were created in the Balkans, especially after the Annexation crisis, for an outbreak of conflict which could grow into a war of wider proportions. Later events in fact proved this.

As far as Serbian history is concerned, in this chapter the author paid special attention to the preparation and execution of the May Coup in which the Karadjordjević dynasty seized the Serbian throne from the Obrenović dynasty. The taking over of the Serbian throne by Peter I Karadjordjević (1903–1921) prompted changes in the Serbian national and foreign policy, which definitely influenced the relations with Romania, too. From diplomatic reports by Romanian ambassador to Belgrade, Edgar Mavrocordat, the Romanian public was well informed about the events which took place. King Carol I (1866–1914), political elites, and the general public in Romania condemned the assassination of Serbian king Alexander Obrenović and Queen Draga Mašin; however, Ciuruschin’s research shows that such an opinion in Romania was soon prevailingly replaced by the opinion that the ousting of the dynasty had been necessary, since it had brought Serbia “to the verge of disaster” (p. 17). The coronation of King Peter I in September 1904, raised a great interest among the Romanian diplomacy, and the presence of high state official Edgar Mavrocordat, plenipotentiary of King Carol I, was an opportunity to renew the good relations between the two countries. The Macedonian problem absorbed and influenced the Romanian-Serbian relations in the sense of inevitable drawing closer of the two countries, since they had common interests in Macedonia, before all in the sense of preventing the spread of Bulgarian influence in that region. The author therefore paid special attention in the first chapter to the convergence of Romania and Serbia which was especially prominent in the period from 1903 to 1914, owing to the spread of Bulgarian influence in the Balkans.

Chapter Two, titled *Relations between Romania and Serbia at the Time of Bosnian Crisis (Relațiile României cu Serbia în cursul crizei bosniace)* consists of five parts in which the history of Serbia and Europe at the time of the crisis instigated by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
presents the Serbian-Romanian relations in the period of the important changes in the Balkans between 1912 and 1913. Special attention is paid to the place and role of Romania in international relations and in the Balkans. Romanian diplomacy promoted active foreign policy, maintaining diplomatic relations with over 14 countries. In the Balkans, it advocated preserving the status quo and the balance of powers between the Balkan countries since it was the only way to ensure national security. Continuing the policy from the previous period, according to Ciuruschin, Romania retained its neutral standpoint towards Serbia, and the convergence between Romania and Serbia occurred in the period when a rift began to show through in the Balkan Alliance, due to "expansionist aspirations of Bulgaria" (p. 109). As it already became apparent during the First Balkan War that the defeat of the Ottoman Empire would result in a disturbance of balance of powers in the Balkans until then and that the status quo ante bellum would not hold, Romania saw its interest in strengthening its strategic border in Southern Dobruja. Between December 1912 and March 1913, Serbian diplomacy assumed a position, which Ciuruschin describes as "ambiguous", towards the Bulgarian-Romanian dispute. Bearing in mind that, based on its treaty with Bulgaria, Serbia was obliged to secure military aid to Bulgaria, a potential Romanian-Bulgarian war could deteriorate the Romanian-Serbian relations. On the other hand, Serbia had an unresolved situation with Bulgaria on the issue of central parts of Macedonia. The author emphasises that Serbia expected support from Romania in case of a threat of Austria-Hungary or Bulgaria. However, King Carol I and Romanian Prime Minister Titu Maiorescu could not accept signing of any kind of treaty with Serbia, due to the obligation to abide by the military agreements signed between Romania and

Chapter Three: Romania and Serbia in the Period of Balkan Wars (România și Serbia în timpul războaielor balcanice)
Austria-Hungary in November 1912, and
the convention of alliance with Austria-
Hungary, Germany and Italy, renewed in
February 1913. Nevertheless, according
to Ciuruschin, Romanian diplomacy en-
couraged the Serbian Government to
withstand the pressure of Austria-Hun-
gary and Bulgaria and to wait for the ri-
ght moment to fulfil its national interests
(p. 300). Ciuruschin also paid attention
to the Bucharest Peace Conference, after
which the positions of Serbia and Ro-
mania were reinforced, especially in terms
of territorial enlargements, as well as in
the field of diplomacy, which shaped their
mutual relations.

The period from the end of the Se-
cond Balkan War, up to the Sarajevo as-
sassination, Austro-Hungarian ultimatum
and the declaration of war on Serbia are
presented in Chapter Four, Friendly Rela-
tions between Romania and Serbia between
Treaty of Bucharest and beginning of World
War I (Relații amicale între România și
Serbia, de la Pacea de la București până la
începutul primului război mondial). Over
this period, Serbia and Romania endeav-
oured to maintain the situation which
was created after the end of the Balkan
Wars. The author presented an analysis of
joint diplomatic actions of the two coun-
tries with the aim of maintaining peace in
the Balkans and thwarting the aspirations
of Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary which
were targeting the preservation of the
newly-created situation. Since autumn
1913 already, Austro-Hungarian diplo-
macy exercised pressure on Bucharest
with the aim of distancing Romania from
Serbia. As the relations between Aus-
tria-Hungary and Serbia were becoming
increasingly tense, Romanian diplomacy
found itself in a situation, as Ciuruschin
noticed, “to have formally been an ally of
Austria-Hungary, and a friend of Serbia”.
Urged by France, Russia and the United
Kingdom, Romania attempted to prevent
the outbreak of war, through efforts to
negotiate an extension of the deadline for
Serbian response to the Austro-Hungar-
ian ultimatum, without success though.
Germany wanted war, while France, the
United Kingdom, Russia and Italy wanted
to avoid it until the last moment. This
is when the period of peace in the Balkans
ended — a period in which, according to
the author, Romania and Serbia had suc-
cessful political and diplomatic collabo-
roration and during which they advocated
their mutual interests.

The monograph of Miodrag Ciurus-
chin which contains almost four hundred
pages of text makes a valuable contri-
bution to the exploration of history of
Serbian-Romanian diplomatic relations.
At the same time, this monograph is a
contribution to better knowledge of in-
ternational relations in Europe from the
beginning of the twentieth century to the
outbreak of World War I. The use of sour-
ces and literature of both Serbian and Ro-
manian provenance is a valuable feature
of this study which was facilitated by the
author’s competent command of both the
languages. The monograph Political and
Diplomatic Relations of Romania and Ser-
bia in Period between 1903 and 1914 shed
light on a number of important aspects of
the Serbian-Romanian diplomatic rela-
tions in the years before the Great War
(1914–1918). As a piece of work which
can enrich the expert knowledge, it is
recommended to historians, but also to
wider readership interested in acquiring
deeper knowledge of history of Serbia,
Romania, and Europe in the first decades
of the twentieth century.
Der Große Krieg. Die Welt 1914–1918 (The Great War. The World 1914–1918) is the most recent book written by Herfried Münkler, German political scientist and Professor of Political Theory at the Humboldt University in Berlin. Previously known for his books “New Wars” (2005), “Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States” (2007), and “Die Deutschen und ihre Mythen” (2008), Münkler has treated us with an extensive book about the First World War. Divided into nine parts the book aims to cover all of the aspects of the Great War, from its origins and causes to its consequences and parallels with the contemporary world. All the parts are titled after its main subject but also include a range of various themes. This review will focus on the questions of the origins and causes of the war and partly on its consequences, because the author offers some new interpretations of these issues.

The first part, “Long and short paths to the War”, deals with the questions of the origins and causes of the war as well as the guilt for the outbreak of the war. Münkler argues that there are two different approaches in researching the origins of the war. The “short way” approach is based on the assumption that the Sarajevo assassination was a starting point of the crisis and thus is usually focused on the period of less than five weeks prior to the outbreak of the war. On the other hand, the “long path” approach considers the event in Sarajevo as a mere spark that triggered the war; had it been absent, the war would have broken out due to any other incident. This approach emphasizes the development of European politics from the birth of the Bismarck’s German Empire in 1871 onwards. It was then, Münkler claims, that the idea of a “feared powerful actor in the middle of the continent” was born. The fear of German Reich influenced the decisions of European politicians. “The French were afraid of their marginalization, the Russians were concerned about the loss of influence after having been defeated by Japan, Austria-Hungary feared for the loss of its great power status, the United Kingdom was overwhelmed with fear of decline and in Germany the encirclement obsession reigned”.

Münkler claims that the existing “grand narrative” interpretation created by the German historians Fritz Fischer and Immanuel Geiss and followed by Hans Ulrich Weller presents the Great War as “predetermined” and Germany as the troublemaker whose main goal was the world domination. Instead of the concept of “Griff nach der Weltmacht”, the author puts forward the idea of “the willingness to wage a pre-emptive war”. Münkler’s thesis of the preventive war is based on the claim that if one analyses socio-economic structures rather than international relations the responsibility for the war lay on all of the great powers. Germany was not the only active imperialist power in Europe. Münkler states that German leadership needed to have two conditions fulfilled in order to start a pre-emptive war. The first one was to ensure participation of its ally Austria-Hungary and the second condition, concerned the inter-

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1 Those are Münkler’s books translated into English so far, German editions are from 2004 and 2005 respectively.

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nal unity of the country. When the crisis broke out in the Balkans in 1914 the Dual Monarchy was willing to go to war, and the first condition was fulfilled. The second one, the internal unity of Germany, was met when the Social Democrats endorsed what the government termed the defence of the homeland from the Russian aggression.

Along with the blank-cheque given to Austria-Hungary by Germany, the unconditional support given to Serbia by Russia, and to Russia by France, were equally important for the outbreak of the war. Otherwise, Russia would have been more careful in her support of Serbia. Using counterfactual approach Münkler concludes that with the absence of Russian support the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia would have been no more than the “Third Balkan war” easily won by Habsburg Monarchy. Serbia would continue its existence as an independent state and Austria-Hungary as a great power. On the other hand, there was a major difference in comparison with the great power diplomacy at the time of the Balkan Wars: Bethmann-Hollweg and the entire German leadership refused cooperate with Great Britain and restrain Austria-Hungary from its aggressive policy towards Serbia, despite the fact that the Serbian government had no responsibility for the assassination in Sarajevo. The decisions made in Vienna and Belgrade could not have had such fatal consequences if there had been a different approach from Berlin. Nevertheless, other great powers, should have better appreciated, according to Münkler, Germany’s central position in Europe. Instead, they created a setting for the encirclement of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Despite his notion of the shared responsibility Münkler’s explanation of the July Crisis involves certain troublesome remarks concerning Russia. After concluding that Germany and Austria-Hungary were surrounded by hostile alliances, the author does not take into consideration that Russia was also cornered by the Dual Alliance and had already had its great power position challenged during the Annexation crisis and the Balkan Wars. The German position during the July Crisis was more provocative to Russia and her allies than the author would have us believe, and the blank cheque given to Austria-Hungary on 5 July was as much as aggressive as it was irresponsible. Since Russia had backed down in 1908 and failed in her alleged role of the protector of Balkan Slavs was it really surprising for the German leadership that St. Petersburg was bound to stand its ground in 1914? Moreover, the situation in Russia was better than that in 1908 when the Romanov dynasty had been shaken after the recent defeat in the 1905 war against Japan. Also, France and Great Britain were expected to be more active and supportive in case of a conflict. Münkler concludes that “the key for war” was in Russia and that without its intervention there would be no major conflagration. This proposition does not seem to be in keeping with the author’s thesis of the shared war which is incompatible with singling out

3 “What is striking about the blank cheque is not that it was issued but that it was indeed blank.”, in: Hew Strachan, The First World War, vol. I: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 95.
one great power as a sole keeper of “the key to war”. It rather shifts the responsibility from Germany onto Russia.

Münkler offers an extensive, interesting and vivid history of the war from its beginning until November 1918. His account of the war operations based on the writings and testimonies of the combatants create the sense of gruesome reality. At the outset of second chapter the author discusses the main idea behind the German strategy, the Schlieffen Plan. The plan assumed that Britain would remain neutral in the case of a European war. The first battles of the war were heavily influenced, besides military strategy, by prestige considerations. One of the assumptions of the Schlieffen Plan was that it was necessary to withdraw forces in the East to the strategically better positions within German territory in order to gain enough time to win the decisive battle against France. Such a plan discounted the fact that the ancestral lands of the Hohenzollern dynasty would be handed over to the enemy. Similar considerations were at work in Austria-Hungary where the decision to attack Serbia with the third of the Austro-Hungarian forces was based on the Chief of Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf’s, considered opinion that the defensive in the Balkans would be a blow at the Dual Monarchy’s prestige. At the beginning of 1915, the Dual Monarchy lost much of its prestige because of the military disaster after the defeats in Serbia, and its great power status after the defeats at the hands of the Russians. For the remainder of the war Austria-Hungary was entirely dependent on German support.

Following his accounts of the Battles at Marne and Tannenberg Münkler argues that the decisions about the war aims resulted from the struggle between the moderate Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, on one hand, and the new Chief of Staff Falkenhayn and the Hindenburg-Ludendorff duo which grew in importance — and eventually had dictatorial powers — after the victory at Tannenberg, on the other. Münkler emphasizes the importance of the ambiguous German war aims at the beginning of the war in comparison with other great powers. While most of the German population saw the French as the archenemy, the elites were divided on the score. After August 1914 the German society was soon transformed into something of a victimized and sacrificial community. For the Germans, the war was purely defensive. Münkler points out that the lack of defined policy at the beginning of the war made the German leadership pursue divergent war aims. The indecisive formulation of strategic goals paved the road for the increasing influence of military leaders especially Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

The narrative then turns to other war theatres: the Middle East, East Asia and the Gallipoli Campaign. The Balkan front is unfortunately discussed in just few sentences. The author deals with the trench warfare, the superiority of defence in military operations, the everyday experience of soldiers and the development of chemical warfare, an area dominated by Germany throughout the entire war. The Italian entrance into the war did not tip the scales. Contrary to expectations Austria-Hungary did not crumble under attack of this new enemy. Instead, Austro-Hungarian military reputation recovered, mainly due to the fact that the Monarchy’s Slav soldiers bravely fought against their traditional enemy, and not against other Slavs. Münkler concludes his narrative of the events of 1916 with an explanation of psychological effect of the quick victory against Romania, and the strained relations between the German and Austro-Hungarian military commanders. The author also explains how it was possible for Hindenburg and Ludendorff to forge such striking careers in the First World
with the legacies of the conflict. The author states that the collapse of the three great empires of the East, Romanov, Habsburg and Ottoman, meant the continuation of wars in Eastern Europe. The hostilities in the West were ended on November 11, 1918 but in Eastern Europe they were continued through the Russian Civil War, the Polish-Russian war, fighting in the Baltic States and Greek-Turkish war. The war also left the Balkan states, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Romania with the ambitions for the inclusion of their population outside of the state borders. Such problems, claims Münkler, still present the security challenge for the European Union. In addition to the Balkans, the political situation in the Middle East and the Caucasus region is also still dominated by the legacy of the Great War. Such thesis lacks a more critical approach to the imperial and colonial policies led before and after the First World War by the Great Powers. The contested borders among Balkan and Middle East countries have remained, to a large extent the legacy of those policies. Finally, Münkler makes an interesting comparison between the 21st century China and Wilhelmine Germany based on their similar economic and political rise and fears of their neighbours. Therefore, the greatest contemporary responsibility is placed in the hands of the United States leadership which have to make sure that its policies do not lead to the encirclement of China.

Apart from the previous remarks, the title of the book is entirely misleading: it is a detailed narrative about Germany in the First World War rather than a global history of the conflict. Nonetheless, the vivid, and smooth writing style and the interesting new assumptions make this book an excellent addition to the ever-growing literature on the First World War.

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